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**The Visegrad Four: from Loose Geographic Group to Security Internationalization?**

Summary: The author defines that institutionalization through the construction of the Visegrad Group identity has aided in this region’s rise to prevalence in areas such as trade and security; and contends that in order to have even stronger influence in Europe, the Group must continue to define its relevance as a unified faction. The author concludes that the building up of a common Visegrad identity must be necessarily based on a common language, in which one addresses common security threats, positions toward Russia, toward the transatlantic relations and a common vision of one geographically and culturally shared political view of European and Euro-Atlantic affairs.

'Central Europe'¹ is an amorphous concept loaded with historical memories. In the 1960s and 1970s the term had little political currency and was invoked only by a small number of historians specializing in the Hapsburg Empire and returning back to Friedrich Naumann’s plan for an economic bloc in central Europe in the early 20th century. In the early 1980s, ‘Central Europe’ came to express the political aspirations of some of the members of the democratic

¹ ‘Central Europe’ refers here to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, i.e. to fours Central European countries, which have formed the non-institutional regional cooperation group – the Visegrad Group – already at the beginning of the 1990, which means at the time all of these countries were looking for their new position in integrated Europe. One of the reasons why all of these countries harked back to the politically almost forlorn term ‘Central Europe’ was also to differentiate themselves from both ‘Eastern Europe’ and ‘Central Eastern Europe’, which were commonly in use in the West following the end of the Cold War.

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opposition in Poland and Hungary. Unlike the Czechoslovak diplomats, the Hungarian and Polish ones were vigorously resisting the usual classification of the then ‘Soviet bloc’ as ‘Eastern Europe’ and reminded of specific historical, cultural, geographical and political autonomy of ‘Central Europe’ in the historical political landscape of Europe.

Political changes in 1988 and 1989 in the countries of Eastern Europe, which had formed the Soviet bloc before, and the differences in the roads that the post-Communist countries and the new democracies may tell us how misleading terms like ‘Eastern Europe’ were then. It was not one version but various national forms of communism, which were imposed in Central Europe after 1945. For the countries of the regions, history matters.

Referring to the region with a capital letter, as ‘Central Europe’, creates an artificial reification that tends towards exclusion. Regions such as central Europe are specific constructs serving particular analytical or political (from the point of view of integration into NATO or into the EU) purposes. Having once (in the first half of the 1990s) emphasized the ‘central’ position of this region, intentionally tried to devaluate integration ambitions of other post-communist countries from ‘Central Eastern’ or ‘Southeastern’ regions in the EU and NATO integration processes not believing, at that time, in a ‘big bang’ enlargement of the EU and partly NATO, which happened in 2004. The term was aimed to suggest that ‘Central Europe’ is a de facto semi-western region between Western and central Eastern Europe and deserves a preferential integration treatment.

This goal was served by the fact that founding the Visegrad Group in 1991, the Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak (later Czech and Slovak) politicians were rejecting the inclusion into the Visegrad Group (rejection to enlarge the group by some other countries from the region like Slovenia, Croatia or, e.g. Romania) by a historically symbolic and geographically firmly defined area of former medieval kings [Polish, Czech, Hungarian] and by the will of the present

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3 Interviews of the author with, e.g. Attila Agh or András Balogh from Hungary in the previous years.
The Visegrad Four: from Loose Geographic Group to Security Internationalization?

Questions of Institutionalization and an Identity of Central Europe – the Visegrad Group

