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Ivo Samson and Jozef Ulian

# Problems of security sector reform in Slovakia

Abstract: *Security sector reform is a rather complex and complicated issue. There are various aspects to security system reform. The article focuses primarily on an analysis of security sector reforms implemented in relation to the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, the export of arms and especially arms export control, and on the specific features of Slovakia's approach to security sector reform. The ultimate aim of this study is to provide a particular perspective on the series of problems Slovakia has had to struggle with up to the present day.*

> "We trained hard…but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."[1]
>
> Gaius Petronius (he died in 66 BC)

Only a short time has passed since discussions first began on security sector reform (SSR) in the 1990s. At the very beginning of the debate, there was no expert consensus on the definition of SSR,[2] due in part to the fact that such a consensus can be achieved only at the theoretical level, as the institutions

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1 Quoted in V. Tarasovič, "Reformy ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky nielen ako podmienka integrácie do NATO," in R. Ondrejcsák, V. Tarasovič, E. Nečej, *Experiences from transatlantic integration and security sector reform and implications for partner countries*, Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), 2008, p. 65.

2 D. Hendrickson, "A review of security sector reform," *The Conflict, Security and Defence Group Working Papers,* No. 1, September 1999, p. 4. Available online: http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/work1.pdf (accessed on August 14, 2011).

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of SSR have individual characteristics and they operate within changing local environments.

A number of studies and books have been published on the subject of defining SSR and specifying its main features and characteristics. Their common denominator can be found in the assumption that any state lacking democratic control (under public supervision) of the security system is harmful to the healthy development of society. The primary goal of the very idea of SSR lies in the fact that the control of repressive security instruments – be it the armed forces, the police, the security services and/or other components of the security system – is a *conditio sine qua non* for a state seeking to be a "liberal democracy."

*The Central Eastern European approach to SSR refers to either adaptation (a process), reform (a project), or transformation (a total change) of the armed forces or other core security actors.*

At the beginning of the extensive SSR debate, some "traditionalists" tried to define the field of study, i.e. "the security sector."[3] Four different yet analogous groups of actors were defined, consisting, firstly, of the state institutions of power authorized to use force in the shape of the armed forces, the police, paramilitary units, intelligence services, customs and border guards and civil protection bodies; and, secondly, of the institutions charged with exerting control over the preceding group (the state institutions of power). The second group may include official legislative and executive bodies such as parliament, the highest state officials and the affiliated institutions at their disposal. The third group consists of the state instruments of justice such as the courts and various bodies dealing with, for instance, prosecution and human rights protection; and, finally, a number of actors which are harder to classify such as private security agents, non-state institutions ("militias") and various sorts of rebel forces, for example. Here, various civil society organizations (CSOs) have to be classified as part of the fourth group.[4]

The position of Slovakia regarding SSR has to be seen as part of developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after the end of the Cold

[3] D. Hendrickson, A. Karkoszka, "The challenges of security sector reform," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2002. Armaments, disarmament and international security*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 175–176.

[4] M. Caparini, P. Fluri, "Civil society actors in defence and security affairs," in M. Caparini, P. Fluri, F. Molnar, eds, *Civil society and security sector. Concepts and practices in new democracies*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Berlin, 2006, pp. 9–26.

War and in connection with the democratization of security in general (not only the armed forces).

In 1990, the British Secretary of State introduced SSR[5] as a program for rebuilding state security in CEE countries. The entire approach of these countries has been driven by the political decision to create conditions to facilitate entry into Western political, economic, and security institutions. In 2002, bearing in mind other regions of the world as well, the United Nations Development Program coined a new phrase – Justice and Security Sector Reform. The OECD's 2004 ministerial meeting defined SSR in terms of core security actors, security management, justice and law enforcement institutions, and non-statutory security forces.[6] The definition was adopted by the European Union,[7] United Nations,[8] African Union (ECOWAS), the USA, France, and Sweden etc. SSR is thus accepted as a model in state-building policy and practice, and is widely perceived to be a precondition for stability and sustainable development. The "European approach" means the "developmentalization" of security. However, SSR processes are influenced by non-European actors. The Central Eastern European (new NATO/EU member states) approach to SSR refers to either adaptation (a process), reform (a project), or transformation (a total change) of the armed forces or other core security actors.

There are various aspects to SSR. The authors of this study focus on security sector reform within the armed forces (namely, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic), on reform of arms export (specifically, arms export control) and on Slovakia's particular approach to SSR. Thus, the study seeks to provide a particular perspective on the series of problems Slovakia has had to struggle with up to now.

## Armed forces and SSR in Slovakia

The reform of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR) has always been regarded as the core element of SSR. The claim of the armed forces to hold an exclusive monopoly in the course of SSR can be successfully challenged

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5 "Security sector" and "security system" are synonymous – they refer to a broad range of security and justice institutions.

6 *OECD DAC handbook on security system reform. Supporting security and justice*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf (accessed on August 14, 2011).

7 "EU concept for ESDP support to SSR," Council of the European Union, October 13, 2005. Available online: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/resources/EU_Concept_for_ESDP_support_to_Security_Sector_Reform.pdf (accessed on August 14, 2011).

8 "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting SSR," Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, January 23, 2008.

using the definition of security sector reform and the modernization of security reform development.

The reform of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic seems to be a continual and never-ending process.[9] For practical reasons, the reforms of the security sector, seen from the "absolutist" hegemony of the armed forces' priorities in Slovakia following the division of Czechoslovakia (which also meant the division of the joint Czechoslovak Armed Forces), can be divided into several stages including:

1. period of identifying the problems (1993–1995);
2. declared continuity of reform attempts (1996–1998);
3. armed forces' reforms at the time of realistic NATO integration expectations (1999–2003);
4. attempts at reform after NATO integration (since 2004).

Altogether, one can count more reform attempts (reform periods) since 1993 but the period after 1999 has been characterized by a number of legislative ammendments and the adoption of many documents accompanying the reform process in the AF SR.[10] The elaboration of the Strategic Defense Review[11] based on the proclamation in the 2010 Government Manifesto[12] represents yet another step in the reform process within the AF SR.

In all these periods, one can find a single fundamental point that can be summarized by a number of initiatives – an effort to define the place, role and capacity of the armed forces in the new security environment: reduce the financial requirements for maintaining the original armed forces; reduce the numbers in the armed forces; turn the personnel pyramid on its head (i.e. reduce the number of high-ranking officers and increase the number of rank-and-file personnel);

[9] V. Tarasovič, "Nekonečný príbeh reformy slovenských ozbrojených síl," *zahranicnapolitika.sk*. Available online: www.zahranicnapolitika.sk/index.php?id=965 (accessed on August 14, 2011).

[10] The security sector reform in the armed forces is documented in detail in the annual *Súhrná spáva o stave spoločnosti* (*Reports on the state of society*) published by the Institute for Public Affairs in Bratislava in the section dealing with foreign policy and/or security policy. See the recent report *The report on the state of society and democracy and trends for 2011*, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2011.

[11] R. Ondrejcsák, "Strategické hodnotenie obrany. Kde sme a kam smerujeme," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic. Available online: http://www.mosr.sk/20076/?mnu=518 (accessed on August 14, 2011).

[12] "Civic responsibility and co-operation. Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the period of 2010–2014," Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: http://www.vlada.gov.sk/data/files/855_the-manifesto-of-the-government-of-the-slovak-republic-for-the-period-of-2010-2014.pdf (accessed on August 14, 2011).

conduct a reform of the AF SR while exploiting the knowledge and experience of NATO's defense-related planning; achieve the required level of interoperability and compatibility in the command and management structures, communication and intelligence systems and logistics and infrastructure; language training; defense-related planning and procurement of resources; modernization of arms, technology and military material; restructure and harmonize the AF SR so that it is comparable to the armed forces of the NATO member states, and adapt them to the human, material and financial resources available; develop the armed forces while stressing the improvement of operational skills, its abilities to work within international groups, apply doctrines and administrative procedures, modernize the command, management and communication systems, conduct specialized and language training of key staff; decrease the number of military staff, optimize ratios within the soldier staffing structure; gradually switch to professional armed forces (being accomplished in the wake of NATO integration); gradually modernize the command, management and communication systems, armament and technology of the armed forces; develop scientific and technology-related cooperation with NATO; exploit its own defense industry potential and develop the defense infrastructure; shaping the defense and military capacities capable of contributing to the joint defense of the member countries after joining NATO; provide training to the required numbers of military staff to extend Slovakia's representation in international operations of crisis management; foster operational partnerships and compliance with standardization requirements; improve asset and fund management; increase the share of expenditures on development programs; rationalize the support activities of the defense sector and cut positions not related to the striking power of the state.

These or similar items are to be found in practically all crucial documents relating to AF SR reform.[13] Generally, one can divide the process of the reform of the AF SR (formerly the Army of the Slovak Republic) into several stages. It is not particularly helpful to specify the periods exactly i.e. define the individual periods according to precisely defined stages. Nonetheless, one can select, roughly, three broad stages in the development of the reform of the AF SR including the previous Army of the Slovak Republic until its official transformation into the AF SR in 2002.

Following the division of former Czechoslovakia, the period of 1993–1995 can be seen as the stage in which the AF SR sought its own security-military identity. In 1996–1998, some attempts were made to keep the initial reforms

[13] The reform process can be seen in documents "Models" (Model 2010, Model 2015, Model 2020) available on the web site of the Defense Ministry of the Slovak Republic (www.mosr.sk).

active. Since 1999, the reform of the AF SR has largely been determined by NATO accession.[14] Defense planning certainly accelerated with the ongoing NATO accession plans. It began with the first "test stage" ("zero year") in 2001 and continued with another phase of defense planning for 2002–2007.[15] Following the stage after 1999 up to the accession of Slovakia into NATO, the process of SSR was closely linked to deep transformation in civil-military relations as well.[16]

## Arms export control as part of SSR

As far as the CEE countries and Slovakia especially is concerned, the issue of legal and (legitimate) arms export constitutes a critical (and often neglected) contribution to SSR. There are serious questions regarding the problem of who can sell stockpiled weapons and what the conditions are for international export in order to avoid unnecessary accusations of illegal or unethical business. A parallel question is how compatible the arms export is with SSR.

Stockpiled weapons or surplus stock have been seen as military "materiel" belonging to the Slovak Defense Ministry, i.e. as arms which are directly owned by the Defense Ministry or are managed by the Ministry. The sale of arms, however, is no longer the direct concern of the Ministry since it releases the arms to arms export companies.

The challenge of strengthening arms export controls and increasing transparency in the arms trade is considerable, as Slovakia was suspected of having violated arms export rules many times in the past.[17] Fortunately, in order to achieve its goal of full membership in the EU and NATO, Slovakia had to fulfill strictly defined criteria and while not explicitly included in the accession negotiations, the Slovak Republic had to uphold stringent arms export controls.

The adoption of the EU Code of Conduct in the late 1990s[18] was an important initiative towards establishing multilateral controls with regard to legal arms transfers. The "code" provides for a politically binding instrument to

[14] On the whole process of "periodization" see V. Tarasovič, "Reformy ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky nielen ako podmienka integrácie do NATO," op. cit.

[15] M. Korba, I. Samson, "Reforma bezpečnostného sektora. Skúsenosti Slovenskej republiky," Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Assocation, December 2006, p. 22. Available online: www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/projekty/45 (accessed on August 14, 2011).

[16] J. Simon, *NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, a comparative study in civil-military relations*, Oxford: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 2004, pp. 145–238.

[17] "Arms trade, human rights, and European Union enlargement: the record of candidate countries," *A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper*, October 8, 2002, p. 2.

[18] On the Code of Conduct on arms export (concerning development and regulations) see "Code of conduct on arms export," Council of the European Union. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/codeofconduct.pdf (accessed on August 14, 2011).

regulate the member states' arms exports. It also establishes several export criteria, which governments must follow when authorizing or rejecting arms export applications. The EU code also requires each member state to produce an annual report on its arms exports and its implementation of the code. The EU Council of Ministers discusses the reports submitted annually and then compiles a consolidated report of the annual review of EU arms exports. The EU code does not require countries to publish their national annual reports, but most member states do so.

Looking deeper into this sensitive problem, one can see that the Defense Ministry controls excess military materiel, including surplus stocks of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. The Ministry can sell the surplus materiel directly or it may sell surplus equipment through consignment. In theory, there should be little risk that it will be sold to a dubious end user, because any materiel involved in this consignment procedure can be sold only to applicants who meet the legal criteria concerning trade with military materiel.[19]

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According to the law, it is necessary that the following information be provided before the sale can be approved: the type of materiel to be sold, the correct forms, the final destination, the date of the sale, the time of the inspection, and other information as required. In this respect, the Slovak procedures for selling surplus military materiel seem to meet international norms. However, it is not clear if the system has enough checks and balances to prevent corrupt employees from releasing weapons for illegal export.[20]

One has to differentiate between the direct actors in a sale on the one hand and the brokers of the arms business on the other. It should be noted that although offshore brokers fall under state supervision, it has been difficult to find anything but general information about the role they play in arms exports. The brokers contact domestic firms and arrange arms sales. It does not appear,

[19] On updated arms control regulations see more in a comprehensive report on Slovak foreign policy (in Slovak), http://www.mzv.sk/sk/zahranicna_politika/bezpecnostna_politika-kontrola_zbrojenia&TV=Y (accessed on August 14, 2011).

[20] Research is currently being conducted in this area that is expected to confirm this, in part, at least.

however, that the Government of Slovakia exercises any stringent control over this link in the export of arms, beyond the purely legislative framework.

According to army officials, the Defense Ministry takes great care in safeguarding military stockpiles. The procedures for handling stockpiled weapons were established in accordance with the transformation of the Slovak military from a Warsaw Pact-style force to a modern, NATO-compatible military. This move can surely be seen as a contribution to security sector reform with no "buts," i.e. any serious objections to be raised.

Once the Ministry has identified the military materiel to be dispensed with, it is offered to brokers and arms traders. The Ministry prefers that this materiel be sold to state enterprises. Before the materiel is sold, the Defense Ministry must notify other organs of the Slovak Government and obtain permission to either scrap or sell surplus weapons. The government can respond in three ways:

a. the weapons can be scrapped and some scrapped remains can be offered for sale;
b. the weapons can be modified for training purposes;
c. the weapons can be offered for sale.[21]

Once a sale has been approved, it is turned over to the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry will remain in contact with the firm involved and provide an export license.

Military materiel can also be scrapped and there are several reasons for doing this: the equipment is obsolete or there is no demand for it, or it is impossible to sell particular items due to international or bilateral obligations. Up until recently, several state-owned companies had permission to scrap equipment (Trenčín, Moldova nad Bodvou, Nováky). Over the past 10 to 15 years, small and light weapons, ammunition, fuel cells, and short-range Soviet-era SS-23 missiles have been destroyed. According to Slovak officials, precise records are kept on scrapped materiel.

In recent years, changes have been introduced into the system of arms export control. We should differentiate between the actual changes (changes to procedures, legislation, the regulatory framework, trade control enforcement training, the technical equipment of the customs authorities) and the psychological impact of EU membership (since May 2004). EU membership has both eased and complicated the autonomous decision-making of the Slovak authorities. Act No. 179/1998 is still the basic law governing the problems of

[21] The information was gathered by Ivo Samson at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic while conducting research on arms export control in Slovakia.

import, export, acquisition, mediation of trade and transportation of military materiel. This legal norm has been amended several times.

The basic changes implemented can be summarized as follows. According to the amendments, the Economy Ministry is obliged to publish (public and non-classified) annual reports on military material trade.[22]

Questions remain as to the transparent competencies of the Slovak Information Service (SIS), which has been regarded as the state agency with the full right to intervene in the process of trade applications. The authority of the SIS in vetoing military trade is controversial due to the specific character both of arms export and the SIS. According to relatively recent information, the opinion of the SIS – provided that it is delivered in due term and is substantiated – may be relevant if it relates to granting trade permission for companies. The opinion of the SIS can be considered to be a recommendation, if it relates to the granting of licenses for individual deals involving military material.

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According to Act No. 318/2005 Coll., it is no longer possible for the SIS to rescind permission to trade with military material by canceling the validity of verification on industrial security – the Certificate on Entrepreneur Industrial Security (CEIS) issued by the National Security Authority (NSA). In terms of transparency, the role of the SIS (being the civil intelligence service of a democratic state) must be regarded as a contribution to SSR in Slovakia.

As far as the competencies of other state agencies are concerned, it is the Ministry of the Economy which holds the right to impose special legal conditions for trade with military materiel on companies whose permission for trading with this material has expired or been rescinded.

Another change was introduced with the so-called “arms amnesty.”[23] Holders of military materiel not possessing legal authorization for arms trade

[22] The reports were first published in 2004, the last available report on arms export dates back to 2010. See “Annual report on military material trade in 2010,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010. Available online: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/slovakia/slovakia-national-reports (accessed on August 14, 2011).

[23] “Na Slovensku bude ďalšie kolo zbraňovej amnestie,” *aktuaility.sk*, August 20, 2009. Available online: http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/143364/na-slovensku-bude-dalsiie-kolo-zbranovej-amnestie/ (accessed on August 14, 2011).

(ATMN) were given the opportunity to notify the Economy Ministry about the quantity and location of the stockpiling of military materiel. The Ministry could decide how to dispose of this materiel so that it did not remain in the possession of persons or companies not meeting the requisite legal criteria.

Holders of the ATMN were obliged to submit a Certificate on Entrepreneur Industrial Security to the Economy Ministry.

Some regulations (acts, ordinances, regulations, norms and practices) have remained unchanged. The Economy Ministry has retained its status as the main authority in managing arms export control (as the licensing authority and "guarantor" of the arms export process in the Slovak Republic). The Foreign Ministry formally retains the veto right but only in cases where the Economy Ministry cannot evaluate the risk (of the country of destination) alone and asks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to do so. What has changed (or not changed compared to the pre-2011 period) is the absence of international scandals involving Slovakia in illicit arms exports. The main "scandals" were reported in the pre-integration period (to NATO and the EU). The only scandal (albeit not of an international dimension) to have occurred relatively recently is perhaps that involving Minister of the Economy Ľubomír Jahnátek, following a public interview in March 2007.[24] During the interview the Minister admitted that state companies dealing with arms exports should enjoy the same rights as private companies in winning over public officials in developing countries. From the interview, however, it was not clear if the Minister had "black money" and bribes in mind; we should not exclude the possibility of journalistic spin either.

Generally, one can assume that the arms trade has ceased to be an international problem for Slovakia (compared to the 1990s) and there is no firm evidence of any illegal arms trade occurring in Slovakia.

## The specifics of the Slovak approach to SSR

Slovakia took two pillars (executive and legislative) of state-building seriously in terms of the European model of the state in 1993. Slovakia created the constitutional bodies that were lacking and adapted (reformed and/or transformed) existing ones. Despite several attempts to transform the judiciary, the third pillar of the state remains problematic. Society continues to suffer from corruption and the judiciary requires a good "self-clean." However, external pressure placed on judges simply serves to polarize the judiciary.

[24] See "Ľ. Jahnátek: "Netradičné formy predaja" možno ošetriť," *eTrend.sk*. March 22, 2007. Available online: http://ekonomika.etrend.sk/ekonomika-slovensko/l-jahnatek-netradicne-formy-predaja-mozno-osetrit.html (accessed on August 14, 2011).

Strict political, economic and social reforms were implemented after the parliamentary elections in 1998.[25] These reforms accelerated internal processes to the extent that, in 2004, Slovakia was regarded as being the best prepared partner country for NATO membership of all the CEE candidate countries. This, surely, was evidence of progress within SSR, namely in the reform of the armed forces. As a result of foreign assistance in human resources development, the Defense Ministry headed the administration for adopting NATO (EU) standards, and implementing Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). There were some attempts at a holistic approach to SSR[26] as well in Slovakia. The “holistic” approach to SSR includes an overreaching framework for SSR involving both state agencies and intergovernmental organizations.[27]

Unfortunately, one has to admit that since the accession to NATO and EU in 2004, Slovak political elites have lost active interest in security and sadly this remains the case in 2011.[28]

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The administration of 2006–2010 reverted the security sector to the “old” system. Security ceased to be a priority and the absence of an immediate threat to national security was stressed. Therefore, a lack of Western-style quality controls[29] caused partial adaptations in some ministries. The adaptations were driven by a law which sometimes did not protect sufficiently against corruption, clientelism and lobbyism. Regardless, contributing to the coalition’s operations became the “prioritized priority.” In 2007, it became clear that the capabilities required for “Model 2015” were not achievable and neither were the units planned for NATO’s Response Forces

[25] Although NATO/EU membership dealt with security issues, a holistic/coherent approach had not been discussed during the 1990s.

[26] In 2003, a unique model for joint education of both civilian and military personnel following a holistic approach to the SSR was proposed (prepared by the co-author of this article, Jozef Ulian and his team). In 2004, the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved the model in law. Unfortunately, in 2008, the Slovak Parliament redirected the transformation to the old system. Incidentally, Hungary, for example, is now copying the previous Slovak model, which it is promoting as innovative and unique.

[27] D. Law, “‘Intergovernmental approaches to security sector reform,” Background paper for the workshop on “Developing an SSR concept for the United Nations,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2006.

[28] SSR “was trimmed down” to a reduction in military and civilian personnel.

