

tégiu a intenzívne do nej zahrnúť mestské aj vidiecke obyvateľstvo. Zintenzívniť sa tiež bude musieť informačná kampaň a vzdelávacie aktivity, hlavne tie, ktoré sú zamerané na chorvátske médiá. Okrem práce s verejnou mienkou a informovanosťou populácie má Chorvátsko isté ťažkosti aj v oblasti ekonomiky. Nevie si zatiaľ poradiť s vysokým verejným dlhom a vysokým rozpočtovým deficitom. Je otázne, ako krajina zabezpečí, aby sa terajšia makroekonomická stabilita pretavila do udržateľného rozvoja. Ekonomickú evolúciu by mala podporiť rýchlejšia implementácia štrukturálnych reforiem, privatizácie, reštrukturalizácie a zabezpečenie konkurencieschopnosti chorvátskych produktov.

Z technickej stránky bude podľa autorky Chorvátsko potrebovať viac času na zmeny. Krajina si potrebuje dobudovať inštitúcie a posilniť ich kapacitu, aby boli schopné absorbovať a spracovať všetku podporu EÚ. V otázke životného prostredia má Chorvátsko podobné deficity. Európska únia považuje túto oblasť v rámci integrácie za jednu z najproblematickejších, pretože si vyžaduje veľké investície a posilnenie administratívnej kapacity.

Výhodou a zároveň nevýhodou pre Chorvátsko môže byť pravidlo únie, ktoré určuje intenzitu a rýchlosť predvstupových rokovaní kandidátskej krajiny na základe jej plnenia požiadaviek a kritérií Európskeho spoločenstva. Keďže práva a záväzky voči EÚ nemôžu byť predmetom rokovania, kandidátska krajina sa im nemôže vyhnúť a teda záleží len na nej, ako rýchlo a intenzívne bude pracovať na ich splnení v záujme svojho členstva. Ak Európska komisia potvrdí naplánovaný dátum začatia prístupových rokovaní s Chorvátskom (marec 2005), tento proces by nemal stroskotať na pomalosti a neoperatívniosti chorvátskeho prístupu k rokovaniam (príspevok bol napísaný vo februári 2005, poznámka redakcie). K dnešnému dňu síce má Chorvátsko definované vyjednávacie štruktúry, ale nepodarilo sa mu ešte vytvoriť negociačný tím. Ako autorka zdôrazňuje, existencia a funkčnosť tejto skupiny v dostatočnom predstihu je dôležitá kvôli príprave na vyjednávanie a kvôli príprave podkladov na obhájenie postojov.

Napriek spomínaným nedostatkom pri plnení požiadaviek EÚ je začatie rozhovorov s Chorvátskom dôležité hneď z niekoľkých hľadísk. Po prvé, únia oceňuje snahu, ktorú krajina vynaložila na zmenu vnútorného fungovania štátu i politiky a na dosiahnutie kodanských kritérií. Po druhé, i z nedávnej minulosti je zrejmé, že európska integrácia je motivujúcim faktorom zmeny a jednoty v krajinách strednej a východnej Európy. Preto je začatie prístupových rokovaní s Chorvátskom nesmierne dôležité pre daný región, jeho budúcnosť a smerovanie.

**Mensur Akgün\***

## Does Culture Matter?

*As a prince of the Church, Richelieu ought to have welcomed Ferdinand's drive to restore Catholic orthodoxy. But Richelieu put the French interest above any religious goals. His vocation as cardinal did not keep Richelieu from seeking the Habsburg attempt to re-establish the Catholic religion as a geopolitical threat to France's security. To him, it was not a religious act but a political manoeuvre by Austria to achieve dominance in Central Europe and thereby to reduce France to secondary status.*

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 59.

Those of us who still believe virtues of rational calculation in protecting national interest owe a lot to Cardinal de Richelieu, the First Minister of France from 1624 to 1642. He coined the term *raison d'état* to justify the French "heresy". His ideas were later adopted by the

\* Mensur Akgün, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (makgun@tmn.net)

other European states and emulated by the non-Europeans including the Turks. With his wisdom and practice, not only the balance of power replaced the nostalgia for universal monarchy but we also learned the futility of pursuing cultural causes as state interests. Since then fewer and fewer wars have been fought for purely religious or cultural reasons.

The Westphalian state system has shown a remarkable tendency to maintain Richelieu's legacy. Among the 177 wars fought between 1648 and 1989, religious or religion related sub-causes of the wars only amount to 22 and in most instances they were either auxiliary reasons or used as pretexts (*see Holsti, 1991*). Despite claims to the contrary, it is highly likely that this tendency will not change so easily in the near future. States will not fight religious wars, coalitions will not be built on the basis of cultural or religious affinity. The suicidal states will be exceptional; the clash of civilisation prophecy will remain as an academic fantasy.

This doesn't mean that states will not take into account cultural values while formulating their policies. They of course do and will. Culture has always been an important factor in decision-making and is likely to remain so. But when push comes to shove, when state survival is under imminent threat, when states have to choose between their security and cultural preferences, they usually choose security instead of values they presume to uphold. History is abundant with the examples of these "tough" choices.

This article briefly elaborates two of these choices from Turkey's recent imperial history. As will be shown in the following pages, Turkey had to collaborate with Russia in protecting its territorial integrity and political survival during both Napoleon's Egypt expedition in 1798 and during Egypt governor Mehmet Ali's revolt in 1833. In both instances the Sublime Port, the imperial bureaucracy, was extremely reluctant to collaborate with the Russians, but had no other option than to form an alliance with the archenemy despite the fact that the latter's ambitions over the Ottoman realms were very well known.

