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

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Vladimír Slugeň

Future of nuclear power engineering after Fukushima accident

Abstract: *Less than one hour after the March 11, 2011 earthquake a massive tsunami inundated the nuclear site at Fukushima Daiichi with seawater. The damage caused by the flooding of the site resulted in loss of cooling to the three reactor units causing release of radioactive material to the environment. The nuclear accident was classified at Level 7. There are no doubts that many countries after the detailed analyze of Fukushima accident reconsider their energy policy and the oldest nuclear power plants will be closed or new projects will be postponed. Very important in these considerations will be the industrial status and outlook to the next decades.*

Fukushima accident as a milestone in nuclear safety development

On March 11, 2011 Japan suffered a magnitude 9 earthquake, the largest ever recorded in the country. At the time of the accident, three of the site's nuclear reactor units (reactors 1–3) were operating at power. Reactor 4 was refueling, and reactors 5 and 6 were shut down for maintenance. Reactors 1–3 were automatically shut down when the earthquake occurred. However, less than one hour after the earthquake, a massive tsunami generated by the earthquake inundated the nuclear site at Fukushima Daiichi with seawater. The damage caused by the flooding of the site resulted in loss of cooling to the three reactor units. This led to overheating, hydrogen explosions and melting of the core of the three reactors. As a consequence, there were major releases of radioactive material into the environment. These releases were initially into the air, but subsequently there were also radioactive releases into the sea through the discharge of water used to cool the reactors and the

Slugeň, V., "Future of nuclear power engineering after Fukushima accident," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XXI, No. 1–2, 2012, pp. 3–10.

spent fuel ponds. The nuclear accident was classified at Level 7, the highest on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).[1]

This was the first time multiple units (3) were damaged by a common source. It happened in a technically highly developed country, 25 years after the Chernobyl accident, in spite of the huge scope of measures and improvements in nuclear safety management. Nobody died or became sick due to irradiation, nevertheless, the costs connected to decommissioning and revitalization of the region will be enormous. Fears, supported and distributed by different media, destroyed the fragile balance of nuclear energy acceptance by the public in many countries.

Goals towards a decarbonized economy

The easiest way to replace nuclear power plants (NPP) is with gas, oil or coal combustion. Plenty of new combustion units have been built over the past months: blench CO_2 production, global warming, etc. A proper energy mix (including nuclear power) was predicted for the following decades as an optimal way towards a worldwide decarbonized economy. The European Union has set a specific goal to achieve a decarbonized economy by 2050, and the European Commission's (EC's) Energy roadmap 2050, which was published on December 15, 2011, explores five scenarios for achieving the decarbonization of the EU's energy system[2] with the following statement:

> Costs will have a huge impact on the final price of electricity to be paid by European businesses and households. Total energy costs are lowest in those scenarios of the EC's Energy Roadmap 2050 that have the highest nuclear share.

The results of the public consultation on the Energy Roadmap 2050 indicate that "about half of all respondents believe that global fossil fuel prices

[1] T. Ohnishi, "The disaster at Japan's Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant after the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami, and the resulting spread of radioisotope contamination," *Radiation Research* Vol. 177, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1 – 14.

[2] "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Energy Roadmap 2050," COM(2011) 885 final, European Commission, December 15, 2011. Available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011PC0885: EN:NOT (accessed on March 15, 2012).

in relation to costs of domestic energy resources and long-term security of supply will be the most likely key drivers of the future European energy mix." The Roadmap focuses mainly on the EU's energy policy goal of decarbonizing the economy, and understates the other primary objectives of security of supply and competitiveness. The radical revolution through which the energy sector will have to go implies profound changes in many areas of European society. One of the factors limiting broader deployment of nuclear is public acceptance. However, with the envisaged overhaul of the energy infrastructure, public acceptance could become a major concern and obstacle to other low-carbon technologies as well.

The results of the public consultation on the Energy Roadmap 2050 indicate that about half of all respondents believe that global fossil fuel prices in relation to costs of domestic energy resources and long-term security of supply will be the most likely key drivers of the future European energy mix.

The full potential of nuclear's contribution to decarbonizing the European economy, as well as energy security and competitiveness, should be properly recognized. The IAEA states [3] that nuclear energy is a decarbonization option that provides most of the low-carbon electricity consumed in the EU today.[3] It clearly acknowledges the positive contributions nuclear energy makes to the energy transformation process. Nuclear is declared as being one of the four main options (along with efficiency, renewable energy sources and carbon capture and sequestration technology) for cutting energy-related CO_2 emissions in the future. It is also recognized as contributing to lower system costs and electricity prices. These statements are, however, not reflected in the Energy Roadmap 2050 decarbonization scenarios. The nuclear share ranges from an insignificant 2.5 per cent to a modest 19.2 per cent of power generation, a figure still well below the level of 26.4 per cent in the reference

[3] "Climate change and nuclear power 2011," International Atomic Energy Agency, November 2011. Available online: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/11-43751_ccnp_brochure.pdf (accessed on March 15, 2012).

[4] "Commission staff working paper," SEC(2011) 1569, Part 3/3 accompanying the document "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Energy Roadmap 2050," op. cit. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/doc/sec_2011_1569_3.pdf (accessed on March 15, 2012).

scenario.[4] It looks as though the projected nuclear contribution has been unduly influenced by the Fukushima accident and that the benefits of nuclear have therefore been suppressed. It can be stated that once the ongoing risk and safety re-assessment process has been completed, public support for nuclear power is likely to recover (as has been seen already for example in the UK and Finland). With its 90 per cent+ availability and geopolitically stable fuel suppliers, nuclear is a significant contributor to energy security and diversity. It provides security against interruption of fossil fuel supplies or price hikes, and offers reliable base-load electricity as a complement to intermittent renewables.

Nuclear stays also in future as important source of secure energy supply

The recent announcements of EU member states indicate that, in 2050, nuclear energy's share can be expected to be at least 20 per cent of the predicted electricity demand. A bigger nuclear share, close to the current level of roughly 30 per cent of electricity supplied, will very likely be needed if Europe is to achieve all three objectives of decarbonizing its economy while also enhancing energy security and global competitiveness. This is confirmed by the results of a comparative Prognos study[5] of eight mid- and long-term energy scenarios for the EU, which was commissioned by the EC. The conclusion of the study underlines the fact that scenarios based on ambitious emission reduction targets anticipate, barring politically-driven phase-out policies, a sustained nuclear share in electricity generation and a corresponding increase in nuclear power capacity by 2050. The Prognos scenarios show a median value of about 170 GWe of nuclear capacity in 2050 (which would mean approximately 28 per cent of predicted electricity demand, i.e. close to the current level).

At the global level, nuclear energy is recognized as a proven technology that can provide emission-free and affordable electricity, can be fully integrated into the existing infrastructure and is ready to be one of the building blocks of

[5] "Summary: Analysis and comparison of relevant mid- and long-term energy scenarios for EU and their key underlying assumptions," ENER/10/NUCL/SI2.561687, Prognos AG, March 21, 2011. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/opportunities/doc/competitiveness/2011_04_05/prognos_summary_eu_scenarios_110321.pdf (accessed on April 2, 2012).

future energy systems. The IEA, in its *World energy outlook 2011*,[6] predicts nuclear generation growth of about 70 per cent by 2035, led by China, Korea and India. ExxonMobil[7] sees global nuclear capacity growing by more than 80 per cent through 2040 compared to 2010, rising by 2 per cent a year on average. This is 0.5 per cent lower than previous estimates, having taken into account the Fukushima accident, but is still a very significant rate of growth. In contrast to these forecasts predicting global growth of nuclear energy, and despite much uncertainty surrounding the extent to which other low-carbon technologies become technically and commercially viable in the future, the Energy Roadmap 2050 includes scenarios with a lower or much lower nuclear contribution. It also includes scenarios which disregard the fact that many member states will not find it economically or operationally attractive to install large amounts of renewable energy capacity.[8]

At the global level, nuclear energy is recognized as a proven technology that can provide emission-free and affordable electricity, can be fully integrated into the existing infrastructure and is ready to be one of the building blocks of future energy systems.

In times of increasing global competition pressures, and bearing in mind the increasing struggle to preserve jobs, Europe can ill afford to abstain from global nuclear energy markets. The nuclear energy industry plays an important role in the European economy and its global competitiveness, a point that is not picked up on in the Energy Roadmap 2050. Europe's nuclear industry currently employs around 500,000 people,[9] including those in the associated supply chain. These are mostly highly qualified people with a broad range of skills such as engineers, physicists, IT and safety specialists. European companies are world champions in nuclear

[6] *World energy outlook 2011*, International Energy Agency, 2011.

[7] "2012 The outlook for energy: a view to 2040," Exxon Mobil, 2012. Available online: http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/files/news_pub_eo.pdf (accessed on June 1, 2012).

[8] "Commenting on the EC's Energy Roadmap 2050," FORATOM *Position Paper*, February 22, 2012. Available online: http://www.foratom.org/publications.raw?task=callelement&item_id=39&element=0ab27474-adf5-41db-8395-e2f040908c60&method=download (accessed on March 1, 2012).

[9] Ibid.

fuel fabrication, enrichment, reprocessing and waste management, as well as leaders in nuclear component manufacturing. Worldwide, more than 150 new nuclear units are under construction or in an advanced stage of planning or licensing. The American Department of Commerce estimates that the global market for nuclear fuel, components and related services will be 500–740 billion US dollars over the next 10 years.[10]

Technology "winners" should not be chosen in advance

All types of low-carbon technology may be needed to achieve the ambitious goal of decarbonizing the EU's energy system in general and the electricity sector in particular. However, not all existing technologies will be technically and commercially proven within the required time scale. At present, the effective large scale use of many low-carbon technologies, e.g. carbon capture and sequestration and wave power, remains questionable. Moreover, a grid flexible and reliable enough to deal with increasing intermittency of electricity sources is neither well-developed, nor the need for it sufficiently addressed. In a similar vein, research and development priorities in terms of key technologies, timelines and assigned resources for providing low-carbon electricity are inadequate. Taking all this into account, flexibility must be preserved in order to allow adaptation to the technological and socio-economic changes that will arise.

What is the actual status of NPPs now?

In December 2011, 435 units were declared as in operation (although some of them were in testing mode) and 64 in process of being built. In the following table, the new units are indicated in brackets.

There is no doubt that many countries, after the detailed analysis of Fukushima accident, reconsidered their energy policy and the oldest NPPs will be closed or new projects postponed. Very important to these considerations will be the industrial status and outlook over the following decades.

[10] "White paper. Nuclear energy's economic benefits – current and future," Nuclear Energy Institute, April 2012. Available online: http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/whitepaper/jobs (accessed on June 1, 2012).

Table Actual status of NPP worldwide

Europe **188 (+18)**	**America** **128 (+3)**	**Asia** **117 (+43)**	**Africa** **2**
Armenia 1	Argentina 2 (+1)	China 16 (+26)	Republic of South Africa 2
Belgium 7	Brazil 2 (+1)	India 20 (+6)	
Bulgaria 2 (+2)	Canada 18	Iran 1	
Germany 9	Mexico 2	Japan 50 (+2)	
Finland 4 (+1)	USA 104 (+1)	Pakistan 3 (+2)	
France 58 (+1)		South Korea 21 (+5)	
UK 18		Taiwan 6 (+2)	
The Netherlands 1			
Rumania 2			
Russia 33 (+10)			
Sweden 10			
Swiss 5			
Slovakia 4 (+2)			
Slovenia 1			
Spain 8			
Czech Republic 6			
Ukraine 15 (+2)			
Hungary 4			

Source: "Kernenergie nach Fukushima: Lehren und Konsequenzen," AREVA *Argumente*, March 2012. Available online: http://de.areva.com/mini-home/liblocal/docs/argumente/PUB_argumente_postfukushima_CG_V10_de_201203.pdf (accessed on June 1, 2012).

Conclusion

Nuclear technology is multi-disciplinary, covering nuclear and reactor physics, thermal hydraulics and mechanics, materials science, chemistry, health science, information technology and a variety of other areas such as risk governance and education and training. Mankind enjoys many benefits from nuclear-related technologies, most notably electricity production. NPPs were developed during the last 60 years. Huge investment and actual achieved safety levels – generally two orders better than by many other technical systems in power engineering – was the answer of nuclear industry after Chernobyl accident for next NPPs use and public acceptance.

Nevertheless, the Fukushima accident was proof that:

1. although the accident probability was declared as extremely low – accidents can happen and preparedness for several accident management should be secured,
2. although there are many dangers around us – the fear of nuclear has in some political speeches an extremely high importance.

Bearing in mind these latest events, the Slovak Nuclear Society has asked all institutions and stakeholders in Slovakia for a common effort in favor of the permanent improving of safe and reliable use of nuclear power, which is the only real way forward for a secure energy supply in Slovakia.

Juraj Rovný

Nuclear energy after Fukushima? Strong and independent national regulators

Abstract: *The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan has re-opened discussions about the future of this industry in many countries. While those supporting nuclear energy point mainly to the enormous natural disaster that could not be predicted the opponents declare the inability to manage nuclear safety on a long-term basis. The article summarizes the main conclusions of the Japan National Diet investigation report that goes beyond the direct technical causes and equipment failures. It shows that the root causes of the accident are in institutional and cultural issues rather than in technical failures or natural conditions. Therefore, the roles and positions of national regulators providing independent nuclear safety oversight should be strengthened. A broader view on nuclear energy in the context of other types of industries is provided. Public acceptance of nuclear is different from other industries, since it is not tolerated that nuclear energy can learn from its mistakes. Though the event in Fukushima has lead to nuclear phase-out decisions in several countries, it does mean a full stop for nuclear energy.*

Nuclear energy is the most controversial way of generating electricity.. The majority of the world agrees with the advantages, disadvantages and risks of traditional fossil technologies, as well as renewable energy sources. But nuclear energy, even after more than five decades of its wide industrial use, has its strong advocates as well as persuaded opponents. The main reason for such polarity is the different perception of nuclear safety.

Long experience of using nuclear energy has provided satisfactory proof that it is a high-dense, carbon-free and economically competitive way of generating electricity. After more than 20 years since the Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986), and having operated more than 400 nuclear reactors

Rovný, J., "Nuclear energy after Fukushima? Strong and independent national regulators," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XXI, No. 1–2, 2012, pp. 11–20.

around the world without any remarkable incident, it seemed that nuclear safety was being managed well. Nuclear fission technology at the beginning of 2011 was getting a new lease of life and was referred to as "the nuclear renaissance." Several European countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, and Poland) and many others declared its plans to build new nuclear power plants (NPP). Nevertheless, the history of nuclear energy has been significantly touched by a substantial nuclear accident that began on March11, 2011 in Japan. Many are asking whether the Fukushima accident was the final proof of the fact that nuclear energy unavoidably carries unacceptable risk to the public and the environment, or whether it was just a statistical coincidence related to any industrial activity from which lessons for nuclear safety can be learned. Before providing an opinion about how this accident will influence the future of nuclear energy around the world, several facts and circumstances must be mentioned.

Japan has long been perceived as one of the world leaders of nuclear energy. At the beginning of 2011, it operated 50 nuclear reactors and was third in the world for its number of reactors.[1] The design and technology of Japan nuclear power plants has always been considered advanced with a high level of safety.

The Fukushima accident

On March 11, 2011 an extremely strong earthquake hit Japan and subsequently induced a huge tsunami that reached part of the western coast. As a result of this enormous natural disaster, nearly 20,000 people were confirmed dead or missing.[2] Many more lost their homes and other properties, and a significant portion of the infrastructure was severely damaged. There are several NPPs situated in the area that were affected by these natural phenomena. The one most affected was the Fukushima Daiichi NPP that consisted of six NPP units.

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[1] "Power reactor information system," web-based electronic database administrated by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Available online: http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx (accessed on August 12, 2012).

[2] "Nation marks first anniversary of disasters," *The Japan Times*, March 12, 2012. Available online: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120312a1.html (accessed on August 21, 2012).

It was proved by a later investigation[3] that all six units were successful in coping with the earthquake according to their design. However, as a result of an earthquake lasting almost one minute, the whole site was disconnected from all the offsite power transmission lines as most of the poles fell down. The electricity required for cooling nuclear fuel and removing residual heat was supplied by emergency diesel generators. That means that all the safety systems designed to work after a seismic event, were in operation. Reactors were safely shut down and the cooling of nuclear fuel was provided. Approximately one hour after the earthquake, the whole of the Fukushima Daiichi site, situated directly on the coast, was flooded by an enormous 15 m high wave – a tsunami. All except one of the emergency diesel generators were damaged and stopped functioning. In addition,, most of the premises, buildings, power switchyards and other equipment was severely damaged by the wave. This caused an emergency situation, which in nuclear terminology is called a "station blackout." This meant there were no power sources available for supplying safety systems to continue removing residual heat from the reactor core. There are several design provisions on every NPP to prevent such situations happening, and its occurrence has extremely low probability. Managing such situations is intrinsic to the design of most existing NPPs and thus immediate actions to restore the power supply to the most critical components must have been performed. This had been done at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. Control room operators and other workers present at the site made a remarkable effort to manage the unexpected situation. Working in very difficult conditions (low temperatures, no running water, using only flashlights, without communication systems and without information about their families)

It has been estimated that about 1/6 the amount of emissions from the Chernobyl accident when converted to iodine was emitted.

[3] The first complex investigation was conducted by an international mission organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency and results were published in the mission report "IAEA international fact finding expert mission of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident following the great east Japan earthquake and tsunami," International Atomic Energy Agency, Japan, June 2012. Available online: http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/pdfplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_final-fukushima-mission_report.pdf (accessed on August 21, 2012).

workers did their best to prevent the accident developing. The response of the people coping with the accident definitely deserves our highest appreciation. However, despite this extreme effort, core melt occurred in three of the reactors. Multiple hydrogen explosions and the release of liquid and gaseous radioactive materials to the environment took place as well. Fortunately there were no fatalities caused directly by the accident, but more than 100,000 people were evacuated and 1,800 km^2 of area was contaminated. It has been estimated that about 1/6 the amount of emissions from the Chernobyl accident when converted to iodine was emitted.[4]

Who's to blame?

The whole nuclear community was concerned about what factors would be identified as the main causes of this accident. Theoretically it could just be nature, human factors, wrong technology or a combination of them all. There were three main investigation reports published which tried to estimate the direct and the root causes of this disaster. These were the International Atomic Energy Agency fact finding mission report (mentioned above), the interim and later the final Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report written by TEPCO[5] – the utility operating the Fukushima NPP, and the National DIET of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission report.[4]

The first two mainly pointed out that the unexpected and immense natural event was of such a magnitude that nobody could have predicted it. However, the third investigation committee came up with different conclusions. An unusually critical report said that the potential scope and parameters of both the earthquake and the tsunami, and their possible effect on NPP cooling systems were well known facts before the accident. Nevertheless, cultural factors typical of Japanese society, such as their obedience to higher authorities combined with a lack of independent nuclear safety oversight, meant that these risks were ignored, underestimated and neglected. As

[4] "The official report of the Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission, Executive summary," The National Diet of Japan, English translation, Japan 2012, p. 38.

[5] "Final report of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company," June 23, 2012. Available online: http://icanps.go.jp/eng/finalgaiyou.pdf (accessed on August 21, 2012).

the report clearly states, in contradiction to the previous officially published conclusions, the Fukushima nuclear accident "was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented."[6] This was an unexpected and devastating conclusion for a country that generally enjoys a high reputation for its advanced engineering technologies and excellent performance. In the case of the Chernobyl accident, the whole nuclear community blamed the old soviet technology and the political regime. But these arguments clearly cannot be applied to the Fukushima accident.

"Made in Japan" disaster

The principles of nuclear safety are well known, and the Fukushima accident did not give any further insights. This does not mean that there are no lessons to be learned from the accident, but the main concept of nuclear safety, as developed so far, still remains valid. External natural hazards such as earthquakes, flooding, and their possible consequences, such as loss of the electricity supply, were known to the nuclear industry and had been analyzed. The concept of nuclear safety is applied in two main steps. Firstly, possible hazards are identified and their severity is estimated. Secondly, the design of the plant is developed in order to safely manage these hazards. There are international standards devoted to both steps, i.e. hazard identification as well as how to reflect these risks in the design. According to current international nuclear safety practice, such an assessment is done not only at the very beginning, when an NPP is designed, but also regularly during its operation, especially if new information regarding possible hazards becomes available. Unfortunately this process clearly failed in Japan.

Cultural factors typical of Japanese society, such as their obedience to higher authorities combined with a lack of independent nuclear safety oversight, meant that risks were ignored, underestimated and neglected.

[6] "The official report of the Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission, Executive summary," op. cit., p. 9.