[29] “Accountability” has been linked to *quality assurance* and it generally means *compliance with rules*.

(NRF), and EU Battle Groups (EU BG). However, substantial resources were spent on maintaining old-Soviet armaments which meant withdrawing basic services at the cost of other segments. It became clear that some areas were problematic:

*Intellectual area:* The intellectual sphere of some core security actors began causing serious problems; strategic assessment ignored national traditions and experience; the absence of analytical centers (Centers of Excellency or Towers of Excellency) to support decision-making became visible.

*Organizational area:* The administration did not stop "resortism;"[30] the judiciary, police, and other bodies were not included in SSR; a joint approach remains a coveted goal and is still to be highly recommended

*Support area:* Modern weapons compatible with Tactics, Technics, Procedures (TTPs); public pressure for 3Es (Economy, Effectiveness, Efficiency) in the security sector; an information strategy for public support of SSR.

*It is worth noting that the defense budget fell from 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 1.23 per cent in 2010 and to 1.13 per cent in 2011.*

In looking at the terminology used in Slovakia, one has to say that OECD, UN and EU terms, and the concepts and scope of modern SSR are not used by the Slovak security community (bar a few individuals). For this reason, it is impossible to claim that the security actors have in fact taken a holistic/coherent approach. Therefore, security management and core security actors are engaged in a vertical adaptation of their own structures that have no relation to other parts of the sector (this is known as "resortism").[31] Adaptations in security management follow interoperability (necessary conditions) with NATO, but the required degree of operability (for self-development) is absent.

In 2004, the first generation of Slovak security actors dating back to Slovak state independence (and the one following this "generation" as well) left the active scene.[32] Security actors still prefer foreign assistance which is, of course, no longer needed now that Slovakia has become a full-fledged and active member of both NATO and the EU. Admittedly, many Slovak experts have been frustrated by this approach of the state. Consequently, fewer and fewer qualified individuals are willing to cooperate with the administration on security issues.

[30] For an explanation of this term see below as well as M. Korba, I. Samson, "Reforma bezpečnostného sektora. Skúsenosti Slovenskej republiky," op. cit.

[31] There have been at least seven attempts to adapt the armed forces since 1993, while the police reforms were only begun in 2011.

[32] In actual fact, they were "fired."

It is worth noting that the defense budget fell from 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 1.23 per cent in 2010 and to 1.13 per cent in 2011.

Some security actors have presented defense adaptations (Model 2010, 2015, 2020) as successful reforms, but it has been proved that this is not the case, at least in terms of SSR. The armed forces' inability to educate the young generation about military traditions and train active reserves is more serious than politicians realize. Political elites only seldom understand the SSR concept and they rarely pay appropriate attention to security.[33] This seems to be one of the reasons why society (voters and taxpayers) are not interested in SSR. Under these circumstances, SSR has "degenerated" to simply meaning the adaptation of the armed forces to current security developments. This does not mean that the armed forces are unimportant but, as has been presented above, the armed forces are only one of several actors in the security sector. Nobody would deny that the armed forces are an important segment of the security sector, but they should not be portrayed as being the only security factor covering the security sector reform.

## New challenges in the era of selectivity

It has often been emphasized that obtaining NATO/EU membership and SSR are quite different processes with histories of their own. Generally, the incompatibility of SSR between the individual Visegrad countries is obvious. Nevertheless, there are several ways in which SSR could be viewed positively, as a healthy challenge.

The "era of selectivity" should be understood as a period when the perceptions of political will, security reform programs, effective judiciary and local administration are identical or at least similar. In this way, the current perception of SSR is different from the post-Cold War reform efforts. The countries concerned must implement these reforms themselves and not rely exclusively on the aid of external actors.

International institutions cannot implement the SSR of its member states on their behalf. In this sense, it means that the individual countries have to start realizing their own goals using their own means and their own resources.

It is not that clear that SSR can be made compatible with the realities of the so-called developing countries in Africa and/or Asia. The EU/UN security policy towards these countries can surely produce better quality reforms if we (member states) contribute both the experts and the know-how in the field of SSR.

[33] Political elites forget that the country joined NATO as a whole (not its armed forces), and that the EU has no armed forces at all.

A key challenge is to improve operational and expert capacity to provide support for SSR. The UN and the EU have created databases of experts to assist. In December 2009, the UN roster of SSR experts was established. The roster consists of 41 individuals (including one Slovak representative). In November 2010, the EU was able to offer some 120 SSR experts (including two experts from the Czech Republic and one expert from Austria).

Slovakia, a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council,[34] released a Presidential statement on SSR in 2006–2007 when it was temporary presiding country. Slovakia has also been the initiator and chair of the UN Group of Friends of SSR, which can communicate UN member states' requirements. There is no doubt that since then the Foreign Ministry has been doing a good job. On the basis of Slovakia's initiative, nationals of all security management organizations attended an SSR course in April 2009. In June 2011, members of the V4 group along with Austria and Croatia joined an SSR training course. The current situation in the Muslim world in countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, and Libya. clearly indicates that a cooperative approach to SSR is both a challenge and the way forward.

*The opportunity to rebuild a state's security was not fully utilized in Slovakia and this is true of the whole macro-region of CEE.*

The interactive approach in the "era of selectivity" also includes two important aspects.

The first is bilateral cooperation in intellectual and support areas. Specifically, this includes:

a. work hitherto on current successes in bilateral cooperation (such as CENTCOOP and Tisza);
b. introducing useful measures for strengthening the industrial and technological base and improving the effectiveness of military expenditures;
c. continuing the successes of the Slovak Foreign Ministry in SSR, including training courses within the framework of national defense academies.

[34] The role of the UN in post-conflict security sector reform," Report from the roundtable co-organized by Slovakia and the Netherlands with the assistance of DCAF, New York, November 3, 2006. Available online: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SSR%203%20November%203.pdf (accessed on August 14, 2011).

The second aspect concerns EU (UN) cooperation towards third countries. In this respect, one cannot avoid mentioning:

a. the evaluation of trends, requirements, and capabilities;
b. the tactical approach to the development of multinational units in operations of crisis management (with UNICYP being the priority); assistance to Western Balkan countries preparing for NATO and EU integration.

The opportunity to rebuild a state's security was not fully utilized in Slovakia and this is true of the whole macro-region of CEE. A holistic and coherent approach to SSR was a necessary condition for its success. SSR cannot be submerged as part of the accession process into international organizations; we regard these as two different "items." In addition, each country cooperating within the EU must consider the phenomenon of the "era of selectivity." Permanent military assistance (advising on the armed forces' adaptations) for the new democracies is not a tenable model for any future civil society.

The financial crises overseas, the debt crisis in the euro zone, and/or the Arab Spring pose challenges for country leaders and security actors regarding the use of a common language on SSR to improve democratic institutions and thus tackle forthcoming crises.

## In lieu of a conclusion

It is only with difficulty that the recently published Strategic Defense Review could be called strategic or innovative; it does not fully address the serious issues relating to SSR. Thus, Slovak security actors may have confused citizens, taxpayers, and partners (namely: are defense costs of the Slovak Armed Forces really in the interests of the state at all?). If we are to summarize the position of Slovakia in Europe and/or in the transatlantic region, we can question whether after 20 years of adaptation, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic are still the decisive security actor in Slovakia.

There is a wealth of evidence that shows that in 2011 the "resortism" of the security management and core security actors is still an issue, while justice and law enforcement institutions as well as non-statutory security players are still being neglected in the process of SSR.

Christos Katsioulis and Marius Müller-Hennig

# German defense policy at another crossroads: structural transformation with a European dimension?

Abstract: *The current transformation of the German Armed Forces will probably result in a military that is better equipped and capable of deploying more soldiers. However, there is no clear provision specifying in what sort of missions and within what politico-military framework it will engage in the future. Equally, the envisaged transformation precedes any coherent strategy development and defense policy reformulation on the national or international level. It also focuses narrowly on the aspect of efficiency, while a focus on effectiveness and flexibility would be more appropriate. With regard to NATO, the EU and other partners, the current transformation appears ambivalent: while the transformation will probably make more resources available for expeditionary missions, the requirements of classic defensive capabilities are more-or-less ignored. The defense budget cuts which triggered the current transformation process cannot be met if the current transformation proceeds as planned. The consequences of this transformation for the civil–military relationship, which has been of crucial importance for German defense policy ever since rearmament in the 1950s, have not been sufficiently considered. Demands for more public awareness alongside support for and critical monitoring of the military are not new and face the reality of a benign lack of public interest at best.*

Over the past two decades, the pace of change for the Armed Forces in Germany – the Bundeswehr – has already been quite rapid. In the past two years, however, the dynamics of change have gained extraordinary momentum. It is less than 24 months since the budget restrictions for the Defense Ministry (MoD) made the new reform of the Bundeswehr mandatory, and now

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fundamental decisions have already been taken. Additionally the MoD has had to cope with a change of minister whilst the reforms were in full spate due to a scandal concerning the doctoral thesis of the former Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.

The main features of the reforms are as follows: it has been decided to further reduce the size of the Bundeswehr from its current 235,000 soldiers to around 185,000 soldiers and to suspend compulsory military service, an option that was virtually inconceivable only two years ago. Parallel high profile defense procurement programs will be cut and more equipment will be bought "off-the-shelf." The Ministry is to be considerably reduced in size as well and the command and headquarter structures tightened, clarifying responsibilities and competencies.

As if this program for change was not enough in itself to keep the Bundeswehr busy for the next decade, let alone for the coming year, the German Armed Forces were unexpectedly hit by a couple of scandals and problematic incidents at the turn of the year. The difficult and hazardous deployment of the 5,000-strong German ISAF contingent in Afghanistan, which represents the most robust mission of the German Bundeswehr ever, and contributions to another ten missions abroad should not be forgotten either. Will all this have a drastic but also potentially beneficial effect on the Bundeswehr or will it present the institution with challenges that are just a little on the large side? What is the aim of the current reform process and what kind of defense and security role can Germany fulfill within the EU and NATO in the future, since Germany makes a point of being a support pillar for both equally? In order to provide such an assessment, we first need to briefly put the current developments in the historical context of German defense and security policy since the end of the Cold War.

## Looking back: twenty years of continuous change – no end in sight?

Since the end of the Cold War, German defense policy and the German Armed Forces have undergone continuous restructuring, downsizing and change in terms of mission scenarios. While that change is not completely unique within the Alliance, Germany's position as the former "number-one" Cold War front-line state means that the magnitude of necessary changes has been extraordinary. The vanishing of the supposedly existential threat from the former Warsaw Pact had an immediate impact – direct as well as indirect – on German defense policy. With a Cold War high of nearly 500,000 soldiers, the German armed forces were significantly oversized for a post-Cold War European neighborhood

with no direct territorial threats, either to Germany or to the North Atlantic Alliance in general.

In this period, two dynamics can be differentiated. At the beginning, the logic of downsizing and integrating the former East German Armed Forces (NVA) dominated the reform dynamic. This dynamic meant, on the one hand, the realization of a "peace dividend" and, on the other, sent a timely signal to its European neighbors that a reunited Germany would not slip back into past patterns of military dominance in continental Europe. At this time the aspect of civil–military relations – crucial since the beginning of rearmament in the 1950s in West Germany – was still high on the agenda. But, gradually, new international mission scenarios became relevant for Germany and its armed forces.

*Parallel to the incomplete strategic discussions and the trend for reducing troop sizes, the terms for compulsory military service have been reduced step-by-step over the past two decades.*

At the end of the century, this second dynamic became preeminent. The missions became more and more complex, demanding and multidimensional, and the institutional system in Germany adapted to that emerging reality. Especially in the context of the Balkan wars, the need for more capable and robust capacities to contribute to international peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions became evident, on the German as well as the European level. At the height of this development – during the Kosovo War – the German public debate about the future role of the military in foreign and security policy was rather broad and heated. It led to a general understanding that German responsibility meant that it could no longer abstain from robust engagement (as in the Iraq war in 1991), but needed to engage for peace and human rights. That debate was followed by a divided discourse on the consequences, which was limited to the expert community. On the one hand (Weizsäcker commission report), it focused primarily on the structure of the armed forces and led in 2003 to extensive reform and a reduction in the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, a separate discussion about German capacities and strategies for civilian crisis prevention and conflict resolution took place in the foreign and development policy community and resulted in the adoption of a general concept of the German Government in 2000 and an action plan for crisis prevention and conflict resolution which was passed in 2004. One year later, a crucial legal basis for the armed forces was established, when the German Parliament passed a new law defining the

parliamentary prerogative for the deployment of German troops to missions abroad. But an overarching, open debate about German foreign and security policy was lacking and even the often cited 2006 White Paper on security policy and the reform of the German Armed Forces – which remains the most prominent reference document for today's reforms – failed to integrate these separate strategic discussions into a holistic perspective for German foreign and security policy.

Parallel to the incomplete strategic discussions and the trend for reducing troop sizes, the terms for compulsory military service have been reduced step-by-step over the past two decades. However, conscription itself – a core pillar of civil–military relations in German democracy – has remained uncontested and has always found broad support in parliament and society.[1]

## The current reform – cut the budget and meet the challenges?

The situation of the German Armed Forces in 2011 is rather odd. On the one hand, the need to cut the budget due to the financial and economic crisis is pressing; on the other hand, the challenges, especially in the mission in North Afghanistan, are ever more demanding. And new missions are looming on the horizon, as the situation in Northern Africa, especially in Libya and Sudan, could require the stabilizing forces of the EU and NATO, including German troops.

The reform is therefore faced with the task of fitting the Bundeswehr into a Procrustean bed: it is supposedly too large for the financial framework, but too small for the challenges of missions abroad. The MoD therefore offered a two-sided argument to solve the dilemma. The current reform of the German Bundeswehr is to be brought forward with the rationale of cutting the budget by nearly 8 billion euros by 2015 and it should also allow Germany to deploy more than 7,000 soldiers abroad: the numbers discussed range from 10,000 to 14,000 deployable soldiers. The Government offered two "magic bullets" to achieve that aim: first, the suspension of conscription, combined with a further reduction in the overall size of the Bundeswehr and the Ministry itself; second, reform of procurement processes by concentrating on off-the-shelf solutions and considerably reducing the costs of major projects through negotiations with the defense industry. Of course, the Chancellor and the Defense Minister

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1 For the years 2005–2006 cited from "Präsentation Bevölkerungsbefragung," slide 39, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2006. Available online: http://www.sowi.bundeswehr.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NjgzNjc3NzI2Nzc1NjEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Bevoelkerungsbefragung%20Sozialwissenschaftliches%20Institut%20der%20Bundeswehr%202006.pdf (accessed on September 28, 2011).

claimed throughout the debate that security policy was not subject to the "cash situation" (*Kassenlage*). This public claim notwithstanding, the order was given to work out scenarios for substantial reductions, without any serious consideration of new strategic dynamics since the publication of the White Paper in 2006 or substantial coordination with neighbors and allies or contingency planning beyond the current mission scenarios.

In his argument for further reform the Defense Minister could also draw on a commission (*Weise-Kommission*) which was established shortly before the tight budget provisions were issued by the Finance Ministry. However, the financial framework was discussed before a security policy-based explanation was brought forward and even that commission predominantly focused on how to realize efficiency gains without a recalibration of basic strategic assessments. These hasty reform efforts coincided with a scandal leading to the resignation of Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.

His successor, since March 2011, Thomas de Maizière, recalibrated the reform of the Bundeswehr, adding a conceptual basis to the above mentioned changes. He issued new defense policy guidelines, outlining the environment for German security policy, German interests, and the strategies and means to achieve them. He thus turned the logic of his predecessor round and put the financial framework behind the strategic analysis. However, although he could negotiate some room for maneuver with the Treasury, he could not revise the basic decisions on conscription or the financial framework. The new Minister is also confronted with the Procrustean dilemma – a Bundeswehr with too many tasks and too little financial backing. Additionally he has to cope with his predecessor's groundbreaking decision, for which the Bundeswehr has been poorly prepared: the end of general conscription, which he supported when Minister of the Interior.

## A professional expeditionary army – the right structural adjustments?

This first pillar of the current reform process, the suspension of general conscription, came as quite a surprise. While it had been demanded by the smaller political parties (the Liberal, Green and Left parties) in parliament for quite some time, both major political parties, the conservatives as well as the social democrats, were previously broadly in favor of conscription. The fact that a conservative defense minister now not only advocated the suspension of conscription as an option but also managed to rally nearly all influential conservative politicians from federal government, the influential prime ministers of the federal states as well as the influential party cadres behind this cause

was nothing short of a political masterstroke. But the logic associated with this suspension is not as uncontroversial as it might seem at first sight. Since conscripts are by default not deployed to missions abroad, they of course tie down a certain proportion of Germany's professional soldiers at home as well. Therefore, by suspending conscription the proportion of troops available for deployment abroad can be increased, even when the total size of the armed forces may decrease. But compulsory military service is still one of the most effective ways of attracting sufficient people to the career of professional soldier. Experiences from other countries which have suspended or completely abandoned compulsory military service illustrate the difficulties that come with this move. The very first experiences with volunteers in the German Armed Forces seem to underline this point, as 20 per cent of recruits leave service in the Bundeswehr within the first months.

The second pillar of the reform, to significantly increase to 10,000 (Report of the Chief of Armed Forces Staff Volker Wieker) or even double (Weise Commission) the effective capacity for sustainable deployment to missions abroad (until now the number has amounted to around 7,000) seems to be rather uncontroversial at first sight. After all, the Allies – above all the United States – have more than once lobbied for greater German commitment of troops for out-of-area missions. But the German Armed Forces in their current structure are close to their limit with regard to deployment capacity. Any additional capacities to be made available in the course of the new transformation therefore should be welcomed. The underlying assumption, however, that this sort of mission will be the dominant task for the German Armed Forces in the future comes without any updated threat assessment or consideration of political dynamics. It seems to be a sort of ad hoc stipulation and obviously is not based on new comprehensive deliberation concerning threats, strategic options, limited resources, and the domestic debate in Germany. The lack of a strategic debate combining a comprehensive foreign-, security- and development-policy rationale with the financial framework becomes evident. The new Defense Policy Guidelines,[2] presented in May 2011, try to close that gap ex post, but do not provide the necessary ground for such a strategic decision, as they are a document of the MoD and cannot include the broader aspects of foreign and security policy. The guidelines focus thus on the tasks of the Bundeswehr.

[2] "Defense Policy Guidelines," Federal Ministry of Defense, 2011. Available online: http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzIzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NmY2ODMyNmU2YjM0N2EyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Defence%20Policy%20Guidelines%20(27.05.11).pdf (accessed on September 28, 2011).

Additionally, new parliamentary mandates – which for Germany is the conditio sine qua non for a new mission such as the current one in Afghanistan – hardly qualify as a realistic option for the foreseeable future. All in all, the current transformation process will be the final step taking a predominantly defensive military to a military with a more distinct expeditionary character. While this much seems to be clear – namely that the character of the German Armed Forces will become more expeditionary – there still remain serious questions that go beyond this abstract issue. Such expeditionary forces, for example, could be deployed to a series of completely different missions, ranging from power projection, actual military intervention, peacekeeping and stabilization to international disaster relief.

## Germany's role in the alliance, and in European and global security

The reform rationale somehow fails to take into account the international debates that frame German security policy to a high degree. The discussion that led to NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, offers a slight shift towards more defense and regional crisis management and away from global intervention capability and power projection. A German Bundeswehr concentrated on missions abroad would fit the NATO profile of 1999 rather than the fairly intervention-ambivalent NATO of 2010, which is engaged right now in many out-of-area missions but seems rather reluctant to engage in more theatres.[3] The German role in NATO has encountered some reservations in recent years, especially on the part of the smaller Allies, not least because of Berlin's approach of integrating Russia into a system of cooperative security in Europe. The decision to abstain in the vote on UN-SR 1973 and subsequently even to withdraw German soldiers from the NATO units in the Mediterranean has all but improved that picture. This skepticism could be met with German engagement in the core task of NATO, the defense of the Alliance. One minor example of practical solidarity is the Air Policing for the Baltic States, which was carried out by the German Luftwaffe in 2005, 2008, 2009, and 2011. Although the Defense Ministry claims that the new structure of the Bundeswehr would still allow it to fulfill all the demands and expectations of the Allies, it seems difficult to conceive how a reduced German Bundeswehr will be able to ease the skepticism of the Allies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, when the focus of the Bundeswehr as well as its best units are concentrated in out-of-area missions. Therefore the current cuts in quantity need to be coupled with

[3] Cited from the debates in NATO on the engagement in Libya.

an increase in quality. This has been neglected in the current reform debate; the focus was rather on numbers. However, the latest documents on the transformation[4] signify an improvement in training, capabilities and equipment leading to more capable and flexible units of the Bundeswehr, which would allow them to fulfill the different tasks better than before. But this needs to be matched with qualified personnel, the best heads and minds as the Weise-Report puts it, an aspect, which has yet to be finally cleared.