For heuristic purposes these two endeavours are significant since they provide historical evidence on alliance formation between an explicitly Muslim state and an explicitly Orthodox state. The arguments referring to systemic change receptive to the prophecy of cultural clash since 1990s are also discredited with the current state of Russian-Turkish relations. Since none of the problems between the two countries were of religious nature. The CFE's (*Conventional Forces in Europe*) wings, mutual support to

ethnic separatist groups, competition over the spheres of influence including pipeline struggle and the Straits issue, and finally the problems related to the deliveries of S-300 anti-ballistic missiles to the Greek Cypriot Administration are all examples of full-fledged secular, mundane problems.

### A Brief Narrative

The diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey were established in 1492 when an envoy of Ivan III was sent to Istanbul with a mandate to obtain commercial concessions from Sultan Beyazit II. The first Turkish emissary Kemal Bey, on the other hand, was sent to Moscow after some interval, in 1515. Despite occasional ruptures diplomatic relations continued since then and the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the relations was celebrated in 1992. But if one has to describe the true nature of the relations; hostility, suspicion, distrust and atrocity would be the most appropriate words for the "glorious" history of Russian-Turkish relations.

The first major crisis took place in 1569 when the Turks decided to dig a waterway between Don and Volga rivers with the ostensible aim of hindering further Russian encroachment to the Caucasus. The first serious confrontation however started with the war declared by the Ottomans on 11 April 1678 and ended with the slaughter of almost 30 thousand occupants of the Chehrin fort on the Ukrainian soil a few months later. The first peace treaty was signed four years later on 13 February 1681 at Bakhchisarai (Bahçesaray) in the Crimea. Despite its 20 years stated duration, this first treaty lasted only six years due to Russian attempts to reap the fruits of the Turkish defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 by joining the *Holly League* against the Muslim "infidels".

In the following years Russians fought two wars against the Turks to gain a foothold on the Sea of Azov and then to reach the Black Sea. Although Peter the Great's first attempt to conquer Azov fortress in 1695 ended with a humiliating defeat, the siege he laid to this key Ottoman fortress with a flotilla built at Voronezh and with an army of 60,000 men a year later was successful. (*Hosking, 2001:194, Platonov, 1966: 214*) When the fortress capitulated on 26 July 1696, the Black Sea route was now for the first time open to the Russians. On 26 January 1799 the Russians and the Turks signed armistice and the final treaty terminating the hostilities was signed in Istanbul on 13 July 1700, on the eve of Peter's Great Northern War.

With this treaty, Turks ceded the Fortress of Azov. However, the Russians were unable to enter Crimea and control Kerch Straits. They had to fight five other long and costly wars with the Turks between 1735 and 1829 to reach the Black Sea coasts. Moreover, they also lost Azov, although temporarily, to the Turks in 1711 when a Turkish army surrounded Peter's forces on the Pruth river. But Azov could only be held by the Turks until 1736. Then Field Marshall Münnich of Russia with the pretext of ending the raids of Crimean Tatars attacked the Crimea, captured the important Turkish fortress of Ochakov, crossed the Pruth river, defeated the Turkish forces near the village of Stavuchany and also took the Azov fortress (*Platonov, 257; Hosking, 195; Kurat, 1970: 22-23*). Under the terms of the peace treaty signed at Belgrade in 1739, while Russians failing to gain a foothold by the Black Sea and maintain a fleet, they got vast nearby territories and convinced the Turks to demolish Azov.

Despite some ambitious Russian plans to conquer Istanbul with a surprise attack, the following 30 years of the Russian-Turkish relations were relatively calm. After declaring war in 1768 with the urge of France, Turkey suffered enormous losses both at land and sea battles. The fortress of Khotin was lost in the first year of the war. The Russians moved simultaneously towards the Balkans, the Crimea and the Caucasus. The Russian navy, under Count Aleksei Orlov, was dispatched from Baltic to Mediterranean and on 7 July 1770 it burned the whole Turkish fleet to the water edge at Chesme Bay (*Platonov, 294-295; Kurat, 26*). The Russian impact was felt all over the Ottoman Empire. Orlov stirred up revolts among the Sultan's Greek subjects on the Peloponnesus. Russian land forces crossed the Danube and even reached so far as Shumla.

After inconclusive attempts in Fokshani and Bucharest, peace came with the treaty signed in a town on the right bank of the Danube, Kuchuk Kainardji on 21 July 1774. This treaty while recognising Crimean Tatar's ostensible independence that would last only for 10 years, opened the way for further Russian encroachments towards the Ottoman realms. Russia obtained among others strategically important Azov, Kerch, Kinburn fortresses. The Turks for the first time lost Muslim subjects to a Christian state and in the Caucasus Kabarda became part of the Russian Empire (*Hosking, 231*). Moreover, with the Article 11 of the treaty, the Turks conceded to Russian merchant shipping the right of free navigation in both Black Sea and the Straits (*For the text of the treaty see Hurewitz, 54-61*). But most of all, the Porte, according to the later Russian interpretation of

article 7 and 14 of the said treaty, agreed to Russian intervention to the matters concerning religious freedom of the Sultan's Christian, that is to say Orthodox, subjects.

The Kuchuk Kainardji peace did not last very long. Count Grigorii Potemkin, one of Catherine's favourites and governor of Novorossia, wanted to use the Terek fortifications and the newly built Black Sea fleet as a power base from which to encourage both Caucasian tribal leaders and Balkan Orthodox subjects to rebel against the Turks (*Hosking, 233*). His ultimate aim, according to Hosking (233), was "the recreation of the Byzantine Empire on the ruins of the Ottoman, with replacement of the crescent by the cross on the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Constantinople". If ever achieved, this "Greek Project" would have combined Russia's great power aspirations with her Orthodox ecumenical ones (*see Hosking, 233; Platonov, 296-299; Kurat, 32*). In preparation for this great event, Catherine had her grandson named Kostantin (*Hosking, 233*).