The operating organization has the primary responsibility for nuclear safety. It should be in its own interest to operate an NPP that is able to manage also low probable initiating events as for example stronger than design basis earthquake or higher wave of tsunami. Nevertheless, in order to ensure a high level of safety (supported also by the international *Convention on nuclear safety*[7]) the world nuclear community committed to establishing national regulators that should act as independent bodies overseeing all activities related to peaceful use of nuclear energy – giving the highest priority to safety. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), a government regulatory agency in Japan, has been in place for many years but its role was only formal. The findings of the Independent investigation commission revealed that NISA did not have enough legal power. It lacked independence and, tragically, actually facilitated the Fukushima accident. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the owner and operator of the Fukushima NPP, opposed and delayed any efforts by the NISA to increase the resistance of the plant to known natural hazards such as earthquakes or tsunamis. TEPCO aimed at minimizing investments into severe accident mitigation systems and basically into any major modernization projects. By so doing it failed in its role to be a responsible and safety-oriented operator of NPPs. In addition, NISA failed to fulfill its role as an independent authority and allowed the operation to continue under such circumstances.

TEPCO failed in its role to be a responsible and safety-oriented operator of NPPs.

The role of national regulators

The sad Fukushima story shows us that the presence of a strong, competitive and independent nuclear regulatory authority is one of the basic pillars for ensuring nuclear safety. It is neither within the author's competence nor intention to estimate the situation in all 30 countries that use nuclear power. However, the author unhesitatingly claims that the series of failures that allowed a major earthquake in Fukushima to result in a core meltdown due to

[7] "Convention on nuclear safety," *Information Circular* INFCIRC/449, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, July 5, 1994, Article 7.

practically no safety or mitigating systems could not happen in Slovakia if the risk of such hazards were known years before.

The Nuclear regulatory authority of the Slovak Republic (Úrad jadrového dozoru (UJD)) has made great progress in its own development. Its position is right in the state administration; it manages to create and maintain up-to-date nuclear legislation; and it has gained the confidence of the public.[8] It has proved its independence and real enforcement powers over time by imposing financial penalties on nuclear operators – license holders in Slovakia. UJD is one of the leading authorities around the globe in prescribing significant modernization of supervised NPPs. A clear example of a different attitude compared to NISA, is the fact that UJD prescribed a new target value for seismic resistance of Mochovce NPP based on the new seismic risk study that is 50 per cent higher than the current one. This has been officially endorsed and published on March 4, 2011, i.e. one week before the Fukushima accident.

The role of every nuclear country is to create and then preserve, or even improve, suitable conditions for its nuclear regulator, and protect it from any possible threats that would arise from interests other than nuclear safety ones.

No other business like nuclear

As already mentioned above, the technical and organizational principles of the safe use of nuclear energy are generally known. The problem is how strictly these are applied. And naturally even a more general question could be raised: Is it possible to apply all of those principles continuously and systematically in every situation without exception? My personal opinion is that it is not possible. But that itself is not a reason to abandon the nuclear way completely. One might try to see a parallel in other industries or human activities. Air transport has also been related to accidents and, despite the fact that statistically it is one of the safest ways of transport, many people are afraid of flying. Principles of safe flying are known but it does not prevent us from accidents. These factors are similar to nuclear energy. But the difference is that there has not been any societal discussion about the

[8] Public opinion surveys done by independent agencies between years 2006 and 2011. Available online: http://www.ujd.gov.sk/ujd/web.nsf/$All/D808374BAF6E43AAC12574F8004BF2B4 (accessed on September 9, 2012).

termination of air transport following a major airplane accident. Neither was there any serious discussion about terminating oil transport using oil tankers after one after a serious accident. Nobody proposed stopping the use of natural gas after the explosion in Ghislenghien (Belgium, 2004), despite the fact that the number of direct fatalities was higher than in Fukushima. The generally accepted response was to adopt lessons learned and make provisions to prevent its repetition in the future, or at least to decrease its probability. It seems to be only in the nuclear industry that every failure re-opens a debate about its legitimacy.

Comparing facts and figures on a serious and scientifically correct basis, it is obvious that nuclear energy is one of the safest ways of generating electricity.

Comparing facts and figures on a serious and scientifically correct basis, it is obvious that nuclear energy is one of the safest ways of generating electricity. Nevertheless in the case of nuclear energy, the public does not take into account the facts and figures but bases their attitude mainly on emotions and feelings. However, nuclear energy also has the right to learn from its mistakes. This is a fact to be reconciled with.

The future of nuclear energy

The immediate future of nuclear energy is not difficult to predict. On the one hand there are few countries that, as an immediate response to the Fukushima accident, announced a phase out of their nuclear energy programs (as for example Germany, Switzerland and Belgium) or abandoned their plans to develop it (Italy). Nevertheless these decisions are not necessarily their final ones. Two of the mentioned countries (Germany and Italy) have taken such decisions before and then re-evaluated them later on.[9,10] Seeing the future

[9] "Laufzeitverlängerung von Atomkraftwerken zugestimmt," Press release of the German Bundestag, 2010. Available online: http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/32009392_kw43_de_atompolitik/index.html (accessed on September 22, 2012).

[10] "Italy rejoins the nuclear family," *World Nuclear News*, July 10, 2009. Available online: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP_Italy_rejoins_the_nuclear_family_1007091.html (accessed on September 22, 2012).

of nuclear energy from a world-wide perspective, however, shows a different trend. There is continuing support for nuclear energy within the majority of EU nuclear countries, including new projects (e.g. Slovakia, Poland, France, Finland, UK), as well as outside of Europe (e.g. USA, China, India, Turkey, United Arabic Emirates, Vietnam).

This fact is supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It states in its 2012 nuclear technology review[11] that the Fukushima accident will slow down the development of nuclear energy but will not reverse it. The IAEA predicts that the development of nuclear energy until 2030 is estimated to be between 35 per cent (low projection) and 100 per cent (high projection) in terms of installed capacity. These numbers were lowered by 7 per cent and 8 per cent respectively, compared to 2010 values, due to the Fukushima accident. It means that the accident has had a very minor impact on other countries regarding the establishment and development of their nuclear industry.

The question of abandoning nuclear energy has to always be seen in the context of all related aspects. NPPs would have to be replaced by other electricity sources. Even highly motivated and determined countries investing massively in renewable energy sources during the last two decades, have understood that replacing large capacities by wind or solar energy is more a wish than a realistic objective. For example, the German government announced the development of fossil plants with a total capacity of 10 GWe over the next decade as a result of their nuclear phase out decision.[12] And that is a deep hit to the Kyoto commitments.

Conclusions

Making any judgment on nuclear energy based on the Fukushima accident would be premature and short-sighted. It has to be assessed from a long-term perspective taking into account all the advantages and previous

[11] "Nuclear Technology Review 2012, report by the Director General," International Atomic Energy Agency, General conference, 56th regular session, August 1, 2012, Vienna, p. 11. Available online: http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-3_en.pdf (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[12] "Next Merkel's 'green' shift forces Germany to burn more coal," The Global Warming Policy Foundation, August 28, 2012. Available online: http://www.thegwpf.org/merkels-green-shift-forces-germany-to-burn-more-coal/ (accessed on September 8, 2012).

achievements, as well as the drawbacks and failures. Such an assessment and decision is in the hands of each individual country. Nuclear energy will certainly be part of the energy mix of many countries for a notable period to come. The reasons are obvious. It is price competitive, independent from oil prices and carbon-free.

Nuclear fission technology has been a great success but, as with other energy sources, it is just a bridge to another way of generating electricity.

Much attention has been dedicated to the development of state of the art, complex and detailed technical standards in the area of nuclear safety. But history shows us that the focus should be broadened to the establishment and support of strong independent regulatory authorities. Existing nuclear safety instruments failed to discover that Japan lacked a strong and independent nuclear regulator for a notable period of time. Addressing this issue would be a big step towards the safe and reliable operation of NPPs. This is particularly important in the current economic recession when governments are drastically cutting their expenditure.

At the same time one should bear in mind that nuclear fission technology is not a permanent solution. We must work on the future steps. Nuclear fission technology has been a great success but, as with other energy sources, it is just a bridge to another way of generating electricity. Until then, we have to learn all the lessons from any, even minor, incidents with nuclear energy in order to avoid or minimize their repetition.

Lukáš Tichý

The Czech discourse on the completion of the Temelín Nuclear Power Plant

Abstract: *In early August 2009, the Czech company ČEZ announced a public tender to enlarge its existing nuclear power plant Temelín with the addition of two reactors, with the option to build additional nuclear units in the Czech Republic and abroad. The tender attracted the attention of three companies, from the US, Russia and France, which submitted their proposals to the state-owned energy company ČEZ at the beginning of July 2012. The main goal of this article is to analyze and interpret the Czech discourse on the construction of the third and fourth block at the Temelín Nuclear Power Plant, in the context of Czech energy policy and security. At the theoretical level, the article builds upon social constructivism, which in relation to discourse analysis, as the basic methodology used in the text, reflects a number of theoretical assumptions. Methodologically, the article is based on thematic discourse analysis.*

A year and a half ago, following the earthquake and tsunami which hit Japan on March 11, 2011, the power supply and cooling system of the three active reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) were disabled, leading subsequently to a leakage of radioactive materials into the environment. The Fukushima nuclear accident, the worst since Chernobyl, once again stirred up the debate on nuclear energy security, even more so, and in this respect divided the European Union even further into two ideologically irreconcilable camps: the supporters and opponents of nuclear energy.

Among those EU member states which either abandoned their nuclear programs, suspended them at some point in the past, or intend in the future to close their nuclear power plants, are Austria, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Outside the EU there is, for example, Switzerland. In the context of Czech

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energy security problems may arise, especially in connection with the decision of the German government to order the immediate closure of their oldest nuclear reactors and eventually to completely abandon nuclear power. The remaining German nuclear reactors will be gradually phased out between 2015 and 2022. Germany intends to replace 27 per cent of its nuclear production of electricity, partly with coal and gas, but mainly with renewable resources, including the construction of new wind farms in the north of the country – which is not currently supported by an adequate transmission infrastructure. In the Czech Republic, therefore, there is a concern that a surge in German electricity coming from renewable energy sources will cause an overload of transmission networks. At the same time, the company ČEZ has already warned in this regard that wind intensity increases the risk of blackout in Europe, with the result that Germany will not be able to control the flow of electricity from wind farms in the north of the country.

On the other hand, in many EU member states the events at Fukushima have been followed by a decision to increase the share of nuclear energy, both in the total energy mix and in the generation of electricity. In the 14 EU member states, there are currently 143 nuclear reactors, which cover 31 per cent of electricity consumption. The motivation of supporters of nuclear energy is different from the public perception of nuclear energy, i.e. that it guarantees energy self-sufficiency through a strengthening of its position in the European electricity market, in order to do away with an uncomfortable energy dependence on Russia.[1] The leader of the pro-nuclear block is France, with 22 nuclear power stations and a 74 per cent share of the nuclear generation of electricity. Besides France, one of the main supporters of nuclear energy in Europe is the United Kingdom, with ten nuclear power plants.[2] Meanwhile, in Finland the third reactor of the Olkiluoto NPP is currently under construction.

Also pro-nuclear are all four Visegrad Group countries, i.e. Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary (which intends to increase the share of nuclear energy in the total generation of its electricity from the current 40 per cent to 60 per cent), and Poland. Although Poland still has no nuclear power plant,[3] the Polish population is probably the most "pro-nuclear" in the EU, regarding

[1] L. Tichý, "Jaderná politika EU a dostavba JE Temelín v ČR," *Bulletin CEJISS* Vol. 2, No. 2, 2012. Available online: http://cejiss.org/sites/default/files/newsletter_cz_kveten_2012.pdf (accessed on August 31, 2012).

[2] The United Kingdom plans to build up to eight new nuclear power stations.

[3] In Poland, 90 per cent of the electricity is generated from coal.

nuclear power as a means of reducing their dependence on imported Russian gas, and as a way of guaranteeing the environmental goals of the EU energy policy.

In the Czech Republic there are two nuclear power stations: the Temelín NPP with two nuclear units and an installed capacity of 1,000 megawatt (MW)/block, and the Dukovany NPP with four nuclear units and an installed capacity of 440 MW/block. The share of nuclear energy in the primary Czech energy mix is about 15 per cent, but the share of electricity generated from nuclear is about 30 per cent.

Therefore, on August 2, 2009, the ČEZ energy company opened a public tender for the selection of a contractor to build the two nuclear units designed for the Temelín location. Apart from the requirement for delivery of two new nuclear units, the public tender also includes a requirement for unilateral options for the benefit of ČEZ regarding the construction of up to three more nuclear units in other potential locations within Europe (Dukovany NPP in the Czech Republic, and Bohunice NPP in Slovakia). The tender represents the biggest contract in the entire history of the Czech Republic and one of the most important energy projects in Central Europe. On July 3, 2012, ČEZ opened bids for the public contract for the completion of the Temelín nuclear power plant in the presence of the bidders – the French group Areva, an American consortium of Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC and Westinghouse Electric ČR, and a Czech–Russian consortium of Škoda JS, Atomstroyexport, and Gidropress. ČEZ now has more than one year to select its supplier, as the contract is planned to be signed in late 2013. However, the big decision as to whether the winner of the bid will be confirmed or not is in the hands of the Czech government, a major shareholder of ČEZ.[4] The cost of completing the Temelín NPP might be known only after the contract is concluded.[5]

Depending on the chosen technology, and the extent of construction, the share of generated electrical energy from nuclear could increase to about 40–50 per cent in the Czech Republic.

[4] The state is the majority shareholder of ČEZ, owning 70 per cent.

[5] According to worst case scenarios, the price of the contract might be around 500 billion Czech crowns. At the same time, there are arguments that challenge the economic and

One of the main reasons for the completion of the Temelín NPP is to ensure reliable future coverage of the growing electricity consumption in the Czech Republic, and thus to enhance Czech energy security. Depending on the chosen technology, and the extent of construction (Temelín only, or also Dukovany NPP), the share of generated electrical energy from nuclear could increase to about 40–50 per cent in the Czech Republic.

The aim of this article, research questions, and the theoretical and methodological framework of the analysis of Czech discourse

The goal of this article is to analyze and interpret the Czech discourse on the completion of the Temelín nuclear power plant, against the background of the conceptual-theoretical debate on Czech energy policy and security. In order to reach this goal, we will ask two interrelated questions:

1. What are the main topics of the Czech discourse on the completion of the Temelín NPP?
2. How do Czech political leaders interpret these topics of Czech discourse?

At the theoretical level, this article builds upon social constructivism. According to Nik Hynek and Vít Střítecký, social constructivism, in relation to discourse analysis (the basic methodology used in the text), reflects three theoretical assumptions. First, it is a critical constructivist belief that discourse constitutes semantic structure, which in turn constructs social reality. Secondly, discourse is understood as a socially productive phenomenon, which allows us to create and to reproduce discursively defined social reality. Discourse thus defines the relevant entities and their discursive action, allowing us to shape or to reshape socially constructed reality. Thirdly, it is a fact that the formation and legitimization of this activity orients research toward dominant or hegemonic discourses.[6]

technological feasibility of the tender, and especially the ability of the company ČEZ to finance the completion of the Temelín NPP. See I. Kotev, "Why CEZ cannot afford to build Temelin 3&4," *Candolle Research*, January 2012.

[6] N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnost podle českých atlantistů," in P. Drulák, V. Střítecký, eds, *Hledání českých zájmů. Mezinárodní bezpečnost*, Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2010, p. 85; J.L. Milliken, "The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of research and methods," *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999, pp. 225–54.

The practical approach employed in our research was as follows. We explored a set of textual and speech units produced both by Czech central institutions and their political representatives. Our sample contains 130 units in all. The period investigated spans from August 2, 2009, when the power company ČEZ announced the public tender for the completion of two new nuclear reactors at the Temelín NPP, to July 3, 2012, when all three foreign companies submitted their bids to ČEZ.

The research was divided into the following steps. First, we compiled a corpus of speeches, interviews and press releases of significant Czech political actors, as the representatives of the central authority of the Czech Republic. Specifically, the Government was represented by the Prime Minister (first Jan Fischer, now Petr Nečas),[7] the Ministry of Industry and Trade by the Minister of Industry and Trade (first Václav Tošovský, later Martin Kocourek, now Martin Kuba),[8] the Ministry of the Environment by the Minister of the Environment (first Ladislav Miko, later Jan Dusík, Rut Bízková, and Pavel Drobil, and now Tomáš Chalupa),[9] and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (first Jan Kohout, now Karel Schwarzenberg).[10] To avoid excessive focus on individual members of the Czech Government, we included interviews with the Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Security of the Czech Republic[11] and since 2010 also Government Commissioner for the completion of Temelín (Václav Bartuška), as well as statements of the President of the Czech Republic (Václav Klaus).

We selected only those speech documents in which the key phrase "Temelín Nuclear Power Plant" was found in connection with "completion," "construction" or "expansion." With this criteria we obtained 124 documents (official and unofficial speeches, interviews, and press releases). All

[7] Jan Fischer was Czech Prime Minister from April 2009 to June 2010. Since July 2010 it has been Petr Nečas.

[8] Václav Tošovský was Minister of Industry and Trade from May 2009 to July 2010, and Martin Kocourek from July 2010 to November 2011. Since November 2011 it has been Martin Kuba.

[9] Ladislav Miko was Minister of the Environment from April 2009 to November 2009, Jan Dusík from November to March 2010, Rut Bízková from April 2010 to June 2010, and Pavel Drobil from July 2010 to December 2010. Since January 2011 it has been Tomá Chalupa.

[10] Jan Kohout was Foreign Minister from May 2009 to June 2010. Since July 2010 it has been Karel Schwarzenberg.

[11] In 2006, the Foreign Ministry established the post of Ambassador-at-Large for Energy Security of the Czech Republic. The post has been held by Václav Bartšuka since its inception.

Table 1. Speeches, interviews, and press releases of the Czech political representatives

Overview of selected political representatives of the Czech Republic		Year				Total public statmentes by author
		2009	2010	2011	2012	
Prime Minister	Jan Fischer	2	3	-	-	5
	Petr Nečas	-	2	16	5	23
Ministry of Industry and Trade	Václav Tošovský	3	5	-	-	8
	Martin Kocourek	-	3	5	-	8
	Martin Kuba	-	-	6	16	22
Ministry of the Environment	Ladislav Miko	4	-	-	-	4
	Jan Dusík	1	3	-	-	4
	Rut Bízková	-	2	-	-	2
	Pavel Drobil	-	7	-	-	7
	Tomáš Chalupa	-	-	1	0	1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Jan Kohout	3	2	-	-	5
	Karel Schwarzenberg	-	2	2	2	6
Ambassador	Václav Bartuška	3	3	8	5	19
President	Václav Klaus	2	1	5	2	10
Total public statements by year		18	33	43	30	124

Source: The author.

statements and interviews were obtained from the official websites of the Government of the Czech Republic, the selected ministries, or the President of the Czech Republic, or from the websites of Czech television or radio stations, or newspapers. The distribution of selected speeches, interviews, and press releases, by author and date of publication, is summarized in Table 1.

In addition to speeches and interviews, we also included six key documents dealing with the Temelín NPP and its "completion/construction/expansion" that were published by Czech central institutions, namely the government, the ministry of industry and trade, and the ministry of foreign affairs. The distribution of documents across the Czech central institutions and their dates of publication are shown in the following table (see Table 2).

Overall, we gathered 124 official and unofficial speeches, interviews, and press releases of Czech political representatives, and six official documents of individual Czech central institutions – 130 textual units altogether.

Table 2. Documents of the individual Czech central institutions

Year	Number of documents selected Czech central institutions			
	Government	Ministry of Industry and Trade	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Total
2009	0	0	0	0
2010	1	1	0	2
2011	1	0	1	2
2012	1	1	0	2
Total	3	2	1	6

Source: The author.

The research was based on the interpretive tradition, and within this, on discourse analysis, the basic methodological tool used in this article.[12] Discourse analysis in the context of this article is not to be understood as a specific method, but as an overarching methodology within which it is possible to combine different methods.[13] The aim is to explore a number of documents and statements dealing with the issue of the completion of the Temelín NPP in order to discover their basic themes, as well as the basic arguments presented in relation to them.[14]

The Czech discourse on the completion of Temelín

The existence of the various topics within the Czech discourse associated with the completion of the Temelín NPP was examined by means of data-thematic analysis – within the methodology of discourse analysis. Thematic analysis lies in the process of searching for and finding key themes for characterizing the pertinent phenomenon. In fact, it is possible to identify this process with multiple readings of the data. This analysis focuses on the exposure of patterns

[12] N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "Energetická bezpečnost podle českých atlantistů," op. cit., p. 86; R. Wodak, M.J. Meyer, eds, *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, London: Sage, 2001.

[13] N. Phillips, C. Hardy, *Discourse analysis: investigating processes of social construction*, London: Sage Publication, 2002, p. 3; N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "Český diskurz o protiraketové obraně a národní zájem," *Mezinárodní vztahy* Vol. 45, No. 1, 2010, p. 8.

[14] N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "Český diskurz o protiraketové obraně a národní zájem," op. cit., p. 9; N. Phillips, C. Hardy, *Discourse analysis: investigating processes of social construction*, op. cit.; N. Fairclough, *Discourse and social change*, Cambridge: Policy Press, 1992.