Another difficult aspect of the German armed forces reform is the missing European dimension. The two relevant reports with regard to reform, the Weise Commission and the report of the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff, rhetorically underline the importance of European burden-sharing in defense procurement, research and development, and the pooling and sharing of capabilities. However, this rhetoric is coupled with deep skepticism with regard to actual results. General Wieker's report does not anticipate net savings through Europeanization in the coming years. The cautious European approach in the reform is matched by similar behavior at the European level. The former Minister of Defense zu Guttenberg, together with his Swedish colleague, presented the so-called Ghent Initiative. Its aim is to foster European burden-sharing through specialization of capabilities. But the first step is just to introduce national review processes to identify possible areas of cooperation. The various member states are to check which parts of their national armed forces they could share with others or provide to the Allies. In this process they are to be supported by the European Defence Agency. This initiative is necessary and important; however, the timing is rather problematic, as cuts are taking place in defense budgets right now, and the time is ripe for real action. France and Great Britain have shown what such a step towards more cooperation in Europe might look like. With the bilateral treaty on defense and security cooperation the two most important military powers in Europe

*A German Bundeswehr concentrated on missions abroad would fit the NATO profile of 1999 rather than the fairly intervention-ambivalent NATO of 2010.*

[4] "Sachstand zur Neausrichtung der Bundeswehr," September 20, 2011. Available online: http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NzM3NjZkMzI3OTczMzEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Informationspaket%20Grobstrukturen%20der%20Bundeswehr%20gesamt%20neu.pdf (accessed on September 28, 2011).

agreed to deepen their cooperation, especially concerning nuclear research, aircraft carriers and expeditionary forces. Germany, the traditional other part of the European engine, stands aside, although it is faced with exactly the same challenges regarding the conception of security policy as well as budget restrictions. The new Minister de Maizière, who had been expected to improve most of the deficits of his predecessor, did not send very optimistic signals when he declared that European experiences in security policy have been rather sobering and that he would thus focus more on cooperation within NATO.

## The civil–military relationship and post-conscription after Afghanistan

While so far we have focused only on the strategic question of capabilities, threats and mission scenarios, there is another important dimension for the reform of German defense policy that must not be neglected. As already indicated, the civil–military relationship has been a core concern for German defense policy since World War II. The Armed Forces had to be securely embedded in German democracy and live up to high internal standards which became embodied in the principle of the "citizen in uniform" and a particular concept of responsible leadership development and civic education (*Innere Führung*). While these concepts are not completely dependent on a conscript army, it can be stated that these internal standards and conscription were mutually conducive and there is no real concept on the horizon which might address the challenges this reform entails for civil–military relations. Through general conscription a wide range of young men from diverse socio-economic backgrounds made the armed forces directly relevant for large parts of the German population. In turn, this wide "catchment area" also provided for a diverse military that could draw on a wide range of professional and social qualifications, and experience. Attracting a similarly diverse spectrum of young professional soldiers without general conscription would come at a substantial cost. It remains to be seen whether the current proposal of voluntary service attracting up to 15,000 soldiers for a service duration of up to 23 months will be able to make up for the suspension of general conscription. Initial experiences illustrate some of the difficulties, as many young men and women have signed up to serve, but the rate of people leaving after a few months of service is also quite high. The need to address the issue of providing incentives and a constructive atmosphere for the voluntary service is pressing.

Additionally, the current reform agenda has not given a convincing answer to the question of how the Bundeswehr can attract the necessary number of young professionals to maintain the level of 185,000 soldiers in the coming

years. Against the background of demographic change in German society, the armed forces will be competing with many other employers for the best human resources. What the Bundeswehr can offer at present is not seen as attractive and needs to be refined to make the service a viable option for a sustainable number of people. This requires more resources, more career options within and outside the armed forces, and new models to balance work and family life – especially for professional soldiers.

## Outlook – strategic assessment and strategic discussion missing

Germany in 2011 is at a crossroads: it needs to find a way to meet the challenges of the financial and economic crisis and, at the same time, remain a credible and capable actor in security policy, with all the necessary instruments at hand. The current reform fails to meet this double challenge and is focused solely on fitting the Bundeswehr into a smaller Procrustean bed framed by massive budget cuts. It remains unclear how the new German Bundeswehr will be able to meet international expectations and the high standards defined by German integration in NATO and the EU. The reform process is oddly inward: references to European and Allied partners are rather thin and rhetorical. If there is no widening of the narrow debate beyond the call for more expeditionary forces and budget savings at the same time, Germany will fail to fulfill its traditional role as an engine of multilateralism. The reform process is thus short-sighted and could lead the Bundeswehr into the necessity of reforming itself again in a few years. The flexibility required to cope with newly emerging threats and risks is missing and could lead to further misunderstandings with the Allies and partners. This calls into question one of the major pillars of German defense and security policy, namely *Bündnissolidarität*, meaning solidarity within the Alliance and the European Union. However, although these decisions are important for the future of German security policy, even within Germany there is no strategic debate on the future path, while a rather finance-driven logic guides the reform of the armed forces and the Defense Ministry. New tasks for the Bundeswehr – for example, a greater focus on maritime missions to protect seafarers and sea lanes – are missing from the debate, and it is unclear

*It remains unclear how the new German Bundeswehr will be able to meet international expectations and the high standards defined by German integration in NATO and the EU.*

whether and how the reformed Bundeswehr could meet these challenges in the future. The basic prerequisite for providing such strategic flexibility would be a sound assessment of the current global and regional strategic environment and its future development. The new Defense Policy Guidelines provide some assessments in this direction, but also introduce a rather narrowly defined national interest. But since the most reliable feature of such assessments is uncertainty, one of the core recommendations for Germany would probably be that its defense policy and armed forces reform should favor effectiveness and flexibility over efficiency. But a narrow focus on efficiency is the most distinctive feature of the current transformation logic – and probably its most serious flaw.

Gergely Varga

# Security sector reform: Hungarian experiences in the defense sector

Abstract: *Transforming a country's security system is a never-ending task, with each nation trying to adapt to the ever-changing internal and external security challenges. Security sector reform can be a struggle in war-torn countries and failed states, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, but neither is it a simple process in countries going through major peaceful transformation of the political–economic system. In the last two decades, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary, found this out the hard way. This article takes a look at the Hungarian experience on security system reform, focusing on the defense sector. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO accession and integration into the Western military alliance were the main driving force for the defense policy of Hungary, which had just regained its freedom from Soviet rule. This was a highly important and useful strategic objective and was an incentive for reform, but it was not enough to prompt the comprehensive, deep transformation and modernization of Hungary's military capabilities. As we show in this article, the lack of a long-term predictable strategy and political attention, decreasing resources and slow structural changes were key features in the challenge of reforming Hungarian defense.*

Hungary has been involved in security sector reforms of the major peace support operations of NATO for the past twenty years. The enormous task of rebuilding/transforming a nation's security system, from the armed forces to police law enforcement agencies and the intelligence services, is a long and sometimes painful task, as can be seen in the Balkans or Afghanistan. However, even within much more developed countries, where there has been no armed conflict to tear apart the state and its institutions, transformation of the security sector can be a major challenge, especially in countries going through systemic transformation of their political and economic systems and social institutions.

Varga, G., "Security sector reform: Hungarian experiences in the defense sector," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XX, No. 3, 2011, pp. 29–42.

This analysis focuses on the Hungarian experience of the last 20 years, during which the county had to transform itself from a communist dictatorship into a functioning democracy. It concentrates, however, on only one segment of the security sphere, the defense sector. Naturally each security sector has its own peculiarities, but there are many common challenges to be overcome, and many of the conclusions regarding its successes and failures can be applied to other areas of the security sector.

More than 20 years have passed since the 1989–1990 changes, which laid the foundations for the Central European nations, including Hungary's current historical conditions. The basic pillars including democratic institutions and the market economy were established at the beginning, but two decades later it has become clear to all in Hungary that it takes much more than simply implementing new basic rules to become a real democracy and have a successful, competitive economy. Of course, the Hungarian security sector is generally no exception. Creating and maintaining a modern, effective defense force and law enforcement agencies and other related institutions and agencies is a complex and far-reaching task. Like other Central European countries, Hungary has faced similar external and internal security challenges since the fall of communism. The geopolitical changes, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, the emergence of national aspirations in Eastern Europe, globalization, the opening up of borders, and the economic and social transformation are all challenges that emerged at once. The lines between external and internal security issues, traditional security policy and law enforcement became more fluid. The Hungarian security sector, which was designed to serve and preserve an authoritarian regime in a much more closed and predictable environment, has, as a whole, had to be transformed in order to cope with the new challenges and fulfill the requirements of the rule of law and democratic civilian control.

*The transformation of the security sector was not the core focus of the overall transition process Hungary underwent.*

It is important to note that although the connecting points between the security sectors have multiplied in the last two decades, it is more accurate to speak of security sectors rather than one integrated security sector, from an institutional point of view at least. Over the past few decades, the defense sector, the secret services, law enforcement, the disaster response and civil emergency institutions have all developed their own, rather individual histories, which naturally crisscross and impact on other fields. Hence, it is worth mentioning

the different regulatory areas as well when discussing the subsequent security sector reforms. A comprehensive and in-depth analysis of all the sectors is beyond the framework of this article; the paper therefore focuses only on one segment – the defense sector – and draws some general conclusions on that topic. It will, however, first refer to some assessments on the common, primarily political, challenges facing the security sector as a whole, and also mention the challenges facing the different subsectors.

In looking at the history of the security sector in Hungary, our starting point should be the fact that the transformation of the sector was not the core focus of the overall transition process Hungary underwent, at least following the basic democratic changes of 1989–1990. In a sense this was a positive symptom, since it meant that there were no existing, critical external and internal security threats or problems facing Hungary, which the political elite would have had to tackle; nonetheless, in no way would I wish to belittle the new challenges. The other rather odd thing that could be derived from the previous statement is that the reforms or changes were to a rather large extent driven by the burden of resources, and not by the tasks and required capabilities. During this period, the defense forces in particular were treated in accordance with the "leftover principle" as far as the state budget was concerned.

The Hungarian political system was polarized early on from the 1989 transition and has not changed in terms of the lack of trust and unwillingness of the political parties to cooperate and compromise. This has implicitly had a negative effect on each sector of the government, including the security sector. The ruling governments, therefore, have thought only in terms of four-year cycles at best, or even shorter timeframes, making long-term strategic planning and implementation impossible. It is difficult to count the number of reform initiatives of the defense sector alone. The term "reform" has now virtually disappeared from the vocabularies of the political parties because it has become seriously compromised for two reasons. On the one hand, reforms have usually meant primarily budget cuts, and on the other hand, such a large number of "reforms" have been announced and yet so few have been brought to a successful end that the term has lost credibility. Another consequence of the polarized political atmosphere is that successive governments often fell to extremes while pursuing their policies; accepting criticism or useful proposals from the opposition has always been a rare event. Thirdly, the heated domestic political discourse did not encourage the governments to undertake the deep structural and much needed reforms quickly; on the contrary, the norm was to postpone painful decisions. To varying degrees all these problems were present in each segment of the security sector.

## Security policy in search of strategy

Developing the basic objectives and roles, and formulating a strategy in the new security environment was an enormous task for all transforming Central and Eastern European countries. There were common challenges, which each country in the region had to face, such as the changing and unpredictable environment, the difficulties of transforming from authoritarian regimes to democratic political systems in the domestic arena, and the fact that the political and security leaders were inexperienced. The first national security strategy, which provided a comprehensive conception of the main directions of defense policy, was only formulated in 2002, but even that strategy had a very short life, since it was adopted just before the 2002 elections, and the newly elected Government neglected the document.

After regaining freedom from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, it was not obvious that Hungary would become a member of NATO within a decade.[1] There was much uncertainty both on the side of NATO and the leaders of the Central and Eastern European nations about the future security architecture of Europe. Neutrality seemed to be a viable option in the early 1990s in Hungary, and it was a popular option[2] in some circles of the first conservative Government. Despite the fall of the iron curtain and the end of the cold war, the traditional challenges of Hungary's geopolitical position seemed to reemerge. Distrust has long reigned between Hungary and her surrounding neighbors, countries inhabited by about 3 million Hungarians due to the WWI peace treaty, known as the Treaty of Trianon. The fear of possible encirclement reappeared at the beginning of the 1990s amongst some members of the Hungarian political elite, which made way for the defense concept of "circularized defense." This meant that the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) had to be prepared in theory to counter aggression from multiple directions at the same time. This concept required a relatively large force, and hence a conscription army was maintained. This focus on territorial defense was further strengthened by the war in the Balkans. Although Hungary was not directly involved in the conflict, Yugoslav aircraft violated the border and relations with Belgrade in general were tense. Given the economic and budgetary constraints, coupled with the unpopularity of the conscription army, maintaining a large force seemed to be unrealistic in the long term as well.

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[1] L. Barta-Vámos, "The foundations of the Hungarian security policy and the traditions of decision making," *Aarms* Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008, pp. 63–71.

[2] T. Kern, "A rendszerváltás utáni haderőreform kísérletek. Eredmények és kudarcok," *Századvég Műhelytanulmányok*, 2008. Available online: http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/letoltesek/6.pdf (accessed on September 4, 2011).

With the uncertain security environment, the limits of Hungary's capacity and the desire to belong firmly to the West, NATO accession increasingly became the strategic objective of the political and military elite. Participation in partnership programs and peace support missions, and preparation for accession became the main and most effective drivers of reform in the defense field. Hungarian participation in the IFOR and SFOR missions was a major success and the work of the Hungarian forces and the engineer battalion in Bosnia was widely recognized in NATO;[3] however, it became clear that only a small section of the HDF was prepared to be sent on peace support missions. Nonetheless, providing more resources was not possible in the mid-1990s, since the extent of the defense sector was largely determined by the major budget restrictions of 1995, when the defense budget hit a low.

*Strategic planning seems to have meant accommodating pressing external burdens and short-term political objectives, rather than the careful formulation and execution of long-term strategies.*

The first comprehensive reform measures were only taken by the Fidesz government from 1998 onwards and during Hungary's early years as a NATO member.[4] The KFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia, the September 11, 2001 attacks and the geopolitical events that followed clearly demonstrated that Hungary would have to prepare itself for a more robust role in the peace support missions, especially in the Balkans, traditionally a strategic region for Hungary. The regional and global security developments in tandem with the consolidation of the Balkan conflicts and September 11 shifted defense policy even further towards defending interests and values rather than territory. The political leadership of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (MoD) subordinated each segment of the HDF to the missions. It was true that participating in the peace support operations was the main driving force for defense reforms, and the HDF gained valuable experience from the NATO led missions. Although Hungary was performing relatively well in the missions, particularly considering its size, it was subject to constant criticism[5]

[3] Z. Szenes, "Koncepcióváltás a magyar békefenntartásban?," *Nemzet és Biztonság*, No. 4, 2008, pp 67–80.

[4] T. Kern, op. cit.

[5] See "Kemény NATO kritika a honvédségnek," *Origo Online*, April 6, 2000. Available online: http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20000406kemeny.html (accessed on September 5, 2011); "NATO-kritika a kormánynak," *Origo Online*, October 12, 2004. Available online: http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20041022natokritika.html (accessed on September 5, 2011).

from the beginning of accession because of the overall underfunding of the defense sector, and its not meeting previously promised commitments. The conservative government led by Fidesz between 1998 and 2002 tried to maintain a balanced approach regarding Article 5 and the peace support tasks, whereas the socialist–liberal governments from 2002 up to 2010 placed greater emphasis on the latter. Under the 2002–2006 socialist–liberal government, the capabilities of territorial defense were significantly reduced and complete arms-systems (heavy artillery, armored divisions) of the HDF were withdrawn for financial reasons. The opposition, at that time Fidesz, strongly criticized these actions, and when it came to power in 2010, one of its main political goals concerning the HDF was to rebalance priorities. However, the combined promise to uphold international commitments and budget restrictions will probably significantly restrict its latitude.

As the historical background briefly outlined above shows, each government since 1990 has put some form of defense reform on its agenda, but successful implementation, not to mention comprehensive transformation, was usually slow or delayed. In the initial years after the changes in 1989, the focus was on securing rule of law and shifting to civilian control of the armed forces, while creating the major legislative frames and competencies. The first major comprehensive reform package was the strategic review of the Orbán Government around the time of Hungary's NATO accession, which brought major structural changes, but did not resolve core questions, such as the question of conscription, or Hungary meeting her obligations towards NATO on modernization, and the budget. In the course of the defense reforms, the most palpable change in the eyes of the public was of course the abolition of conscription in 2004 that resulted from the defense review of the previous years. Although the transfer was conducted successfully, there were not sufficient funds to implement the necessary further reforms or modernization programs outlined in the years following the reform initiatives.[6] The increasing military obligations within NATO concerning peace-support missions made the transformation all the more pressing, but generally the HDF managed only to implement the most necessary improvements. Listed in the table below are the major steps taken in the transformation of Hungarian defense over the past twenty years; a brief summary of the areas covered within each phase is given.

In summary, strategic planning seems to have meant accommodating pressing external burdens and short-term political objectives, rather than the careful formulation and execution of long-term strategies. In what follows we

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[6] Z. Szenes, "Magyar haderő-átalakítás a NATO-tagság idején," *Nemzet és Biztonság*, No. 3, 2009, pp: 33–43.

**Table 1**. Major military reforms in Hungary, 1990–2010

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1990 | amendments to the Law on national defense<br>Partnership for Peace | • civil–democratic control of the armed forces<br>• structural transformation of the leadership of the HDF |
| 1993 | amendments to the Law on national defense | • civil democratic control<br>• authorities capacities |
| 1995 | resolution on long- and medium-term transformation of the armed forces | • basic objectives and scope of medium-term and long-term transformation<br>• new command and control system<br>• beginning of the transformation of the conscript army into a mixed system |
| 1998 | security and defense policy principles | • basic policy objectives, principles |
| 1999–2000 | strategic review | • integration of the chiefs of staff and the MoD<br>• expanding the number of high-readiness forces<br>• organizational rationalization<br>• preparation for the possibility of introducing a professional force<br>• but maintaining conscription<br>• modernization of mobilization, training, capabilities in a 10 year time-period |
| 2002–2003 | defense review | • transformation into a professional army<br>• reassessment of the security environment<br>• reassessment of roles, functions<br>• improving capabilities, in light of Prague capabilities requirement |
| 2006–2007 | defense transformation | • organizational reform of the MoD and related agencies<br>• organizational reform of the HDF |
| 2009 | National military strategy | • basic policy objectives, principles |

would like to analyze some of the core questions of the transformation process, in order to highlight the particular challenges and tasks facing the sector. The three themes will be budget, transitioning to a democratic system with civilian control and force strength; naturally these only cover a fraction of the defense issues, but in some way they have all been and will be essential to the transformation of Hungarian defense.

## Budget, the defense sector as "leftover"

It is worth beginning with the financial issues concerning the defense sector, since resources decisively determine the extent of development in each sector. After the political transformation, the defense sector lost its privileged status and this was also reflected in its budget. From the late 1980s onwards there had been a steady decline in defense expenditure until 1996.[7] After the severe financial strains and reforms of the Horn government, and with modest economic growth starting in 1997, defense budgets began to increase slowly, and this trend continued until 2003, although it never reached the NATO standard of 2 per cent. Up until this point, the economic growth figures and defense expenditure largely correlated each other, as can be seen below in Figure 1. After 2003 this trend changed.

Although economic growth in Hungary lagged behind that of neighboring countries, there were still some modest increases in GDP up until 2008. Defense expenditure started to decline as early as 2004, however. The socialist–liberal government made increased welfare spending a priority during its rule. After the 2006 election, the second Gyurcsány Government had to start seriously

**Table 2.** Comparison of Hungarian GDP growth and defense expenditure growth, 2001–2010

| | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP growth (%) | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 0.1 | 0.9 | -6.8 | 1.3 |
| Defense budget growth (%) | 10.6 | -5.8 | 4.5 | -5.6 | -10.8 | -10.6 | 3.8 | -6.0 | -11 | 7.4 |

Sources: "Financial and economic data relating to NATO defence," NATO Public Diplomacy Division, March 2011. Available online: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110309_PR_CP_2011_027.pdf (accessed on September 2, 2011); "Real GDP growth rate," Eurostat. Available online: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb020 (accessed on September 2, 2011).

[7] B. Taksás, "A honvédelmi tárca költségvetése a számok tükrében. (2001-2008)," *Hadtudományi Szemle*, No. 1, 2009. Available online: http://hadtudomanyiszemle.zmne.hu/?q=hu/2009/2-%C3%A9vfolyam-1-sz%C3%A1m/t%C3%A1rsadalomtudom%C3%A1ny/honv%C3%A9delmi-t%C3%A1rca-k%C3%B6lts%C3%A9gvet%C3%A9se-sz%C3%A1mok-t%C3%BCkr%C3%A9ben-2001-2008 (accessed on September 5, 2011).

tackling the enormous state deficits; hence, the resources available to the defense sector were further slashed. Hungarian defense expenditure became one of the lowest within NATO, declining steadily to around one per cent of GDP. As shown in Figure 1, the last decade has seen the MoD make negative budgetary changes. The Orbán Government sought to alter this trend and introduce some initial steps. In the original fiscal plans for 2011 there was a modest increase for the MoD. However, due to the rapidly deteriorating international financial environment, and the government's miscalculation regarding budget forecasts, the budget for the MoD was modified in early 2011, removing nearly 10 per cent of its total resources. The current outlook is rather bleak given the European crisis and Hungary's continued weak economic performance.