Prior to the integration of all Visegrad countries into the EU (2004) and NATO (1999 and 2004), the process of transferring institutions across state borders were of great importance as creating potential buffers that, in the absence of common membership in multilateral institutions, one believed that an import from some institutional models from the West can help the adaptation to a new international environment. The Visegrad Group, however, was not very eager to present itself as an alternative to successful European or Euro-Atlantic integration groupings fearing that this can be misused by the EU and NATO as an excuse for closing their doors to new member states from the former Soviet bloc. In spite of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) signed already in 1993, the Visegrad Group as a whole experienced heavy doubts about the effectiveness of a coordinated block approach toward the coveted western institutions (EU and NATO first). The position of the then Czech Prime Minister (and today – 2009 – the Czech President) Václav Klaus towards the Visegrad Group was very skeptical.4 He even did not hide the opinion that the Visegrad Group was established not to bring the participating Visegrad countries into the EU (and/or) NATO, but on the contrary, to prevent them from entering these integration groupings. Already in the very beginning of the 1990s, the Visegrad Group refused to be duly ‘institutionalized’, i.e. having similar (or parallel) institutional structures like other European or Euro-Atlantic institutions. Central Europe thus had no objectives to demonstrate its political or even security policy characteristics in the 1990s, it is prior to the integration of some of them into NATO (Czechs, Hungarian, Poles in 1999).

The question of a possibility to build up a common ‘Visegrad identity’ has appeared as a reality only after 2004, when all four countries did not have to bother with being regarded as a relatively prosperous regional multistate institution being able to develop its relations with the EU at the basis of something like a ‘privileged partnership’.

General Discussion on a Common Visegrad Identity: Visegrad and Russia

The idea of a common Visegrad security identity is part of a long-term project (2008-2010 in the first, initial phase) by four Visegrad security thinktanks based on one special research goal, which is the possibility of forming the basis for a common Visegrad security identity within the community of democratic states [esp. NATO and EU].

It is natural, that forming a common Visegrad identity cannot and must not be seen as an attempt at establishing a ‘small NATO within NATO’ or a ‘parallel CFSP/ESDP within the EU’. It should rather follow the goal to contribute to NATO’s and EU’s security and defence tasks with an efficient pooling taking place in the Central European region [namely in the Visegrad area] and contribution to the common NATO/EU goal by using common [Visegrad] capacities, capabilities, sources and experience. To envisage such a proposal and to set the regional [Visegrad] approach within the context of common NATO’s [and EU’s] global security threats represents the first big event within this regional ambition. The opening discussion should deal with national security identities in V4 countries, particularities in perception of security threats, attitudes of political and other elites, etc.

Summarizing the common Visegrad perception of security threats and defining an awareness of common Visegrad security identity can be a new step for the ability of the Visegrad Group to formulate – fully within NATO and EU – its common security interests.

traditionally been a common security threat or at least a common security risk (not to speak about a common enemy). However, no documentary platform either in the EU [e.g. in the European Security Strategy or its update planned for 2010] or in NATO [e.g. in NATO’s Strategic Concept or in the New Strategic Concept planned for 2010] speaks or will speak about ‘enemies’ in the shape of concrete states. One can, however, expect that the documents will mention security risks stemming from the Russian energy policy, non-transparent steps of Russia in Southern Caucasus or in Ukraine as about moves increasing instability in the Euro-Atlantic or Euro-Asian regions. In this respect, a common
position of the Visegrad countries toward Russia (with emphasis on energy policy, for example), can form a common departure point of the Visegrad group for creating a common security interest vis-à-vis Russia. The common approach of the Visegrad Group can hardly face any criticism within EU/NATO, as not only the Central Europeans, but generally even the ‘broader Central Europe’\textsuperscript{5} is still unilaterally and to various degrees dependent on Russian raw energy materials.

The perspectives of a common Visegrad identity towards the Russian Federation can be fully compatible with the agenda of EU relations toward the Russian Federation, as well as the goals of Russian security policy toward the EU. The contribution of the Visegrad countries to the ESDP vis-à-vis the Russian security policy factor can present specific experience these countries have accumulated in the course of several decades.

Summarizing the common Visegrad perception of security threats and defining an awareness of common Visegrad security identity can be a new step for the ability of the Visegrad Group to formulate – fully within NATO and EU – its common security interests.