Provoked by Russia and encouraged by Britain, Turkey decided to declare yet another war on Russia on 15 August 1787. Despite the Austrian involvement on the Russian side, the first months of the war were favourable for the Turks. But soon they began to suffer enormous losses on several fronts. In 1788, Ochakov fortress near the Bug River and later in 1790 Ismail on the Danube were lost to the Russians. It looked as if the Russians would march on Istanbul (*Platonov, 298*). This possibility frightened the Turks. When their attempts to engage Prussia with the war failed due to the French Revolution, the Porte decided to conclude the war as advised by the British. The treaty was signed at Jassy near the Prut River under the Russian occupation on 21 December 1791. Turkey ceded the fortress of Ochakov, the territories lying between the Bug and Dniester rivers and recognised the Russian sovereignty over Crimea and promised to pay indemnities (*see Platonov, 299; Erim, 184-185*).

### Alliances

In 1798, the winds of European politics had begun to blow from a different direction. The revolutionary France after consolidating itself had conquered Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and almost all Italy. Napoleon was planning to invade Egypt and trying to restore Poland. The Russian interests this time converged with the Turkish interests and an unlikely alliance was formed against France on 23 December 1798. The proposal to form

such an alliance had come from Russia and the Ottomans could only accept this proposal after lengthy deliberations both among themselves and with the Russian representatives in Istanbul.

The Ottoman government did not want to jeopardise its relations with France and feared from a Russian setup. Sultana Selim III even ordered his Grand Vizier to take all necessary military measures at the Black Sea entrance of the Bosphorus in order to avoid a Russian *fait accompli* (Tukin, 107). But at the end reason d'état prevailed in the Ottoman capital and the first ever alliance between Russia and Turkey was signed despite the burden of history and the great affection against the French way of life.

The Turkish and Russian fleets sailed together and captured Ionian Islands. Despite some minor crises, this marriage of convenience survived until 1806. It was even solidified briefly in 1805 with the signature of a new treaty. But with the defeat of Russian forces at Austerlitz by Napoleon, the Sublime Port decided to approach France and in the mean time tried to hinder the Russian naval traffic contrary to the letter and the spirit of the 1805 Treaty. When Sultan Selim III deposed the Russophile governors of Moldavia and Walachia with the encouragement of the French representative in Istanbul, open warfare broke out and continued with some interruption until signature of the Treaty of Bucharest through British mediation on 28 May 1812 whereby Russians acquired Basserabia.

The Bucharest peace lasted only until the naval battle at Navarino Bay resulting from joint intervention of the European powers to the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1827. Soon after the Sublime Port's refusal to ostensible mediation of Britain, France and Russia in the dispute, the three powers sent their fleets to stop the suppression of the Greek rebellion by the Ottoman forces mainly composed of well-trained, properly organised Egyptian forces of Khedive Mehmed Ali. In 1827, the combined fleet of Russia, France and Britain under a British command entered the harbour of Navarino (now Pylos) and destroyed the bottled-up Ottoman fleet. The destruction of the fleet helped to bring about the withdrawal (1828) of Mehmet Ali's forces from the war in Greece and enabled the Greek independence. But at the same time it led to another Russo-Turkish war.

Perturbed by the Turkish reinforcements along the Danube basin, Russia declared a war on 26 April 1828 and seized the Turkish fortress of Varna. After some recess at Shumla, Russian forces crossed the Balkans and captured Edirne (Andrianople) while invading Eastern Anatolia almost

simultaneously. Overwhelming Russian victories and the threat they posed to the capital forced the Sublime Port to seek peace. On 14 September 1829 Edirne Peace Treaty was signed with rather lenient terms for the Ottomans. Despite some minor territorial rectifications the Pruth River remained as the major border between Russia and Turkey on the Western front and Turkey recognised Russian acquisitions from Iran with the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) on the East. However, Turkey had to accept complete internal autonomy for Moldavia, Walachia and Serbia as well as Russian effective control over these dependencies. Istanbul also had to recognise the Greek independence.

Although resentful, bitter and distrustful, the Sublime Port soon after the conclusion of Edirne Peace Treaty made an unexpected move and allied once more with the Russians against its former vassal and ally Mehmet Ali of Egypt. It was yet another marriage of convenience decided purely on *raison d'état*. Sultan Mahmut II, fearing from a probable dethronation, reluctantly accepted Russian help. The Tsar Nicholas on the other hand, extended his assistance with expectation that the Sublime Port's weakness would make the Turks entirely dependent on Russia (*see Pares, p.351*). However, after a Russian force of 15,000 men landed near Beykoz at the Anatolian banks of the Bosphorus to protect Mahmut II from Mehmet Ali's army in February 1833, Britain and France intervened on behalf of the Sultan and the problem was settled although temporarily at Kütahya, in Western Anatolia.

But Russian troops continued to stay there until the signature of the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi on 8 July 1833. With the secret clause of this treaty the Port undertook to close the Straits to the war vessels of all foreign powers. As Platanov aptly put Hünkâr Iskelesi "gave Russia a predominant influence in Turkey and the Tsar became the friend and the protector of the Sick Man of Europe" (*p.353*). European diplomacy fearing from the consequences of this new friendship tried to nullify it in every conceivable way. They seized upon Mehmet Ali's final showdown with the new Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid in 1839 and acted in concert against the Sultan's rebellious subject. Austria, France, Britain, Prussia and Russia notified the Sublime Port about their agreement and advised not to accept any of Mehmet Ali's demands without informing five European powers. While Mehmet Ali's threat was eradicated with the establishment of this encomium, it at the same time served to pacify the Russian influence over Turkey.