Table 3. Main themes and key phrases in Czech discourse on completion of the Temelín NPP

Main themes	Key phrases
security	energy
	safety of nuclear power plants
	decision of the Czech government
foreign policy relations	bidders of tender
	neighboring countries
	the European Union
economics	cost and economic benefits
	involvement of Czech companies
technology	technology of new reactors
	transfer know-how

Source: The author.

of content organization and relationships in the framework of the analyzed data, through which the emerging themes become analytical categories.[15] While there are several ways in which themes can be operationalized, this article will operationalize themes through key phrases. These key phrases will be structured according to the thematic field and typologized on the basis of abstraction into general categories.[16]

The thematic analysis is based on documents of individual Czech central institutions, and on speeches, interviews, and press releases of Czech political representatives. The aim of this thematic analysis is to answer our first and second research questions:

1. What are the main topics of the Czech discourse on the completion of the Temelín NPP?
2. How do Czech political leaders interpret these topics of Czech discourse?

In our analysis of the selected documents and speeches, we have progressed to where we have identified, on the basis of multiple readings, the main themes and associated key phrases which have appeared in the context

[15] N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "The fortunes of the Czech discourse on the missile defense," in P. Drulák, M. Braun, eds, *The quest for the national interest. A methodological reflection on Czech foreign policy*, Prague: Institue of International Relations, 2010, p. 88.

[16] N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "Český diskurz o protiraketové obraně a národní zájem," op. cit., p. 9.

of the discussion on the expansion of the Temelín NPP. In our case, the key phrases were inspired by the existing connections from which diagnoses of the themes themselves emerged.[17] At the same time, our identification of the key themes of the Czech discourse is based on the set of fundamental criteria which the ČEZ energy company has determined for the selection of a suitable candidate for the completion of the Temelín nuclear power plant. Preliminary analysis of the documents and speeches showed that within the Czech debate four general themes dominate in relation to the tender for the completion of the Temelín NPP (see Table 3).

Security in the discourse on the completion of Temelín

The analyzed documents (published by Czech central institutions and public statments of political representatives) revealed that within the Czech discourse regarding the expansion of the Temelín NPP, the theme of security is the one that clearly dominates. Within this discourse, security is perceived and interpreted in a broader context and is associated with a range of issues and topics.

Within the Czech discourse regarding the expansion of the Temelín NPP, the theme of security is the one that clearly dominates.

The theme of security is most often connected with the issue of energy, or rather energy security, as for example: "I consider it extremely important that the expansion of the Temelín nuclear power plant bring our country, among other benefits, also the energy security of the Czech Republic,"[18] or "the enlargement of the existing Temelín nuclear power plant with the addition of two reactors contributes significantly to the energy self-sufficiency of the Czech Republic."[19] Similarly, according to former Minister of the Environment

[17] N. Hynek, V. Střítecký, "The fortunes of the Czech discourse on the missile defense," op. cit., p. 88.

[18] M. Kuba, "Možnosti těžit uhlí za limity bych se nevzdával," *Hospodářské noviny*, December 9, 2011. Available online: http://www.mpo.cz/dokument92935.html (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[19] "Ministr průmyslu a obchodu připomenul na bratislavském fóru nutnost zajištění stability výroby energie," Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Czech Republic, May 15, 2012. Available online: http://www.mpo.cz/dokument104477.html (accessed on September 1, 2012).

Pavel Drobil, "Additional blocks at nuclear power plants will allow us in the future – when power plants based on fossil fuels are phased out – to replace them without compromising our energy independence or energy self-sufficiency."[20]

A plan for the enlargement of the Temelín nuclear power plant with an additional two blocks is necessarily viewed in the context of the Czech debate on nuclear energy. According to former Minister of Trade and Industry Martin Kocourek, "Nuclear energy is the future of Czech energy security. Therefore we have to focus on the fast completion of the Temelín nuclear power plant."[21] The position of the Czech Republic is exactly expressed by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Kohout:

> In the Czech Republic there is no solution for energy independence without nuclear energy. We have very limited energy reserves, and renewable resources like solar, biomass and wind energy are also limited. If we want to replace nuclear energy, for example, with gas, this would lead to a much higher energy dependence of the Czech Republic on gas producing countries.[22]

The building of Temelín III and IV is advocated based on the significance and relevance of nuclear energy as an important resource which can provide greater energy security and self-sufficiency for the Czech Republic. At the same time, nuclear energy is perceived as an accessible and available resource that will not increase the import energy dependence of the Czech Republic, which has only limited energy reserves.

In addition, Czech Prime Minister Petr Nečas emphasized, "So that we are able to continue both to provide for electricity consumption and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of CO_2, we have decided for the further development of nuclear energy in the Czech Republic."[23] Energy from nuclear

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[20] "Solární panely a kůrovec? Obrovský průšvih zelené energetiky, říká Pavel Drobil," *Právo*, August 28, 2010.

[21] "Martin Kocourek: Ministr byl hostem pořadu Dvacet minut Radiožurnálu," *ČRo 1 – Radiožurnal*, March 18, 2011. Available online: http://www.mpo.cz/dokument85344.html (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[22] "Die Nato muss zur territorialen Verteidigung zurückkehren," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 3, 2010.

[23] "Petr Nečas: Projev premiéra a předsedy ODS na Česko–saské energetické konferenci," Government of the Czech Republic, October 7, 2011. Available online: http://www.petr-necas.cz/clanek/22/projev-premiera-a-predsedy-ods-na-ceskosaske-energeticke-konferenci (accessed on September 1, 2012).

power plants is also perceived as being one of the cleanest and most stable sources of energy, unlike renewables. "The supply of nuclear power to the network is long-term and stable, not like some renewable resources,"[24] and therefore, "We cannot do without nuclear energy."[25] Similarly, the former Environment Minister Rut Bízková expressed, "I am in agreement with the completion of the Temelín NPP; in terms of climate protection it is a clean source of energy."[26]

At the same time, the Government of the Czech Republic is planning both to phase out coal mining and to reduce the consumption of coal, from which almost 60 per cent of electricity is currently generated. This decreased share of coal in the Czech energy mix is expected to be replaced by nuclear. This was confirmed, for example, by the Minister of Trade and Industry Martin Kuba: "Strategically, I believe that nuclear energy is the main step we can take, both to reduce the share of coal in Czech energy and to ensure stable and affordable electricity;"[27] therefore "it is important to pay close attention to the completion of the Temelín NPP."[28] Similarly, Václav Bartuška said, "To be honest, we are building Temelín III and IV for our own domestic needs, because we have to replace some of the coal-fired power stations with new resources, and we see nuclear as a reliable, long-term and relatively [stable] source of electricity, besides being clean."[29]

The enlargement of the existing nuclear power plant Temelín with two additional reactors will result in a higher share of electricity produced from nuclear, because "the generation of electricity from nuclear is basically the cheapest electricity;"[30] and, "We need electricity. I am convinced that the

[24] "Martin Kuba: Impulsy Václava Moravce," *Rádio Impuls*, April 19, 2012. Available online: http://www.ods.cz/clanek/1299-impulsy-vaclava-moravce (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[25] "Václav Tošovský: Proud dojde za tři až šest let," *Týden*, September 21, 2009. Available online: http://www.mpo.cz/dokument64843.html (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[26] "S dostavbou Temelína souhlasím, je ekologický," *Boleslavský deník*, April 22, 2010.

[27] "Maritn Kuba: Otázky Václava Moravce," *Česká televize*, July 15, 2012. Available online: http://www.ods.cz/clanek/1818-otazky-vaclava-moravce (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[28] "Martin Kuba: Interview ČT24," *ČT24*, November 30, 2011. Available online: http://www.ods.cz/clanek/356-interview-ct24 (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[29] "Consequences of German nuclear phase-out for Czech Republic still unclear, says energy expert," *Czech Radio 7*, May 24, 2011. Available online: http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/consequences-of-german-nuclear-phase-out-for-czech-republic-still-unclear-says-energy-expert (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[30] "Martin Kocourek: Ministr byl hostem pořadu Interview ČT24," *ČT24*, July 14, 2010. Available online: http://www.mpo.cz/dokument76633.html (accessed on September 1, 2012).

share of electricity from coal will be reduced, and the proportion of nuclear will be increased from 30 per cent to 50 per cent."[31] The need both to guarantee a balanced energy mix and to increase the production of electricity to cover future consumption in the Czech Republic are, in the context of energy security, additional arguments for the completion of the Temelín NPP.

The need both to guarantee a balanced energy mix and to increase the production of electricity to cover future consumption in the Czech Republic are, in the context of energy security, additional arguments for the completion of the Temelín NPP.

In the analyzed documents and speeches, the theme of security was very often used in connection with the requirement to ensure safety standards in the completion of the Temelín NPP for all three foreign bidders. For example, according to Bartuška, "One of the main conditions of the tender was that the nuclear reactors would meet European safety requirements and European authority requirements."[32] Similarly, Nečas, who repeatedly talked about the safety of Czech nuclear power stations, said, "The safety of nuclear power plants and their service are a long-term priority for the Czech Republic, and I cannot imagine that Czech citizens will be threatened, even for a second, by the operation of the nuclear power plants."[33]

In a word, the debate on nuclear energy and security was negatively affected by the Fukushima nuclear accident of March 2011. However, shortly after the Fukushima accident, Nečas announced that the construction of the new reactors would continue as originally planned. "There is absolutely no reason for any concern, either in terms of potential threats corresponding to the nuclear accident in Japan, or in terms of the

[31] "Václav Bartuška, vládní zmocněnec pro dostavbu jaderné elektrárny Temelín," *ČRo 1 – Radiožurnál*, November 4, 2011. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/archivy/z_medii/dostavba _jaderne_ elektrarny _temelin.html (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[32] "Václav Bartuška: Svět si připomíná 25 let od výbuch reaktoru v Černobylu," *ČRo Rádio Česko*, April 28, 2011. Available online:. http://www.rozhlas.cz/zpravy/evropa/_zprava/724622 (accessed on September 1, 2012).

[33] "Premiér v Rakousku: Jaderná bezpečnost je pro českou vládu prioritou," Government of the Czech Republic, March 3, 2011. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/premier-v-rakousku-jaderna-bezpecnost-je-pro-ceskou-vladu-prioritou-82453/ (accessed on September 1, 2012).

running of Czech nuclear power plants,"[34] since "the Czech nuclear power plants are operated safely."[35] Similarly, Minister of the Environment Tomáš Chalupa expressed, "The earthquake and subsequent tsunami that caused the Japanese power plant accident are not, in our opinion, risks faced by nuclear power plants in Central Europe."[36] Therefore, "the events at Fukushima have not changed the intention of the Czech Republic to complete Temelín."[37]

Last but not least, the Czech government strongly supports the plans to build new nuclear blocks at Temelín as an important part of the optimal energy mix of the future, as endorsed by the draft state energy strategy of the Czech Republic.[38] It has made it plain that it expects to play a role in the decision concerning the awarding of the contract, because, "Everywhere in the world, nuclear energy and nuclear power plants are related to the security and strategic interests of the state. Everywhere in the world, therefore, governments are trying to influence those projects."[39] This was confirmed, for example, by Nečas: "This tender involves considerable security, economic and foreign-policy risks," therefore "the government is responsible for this fundamental strategic question, and will also be deciding on the tender schedule." [40] On the other hand, Bartuška admitted that the Government of the Czech Republic does not have to opt for or confirm any of the three

[34] "Petr Nečas: Prioritou české energetiky zůstává bezpečnost a stabilita dodávek," Government of the Czech Republic, March 17, 2011. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/tiskove-konference/tiskova-konference-po-jednani-vlady--17--brezna-2011-82306/ (accessed on September 3, 2012).

[35] Ibid.

[36] "Tomáš Chalupa: Stanovisko ministra životního prostředí Tomáše Chalupy," Ministry of Environment of the Czech Republic, May 2011. Available online: http://www.mzp.cz/cz/news_110512_soder (accessed on September 3, 2012).

[37] "Premiér: Součástí energetického mixu musí zůstat i jádro," Government of the Czech Republic, May 14, 2012. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/clenove-vlady/premier/vyznamne-projevy/premier-soucasti-energetickeho-mixu-musi-zustat-i-jadro-95500/ (accessed on September 3, 2012).

[38] In July 2012, Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Czech Republic published new updated State Energy Policy of the Czech Republic called "Aktualizace Státní energetické koncepce České republiky." Available online: http://www.mpo.cz/dokument106059.html (accessed on September 3, 2012).

[39] "Jan Kohout: Temelín si pohlídáme," *Respekt*, November 16, 2009. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/jup/cz/o_ministerstvu/archivy/clanky_a_projevy_ministra_kohouta_2009/x2009_11_16_temelin_si_pohlidame.html (accessed on September 3, 2012).

[40] "Tisková konference po jednání vlády," Government of the Czech Republic, February 9, 2011. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/tiskove-konference/tiskova-konference-po- (accessed on September 3, 2012).

candidates, because if "none of the three bidders satisfies us, we will not choose any of them and then the tender will end."[41]

Foreign policy relations in the discourse on the completion of Temelín

As with the issue of security, the theme of foreign policy relations in the context of the completion of the Temelín NPP is also perceived and interpreted very broadly within the Czech discourse. First, the issue of foreign policy relations is connected with the negotiations of members of the Czech Government with the political representatives of Russia, US, and France concerning this tender. Secondly, Czech foreign policy is also focused on relations with neighboring countries, in particular Germany and Austria, which are strongly opposed to ČEZ's plans to enlarge its existing nuclear power plant at Temelín with the addition of two reactors. Thirdly, Czech political representatives are advocating both nuclear energy generally, and the completion of the Temelín NPP, within the European Union.

As mentioned above, the three foreign bidders – a consortium of Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, and Westinghouse Electric ČR; the group Areva; and a consortium of Škoda JS, Atomstroyexport, and Gidropress – are candidates for the tender for the completion of Temelín. Since the announcement of the tender for the construction of the Temelín NPP, the Government of the Czech Republic has unambiguously maintained that the tender will be open and all candidates will have an equal chance. On the one hand, this was confirmed, for example, by Václav Bartuška: "we have no preference, the tender is really open to all,"[42] and, "All three bidders have a chance." [43] And furthermore, "We have clearly declared that we are interested in ensuring an open, transparent and fair tender, and in letting

[41] "Interview s Václavem Bartuškou na téma dostavby Jaderné elektrárny Temelín," *Český rozhlas 6*, December 16, 2011. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/archivy/z_medii/interview_s_vaclavem_bartuskou_na_tema.html (accessed on September 3, 2012).

[42] "Václav Bartuška, vládní zmocněnec pro dostavbu JE Temelín," *Dvacet minut Radiožurnálu*, February 10, 2011. Available online: http://www.rozhlas.cz/radiozurnal/dvacetminut/_zprava/vaclav-bartuska–849539? print=1 (accessed on September 4, 2012).

[43] "Václav Bartuška, vládní zmocněnec pro dostavbu jaderné elektrárny Temelín," op. cit.

the best bid win."[44] On the other hand, Bartuška has admitted, "none of the candidates has convinced me that it is able to build Temelín III and IV, because all three have their problems and difficulties."[45]

Nevertheless, since the very beginning the tender has held the strong interest of all three foreign bidders. For example, "We see it regularly, in Prague, Pittsburgh, Moscow or Paris. If we had three very serious candidates at the beginning, after Fukushima we have three very desperate bidders."[46] Similarly, the political leaders of the US, Russia and France are each lobbying for their firm in the tender for the completion of Temelín. "In strategic terms, and in terms of the amount of money, this is a major contract. Therefore, both President Obama and President Medvedev have a keen interest in their countries' companies receiving this contract. French President Sarkozy also has an interest, and it is logical."[47]

As with the issue of security, the theme of foreign policy relations in the context of the completion of the Temelín NPP is also perceived and interpreted very broadly within the Czech discourse.

For example, the tender for the completion of the Temelín NPP was one of the issues in the negotiations between Petr Nečas and American President Barack Obama in October 2011. "Obama said only that the bid has the support of the US government, which also includes cooperation in the field of nuclear science and nuclear research. The United States in this area is truly the global leader."[48] And previously, Nečas had discussed the tender with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and French Prime Minister Francois Fillon in Paris, in February 2011.

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[44] "Události, komentáře," *Česká televize*, October 27, 2011. Available online: http://www.petr-necas.cz/clanek/ 188/udalosti–komentare (accessed on September 4, 2012).

[45] "Rozhovor s Václavem Bartuškou: Evropa se rozhodla, že shnije," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, September 18, 2011. Available online: http://atominfo.cz/2011/09/rozhovor-s-vaclavem-bartuskou-evropa-se-rozhodla-ze-shnije/ (accessed on September 4, 2012).

[46] Ibid.

[47] "Václav Bartuška: Rozhovor na téma Temelín," ČRo Rádio Česko, July 21, 2010. Available online: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/archivy/z_medii/rozhovor_na_tema_temelin.html (accessed on September 4, 2012).

[48] "Události, komentáře," op. cit.

Of the three candidates for the tender, the Russian Federation was most often mentioned in the analyzed documents and statements. While Czech politicians are rather restrained in their position *vis-à-vis* French Areva and American Westinghouse, on the issue of the participation of the Russian company, the Czech political scene is divided into two opposing camps. On the one hand, for example, Václav Bartuška wanted to exclude Russia from the tender, because:

> The basic rule of energy is: diversification. Now, we have six Soviet, or rather Russian, reactors – four reactors in Temelín and two reactors in Dukovany. We take Russian nuclear fuel, and I think that if we build more reactors, they should not be from Russia.[49]

Later, Bartuška softened his stance, "Historically, I was the one who wanted Russians to be excluded from the tender. I was the only one who wanted it, and I lost my battle."[50]

Czech President Václav Klaus supported the Russian bidder in the tender for the completion of the Temelin power plant.

The main argument against the Russian company's winning the tender is the fear of excessive Czech energy dependence on Russia: "We must not forget that we have a great dependence on Russia; there is gas, some oil and so on. Therefore, we should be very wary. I do not like it when one state has too much influence on us."[51] Similarly, former Minister of the Environment Ladislav Miko pointed out this concern about the increasing dependence of the Czech Republic: "we will end up exchanging gas dependence on Russia for dependence on Russia via uranium. I do not know if that is the solution."[52]

[49] "Václav Bartuška: Rusové nám vlastně dělají dobrou službu," *Hospodářské noviny*, November 6, 2009.

[50] "Interview s Václavem Bartuškou na téma dostavby Jaderné elektrárny Temelín," op. cit.

[51] "Rozhovor s ministrem Karlem Schwarzenbergem," *ČT24*, December 16, 2011. Available online:http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/archivy/clanky_a_projevy_ministra_schwarzenberga_4/x2011_12_16_rozhovor_s_ministrem_zahranici_karlem_schwarzenbergem.html (accessed on September 5, 2012).

[52] "Ladislav Miko hostem Studia STOP," *Český rozhlas 6*, October 15, 2009. Available online: http://www.mzp.cz/cz/articles_cro6_091015studio_stop (accessed on September 5, 2012).

On the other hand, Czech President Václav Klaus supported the Russian bidder in the tender. During the Prague meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in December 2011, Klaus clearly stated, "In the Russian proposal I see positive aspects, namely in the relatively high share of participation of Czech companies in the subcontracting."[53] The Czech President does not perceive the involvement and possible victory of the Russian company as a threat:

> I absolutely don't understand why we should fear Russian companies more than any others. It is an anachronism, and a demonstration of the inability to think rationally and in a manner which reflects the realities of the contemporary world.[54]

On the other hand, the completion of the Temelín power plant has raised the concerns of neighboring countries, chiefly Germany and Austria, which are intensively protesting against the construction of the Temelín NPP. According to a Czech Government document, called Analysis of vulnerabilities in construction of the third and fourth blocks of the Temelín nuclear power plant, the ongoing consultations of the International Energy Agency with Austria and Germany are proceeding in the correct manner at the government level, and the Czech Republic is increasingly able to explain the issues. On the other hand, this government document warns against a possible deterioration in both German and Austrian policy towards the Temelín NPP, because, "It increases the risk of altering the federal policies (of Austria and Germany) under pressure from those federal states which are sharply anti-nuclear (Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Bavaria)."[55]

The position of the Czech Republic towards Germany is probably best expressed by Czech Prime Minister Petr Nečas:

> The Czech Republic fully respects the decision of its neighbor, Germany, to phase out nuclear energy; on the other hand, we expect the same

[53] "Václav Klaus: Kontakty mezi Ruskem a ČR na dostavbu Temelín," *ČRo Rádio Česko*, December 9, 2011. Available oline: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/archivy/z_medii/kontrakty_mezi_ruskem_a_cr_na_ dostavbu.html (accessed on September 7, 2012).

[54] "Rozhovor prezidenta republiky pro Lidové novin," *Lidové noviny*, December 18, 2010.