Up to now, the Visegrad Group has reached a relative consensus as to foreign policy agenda (New Visegrad Declaration of Kroměříž, 2004).\textsuperscript{6} Building up a common Visegrad security policy still remains on the agenda for the future. However, facing common new global security threats has offered an opportunity for the Visegrad Group to declare a political will to pursue – besides foreign policy goals – a common security policy agenda as well. Forming a common Visegrad ‘security identity’ should become the long-term objective of the non-governmental organizations of the Visegrad Group countries, because of their flexible opportunities to meet each other without diplomatic hurdles and being able to neglect eventual ‘freezes’ in mutual relations, like has been the recent ‘freeze’ following the Slovak-Hungarian dispute in Summer of 2009. Under the condition of a constructive cooperation with their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the non-governmental organizations can enjoy a unique legitimacy to promote the idea of a common Visegrad identity within the NATO/EU area.

\textsuperscript{5} ‘Broader Central Europe’, or the ‘CE-10’ is a term, that has been sometimes used in discussion the EU’s newcomers to the EU and their security policy relations toward the Russian Federation. See, e.g. M.M. Balmaceda, “EU Energy Policy and Future European Energy Markets: Consequences for the Central and East European States”; http://www.uni-mannheim.de/fkks/fkks27pdf.

\textsuperscript{6} See the full text of the document: “Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrad Group Countries after their accession to the European Union [12 May 2004]”; http://www.ena.lu/declaration_cooperation_visegrad_group_countries_accession_eu_12_2004-02-18782.
Besides the positions taken to the energy policy or towards the Russian foreign policy [like the BMD – Ballistic Missile Defence], the discussion should focus also on global security threats as specified in security agendas of crucial international organizations Slovakia is a member of (esp. NATO and EU). Recently, some new or “rehashed” global security concerns were raised: WMD, terrorism, Afghanistan-linked peace supporting operations, failed states [European Security Strategy], Iran-linked nuclear program [UNSC]. These concerns [security threats] have been repeated many times in various NATO and EU documents, as well as in the security documents of individual Visegrad countries. Reflection of these security concerns in the Visegrad Group betrays a lot of similar, partly even identical responses.

The agenda of the discussion, therefore, follows a methodological bridge combining: global security threats as the most visible common denominator of NATO/EU countries – defining shared Visegrad security policy interests based at the identification of global security threats – proposing a joint security approach of the Visegrad countries in order to contribute to the cohesiveness of NATO’s and EU’s (ESDP) security policies.

More Detailed Proposal for a Discussion on Common Visegrad Identity

Methodologically, the discussion on common Visegrad Identity should be best structured according to the following items/topics:

a. the nature of global security threats and their perception in NATO/EU countries;

b. common Visegrad security perception measured against the existence of global security threats;

c. specific global security threats as seen by individual Visegrad Group countries (compared with other NATO/EU countries’ views and with the evaluation of these threats.

Specific Issues to be Discussed

First, the specific agenda for discussions should depart from the consensus on the relevancy of global security threats as defined by NATO documents and the EU attempts to reach a common basis for a consensual security and defence policy. Flexibly, changes and modifications in NATO/EU security and foreign policy modalities should be reflected. The Bucharest NATO Summit Declaration and this year’s Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit Declaration, e.g. cannot be seen anymore as a reliable common denominator for building up Visegrad security
identity, as the construction of ballistic missile defence (BMD) sites in two Visegrad countries was cancelled by the US president in September of 2009. At the same time, a continuation and a qualitatively new level of BMD was put into perspective and the US side announced a new ‘stronger; smarter and swifter’ BMD plan, as the ballistic missile threat will probably present an increasing danger of general security threats to Allies’ forces, territory and population.

Second, the evaluation of official and politically obliging NATO/EU documents (corresponding to UNSC resolutions). One should pay attention to concrete interpretations of these documents in the Visegrad Group countries.

Third, debating the issue of finding a common approach within the Visegrad Group, and of contributing (in the form of a one-voice approach) to NATO/EU consensus on global security threats.

Fourth, dealing with global security threats as defined above (terrorism, WMD, ballistic missiles, failed states) and responses to them (UN/NATO peace-supporting operations).