## Civilian control and democratic supervision

The constitutional changes and major legislative measures adopted in 1989–1990, during the transition period, laid down the basis for democratic control of the armed forces. The state-party structures that had formerly existed in the armed forces were dissolved, party privileges and the scope of authority were withdrawn, and fundamental political rights and civil liberties (the right to free speech, free assembly and free religion) were guaranteed by law. A major objective of the legislators was to "depoliticize" the HDF, and build democratic checks and balances into the political command and control structures.[8] Therefore the state administration was separated off from the military organization and the Command of the Hungarian Defense Forces was made independent from the Defense Ministry. This newly created body was subordinated to the prime minister via the defense minister. Yet, according to the new constitutional provisions, the commander in chief of the HDF is the president,[9] which theoretically means that the president is now top of the command chain. Parliament gained the right to decide on the deployment of the HDF inside and outside the country. The new structure raised serious questions about whether there was a clear chain of command and system for oversight, and paved the way for disputes over responsibility for the next decade between the military and the political–civilian establishment. All of this was manifest in

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[8] Z. Murányi, "A civil kontroll néhány jogfilozófiai és politika-elméleti problémája a magyar honvédelemben," in R. Joó, G. Pataki, *A haderő demokratikus irányítása*, Budapest: Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, 1998.

[9] "The President of the Republic is the commander in chief of the Hungarian Defense Forces." The Constitution of the Hungarian Republic, 29 § (2).

the political disputes between the first democratically elected Government and the President, and was resolved by the Constitutional Court in 1991. The Court ruled in favor of the Government, stating that responsibility for operational command and control of the Armed Forces clearly lies with the executive branch and that the president can issue guidelines, but cannot directly give orders to the Commander of the HDF. This ruling, along with the Law on national defense adopted in 1992, guaranteed government guidance of the armed forces, and was further support for the strengthening of civilian control, although this took years to materialize in practice. The Government increased the number of civil servants at the Defense Ministry, and the State Secretary became a civilian. However, there were often problems concerning cooperation between the civilian and the military apparatus, therefore the question of an integrated framework was raised towards the end of the government led by Magyar Demokrata Forum (MDF).

*Even creating the main legislative and institutional framework, necessary to develop a force capable of adjusting to the new environment, took more than a decade.*

Despite these problems, the 1994–1998 socialist–liberal Horn Government did not change the basic framework of the MoD or the HDF.[10] However, some changes were made at the MoD, and these could be considered a retrograde step, since the administrative leadership of the MoD was awarded to generals and not civilians. The debates between the civilian and military leadership continued and the flow of information, cooperation and coordination was delayed. On the other hand, amalgamating the position of the Chief of Staff and Commander within the military structure can be considered a positive step towards NATO standards, as can the creation of the Air Force General Staff, the Land Forces General Staff and Logistics under the HDF Chiefs of Staff.

The tensions between the Ministry and the Chief of Staff were resolved only after the strategic review of the Orbán Government in 2000–2001, the main findings and objectives of the review were strengthened by a parliamentary resolution.[11] The Command of the HDF was re-organized, and a new integrated Ministry was formed. The Chief of Staff became part of the Ministry, while

[10] T. Kern, op. cit.

[11] "61/2000. (VI. 21.) OGY határozat a Magyar Honvédség hosszú távú átalakításának irányairól." Available online: http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o00h0061.htm/o00h0061.htm (accessed on September 5, 2011).

remaining part of the HDF as well. The structure of the military was also transformed, with the establishment of the Joint Forces Operational Center as the central organ under the Chief of Staff, while the Land Forces Staff and Air Force Staff were transformed into Commands. The organization of the military was further improved in 2007 with the establishment of the Joint Forces Command, and with the integration of the Land Forces, Air Force and Joint Forces Logistic Support, Medical, Information Technology Commands and several Ministry organizations. The new joint command was created to enable it to step up to the challenges posed by modern warfare, especially delivering comprehensive peace support operations.[12] Obviously, the organizational and structural reforms mentioned above are those that are most important; each government made changes according to its own preferences and priorities at the central ministry level, the military branch and the related organizations and institutions. This brief overview shows that even creating the main legislative and institutional framework, necessary to develop a force capable of adjusting to the new environment, took more than a decade.

## A small and professional force

The Hungarian Armed Forces – like most Eastern European armies – was a mass army designed for traditional territorial warfare against the Western forces. The transformation of the Army from an obligatory conscript force into a narrower, mobile, voluntary professional force took a long time, and in some ways has yet to be completed According to figures issued by *The Military Balance*, the number of active forces decreased gradually from 94,000 in 1990 to 29,000 by 2011, with a slight increase from the lowest number, 25,000, recorded in 2007.[13] The first steps towards professionalizing the force were taken in 1995, when contracted soldiers joined up. Although the basic objectives of transforming the army into a smaller, professional army were the same as in other countries – modernization, reducing costs – for a long time the decreasing numbers in the armed forces did not significantly alter the old mass army structures, and the modernization programs (new equipment, tools, military hardware) progressed very slowly; consequently, these goals were not met. Reform – just as in other areas of government – after the constant, ever-changing reform programs of the armed forces was perceived by the public

[12] J. Jakus, "A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól napjainkig," *Hadtudomány*, No. 1, 2005. Available online: http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhtt/hadtudomany/2005/1/2005_1_5.html (accessed on September 2, 2011).

[13] *The Military Balance 2011*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011.

and by the military personnel to be just a way of reducing spending with no qualitative changes.

Having fewer conscripts and a shorter military service in the HDF was the most, or perhaps the only visible element of the changes to the public. With the conditions within which obligatory military service was conducted deteriorating and the lack of direct military threat in sight of Hungarian society, conscription became more and more unpopular amongst the public throughout the 1990s. Since the creation of a professional army required major political, structural and financial changes, and as stated above, the defense sector was not a priority for politicians, conditions for ending conscription only evolved by the early 2000s. Traditionally the parties on the right were more careful and divided on the subject, but by the end of the 1990s those on the conservative side became much more open to professionalization. The strategic review of the first Orbán Government stated[14] that it would create the conditions for transformation into a professional force, but only while maintaining general conscription and it adhered to this position throughout its time in office.[15] The socialist–liberal Government formed in 2002 decided to resolve the question, and in 2004 the Government and opposition agreed to create the necessary legislation to halt conscription and create a defense force composed of professional contract and reserve forces, and the transformation was successfully implemented starting from 2005. HDF numbers stabilized at around 25,000 in 2005 and a slight increase is planned for 2011.[16]

But behind the numbers, the picture is much more worrisome. As with other European nations, Hungary is struggling to meet its NATO obligations when it comes to the number and quality of deployable forces. Hungary deploys about 1,000 soldiers in missions around the world, mostly in Afghanistan and in Kosovo. Of the 25,000 strong force, in reality there are only about 9,000–10,000 soldiers theoretically capable of being deployed on foreign missions, if they were given the necessary capabilities, equipment, and financial resources. Bearing in mind the rotations in the missions, the necessary pre-deployment training and the subsequent resting period, it is a major task, in terms of manpower, for the HDF to meet the coalition obligations undertaken by Hungary.

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[14] "61/2000. (VI. 21.) OGY határozat a Magyar Honvédség hosszú távú átalakításának irányairól," op. cit.

[15] T. Kern, op. cit.

[16] "1500 fővel növelné a honvédek számát a kormány," *Origo Online*, October 26, 2010. Available online: http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20101026-simicsko-1500-fovel-novelne-a-honvedseg-letszamat-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium.html (accessed on September 2, 2011).

## Without reserves

No country can afford the luxury of not having some kind of complementary force alongside the professional forces. Unanticipated security threats, natural disasters or other unpredictable events may occur and additional forces and capabilities might be needed. However, Hungary transformed its army into a professional force without building the required complementary component, and this has been the case for years, despite numerous incidents – especially floods – over a short period of time illustrating the fact that the county needs a well trained, effective reserve force.

The first proposal to establish a reserve force, a National Guard, came in 2000 from the Fidesz party. The aim was to create an approximately 20,000 strong force alongside the small, professional force.[17] The three-month obligatory military training period was to be retained and the ranks of the Guard were to have been filled by those choosing to serve later. The concept did not receive political backing, even from the Government, partly because of the unpopularity of conscription, and partly because of the necessary extra resources it would have required, and ultimately it failed. The next initiative to create a reserve force emerged when the legislature sought to create a professional armed force in 2004. Fidesz wanted to link the abolition of conscription to the establishment of a complementary defense force. Although the proposed legislation provided a formal opportunity to create reserve forces, in reality, it did not solve the broader financial and regulatory questions relating to the issue. The completely voluntary reserve force was formally established, but there were no incentives in the system for citizens or for employers, the number of reserves could not even be measured in hundreds. For years, the socialist–liberal Government – it seems – had no intention of dealing seriously with the question. The first serious steps to cure the problem were taken in 2008. After the Government had undertaken a comprehensive review of the reserve system, parliament amended the legislation on HDF forces. Although the amendments were an improvement on the basic regulations, there was no plan to provide further resources for the reserve forces due to budgetary restraints. According to the second Gyurcsány Government, plans for a functionally operational, effective reserve force would

*No country can afford the luxury of not having some kind of complementary force alongside the professional forces.*

[17] T. Kern, op. cit.

only have been developed by 2013–2014. After the change of government in 2010, the new leadership of the MoD put greater emphasis on the reserve forces.[18] New legislation adopted in the summer of 2010 stipulates that the reserve forces shall consist of operational reserves and defense reserves. The latter group of reserves could participate in HDF operations, such as guarding military facilities or emergency operations. Hence, the approximately 2,000 private security guards, who were previously guarding military installations as employees of private firms could serve – if they chose – in the reserve forces after basic training. The new government's goal is to create an 8,000 strong reserve force by the end of its term.[19] However the basic problems of the reserve system, lack of funding and incentives, have yet to be resolved, and with the bleak financial outlook it seems likely that this will remain the case.

## Conclusions

There are many factors which have contributed to the slow and painful transformation of defense in Hungary. The lack of political leadership, proper financial resources, cooperation between civilians and politicians, public interest and resistance from the army have all contributed to this outcome. With financial opportunities likely to remain thin on the ground for the coming years, the responsibility of the political leadership in addressing the non-financial challenges with greater resolution is even greater. The political leadership must also be aware that the threats and challenges, and the means of addressing them have become much more complex.[20] The most obvious example is terrorism, where a truly integrated approach is needed to prevent and minimize the risks or the consequences of an attack. Although Hungary has not been the target of terrorism in the last two decades, there have been a number of catastrophes, which tested the Hungarian security sector as a whole: floods, storms, and industrial disaster. All these events highlight the need for long-term strategies based on an integrated, comprehensive approach, which may make defense reforms even more difficult to achieve. As the core task of the Hungarian defense forces, and every other NATO members, is still to defend the territory and integrity of the country and its allies, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between preparing for this core, but unlikely task, and dealing with the daily challenges of the present.

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[18] T. Kern, "Több mint félsiker a második Orbán-kormány védelempolitikájának első évéről," *Nemzet és Biztonság*, No. 5, 2011, pp 70–80.

[19] "1500 fővel növelné a honvédek számát a kormány," op. cit.

[20] "Security system reform and governance," *DAC Guidelines and reference series*, OECD, 2005. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf (accessed on September 4, 2011).

Zdeněk Kříž and Miroslav Mareš

# Security sector transformation in the Czech Republic

Abstract: *The transformation of the security sector occurred as part of complex changes to the political regime in the Czech Republic, changes to state sovereignty and profound changes in the security environment. Since 1993, the military sector has been undergoing permanent transformation. The process has converted the Czech Army from a mass army intended for territorial defense to small sized armed forces whose anticipated deployment will primarily be in expeditionary operations under the auspices of various international organizations. The homeland security sector was confronted with the grim legacy of the communist repressive apparatus. Nevertheless, the reform of homeland security occurred without a clear conceptual multi-department framework. In fact, the police reform has yet to finish; there are also discussions on the aptness of the selected system of intelligence agencies.*

The goal of the paper is to describe and analyze the basic characteristics of the security sector and security policy transformation since the fall of communism in the Czech Republic. In the communist era, security policy actors were perceived as a central pillar of the regime and hence, their transformation into security actors of a democratic state was a crucial attribute of transformation and consolidation as such. The security sector comprises both defense policy and the military sector, i.e. the areas also known as homeland security. Research into the transformation of both sectors has already become the subject matter of specialized research, including that by both authors of this article. Therefore, this article also follows the basic conceptual features of their previous publications on this topic.[1]

[1] Especially Z. Kříž, "Obranná politika," in S. Balík, O. Císař, P. Fiala, eds, *Veřejné politiky v České republice v letech 1989–2009*, Brno: Centre for the Study of Democracy and Culture, 2010,

Kříž, Z., Mareš, M., "Security sector transformation in the Czech Republic," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XX, No. 3, 2011, pp. 43–60.

## Security system transformation

The security system of the Czech Republic represents a specific institutional structure whose final form has yet to be completed. Its form has been shaped both by the necessity of dealing with the communist heritage and the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Federation, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO), the Europeanization process in connection to the preparations for EU membership and the consequent achievements in this organization (including within specific sub-parts, such as the Schengen system, or the outcomes of its actions, such as EU battlegroups for instance).

In the context of security–political development, it is difficult to determine a specific date or event signifying the completion of security sector transformation. During the so-called Velvet Revolution towards the end of 1989, it was important that the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA), the National Security Corps (SNB), the People's Militias (LB), the other bodies of the then security system and the occupation armies of the Soviet Union did not intervene using force or even military force against the democratization process and its representatives.[2]

*In the context of security–political development, it is difficult to determine a specific date or event signifying the completion of security sector transformation.*

Moreover, the most discredited security forces of the previous regime, above all the secret police and intelligence service – State Security (STB) – and the above-mentioned People's Militias, were also abolished without major problems. The military, the police and the other forces underwent a wave of purges expunging the most discredited people (even though in many cases some exponents of the past regime might have managed – also with assistance of their allies in these commissions – to survive). A strict amendment was also introduced by the "Lustration Laws" of 1991, which are still in force in the Czech Republic nowadays (there were heated discussions at the time they originated and also afterwards when their enforcement was extended).[3] The withdrawal of the Soviet occupation armies in

pp. 324–366; M. Mareš, "Bezpečnostní politika," in S. Balík, O. Císař, P. Fiala, eds, op. cit., pp. 30–72.

[2] M. Mareš, *Terorismus v ČR*, Brno: The Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 91.

[3] P. Žáček, *Boje o minulost*, Brno: Barrister and Principal, 2000.

1991 also had a real and symbolic impact on independent security development in Czechoslovakia and its successor states.[4]

The disintegration of the Czechoslovak security system must be viewed as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the security forces were altered to reflect the increasing demands on the competencies of the individual federal republics. The changes in the security forces occurred at a time when requirements concerning the division of the federation had still not been formulated by relevant politicians. Consequently, in the second stage, the Czechoslovak security forces were split along country lines into the security forces of the newly independent republics. The process was successfully completed without any major complications. Taking into account the context of what was going on at that time in the former USSR or the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the peaceful character of the disintegration of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) was exceptional in the post-communist region.

The development of security policy after the fall of communism was also unquestionably affected by the overall situation in the global and regional security environment. The threat of a global nuclear war was reduced and attention shifted to the threats presented by ethnic conflicts, terrorism and the proliferation of so-called rogue states. In the 1990s as well as the first decade of the new millennium, the risk of a civil war on Central European territory became unlikely. By contrast, there was an increase in extremist subversive violence, organized crime, corruption and other threats, including the new dimension of a terrorist threat. This change corresponded to changes in security concepts and the security system as well. It must be emphasized that the security system of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) had also anticipated various kinds of threats (including those to homeland security); however, its priority was military security in particular, due to the country's membership in the Warsaw Pact and its confrontation with NATO. In this respect, the security system of the CR is focused on a wider range of threats of a comparable gravity, whilst the priorities of that focus respond to changes in the security situation (e.g. after September 11, 2001, antiterrorist policy was strengthened to a great degree).

Since 1999, the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic has been the main concept document for determining the main focus of security policy. Throughout the 1990s, there were discussions on the nature of the concept documents, and in the end (influenced in part by academic security research,

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[4] S. Naďovič, H. Foertsch–Karácsony, Z. Ostrowski, *The great withdrawal (Withdrawal of the Soviet–Russian army from Central Europe 1990–1994)*, Bratislava: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2005.

especially Jaroslav Janda's team)[5] the comprehensive concept of security won (by contrast, for example in 1994, the then Minister of the Interior, Jan Ruml, claimed that security interests in the area of homeland security were separated from military political interests).[6]

The first security strategy was adopted in 1999 by the social–democratic Government of the time to criticism by the opposition. Another version from 2001 was more widely discussed before being accepted in the political and academic spheres. The same is also true of the 2003 version of the security strategy.[7] Moreover, this document also fulfilled the "strategic role" in the sense that it was in operation for much longer than the previous strategies. A new Security Strategy was adopted in 2011.[8] In their defense policy sections, the 2001, 2003, and 2011 strategies all clearly prefer collective defense within NATO and side-track individual defense, which was still emphasized in the 1999 security strategy.[9]

Security legislation, too, had undergone a process of tumultuous development. Many laws had been repealed and amended by the end of the 1990s; yet some problems had not been addressed. To simplify slightly, it is possible to state that in the mid 1990s, there was a certain vacuum filled by a "legislative whirlwind" in the late 1990s and at the turn of the new millennium. In 1999 a set of military legislation was adopted.

This was the consequence of several factors including the accession of the Czech Republic to NATO, the gradual approximation of European law as well as the experience with the great floods in Moravia in 1997. An important role in the further development of legislation was played by the passing of Constitutional Law No. 110/1998 Coll. on the security of the Czech Republic,[10] which stipulated the basic security states and initiated the establishment of the National Security Council and other security forces. However, work on a document that would define the security system forces clearly and in detail came to a standstill during

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5 J. Janda et al., *The security policy of the Czech Republic*, Prague: Institute of International Relations, 1997.

6 J. Ruml, "Cíle, úkoly a problémy bezpečnostní politiky ČR z globálního i resortního pohledu," *Mezinárodní politika* Vol. XVIII, No. 5, 1994, p. 10.

7 "Nová Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky," *Revue politika*, February 20, 2004. Available online: http://www.revuepolitika.cz/clanky/642/nova-bezpecnostni-strategie-ceske-republiky (accessed on September 14, 2011).

8 "Bezpečnostní strategie 2011," Government of the Czech Republic, 2011.

9 For details see J. Síla, "Strategické bezpečnostní dokumenty," in M. Balabán, J. Duchek, L. Stejskal, eds, *Kapitoly o bezpečnosti*, Prague: Karolinum, 2007, pp. 90–92; "Bezpečnostní strategie 2011," op. cit.

10 V. Man, "Ústavní úprava zajišťování bezpečnosti České republiky," in M. Balabán, J. Duchek, L. Stejskal, op. cit., pp. 47–76.

**Table 1.** Overview of states of crisis declared in the Czech Republic

| Crisis state | Reasons for declaration | Body responsible for the declaration | Territorial scope of application | Temporal scope of application |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Military crisis state** | | | | |
| Belligerency | Attack on the Czech Republic, or if international treaty obligations in the area of joint defense have to be met. | Parliament | Entire state territory | No limit |
| State of nation threat | Immediate threat to state sovereignty or to state territorial integrity or its democratic principles by foreign states or foreign non-state actors | Parliament on government proposal | Entire state territory or part thereof | No limit |
| **Non-military crisis state** | | | | |
| State of nation threat | Immediate threat to state sovereignty or to state territorial integrity or its democratic principles by foreign states or foreign non-state actors | Parliament on government proposal | Entire state territory or part thereof | No limit |
| State of emergency | Immediate threat to lives, health or property values or internal order and security to a considerable extent due to natural disasters, ecological or industrial accidents, incidents or other dangers. | Government | Entire territory of the state or part thereof | 30 days at most, further (even repeated) extension possible |
| State of threat | | Governor of the region (kraj), governor of the capital of Prague | Entire territory of the region (kraj) or the capital of Prague or part thereof | 30 days at most, further (even repeated) extension possible |

Source: *Právní úprava krizového řízení v ČR. Vybrané problémy právní teorie i praxe*, Prague: Eurolex Bohemia, 2006, 398 p. Modified by M. Mareš (adding subjects responsible for the declaration of the state, partial changes in formulation).

the late 1990s due to the lack of political interest, and thus this important aspect of consolidating the security sphere remains unfinished.[11] However, the basic features of the system are defined in the security strategy mentioned above.

## Military sector transformation

After 1989, Czechoslovakia underwent a fundamental transformation of the entire military sector, as prior to 1989 it had respected, with minimal reservations, the foreign and military policy course set by the Soviet Union.[12] The military sector of the independent state had to be built from ground zero. This process began with the implementation of civil military relations typical of a consolidated democracy.[13] The first phase culminated in the adoption of the Military Doctrine of the CSFR in March 1991. The successful division of the armies due to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a crucial task in the transformation of the military sector.[14]

Two possible options on military sector transformation were discussed in Czech society after 1993: the autonomous option and the alliance option. The second eventually prevailed and the Czech Republic sought to gain security guarantees under NATO membership.[15] This goal was unequivocally stated in the 1996 Government Manifesto.[16]

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[11] A. Rašek, "Systém komplexního řízení bezpečnosti České republiky – východisko pro modernizaci bezpečnostního systému," *Working Paper SBP CESES*, 2011. Available online: http://www.ceses.cuni.cz/ CESES-65-version1-TRS_WP_08.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[12] L. Dobrovský, "Stručný nástin polistopadového vývoje zahraniční politiky a její vliv na formování politiky bezpečnostní, respektive obranné," in *Bezpečnostní politika České republiky – výzvy a problémy*, Conference "15 let vývoje bezpečnostní politiky a armády v Československu a České republice" volume, Prague: Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic and Avis, 2004, pp. 35–37. Available online: http://ceses.cuni.cz/CESES-73-version1-sbornik_bpcr_vyzvyaproblemy.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[13] See Z. Kříž, "Army and politics in the Czech Republic twenty years after the Velvet Revolution," *Armed Forces and Society*, No. 4, 2010, pp. 627–646; Z. Kříž, *Civilní řízení a demokratická kontrola armády v České republice. Peripetie transfomrace vojensko-civilních vztahů po roce 1989*, Brno: Masaryk University, 2004.