[55] "Analýza slabých míst výstavby 3. a 4. bloku jaderné elektrárny Temelín," Government of the Czech Republic, October 12, 2011.

> respect from Germany for the Czech decision to continue with our nuclear energy program. . . . I informed Ms Federal Chancellor, and offered her the opportunity to organize a public debate in Germany on the project of the completion of the Temelín NPP. Indeed, we have nothing to hide.[56]

Nečas has expressed this same position of the Czech Republic in relation to Austria: "We are preparing for a transparent dialogue. We have no reason to hide information. We are getting all the necessary information ready to share with the Austrian community."[57]

Last but not least, the Czech Republic has for a long time been defending and supporting nuclear energy as a safe, stable and clean source of energy in its relations with the European Commission, which attempts both to influence the energy mix of member states, and to enforce movement towards a low carbon policy. According to Martin Kocourek, "We argue that nuclear energy is safe in European conditions . . . and . . . if Europe is going to be competitive, it needs the cheapest energy, and nuclear energy certainly contributes to it."[58] Similarly, Martin Kuba stated, "If we want to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 20 per cent by 2050 . . . nuclear energy is the logical basis for it."[59] Furthermore, Petr Nečas has called to mind that the composition of the energy mix, as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, is in the hands of member states, and therefore, "we intend to continue in the process that will lead to the construction of additional nuclear blocks."[60]

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[56] "Tisková konference po jednání premiéra Petra Nečase s bavorským ministerským předsedou Horstem Seehoferem," Government of the Czech Republic, November 23, 2011. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/tiskove-konference/tiskova-konference-po-jednani-premiera-petra-necase-s-bavorskym-ministerskym-predsedou-horstem-seehoferem–23–listopadu-2011-89812/ (accessed on September 7, 2012).

[57] "Premiér v Rakousku: Jaderná bezpečnost je pro českou vládu prioritou," op. cit.

[58] "Martin Kuba: Možnosti těžit uhlí za limity bych se nevzdával," op. cit.

[59] Ibid.

[60] "Premiér Nečas: Chceme silnou a soběstačnou energetiku," Government of the Czech Republic, March 29, 2011. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/premier-necas-chceme-silnou-a-sobestacnou-energetiku-82653/ (accessed on September 7, 2012).

Economics and technology in the discourse on the completion of Temelín NPP

The themes of security and foreign-policy orientation are very closely connected with the question of economic benefits and technology. Besides security, the main criteria for the selection of the winner of the tender are the following: cost, know-how transfer, and the share of Czech companies participating. This was confirmed, for example, by Petr Nečas: "I informed Mr Francois Fillon that the main criteria will be cost, technology sharing, and the participation of Czech companies in the tender. The ability to guarantee the budget and the schedule of construction is also very important."[61]

The cost of the tender will come from the price bids of the three foreign candidates, because, "The Temelín tender is now the only one in the world, and we have three desperate candidates. They themselves have to consider what price they are willing to bid."[62] In addition, "We are waiting to see what they offer us, and we are trying to be equally harsh on all three candidates."[63] However, the state-owned energy company ČEZ estimates the complete cost of the two new reactors at around 300 billion Czech crowns. According to Václav Bartuška, it is premature to talk about cost at present, because "the price will be in the bids that will come sometime in the first half of next year. I admire those who are already able to predict what those bids will look like."[64] However, Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg pointed out that the cost of completing the Temelín NPP should not be the main criterion, since:

> With such a large building project, which will have such a huge impact on the economy, and which will have a foreign policy impact as well, we have to take all factors into account. The government must not look only at the operational and investment side of things.[65]

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[61] "Premiér v Paříži: Evropa se musí vrátit k základům integrace a zaměřit se na svobodný trh," Government of the Czech Republic, January 6, 2012. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/premier-necas-v-parizi-evropa-se-musi-vratit-k-zakladum-integrace--zamerit-se-na-konkurenceschopnost-a-svobodny-trh-91599/ (accessed on September 8, 2012).

[62] "Václav Bartuška: Jaderná renesance? Až nějakou uvidím, uvěřím, že existuje," *E15*, October 3, 2011.

[63] "Interview s Václavem Bartuškou na téma dostavby Jaderné elektrárny Temelín," op. cit.

[64] "Rozhovor s Václavem Bartuškou: Evropa se rozhodla, že shnije," op. cit.

[65] "Schwarzenber: Pokud Saša Vondra nese odpovědnost, měl by odstoupit, i když je přítel," *Právo*, February 12, 2011.

Another very important issue is what the economic benefits and advantages of building Temelín III and IV are, in relation to the current and future price of electricity, because "Temelín must come with an acceptable energy cost."[66] Martin Kuba has called to mind that what is first necessary is to adjust the economic functioning of two new reactors at the Temelín NPP:

> There is the possibility that ČEZ will look for a strategic partner for investment; but there are other options, such as a fixed price of electricity. When electricity is expensive, the company returns surpluses, and when electricity is cheap, the state supplements the losses of the company.[67]

On the other hand, Bartuška admitted that if the contract price is too high, "We can say to all three candidates that we will not build. If the cost is too high, we won't go into it."[68] At the same time, former Minister of the Environment Jan Dusík, for example, has questioned the economic benefits of building Temelín III and IV. "However, when we look at the enlargement of the Temelín nuclear power plant, of course it will cause public investment, because after expansion the plant's increased power will actually need to be conveyed to the transmission system, and this will require state money."[69]

Very important issue is what the economic benefits and advantages of building Temelín III and IV are, in relation to the current and future price of electricity.

Another important criterion of the tender is the involvement of Czech companies in the contract. All three foreign bidders have consistently promised that Czech firms could receive up to a 75 per cent share of the entire contract. Although this criterion is not officially stated in the tender documentation, Czech political representatives are attaching great importance to it. "This condition is not defined in the tender documentation, but as minister of Czech

[66] "Martin Kuba: Fakta Barbory Tachecí," op. cit.
[67] "Martin Kuba: Možnosti těžit uhlí za limity bych se nevzdával," op. cit.
[68] "Václav Bartuška, vládní zmocněnec pro dostavbu JE Temelín," op. cit.
[69] "Dražší elektřina, Kritika zelených k některým zákonům, Neoprávněné odběry elektřiny," *ČT 24*, February 14, 2010. Available online: http://www.mzp.cz/cz/articles_100214_otazky (accessed on September 8, 2012).

industry, I want the percentage of cooperating Czech firms to be maximized. I will attempt to force potential candidates to let our companies into their international projects."[70] Because, according to Kuba:

> I don't want ČEZ to spend a lot of money somewhere abroad, since this money should contribute to the work of domestic companies. I perceive the enlargement of the Temelín NPP as a great opportunity for domestic firms, and as an opportunity to improve the infrastructure in the region.[71]

On the other hand, Bartuška does not believe that the winner of the bid will eventually allocate 70 per cent of the contract to Czech firms, because "all three suppliers are promising something that they can always take back in the event they win the bid."[72]

Besides the economic aspect, the awarding of the tender will also be based on the technological side of the bid, which is connected with the selection of reactor. Each of the bidders has proposed a different model of nuclear reactor with a different installed capacity. The French group Areva is planning to build a large third-generation reactor EPR (European power reactor), with an installed capacity of around 1,600 megawatts. The other two bidders are offering reactors with lower capacities. Westinghouse is offering a reactor with an installed capacity of 1,150 MW, and Atomstroyexport is offering 1,200 MW. In this context, Bartuška has called to mind the problems that accompanied the construction of Temelín I and II: "There exists a nightmare, called Temelín I and II, which mixes two different technologies, American and Soviet, and two different mentalities. I think that after such an experience no one would want to try another compromise."[73]

At the same time, one of the main criteria of the tender is the transfer of know-how from the winner of the contract – which means "being able

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[70] "Martin Kuba: Elektřina pro nás může být jako ropa pro Rusko," *Občanská demokratická strana*, March 10, 2012. Available online: http://www.ods.cz/clanek/1007-elektrina-pro-nas-muze-byt-jako-ropa-pro-rusko (accessed on September 8, 2012).

[71] "Martin Kuba: Možnosti těžit uhlí za limity bych se nevzdával," op. cit.

[72] "Václav Bartuška: Rozhovor na téma Temelín," op. cit.

[73] "Exkluzivní rozhovor s Václavem Bartuškou, vládním zmocněncem pro dostavbu JE Temelín," *AtomInfo*, September 9, 2010. Available online: http://atominfo.cz/2010/09/exkluzivni-rozhovor-atominfo-cz-s-vaclavem-bartuskou-vladnim-zmocnencem-pro-dostavbu-je-temelin/ (accessed on September 8, 2012).

to operate a large part of the nuclear power plant ourselves."[74] Similarly, Bartuška has expressed:

> For us it is crucial that knowledge of the reactor remain in this country; the knowledge of how to operate and improve the reactor. I mean not just the popular term "know-how;" the key is know-why – why the reactor works as it does. This is valuable if you're not going to be calling Moscow, Paris or Washington for repairs.[75]

Last but not least, according to Bartuška, each of the three candidates must prove that it is able to build, in real time and money, the two nuclear units at Temelín as specified in the contract. Each of the three bidders must demonstrate that they will be able to start at least one functional reactor in 2013. "Let me emphasize that if we select someone, the signing of the contract should be done only after completion of the referenced construction. We can stipulate – we want to see a running, functional, operational block. It seems to me a legitimate request."[76]

Conclusion

The issue of the completion of the Temelín NPP, which will have significant implications for the future of the Czech economy and energy sector, is currently one of the most debated political questions in the Czech Republic. The aim of this article was to analyze and interpret the main topics of the Czech discourse on the completion of the Temelín NPP, within the context of Czech energy policy and security. The main issues of the discourse have been identified and interpreted on the basis of a thematic analysis within the methodology of discourse analysis. The thematic analysis was based both on the key documents of selected Czech central institutions, and on the speeches, interviews and press releases of significant Czech political representatives, during the period of August 2009 to July 2012.

The analysis revealed the existence of four general themes in relation to the tender for the building of Temelín III and IV, which are as follows:

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[74] "Interview s Václavem Bartuškou na téma dostavby Jaderné elektrárny Temelín," op. cit.
[75] "Václav Bartuška: Jaderná renesance? Až nějakou uvidím, uvěřím, že existuje," op.cit.
[76] Ibid.

1. security;
2. foreign policy relations;
3. economics; and
4. technology.

The security theme clearly dominated in the Czech discourse. First, the theme of security was most often connected with ensuring energy security. In the context of energy security, the main arguments for expansion of the Temelín NPP were as follows: enhancing the energy self-sufficiency of the Czech Republic, not increasing energy dependence, guaranteeing a balanced energy mix, and increasing production of electricity to covering future consumption. Secondly, the theme of security was used in connection with the requirement to ensure safety standards in the completion of the Temelín NPP for all three bidders, and with the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Last but not least, security represents one of the main reasons for strengthening the role of government in the tender.

The issue of the completion of the Temelín NPP is currently one of the most debated political questions in the Czech Republic.

The theme of foreign policy relations in the Czech discourse was mostly focused on the activities of the three foreign candidates, and on the influence of the political representatives of the Russian Federation, US, and France, who are strongly promoting their companies during negotiations with Czech politicians over the building of Temelín III and IV. Secondly, there are arguments within the Czech discourse directed toward Germany and Austria, in defense of the enlargement of the Temelín NPP. Thirdly, the theme of foreign policy relations is connected with the Czech support of nuclear energy within the European Union.

The third and fourth themes of Czech discourse are economics and technology, which are associated with the main criteria for the selection of the winner of the tender. The most frequently mentioned criteria were the proposed cost of building Temelín III and IV, the participation of Czech companies in the tender, and the transfer of know-how to operate the reactor.

Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz

Poland's energy security: between German nuclear phase-out and energy dependency from Russia

Abstract: *There is a strong belief among Polish people that Poland's energy security is determined to a large extend by foreign countries' activities, especially Russia, which is the biggest global energy exporter, and Germany, which remains one of the biggest energy importers in the world. In the article, the opportunities and risks for Poland resulting from the German nuclear phase-out and Russia's expansive energy policy are examined. The author concludes that Poland's energy security is rather dependent on Poland's own efforts to liberalize and diversify its energy market, than on other countries' policies, which may not fully concur with Poland's energy interests.*

Main challenges for Poland's energy security

Poland is the largest coal producer in the European Union, and nearly all the electricity generated in the country comes from coal. Due to the significant role of this fossil fuel in the energy mix, Poland one of the EU member states which is characterized by its low level of dependence on energy imports. The Polish score in this regards is about 31 per cent, well below the EU average. There are only a few countries in the EU which are more self-sufficient, such as Denmark, Estonia, Romania, Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom, while many members are more than 75 per cent dependent on energy imports , such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxemburg and Ireland.[1]

[1] "Energy dependency," Eurostat. Available online: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc310 (accessed on September 25, 2012).

Ćwiek-Karpowicz, J., "Poland's energy security: between German nuclear phase-out and energy dependency from Russia," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XXI, No. 1–2, 2012, pp. 44–55.

Table. Poland's demand for primary energy until 2030 (in Mtoe)

	2006	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030
Hard coal	43.8	37.9	35.3	34.6	34.0	36.7
Lignite	12.6	11.2	12.2	9.4	11.2	9.7
Crude oil	24.3	25.1	26.1	27.4	29.5	31.1
Natural gas	12.3	12.0	13.0	14.5	16.1	17.2
Renewables	5.0	6.3	8.4	12.2	13.8	14.7
Nuclear	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	5.0	7.5
TOTAL	97.8	93.2	95.8	101.7	111.0	118.5

Source: "Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku" ["Poland's Energy Policy until 2030]," Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2009, Annex 2.

The dominant position of coal in the Polish energy mix will have negative consequences, taking into account Poland's obligation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. So far Poland has fulfilled all limits set by the Kyoto Protocol and follows the EU climate policy until 2020, however the future EU climate policy, focusing on a further decrease of CO_2 emission limits, may be quite challenging for a growing Polish economy. Therefore, in 2009 the government adopted a new energy strategy, which envisages real change over the next two decades. The share of renewable energy sources, crude oil, natural gas and nuclear energy will increase in the Polish energy mix, while hard coal and lignite consumption will decrease.[2]

The majority of natural gas and crude oil consumed in Poland comes from abroad. Russian oil and gas supplies cover 90 per cent and 65 per cent of domestic demand, respectively. Due to its transit role, Poland was able to receive energy supplies from Russia for a reasonable price. Two main energy routes from Russia to Germany; the Druzhba and Yamal pipelines, ran through its territory. This situation changed between 2011–2012. The first line of the Nord Stream was launched, as well as the second part of the Baltic pipeline system, and a new oil terminal was established in Ust–Luga. The significance of Poland's transit role for Russian energy exports was reduced, as a considerable amount of Russian fossil fuels can now be delivered directly

[2] "Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku" ["Poland's Energy Policy until 2030]," Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2009, Annex 2. Available online: http://www.mg.gov.pl/Bezpieczenstwo+gospodarcze/Energetyka/Polityka+energetyczna (accessed on September 23, 2012).

to Germany and other countries in Western Europe. This situation has had serious consequences for Poland's energy security, as there is still a legal risk that Russian oil and gas supplies could be cut off from Poland; however the bargaining position of Polish energy companies has significantly diminished this risk.

The dominant position of coal in the Polish energy mix will have negative consequences, taking into account Poland's obligation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.

Assuming Russian foreign energy policy is aimed at developing transport infrastructure rather than exploring new gas and oil fields, there are two main long-term challenges for Poland's energy security.[3] First of all, Poland's aim is to diversify its energy external supplier and limit its dependence on Russian sources. Poland should also build a competitive energy market, especially for electricity and gas, which will reduce the possibility of domestic and foreign companies gaining a monopoly.

Consequences of German–Russian energy cooperation and the German nuclear phase-out

Construction of the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea from Vyborg near Sankt Petersburg to Lubmin near Greifswald was launched by German and Russian governments from the perspective of the beginning of a new stage of energy cooperation between these two states. Germany's decision to participate in the Nord Stream project, despite negative political and economic consequences for Poland and other Central and East European countries, has been driven by increasing domestic demand for fossil fuels resulting from significant economic growth occurring at that time. Germany's acceptance of an increase in Russian energy imports meant that this country became the biggest external supplier for the German market, covering nearly

[3] J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, "Polityka energetyczna Rosji – szanse i wyzwania dla Polski i Unii Europejskiej" ["Russia's energy policy-chances and challenges for Poland and the European Union"], *Raport PISM*, July 2011, pp. 5–7. Availabe online: http://www.pism.pl/index/?id=6ef07f927172f6d48f2e72d606a03713 (accessed on September 29, 2012).

40 per cent of natural gas (34–38 billion cubic meters) and 30 per cent of crude oil (32–34 million tons) consumed there.[4]

There was a strong belief in Germany that, due to its export oriented industry, increasing Russian energy supplies were essential to maintain economic growth. The EU financial crisis and Russia's problems in maintaing high levels of oil and gas production, undermined German confidence in the sustainability of Russian supplies, at least among experts. They also emphasized the negative consequences of oil-indexed long-term contracts with Gazprom, which enforced European clients to pay too high a price, in comparison to the current gas market trends.[5] The German economy seems to be less energy-intensive now than before crisis, as this country has picked up economic growth without a simultaneous increase of energy consumption. At the end of 2011, according to the German statistical office, the economy had a 3 per cent growth in GDP, while overall demand for energy fell by more than 5 per cent, from year to year. In that period, only demand for lignite (3.3 per cent) and renewable sources (6.3 per cent) increased, contrary to the consumption of natural gas (-12.9 per cent), oil (-3.0 per cent) and hard coal (-0.7 per cent).[6]

However, Germany's demand for fossil fuel may increase in the coming years because of the nuclear phase-out after the disaster at the Fukushima power plant in March 2011. The Federal Government, under strong domestic public pressure at that time, decided in June 2011 to immediately decommission eight nuclear power plants and to stop the use of nuclear

[4] "Energie für Deutschland 2011, Fakten, Perspektiven und Positionen im globalen Kontext," Weltenergierat– Deutschland e.v., 2011, pp. 100–104. Available online: http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/energie_fr_deutschland_2011l.pdf (accessed on September 18, 2012).

[5] K. Westphal, "Security of gas supply. Four political challenges under the spotlight," *SWP Comments*, No. 17, June 2012, p. 2. Available online: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C17_wep.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2012); S. Meister, "An alienated partnership: German–Russian relations after Putin's return," *FIIA Briefing Paper*, No. 105, May 2012, p. 6. Available online: http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/263/an_alienated_partnership/ (accessed on September 10, 2012).

[6] "Energiedaten," German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2012, graph 4. Available online: http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E/energiestatistiken-grafiken,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf (accessed on September 15, 2012). See also: "Energieverbrauch sinkt 2011 kräftig," Rohstoffwelt, December 20, 2011. Available online http://www.rohstoff-welt.de/news/artikel.php?sid=32459 (accessed on September 8, 2012).

power by 2022. The natural beneficiary of the German move away from nuclear energy can be, therefore, gas and coal which may replace nuclear in electricity production. It is worth noting that in the case of natural gas and hard coal, Germany has no option to decrease its external dependency, as current domestic gas production covers only one-seventh of the demand, and coal production will be terminated by 2018. A different situation can be observed in lignite production, as Germany is the leading global producer with 176 million tons in 2011.[7] In this case, one may expect an increase in both production and consumption.

Undoubtedly, German energy policy is determined by environmental aspects, and not just related to nuclear energy, but to the development of renewable energy sources and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. According to a public survey, 85 per cent of Germans favor an increase in investment in renewables, while only 31 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, support the construction of gas and coal power plants.[8] This strong public attitude toward the future energy mix means that, regardless of who will be in power in Germany after the national elections in autumn 2013, the nuclear phase-out program will be maintained while renewables will be a priority.

The natural beneficiary of the German move away from nuclear energy can be, therefore, gas and coal which may replace nuclear in electricity production.

Before the Fukushima disaster and the German decision to accelerate the termination of its nuclear program, the federal government, at the end of 2010, adopted an energy strategy in which were stated very ambitious reduction targets. The consumption of energy aimed to be reduced by 20 per cent until 2020 and by 50 per cent by 2050, while greenhouse gas emissions should decrease by 40 per cent until 2020 and 95 per cent by 2050.[9] The unexpected acceleration of the nuclear phase-out means, for

[7] "Coal statistics," World Coal Association, August 2012. Available online: http://www.worldcoal.org/resources/coal-statistics/ (accessed on September 5, 2012).

[8] *Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2010, Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsumfrage*, Berlin: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2010, p. 11.

[9] *Die Energiewende in Deutschland. Mit sicherer, bezahlbarer und umweltschonender Energie ins Jahr 2050*, Berlin: German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2012, p. 32.