Fifth, the global dimension of security threats should be visualized by the combination of the relevance of global security threats for NATO/EU with the reception of these threats in Central Europe (Visegrad countries) following the aim to explore a possibility/chance of building up a regional – Visegrad – security identity against the background of these threats.

Results to be Achieved

Being a contribution to security debates in NATO/EU, the ‘Common Visegrad Identity’ initiative and the discussion on it should also reflect some future steps expected within NATO/EU:

- NATO finishes preparation activities to a new NATO strategic concept;
- EU has been working on up-dating its European Security Strategy;
- ‘Autonomously’, the Visegrad Group – as regional security entity speaking with one language of security interests – will obviously not be able to step into the discussion on the wordings of the New Strategic Concept and an up-dated European Security Strategy. Anyway, the Visegrad Group can utilize both crucial documents for the realization of its own ‘niches’ in the scope of the European or Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Due to the results of the discussions on a common Visegrad security identity (contributions, debate, outreach, consultations with the government),

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a set of recommendations for NATO (or the EU) can be proposed. The recommendations should reflect the positions of governmental and NGO experts from the four Visegrad countries covering the debated issues. The first set of recommendations could pay attention to the convergence/dichotomy within the individual countries [governmental and NGO elites], the second one could focus on the convergence of a common security identity view among the four Visegrad countries.

In the sphere of global security threats as posed for NATO/EU, which means, automatically for the Visegrad countries at the same time, the goal of creating a common Visegrad security identity is to evaluate global security threats as a top priority for NATO/EU security concerns in accordance with the results of the New NATO Strategic Concept, latest NATO summits and the European (EU) security priorities (threats that will be posed by the up-dated European Security Strategy). Due to the fact that NATO and EU memberships overlap in the absolute number of cases/member states, the NATO/EU point of intersection vis-à-vis global threats has been assumed as a matter of fact.

One of the crucial problems to be discussed in this part of the common Visegrad security agenda is the nature of specific global security threats and the explanation of their prominent position within the security threats mentioned by NATO. NATO and the EU (both involving Visegrad) should elaborate on the coveted common approach of all institutional actors.

One will, at the same time, explore the European/NATO ability to accept the defence against the global security threats as a guarantee for future security for NATO/EU countries.

**Sub-Actors in Challenging Global Security Threats: Building up Common Regional (Visegrad) Security Identity**

As to the Central European (Visegrad) dimension of the goal, key questions to be answered and recommendations to be elaborated include:

- Can the Visegrad Group find a consensus in NATO’s recognizing the global security threats as a common security-policy platform resulting in a common Visegrad security identity within NATO?
- What can a small group of countries like the Visegrad Group do for putting an additional value to the efforts against the global security threats – in concrete: effective international control regimes (e.g. the former role of Slovakia in the UNSC 1540 Committee)?
- What is the compatibility of global threat perceptions between NATO/EU countries (emphasis on the Visegrad Group) and directly involved regional actors?
Can a common security identity in the V4 countries contribute to a strengthened NATO (and possibly EU) effectiveness in implementing the new NATO Strategic Concept and NATO summit conclusions concerning the ballistic missile threats?

With respect to the security threat posed to NATO/EU generally, the position of Central European countries (Visegrad Group) toward the global security threats should be discussed with focus on this problem, which can intervene with the security and defence policy of both old and new NATO Member States.

The parallel objective of this agenda is to define a common denominator in the Visegrad Group as to sharing similar/analogous/identical policy vis-à-vis the reaction to global security threats.

The issue of global security threats should be debated from the point of view of the NATO-focused (NATO will be preferred as a reference framework owing to the fresh results of the future NATO Summit) defence against global (new) security challenges.