[14] K. Pezl, "Ohlédnutí," *Vojenské rozhledy* Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 2009, p. 3. Available online: http://www.army.cz/images/id_3878_4000/3538/vr2009_4.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[15] For details see A. Rašek, "Nelehká přeměna armády a zrod bezpečnostní politiky," in *Bezpečnostní politika České republiky – výzvy a problémy*, op. cit., p. 12.

[16] "Vláda ČR, Programové prohlášení 1996," Government of the Czech Republic, 1996. Available online: http://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=26625 (accessed on September 7, 2011).

Military sector transformation is a never ending story in the Czech Republic. Between the years 1993 and 1999, transformation was motivated by the country's efforts to gain NATO membership and the entire military sector was fundamentally, although insufficiently, reformed. While in the period of 1990–1992, the transition was from an army built to invade Western Europe under the leadership of the USSR to an army intended for territorial defense in all directions. After 1993, an ever greater emphasis was laid on adaptation to NATO standards in order to achieve interoperability with NATO structures and participate in its collective defense. The Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) was primarily intended for territorial defense against potential aggression from all directions. The Army was to maintain all capabilities necessary for self-sufficient operation in all key areas. Efforts to acquire capabilities to carry out various types of peace operations under UN, NATO and recently also European Union auspices marked a new element after 1990–1992. This also prompted the launch of a number of modernization and procurement projects.

*Despite the fact that the reforms carried out in the 1990s brought the Czech Army closer to NATO standards, the 1999 accession to NATO did not mark an end to reform efforts.*

Despite the fact that the reforms carried out in the 1990s brought the Czech Army closer to NATO standards, the 1999 accession to NATO did not mark an end to reform efforts. In 2001, the Czech Government decided to launch preparations for a radical reform of the army. The army reform started in 2002 with the adoption of the Concept for the build-up of the professional Army of the Czech Republic and the mobilization of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which was, however, significantly modified the following year. Hoďáněk, Krulík and Procházka state that "one of the reform goals was to create modern armed forces, which would be technologically capable of interoperable action with allies, sustained combat activities day or night, under adverse weather conditions, and in geographically and climatically demanding conditions."[17] The development of military capacities necessary for expeditionary operations became a priority after 2003.

Therefore, Czech Army recruitment is voluntary as of 2005 and under CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) limits, the number of heavy weapons systems continues to be reduced even below what it was in 2003. The abolishment of

[17] O. Hoďánek, V. Krulík, J. Procházka, "Bezpečnostní systém a jeho hlavní komponenty," in M. Balabán, J. Duchek, L. Stejskal, op. cit., p. 138.

the compulsory military service principle was supported by all relevant political parties, with the exception of the Communist Party.[18] The main reform goals were to be completed between 2010 and 2012. However, in 2007 the government adopted a resolution entitled Transformation of the Defense Ministry of the Czech Republic (Government resolution No. 1194), which modifies the reform.. The pivotal aim of the reform – the build-up of an army primarily intended for expeditionary operations (mainly including military peace support operations) within a multinational format has not changed.[19] As a result, since 1993 the Army of the Czech Republic has undergone a drastic reduction in the number of personnel and heavy combat materiel, which puts it far below CFE limits.

*Many past acquisitions of military equipment were prompted more by the need to satisfy the interests of the Czech defense industry than the real needs of the army.*

The outlook for the future is not too optimistic. In all likelihood, the Czech Republic will have to abandon its ambition of maintaining an army of 26,000 soldiers, due to the ageing population and decreasing competitiveness of the Defense Ministry as an employer. The accumulated deficit in equipment, machinery, materiel, and infrastructure is estimated at 4.3–4.8 billion USD. Furthermore, considerable investment into aviation and land hardware, estimated at billions of USD, will be necessary from 2015 to 2020 – this will, however, not be available from the Defense Ministry budget.[20] The new 2011 White Paper on defense proposed measures to address this state. However, their implementation remains a question for the future and is uncertain.

If we were to assess the overall transformation of the Czech Army we would be forced to arrive at the conclusion that the entire process has been very

[18] For more see L. Frank, "Názory vybraných českých parlamentních politických stran na profesionalizaci ozbrojených sil ČR," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 1, 2001, pp. 47–74. Available online: http:// www.defenceandstrategy.eu/filemanager/files/file.php?file=6403 (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[19] For more about transformation of military sector compare with J. Procházka, "Koncepční přeměny v armádě po roce 1989," *Vojenské rozhledy* Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 2009, pp. 38–49. Available online: http://www.army.cz/images/ id_3878_4000/3538/vr2009_4.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[20] "Bílá kniha o obraně," Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2011, p. 13. Available online: http://www.mocr.army.cz/scripts/file.php?id=79599&down=yes (accessed on September 7, 2011).

chaotic – exemplified by the frequent changes in army reform policy, a regular phenomenon since the formation of the Czech Republic. None of the reform policies adopted in the past have been realized in a form resembling their original version or in adherence with the set time schedule. Reform changes were very often launched even before an assessment had been made of the impacts of the ongoing reform. The effectiveness of defense planning can therefore be very seriously questioned.[21] Political support for the entire process on the part of political elites was also insufficient and often even counterproductive.

The transformation of the ACR was also accompanied by its modernization. In general, it can be said that in the period of 1993–2003 the aim was to modernize all traditional capacities of the army in order to acquire a full spectrum of capabilities allowing for self-sufficient operation. Emphasis was laid on the procurement of a smaller number of very modern weapons systems either through the modernization of existing ones (T-72) or the acquisition of completely new ones (e.g. L-159, JAS-39 Gripen). This strategy had to overcome a number of problems. First of all, the entire history of military equipment procurement since 1993 points to substantial shortcomings in the procurement system of the defense department, which is prone to corruption, lack of transparency, and the acquisition of equipment for which in turn there is no sensible use.[22] Furthermore, allocated Defense Ministry resources did not meet the needs of the military sector and were often reduced on an ad hoc basis to meet some short-term needs without consideration of the long-term effects. Last but not least, the influence of interest groups in the Czech defense industry also led to some unreasonable acquisitions. We cannot overlook the fact that many past acquisitions of military equipment were prompted more by the need to satisfy the interests of the Czech defense industry than the real needs of the army. These include first and foremost the large acquisition of light combat aircraft L-159 ALCA – 72 at the price of 2.8 billion USD.[23] Furthermore, this includes the modernization (eventually cancelled) of the Mig-21 supersonic jet fighter aircraft and especially the modernization of the T-72 tank. In the end, the number of modernized tanks was reduced from 353 to 134 and ultimately to 30 tanks at the cost of 242 million USD – their future still remains uncertain.[24]

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[21] For more see B. Pernica, "Obranné plánování České republiky. Tři kritické poznámky," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 2, 2004, pp. 105–109.

[22] Ibid.

[23] "Přezbrojení české armády stojí desítky miliard korun," *ČTK*, 2009. Available online: http://www.financninoviny.cz/zpravy/prezbrojeni-ceske-armady-stoji-desitky-miliard-korun/363343&id_seznam=6408 (accessed on October 7, 2009).

[24] "Armáda zakonzervuje tanky, které za miliardy zmodernizovala," *ČTK*, 2009. Available online; http://www.financninoviny.cz/tema/zpravy/armada-zakonzervuje-tanky-ktere-za-miliardy-

The logic behind the procurement of 30 modernized T-72 tanks has also been repeatedly contested in the past. [25]

Some of the modernization projects realized through foreign suppliers also raise serious concerns. This particularly involves the original interest in buying 24 to 36 JAS-39 Gripen supersonic jet fighter aircraft in 2001, then in 2005 it was decided to lease 14 aircraft at the price of 1.1 billion USD.[26] The leasing of the aircraft as well as the background to the transaction remain questionable and are the subject of investigations in multiple states due to suspicion of corruption. The largest current modernization project is the acquisition of 107 Pandur II wheeled armored vehicles from the Austrian company Steyr at the price of 774 million USD.[27] This project is also beleaguered with suspicions of corruption or at least of wasting public resources.

The availability of financial resources is crucial for the future of Czech military sector transformation. In its pursuit of NATO membership the Czech Republic made a political commitment to annually allocate 2 per cent of its GDP to defense.[28] Nevertheless, defense expenditures dropped well below this level. In 2010, budget expenditures of the Ministry of Defense amounted to 1.29 per cent of GDP.[29] Due to the need to stabilize public finances in the Czech Republic and the low risk of a military attack on the territory of the state or its allies there is no reason to expect an increase in defense expenditures relative to GDP.

In general, we can state that after 2003 preference started to be given to the modernization of weapons systems deployable in expeditionary operations. The aim of modernization is no longer to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities for self-sufficient operation, exemplified by the preference for dominant heavy weapons systems. Priority is given to capabilities necessary for expeditionary operations in a multinational framework with a special emphasis on weapons systems suitable for air transport. Emphasis is laid on greater accuracy of

zmodernizovala/387333&id_seznam=316 (accessed on October 7, 2009); F. Šulc, "Miliardy utracené bez rozmyslu," *Lidové noviny*, July 23, 2009, p. 2.

[25] For more see V. Galatík, "AČR a tanky," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 1, 2002, pp. 91–94. Available online: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/filemanager/files/file.php?file=6389 (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[26] F. Šulc, op. cit., p. 2.

[27] "Přezbrojení české armády stojí desítky miliard korun," op. cit.

[28] For more see V. Mazalová, "Strategické dokumenty ČR a jejich reflexe v oblasti finančních zdrojů pro potřeby ozbrojených sil," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 1, 2006, p. 64. Available online: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/filemanager/files/file.php?file=6268 (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[29] "Resortní rozpočet," Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2011. Available online: http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/mo/ pdf/Rozpo__et_2011.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2011).

weapons systems, passive and active protection of forces against the opponent, and the connectivity of weapons systems into networks allowing for real-time transfer of information on the battlefield.[30] These developments follow the main trends in the Revolution in Military Affairs – RMA.

After 1989, the transformation and modernization of the army was also accompanied by a fundamental transformation of the defense industry. Socialist Czechoslovakia had an oversized defense industry, which was partly built on the tradition of interwar Czechoslovakia in Bohemia. Slovakia's defense industry was primarily built after 1945.[31] Defense industry production culminated in 1987[32] and declined steeply after 1989.[33] The main reasons for this being the significantly decreased demand on the world market caused by the end of the Cold War, the Iraq–Iran war, the signing of the CFE treaty, and the new foreign policy orientation of the country, which precluded it from arms trade with some traditional Czechoslovak customers (Libya, Syria, Iraq, and others). Conversion of the defense industry was thus inevitable. It was more an economic necessity than simply the political intent of new political elites.

*The prospects for the Czech defense industry lie only in supranational integration and cooperation in reaching foreign markets.*

According to J. Fučík, the Czech defense industry currently has to operate in a dynamically changing international environment subject to an ongoing revolution in military affairs, under integration tendencies both in the USA and within the European Union, and most of all within the context of a structural transformation of the defense industry signaling the end of the traditional production of complete weapons and the formation of a category of integrators who finalize the products from individual components.[34] At the European level, developments key to the

[30] O. Hoďánek, V. Krulík, J. Procházka, "Bezpečnostní systém a jeho hlavní komponenty," in M. Balabán, J. Duchek, L. Stejskal, op. cit., p. 138.

[31] For more see M. Krč, "Evoluce československého zbrojního průmyslu," in *Sborník Vojenské akademie, řada C*, No. 3, 1992, pp. 9–22.

[32] M. Krč, "Obranná průmyslová základna a obranná průmyslová politika," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 1, 2002, p. 120. Available online: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/filemanager/files/file.php?file=6392 (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[33] For more on this issue see L. Ivánek, "Ekonomické aspekty konverze české (československé) zbrojní výroby," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 1, 2002, pp. 133–138. Available online: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/filemanager/files/file.php?file=6390 (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[34] J. Fučík, "Průmyslová základna obrany ČR, její současný potenciál pro vyzbrojování vlastních sil, vývoz a účast v mezinárodní zbrojní kooperaci," in *Bezpečnostní politika České republiky, výzvy a problémy*, op. cit., pp. 203–208.

defense industry take place within the EDA (European Defense Agency) framework with the aim of creating a European market with military materiel.[35]

The Czech Republic is not self-sufficient in terms of arms production. According to Štefec, Procházka and Velčovský, the Czech defense industry is only capable of

> meeting army needs in selected fields such as the research, development and maintenance of aerial equipment, the maintenance and modernization of wheel and track equipment, the protection against the use of WMD, infantry weapons and ammunition, radar equipment, passive reconnaissance equipment, off-road vehicles and trucks, and so on.[36]

Foreign suppliers will most likely play an increasing role in the future as they will be able to compete on price, production capacity and bribes for Czech politicians.

However, building up a small, professional army undergoing modernization will generate relatively low demand, which the Czech defense industry could meet and at the same time would provide it with a reputation amongst foreign markets. Nonetheless this limitation will most likely compound the ongoing lack of transparency and rational procurement policy. Therefore, in the current situation the prospects for the Czech defense industry lie only in supranational integration and cooperation in reaching foreign markets. The only way to maintain arms production is to focus on sub-deliveries to large global integrators, and this has already been adopted by many Czech companies. The future of the L-159 ALCA light combat aircraft manufacturer as an integrator also remains very uncertain as all attempts to sell the company to foreign investors have so far been unsuccessful.[37]

The conceptualization of a rational, transparent, and consistent development policy for the defense industry base coupled with the establishment of a few priorities would facilitate the survival of some of the Czech defense industry companies. Unfortunately, such a policy has not been created yet.[38] The existing

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[35] More at European Defence Agency web page. Available online: *eda.europa.eu* (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[36] J. Štefec, J. Procházka, V. Velčovský, "Ekonomické aspekty bezpečnosti (Průmyslová, rozpočtová a akviziční politika, cesty k efektivnímu využití prostředků)," in *Bezpečnostní politika České republiky, výzvy a problémy*, op. cit., p. 174.

[37] Compare with B. Pernica, "Obranné plánování České republiky. Tři kritické poznámky," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 2, 2004, pp. 105 – 109.

[38] Compare with J. Švestka, "Výzbrojní politika ozbrojených sil České republiky," *Obrana a strategie*, No. 1, 2006, pp. 71 – 90.

strategic documents in the armament realm were enforced by the endeavor to obtain NATO membership and their practical impact was of little significance.[39] In appraising the importance of the document entitled the Principles of cooperation between the State and the defense industry in the Czech Republic, Josef Fučík claims that "instead of clearly defining state interests in the arms sector on the basis of security and defense policy needs, the Principles contain vague formulations and they are almost unintelligible at times."[40]

## Transformation of the homeland security sector, intelligence agencies and the police

The transformation of the homeland security sector was executed by the Ministry of the Interior in particular. The Ministry was put in charge not only of the Police of the Czech Republic, but also of the Fire Rescue Service responsible for the integrated rescue system as a specific subsystem of the entire security system. However, other forces engage in homeland security as well (e.g. the Ministry of Justice within penitentiaries or the Ministry of Transport in homeland security). In what follows, attention will be paid to the overall framework of the transformation and in particular to the intelligence agencies and the police; other security corps will not be dealt with due to the limited space of the article.

The transformation of the homeland security sector was related to the challenge of an urgent need to distance itself from the negative manifestations of the repressive apparatus of the communist regime. At a symbolic level, this was made clear with the name change of the security corps (Police instead of the National Security Corps); however, it was the dissolution of the security corps that had a greater impact, whether they were replaced by new ones (e.g. the State Security was disbanded and then replaced by new intelligence agencies), or whether they were withdrawn with no substitution (the disbanding of the People's Militias or the Border Guard)[41].

The transformation of the individual components of the security system within homeland security occurred with absolute anonymity and without an established comprehensive strategic framework. In addition, there were dramatic changes to the legislation (e.g. amendments to the penal code and

[39] J. Štefec, J. Procházka, V. Velčovský, op. cit., p. 169.

[40] J. Fučík, "Průmyslová základna obrany ČR, její současný potenciál pro vyzbrojování vlastních sil, vývoz a účast v mezinárodní zbrojní kooperaci," in *Bezpečnostní politika České republiky, výzvy a problémy*, op. cit., p. 210.

[41] M. Pulec, *Organizace a činnost ozbrojených pohraničních složek. Seznamy osob usmrcených na státních hranicích*, Prague: Office of Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes Investigation Service, 2006.

to the judiciary (e.g. replacing state prosecutors with state attorneys), which directly affected homeland security and security corps activities.

As opposed to the military, where a regularly amended Military strategy of the Czech Republic is adopted, no comprehensive concept document of a similar type exists for homeland security. The current state of affairs is the existence of a relatively broad range of documents, which are partly summed up in the Crime Prevention Strategy for the period 2008–2011. Its appendix consists of a list of over 40 publications on security and prevention topics from the departments of the interior, health care, justice, transport, foreign affairs, defense, labor and social affairs, and education, youth and sports.[42] They include:

- Counter-terrorism strategy (Interior Ministry);
- Anti-extremism strategy (Interior Ministry);
- Policy for tackling organized crime (Interior Ministry);
- Government anti-corruption strategy (Interior Ministry);
- National drug policy strategy (Interior Ministry);
- National strategy for combating human trafficking (Interior Ministry);
- National plan of action against commercial sexual exploitation of children (Interior Ministry);
- Policy for tackling crime relating to information technologies (Interior Ministry);
- Policy for tackling environmental crime (Interior Ministry);
- Strategies for the work of the police of the Czech Republic in relation to minorities (Interior Ministry);
- Policy for citizen protection until 2013 and outlook for 2020 (Interior Ministry);
- National action plan of social integration (Labor and Social Affairs Ministry);
- Program to support Roma community integration (Education, Youth and Sports Ministry);
- Strategy for preventing social pathology in children and young people (Education, Youth and Sports Ministry);
- National road safety strategy (Transport Ministry).

The transformation of the intelligence agencies must be seen as an essential component of security transformation, due to their specific roles and competences. The intelligence services must be viewed as part of different

[42] "Seznam koncepčních materiálů věnujících se prevenci kriminality a zvyšování bezpečí," Appendix 1 to the "Crime Prevention Strategy for 2008 to 2011," Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, Office of the Government of the Czech Republic.

security sectors, not only homeland security. Nevertheless, in the context of the transformation of the security sector in the Czech Republic, it is logical to conduct an analysis within the homeland security sector with respect to the institutional categorization of two of the three existing intelligence agencies and with respect to their competences. After the fall of communism, the Intelligence Service of the Border Guard and Border Protection (ZS PS OSH) and State Security were abolished.[43]

As part of civil homeland intelligence, the Office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy (ÚOÚD) was founded in February 1990 and replaced in January 1991 by the Federal Information Service (FIS), which was still a part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. In July 1991, the FIS was replaced by the Federal Security and Information Service (FBIS). The FBIS had already been stipulated in law and it was under the control of Parliament.[44] With the disintegration of the federal state, the FBIS was abolished and its activities were transferred to the Security Information Service (BIS) of the independent Czech Republic.

The Intelligence Service of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (ZS FMV) was founded following the disbanding of the State Security Counter-Intelligence Service. By December 21, 1990, the Office for Foreign Relations and Information (ÚZSI) of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (FMV)[45] had been established as an intelligence service operating with a foreign remit. After the federation split, it was replaced by ÚZSI in the Czech Republic, which is predominantly under the control of the Czech Interior Ministry. To replace Section III of the StB (Military Counter-Intelligence), the Military Intelligence (VOZ) was founded in 1990, which passed from Ministry of the Interior control to that of the Federal Ministry of Defense. After the disintegration of the Czechoslovak federation, the Czech half of the VOZ fell under the control of the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic. The General Staff Intelligence Service did not undergo any significant reform in the first years after the regime change. After the dissolution of the federation, the Military Intelligence Service was founded in the Czech Republic. In 2004, the law clearly stipulated the existence of a single military intelligence service called Military Intelligence (VZ).

Therefore, the Czech Republic chose to follow the model of having two civil intelligence services (one operating within homeland security and the other

[43] K. Zetocha, *Zpravodajské služby v nové demokracii. Česká republika*, Brno: Barrister & Principal, p. 53.

[44] M. Churaň et al., *Encyklopedie špionáže. Ze zákulisí tajných služeb a zejména Státní bezpečnosti*, Prague: Libri, 2000, p. 118.