German authorities, that its most important objective is to balance energy supply and demand. By 2022 the government will have to compensate the deficit of 20 GW of electricity, which is one fourth of domestic production. At the beginning, this deficit was planned to be covered by an increase of energy production from renewable sources, as well as by the growth of energy efficiency. Nevertheless, Peter Altmaier, Minister of the Environment, has questioned this plan, pointing out the underestimated electricity costs and unrealistic timetable.[10]

It is worth noting that, despite the German political bias on the development of renewable energy sources, the German energy companies do not preclude investment in construction and modernization of gas and coal-fired power plants. The latter is evaluated as a better complement to the renewables due to lower costs and CO_2 emissions, faster depreciation, and operational flexibility that allows additional electricity supplies to be launched immediately during periods of increased power consumption. Also, the German authorities are working on a number of amendments to the regulations dealing with the functioning of the energy market. They plan to financially support the construction of gas and coal-fired power plants, which could be an incentive for countries exporting these two fossil fuels. The scope and form of subsidizing must meet EU requirements, which will be very restrictive especially for plants planned after 2020.

Moving away from nuclear energy means that Germany has to move its economy faster toward renewables. Therefore, German politicians give strong political support for such projects. In 2011 Chancellor Angela Merkel took part in the launch of the first offshore park in the Baltic. Wind farms may also expect the largest funding from the state budget. So far Germany's wind power plants have a strong position in the onshore sector and are trying to catch up in the offshore one. The main obstacles for the development of offshore wind farms were due to technical and administrative difficulties. The regulation on the German Baltic Sea exclusive economic zone was only adopted in 2009. Moreover, there is a huge difference between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, as in the latter there are only three wind farms while in the North Sea – 20 parks. The implementation of ambitious plans for wind energy in Germany, however, is primarily threatened by the poor condition of the existing grids. Moreover it is difficult to develop energy networks as it is very unpopular in local societi.

[10] "Altmaier zweifelt an Prognosen der Regierung," *Der Spiegel*, July 17, 2012.

Nuclear phase-out makes Germany net importer of electricity. This situation opens up opportunities for its neighbors, such Poland, which has already increased its electricity export to Germany. Also the additional energy supplies coming from the projected nuclear power plants in the Baltic Sea region may be quite attractive for Germany. However, so far, there is no clear position from the German side on this matter. At least four states in this region plan to build their own nuclear power plants: Russia, Belarus, Lithuania and Poland, but only Poland has a real chance of exporting its energy to Germany due to its geographical proximity.

Russia's energy policy towards Poland, Germany and the EU

Russia is trying to fill the gap resulting from the German nuclear phase-out. Russian companies recently offered German partners additional gas supplies and joint ventures, in particular constructing and modernizing power plants located in Western Europe. In July 2011, Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding with RWE (for a few months), aimed at establishing a joint venture which would exploit existing gas and coal-fuelled power plants and the construct new ones in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. According to press reports at the same time, Novatek (the second largest gas producer in Russia) proposed that EnBW (the third largest German energy company) purchase 25 per cent of its stake in VNG, which is the largest gas supplier in East Germany.[11] Moreover, during intergovernmental consultation in July 2011, the Russian authorities expressed the will to increase the volume of gas supplies by one third and to build a third branch of Nord Stream.

So far none of these projects has been realized, and German politicians, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, speak with reservation about the possibility of closer a energy partnership with Russia.[12] Although Gazprom offered gas price discounts to some German companies in February 2012, they stayed away from creating joint ventures with the Russian giant. Furthermore, the European Commission antitrust investigation launched against Gazprom in September 2012, may only reinforce the German position of avoiding making serious decision with a Russian company nowadays.

[11] "EnBW will Russen bei Verbundnetz Gas einsteigen lassen," *Handelsblatt*, July 19, 2011.

[12] "Press-konfierienciya po itogam rossiisko, Germanskih mezhgosudarstvennyh konsultacii," President of the Russian Federation, July 17, 2011. Available online: http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/12024 (accessed on September 9, 2012).

Recent changes in gas markets caused by a sharp increase of unconventional gas production in North America and the increasing liquefaction of natural gas (LNG) in the world, meant that the price of Russian gas ceased to be attractive to German customers. Despite the renegotiation of long-term contracts and receiving special discounts from Gazprom, German firms have to pay more for Russian gas than for the gas sold by other exporters in long and short-term transactions. In effect, in 2009, Norway, the second largest external supplier of gas to Germany, sent almost the same volume of gas (32.5 bcm) as Russia (35.7bcm).[13]

Although the close economic cooperation between Germany and Russia seems to be experiencing a temporary downturn after launching the second line of Nord Stream, the German side does not express the will to shift its energy policy towards greater diversification and reduction of its import dependency on Russia. After the gas price discount offered by Gazprom in February 2012, the first LNG construction project in Germany seems to be less profitable. Moreover, German companies do not extensively use the LNG terminals in neighboring countries to supply the domestic market.

Nuclear phase-out makes Germany net importer of electricity. This situation opens up opportunities for its neighbors, such Poland, which has already increased its electricity export to Germany.

In order to maximize profits on the European markets, the Russian authorities try to enlarge their downstream and midstream activities. Negative financial condition of many EU refineries, mainly caused by an oversupply of refining capacity, has been used by Russian companies to purchase new assets in Europe. At the beginning of the crisis in 2008, the Russian private company Lukoil started its expansion in Italy, taking 49 per cent of shares in the ISAB refinery in Sicily. After a few years, the Russian company became major shareholder and since 2011 it has owned 80 per cent of the shares. Lukoil is also a minor owner of the Dutch refinery in Vlissingen with 45 per cent of the shares. In addition, the Russian state-owned company Rosneft controls over 11 per cent of the German refinery market, owning a different number of shares in such refineries as Gelsenkirchen, Schwedt,

[13] "Natural gas information," OECD/IEA, 2011, quoted by: "Germany – Gas Supply," Energy Delta Institute, 2012. Available online: http://www.energydelta.org/ (accessed on September 25, 2012).

Karlsruhe, and Neudstadt. As a result of Petroplus' bankruptcy, the Russian private company Gunvor, owned by Genadiy Timchenko, recently bought two Belgian and German refineries in Antwerp and Ingolstadt. Taking into account the worsening financial situation of other European oil companies, further expansion of Russian companies in the refining sector is expected – mainly in Spain, Greece and Italy.

The foreign activity of Russian energy companies is support by the government, which develops extensive new export routes for Russian energy sources such as the BPS 2 crude oil pipeline and the oil terminal in Ust Luga. For the Polish oil companies, Orlen and Lotos, the Russian firm taking control of East German refineries in Schwedt and Leuna, would have a significant impact, as these two utilities are located in close proximity to the Polish border. This potential purchase would not only result in growing competition in the Polish market, but would also create some problems with supplies of Russian crude oil through the Druzhba pipeline. Russian companies have, so far, not been able to deliver crude oil to Schwedt or Leuna without using the Polish part of the Druzhba pipeline because of limited capacities of oil terminal in Rostock and the pipeline Rostock–Schwedt.[14]

For the Polish oil companies, Orlen and Lotos, the Russian firm taking control of East German refineries in Schwedt and Leuna, would have a significant impact, as these two utilities are located in close proximity to the Polish border.

Russia is also trying to use its advantages in nuclear energy. Development of this sector, in addition to oil and gas, would significantly strengthen the energy potential of Russia and its export opportunities. One of the major projects in this area is the construction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in Kaliningrad with a capacity of about 2,400 MW. The majority shareholder is Rosatom, the state-owned company, and the cost of this project is estimated at more than six billion euros. Russia argues that the construction of power plants is crucial for covering the energy deficit in the Kaliningrad region, due to the closure of the Lithuanian nuclear power plant in Ignalina. In reality, the current demand for electricity in the Kaliningrad region is completely covered by two gas-fired power plants located in this area.

[14] J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, op. cit.

The construction of BNPP, which would produce the majority of energy for export, has primarily a geopolitical significance rather than an economic one. This strategic project should prevent Russia's neighbors from constructing their own nuclear power plants. According to the Russian government's plan, the BNPP should be operational in 2016–2017, so before the other power plants that have been planned by the Lithuanian and Polish governments for the Baltic region. Russia would like to export a significant amount of energy from the BNPP to Poland, Baltic states and Germany. However, the existing cross-border transmission lines need huge investment, which need be agreed by both sides.

Apart from the nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad, Russia is also engaged in the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Belarus. In March 2011, the authorities of these two countries agreed to build a joint nuclear power plant near Grodno with a capacity of 2,400 MW. The contact was signed on July 18, 2012, and building will begin in June 2013. According to the schedule, by 2017 the first reactor should be completed, and the cost is estimated at more than ten billion US dollars. The Russian and Belarusian governments agreed on a joint venture to distribute the electricity produced in the nuclear power plant. It means that Russia would not only receive income from energy exports, but would also be in a better position to expand its energy markets further to Belarus, Poland and the Baltic States.

Perspectives and recommendations

From the point of view of Poland's energy interests, it is crucial to diversify, liberalize and integrate the EU energy markets. For this purpose, the Polish priority should be the timely completion of the LNG terminal in Swinoujscie by mid–2014, as well as the further construction of gas and electricity interconnectors, enlargement storage capacity, and the liberalization of the domestic gas market. These aims could be much easier achieved thanks to recent antitrust investigation conducting by the European Commission against Gazprom. So far inflexible oil-indexed price formula using in long-term contracts by Russian gas giant enforced the Polish company PGNiG to pay one of the highest prices for Russian gas in the EU.

Poland has a chance to increase its energy security and reduce dependence on external suppliers, as it is seriously exploring unconventional natural gas fields. Compared with other EU countries, Polish resources seem to be quite

promising. According to the US Energy Information Agency, Polish shale gas reserves are estimated at 5.3 trillion cubic meters, however, a recent survey made by the Polish Geological Institute shows lower calculation.[15] The Polish authorities have issued over 100 exploration licenses to national and international companies. It is worth mentioning that the public debate about shale gas has not, so far, revealed any serious division in society or between political parties. This is probably because of the high cost of energy dependence on Russia and the strong will among Poles to establish a competitive gas market which eliminates monopolistic practices. The development of shale gas production in Poland would certainly change the gas market, not only in Poland, but also in Central Europe. Therefore the Polish experience is being closely observed by the EU and its member states, which could also own significant amount of shale gas reserves.

From the point of view of Poland's energy interests, it is crucial to diversify, liberalize and integrate the EU energy markets.

A lower dependence on external energy suppliers is also associated with Polish plans to build its first nuclear power plant. According to government's plan, by the end of 2013 the final location should be chosen and the contract for the construction should be signed. By 2022 the first reactor should be in service. The project is led by the Polish company PGE, which is interested in creating a consortium with other partners, such as KGHM, Tauron and Enea. Also the foreign investor, with experience in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, is welcomed.

The most serious consequences for Polish energy companies could be that their actions will bring closer cooperation between Russia and Germany in the oil sector. Further acquisition of German refineries by Russian companies, especially those located close to the Polish border, may lead to the closure of the Druzhba pipeline and to the enlarging of the oil terminal in Rostock and

[15] "World shale gas resources: an initial assessment of 14 regions outside the United States," US Energy Information Administration, 2011. Available online: http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/. See also: "Assessment of shale gas and shale oil resources of the lower paleozoic Baltic–Podlasie–Lublin basin in Poland," Polish Geological Institute, Match 2012. Available online: http://www.pgi.gov.pl /en/arhiwum-aktualnosci-instytutu/4112-pierwszy-raport-o-zasobach-gazu-i-ropy-w-lupkach-konferencja-prasowa.html/ (accessed on October 1, 2012).

the pipeline Rostock–Schwedt. In that case Russian companies would gain better bargain position *vis–à–vis* firms from Poland (Orlen and Lotos) and other EU members. To eliminate this negative scenario, the close cooperation between Central European countries is needed. These countries should pay more attention to Caspian oil and the possibilities of having improved access to these deliveries.

Matúš Mišík

Crisis as remedy? The 2009 gas crisis and its influence on the increase of energy security within Visegrad Group countries

Abstract: *This paper analyzes a change of attitude among the Visegrad Group towards energy security, as a result of the 2009 gas crisis. On the one hand, the crisis fully unveiled the challenges these countries face in regard to energy security; on the other hand, it provided an important impulse for cooperation among them. This contribution studies the development of this cooperation in the periods before and after the crisis, when the first concrete steps toward increasing energy security were undertaken by the V4 countries (most importantly, the planned North–South energy corridor). It also examines the role of the EU, which supports infrastructural projects in central Europe. The paper argues that the crisis has had a positive influence on the increase of cooperation in energy security, which was previously, despite its challenging nature, largely neglected by the governments of V4 countries. The crisis thus served as a catalyst for cooperation, and paradoxically has had a positive influence on the increase of energy security in the region.*

The 2009 gas crisis, which – for the very first time in the almost 40-year history of Russian export of energy resources to Europe – caused a full cut-off of natural gas supplies, is generally viewed as a breaking point in the perception of Russia as a reliable energy supplier. The crisis shook the Russian image of a reliable partner, and since then European countries have been much more keen to look for an alternative to the Russian supply.

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We can, however, see the crisis from a much more positive perspective as well, since it has also caused an increased interest in energy security among many European (not only EU) countries, an issue basically neglected for many decades in spite of its key importance in the region.

This paper analyzes the development of cooperation among the Visegrad Group (V4 – Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) before and after the gas crisis. It views the crisis as a critical juncture that caused a change in the energy security policies of V4 countries – a change from long-term proclamations to middle and short-term actions. This change can be best seen in the increased cooperation in energy supplies diversification, which has transformed into activity in the development of the so called North–South energy corridor. Although vulnerability in energy supplies (especially natural gas) had been well known for a long time prior to 2009, only after the gas crisis did the V4 countries start to be actively engaged in proposing concrete steps to increase their energy security. The main argument of the paper is that the 2009 gas crisis stimulated mutual cooperation between V4 countries in the area of energy security, and thus served as a remedy for their energy security problems.

Although vulnerability in energy supplies had been well known only after the gas crisis did the V4 countries start to be actively engaged in proposing concrete steps to increase their energy security.

The paper utilizes data from semi-structured interviews with domestic decision makers and experts, as well as diplomats from permanent representations in Brussels. It also utilizes statements, press releases and official documents issued by national governments, energy regulatory bodies and EU institutions. Among the many energy resources, the main focus is on natural gas, since this was the main protagonist of the 2009 crisis, and also because most efforts in the area of energy security are focused on it. The largest share of the natural gas supplies of V4 countries is imported from Russia, and for all four countries these supplies are crucial, although the countries differ in their level of dependency.

The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, the second section deals with cooperation within the V4 group prior to the 2009 gas crisis. It shows that this cooperation was very limited (or ever non-existent), despite a similar but smaller gas crisis that occurred in 2006.

The V4 countries did not take energy security challenges with the gravity they warranted during this period. The third section recounts the events of the January 2009 gas crisis, and demonstrates that the V4 countries not only did not expect it, but also lacked the tools to deal with it. Moreover, infrastructural limitations negatively influenced the carrying out of emergency procedures, a problem most evident in the case of Slovakia. The fourth section analyzes the development after the crisis, which was characterized by an intensifying of mutual cooperation among the V4 countries, as well as by an increase in the requirements of these states for EU aid in dealing with energy security challenges. The most visible example of this cooperation is the proposed North–South interconnector between Polish (Świnoujście) and Croatian (Adria) terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG), which will link all four V4 countries and diversify natural gas supplies. Lastly, the conclusion summarizes the main findings of the paper, and argues that the 2009 crisis indeed signified at least a partial remedy for the energy security "illness" of the V4 countries.

Cooperation among V4 countries in energy security before 2009

Cooperation among V4 countries in energy security before the 2009 gas crisis was basically non-existent, or at best very limited. Although challenges in energy supplies were well known, the governments of V4 countries did not engage in regional projects that would actually increase the energy security of their countries, and only the Czech Republic diversified its natural gas supplies. Representatives of V4 countries met regularly on all levels (from expert to the highest level) and discussed energy issues, but their mutual cooperation never went beyond joint proclamations. V4 countries supported EU efforts in the area of energy security, but did not themselves initiate the development of concrete energy projects. Even the gas crisis of 2006 – when supplies from Russia to Europe were cut by 30 per cent – failed to stimulate interest in the issue of energy security.

Prior to 2004, the Visegrad countries were focused on the process of accession to the EU, and their mutual cooperation was aimed primarily at this goal. After becoming members of the EU, they had a rather hard time finding a common area of interest. While relations with Eastern neighborhood countries was one of the main issues, energy issues were not included in this agenda until 2009. Energy, and especially the issue of the EU climate and

energy package, formed a part of the mutual talks among V4 countries, but it was only a marginal interest and prior to 2009 had not become an important part of their common agenda. The European Nuclear Energy Forum founded in 2007 was a bilateral initiative of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, not a V4 project. When dealing with energy issues, V4 negotiations did not result in plans for solving common energy problems (such as energy security), but focused rather on proclamations about the need to do something in this area, and on support of the EU's efforts. For example, after the meeting in 2007, the prime ministers of V4 countries stressed that "energy security is of major and strategic importance for the sustainability of economic development in Europe," and called "for a more coordinated approach in this field" at the EU level.[1] Such a passive *modus operandi* towards energy security was typical for the whole period between 2004 and 2009.

Representatives of V4 countries met regularly and discussed energy issues, but their mutual cooperation never went beyond joint proclamations.

V4 countries often meet in wider formats (V4+) which include additional countries (usually the Baltic states, Austria, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania, but others as well) to discuss issues connected to the whole region. Such meetings prior to 2009 also dealt with the issue of energy security, but similarly to V4 meetings they were focused on generalities, did not propose any concrete measures, and resulted only in support of the EU and its efforts to increase energy security, calling for its intensification. A perfect example of this approach is a statement issued by the foreign ministers of V4+ countries in November 2008, who "express[ed] their hope that during the [upcoming] Czech and Swedish Presidencies the European Council [would] give a clear and strong political signal to further implement and develop the European policy on security of energy supplies as well as a viable and well-integrated EU energy market."[2] A very similar signal was sent to EU institutions the same month by the prime ministers of V4 and Baltic states (V4 plus B3), who asserted that the European Commission should be dealing with energy security issues.

[1] "Press statement, V4 prime ministers summit, Bratislava, 18 June 2007." Available online: http://www.Visegrad group.eu/2007/press-statement-v4-prime (accessed on February 10, 2012).

The prime ministers "emphasize[d] that the European Commission should pave the way for diversifying energy resources and routes of its supply to the European Union."[3] On the other hand, the summit of V4 presidents in 2008 did not deal with energy issues at all.

What is very interesting and hard to understand from today's point of view, is that energy was not on the agenda during negotiations between V4 and the Ukraine in 2008. Joined by Sweden, the V4 countries and Ukraine discussed areas of mutual interest, the possibility of developing regional projects or visa facilitation, their negotiations of a deep and comprehensive free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, and people-to-people contacts, but not energy related issues.[4] The 2009 gas crisis definitively shifted the focus of talks between V4 and the Ukraine toward these topics.

The first gas crisis that occurred in January 2006 did not increase interest in energy security among V4 countries. Disputes between Russia and Ukraine caused an approximately 30 per cent reduction in gas supply to Europe for several days. The two involved countries fought over the price of gas for Ukraine, and for the price of its transport through Ukrainian territory. This was the first time that gas supplies were reduced for political reasons and not technical ones. The crisis was a "wake-up call," not only for some member states but also for the European Commission, and one of the reasons behind the increased interest in energy policy.[5] The EC published a Green Paper, A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy, which mentioned the need to establish an external energy policy for the EU in order to secure energy supplies. It outlined a community-wide energy policy at both the internal and external levels, and established six areas of priority:

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[2] "Joint statement of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group countries and of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden," Warsaw, November 24, 2008. Available online: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2008/joint-statement-of-the-110412-4 (accessed on February 10, 2012).

[3] "Joint statement of the Visegrad Group prime ministers," Warsaw, November 5, 2008. Available online: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2008/joint-statement-of-the-110412-3 (accessed on February 12, 2012).

[4] "Joint statement of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Visegrad Group countries, Sweden and Ukraine," April 23, 2008. Available online: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2008/joint-statement-of-the-110412 (accessed on February 12, 2012).

[5] O. Gelden, C. Marcelis, A. Mauer, "Perspective for the European Union's external energy policy: discourse, ideas and interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France," SWP Berlin *Working Paper* FG 1, 2006. Available online: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/External_KS_Energy_Policy__Dez_OG_.pdf (accessed on February 10, 2012).

competitiveness within the internal energy market, diversification of the energy mix, solidarity, sustainable development, innovation and technology, and external policy. The aim of the last mentioned priority was for all members of the EU "to speak with the same voice."[6] Not all EU member states, however, considered the energy security issue to be a crucial one, and the Council rejected the proposal for a Common European Energy Policy advocated by the Commission in the Green Paper of March 2006. However, the 2006 paper marked the beginning of a period of further Commission initiatives in foreign (external) energy policy, and interest in the energy security of the member states.