When Hünkâr Iskelesi Treaty lapsed in 1841, a new conference of the European Great Powers convened with the participation of an Ottoman delegation in London and confirmed the age-old principle of the Empire as to the closure of the Straits to all foreign warships. However, the Russian objective has always been to secure a free passage for the Russian fleet between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean without conceding the same right to the non-littoral countries. This objective gained its impetus in the immediate aftermath of the London Conference and Russians had even begun to talk about the partition of the Ottoman realm. The “Sick Man of Europe” introduced to the European diplomatic parlance by Tsar Nicholas on 9 January 1853 during an informal talk with the British Ambassador Sir Hamilton Seymour at a reception in St. Petersburg. This talk and the impressions basically gathered during Tsar’s visit to London in 1844 with respect to Russian intentions towards Turkey led to the formation of a new British policy. When Prince Menschikow presented Tsar’s ultimatum to the Sublime Port, the British and to some extent the French had already made their mind to support territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

### Europe against Russia

Britain first tried to encourage Turks to appease Russians in their demands concerning Holy Places in Jerusalem. But with Russian victory over the Turkish fleet near Sinop in the Black Sea, the British together with the French actively intervened to the conflict. They launched attacks on various fronts before Crimea became the chief scene of war by the fall of 1854. After a long siege of Sebastopol and a series of bloody campaigns the war ended on 27 August 1855 with a defeat of the Russians. The Treaty of Paris signed on March 30, 1856 was a setback for Russian ambitions over the Turkish imperial possessions (*see Platonov, 367*). Moreover Russia lost her exclusive right to exercise protectorate over Turkey’s Christian subjects and was banned from keeping navy in the Black Sea (*Platonov, 367; Kurat, p. 74*).

The next round of confrontation took place in 1877. The Russians with the ostensible aim of freeing their ethnic brethren in Serbia and Montenegro from the Turkish yoke declared a war on 12 April 1877 immediately after the failure of an international conference convened in Istanbul to settle the Balkan problems. Within a few months the Russians crossed the

Danube and made their way through the Balkan Mountains. Except for a heroic Turkish resistance at the Shipka Pass by the legendary Osman Pasha, Russia crossed the Balkans unhindered and entered into Southern Balkans. When Edirne (Adrinople) was captured, the road to Istanbul became wide open for the Russian forces. On February 19, 1879 the Treaty of St. Stefano (Yeşilköy) was signed and the humiliating terms of the Treaty could only be averted with the “timely” intervention of the British. An international Conference convened in Berlin revised the terms of the St. Stefano Treaty in Turkey’s favour on 4 June 1878.

During the rest of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century no major diplomatic or military confrontation took place between the two countries. Until the World War I, the relations were relatively friendly, the diplomats and the statesmen from both sides played major roles in normalisation of relations. Yet, the Russian objective always remained the same and they tried to secure the free passage of the Russian fleet between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean without conceding the same right to the other powers. This objective gained its particular impetus after the Russian defeat in 1905 by Japan. Rivalry with Austria for influence over the Balkans and the increasing German weight over the Port alarmed the Russians. For all these reasons the Russian Government vigorously tried to revise from 1906 onwards the regime of the Turkish Straits. The Tsar’s principal advisers held several conferences to discuss even the feasibility of a Russian occupation of the Straits.

Immediately after Russia’s western allies attacked the Dardanelle in February 1915, Tsar Nicholas II presented an aide-memoire to the British and French ambassadors in St. Petersburg, demanding a definite solution of “time honoured aspirations of Russia” with respect to “Constantinople” (*See Hurewitz: 1956, Vol II, pp. 7-11*). The Tsar stated that every solution would be “inadequate and precarious” if Istanbul, the western bank of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, Dardanelles, southern Thrace to the Enez-Midyne line, as well as corresponding Asiatic shore together with the islands had not incorporated into the Russian Empire. Britain and France agreed to the annexation of Russia of the entire region in return for a free port and freedom of passage through the Straits for their merchant ships.

This quid pro quo repudiated soon after the Bolshevik Revolution on 3 December 1917 and the new Russia began to support her traditional enemy Turkey. Even a friendship treaty was signed in Moscow on 16 March 1921 and the new Turkish regime in Ankara obtained a sizeable financial

as well as military aid from Moscow during their War of Independence (*Oran: 2001,162*). When the final peace conference opened in 1922 at Lausanne following the war, the Soviet and Turkish delegates simultaneously resisted the Western powers with respect to the internationalisation of the Straits regime, as well as its demilitarisation. Despite the Turkish delegations reluctance to defend their position as fiercely as the Russians, the spirit of co-operation survived the Lausanne Peace Conference.

### New States

After some setbacks basically related to the persecution of the Turkish communists in the immediate aftermath of the Conference, the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras and his Soviet counterpart Georgi Vasilievich Chicherin signed a friendship treaty in Paris on 17 December 1925, and this treaty became the backbone of the relations between the two countries until the end of the World War II. The scope of security co-operation established with the treaty widened and deepened with the protocol signed on 17 December 1929. The Soviet friendship gained in the later part of the 1920s became so important for the new Turkish leadership that the monument erected in 1928 at Istanbul's Taksim Square to celebrate the victory in the War of Independence had two Soviet generals just behind Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and the first president of the country.

However, throughout the World War II and even before the War, there had never been a lack of tension in the Turkish-Soviet relations. The Soviets were not satisfied with the results of the *Montreux Conference* convened in 1936 to give a new shape to the regime of the Turkish Straits. The Soviet fleet had in fact obtained a preponderant position in the Black Sea. Moreover, in the case of war it would be able to attack a hostile fleet in the Mediterranean and then retire to its home bases without effective pursuit. But the Soviet delegation at Montreux had failed to secure an exclusive right to use the Straits for belligerent purposes. The Soviets had put forward demands for modifications in effect amounted to the joint administration of the Straits on various occasions.