[45] L. Pokorný, *Základy právní úpravy činnosti zpravodajských služeb*, Prague: The Police Academy of the Czech Republic, 2007, p. 29.

within foreign security) and one military service (both homeland and foreign). A coordinator is appointed by a special committee of the National Security Council. The BIS and VZ are under the direct supervision of Parliament. From time to time, politicians and experts discuss changing this model, thus far to no firm conclusion.[46]

As for public and media opinion, the intelligence agencies had undergone an interesting process, aptly summed up by Petr Zeman (an intelligence agency expert and former Director General of the Office for Foreign Relations and Information):

> In the first eighteen months after the establishment of the new Czech Republic, attention was drawn to the profound social changes, above all to economic transformation. The intelligence services found themselves in legal limbo; at the same time, they were mocked by the media (this is true even today) due to their failures and scandals, partly based on reality, partly completely fictitious. While at the end of 1991, the predecessor of today's BIS was perceived very positively by the public and media (despite the tumultuous development of disputes within the service), i.e. as society's protector against the return of totalitarianism, by 1993 at the latest this original image had vanished, and thereafter the public and the media of the time saw the intelligence agencies as a gang of suspicious scamps going from one scandal to the next.[47]

The police sector underwent changes, part of which included the symbolic name change of the corps. In 1990, the SNB oath was changed and purges were started in the SNB, including the Public Security Service. In 1991, the Police of the Czech Republic (PČR) was specified in law; at the federal level, it was the Federal Police Corps and the Castle Police Corps. These last two ceased to exist with the split of the federation and the PČR became the main police force.[48]

The PČR is under the control of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. Its organization is divided into the Police Presidium of the Czech

[46] P. Zeman, "České zpravodajské služby po roce 1989," in M. Balabán, J. Duchek, L. Stejskal, eds, op. cit., pp. 231–276.

[47] P. Zeman, "Historie a limity debat o reformě zpravodajských služeb v ČR aneb umíme si už nalít čistého vína?" Europeum, 2009. Available online: http://www.europeum.org/doc/pdf/Petr_Zeman_zari_final.pdf (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[48] M. Mareš, "Policija i specsluzhby v processe demokratizacii v Cheshskoj Respublike," in S. Balík, P. Pšeja, eds, *Perechod k demokratii – češskij opyt*, Brno: Centre for the Study of Democracy and Culture, 2006, pp. 158–178.

Republic led by the police president and other units with republic-wide or regional competence. After the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, the National Unit of the European Police Office (Europol) was established within the Police Presidium. The police president is appointed and removed from office by the Minister of the Interior with government approval. The police have undergone several stages of change and reform, whereby the most fundamental reform was launched in 2007. One of its purposes was to adjust police structures in line with the structure of administrative districts.[49] At present, discussions are ongoing regarding the inspection of the police and other security corps, which should hopefully be solved by the adoption of the law on general inspection of security corps.[50]

Alongside the state police, municipalities and towns were allowed to establish municipal or city police forces to settle local matters of public order. The municipal police answer to the mayor, unless the municipal board authorizes another board member to be in charge of the municipal police. The municipal police have limited jurisdiction compared to the state police, with whom municipal and city police officers can cooperate.[51]

*The Czech Republic chose to follow the model of having two civil intelligence services and one military service.*

In the early 1990s, police forces had to face the challenge of a significant increase in crime.[52] Paradoxically, this situation contributed to police forces being perceived as essential and thus crime experts who used to work in the communist police were not forced to leave. However, the Czech police have been damaged by mistakes made by the management as well as current measures due to budget cuts.

## Concluding remarks

The transformation of the security system took place as part of complex changes to the political regime in the Czech Republic, changes to state sovereignty

[49] M. Bohman, "Policie České republiky," in M. Balabán, J. Duchek, L. Stejskal, eds, op. cit., pp. 155–185.

[50] M. Matlochová, "Vláda schválila návrh zákona o inspekci bezpečnostních sborů," Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2011. Available online: http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/vlada-schvalila-navrh-zakona-o-inspekci-bezpecnostnich-sboru.aspx (accessed on September 7, 2011).

[51] P. Mates, J. Škoda, F. Vavera, *Veřejné sbory*, Prague: Wolters Kluver ČR, 2011, p. 108.

[52] O. Novotný, J. Zapletal et al., *Kriminologie*, Prague: Eurolex Bohemia, 2001, pp. 58–59.

and profound changes in the security environment. Despite a number of problems caused, in part, by the problematical political culture associated with the transition, the transformation can be evaluated as having been relatively efficient. Nevertheless, a lack of conceptual thinking can be found in a number of areas, which became evident both in military and homeland security. As has also been mentioned, some processes launched in connection with the fall of communism are still to be completed (e.g. in regard to the security system).

Since 1993, the military sector has been undergoing permanent transformation. This process has converted the Czech Army from a mass army intended for territorial defense to small sized armed forces whose anticipated deployment will primarily be in expeditionary operations under the auspices of various international organizations. A number of driving forces can be indentified in this process. First and foremost, the Czech Republic wanted to gain NATO membership and therefore had to adapt its military sector to Alliance standards. However, other causes of transformation cannot be overlooked. Czech society feels safe from outside military aggression and is therefore unwilling to allocate resources to defense or participate through military service. That is why recruitment became voluntary and why expenditures in the defense budget are steadily dropping. If we connect the dots between current developments and the increasing state debt, corruption, and clientelism, not only in the defense department but society as a whole, we can but arrive at the conclusion that in the near future the entire military sector will face problems. These problems are, however, so grave that they may endanger the survival of the Czech army as an institution capable of meeting society's expectations. The future existence of the Czech military is at stake.

The homeland security sector was confronted with the grim legacy of the communist repressive apparatus as well. Nevertheless, the reform of homeland security occurred without a clear conceptual multi-department framework. In fact, reform of the police force has not been finished yet; there are also discussions on the aptness of the selected system of intelligence agencies. Despite all the problems, at least the main challenges, caused by the tumultuous development of crime during the transition, have been responded to and the homeland security sector is adapting to the new dimension of current security threats in the world.

Andrei Anatolyevich Kazantsev

# Reform of security sector and securitization: contradictions in Russian policy in 2000–2011

Abstract: *The article analyzes the reforms of the Russian security sector during the two Vladimir Putin presidencies (2000–2004, 2004–2008) and the Dmitry Medvedev presidency (2008–until present). The functioning of the security sector in Russia is analyzed within the context of the general evolution of Russia's political system. The author employs the theory of securitization in his exploration of issues such as changes in the structure and functions of security agencies within the context of the evolving way in which the Russian leadership perceives security threats. Most specifically, the paper analyzes the key contradiction between the policy directed at modernizing and rationalizing Russia's security sector, on the one hand, and the policy directed at expanding the security agenda, widening the authority of different security agencies, and increasing their control over society, on the other hand. The role of the courts in the Russian political and administrative system, the pace of military reform, relations between the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of Defense and recent developments in the FSB, police and other agencies are analyzed from this point of view.*

The article analyzes the reforms of the Russian security sector during the two Vladimir Putin presidencies (2000–2004, 2004–2008) and the Dmitry Medvedev presidency (2008–until present). The author employs the theory of securitization in his exploration of issues such as changes in the structure and functions of security agencies within the context of the evolving way in which the Russian leadership perceives security threats. Most specifically, the paper analyzes the key contradiction between the policy directed at modernizing and rationalizing Russia's security sector, on the one hand, and the policy

Kazantsev, A.A., "Reform of security sector and securitization: contradictions in Russian policy in 2000–2011," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XX, No. 3, 2011, pp. 61–81.

directed at expanding the security agenda,[1] widening the authority of different security agencies and increasing their control over society,[2] on the other. This contradiction is rather clear. The effective modernization and reform of the security sector requires resources to be concentrated in key directions. Moreover, reforms of the security sector that aim to guarantee its ability to provide security for the people under democratic principles requires a decrease in the authority of the security agencies, since the authority of security agencies in democratic societies is much less pervasive than in totalitarian ones. This main contradiction is also connected to many other contradictions in Russia's security policy of the last decade and these will be analyzed below.

Due to these contradictions, some of the real achievements in the reforms of the security sector in 2000–2011 have been accompanied by setbacks, as far as the introduction of democratic values and practices into the security sector is concerned, even when compared to Russia of the 1990s.

## Security sector reform, authority of security agencies and securitization/desecuritization: Russan case

Neither the neo-realist tradition[3] dominant in American security studies nor the geopolitical tradition[4] dominant in Russian security studies methodologically justifies the analysis of the structure and functions of security agencies within the context of the evolving perception of security threats. Subjective threat perception is considered unimportant by both traditions because the threats are defined either by the objective structure of the international system (neo-realism), or by the system of spatial constraints (geopolitics). Both structural arguments may be correct in the Russian case, but in the long run. In the short-term and even medium-term perspective, Russia in the 1990s saw a radical change in its perception of international threats, moving from a Cold war pattern to a pro-Western pattern. Then, at the end of the 1990s Russia gradually returned to perceiving the West (NATO) as the main security threat. Another radical change in threat perception that will be analyzed in this article

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1 A. Kazantsev, *Rasshirenie problematiki bezopasnosti v politike Rossii: cecuritizacia, biopolitika i novye administrativnye praktiki*, Moscow: Prospekt, 2009.

2 A. Soldatov, I. Borogan, *The new nobility: the restoration of Russia's security state and the enduring legacy of the KGB*, New York: Public Affairs, 2010.

3 K.N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

4 L. Ivashov, *Rossia I mir v novom tysyacheletii: geopoliticheskie problemy*, Moscow: Paleia-Mishin, 2000; A. Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii*, Moscow: Arktogeia, 1997. See also: A. Ingram, "Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia," *Political Geography* Vol. 20, No. 8, 2001, pp. 1029–1051.

as being important for security sector reform is the enormous expansion of the security agenda during Putin's two presidencies.

The theory of securitization developed by prominent European scholars (e.g. B. Buzan, O. Waever, etc) provides us with a good methodological instrument for the analysis of such short- and medium-term changes in threat perceptions. Methodologically, studies on securitization as the process of the formation of discourse on security in contemporary international relations and security studies have shifted towards analyses relating to the identity factors defining security policies in different countries. This approach to security correlates with Constructivism's focus on identity formation as the key to explaining the international behavior of states.[5] Securitization studies began within the framework of the approach to security studies developed by the English and Copenhagen schools in international relations.[6] Buzan and Wæver define securitization as the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.[7]

Guaranteeing security and simultaneously balancing the value of security and values such as democracy and human rights have become the key political problem in the contemporary world in general. This is not only a problem for Putin's Russia. For example, in many respects security issues have defined American foreign policy since 9/11 and security discourse was used in order to justify the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The issue of balancing security and human rights was extensively discussed in relation to such issues as the fate of the prisoners at Guantanamo. Security discourse also significantly influenced American domestic politics in areas such as the increased degree of state control over individual citizens and the growth of influence of the neo-conservatives etc. This also provoked intense discussions about the problem of balancing security and democracy.

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[5] A. Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[6] B. Buzan, *People, states, and fear: the national security problem in international relations*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983; B. Buzan, *People, states, and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*, Boulder: L. Rienner, 1991; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis*, Boulder: L. Rienner, 1998; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[7] B. Buzan, O. Wæver, *Regions and powers: the structure of international security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 491.

In this respect it is important to pay some attention to the literature pointing out the clear tension between the expansion of the security agenda and democracy. There is a line of thought that suggests that in extreme cases securitization can cause the total or partial disappearance of democracy within the framework of formally existing democratic institutions. This argument was used for the first time by the famous German lawyer, Karl Schmitt,[8] who proved that in order to destroy democracy within the framework of democratic institutions it is enough to proclaim a state of emergency. This tactic was used by the Nazis, when they set fire to the *Reichstag* and subsequently accused the communists of the crime and proclaimed a set of emergency measures. After that Schmitt was considered one of the most prominent lawyers of the "Third Reich." Recently, the idea that an expanding security agenda has a negative influence on democracy was used by prominent Italian scholar Giorgio Agamben in his study on aspects of the global war on terror.[9]

There is a clear connection between the securitization of new issues (the expansion of the security agenda) and the expansion of the authority of security agencies. The expansion of the authority of security agencies refers to the fact that in key legal and governmental documents an increasing number of issues are attributed to spheres of national security (i.e. securitized). The opposite is also true: if the state leadership sees a new issue as a national security concern, it creates a new security agency to control this issue (for example, the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia), transfers it from civilian agency to security agency (the Federal Migration Service became part of the interior ministry), or appoints former or even acting undercover, security officers to key political, administrative and economic positions. This last refers specifically to Putin's policy of the mass appointment of Federal Security Service (FSB) officers to key positions in the Russian government and state-controlled corporations.[10] Thus, these spheres are taken out of "normal," transparent and democratic civil procedures and are now subject to the "emergency" non-transparent and hierarchical procedures of the security services.

Since the security services have expanded their spheres of control they no longer have the time nor the resources to concentrate on reform, simply because their efforts are spent increasing their spheres of control and effectively controlling new areas. Moreover, turf wars and even direct armed

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[8] K. Schmitt, *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*, Cambridge (Mass): MIT Press, 1985; K. Schmitt, *The crisis of parliamentary democracy*, Cambridge (Mass): MIT Press, 1988.

[9] G. Agamben, *The state of exception*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.

[10] A. Soldatov, I. Borogan, op. cit.

clashes between different security services (as occurred between the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia and the FSB, see below) can occur as a result of their rival attempts to increase their sphere of control. In general, the link between the reform of the security sector, on the one hand, and the expansion of the authority of the security agencies and the securitization of new issues, on the other, is negative because the expansion of the authority of the security agencies contradicts democratization – the key element of the reform of the security sector – while the securitization of new issues leads to the expansion of the authority of the security agencies and creates negative stimuli for reform.

The securitization of new issues and the expansion of the authority of the security agencies, means that Russian policy on security sector reform has been characterized by a lack of concentration on the part of policy makers regarding the implementation of the officially proclaimed reforms, an absence of the political will to realize them, a lack of resources allocated for the reforms, and the pursuance of mutually contradictory tasks.

*Since the security services have expanded their spheres of control they no longer have the time nor the resources to concentrate on reform.*

However, one could not say that there are convincing arguments for the idea that the expansion of the security agenda and the expansion of the authority of the security agencies in Russia have been the result of a direct conspiracy of the FSB[11] as some of Putin's critics would have it. "Conspiracy theories" of such scale usually cannot be proven by definition.[12] Moreover, key proponents of the "conspiracy theory" such as Litvinenko and Berezovsky have a poor reputation and cannot be considered as disinterested witnesses or objective analysts. So, their ideas should be considered in the same category as Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11; a matter of quasi-religious belief or disbelief.

One can state that the expansion of the security agenda in Russia is the result of two developments. First, there was a general tendency in world politics during the global war on terror to expand the security agenda and to use extreme means to oppose terrorist threats. As a result, Putin was generally

[11] Y. Felshtinsky, A. Litvinenko, *Blowing up Russia: the secret plot to bring back KGB terror* (translated from Russian by Geoffrey Andrews and Co.), London: Gibson Square Books, 2007.

[12] The author agrees with the following point of view: Review of the book Y. Felshtinsky, A. Litvinenko, op. cit. by V. Groskop, *The Observer*, January 21, 2007. Available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2007/jan/21/politics (accessed on July 10, 2011).

able to successfully sell his policy of expanding the security agenda to the world (the story of how George W. Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw a trustworthy person is well known). Second, it was the result of a specific situation in Russia's security sector in the 1990s. General chaos in the political, economic and social life of the country and the absence of basic security guarantees on all levels made the expansion of the security agenda and the rise of the power of the security services inevitable in some respects. The Russian population wanted, at least, basic "order" and a "strong hand" that could guarantee it. Putin responded to this popular demand.[13]

## Putin–Medvedev era in the evolution of the security sector in the context of post-Soviet Russian history

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and up until 2000, all the elements of the Soviet security sector were simply destroyed in Russia, due to the lack of financial resources, and the general political, economic and administrative chaos that reigned. Yeltsin's administration was mostly interested in securing the political loyalty of the security services, especially, the Interior Ministry, the army and the FSB, particularly given the internal political battles (such as the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the coup of 1993, the highly controversial presidential elections of 1996 and the default of 1998) and intense security challenges (the Chechen war, various conflicts in the outlying areas of the former Soviet Union, the combined threat of Islamic extremists in the Northern Caucasus and the Taliban in Central Asia at the end of the 1990s).[14] The 1993 Russian Constitution, laws and various government plans provided for the modernization of the security sector and for its functioning within the context of a democratic political system and market economy. However, they remained mostly on paper. Achievements made in destroying the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism, such as increased personal freedoms and the weakening influence of the security services were more the result of general and chaotic societal processes than the result of government efforts. Moreover, the political, social and economic upheavals of this period created new problems in Russia's security sector and seriously aggravated old problems, such as the total corruption of the administrative

[13] See general analysis of Putin's policy in R. Sakwa, *Putin: Russia's choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

[14] See a description of the Yeltsin administration that is both objective and sympathetic to Russia in S. Talbott, *The Russia hand. A memoir of presidential diplomacy*, New York: Random House, 2003. See also an analysis of Russian security problems in the general context of political and social life in R. Sakwa, *Russian politics and society*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

apparatus, the privatization of violence and the creation of a specific political economy of "violent entrepreneurship,"[15] the wide-spread establishment of networks of corrupt security officers, criminals and businessmen,[16] the general atmosphere of pervasive crime and lawlessness, and the feeling of insecurity among the population. In general, the control previously held by the Communist Party and the KGB over Russian life was effectively replaced by criminal control. This was a general popular perception, demonstrated, for example, by the popularity of the film *The great criminal revolution* by the well-known film maker and State Duma deputy Stanislav Govorukhin, in which key events in the history of post-Soviet Russia were analyzed from the point of view of the victory of the "mafia."

*In general, the control previously held by the Communist Party and the KGB over Russian life was effectively replaced by criminal control.*

There are three reasons why the modernization of the security sector in Russia after 2000 was possible. First, there was significant popular demand for reforms in this sphere and Putin, both a former KGB officer and member of Anatoly Sobchak's democratic government of St. Petersburg, was perceived as the right man to accomplish this task. Second, after 2000 the Russian state had sufficient revenue mostly due to the high energy prices on the world markets. Third, administrative practices in Russia were standardized; achieved, unfortunately, mostly, due to the concentration of power (the creation of a "vertical of power" centered on Putin, and, later, on the Putin–Medvedev "tandem"). This concentration of power created the basis for some of the contradictions in the reforms of the security sector in Russia, since the lack of political competition and increased control of the state over the mass-media reduced the transparency of the reform process. As a result, it created an additional stimulus for increasing corruption in the security agencies (see below). Moreover, the concentration of power undermined elements of the modern and democratic practices that the Russian leadership had tried to introduce into the security sector (such as parliamentary and public

[15] V. Volkov, *Violent entrepreneurs: the use of force in the making of Russian capitalism*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.

[16] V. Sergeyev, *The Wild East: crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia*, New York: Armonk, 1998; A. Ledeneva, *How Russia really works*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006; A. Ledeneva, *Russia's economy of favors*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; F. Varese, *The Russian mafia. Private protection in a new market economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

control, elements of transparency and regular contact with the mass-media, the increased role of the independent judiciary system, and guarantees that citizens' personal rights would be observed).

It is well-known that there are disagreements between Putin and Medvedev on some key foreign policy issues (for example, their position on NATO's involvement in the Libyan civil war) and on some key domestic problems (for example, their position on the degree of control security services should have over businesses). However, there are many more similarities between them. According to the Russian press, they now constitute the ruling "Putin–Medvedev tandem," as President and Prime Minister. The elements of continuity between Putin's two presidencies and Medvedev's presidency are very strong. So, one can analyze the period of 2000–2011 as a de facto single "Putin–Medvedev" period.

> It is impossible to understand the evolution of the Russian security sector without taking into account the enormous expansion of the security agenda in this period. Security has become a key political value in the official rhetoric, in the propaganda of the state-controlled mass-media, and in key laws and official documents defining domestic and foreign policy.[17]

In general, security was used by the authorities (especially, during Putin's two presidential terms) in the following way:

- to justify key foreign policy objectives: to guarantee a successful fight against terrorism in the Northern Caucasus, to support the US operation in Afghanistan, to oppose NATO enlargement on the territory of the former Soviet Union and to oppose the positioning of the American anti-missile defense system in Eastern Europe, to control the post-Soviet space and oppose the wave of color revolutions and the revolutionary governments in Ukraine (former president Yushchenko) and Georgia (President Saakashvili), etc;
- to justify key domestic policy objectives: to fight Islamic extremism and separatism in the Northern Caucasus, to establish state control over key mass-media, to concentrate all administrative and political power in the Kremlin, to abolish the election of provincial governors and to establish a "vertical of power" (this was done after the terrible terrorist act committed during Moscow's popular musical "Nord–Ost" in 2002 and was justified by the logic of the war on terror), to alter the balance of power inside elite

[17] A. Kazantsev, op. cit.

groups by promoting representatives of security agencies, primarily the FSB, to the most important positions, and to fight political opposition defined as "asystemic" and "extremist."

- to justify key elements of internal and external economic policy: to establish state control over key branches of industry defined as "strategic," especially, over the gas and oil industries, to push Western investors out of these industries, to diminish the influence of Russian "oligarchs" and to establish the strict control of the security agencies over these businesses, and to conduct an energy security policy under the slogan of the "energy superstate."