Energy in general, and energy security in particular, had not been at the center of the V4 countries' attention prior to the 2009 gas crisis. The main focus of these countries before 2004 was the EU accession process, and they had difficulty finding a new main issue of common cooperation once they became members. They started to focus on the Eastern neighborhood of the EU, but did not include energy in the context of their cooperation with these countries. The smaller gas crisis that occurred in 2006 did not foster cooperation in energy security among V4 countries, but it did change the position of the EC, which began to put much more emphasis on energy security than previously. The V4 countries supported these activities of the EC and called for their intensification, but did not propose any concrete solutions or projects. This changed after the 2009 gas crisis, on which the next section of this paper is focused.

The 2009 gas crisis and its impact on V4 countries

The 2006 crisis increased the focus on energy security within EU institutions, but the 2009 crisis changed also the view of some, though not all, member states of the EU. This second gas crisis was much more severe, because this time supplies were fully cut off and no gas flowed from Russia to Europe through the Ukraine. The V4 countries were affected to different extents, and their reaction to the crisis diverged, based on their level of access to alternative gas supplies. The main argument of this paper is that the crisis

[6] "Green paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy," COM (2006) 105, Commission of the European Communities, March 8, 2006. Available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006: 0105: FIN: EN: PDF (accessed on February 15, 2012).

provided an important impulse for cooperation among V4 countries in the area of energy security, and thus had a positive influence on this area.

Disputes between Russia and Ukraine over the price of gas and transport fees in January 2009 caused a full cutting off of gas supplies through the Brotherhood gas pipeline for the very first time in the almost 40 year history of Russian export to Europe. It was another "Russo-Ukrainian gas soap opera, which this time developed into a thriller."[7] Gas supplies were interrupted for 11 days, and altogether 17 European (12 EU) states were impacted. Not all EU member states were affected to the same extent. Most were able to supplement missing supplies by domestic production, or with supplies coming from other directions or from storage capacities. Slovakia and Bulgaria, however, were forced to adopt emergency procedures restricting industry use, since they did not have alternative sources of natural gas (except a very small domestic production that could not cover a significant part of consumption) and had to deal with infrastructural limitations (an insufficient level of gas supplies at storage facilities). Because of a lack of the gas needed to generate electricity, Slovakia was facing possible blackouts. After several days without gas, the Slovak government was considering restarting the then-recently closed nuclear power plant in Jaslovské Bohunice. This produced a rather harsh reaction from the representatives of the EU, and therefore this proposal did not materialize in the end. On January 18, 2009, one day before supplies from Russia were resumed, a reverse flow from the Czech Republic was commenced, and gas coming from the direction of west supplied Slovakia.[8] The Czech Republic, which began its half-year presidency of the Council of the EU on January 1, 2009, put a lot of effort into solving this issue, and Prime Minister Mirek

The crisis provided an important impulse for cooperation among V4 countries in the area of energy security.

[7] E. Wyciszkiewicz, "From August war to January gas row: Implications for post-soviet energy landscape," in E. Wyciszkiewicz, ed., *Geopolitics of pipelines. Energy interdependence and inter-state relations in the post-soviet area*, Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2009, p. 183.

[8] "Správa o dodržiavaní pravidiel pre fungovanie trhu s elektrinou a plynom," Bratislava: Úrad pre reguláciu sieťových odvetví, 2010. Available online: http://www.urso.gov.sk/doc/dokumenty/Sprava_o_dodrziavani_PTE-PTP-2010.pdf (accessed on February 2, 2012).

Topolánek himself initiated a number of measures, not only at the bilateral but also at the EU level.

Hungary was forced to restrict only the largest gas customers (basically the gas-combustion power plants, until January 15th) and was able to cover consumption by an increased withdrawal from storage facilities and domestic production, as well as with increased supplies coming from the west. Moreover, Hungary was able to help Serbia with additional gas supplies. All in all, "the outage of gas import affected Hungary less than the surrounding countries, thanks partially to the extent of their established gas storage capacity, to adequate winter preparations, and to the fair cooperation of affected organizations."[9] The Czech Republic imports a significant part of its gas consumption from Russia, but was able to supplement its missing supplies with gas coming from the west and from storage facilities during the crisis.[10] Russian supplies were redirected through Poland and Germany (the Yamal pipeline), and a reverse flow was used to supply eastern areas of the republic. Moreover, supplies from Norway were increased. Poland was not directly influenced by the crisis, since it imports most of its gas from Russia through Belarus and the Yamal pipeline; but the Polish took the situation seriously, since they were afraid such an event could be repeated at any time, in any part of the infrastructure.[11]

The V4 countries reacted differently to the crisis. The Slovak Government, as the only involved country, openly blamed Ukraine for the crisis,[12] while the representatives of the other three V4 countries either blamed both sides for the situation or assumed a neutral position. As government officials admitted, neither Slovakia nor the Czech Republic was prepared to face a situation in which no gas was flowing from the Ukraine, even though a similar gas crisis had occurred previously in 2006. Poland was in different situation because

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[9] "Annual report to the European Commission 2010, Hungarian energy office." Available online: http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICA-TIONS/NATIONAL_REPORTS/National%20reporting%202010/NR_En/E10_NR_Hungary-EN.pdf (accessed on February 13, 2012), p. 58.

[10] Interview with an official at the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, August 13, 2009, Prague.

[11] Interview with an official at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 26, 2010, Warsaw.

[12] A. Duleba, "Poučenia z plynovej krízy v januári 2009. Analýza príčin vzniku, pravdepodobnosti opakovania a návrhy opatrení na zvýšenie energetickej bezpečnosti SR v oblasti dodávok zemného plynu," Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy association, 2009. Available online: www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/publikacie/281 (accessed on February 15, 2012).

it uses the Yamal pipeline for gas supply, while Hungary was able to utilize its storage capacity and domestic sources to cover missing supplies.

Although the EU was actively involved in solving the crisis, the Commission in its working paper admitted that "the scale of the gas supply disruptions required an adequate response at the EU level, however, a clear strategy as well as concrete instruments were lacking."[13] An extraordinary Energy Council meeting was held on January 12, 2009 with Ukrainian and Russian ministers present. As recalled by the Czech official who was present at the forum, it was quite difficult to agree on a common EU position, since "all ministers or state secretaries of member states were present" and for the old member states this was not such a "hot issue."[14] The crisis thus underlined the differing views of new and old member states on the issue of energy security. One concrete result of the crisis was the adoption of a regulation on the security of natural gas supplies by the Council of the EU (No. 994/2010) in 2009. It introduced the "N-1" rule, according to which member states have to create emergency stocks of natural gas that will cover demand for a specified time period in the event of a failure of the main gas infrastructure (plus some general stock to cover other emergencies).

The 2009 gas crisis on the one hand fully revealed the challenges of gas supply and transit from Russia through the Ukraine, and on the other hand forced member states to act together and begin a discussion about the security of supply, and the interconnection of the member states' infrastructures. There began to be fruitful cooperation in the area of energy security, especially among the V4 countries, which resulted in the creation of a North–South energy corridor that represents an important diversification project. We will now discuss in more detail the development of cooperation among V4 countries after the crisis.

Increased cooperation in energy after the 2009 gas crisis

The 2009 gas crisis presented a critical juncture which increased interest in energy security among the V4 states, and caused an intensifying of cooperation

[13] "The January 2009 gas supply disruption to the EU: an assessment," *Commission Staff Working Document* SEC (2009) 977. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/documents/alle_emner/energi/2009_ser2_autre_document_travail_service_part1_ver2.pdf (accessed on February 12, 2012).

[14] Interview with an official at the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, August 11, 2009, Prague.

in this area within the group. In addition, the nature of the cooperation shifted from the mere declarations of the past to concrete infrastructural projects that will lead to a real diversification of energy resources, and thus also increase energy security. Cooperation in energy, and especially energy security, has become one of the key topics within the V4 group and is a stable priority of the rotating presidency. The most significant example of cooperation is the agreement to build a North–South energy corridor, and gas interconnectors in particular. These will connect all the countries of the V4 group, but also other states in the region. Some parts of this project have already been finished or are under construction, which demonstrates the active approach of V4 towards energy security after the 2009 crisis.

The most significant example of cooperation is the agreement to build a North–South energy corridor, and gas interconnectors in particular.

Energy security became a part of the V4 group agenda while the gas crisis was still underway in January 2009. The prime ministers of the V4 countries were meeting then on the occasion of the Slovak adoption of the euro, but this issue became secondary and the resolution of the gas crisis moved to the top of the agenda. No long-term proposals were suggested at the meeting, as the crisis was in progress and there was the need for immediate solutions. The topic of energy security was again discussed at the V4 level in May of the same year, when the foreign affairs ministers met. Although energy security was a part of their negotiations, it was only marginally so, and the meeting did not contribute to a long-term resolution of the problem. Much more important from our perspective was the summit of prime ministers that took place at the end of the Polish V4 presidency in June 2009 in Cracow. The prime ministers agreed to create a task group of governmental plenipotentiaries for energy security, the so called V4 High Level Energy Working Group. The role of the group was to foster mutual cooperation in energy security and to examine possible joint infrastructural projects.[15] It met for the first time in November 2009, with energy experts discussing areas of common interest in energy security with

[15] "Press release of the Polish V4 presidency after the official summit of the prime ministers of the Visegrad Group countries," Wieliczka, June 3, 2009 Available online: http://old.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=1117&articleID=23250& ctag=article list&iid=1 (Accessed on February 13, 2012).

a focus on the North–South energy corridor connecting all four countries, and the development of the two LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia that would enable access to LNG. The working group thus set an agenda for the energy security summit that took place the following year.

2010 was a turning point in the cooperation between V4 countries in energy security. On February 24, 2010 an energy security summit took place in Budapest in V4+ format. Besides the V4 group, other countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe also took part – Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Romania. The main focus of the meeting was on the security of natural gas supplies and its diversification, although other energy resources were also taken into consideration, including nuclear energy (with the exception of Austria, which did not support this part of the final declaration). Representatives of participating countries expressed their support for the strengthening of cooperation in natural gas diversification, by promoting the North–South energy corridor and the development of Polish and Croatian LNG terminals, and by supporting Nabucco and the activities of the EU in the area of energy security. They also expressed their opinion that the EU should back the energy infrastructural project, and "[d]eclare[d] their willingness to provide support and joint efforts for a higher allocation of EU financial resources notably from the EU cohesion policy to all infrastructure projects aimed at increasing the energy security of the region."[16] Moreover, representatives of the V4+ group created expert level "ad hoc" groups that dealt with concrete energy projects, such as the North–South corridor, regional interconnectors, energy supply security policy harmonization, LNG, etc. The role of these groups was to prepare solid proposals for the implementation of energy projects and their improved coordination.

As with the previous Hungarian presidency of the V4 group, the Slovak presidency that began in July 2010 also considered energy security to be one of its main priorities. On September 15, 2010 the ministers of V4 countries responsible for energy sent a joint letter to European Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger, informing him of their common efforts in area of energy security, and urging the European Commission to include the North–South energy corridor among the priority infrastructural projects of the EU. Thanks to this common initiative, the energy corridor became one of the priorities in "Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond," published by the

[16] "Declaration of the Budapest V4+ energy security summit," Budapest, February 24, 2010. Available online: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2010/declaration-of-the (accessed on February 10, 2012).

Commission in November 2010. Moreover, it led to the establishment of a High Level Working Group on North–South Interconnections, chaired by the European Commission and composed of V4, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia with the status of observer. This working group created an Action Plan in 2011, which listed all the infrastructural projects necessary for the diversification of energy supplies (gas, oil, electricity) in the V4+ region. Moreover, sectoral working groups were established for gas, oil, and electricity, composed of representatives of involved states, regulators and business.

At a meeting on January 25, 2011 in Bratislava, the ministers of the V4 group responsible for energy confirmed their common goal to continue cooperation in energy security, and moved the North–South corridor project forward by proposing concrete steps for 2011. The Declaration, *inter alia*, called for the fixing of a preliminary technical design for the interconnector, supported "Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond" with the North–South corridor among the top EU infrastructural priorities, and enhanced the mutual cooperation of V4 countries in all areas of energy and energy security in particular.[17] On February 4, 2011 the Extraordinary European Council meeting adopted Energy Strategy for Europe 2020, which confirmed the importance of the new infrastructure in Central Europe, and maintained the possibility of financing such projects from public (EU) resources.

During the Slovak presidency of V4, intense cooperation began within the lower level "ad hoc" ministerial working groups. The V4 Working Group on the North–South Interconnection met twice (September 2010 and April 2011) to discuss steps needed to include this project in the new EU financial framework for 2014–2020, and to propose the technical design of individual interconnectors as well as scenarios in the event of a complete cut off of supplies from the Ukraine. Moreover, the Working Group on Energy Security in the gas and oil industries, which discussed prevention plans and risk analysis, and the Working Group on European Affairs and Strategic Issues, which dealt primarily with the EU Energy Efficiency Risk plan, met in the course of the Slovak V4 presidency.[18] These three working groups prepared the ground for

[17] "Declaration of V4 energy ministers," Bratislava, January 25, 2011. Available online: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/declaration-of-v4-energy (accessed on February 10, 2012).

[18] "Annual implementation report of the Program of the Presidency of the Slovak Republic in the Visegrad Group." Available online: http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_A419A5C444F94E20C12578B2004C2295_EN/$File/Annual_Report_Sk_V4_Pres.pdf (accessed on February 20, 2010), p. 8-9.

negotiations at higher levels, and were especially active in the North-South gas interconnection.

The aims agreed on at the ministerial meeting in January 2011 were reaffirmed at the conference of prime ministers of V4, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of mutual cooperation on February 15, 2011. They declared their support for increasing energy security by further developing the internal energy market and enhancing "V4 regional cooperation within the EU framework," as well as their intention "to develop the energy infrastructure, especially by the implementation of the North-South gas interconnections and the modernization of the oil and electricity networks."[19] The next important step towards the development of this interconnection was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on North–South Interconnections in Central–Eastern Europe, between 10 countries and the European Commission. Besides the V4 group, the signatories were Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Romania and Slovenia.[20] The aim of the memorandum is to improve the mutual energy interconnectivity between states, in natural gas, oil and electrical energy, "in order to achieve the ambitious objective of market integration, diversification and security of supply and sustainability in Central–Eastern Europe."[21] The Action plan – comprised of the priority infrastructural project which resulted from the Commission-led High Level Working Group on North–South Interconnections – was attached to the memorandum and included a list of the infrastructural projects necessary to develop the North–South energy corridor.

The North–South energy corridor, and especially the gas interconnectors, should contribute to reducing the region's dependency on Russian supplies, and thus also to strengthening the position not only of the Central European region, but also of the whole EU, in relation to Russia. During the 2009 gas crisis there was enough gas in Europe, but the lack of interconnections between member states prevented the effective supply of some of the European countries.[22] The North–South interconnection should solve this problem and

[19] "The Bratislava Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Visegrad Group." Available online: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-bratislava (accessed on February 20, 2012).

[20] "Memorandum of understanding on North–South interconnections in Central-Eastern Europe." Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/doc/2011_north_south_east_mou.pdf (accessed on February 20, 2012).

[21] Ibid.

[22] Interview with a representative of Slovak Gas and Oil Association, March 27, 2010, Bratislava.

thus increase energy security within the V4 group. It will link the two LNG terminals in Poland (Świnoujście) and Croatia (Adria). Although these terminals will be able to cover only a small part of the gas consumption in the region, they will significantly contribute to its energy security. As one Polish energy expert confirmed, the terminal "is built for [security purposes], of course. We call this mechanism a security pillow."[23] In spite of its small proposed capacity (5 bcm of gas in the first phase, and 7.5 bcm in the second) it can significantly improve the situation in the event of an interruption of supplies. On the other hand, neither terminal has the capacity (nor, for that matter, the ambition) to replace the current supplies from Russia.

The North–South energy corridor, and especially the gas interconnectors, should contribute to reducing the region's dependency on Russian supplies.

The Action plan attached to the 2011 Memorandum included a list of several short- to long-term infrastructural projects that constitute the North–South energy corridor. The countries involved decided to use and further develop the existing gas infrastructure, since this solution is more feasible than building a brand new pipeline given the capital intensity of such a project. The first steps have already been taken, and the first interconnectors have either been finished recently or are currently being built. Construction of the Polish–Czech interconnector was commenced in September 2011,[24] while the facility for the reverse flow of gas from the Czech Republic to Slovakia was finished in November 2011.[25] The reverse flow was provisionally launched already during the 2009 gas crisis, on January 18, but it was improved afterwards and nowadays it is fully automated. In addition to these projects, the Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers, on January 28, 2011, signed an agreement pledging cooperation "in the construction, operation, maintenance, reconstruction, and operational recovery after breakdown, of the hydrocarbon transmission pipelines

[23] Interview with energy expert at Polish permanent representation in Brussels, May 11, 2010.

[24] "Polish-Czech interconnector launched," *Natural Gas Europe*, September 14, 2011. Available online: http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/polishczech-interconnector-launched (accessed on February 10, 2012).

[25] "Projekt reverzného toku plynu je dokončený," *Eustream Press release*, November 30, 2011. Available online: http://www.eustream.sk/sk_media/sk_tlacove-spravy/projekt-reverzneho-toku-plynu-je-dokonceny (accessed on February 10, 2012).

crossing the common state borders."[26] These projects were supported by the European Union through the European Energy Program for Recovery, which was established to support energy infrastructural projects that were endangered by the economic crisis. Altogether almost 4 billion euros has been allocated for this program.[27] In December 2011 an agreement was signed between Slovakia and Poland for a feasibility study of the mutual gas connector that is supposed be a part of the North-South energy corridor. Details should be elaborated in the course of 2012, and the whole project should be finished by 2020 if the study demonstrates its feasibility.

Conclusion

The findings of the above analysis suggest that the 2009 gas crisis functioned, at least partially, as a remedy for the energy security problems of the Visegrad group. On the one hand, the crisis showed how vulnerable some European states are in the area of energy security (for example Slovakia and Bulgaria), but on the other hand it forced the very same countries (and especially the V4 group) to intensify their mutual cooperation in this area. The cooperation among V4 countries after the crisis resulted in the development of concrete energy projects (particularly the North–South energy corridor) that have the real potential to increase the energy security of the group, and thus to meet the long-term energy supply challenge.

Cooperation in energy security and energy in general among V4 countries before the gas crisis was basically non-existent. It was confined to joint proclamations about the need to foster energy security, and calls to EU institutions to increase activities in this area. The most important initiative of the pre-crisis period, the European Energy Nuclear Forum, was a bilateral project of Slovakia and the Czech Republic only. None of these activities resulted in actual projects increasing energy security in the region. Neither did the 2006 gas crisis (smaller but in other aspects similar to that of 2009) alter the position of the V4 countries. It did change the attitude of

[26] "Annual implementation report of the Program of the Presidency of the Slovak Republic in the Visegrad Group," op. cit.

[27] "Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery." Available online: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex UriServ.do?uri=COM:2010 :0191:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed on February 20, 2012).

the Commission towards energy security, and the V4 countries supported this increased interest, but their activities did not go beyond proclamations. Energy security was not an issue during this period, even when negotiating with Ukraine, one of the key players during both gas crises.

The 2009 crisis caused a positive change, both in the quality of, and in the quality of cooperation in, energy security among V4 countries. Disputes between Ukraine and Russia over the price of gas and its transport caused the interruption of Russian supplies through the Ukraine for 11 days, and many European states were affected. The cut off had differing impacts on various states, most of them able to supplement their missing gas with alternative sources. Slovakia and Bulgaria were the most visible exceptions, without any gas supplies for almost the whole period of interruption. The V4 countries were not prepared for such a situation, and they decided to undertake a common strategy to avoid similar situations in the future. They intensified their joint cooperation and decided to construct a North–South energy corridor that would connect all four members of the Visegrad group and diversify their sources of energy, especially natural gas. The corridor will link two LNG terminals in Poland and Croatia, thus involving also other states in the region in the project (in the so called V4+ format). In order to achieve this goal, mutual cooperation at different levels in energy security was established, with frequent meetings between representatives of V4+ countries. The North–South gas interconnector will comprise several new pipelines, but also existing ones, which will decrease the final cost of the project, thus making it more feasible.

The cooperation among V4 countries after the crisis resulted in the development of concrete energy projects.

The EU also plays an important role in the development of the North–South gas corridor. While before the crisis the V4 countries supported EU activities in energy security but did not take an active part in them, after the crisis – with the development of their own energy diversification projects – V4 countries began asking the EU to support their projects financially. This began as early as 2009, when each country individually requested support from the European Energy Program for Recovery. Since then, they have made use of every opportunity to have the corridor included among EU priorities (and thus to increase support for its development), either currently or in the next financial framework period of 2014–2020.

In conclusion, the 2009 gas crisis can be seen as an impulse that significantly fostered cooperation among V4 countries in the area of energy security, leading to an actual increase of energy security for the group. EU support, however, appears to be essential to this process. The progress of the North–South corridor largely depends on the willingness of the EU to back up this project financially. Given the interest of the EU in increasing energy security, and its level of support up to now, it looks as though the V4 group will in fact manage to construct the interconnection with the help of the EU.