War further deepened mutual suspicions. The partition of Poland and invasion of Finland was seen as an ample evidence of the Soviet intentions regarding Turkey. This view gained its impetus after the partial Soviet occupation of Romania on 29 June 1940 (*Crowe, 1973: 181*). The publication of

the sixth *German White Book* in July 1940 with its references to the allied plans for air attacks to the oilfields in Azerbaijan provoked the Soviet Union. Due to the Turkish involvement, Pravda accused Turkey as well as Iran for "allowing themselves to be harnessed to the chariot of foreign imperialism" (*Quoted from Kirk, 1952: 448*). During 1942 several factors continued to disturb Ankara. Infiltration of Soviet spies into Eastern Turkey, the sinking of Turkish ships in the Black Sea, Russian activities in Azerbaijan and armament of Kurdish groups caused considerable anxiety in Ankara.

The most serious strain developed with the attempt to the life of the German Ambassador Franz Von Papen in Ankara on 24 February 1942. The assassin was blown into pieces with the early detonation on the bomb, but the traces had led to the two Soviet diplomats. The trial of the culprits did not fail to cause reaction in Moscow. Pravda on 5 April 1942, argued that "the Turkish justice had been perverted by the Germans" (*see Kirk, 453*). Under these circumstances the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 26 May 1942 became a major source of concern for Ankara. Turkish journalists who had hardly any intellectual autonomy from Ankara fiercely criticised Soviet expansionism and the British appeasement. Soviet press was at least as much critical as its Turkish counterpart.

It was only after the allied victories that Ankara decidedly tried to improve Soviet-Turkish relations. However, all Turkish attempts were rebuffed by the Soviets. Even the rupture of relations on 2 August 1944 with Germany was far from satisfying the Russians. Pravda reported in early September that Turkey's break with Germany looked like a friendly one since German diplomats still enjoyed diplomatic privileges and going on with subversive activities (*quoted from FO 371/ 44073/ R14481*). After the Bulgarian capitulation to the Red Army on 9 September 1944, the fear of Russia became so wide spread that black out regulations were intensified in Istanbul. The Turkish press as well as the diplomats tried to warn the Anglo-Americans against possible Soviet encroachment towards the Middle East.

During the rest of the war, the Turks never gave up warning the Anglo-Americans about the intentions of the Soviet leadership. They patiently expected discord in the allied relations. In the mean time, Moscow notified Ankara on 19 March 1945 about their intention to denounce the 1925 Turko-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression and it soon became clear that the Soviets would not only demand bases at the Straits but also ask retrocession of territories in Eastern Turkey. Fortunately, the cor-

dial relations between the allies did not last long after the War. When the Soviet Union handed in its first diplomatic note proposing five modifications in the Montreux regime on August 8, 1946, Turkey had already restored the Anglo-American interests in their affairs and was able to suffocate the Soviet demands before they were even voiced in an appropriate international forum.

### Towards Reconciliation

Although the Straits question remained salient for the most of the Cold War, the Soviet leadership never tried to intimidate Turkey by use of force. After joining NATO in 1952, any remaining risk of Soviet attack was largely eliminated for Turkey. On 30 May 1953, The Soviet Union officially denounced its territorial claims and designs to change the *Montreux regime*. Malenkov in the speech at the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953 reiterated the same position and Bulganin during a reception at Kremlin on 7 November 1954 admitted the mistakes made against Turkey and Iran in presence of the Turkish Ambassador. By 1957, despite the Syrian crisis, Turkey and the Soviet Union were able to sign an economic agreement and the Soviets financed one of Turkey's major glass factories. Economic co-operation as well as diplomatic continued throughout the Cold War. Turkey while maintaining and solidifying its ties with the US and Europe, tried to enhance the sprit of co-operation with the Soviet Union.

Yet, the end of the Cold War was not marked as the beginning of amicable relations between the Turks and the Russians. It was instead the beginning of a new era of discord and contention. Despite increasing economic relations and attempts at regional collaboration, the competition over spheres of influence overshadowed relations. Turks suddenly discovered their distant cousins in Central Asia and the Caucasus. They were eager to develop closer relations with the newly independent Turkic republics, while the Russians were trying to keep their formally dissolved empire intact. Every move made by the Turks irritated the Russians. Geopolitical designs trademarked in Washington and the romantic pan-Turkist ideas flowing from Ankara raised concerns in Moscow. The Cold War for the Turks ended only in May 1998 with the Chief of Staff General Karadayi's visit to Moscow (see Akgun & Aydin, 1999: 27).

By the end of the Cold War the Turks also sought to become a major player in the pipeline game. They proposed the southern port of Ceyhan

as the most viable alternative for marketing this oil. Initially the Russians seemed to have the upper hand. The vast pipeline network inherited from the former Soviet Union was the first option to be considered automatically by the multinational consortium. This would probably be the quickest and cheapest way to world markets, bypassing Turkish territory altogether. But the oil brought to Novorossiisk through the existing pipelines could only reach the oil markets via the Turkish Straits.

Ankara claimed that the Straits were already overloaded and unable to carry the extra burden. A new Straits Regulation that made the passage of large oil tankers through the Straits prohibitively expensive was endorsed on 11 January 1994. The Russians challenged the legality of the new regulation and brought the case to the *International Maritime Organisation*. The new rules, the Russians argued, were contrary to Article 2 of the 1936 *Montreux Convention* as well as to several other international legal agreements. The Russian arguments were vague with respect to references to other international agreements, but persuasive as far as Article 2 was concerned.