## Corruption, irrationality and economic costs of securitization in Russia

By a certain point in Putin's presidency all the key dimensions of Russian life had been described in laws, other official documents and the rhetoric of the government on security issues and, therefore, the direct or indirect control the security agencies had over these issues was justified. Sometimes, this created a purely Kafkaesque world of irrationality, putting high additional costs on the economy and closing down opportunities to clearly formulate the most important real dimensions of the national security agenda.

The irrational elements of securitization in Russia are especially clear in the case of demography and migration. The discourse on demographic and related migration issues has been heavily securitized both in official documents and in the discourse of the government-controlled mass-media, where we see genuine social security concerns being combined with elements of old totalitarian biopolitics[18] (on issues such as pro-birth policies) and elements of racism (migration policies, especially, in Moscow).

The securitization of the migration issue was clear from the point of view of the structure of the administrative agencies and cadre policy. In 1992–2000, the Federal Migration Service of Russia was an independent structure that controlled migration from the point of view of maximizing its economic benefits. Migration was under the control of the Ministry of Federation, National and Migration Policy for a short period, and then in 2002 it was replaced by the Federal Migration Service of the Interior Ministry.[19] Control over migration in order to guarantee national security has now become a priority, while economic

[18] L. Kaganovsky, *How the Soviet man was unmade: cultural fantasy and male subjectivity under Stalin*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008.

[19] "O sovershenstvovanii gosudarstvennogo upravlenia v oblasti migracionnoy politiki," The Decree of the President of Russia, No. 232, February 23, 2002.

issues are of secondary importance. Moreover, corruption in this sphere is extensive. This has been underlined by many critics of this policy, even within the Russian leadership; for example, by the head of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament (the Council of Federation), Sergey Mironov.[20] Currently, the Federal Migration Service is one of the most active security agencies, especially in Moscow, where it organizes regular inspections, directed at illegal migrants (mostly, of Central Asian origin). This is accompanied by a press rhetoric that contains clear elements of racism and intensifying clashes between Russian and Islamic youth groups. The intense interethnic violence that occurred in Moscow in December 2010 is a good illustration of this. Securitization of the migration issue is also underlined by the fact that it fell under the supervision of Victor Ivanov, a former KGB and FSB officer within the presidential administration until 2008.

*Control over migration in order to guarantee national security has now become a priority, while economic issues are of secondary importance.*

Securitization of the demographic issue in the official and, especially, semi-official and government-controlled mass-media has been especially irrational.[21] Of course, the issue of demography is important from the point of view of national security, particularly, taking into account Russia's acute demographic crisis, male supermortality, the poor health of young males, the depopulation of Central Russia and Siberia, and the army's reliance on conscripts. Average life expectancy in Russia is 74.67 years for women and 62.77 years for men,[22] and, most importantly, many males in Russia die between the ages of 30–40. This is due to alcohol and drug abuse, low quality medicines, stress and violence. Russia, in general, is experiencing rapid depopulation and a change in the ethnic and religious composition of its population.

However, if citizens' personal freedoms and universal human rights are to be recognized, this issue cannot be directly securitized. The official policy of giving mothers so-called "mother capital" in today's Russia is appropriate because it provides additional social protection for the population. However, this should be a separate issue from the security discourse. The Russian population made

[20] "Mironov: Rossii nuzhna koncepcia migrationnoy politiki," *Rosbalt news agency*, July 23, 2008.

[21] For further details, see A. Kazantsev, op. cit., pp. 79–142.

[22] See the data on the official site of Rosstat. Available online:http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/population/demography/# (accessed on September 1, 2011).

a mockery of Soviet propaganda, which demanded patterns of behavior that contradicted the natural behavioral characteristics of human nature. The same is true of demographic issues in Russia today. Even the ultra-nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky mocked this when in his idiosyncratic non-politically-correct style he proposed that women should not be paid for bearing more children, but that men should be rewarded for having sexual intercourse with as many women as possible;[23] he has also officially proposed polygamy.[24] Semi-official propaganda in the mass-media encouraging women to bear children out of patriotic duty is irrational by definition. If a woman wants to have a child and bring it up, this is because she loves her child, not because she wants to provide the Russian army with a soldier or prevent the "colonization of Russia by foreign migrants." This is human nature and the propaganda in the mass-media cannot change it.

Another irrational and dysfunctional element in securitization has appeared in the Russian economy. The increased control the security services have had over business since 2000 and, especially, following the Yukos affair have put significant additional transaction costs on the economy. The economy was heavily monopolized and put under strict direct and indirect state control as a consequence.[25] Conditions for foreign investment worsened significantly. An official list of "strategic industries," where foreign investment was not welcome, was drawn up. There were also cases where the property of foreign investors in "strategic spheres" was taken by state companies under this or that pretext. Gazprom, for example, with the assistance of the state campaign against foreign investors under the pretext that they had violated environmental laws, purchased a controlling stake in the key Sakhalin 2 project. Having to secure different permits from the security agencies made life harder for Russian businesses. Extensive corruption also means that the security agencies receive large sums of protection money, which may sometimes constitute the bulk of the officers' incomes.

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[23] See, for example, public discussion of this proposal. Available online: http://otvet.mail.ru/question/14566243 (accessed on September 1, 2010). This proposal can be considered as specific Zhirinovsky-style slip of the tongue. However, later he officially formulated a set of measures in the same direction.

[24] "Zhirinovsky predlozhil vyplachivatj 100 tisjach rublej za otkaz ot avtora," *Argumenty i fakty*, January 19, 2010. Available online: http://www.aif.ru/society/news/45189 (accessed on January 19, 2010).

[25] A. Illarionov, "When state means business," *International Herald Tribune*, January 25, 2006. Available online: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-117787804.html (accessed on June 4, 2010); A. Illarionov, "The rise of the corporate state in Russia," conference materials, The Cato Institute, March 7, 2006. Available online: http://www. cato. org/event. php? eventid=2764 (accessed on June 4, 2010).

The economic life of the country cannot be run by the security services by definition because it places high costs on the economy. Eventually, the Kremlin, under Medvedev's presidency, recognized this and since 2008–2009 it has begun, albeit rather cautiously, to implement a new policy directed at demonopolizing and diminishing the role of the state in economic life and diminishing the control the security services have over businesses.

The economic aspects of securitization policy have been very unsuccessful. The direct or indirect control of the security agencies has severely restricted business freedoms in Russia even when compared to neighboring post-Soviet countries with similar historical path dependencies. According to The Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic Freedom and The Heritage Foundation of 2009, the Russian economy was defined as "mostly unfree" with a score of 50.3 and just on the margin of becoming "repressed" (this category starts at 49.9). This is very poor compared to Georgia (70.4), the Kyrgyz Republic (61.3), Kazakhstan (61.0), Azerbaijan (58.8), Moldova (53.7) and Tajikistan (53.0).[26]

Corruption has become widespread in the Russian administration in general and among officers of the security agencies in particular. This was recognized by Putin's administration (it conducted a campaign against so-called "Oborotni v pogonah" ("werewolves with shoulder straps"). During Medvedev's presidency the fight against corruption has significantly intensified and this has become one of the Kremlin's key political priorities. However, the results of these campaigns are rather mediocre, if not negative. The beginning of Putin's first presidency was characterized by a dramatic increase in transparency and a decline in corruption compared to Yeltsin's period. At that time, the majority of Russian companies began moving to so-called "white schemes" from so-called "black schemes" and stopped paying bribes. Unfortunately, the situation quickly deteriorated from the beginning of Putin's second term onwards. In 2002–2003 Russia was placed at 2.7 in Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI), while in 2004 it was 2.8. In 2005 the decline started. The CPI slipped to 2.4. In 2006 it was 2.5, in 2007 – 2.3, in 2008 – 2.1, in 2009 – 2.2 and in 2010 – 2.1.[27] In general, the combination of high levels of state control over the economy and the control wielded over business by security agencies, especially, the FSB, prosecutors and the police, in addition to

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[26] The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, "Index of economic freedom." Available online: http://www.heritage.org/index/excel/2010/Index2010_Data.xls (accessed on February 15, 2010).

[27] See the data of transparency.org web-site. Available online: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results; http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table, etc. (accessed on August 4, 2011).

significant corruption in all the state agencies is not a recipe for the successful development of a market economy.

## Weak independence of courts as key structural problem in Russian security sector

In the Soviet period the courts were the de facto element of the state's repressive mechanism and they were perceived by the authorities and population alike as one of the security agencies. Representatives of the International Commission of Jurists believe that Russian courts are still a closed system, and that legal procedures in criminal cases still have a "condemnatory character" (only one per cent of those accused of different crimes are absolved).[28] Therefore, distancing the courts from the security sector and guaranteeing their independence is a key structural task in the reform of the security sector in Russia. Only independent courts can guarantee competitive politics, the effective functioning of a market economy and a system of checks and balances within the government. Otherwise, the authorities, from the regional level up to the centre, can manipulate political and economic life through their influence on court decisions.

*Many experts believe that the authorities in Russia influence court decisions.*

The 1993 Constitution and existing laws guarantee the independence of the Russian judiciary, but in reality this independence both from administrative power and from economic interests is still not guaranteed.[29] Putin, due to his legal education, had a significant interest in this issue. Medvedev, who was a university law lecturer, made court reforms one of his priorities. The process of introducing jury trials began in 1993 in some of Russia's regions. This process has been very slow but since 2010 all Russian regions have jury trials. There have also been other reforms. In Russia, advocates can now be present not only in court, but also during the preliminary criminal investigation. It is now the judges, not the public prosecutors, who give permission for detention. Some measures have also been undertaken to guarantee the physical safety of judges and ensure their high social status and income.

[28] *Sostoyanie sudebnoi sistemy v Rossii*, International commission of jurists, Geneva, November 2010, p. 35.
[29] Ibid, pp. 32–35.

Still, many experts believe that the authorities in Russia influence court decisions (see, for example, the literature on the Yukos affair,[30] and, especially, the discussion of the second trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in the Russian and international mass-media[31]). In this respect, Moscow's regional government under Mayor Yury Luzhkov (1992–2010) had an especially bad reputation. A special term "Basmannoe pravosudie" (a justice of Basmanny court) has even been coined because the Moscow government won all the cases in this court, situated in one of Moscow's districts. Critics of Luzhkov were fairly often accused of defamation and the fines for this were quite high by Russian standards.

The independence of the courts cannot be guaranteed only through the political decisions made in the Kremlin. The attitudes and values of the judges themselves also need to change. The Russian and international press regularly report on different cases where judges are involved in different criminal corruption networks including the representatives of the Russian security services, businessmen and gangsters. The latest such case is the infamous Magnitsky affair (230 million US dollars were stolen through a false tax rebate scheme and the lawyer who exposed the scheme was imprisoned and killed in jail).[32]

Apart from the corruption of the Russian courts and law enforcement agencies, this case reveals another problem – the terrible state of the Russian system of preliminary detention and the Russian system of correctional facilities. Both systems have still not overcome the legacy of the Soviet prisons and labor camps. In Russia people still routinely remain in detention for many years. The European Court of Human Rights equates this with torture (see, for example, the case of Chebotarevich[33]). The situation in the correctional facilities

[30] R. Sakwa, *The quality of freedom: Putin, Khodorkovsky and the Yukos affair*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[31] A. Blomfield, "Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky goes on trial for second time," *The Telegraph*, March 03, 2009. Available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/4932132/Russian-oligarch-Mikhail-Khodorkovsky-goes-on-trial-for-second-time.html (accessed on February 14, 2011); D. Zaks, "U.S., Europe condemn Russia for tough Mikhail Khodorkovsky sentence," *Vancouver Sun*, December 31, 2010. Available online: http://www.vancouversun.com/health/Europe+condemn+Russia+tough+Mikhail+Khodorkovsky+sentence/4045469/story.html (accessed on February 14, 2011).

[32] See, for example J. Firestone, "Russia's crime of the century. How crooked officials pulled off a massive scam, spent millions on Dubai real estate, and killed my partner when he tried to expose them," *Foreign Policy*, April 20, 2011. Available online: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/20/russia_s_crime_of_the_century?page=0,1 (accessed on June 12, 2011).

[33] "Predvaritelnoe zaklyuchenie kak pytka," *Slavic center for law and justice*, January 15, 2010. Available online: http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=228&ELEMENT_ID=2738 (accessed on June 10, 2011).

is also terrible in terms of violence, nutrition and the spread of diseases, such as tuberculosis, etc.

## Serdyukov's military reform

Until recently, the reforms of the Russian army have been quite moderate. Reform plans, especially, in terms of moving from a conscript army to a professional army (necessitated by Russia's demographic crisis, see above), have been regularly drawn up but not fulfilled. By 2008, the achievements in military reforms mainly boiled down to an increase in funding and a reduction in mandatory military service to one year. The number of military chairs at the universities (where the officers of the reserve force were taught) and the number of military schools was drastically reduced, while the quality and control of education was increased.

In October 2008 Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced that a new reform of the armed forces was to be implemented in 2008–2012. The primary aims of the reform are to reorganize the structure and the chain of command in the Russian army, and to reduce it in size.[34] The number of servicemen in the army will fall from 1,200,000 to 1,000,000, mostly through reducing the number of commissioned officers nearing pension age.

The reform deals especially with the problem of the extensive ground forces inherited from the Soviet Union, which had been specifically designed to lead a full-scale nuclear war preceded by general mobilization. The nature of the ground forces' officer corps of this was rather strange as a result. In 2008 the Russian army consisted of 15,365 Colonels, 19,300 Lieutenant Colonels, 99,550 Majors and 90,000 Captains, but only 30,000 First Lieutenants, 20,000 Lieutenants and 90,000 Praporshchiks (non-commissioned officers).[35] So, the army resembled a reverse pyramid with a large number of senior officers, but a relatively small number of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. As a result, the army was unable to operate in real combat situations. This should change by 2012 and the balance between ranks will become more appropriate. Generally, the number of commissioned officers will be reduced from the current figure of over 400,000 (more than 30 per cent of current staff) to around 150,000 (15 per cent of future staff).[36] Another key element of the reform is the reorganization

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[34] "Military reform to change army structure. What about its substance?", *RIA-Novosti*, October 17, 2008. Available online: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081017/117787642.html (accessed on October 20, 2008).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

of the military command and the control system from a four-tier (military district – army – division – regiment) system to a more flexible and battle-ready three-tier structure (military district – operational command – brigade).[37] The plans also include creating mobile permanent readiness brigades, consisting of battalions. They will mostly constitute airborne units, which have traditionally been considered as the elite of the ground forces in Russia.

Critics of the reform say that the proposed changes lack clarity[38] and that they have not been sufficiently well-explained to the public and the army's staff and that there has been no dialogue between political authorities and the army.

## Military reform and military–industrial complex

Russia has inherited a uniquely large military industrial complex from the Soviet Union. So, reforming it is one of the most important economic aspects of the security sector reforms in general. During the 1990s the potential of the Russian military industrial complex was simply destroyed because the state did not have enough money to buy new arms and did not even pay regularly for the items it ordered. Exports to third world countries, especially to China and India have become the key to the survival of the Russian military industries.

Internationally, the Russian military industries are still very strong; in 2010 Russian military export was about 10 billion US dollars. However, Putin's general policy in this sphere was typical: monopolization. The only state-owned company, Rosoboronexport, was established in 2000 in order to control the export of arms. Putin's decree holds that, since March 1, 2007, Rosoboronexport is the only agency that has the right to export arms. Since 2000 the situation regarding the army's ability to purchase arms has improved dramatically. The government now has enough money from oil and gas exports, and modernizing the army's equipment is one of the key political priorities.

There has been enormous growth in spending on the military industries and military research in Russia today. In 2010 the state arms program constituted a sum equal to 2.6 per cent of Russian GDP, in 2011 it is planned to equal 2.9 per cent of GDP, in 2012 – 3 per cent, and, from 2013 – 3.2 per cent.[39] However, this level of spending may bring quite moderate benefits to the military industry.

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[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] V. Sychev, "Voennye raschody Rossii v 2009 godu. Appetit Serdyukova rastet," *Voennoe obozrenie. Novosti armii i VMF Rossii*, July 6, 2010. Available online: http://www.siliyan.ru/archives/6390 (accessed on August 4, 2011).

Corruption in the purchasing of arms by the Ministry of Defense is traditionally very high.[40] For example, in 2010 President Medvedev recognized in his speech before the board of the Defense Ministry that "the mechanisms for securing contracts in the procurement of arms are still not effective enough."[41] Chief Military Prosecutor Sergey Fridinsky declared in his speech before the board of the Prosecutor General's Office that military prosecutors annually expose thousands of incidences of corruption in the purchase of arms. This corruption affects all stages in the development and production of arms, from research and development up to the supply of new arms. In 2009 alone Russian courts condemned more than 70 public officers for corruption in this area.[42]

The constant turf war between the Ministry of Defense and the military industrial complex in Russia has especially intensified in 2010–2011. In 2010 the Defense Ministry refused to purchase a new tank, the -95, since it is of inferior quality compared to the tanks of NATO countries.[43] The Russian Defense Ministry has also started purchasing new arms abroad, mostly, in Europe and Israel. The Russian military industrial complex is fiercely opposed to this policy.

*Corruption in the purchasing of arms by the Ministry of Defense is traditionally very high.*

In 2011 the Russian press has been filled with mutual accusations of corruption by the representatives of military industry and the Ministry of Defense.[44] The general constructor at the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology (responsible for producing the "Topol-M" and "Bulava" missiles, for instance) has accused the Ministry of Defense of failing to produce state plans for defense purchases this year. Independent military expert Anatoly Tsyganok said that the industry considers the Defense Ministry to be too corrupt to be entrusted with the right to purchase military arms.[45] In turn, Anatoly Serdyukov has accused the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology of overpricing the Topol-M missiles (to

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[40] A. Zyganok, "Neprozrachnye potoky Minoborony," *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, May 28, 2008. Available online: http://www.ng.ru/nvo/2008-05-28/9_minoborony.html (accessed on August 11, 2011).

[41] "Razvorovanny gosoboronzakaz," *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, March 12, 2010. Available online: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-03-12/2_red.html (accessed on August 10, 2011).

[42] Ibid.

[43] M. Rastopshin, "Nashi tanki v realnoy voyne obrecheny?," *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, October 8, 2010. Available online: http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2010-10-08/8_tanks.html (accessed on August 10, 2011).

[44] "Bitva za contract," *Argumenty i fakty*, August 3, 2011, p. 10.

[45] Ibid.

the tune of 3.9 billion rubles). A member of the Public Council of the Ministry of Defense, Igor Korotchenko, has said that an earlier nuclear submarine, the "Severodvinsk", cost 47 billion rubles, while the price of the newer version of the submarine in the same series has increased to 112 billion rubles. President Medvedev has supported the Ministry of Defense saying that it should purchase new arms at transparent prices and not at the prices that the "individual companies would like to set."[46]

There has clearly been a deterioration in the quality of the products produced by the Russian military industrial complex. In 2008 Algeria returned 15 Russian MiG-29 warplanes because of their low quality. After the catastrophe involving a MiG-29 in the Trans–Baikal region in 2008 corrosion was discovered in many of the planes. The Russian Ministry of Defense later decided to buy planes made for Algeria, which places a question mark over the quality of the new equipment that the Russian army purchases. Many experts consider the decline of the Russian military industry and its research and development to be systemic.[47]

The decline of the Russian military industry, especially, when compared to its Chinese counterpart, is also noticeable on the foreign markets. China has used Russian supplies of military equipment to modernize its army, creating fears within Russia (especially about the future fate of depopulated Siberia).[48] China has also used Russian military technologies to effectively modernize its military industry. On international markets (especially, in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, where the Russian position has traditionally been very strong) cheap Chinese copies of Russian arms are rapidly supplanting genuine Russian military equipment.[49]

## FSB, police and other agencies

During Putin's two presidencies the powers of the FSB have been significantly expanded and include almost all spheres of life.[50] Institutionally, it has absorbed

[46] Ibid.

[47] I. Titenko, "Spasenie – proryv v oblasti vysokih tehnologiy," *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, October 9, 2009. Available online: http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2009-10-09/1_spasenie.html (accessed on August 6, 2011).

[48] A. Osborn, "Russian rearmament: Moscow fears China and Islamist insurgents Moscow," *The Telegraph*, February 25, 2011. Available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8346056/Russian-rearmament-Moscow-fears-China-and-Islamist-insurgents.html (accessed on August 6, 2011).

[49] V. Myasnikov, "Pekin zanimaet chuzhoe mesto na mirovom rynke VVT prakticheski bez boya," *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, July 16, 2010. Available online: http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2010-07-16/8_china.html (accessed on August 6, 2011).