Maja Ružić

Bosnia and Herzegovina: a continuation of war by other means

Abstract: *This article addresses the state-building process in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus contributes to the literature on state-building processes in the post-war multinational countries. By analyzing the overall value of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the contemporary predicament of the Bosnian state, the article engages with the most challenging issue on the Bosnian political agenda – the much needed constitutional reform. Through the evaluation of the presented alternatives for the current Bosnian constitutional framework, the article comes to the conclusion that the model of the consociational confederalism, with a further decentralization of the country, may be the only feasible constitutional reform package for ensuring the self-sustainability of the country.*

April 2012 marked the 20-year anniversary of the first hostilities that took place in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The hostilities soon turned into a violent war, which engaged high level of international effort for the purpose of bringing the peace and stability to the war-affected country. Thanks to such efforts, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP) was signed in December 1995. After almost four years of warfare, peace was there to stay, but the question remained: at what price?

This question gains even more value when linked to the contemporary predicament of the Bosnian state. According to the overall opinion expressed by distinguished scholars and political analysts, Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be facing the "most serious crisis since the Bosnian war."[1] The

[1] S. Kappler, O. Richmond, "Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: resistance or emancipation," *Security Dialog* Vol. 42, No. 3, 2011, p. 261.

Ružić, M., "Bosnia and Herzegovina: a continuation of war by other means," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XXI, No. 1–2, 2012, pp. 73–83.

country is not only falling behind in its Euro-Atlantic integration processes, but more importantly, Bosnia and Herzegovina has failed to overcome its primary challenge – "the stateness problem." In fact, the recent turbulent developments in the domestic political agenda, which are channeled through the aversive statements made by the political establishment, continue to challenge the self-sustainability of the Bosnian multinational democracy. The harsh truth in this case may be that the Dayton-designed image of one Bosnia and Herzegovina and the reality of three Bosnias have resulted in a long-term political deadlock. Actually, this discouraging outcome could be foreseen not long ago after the Dayton settlement was signed, considering that the former warring sides did not wait for long before presenting their true preferences that go well beyond the signed agreement. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the lack of political and public will for the acceptance and, above all, successful implementation of the Dayton-proposed consociational confederation arrangement has invoked the question of constitutional revision as the country's possible escape route.

Following the two questions, presented in the paragraphs above, this article will try to connect the debate over the consequences of the of the Dayton peace agreement and the burning issue of Bosnian constitutional change, with the purpose of shedding some light on what may not be a perfect, but a feasible constitutional reform package under the circumstances. With this goal in mind, the paper will be organized in three sections. The first section addresses the question about the overall price of the GFAP, in other words it analyses the peace agreements and the consequences of the way this agreement was reached. The second section deals with the question of the constitutional reform process and the presented alternatives for the current Bosnian institutional framework, which have been a pending issues for more than six years now. Bearing in mind the assumption that in the case of multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina, a workable constitutional framework cannot be drawn on the zero-sum logic. In the third section I will argue that the model of the consociational confederalism with a further decentralization of the country, which is to provide effective share of rule to all three ethnic groups, may not be such a bad idea after all.

Peace without sustainability

With the escalation of war hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the mid-nineties, the international community engaged in "all-out negotiation

efforts"[2] in order to end the war, and to bring stability to the region of Southeastern Europe. These efforts culminated with the signing of the GFAP in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995. The agreement nurtured a territorial and political compromise that brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina after almost four years of war. Through one short GFAP and 12 Annexes, the agreement offered not just a framework for the peace-building process, but also a framework for the future state-building and democratization processes.[3] Hence, Ronald Kostić might be right in arguing that, considering the range of issues on the agenda, the Dayton peace agreement "represents one of the most comprehensive peace agreements negotiated in recent history."[4]

According to the Dayton state-building framework, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be organized on the principles of consociationalism – as a consociational confederation. Consocialism is a model of government developed by Arent Lijphart that gives primacy to collectives, group rights and autonomy rather then individual citizens. Formulated on those assumptions, consocialism may pose as an institutional prescription for the deeply divided societies, but on the condition that all concerned stakeholders support this type of constitutional arrangement. Besides the consociational elements, which recognize the "ethnic groups as the cornerstones of government,"[5] Bosnia and Herzegovina is also shaped as a confederation. The confederal element in the Bosnian state enhances "self-rule" and ensures the primacy of the federal units, rather than the federal government.[6] In addition, mutual veto rights for all three constitutional ethnic

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[2] R. Holbrooke, *To end a war*, New York: Random House, 1998, p. xv.

[3] "The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Available online: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html (accessed on: February 24, 2012).

[4] R. Kostić, *Reconciling the past and the present – evaluating the Dayton Peace Agreement 1995*, Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009, p. 36.

[5] H. Touquet, P. Vermeersch, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: thinking beyond institutional-building," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008, p. 269.

[6] S. Bose, "The Bosnian state a decade after Dayton," *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 12, No. 3, 2005, p. 326.

groups were guaranteed. Thus, according to the Dayton agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be organized as "a complex institutional structure, composed of one state, two entities, three peoples, an estimated 3.9 million citizens, and five layers of governance."[7]

The political, constitutional and territorial compromise for peaceful coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was negotiated, and the international community was there to oversee its implementation. Nevertheless, the way that this compromise was reached and the ambiguous nature of the negotiated agreement may have contributed to the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina "now stands on the brink of collapse."[8] As pointed out by Michael Watkins, the negotiation techniques of the strategic simplification method[9] that were applied at the "all-out negotiations" in Dayton have secured a peace settlement that ended the Bosnian war.[10] However, the long-term consequences of these techniques started to appear in the implementation phase. Undoubtedly, the simplification of party and issue structure at the negotiation table nurtured a fragile peace settlement within the three-week timeframe. The subordination of the negotiation rights of Bosnian Serbs and Croats to the delegations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia reduced the number of incompatible demands at the negotiation table, and thus increased the possibility of reaching a final political compromise. Yet this kind of strategy has invoked the question of the legitimacy upon the entire negotiated agreement. The worrying outcome of this strategic simplification, in the case of the Dayton peace mediation, was the fact that the two parties who did not take part in negotiations of the terms of the final settlement were among the ones who had to implement it. As pointed out by Kostić, the delegations of Bosnian Serbs and Croats were informed about the

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[7] R. Belloni, "Bosnia: Dayton is dead! Long live Dayton!," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol. 15, No. 3–4, 2009, p. 359.

[8] P. C. McMahon, J. Western, "The death of Dayton: how to stop Bosnia from falling apart," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 88, No. 69, 2009, p. 69.

[9] Strategic simplification method represents a rational and well-planed use of different strategies with the purpose of making complex and comprehensive negotiations more controllable. The complexity of negotiations can be a result of the complex party structure – the large and diverse number of parties involved in negotiations – as well as the complex issue structure – a significant number of issues on the negotiation's agenda – or as a result of both. The goal of the strategic simplification techniques is to reduce the number of parties and issues on the negotiation's agenda with the purpose of reaching an agreement.

[10] M. Watkins, "Strategic simplification: toward a theory of modular design in negotiation," *International Negotiation* Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003, pp. 149–67.

compromises that were made on their behalf at the end of the negotiations. Logically, they marked the reached agreement as non-binding and refused to implement it.[11] In addition, in order to have a positive outcome, the Dayton peace agreement was signed by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia on their behalf.

The above-presented paradox of legitimacy is the fundamental problem of the Dayton peace agreement that reflects on the functionality of the Bosnian state even today. Although the Bosnian Croats and Serbs ended up accepting the negotiated arrangement, the overall dissatisfaction with the peace agreement was more than noticeable. The proposed constitutional arrangement faced resistance from all three ethnic groups in Bosnia. The Muslims described it as too federal, the Serbs saw it as insufficiently federal and the Croats challenged the specific implementation of federalism.[12] Drawing on these fundamental differences on the essence of the state, the scholars' claim that the Dayton peace had failed to produce an unambiguous ending to the Bosnian war might have some grounds. Political leaders of the three ethnic groups "maintained zero-sum views of each other,"[13] thus the underlying reasons that led to the war in the first place were still present. Hence, Roberto Belloni may be right in arguing that the post-Dayton political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in fact a continuation of war by other means.[14]

The paradox of legitimacy is the fundamental problem of the Dayton peace agreement that reflects on the functionality of the Bosnian state even today.

Moreover, thanks to these long-term consequences of the Dayton negotiation strategy, the role of the international community as a mediator in the Bosnian "frozen conflict" has not changed for more than 15 years. The political establishment's lack of ability to agree on basic decisions at the state level, and thus to make the system work, has invoked the constant need for international mediation. The absence of willingness to integrate at the state level, which is even more reinforced by weak state institutions, has contributed to the fact that

[11] R. Kostić, *Reconciling the past and the present*, op. cit., pp. 41, 55.
[12] T. Gromes, "Federalism as a means of peace-building: the case of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* Vol. 16, No. 3–4, 2010, p. 365.
[13] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 360.
[14] Ibid.

"almost every important issue at the central government level is deadlocked."[15] In those situations, where political compromise among the representatives of the three ethnic groups could not be reached and a decision had to be made, the international community, through the institution of the High Representative, intervened more directly by imposing the needed change. Consequently, for the purpose of ensuring the functioning of the state institutions, the High Representative has intervened on behalf of the international community in the Bosnian political processes more than 800 times.[16] Due to this contested nature of the Bosnian state, the argument that the functioning of the current constitutional structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be sustained through the strong presence is more than true. As emphasized by Bose, "Bosnia is a state of international design that exists by international design."[17]

Constitutional deadlock

After more than ten years of ensuring the sustainability of the Dayton's constitutional framework the international community raised the question of constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to statements by international representatives, in order to ensure the successful ending of the state-building and democratization processes, and thus to provide an opportunity to end the too-long international engagement in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, the current constitutional arrangement of the Bosnian state needs to be amended. Hence, the overall goal of such a crucial endeavor is to keep the common state and to enable it to function on its own. With this goal in mind, the constitutional reforms talks were launched in 2005 (the April package), and resumed in 2009 (the Butmir talks). Yet, unfortunately, their outcome today can be described by one word – deadlock.

During these seven years of framing constitutional reform as a priority on the domestic political agenda, and as a final task of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina not much has been done on the issue. The reform packages, suggested through two above-mentioned initiatives, underline the importance of creating a stronger, but not directly elected, executive at state level for the purpose of increasing the institutional functionality of the state. In addition, the reforms were to create a purely

[15] P.C. McMahon, J. Western, "The death of Dayton," op. cit., p. 73.
[16] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 362.
[17] S. Bose, "The Bosnian state a decade after Dayton," op. cit., p. 323.

unicameral parliamentary system by taking the legislative power from the House of People, whose delegates are not elected by the popular vote, and concentrating state power in a single and directly elected body – the House of Representatives.[18] Although "entity voting" was to be conserved, both of these high-level internationally led campaigns for amending the shortcomings of the Dayton constitutional structure have resulted in failure.

The proposed alternatives for the Bosnian consociational confederation model failed to gain support from the leaders of the country's political establishment. The problem was, and still is, that all sides at the negotiating table, including the representatives of the international community, had a different idea about how the new constitutional future of Bosnia and Herzegovina should look. The international community saw the reform talks as an opportunity to finish the state-building processes in the county, and thus to finish its mission in Bosnia. From their perspective, the way to reach this goal was through centralization at the state level, which would enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to successfully proceed with its Euro-Atlantic integrations. In other words, the goal was to ensure the full integration of the state by assigning more powers to the central-state institution.[19] Political representatives of the Bosnian Muslims had a similar idea about the new constitutional framework. According to them, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be organized on the principles that would ensure both a more centralized government and a political map that would erase the existing ethnic divisions.[20] However, these notions for the centralization of the state have been challenged by the political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, who had other beliefs about the purpose of the constitutional talks. The representatives of the Bosnian Serbs saw the reform talks as a chance for strengthening "their semi-independent republic,"[21] while the Bosnian Croats wanted to seize this

The proposed alternatives for the Bosnian consociational confederation model failed to gain support from the leaders of the country's political establishment.

[18] "Bosnia's dual crisis," International Crisis Group, *Europe Briefing*, No. 57, November 14, 2009, pp. 7–8.
[19] H. Touquet, P. Vermeersch,, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," op. cit., p. 269.
[20] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 366.
[21] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 367.

opportunity and rectify the injustice done to them at the Dayton peace talks by carving out "a Croat-dominated entity," which would ensure their equal status in the state.[22] Faced with these irreconcilable demands, the involved stakeholders have put the constitutional reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina on hold.

Yet, the representatives of the Bosnian political establishment are not the only ones to be blamed for this unfortunate constitutional deadlock. As pointed out by many analysts, both international initiatives for constitutional reform were poorly organized and badly timed. Hence, part of the blame could be directed at the international community as well.[23] However, the most important obstacle to the possible success of the constitutional talks was the overall bad timing. The April package mostly failed due to the general elections in 2006, and the Butmir process came in the middle of the political campaign for the general elections in 2010. Thus, both initiatives served as a good platform for local politicians to gain points on their election agenda and were a reminder to the international community what are the true preferences of the former warring sides in what is now, in the words of Clausewitz, a "continuation of war by other means."[24]

Exit route

After reflecting on the overall value of the Dayton peace agreement, its constitutional consociational confederal arrangement and the development of the constitutional reforms initiatives that took place in the last six years, only one question emerges: what constitutional framework would work in the Bosnian multiethnic post-war environment? This question becomes even more relevant considering the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights that the current Bosnian constitution is in direct breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the position of the European Union that the constitutional changes should be made before Bosnia and Herzegovina can proceed with its integration process.[25] Therefore, the following paragraphs

[22] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 366.

[23] F. Bieber, "Constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: preparing for EU accession," *European Policy Centre*, April, 2010, p. 1.

[24] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 360.

[25] The European Court of Human Rights found that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is in direct breach with the European Convention on Human Rights,

will try to suggest a possible, and above all feasible, solution for the Bosnian current constitutional deadlock.

For the purpose of coming up with a constitutional way-out, the alternatives to the consociational confederal model, the partition of the country and a more centralized unitary state, should be considered first. Drawing on the political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Dayton peace agreement onwards, it is possible to exclude the secession as a possible alternative. In 2005, political leaders of both Bosnian Serbs and Croats have accepted the reality of one Bosnia and Herzegovina and renounced the aspiration for separation and union with Serbia and Croatia. As far as the unitary and more centralize alternative goes, the constitutional arrangement based on the principles of majoritarian democracy is highly inadvisable for ethnically divided country with a recent war history like Bosnia and Herzegovina. This argument is also supported by the results of the past internationally led constitutional reform talks, which proposed centralization at the state level for the purpose of enhancing the functionality of the Bosnian state. Therefore, as pointed out by Thorsten Gromes, federalism, and in the Bosnian case consociational confederalism, may not be perfect but it is certainly an adequate constitutional arrangement.[26]

As pointed out by many analysts, both international initiatives for constitutional reform were poorly organized and badly timed.

However, this does not mean that the current constitutional status quo should be preserved. Constitutional changes are required in order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a sustainable and functioning country without international supervision. Taking into consideration the history of the Bosnian conflict, the proposed constitutional change should be founded on a broad consensus among all sides involved. With this in mind, the best way of ensuring self-sustainability of the country might be through the preservation of the consociational confederalism model. Yet for the purpose of making the model work, further decentralization of the country should take place.

considering that it favors the ethnic discrimination for representation in the institutions of the country of persons not belonging to one of the three Constituent Peoples. In addition, the Stabilization and Association Agreement cannot enter in force before the needed constitutional changes take place.

[26] T. Gromes, "Federalism as a means of peace-building," op. cit., p. 355.

This approach to constitutional change would discourage the zero-sum logic, which dominated previous constitutional talks, and at the same time would address one essential issue – the demand of Bosnian Croats for territorial autonomy. Hence, the proposed decentralization should provide a basis for the constitutional compromise since it provides an effective shared rule for all three ethnic groups. After all, "it takes three to tango in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In addition, the cruel realty is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina nation-building integration cannot take place, and thus a constitutional arrangement, based on the assumption of building a community of interest, may be the only option for self-sustainability of the Bosnian multiethnic state.

The best way of ensuring self-sustainability of the country might be through the preservation of the consociational confederalism model and further decentralization of the country.

Considering the shortcomings of the previous international initiatives for constitutional change, the window of opportunity for the continuation of the Bosnian constitutional reform process, and for the applicability of the above presented negotiation strategy, opens after the local elections in 2012 and before the general elections in 2014. Placed within this timeframe, the constitutional talks should not serve as a basis for the election campaigns, and thus may have an actual chance of producing a successful outcome. However, besides the appropriate timing, the next international initiative should be built on a well-planned carrots and sticks strategy. This strategy would frame the constitutional talks as a process within which there is something for everyone, but it would also place all the responsibilities on the members of the Bosnian political establishment. The time has come for local political leaders to realize that they have to take some responsibility and stop depending on or complaining about someone else. That being said, the official status of European Union member state should not be granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina without visible progress in constitutional reform. After all, the common desire of all three ethnic groups to join the EU could be a good basis for nurturing a functional community of interest.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia culminated with the outburst of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community undertook the task of ending the war and negotiating a peace agreement that was signed in 1995 in Dayton. The Dayton peace arrangement stopped the war and "created the conditions for life to return to normal."[27] Yet the way that this peace agreement was reached, ensured the unsustainability of the negotiated consociational confederal contitutional framework in the long run. As Kyle Beardsley emphasizes, the actors in the conflict mediation process often tend to discount the future, and thus make bargains that would end the war even at the expense of potential long-term stability. By encouraging agreements that do not go along with the conflicted parties long-term interests, the mediators end up with an artificial peace settlement, which in the absence of the mediator loses its legitimacy.[28]

Drawing on Beardsley's argument, it is not surprising that the international community has invoked the question of constitutional revision as a possible solution for ensuring the self-sustainability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus for bringing to an end international engagement it this state-building process. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the results of the constitutional talks, none of the proposed alternatives to the current consociational confederal model managed to gain support from all concerned sides. The preferences of the representatives of three ethnic groups still remain incompatible and the international community maintains its role of mediator in what is now a "continuation of war by other means."[29]

However, the preservation of the status quo is not an option for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The self-sustainability of the state must be ensured if the country wants to proceed with Euro-Atlantic integration. Hence, considering the developments and the results of the past constitutional reform initiatives, one possible way of reaching this goal might be through the preservation of the consociational confederal model and further decentralization of the country. In this way, the effective share of rule by all three ethnic groups might just create a functioning community of interest, and that is all one can hope to accomplish in a multiethnic post-war country like Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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[27] P. C. McMahon, J. Western, "The death of Dayton," op. cit., p. 72.

[28] K. Beardsley, "Agreement without Peace? International mediation and time inconsistence problems," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 54, No. 4, 2008, pp. 728–9.

[29] R. Belloni, "Bosnia," op. cit., p. 360.

Pravda o obchode. Skutočné dôsledky liberalizácie (originally published under the title: The truth about trade: the real impact of liberalization)

By Clive George. Bratislava: Nadácia Pontis, 2011. 162 p.
ISBN 978-80-968229-4-2

There are very few titles in the Slovak book market that deal with trade liberalization from a critical perspective. The debate within the Slovak media mirrors this lack and does not focus on the social and environmental impact of trade liberalization. We rarely hear about how our trade policies affect the environment or those living outside the European Union. Mostly the debate is about how to attract foreign direct investment or how we should (but never do) support education to become a knowledge economy.

The Pontis Foundation has published a book that adds to the scant literature critical of trade liberalization. Its author, Clive George, was a principal advisor of the World Bank on the evaluation and development of impact assessment systems in the Middle East and North Africa, and an OECD and UNEP consultant who worked on the Sustainable Impact Assessment reports for the European Commission that were supposed to assess the impact of proposed trade liberalization on the environment. George also teaches at the University of Manchester in the School of Environment and Development.

