CIAO DATE: 01/2009
Volume: 10, Issue: 1
Spring/Summer 2006
Young Whan Kihl
The Kim Jong-Il Government’s policy toward South Korea is an extension not only of North-South Korea relations, especially since the historic June 2000 North-South summit meeting in Pyongyang, but also of the DPRK domestic politics of the Kim regime survival strategy. How are the domestic policy agenda of “Building the Kangsong Taeguk (Strong and Prosperous Great Power) and “the Military-First Politics,” for instance, related to the Kim Government policy and strategy toward the South? What are the implications for Pyongyang’s strategy of balancing against major powers’ competing interests and driving a wedge between Seoul and its allies in Tokyo and Washington?
This article will proceed in several steps: first, ascertaining the current phase of inter-Korean relations in its proper historical context and perspective; second, analyzing the legacy six years after the 2000 inter-Korean summit meeting, including the recent meeting of Seoul’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young with Chairman Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang; third, identifying the sources of the DPRK’s long-standing strategy and tactical moves of implementing the reunification policy vis-à-vis the South; and, fourth, addressing the current problems and future prospects for promoting peaceful interaction between the two Koreas.
South-North Korean Relations Under The Roh Moo-Hyun Government (PDF)
Hong Nack Kim
In his inaugural address in February 2003, President Roh Moo- Hyun declared his intention not only to retain his predecessor’s North Korea policy (the “sunshine policy”) but also to expand the scope and the content of the “sunshine policy” in order to build a “structure of peace” on the Korean Peninsula.1 Dubbed as the Policy for Peace and Prosperity,” it envisions three stages of development. In the first stage, South Korea seeks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and facilitate peace on the Korean Peninsula. In the second stage, Seoul seeks to develop further inter- Korean economic cooperation and lay the foundation for a peace regime. In the third and final stage, the policy is to launch a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.2 In implementing the North Korea policy, Roh has pledged to adhere to four basic principles: (1) all issues should be resolved through dialogue; (2) priorities should be placed on building mutual trust and “upholding reciprocity”; (3) the inter-Korean issues should be resolved by South and North Korea in cooperation with the international community; and, (4) Seoul will strive to ensure transparency, expand citizen participation, and secure “bipartisan support” in implementing North Korea policy.
The Roh government’s policy toward North Korea is based on a bold and ambitious vision seeking a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula. It encompasses political, economic and security cooperation between South and North Korea that would help attain eventual peaceful unification. However, the Roh government has encountered numerous problems in implementing its North Korea policy such as the North Korean nuclear issue which has heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s unwillingness to abandon its nuclear weapons program has aroused not only much apprehension about the North Korean nuclear threat but also strong skepticism among many South Koreans about the efficacy of the Roh government’s policy of providing political, diplomatic and economic assistance to North Korea. As a result, instead of building a national consensus on the North Korea policy, the Roh government’s policy for peace and prosperity toward North Korea has become controversial and divisive. In addition, the Roh government’s overly conciliatory attitudes and policy toward North Korea have brought about frequent disagreements and discord with the U.S. in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear issue.
It is the purpose of this study to examine the Roh government’s North Korea policy from the time of its inauguration in February 2003 to the present with the emphasis on the analysis of factors which have shaped the implementation of Seoul’s “peace and prosperity” policy and the outcome of the policy.
Is the Six Party Joint Statement a Viable Roadmap or a Road to Nowhere? (PDF)
Larry A. Niksch
As of this writing in July 2006, North Korea is into the eight month of its second boycott of the Six Party nuclear talks. The first boycott lasted a year, from August 2004 to July 2005. In short, in the last 24 months of nuclear negotiations, North Korea has boycotted the negotiations for 19 of the 24 months. North Korea’s missile tests in July 2006, added a new element to Pyongyang refusal to agree to new Six Party meetings. All the other governments in the talks profess a continued commitment to the negotiations. A realistic question, however, is whether this collective commitment is based on genuine expectations of substantial progress, or is it about maintaining a process, however unproductive, out of fear of unknown consequences if the talks collapse. The question is legitimate, given that the fact that most of the last two years, the diplomacy of these governments have descended to trying to influence the lowest level of North Korean diplomatic behavior: whether or not North Korea will “show up” for a meeting.
Political Economy Of De-Nuclearizing North Korea (PDF)
Yoon-Shik Park
In July 2005, the 4th round of the Six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear weapons program finally resumed in Beijing, China, but no one can tell the outcome of the talks that are intended to verifiably dismantle the nuclear weapons program of North Korea. It is difficult at this stage for outsiders to know why the North Korean regime reversed its previous insistence that it had chosen to become a nuclear power and would no longer bargain over it. However, it is clear that any breakthrough at the talks will be critically connected to both massive economic aid and security guarantees from the West. Without outside assistance, North Korea has no hope of achieving economic development and overcoming widespread economic hardship. Furthermore, North Korean de-nuclearization is important to the South Korean economy as well. Many foreign investors are understandably reluctant to commit their funds in South Korea as long as there is the specter of a North Korean nuclear threat. In late July 2005, for example, Fitch rating service pointed out the North Korean security issue as the most important reason not to upgrade South Korea's credit rating. Around the same time, Standard & Poor's decided to upgrade South Korean credit rating by a notch due to the resumption of the long-stalemated Six-party talks.
The Proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Problems and Prospects (PDF)
Bill Cooper, Mark Manyin
On February 2, 2006, United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Portman and South Korean Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong announced their two countries= intention to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). The announcement came after many years of official and unofficial discussions of the feasibility of concluding an FTA. The climate for launching the negotiations improved following South Korean willingness to address four areas of concern to the United States: beef, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and Ascreen quotas.@ (Screen quotas limit the amount of screen time that foreign films can be shown.)
The U.S. Congress would have to approve an FTA before it could enter into force. The U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUSFTA) negotiations have been conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA) that the Congress granted to the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to negotiate trade agreements to expedite congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). However, the executive branch must fulfill a number of criteria in order to exercise the authority, including specified negotiating objectives in the final agreement and consultation with the Congress prior to and during the negotiations.
Robert Sutter
This article assesses recent developments and the current state of play in China’s relations with South Korea in order to test the widely publicized proposition that China’s rise in Asia is being accompanied by an emerging China-centered regional order that is marginalizing the influence of the previous regional leader, the United States. A careful analysis of China’s relations with its various neighboring countries in recent years shows that China has made the most significant gains in relations with South Korea, and these gains have coincided with a decline in US influence in South Korea brought on by major difficulties in the South Korean-US alliance relationship. Thus, if China’s rise is leading to a China-centered order in Asia that marginalizes the influence of the United States, the trends in the South Korean- China relationship in the context of South Korean-US developments should provide important evidence and indicators.
U.S. Tax Reform and Its Implications for Korea (PDF)
Kiwon Kang
In a globalized economy, resources like labor and capital tend to move their locations across borders in order to reduce their tax burden. As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated, the mobility of resources gradually increases. Increased mobility causes authorities to drive tax reform in each country, so they can prevent internal resources from flowing abroad and, ultimately, secure sovereignty of taxation. Consequently, one country’s tax policy affects the economy of other nations.