Central European/Central Eastern European Contribution to Transatlantic Security

The question, if the long-expected admission of Central European/Central Eastern European (CE, CEE) countries meant a contribution to European or Trans-Atlantic unity, has proved to be quite controversial. Theoretically, the admission of ten ‘post-communist’ newcomers (not only the Visegrad ones) to NATO and EU was accompanied by hopes of increasing the political relevance of the EU and of enlarging the modus operandi of Europe at the international scene. However, still before the official entry of the first eight countries from Central Eastern Europe into the EU in 2004 it had become clear that practically all these countries were going to assume an articulated position on the issue of security and foreign policy, and especially security and defense policy. In the strife between ‘Atlanticists’ and supporters of ‘European autonomy’ in security and defense issues, at the beginning they definitely sided with the US policy concerning the invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that time, there were no differences between the purely ‘Central Europeans’ [the Visegrad Group] and the other ‘Central Eastern Europeans’. In between, in the years 2004-2008 some of these countries have softened their original uncritical support for the American policy in the course of the ‘war on terror’. Anyway, the modifications of attitudes toward Trans-Atlantic issues in the last years cannot conceal the fact that Central Eastern Europeans (including, of course, the Visegrad Group countries) did contribute more to the division of Europe than to its unity. Their pro-US policy on the eve of the Iraqi war helped the
radicals in Washington to display ‘New Europe’ against some allies in NATO and to postpone the implementation of the ESDP project indefinitely. If the recently (Fall 2009) adopted Lisbon Treaty is able to represent a new security and defense unity within the EU-27, cannot be solved at this moment.

In the ‘eastern’ enlargement of NATO, the US found an appropriate instrument in intervening successfully with EU internal affairs, as the NATO enlargement coincided with that of the EU. Even in the year preceding the ‘wars on terror’ and the deep division in the ranks of Europeans on this issue, the official US reports betrayed confidence as to the support by the new allies in Central Eastern Europe: At that time, a confidential report for the US Senate became almost proverbial: “Finally, we were convinced, as have been many US Government officials, that the seven countries seriously under consideration for NATO membership, in addition to the three new members of NATO, are more committed Atlanticists (with the possible exception of Slovenia) than many of the current NATO allies.”

The wave of Central Eastern European support for the ‘war on terror’ policy of the President George Bush came at the time the governments of eight countries had already dates for EU membership. Despite this, three of them – Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – joined some ‘old’ EU countries at the head with the UK in February 2003 and expressed their unlimited support for the planned invasion of Iraq in the controversial Letter of Eight. And quite independently, ten members of the so-called Vilnius Group – an ad hoc regional group of ten countries from CEE created with the aim to support each other’s NATO entry ambitions (including several countries with EU entry dates plus Bulgaria and Romania) – signed a similar letter some days later: This was, once more, widely used by the US public diplomacy in collecting voices of support for the Iraq invasion. This, reciprocally, led some ‘old’ Europeans to harsh reactions at the address of CEE countries, the most notable case being the former French president Jacques Chirac’s rebuke...

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8 “Report of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations” (August 30, 2002), p. 3.
10 “The Recent Trip of Secretary Rumsfeld to Italy and Germany and International Support for the Global War on Terrorism”, http://www.fpc.state.gov/fpc/17712.htm.
telling that the letter was “infantile” and that “they missed a great opportunity to shut up”. In other words, since at least 2003 up to 2008, the new EU (and NATO) members from CEE hardly contributed to a more cohesiveness of the EU in the sphere of foreign and security policy, not to speak about defense policy. Even if some countries – most visibly Slovakia – have strongly damped their transatlanticism in between, there have appeared several other points of friction between the EU and the EU newcomers from CEE, e.g. positions taken vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court, voting in the UN Security Council by Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, anti-missile defense based on the bilateral agreements between the US and CEE countries (Poland and Czech Republic) or the ‘autonomous’ policy of the Czech Republic (to be followed by Slovakia) in negotiations with the US concerning the visa waiver program in 2008.

**Reasons for Central Eastern European ‘Disloyalty’ toward Europe**

The reasons the CEE countries produced accusations of being European unity ‘breakers’ are various and have been mostly correctly analyzed in the last five years. Let us mention the notoriously famous reasons why the CEE countries were so much eager to express support for US foreign policy throughout the 1990s and have often preserved it up to 2008.