Institutionally a scholar with close ties to practitioners, Clive George, provides the reader with a succinct survey on the negative effects of trade liberalization. His goal is to assess "the likely impacts of the current trade liberalization agenda on the world's economies, environments and people." (p. 7) His method is the review of macro-econometric studies of the relationship between trade, economic growth, income and environmental problems, and micro-empirical studies following the impact of previous trade reforms on households or the local environments (ibid). George explains the methodology in chapter three and briefly reproduces the criticism voiced by European NGOs (p. 146). It is sympathetic that he acknowledges that something like an independent organization is an impossible myth (p. 30). The possible lack of independence due to the financial support from the European Commission is balanced out by the acceptance of the book from main environmental NGOs. The main question that he tries to answer is whether the trade agreements are "good or bad." (p. 19) "Do the negotiated trade agreements make a positive contribution to sustainable development or a negative one?" (ibid) The answer is less unequivocal than the first question

suggests, but already the preface reveals that international trade "can be one of the most effective drivers of human understanding and development, or can be used by the richest and most powerful states for their own gain, with little or no regard for the effects on disadvantaged people in other countries or the integrity of the environment locally and globally. The current world trade agenda offers too little of the first and too much of the second." (p. 8)

In the first part, the stage is set by briefly mentioning some of the precedents to the current debates on trade, economy and the environment. The second chapter shows clearly how it is possible for there to be losers in free trade agreements without a conspiracy taking place. A memorable quote from Peter Mandelson (p. 23–24) is a clear example of European double standards that only respond to the desires of European citizens. As George rightly claims, "some of those citizens would prefer European policy to have no adverse impacts on people and environments elsewhere in the world, while others would prefer an extra euro in the pocket." (p. 24) He does not judge the imbalance though. The negotiations are tough, but the negotiators "are all good people" (p. 132) and at the same time they believe it is only necessary "to have liberalized something somewhere for everyone to be a winner." (ibid) According to the author "in countries with highly developed democratic institutions no section of the public can be ignored. Elsewhere the main influence on negotiating positions and often the only influence comes from the major commercial players" (p. 26). Unfortunatley, a large section of the public is often ignored during negotiations, and major commercial players have a major influence in the countries with highly developed democratic institutions.

The second part gives the gist of the book and contains the main econometric argument that the gains from liberalization as modeled by computers are too small in comparison to the "normal rate of growth." (p. 41) The liberalization benefit is "barely one two hundredth of what can usually be expected from other sources." (ibid) This applies to the liberalization of industry (ibid), agriculture (p. 56), or services (p. 70). These models do not take into account the period of adaptation as "the economy is adjusting from one pseudo-equilibrium to another, which takes several years." (p. 45) Unemployment may seriously harm the quality of life during this period. The liberalization of industry has an impact on climate change as well, but this impact is, again, too insignificant to be considered. The transport of products would increase emissions by half a percent, and the relocation of industry to countries with less strict environmental regulation would lead to the introduction of more environmentally friendly methods of production. This does not apply for example to copper mining, but in general it does. (p. 48)

The main policy argument is in favor of the path chosen by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China, and before them Great Britain and Germany. The governments of these countries all protected their infant industries until they were capable of

competing with the leading companies. Only then did they liberalize their markets in specific sectors.

With regard to the food policy, George argues for food self-sufficiency (p. 58–59) and criticizes liberalization when it exposes poor households to market fluctuations. He also argues against land grabs that affect local communities who do not have enough land to feed their own people after it has been bought by a rich foreign government. The environmental impacts of modern farming, the destructive use of insecticides, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers or overproduction can "in principle be managed, and kept within acceptable bounds." (p. 62) Brazil has, according to the author, made such technological progress that it is capable of increasing agricultural productivity while at the same time keeping "pollution levels low." (p. 62–63) How about aiming at no pollution? Unfortunately, at this point he does not use any secondary sources and the reader remains unsure how sustainable non-organic farming can actually be. More discussion of the Malthusian argument (p. 21–22) about rising population and what we can sustainably produce would be useful here.

George is often concerned with biological diversity. He criticizes the expansion of monocultures such as soya, but is not equally concerned with liberalization in countries where biodiversity is low (such as Europe) and the damage is not as serious. Such environmental accounting feels strange. As if it is acceptable that the biological diversity in industrialized countries has been destroyed and what we should care about is the diversity in countries such as Brazil. The importance of biodiversity is connected here only to the global climate. Losing species seems acceptable as long as it does not harm the climate.

The next (sixth) chapter deals with the liberalization of services, and the negative effect of financial liberalization is well clarified here.

Intellectual property (chapter seven) is considered a "legal construct" (p. 82) and its impact on economic growth and industrial progress is presented as the main factor for its existence. The author touches on the issue of generic versions of patented medicines, and shows how insignificant the losses from the liberalization of this market would be for research, which is mostly paid for from public sources (p. 85). The problem of biopiracy is countered by the fact that the diseases in poor countries are at the margin of scientific research.

The usual criticism of FDIs in chapter 8, which claims that their rise does not actually have to lead to higher growth, could be of importance to Slovak readers. According to George, the only advantage could be the transfer of technology but, except for the East Asian tigers, this has not been the case (p. 97–98).

The second part is concluded by a chapter on WTO rules, and it briefly identifies some of the inequalities in the dispute settlement mechanism (p. 101) and the usefulness of preferential treatment. (p. 104)

The last part examines the influence of the Sustainable Impact Assessments Reports on the changes in EU policy. None of the reports "has been brave enough to tell the king that his policy was just plain wrong." (p. 113) They were mostly tactfully suggesting that not everything is bad. "The response has been limited." (ibid) The EU's position paper claims to have implemented 12 recommendations, but an official reaction to the remaining 207 is simply missing. George, however, is optimistic about the debate that these reports have aroused. The Commission representatives have often been leading very lively discussions about the findings of these reports. (p. 115) But unfortunately, none of the reports "has been bold enough to advise the European Commission to stop all further efforts to liberalize trade until fully effective global agreements are in place to halt climate change and biodiversity loss." (p. 116) The Commission can thus "justifiably argue that it is already trying to do what the recommendations say it should." (ibid)

Chapter 11 then moves beyond the modest suggestions of the reports and proposes changes in the trade regime. The author calls for the abolishment of the single undertaking – a principle according to which virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package that cannot be agreed separately – since "many of the biggest adverse impacts of the current trade liberalization agenda are a direct result of the single undertaking." (p. 124) George suggests that many countries should be allowed not to participate fully in the free trade regime in order to protect their infant industries. Agricultural subsidies should only be offered to assure food self-sufficiency, but export subsidies damage many local farmers and should gradually be abandoned. Financial regulations need to be strengthened and services, such as water supply, should be given aid, but not in exchange for privatization. Intellectual property is necessary only after the industry reaches a certain threshold. Most importantly a global mechanism to stop climate change is necessary according to Clive George.

The author presents a very readable account of the "truth" about trade and the inadequacy of the neoliberal theory of minimal government intervention which is "basically unsound and has massive effects." (p. 133) His 'truth' shows that the critique of the free trade dogma is well substantiated by social science research, and that European bureaucrats and representatives are challenged by these ideas. As he claims, "[n]eoliberalism is in retreat." (p. 130) The book is thus a good introductory text for courses in free trade, "development," or globalization, and I hope that Slovak university teachers will make use of it.

However, there are fundamental problems that need to be mentioned. The title immediately shows the need for a more thorough analysis. The truth is very much linked to a system of power and is really an ensemble of rules in which the true and false are separated, according to Michel Foucault. If the reports, cited by George, were only moderately critical in order to ensure they would be

considered by the Commission, it just demonstrates how far the truth can go. They remained within the confines of what would be accepted as the truth. The same could be said about the reviewed book. Its truth follows the rules that separate it from the false, as they were set by natural and social sciences methodologies. In this sense the title is adequate and the book is very truthful - much more truthful than neoliberal theories. However, other truths remain oppressed as their voices cannot be heard because they do not follow scientific procedures. This does not mean that one should entirely discard scientific methodologies, but only that one should accept the fact that there might be other ways for acquiring the truth.

It is then not surprising that the book is Eurocentric, dividing countries into developed and developing as if there actually existed universally valid criteria of "development" or that the path the industrialized countries followed is desirable or reproducible. George unintentionally echoes Cowen's and Shenton's notion of trusteeship in the "intentional development" as he claims that the fundamental "development" problem is to find "well-paid employment for the people whose livelihood opportunities are lost through increasing agricultural productivity." (p. 67) Authoritarianism, which is often present in "development" projects, is excluded from the "not-so-truthful" account of Chinese or East Asian "development" praised as the right way to lift people out of poverty and reach a higher standard of living. The complicity of "countries with highly developed democratic institutions" (p. 26) in the massive material misery, is overlooked in the discussion about oil and diamonds. The resource curse (p. 108 – 110) is caused by the people in government being deformed by the deformed economy, as if the connection between e.g. French and sub-Saharan African governments, also called *Franceafrique* by François Xavier-Verschave, could not cause this curse. The employing institutions may also play a role in the reasoning used by the author.

George's concern about the environment is sympathetic. Each chapter ends with the impact of liberalization of the concrete sector on sustainability. There are two problems (if one disregards the discursive critique of the sustainable development discourse). First, throughout the book George sectoralizes the environment, as he separates the growth of consumption – the desired result of the growth of industry – from environmental problems. The environment remains within the environmental sector and does not trespass to other sectors, which, however, are closely related to it. On page 78 the author makes this explicit. The liberalization of transport services should benefit the environment by introducing better technologies. But these benefits would be offset by the impact of increased shipping. "This is a separate issue, related to the sustainability of material economic growth as a whole. Putting this wider issue to one side, the liberalization of transport services and the elimination of anti-competitive practices offer considerable economic benefits for all countries, rich and poor." (ibid) How can

one put this issue aside? Apparently, the author is well aware of the catastrophic consequences of "material economic growth as a whole" and even calls for a change of our way of life (p. 134) and a radical change of our economic structure. But his techno-optimism makes this change seem rather unconvincing. The way seems to be through energy efficient lightbulbs and photovoltaic cells. (p. 107)

Ending on a positive note, it is nice to see altruism back in the mainstream discourse, even given primacy. We do not reduce poverty only to secure our stability, but "for the sake of altruism." (p. 126)

To summarise, the main strength of the book is that it puts together in an approachable way many arguments against liberalization that are useful for the mainstream as well as radical critics. But these arguments need to be accompanied by a commentary that shows there might be more environmentally or socially friendly truths.

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Citoyennetés et nationalités en Europe
[Citizenships and nationalities in Europe]
By Gilles Rouet, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011. 270 p. ISBN 978-2-296-55797-0

Top French and Polish newspapers joined together to make a common supplement on European issues; Slovak European Commissioner Maroš Šefcovič toured Europe to promote the European Citizens' Initiative; and Croats voted in favor of accession to the European Union by a majority. As the three events show, the crisis-hit Europe is going through a change, which is not only economic. The old continent faces "crises of citizenship" as the authors of *Citizenships and nationalities in Europe* note. François Soulages says in the introduction to the book that these crises are stronger today than they were yesterday, because of a more wide-spread and faster mobility of Europeans. Why go so far? In fact, the economic problems go hand-in-hand with identity doubts, just as the necessary economic solutions require deep political reforms. The recently negotiated Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union is good proof of this.

As important as the nature of the problems, is its trans-European location. Nothing reminds us better than the journeys of the editor of *Citizenships and nationalities in Europe*. Gilles Rouet, the French university professor, moved first from Russia to Slovakia, then to Bulgaria, where he recently organized a conference. Its output is the book before us. In it, the authors from the East and West, who write about West and East, tacitly signal to us that the East–West division has become secondary. Indeed, the book's biggest input to the debate is that the crisis of citizenship and identities is – like the economic crisis – all-European, uniting the "old" and the "new" Europe, and even going beyond the EU. The 14 articles do not seek to offer definitive answers or policy solutions; their academia-based authors ask disturbing questions. In doing so, they quit the borders of legal reasoning, which traditionally frames citizenship and nationality in Europe, and enter a more fitting costume: constructivism mixed with path dependency and the historical method.

The 272 page voyage is lengthy – what are its most important stops? In the first part of the book (Conceive), Serge Dufoulon, anthropology professor in Grenoble, makes a useful distinction between citizenship and nationality. Whereas citizenship refers to the everyday respect of the rules of society, nationality unites around a (pseudo-)visionary project. Dufoulon puts the two in an odd, but innovative dichotomy: while citizenship expresses an everyday "magic," nationality comes

as a "religion." Where is Europe in all this? "The European Union still seems to define itself," writes Dufoulon, in a rather pessimist fashion, "by what it is not, a little bit like in the beginnings of anthropology, the great explorers defined the discovered tribes by the words of absence:" the faithless, the lawless, the hairless (41–2). According to him, Europe remains an intellectual construction without the enthusiasm of the masses.

The book's first part also includes Dufoulon's colleague from Greboble Jamil Sayah's convincing diagnosis of the crisis of the French Republican Model. The "Cult of the republic," based on liberty and equality and leaving the individual alone in a common political community without any particular communitarian links (ethnic, racial, religious), faces problems as well. It has been undermined by an incomplete integration of immigrant groups and amplified by social conflict. As a result, the French model suffers social inequalities (the poor versus the rich), territorial segregation (the banned *banlieues*), and the fragmentation of the society into communities (Are you French or Arab? French or Black? French or Jewish?).

In its second part (Construct), the book features the remarkable article of Abel Polese. Writing about Ukraine, the University of Edinburgh's lecturer reveals how a post-modern nation is built. While the Ukrainian nation-building has been based on the "national language" and the "national myths," it features an incomplete implementation. Therefore, in its official interaction with people, the state unofficially accepts non-Ukrainian languages and identities; hence, it integrates de facto those speaking and feeling Russian. The ethnicity becoming a secondary category gave rise, according to Polese, to a political community in the Ukraine of the 1990s. In turn, the togetherness enabled the 2004 Orange revolution against post-Soviet authoritarianism. The author correctly observes that the lasting fruit of the Revolution is the conviction, still rather rare in the post-Soviet space, that popular opinion counts.

The contribution of François Schmitt, currently teaching in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, in the third part of the collection (Act) is one of those, in which a foreigner teaches a local something about their country. In this article, the something is the Slovak civil society. Schmitt reviews its development in a historical and international perspective. Hence, it is important to know that in its 1990s version, the Slovak NGOs overcame the interwar ethnic and religious divisions, while continuing to serve for democracy-building. Also, the Czechoslovak enthusiasts for the Prague Spring before August 1968 and the French revolutionaries in May '68 were on different sides of the right-left division, but demanded similar concessions from the respective regimes: human rights.

Finally, there is the thrilling article of Anna Krasteva "From the post-Communist to the connected citizen." The professor at the New Bulgarian University makes

a distinction between the pre-1990 Bulgarian, who was active by obligation, but disengaged in reality, and the post-1990 Bulgarian, who engages voluntarily, yet loves abstention. Speaking about all of new Europe's citizens, Krasteva identifies three types: the enthusiast, the outraged, and the spectator. They match the three types of post-Communist leaders: democratic, extremist, and popular and populist. Bulgaria's current state of democracy shows, however, according to Krasteva, that the main problem of post-Communism is "the over-production of leaders and the under-production of citizens." (245) The civic engagement has been reduced to professionalized NGOs who have their own language and foreign funding. Yet, these "engaged citizens" fail to defeat rising populism or answer the questions it brings: Are the verbal attacks on the Roma minority an expression of democratic pluralism or its negation? And this goes for all of Europe: dealing with Attaka is dealing with The National Front.

Citizenships and nationalities in Europe includes some excellent insights. Gilles Rouet's team makes an effort to replace the weary concepts with novel ones (the French Republican Model), interprets the old events in a new light (the Orange Revolution), and places the local games on the international playfield (the Slovak civil society). They provoke (the Bulgarian post-Communism). However, their effort does not always succeed. Some articles include more quoted theories than original ideas, others leave things uexplained. The book lacks coherence. A reader whose native language is not French will have to make a special effort to work his way through the overcomplicated phrasing and theorizing.

Overall, the authors walk in the right direction and the occasional divergence inspires: a novel experiment needs more tests. In the end, it is not always easy to read about the making of Europe, but as Soulages warns in the introduction: "It is true that it is easier to be simplistic than complex; but "simplifying is sacrificing," wrote Bachelard; hence, to simplify Europe means to mutilate it."

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Living in other worlds. After defeat: how the East learned to live with the West

By Ayşe Zarakol, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
ISBN 978-0521145565

After defeat: how the East learned to live with the West is an academic book written by Ayşa Zarakol. The basic epistemological framework of the book is the ceaseless fight between the Self and Other. Using Emmanuel Levinas' famous term, the study offers an outstanding investigation of western "philosophical allergy," specifically, the ontological obsession of the West with its constitutive "Other."[1] It underlines the importance of the "social dimension" and the need of introducing the question of inequality to the international relation theory. In other words, *After defeat* proposes an alternative approach to international interaction which acknowledges the binary logic of establisher vs. outsider dichotomy; subsequently the emergence of stigmatization and inequality within international relations.

The socio-normative hierarchy tends to establish the dualism of insider/outsider and/or establisher/latecomer[2] where the latter has the privilege to present its norms and values as "superior," "natural," "normal," "matter-of-fact," "normative," "rational" or "scientific – objective" and it transforms his particular normativity into a universal meaning and presents itself as the standard of civilization. Whereas the former is deprived of that "positive freedom," to be specific, its norms and values are seen as "inferior," "savage – barbaric," "frozen," "static," "despotic," "semi-civilized" or "libidinous;" thus the latecomer is stigmatized and looses his own normativity, normality, self-identity, self-confidence, and he suffers from the so called "ontological insecurity." The dualist approach establishes fertile ground for the emergence of various normative dichotomies, such as the civilized vs. barbarian/savage, modern vs. traditional, developed vs. underdeveloped, liberal vs. illiberal and/or democratic vs. autocratic. This dualism identifies the standards of civilization and superiority where the Self is more advanced than the Other, subsequently establishing inside and outside. That

[1] C.R. Vasey, "Faceless women and serious others: Levinas, misogyny and feminism," in C. Katz, L. Trout, eds, *Emmanuel Levinas: critical assessments of leading philosophers*, London: Routledge, 2005.

[2] N. Elias, N., J.L. Scotson, *The established and the outsiders*, London: Sage Publication, 1995.

means the "establisher/insider" posits his own particular approach on the highest level and transforms it into a universal meaning, hence eliminating the "social objectivity" from the international interaction. At the same time, the "latecomer" is pushed into a position of acceptance of others´ norms which are alien to him, thus it contains heavy categorization as a member with lower values.

In other words, the Hegelian master versus slave dialectic is an inbuilt nature of international relations where the Master/Self needs to permanently "consume" the Slave/Other in order to prove his superiority, authority and normativity. This recognition game between the Self vs. Other and/or Master vs. Slave is a life and death struggle where one party dies or surrenders and accepts the inferiority. Within this context, the Western world has been able to establish a dominant socio-normative order. Subsequently, the existing state systems and/or international relations have been penetrated and occupied by particular cultural approach. Thus, presenting the Western position as a "post-cultural category" where the space for negotiation about any alternative is locked. The real success of the West was that it managed to convince other great powers, who had their own normative order and their assured "ontological security," to join the western model, to accept these norms and at the same time to give up their particular "normality." Nevertheless, the western model (as any model) is built on particular cultural attributes and features which are naturally alien for the "Others." Subsequently, the Other is seen as abnormal/irrational within the established normativity, he is unable to catch up with the western standards and is stigmatized as inferior, child-like and/or feminine, thus it needs "masculine, patriarchal and/or imperial" help.[3] Simply, the bifurcated world is substituted by a single global social hierarchy with Western values, cultural approach and interests, establishing a world of eerie oppressive silences.[4]

However, the socio-normative hierarchy and/or the stigma theory needs to be revisited over and over in order to maintain, legitimize and justify the dominant position of the establisher, thus preserving the binary logic of "establisher vs. latecomer" dualism, power asymmetry and the superiority and ontological security of the establisher. It means that various socio-normative discourses were present during the centuries, the "civilized vs. barbarian" context dominated the nineteenth century discourse. Within this discourse, the center was the bearer of progress, mind, knowledge, technology, science, freedom and/or control over nature, while the periphery was "reduced" to an inferior position as

[3] J.P. Sharp, *Geographies of postcolonialism: spaces of power and representation*, London: Sage Publication, 2009.

[4] L. Bishai, "Liberal internationalism and the law vs liberty paradox," *Journal of International Relations and Development* Vol. 15, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 201–223.

barbaric or frozen which is uncivilized and ruled by "oriental despotism." The social construction of the socio-normative order underwent serious re-structuralization after the World War II, when the economics and modernity became the leading norms instead of the civilization discourse. The reorganized dualism acknowledged the dichotomy of developed states, which are modern, progressive, dynamic, developed vs. underdeveloped states that need to follow the economical/political path of the developed ones. The newest dualism is drawn between democratic vs. undemocratic states and/or liberal vs. illiberal states. Simply, the stigma of the "Others" is reconfigured over and over again in order to adjust to the changed environment and maintain the superior position.

Moreover, the book offers three deep and profound case studies as empirical evidences for the stigma theory in international relations. The objects of these case studies are Russia, Japan and the Ottoman Empire, where the author demonstrates the manifestation of structural conditions of international relations, namely the binary logic of insider vs. outsider, where the "Western world" occupies the luxury position of normality and objectivity, and where the "non-Western world" gets the shameful position of abnormality. However, the "non-Western world" starts to become not dissatisfied with its inferiority and tries to look for an alternative foreign policy which would assure the long desired "ontological security."

The only shortcoming of the book is the vast amount of information given in the case studies. However, the book *After defeat* offers serious input to the academic literature and international relations theory by underlying the structure of power and the existence of socio-normative hierarchy between states.

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