If read verbally, Article 2 prevented Turkey from taking any action to hinder transit navigation. It was stipulated that, "in time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities". But yet Turkey claimed to have legal right to regulate the traffic. The stakes were high for the Russians. They had to face an unpleasant dilemma. They would either choose to accept the Turkish position or risk the collapse of the *Montreux Convention*. The Turks had already begun to talk about *rebus sic stantibus* to refer to changed circumstances. The circumstances had indeed changed since the signing of the Convention in 1936. The number of vessels passing through the Straits had reached to 50 thousand.

But the real aim was to increase the chances of Baku-Ceyhan project. On the other hand, the Russians knew that too much strain could lead to demands for modification and that the Convention was essential for their security. Because, it limited the number, type and weight of the battleships allowed through the Straits. Any attempt to revise the legally and technically outmoded convention could easily lead to its collapse and thus put all the rights and privileges of the Russians into jeopardy. The decision taken at the *International Court of Justice* with respect to Corfu Canal Case in 1949, the 1958 *Convention on Territorial Waters* and 1982 UN Law

of the Sea Treaty had recognised the rights of innocent passage of battleships through international straits.

The problem could finally be settled in May 1998 during the IMO's (*International Maritime Organisation*) Marine Safety Committee's 69<sup>th</sup> Session with surely hard bargaining. Turkey now has a new regulation. But at the heydays of Baku-Ceyhan mobilisation many in Ankara thought that through this pipeline they would establish a stronghold in the region, enhance their geopolitical importance. In other words, the pipeline would be a major stake in the spheres of influence game unfolding. Turkey could fill the geopolitical vacuum left after the Soviet demise.

As might be anticipated the conflict in Chechnya let to yet another purely secular problem between the two countries. The rather influential Caucasian lobby in Turkey mobilised moral if not material support for the Chechen independence while demanding a firmer stance from the Turkish government against Russia. Ankara tried not to antagonise Moscow and denied any official involvement. However, the unofficial Turkish involvement was sufficient for the Russians to reciprocate by providing facilities to the PKK, the Kurdish separatist terror organisation, in and around Moscow.

Another issue blurring relations was the flanks of the *CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty*. When the CFE treaty was signed, it was based on the assumption of bipolar continuity. But with the collapse of first WTO and then the Soviet Union, all the intricate balances over which the treaty had been based were in danger. The Russian Federation had to protect 50 % of its European territory with 10 % of the TLE, that is to say *Treaty Limited Equipment*. And this 50 % territory also included Chechnya. The Russians on 17 September 1993 officially declared their inability to reach the previously agreed limits in the flanks in a note sent to the signatory powers (*see Falkenrath, 1995*). Ankara became a staunch opponent of any treaty modification until a compromise solution was found by the Americans in May 1996.

Final bone of contention between Russia and Turkey during the late 1990s had also thoroughly secular character. It had nothing to do with "culture". It came to the fore with the Foreign Minister Alecos Mihailides of the Greek Cypriot Administration announcement of the signature of an agreement with the Russian Rosvooruszheniye company for the purchase of antiballistic S-300 missiles on 5 January 1997. Next day the speaker of the Turkish Foreign Ministry claimed that Turkey would not allow

these missiles to be stationed on Cyprus. The resulting three-dimensional crisis lasted until the end of next year. It could only be settled with a decision to deploy the S-300s in Crete instead of Southern Cyprus.

## Conclusion

Since the first confrontation, the Russians and the Turks fought several wars and happily slaughtered each other in thousands if not in tens of thousands. As this brief narrative shows Russia and Turkey have never been great admirers of each other. Numerous wars, horrendous atrocities, prejudices, historical legacies, most of all different faiths shaped the identity of the two countries. Seen from culturalist point of view, they had more reason to fight than to collaborate. They were indeed more than reluctant to co-operate. But when the circumstances required, when their interests coincided, when the state survival was at stake, they were able to co-operate.

Although reluctantly in both instances, the Sublime Port signed agreements with secret clauses envisaging mutual assistance. They were at the end marriages of convenience and lasted until the Ottomans found more convenient bride who happened to be the British. The third collaboration with the Russians during the War of Independence also portrays an important example of none-cultural, but realistic decision-making. Turks in all these instances used the Straits as a trump card in her dealings with the great powers. The Straits were instrumental in positioning Britain against Russia, Russia against Britain.

The imperial bureaucracy was able utilise the Straits during Napoleons invasion of Egypt and during Egyptian governor Mehmet Ali's revolt against the Sultan Mahmut II. The Straits were the main motivation for the Russians to establish alliances with the Turks both during imperial and Soviet periods. The British support, on the other hand, was also based on the Straits. For Britain, the Turkish Straits were the main barrier before the Russian encroachment to the Eastern Mediterranean and thus to the Middle East. Turkey also used the Straits as during her struggle for the pipelines in early 1990s.

Moreover, as it might be clear from the above narrative even for the most ardent culturalist, the issues wars fought for were inherently secular just like the problems we faced in the Post Cold War world. Kalevi Holsti in his seminal work *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International*



*Order 1648-1989* outlines the issues that generated wars between 1648-1713, 1715-1814, 1815-1914, 1918-1941, 1915-1989 on five different tables. They range from territory, commerce, navigation, colonial competition, to defend or support ally. Almost all of them are mundane reasons. The only exception seems to be the protection of coreligionists. But, as Holsti himself confirms "religion was seldom an issue sufficient in itself to lead to war" (*Holsti, 1991: 149*). In case of 1877-78 War between Russia and Turkey for instance, religion was only one among the six major issues generating the war.