[50] A. Soldatov, I. Borogan, op. cit..

some of the agencies (for example, the border guards) that Yeltsin's government had previously separated off from this heir of the KGB in order to diminish its influence. Now, the FSB is the key security agency that sits atop the informal pyramid of all the other agencies. It informally oversees them and coordinates their activities. One of the primary tasks of the FSB that justified the expansion of its powers is to fight terror in the Northern Caucasus. However, this task has not been accomplished very successfully. For example, in the Russian Republic of Dagestan alone 110 terrorist acts were committed in the first six months of 2011.[51]

The huge empire of the Russian Emergency Ministry is usually considered a success story among the security agencies. It includes a civil defence system, specialists in disaster management, and various paramilitary and military formations, etc. The influence of this Ministry during the Putin–Medvedev era has continued to grow. It is the most popular security agency with the Russian population. Some of its units are considered to be the best in the world. For example, the World Health Organization recognized that the Russian Emergency Ministry's field hospital was the most effective during the recent earthquake in Haiti.[52] The Minister, Sergey Shoigu, is, probably, one of the most influential Russian ministers. He has been in office since 1991! He is also a key political figure, the only minister to have been an original founding member of the ruling United Russia party. Critics of the Ministry say that it is irrational to spend considerable financial resources on dealing with the consequences of emergencies if enough money is not invested in preventing them. This criticism was often voiced after the terrible forest fires in Central Russia during the extremely hot summer of 2010.[53] The ministry could not do anything in this situation, but a considerable amount of money was spent. The bounties paid to the emergency officers who put out the forest fires were equal to 2.2. billion rubles, yet the Ministry of Forestry's entire budget for 2010 was 2 billion rubles.[54] The critics also say that it is not effective to have a large state corps of emergency officers, when private companies can do the same thing more cheaply and effectively. For example, during the breakdown of the Sayano–Shushenskaya hydroelectric station in Siberia 60 emergency divers from the Ministry were unable to hermetically seal the damaged compartment of the station in four days, while divers belonging

[51] G. Alexandrov, "Shashlyk s krovyu," *Argumenty i fakty*, August 3, 2011, p. 8.

[52] A stenogram of the report of Russian Emergency Minister Sergey Shoigu to the Council of Federation of Russia, March 3, 2010. Available online: http://www.mchs.gov.ru/interviews/detail.php?ID=30860 (accessed on August 13, 2011).

[53] V. Bondar, "Cena letnih napastey," *Odnako*, September 12, 2010. Available online: http://www.odnako.org/magazine/material/show_9080/ (accessed on August 12, 2011).

[54] Ibid.

to a private firm succeeded within four hours.[55] Foreign private firms were also used to raise the "Kursk" submarine to the surface after it had sunk.

Paradoxically, the office of the prosecutor general – one of whose tasks is to oversee other governmental agencies and prevent corruption – is considered rather corrupt in Russia. This was once again underlined by the recent open conflict between the prosecutors and other security agencies over a case in the Moscow region, when prosecutors allegedly protected an illegal gambling business. The son of the prosecutor general, also a prosecutor, was involved in this case. One of Medvedev's reforms has been to separate the Investigating Committee from the other prosecutors. The independent Investigating committee of Russia has been in operation since January 15, 2011._

*The critics also say that it is not effective to have a large state corps of emergency officers, when private companies can do the same thing more cheaply and effectively.*

The Federal Drug Control Service is also considered a key security agency. It was created once the tax police had been abolished by former KGB and FSB officer Victor Cherkesov on March 11, 2003. Cherkesov was originally considered to belong to the narrow circle of persons whom Putin trusted most. When Putin was head of the FSB, Cherkesov was his deputy. The story of this agency is a good example of how the different security agencies fight for their spheres of control. The battle between this new agency and the FSB, according to Cherkesov's public confessions, actually turned into armed conflict.[56] As a result, Cherkesov was moved out of drug control and he then disappeared from the Russian administrative elite._

However, the most important of Medvedev's reforms is the police reform announced on August 6, 2010. Russian police (especially, the traffic police), a key part of the Interior Ministry, are considered to be totally corrupt by the public. One of the most important tasks of this reform is to eliminate corruption and incompetence. This transformation is underlined by the name change from Russian "militia" to "policia." It is accompanied by strict assessment of police

[55] "Kak spasti vodolazov Rossii," *O-1*, November 24, 2009. Available online: http://www.O-1.ru/?id=26922 (accessed on August 14, 2011).

[56] V. Cherkesov, "Nelzya dopustit, chtoby voiny prevratilis v torgovtsev," *Kommersant*, September 9, 2007. Available online: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/812840 (accessed on August 15, 2011), "Vertikal s GAKom," *Russian sevice of BBC*, October 22, 2007. Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_7055000/7055747.stm#1 (accessed on August 15, 2011).

officers and many of them are fired. However, publically there is widespread skepticism about the success of this ambitious reform.

## Conclusions

In general, reforming the security sector in Russia so that it can guarantee the provision of security to the state and Russian people effectively and under democratic principles is an unfinished project. During the 1990s there was no real security sector reform and all such plans remained mostly on paper. Achievements that were made in destroying the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism in the security sector were more the result of chaotic societal processes than the results of purposeful government efforts. Moreover, the upheavals of this period created new problems in Russia's security sector such as extensive corruption.

Since 2000 the Russian government has made a real effort to reform the security sector, and it has both the will and the resources to carry this out. Some positive things have been planned or achieved, especially during Medvedev's presidency. However, many of the necessary reforms have not been implemented and have not even been planned. One of the reasons for this is the mutually contradictory policy of the Russian leadership. This contradictory policy means that some of the achievements accomplished in reforming the security sector have been accompanied by setbacks even in comparison to the 1990s, for example, in terms of introducing democratic values and practices into the security sector.

The key contradiction is between the policy directed at modernizing Russia's security sector, on the one hand, and the policy directed at expanding the security agenda, widening the authority of different security agencies and increasing their control over society, on the other hand. The effective modernization and reform of the security sector requires resources to be concentrated in key directions. Moreover, the reform of the security sector that aims to guarantee its ability to provide security for the people under democratic principles requires a decrease in the authority of the security agencies. This key contradiction is also connected to many other contradictions in Russia's security policy of the last decade, such as the concentration of power vs. the introduction of democratic practices, the fight against corruption vs. the absence of an effective system of checks and balances, and guaranteeing the independence of judiciary vs. the influence of the authorities over key court decisions justified by national security considerations, etc. All these contradictions in Russian security policy should be overcome if effective reforms of the security sector are to be implemented.

## The European Union and Central Asia

By Alexander Warkotsch, ed., Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011. 224 p.
ISBN 978-0415562362

Why does the European Union need a strategy on Central Asia? This book, *The European Union and Central Asia*, attempts to answer this very question. It focuses on relations between the EU and Central Asia following the Union's adoption of the framework document The EU in Central Asia: strategy for new partnership. The publication examines policy toward the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The analysis evaluates the EU's performance in meeting its policy goals. Until now, only a few publications have comprehensively dealt with this issue, for example, Neil J. Melvin's *Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's new strategy in the heart of Eurasia* (2008), or EU–Central Asia Monitoring working papers (EUCAM).

*The European Union and Central Asia* concentrates mostly on the period from 2007, when the Strategy for a New Partnership was adopted, to 2010. The 200 page publication not only reveals the reasons why this strategy was adopted but also looks at the interests the EU has in this region, and the tools it uses. One of the greatest assets of the book is the fact that it brings together regional experts on the topic to critically reflect on this strategy. The main goal of the publication is to "raise awareness on the effectiveness of the EU policy and – where necessary – propose steps for improvement." (p. 1)

The strategic importance of Central Asia has increased with the war on terror in Afghanistan and with Central Asia's growing energy potential. However, several factors complicate cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian states. Firstly, with the current exception of Kyrgyzstan, these are all authoritarian regimes and power is concentrated in the hands of the presidents. Secondly, the entire system is characterized by strong personalism, patron-client networks and corruption. Thirdly, the EU also competes against Russia and China, which have a better understanding of the practices of these regimes. Although the European Union will never play a primary role in this region, the Strategy is to establish what the EU wants in this area: to bring a set of new tools, such as establishing a regular regional political dialogue at the foreign minister level; to introduce a European Education Initiative and a Rule of Law Initiative; and to establish a human rights dialogue and a regular energy dialogue. For these purposes 719 million euros were allocated for the years 2007–2013.

The introduction provides an overview of the Strategy and of the authors' contributions. The book is divided into two broad sections: the first covers the EU

as actor and include chapters on the general framework of EU–Central Asian cooperation. There are five chapters dealing with Central Asian strategy; strategic tools; the EU member states in Central Asia; bilateral cooperation between the EU and these countries; and Central Asian geopolitics. The second part of the book concentrates on the Strategy's general objectives and the implementation of cooperation priorities: security assistance and border management; human rights and democratization; youth and higher education; economic development and trade; energy cooperation; water and environment; and finally, inter-cultural dialogue.

One of the most visible results of the Strategy is the increase in the number of high-level meetings and visits. But local observers of EU–Central Asian relations admit that the visibility of the EU and the impact of its engagement are practically zero. (p. 18) Internally, EU officials agree that Central Asian projects (BOMCA, CADAP, TRACECA, and INOGATE) are not success stories. (p. 26) In 2005, the European Union created the post of Special Representative for Central Asia. The first Special Representative to be appointed was Ján Kubiš, and he was in office for only one year. Generally, he was considered too friendly towards the Central Asian regimes and to prefer stable relations. (p. 28)

Bilateral initiatives and programs often coexist alongside EU projects. Only a few member states have a history of relations with the countries in Central Asia. But in recent years a significant number of them have become more interested and actively engaged. The most active and visible actor in Central Asia has been Germany with its economic and security interests in the region. "This dominance by one member state has inevitably had a major impact on the development of the EU's policy towards Central Asia and it was no coincidence that it was under the German EU Presidency in 2007 that the Strategy was negotiated and endorsed." (p. 35)

On the other hand, some member states have expressed a less enthusiastic attitude towards the region, especially the United Kingdom. There have been some disputes between member states over issues such as sanctions against Uzbekistan after Andijan or support for Kazakhstan's candidature for the chairmanship of the OSCE. However, these differences are not described in a more detailed fashion in this publication. Since the adoption of the 2007 partnership strategy, the EU has been increasing its engagement with each Central Asian state. "Other major players [Russia and China] perceive the EU as a largely technocratic, sometimes even as an apolitical actor, with only limited interest in extending its sphere of influence- in particular in the security realm." (p. 70) Nevertheless, these key players in the region also share common goals and interests such as regional stability and economic cooperation, and the fight against organized crime, drug smuggling and terrorism.

The security of the Central Asian region is one of the key goals of the EU's strategy, especially dealing with organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration and border security. In practice, most effort is concentrate on border management;

BOMCA (the Border Management Programme in Central Asia) is one of the flagship initiatives of the Strategy. But results in this area are limited.

One of the Strategy's objectives is consolidating democracy. This seems to be rather problematic, because these states are autocracies with restricted political and civil rights. "The Strategy's main characteristic is that its approach to democracy promotion is soft and indirect... The focus is not on promoting strong democratic institutions... but on improving good governance, in particular rule of law." (p. 103) The promotion of democracy and democratic institutions contradicts other objectives contained within the Strategy, for instance, the stability of regimes. This is an example of the inconsistency of the Strategy, as the book under review shows. The approach of the EU on this issue is often criticized since the EU tends to accept the undemocratic practices of these regimes. On the other hand, as the authors of the book argue, this may be the right approach towards Central Asian elites. In difficult regions, such as Central Asia, where the promotion of democracy is associated with high power costs for the ruling elites, soft and indirect approaches to democratization might be more promising than the harsh instruments of punishment and coercion. (p. 112)

Also supporting education should be one of the priorities. The Strategy focuses on higher education and cooperation as well as academic and student exchanges. Although there are three cooperation programs (Tempus, Erasmus Mundus and VET) their contribution is weak. "The projects implemented seem to have benefits for individual people and institutions, but do little to address the broader issues." (p. 127)

Other areas of cooperation have shown only limited results. In economic development, there has only been slow progress in terms of support for trade and investment. The situation is very similar in the area of strengthening energy and transport links. Aims such as searching for new oil and gas fields, developing hydro-power, upgrading the existing energy infrastructure and developing additional pipeline routes and energy transportation networks have remained on paper only. Water management shows some progress as it is one of the most topical issues in Central Asia, which has an impact on the environment. Although the Strategy is formulated in general terms, the EU implements many projects; unfortunately with poor results.

This publication provides a critical evaluation of the first three years of the Strategy for a new partnership. In contrast to official EU reports, this book evaluates the results less positively and more realistically. Several of the Strategy's tools and programs have failed to meet their targets. The primary problem with the EU's Strategy is that it is not a strategy, but a series of unrelated programs that are not joined into a coherent framework that would address the needs of the Central Asian nations and achieve the EU's own objectives. (p. 127)

*The European Union and Central Asia* may prove interesting, especially to those whose interest in the Central Asian region runs deeper. Unfortunately, the book does not provide the reader with either a summary or the main findings. Although there is a summary at the end of each section, in some chapters the evaluation is missing. The last four chapters are also problematic. For example, the chapter on economic development and trade is only about economic development and trade. There are just one and half pages on the importance of the EU in this sector in general terms. If this were a chapter about Central Asian trade then that might be appropriate, but this chapter has very little to do with the European Union or the Strategy or the framework of the book. The next three chapters are similar in this respect, although to a lesser extent. Has the EU been so unsuccessful in these areas that after three years of the Strategy there is nothing to evaluate? The absent conclusion might also answer this question.

To sum up, the publication can be considered a significant contribution to the discussion on the issue of the European Union and Central Asia. It also provides us with a significant amount of important information on the efficiency of the European Union's strategies, and not only in this region. The publication brings a very useful and competent analysis of the Strategy after three years. However, it also contains an important message – the EU must do more, use a new and more effective set of tools and programs, if it wants to be a visible player in the Central Asian states. Perhaps, in three or four years' time, a similar publication will be written evaluating the longstanding success/failure of this strategy.

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## Small states in the European Union: coping with structural disadvantages

By Diana Panke, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010. 243 p. ISBN 978-1-4094-0528-3

The decision-making process within the European Union has long been the focal point of scholars dealing with European integration. With the EU institutional development, the process has become very complicated and in some cases is still secret. Although the Council of Ministers' records are public at present, lower levels of decision-making – the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and/or working groups – are still hidden from public scrutiny. Another recurrent question regarding the decision-making process within the EU concerns the relationship between big and small member states and the ability of the small countries to push through their preferences vis-à-vis the big ones, given their disadvantageous position (especially their smaller number of votes in the Council of Ministers under qualified majority voting). Diana Panke, in her book *Small states in the European Union: Coping with structural disadvantages*, combines these two issues in her investigation into the role small member states play within the EU decision-making process at the COREPER and Council working groups level. She explores the day-to-day bargaining of small members and the strategies they employ in an effort to effectively pursue their preferences at the EU level.

The book has two main goals. The first is to explore how active small states are in negotiations and why some are more active than others. Her second aim is to examine the negotiation success of small member states and find out "under which conditions small states can successfully punch above their weights" (p. 1). The book and its 11 chapters are basically divided into two sections reflecting these goals. Diana Panke uses quantitative analysis to test a whole range of hypotheses that she proposes in each of the two sections. She collected data from the permanent representations of member states on their activities in the EU and uses these to test suggested hypotheses in order to answer her research questions. The author goes into greater depth concerning the success of small member states in pursuing their preferences in two qualitative case studies that are part of the second section. Small states are defined as states that have less than the average number of votes in the Council of Ministers (12.78 votes). Thus, altogether 19 small member states and eight big states are examined in the book.

Following the Introduction (Chapter 1) and second chapter that introduces the issue of the decision-making process in the EU and outlines the challenges facing small members in it, there are a further three chapters (the first section

of the book) covering the first research question on differences in the activities of various small member states at the EU level. In order to overcome their size-related problems, small states engage in capacity-building strategies (such as contacting the Presidency or the Commission in order to obtain additional information, with the aim of strengthening their abilities—altogether she identifies four strategies) and apply shaping strategies (for example arguing, coalition-building, bargaining, lobbying etc, in order to directly influence the outcomes of negotiations—there are 13 different strategies). Panke discovers that small members differ in the frequency with which they apply these strategies in general and also in the policy areas in which they do so (Chapter 3). She develops 28 hypotheses in the fourth chapter, which she then tests in Chapter 5 using quantitative data collected at permanent representations in Brussels and domestic ministries (she also supports these with interviews). The results show that the frequency of employing shaping strategies depends on the speed with which instructions can be developed and adjusted during negotiations as well as on the length of time the state has been a member of the EU. Moreover, states that have the most severe capacity shortcomings are not the most active in employing capacity-building strategies. Members use these strategies in areas that are of the greatest importance for them and choose those strategies that are the “cheapest”, requiring the fewest resources (general arguing, joining coalitions).

The next four chapters (chapters 6–9) answer her second research question regarding the negotiation success of small EU member states. This second section is structured in the same way as the previous one. First there is a descriptive chapter that concludes with several questions concerning negotiation success. Then, on the basis of these questions, Chapter 7 proposes 46 (!) hypotheses that are tested in the next chapter, which concludes that “small states are increasingly able to influence policies in line with their position, the more actively they participate in EU negotiations” (p. 141). Thus negotiation success increases depending on the frequency with which different shaping strategies are employed. But there are important differences between individual shaping strategies – those that are especially successful are persuasion-based strategies (general arguing, expertise-based arguing, problem-solving), while bargaining-based (bargaining and neutral mediation) and lobbying strategies (lobbying the European parliament, and the European Commission) are less effective. The length of time a state has been a member is also important (old members are more successful) and so is the quality of the instructions.

Chapter 9 comprises two case studies that further support the results of the previous quantitative analysis, which use qualitative methods and interviews as empirical material. In contrast to the preceding chapters, this one is very readable with a clear line of argument. It provides remarkably useful insights into the day-to-day operations of the institutions studied. This chapter focuses on the question

of when small members can “punch above their weights” meaning when can they exercise greater influence on the EU decision-making process than their size (and the number of votes they have in the Council of Ministers) would suggest. These two case studies (the alcoholic spirits case and the pesticides case) reveal that a “high level of shaping activity is essential for negotiation success” (p. 196). To successfully pursue their own preferences, states have to apply several shaping strategies throughout the whole decision-making process. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis have proved that the most successful strategies are persuasion-based. The most active and successful states are Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland, Belgium and Sweden. The final chapter summarizes the findings of the book and makes generalizations based on the results.

Let us now consider the strengths of the book before moving on to its weaknesses. Diana Panke has succeeded in revealing the activities of small member states at the working group and COREPER levels. This is an important contribution to the literature on small states in general, and particularly in terms of the decision-making process at these levels, which is generally under-researched. Panke’s attempt to rigorously study the activities of small states, using quantitative methods, is definitely an important addition to the rather sparse existing literature on the subject.

However, the book suffers from several shortcomings that must be addressed here; a few methodological issues, in particular, deserve a closer look. Panke offers very little information on the data and methodology in general. Moreover, she deals with these issues separately for each section of the book (plus the case study chapter), making it even more confusing for the reader. A separate chapter on methodology or at least part of a theoretical chapter with detailed information on empirical data collection would definitely enhance the reader’s understanding of the data presented.

The author should have dealt with these issues in more detail. She does not specify why she focuses on these three policy areas (environment, agriculture and economics) nor does she provide a list of interviewees. The quantitative data on the small states’ activities in the EU were obtained through a survey of staff from the ministries and permanent representations. The questions asked about their “self-perception on the frequency to which they, on average, apply different negotiation activities as well as on their perceived success in a given policy area” (p. 30). Altogether 338 completed questionnaires created the basis for the quantitative part of the book. The problems associated with such a survey may well be obvious, not least that this is a very subjective approach and that presenting such data as “hard”, as the author does, is rather questionable. Furthermore, Diana Panke does not explain why she conducted her research on all the member states (pp. 30–31) when she was interested only in the small ones. Nonetheless, this is a practical

manual on how to study the decision-making process at the lower levels of the Council and it is a very good starting point for future research.

Another issue is that Panke does not deal with the so-called new member states (2004 and 2007 entrants, NMS) to the same degree as she does the "old" members. This is not an issue in the second part of the book where she is concerned with the more active small states, since she claims that NMS are less active than the "old" ones, but in the first part of the book, where she investigates the general activities of the small member states, the book deals very marginally with the NMS. She devotes more space to the NMS in the qualitative chapter, but paradoxically the most often mentioned new state is Poland, which is not one of the small ones.

The reader may find the unbalanced structure of the book slightly discomfiting, especially in connection with the amount of space devoted to the individual issues. While the second chapter on the structural disadvantages of small EU member states is very brief, the ninth chapter, comprising two case studies, is much longer. Moreover, the author very often repeats hypotheses and facts, which can be convenient at times, since the reader does not have to flick back to find the substance of the argument, but on the other hand, it becomes rather annoying at the end of the book. Besides, Panke repeatedly uses the same excerpts from interviews although she claims to have conducted extensive research totaling one hundred interviews (for example p. 170). Unfortunately, the book also contains many typographical errors, which is rather surprising given the prestigious publisher.

Although the book is not without problems, it provides substantial insight into an under-researched area of the decision-making process at the working group and COREPER levels. This area of "low politics" is extremely influential, since most of the decisions are made at the lower levels of the Council. Having an understanding of voting at the ministerial level is very important, but these lower levels decide on most of the proposals, shape most of the policies and some proposals can be blocked in the preparatory phase so they never reach the highest level. In her book, Diana Panke provides us with new information on the activities of small member states and how they cope with their structural disadvantages, i.e. their smaller number of votes. Panke's combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches strengthens her arguments and at least partially persuades proponents of both methodological camps. *Small states in the European Union: Coping with structural disadvantages* is definitely suitable reading for scholars and students dealing with European integration (especially the decision-making process) or the role of small states in the EU, but also integration in general.

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