Obviously, nature of world politics has changed in the Post Second World War period. Identity politics with upsurge of micro nationalism became a new force demanding recognition. We all suffer from the consequences of Al-Quaeda like terrorism. But yet, despite all the horrendous crimes against humanity like in Bosnia, the coreligionists feel no need to pursue punitive actions or use atrocities as a pretext for territorial aggrandisement. As long as the major powers and European countries refrain from defining their "national interests" within Huntingtonian parameters, there is no reason for the world to revert back to pre-Westphalian era even after 11 September.

The test case will again be Turkey. Having completed most of the requirements of the Copenhagen Political Criteria after several domestic and international setbacks, she is expecting to start negotiations with the EU sometime next year. There is no doubt that the Turkish membership is a challenge for the entire Europe. Most of all, it is a challenge for the Europe's presumed Christian identity. The ability of the EU's old and new members to cope with this challenge will determine the future shape of the European Union but also the world politics. The decision in December will either put an end to the culturalist arguments or validate clash of civilisation hypothesis...

### References:

- Akgun, M. & Aydin, T., *Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde Yapısal Sorunlar (Structural Problems in the Russian-Turkish Relations)*. (Istanbul: TUSIAD, 1999).  
 Crowe, F. S., *The Soviet Union and the Turkish Straits, 1933-1945*. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973).  
 Erim, Nihat, *Devletlerarası Hukuk ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri (Documents on International Law and Diplomatic History)*. (Ankara: TTK, 1953).

- Falkenrath, R., A., "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings", *International Security* Vol. 19, No. 4. (Spring 1995).  
 Holsti, K., *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648-1989*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  
 Hoskins, G., *Russia and the Russians: A History*. (London: Allen Lane, 2001).  
 Hurewitz, J. C., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*. (New Jersey: Princeton, 1956).  
 Kirk, G., "The USSR and the Middle East", *Survey of International Affairs, 1936-1946: the Middle East in the War*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).  
 Kissinger, H., *Diplomacy*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).  
 Kurat, A. N., *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII Yüzyilin Sonlarından Kurtuluş Savaşı'na Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (Turkey and Russia: A History of Turkish-Russian Relations from XVIII Century to the War of Independence)*. (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayını, 1970).  
 Oran, B., *Türk Dış Politikası Vol.1 (Turkish Foreign Policy)*. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001).  
 Pares, B., *A History of Russia*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).  
 Platanov, S. F., *History of Russia*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925).  
 Snyder, R.; Bruck, H. W.; Sapin, B., "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics", Rosenau, J. N., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*. (New York: The Free Press, 1969).  
 Tükin, Cemal, *Bogazlar Meselesi (Straits Question)*. (Istanbul: Pan Yayıncılık, 1999).

### Resumé

#### Mensur Akgün: Záleží na kulturných rozdieloch?

Autor sa v článku venuje histórii turecko-ruských vzťahov od začiatkov až po súčasnosť. Turecko a Rusko nadviazali diplomatické vzťahy už v roku 1492. Napriek tomu vyše 500 rokov tieto vzťahy sprevádza predovšetkým nepriateľstvo, podozrievanie a nespočetné vojny. Po analýze ruských a tureckých dejín dospel M. Akgün k záveru, že konflikty medzi týmito štátnymi útvarmi nespôsobili kulturné ani náboženské rozdiely, ale rozličné, niekedy priamo protichodné ekonomické, politické a územné záujmy.

Už v 16. storočí sa Osmanská ríša usilovala zastaviť ruskú expanziu na Kaukaze. V snahe posilniť svoje strategické východiská Osmani roku 1569 postavili vodný kanál medzi riekami Don a Volga. Ruským cieľom v tom čase však nebol Kaukaz, ale polostrov Krym. Koncom 17. storočia začalo Rusko v mnohých vojnách a šarvátkach postupne vytláčať Osmanskú ríšu z územia Krymu. Rusi dokázali dobyť aj strategicky dôležité pevnosti Azov a Chotin, prostredníctvom ktorých kontrolovali Azovské more. Osmanská ríša sa síce viackrát pokúsila získať svoje pevnosti naspäť, ale vojenské ťaženia boli neúspešné.

Po úspešných bitkách o Krym v 18. storočí Rusi pokračovali v expanzii na Balkáne a Kaukaze. Postupujúc zo severu, vytláčali Turkov z územia okolo Čierneho mora. Po veľkých stratách sa Osmani rozhodli ukončiť vojnový stav a roku 1774 uzavreli s Ruskom mier v Kučuk Kainardži pri Dunaji. Podľa mierovej dohody ruské obchodné lode získali právo na voľnú plavbu cez Čierne more a prielivy Bospor a Dardanely. Rusko napriek územným ziskom neustávalo v svojom tlaku južným smerom. Systematicky podporovalo kaukazské a balkánske národy v rebélii proti tureckej nadvláde. Vyprovokovaný sultán vyhlásil ruskému cárovi vojnu. Počas prvých vojnových mesiacov sa Osmanom darilo zatlačiť ruskú armádu na sever, no čoskoro utrpeli vysoké straty na viacerých frontoch. Po dobytí strategických pevností Očakov a Ismail sa Rusom naskytla možnosť zaútočiť na Istanbul. Pod hrozbou priameho útoku na hlavné mesto sa osmanská vláda rozhodla ukončiť vojnu. Podľa mierovej dohody uzavretej 21. decembra 1791 v Jasse sa Turecko vzdalo pevnosti Očakov a územia medzi riekou Bug a Dnester, čím Rusko potvrdilo svoju suverenity nad celým územím Krymu.

Začiatkom 19. storočia, keď Napoleon získaval kontrolu nad Európou, plánoval dobyť aj Poľsko a Egypt, ktoré boli súčasťami Ruskej a Osmanskej ríše. Preto sa Turecko a Rusko na základe svojich politických záujmov roku 1798 spojili proti spoločnému nepriateľovi – Francúzsku. Tento spojenecký zväzok však mal len malú šancu pretrvať dlhšie obdobie. Keď Napoleon porazil ruskú armádu, Turecko porušilo spojenectvo a zablokovalo ruskú lodnú dopravu. Po niekoľkých bitkách sa krajiny roku 1812 zmierili v Bukurešti.

Ďalší rusko-turecký konflikt vznikol po tom, ako hlavné európske mocnosti (Francúzsko, Rusko, Veľká Británia) podporili Grékov v ich vojne za nezávislosť od Osmanskej ríše. Využívajúc naskytnutú príležitosť, Rusi vyhlásili vojnu Turecku. Ich armáda prešla cez Balkán a dobyla Edirne,

bývalé hlavné mesto Osmanskej ríše. Na kaukazskom fronte ruské vojská zaútočili na východnú Anatóliu. Po sérii víťazstiev na oboch frontoch bolo Turecko prinútené ukončiť vojnu aj za cenu ďalších územných strát. Dňa 14. septembra 1829 v Edirne podpísalo s Ruskom mierovú dohodu, podľa ktorej prijalo autonómiu Moldavska, Valašska i Srbska a zaviazalo sa rešpektovať nezávislosť Grécka.

Po edirnskom mieri sa Turecko v roku 1829 ešte raz spojilo so svojim stálym nepriateľom Ruskom proti búriacemu sa vazalovi Mehmetovi Alimu z Egypta. Sultán Mahmut II. sa obával, že stratí kontrolu nad Egyptom, kým cár Mikuláš dúfal, že poskytnutou pomocou dostane Turecko do totálnej závislosti od Ruska. Kým však ruské divízie dorazili do Egypta, Veľká Británia a Francúzsko konflikt vyriešili diplomatickou cestou. Napriek tomu ruské vojsko zostalo v Turecku až do dohody *Hünkâr Iskelesi*, ktorá zaručovala ruský vplyv nad Tureckom. Rusko sa tak stalo veľkým spojencom Turecka. Európskym štátom sa nové spojenectvo nepozdávalo a snažili sa ho narušiť všetkými možnými spôsobmi.

Po vypršaní dohody *Hünkâr Iskelesi* sa roku 1841 konala v Londýne nová konferencia európskych veľmocí za účasti tureckej delegácie. Štáty sa dohodli, že Turecko obnoví svoju kontrolu nad prielivmi a nepovolí prechod cudzím vojnovým lodiam. Rusko nebolo spokojné s touto dohodou, lebo dúfalo, že získa exkluzívne právo pre svoje vojnové lode. Počas konferencie začalo dokonca diskutovať o rozdelení Turecka. Avšak Veľká Británia a Francúzsko podporili Turecko, aby zabránili ešte väčšiemu vzrastu ruského vplyvu na Balkáne a vo východnom Stredomorí.

V ďalšom turecko-ruskom konflikte roku 1855 Turecko za aktívnej účasti Francúzska a Veľkej Británie porazilo Rusko a získalo späť niektoré územia i práva. Roku 1877 Rusko znovu zaútočilo na Balkán s cieľom chrániť svojich pravoslávnych bratov v Srbsku a Čiernej Hore. Keď obsadilo Edirne, Turecko s ním 19. februára 1879 uzavrelo mier v San Stefane. Dohoda bola pre Turecko taká nevýhodná, ba až ponižujúca, že Veľká Británia zakročila a pozmenila ju v prospech Turecka.

Až do druhej svetovej vojny panoval medzi Tureckom a Ruskom relatívny mier. Rusko však stále vyžadovalo voľný pohyb svojich vojnových lodí cez turecké prielivy a po útoku spojeneckých síl na Dardanely roku 1915 si robilo nárok na voľnú plavbu prielivmi. Avšak po Októbrovej revolúcii roku 1917 začalo podporovať svojho starého nepriateľa Turecko. Dokonca poskytlo Tureckej republike finančnú podporu na vojnu za nezávislosť a nový režim v Ankare. Keď sa konala konečná mierová konfe-

rencia v Lausanne, Turecko aj Sovietsky zväz bránili prielivy pred ich demilitarizáciou.

V období rokov 1922 – 1930 boli turecko-sovietske diplomatické vzťahy potvrdené niekoľkými dohodami. Napriek tomu sa roku 1936 obe strany dostali do konfliktu na konferencii v Montreux, od ktorej Sovietsky zväz očakával povolenie voľného pohybu výlučne pre svoju vojenskú flotilu. Práve preto si Turecko počas studenej vojny zlepšilo vzťahy so Západom a informovalo USA o každom pohybe sovietskych námorných plavidiel.

Vstupom Turecka do NATO roku 1952 bola hrozba sovietskej invázie vylúčená. Rok nato Sovietsky zväz oficiálne vyhlásil, že nemá záujem o turecké územia ani o zmenu režimu z Montreux.

Nanovo sa Turecká republika dostala na program dňa po otvorení otázky jej budúceho členstva v Európskej únii. Reakcia členských štátov EÚ rozhodne o geopolitickej budúcnosti Turecka a bude definovať aj budúcnosť jeho vzťahov s Ruskom.

Táto komparácia potvrdzuje, že história Ruska a Turecka bola sprevádzaná stálymi vojnami a konfliktmi, ktoré však v prípade spoločného záujmu dokázali obe strany preklenúť. Spojenectvá a vojny neriešili kultúrne ani náboženské rozdiely medzi týmito dvoma krajinami – vždy išlo o mocenské a politické záujmy oboch mocností.