One of the reasons can be called historical. It was the US who appeared as winner of the Cold War in the eyes of CEE and many politicians appreciated the ‘Americans’ as those bringing freedom and democracy to their respective countries.

Another reason might be found in the continuing emphasis of CEE on hard power. As can be easily established by studying basic security documents – especially **Security Strategies** and **Military Strategies** – the perception of security has remained very traditional and is still focused on the strong role of military.

**Fear of Russia** did not fully disappear in CEE after NATO enlargement. In connection with the recent attempts to strengthen the role of Russia (including the Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty or the threat to aim Russian missiles bearing nuclear warheads at CEE because of anti-missile plans of the Czech and Polish governments), the US might once more appear as a power worth of close alliance links.

**Gratitude** (regardless of the highly questionable value of this category in ‘real politik’) for the US role in pushing through the NATO enlargement process in the 1990s, which was seen as an impetus for the EU to re-consider the originally (up

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11 “Chirac Lashes out at ‘New Europe’”, CNN.Co./World (February 18, 2003).
to the Luxembourg EU Summit in December 1997) EU’s indecisive enlargement policy.

Super power position of the US is another factor that contributed to the decision to rely more on the ‘big American’ than on the EU, which has proven a limited ability up to now in implementing its ambitious goals as formulated in the Lisbon process.13

Lack of unity among ‘old EU Member States’ has made it easier for CEE countries to ignore the call for a more coordinated EU foreign and security policy approach.

Failure [up to now] to develop the CFSP and ESDP processes, postponement of the building up of Rapid Reaction Forces and/or the Battle Groups, as well as the inability to bring the European Security Strategy (2003, 2010) to practical conclusions, which would entail the ability of the EU to engage in crisis management operations everywhere in the world. In spite of the fact that the first European Security Strategy celebrates the 6th anniversary in December 2009, the declamations about the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters “early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention”14 or the claim that the “first line of defense will often be abroad”15 do not seem to be confirmed.

One cannot disregard the fact, however, that the heyday of the unlimited support for the US foreign policy in some CEE countries seems to belong to history, even if most CEE countries can still be regarded as more ‘pro-Atlanticist’ than the average of ‘old’ EU Member States.

One cannot disregard the fact, however, that the heyday of the unlimited support for the US foreign policy in some CEE countries seems to belong to history, even if most CEE countries can still be regarded as more ‘pro-Atlanticist’ than the average of ‘old’ EU Member States. Generally one has to admit a change of hearts in several capitals of CEE and a more sober assessment of bilateral relationship with the USA. Perhaps the most significant change has become visible at the level of public opinion in most CEE countries, which has been characterized by a steady decline of popularity of the once celebrated big North American ally.

Transatlanticism has been a hot issue not only in the CE (Central Europe - Visegrad Group), but also in the whole Central Eastern Europe. It is a question, if a common Visegrad identity is possible without reaching a consensus in a common attitude toward the US foreign policy and the new emphasis of the [new] US president to strengthen the war on ‘rebels’ in Afghanistan.

As could be seen in the case of Iraq, the Visegrad Group was not able to preserve a common position it assumed in 2003. This was visible especially in Slovakia.

Since the late 1990’s up to at least 2006, the Slovak security and foreign policy has been tied more to NATO membership than to the CFSP/ESDP within the framework of the EU. Nominally, Slovakia has always supported the idea of a collective European defense but practical steps have been oriented at NATO as the only realistic supplier of the Slovak security.

The strongly pro-US foreign and security policy of Slovakia might have been the reaction to a period of an almost anti-US foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in the mid-1990’s. The years 1994-1998 meant a relatively anti-American foreign policy position assumed by the populist-nationalist-leftist government. It has to be emphasized that this policy did not mean looking for any alternative in the EU. Both EU and USA were criticizing the so-called ‘democratic deficits’ of the then Slovak government. As the rejection of Slovakia by NATO preceded the rejection of this country by the EU, the US was regarded as the original spoiler of Slovak integration ambitions. After the parliamentary elections of 1998 Slovakia turned to be strongly pro-US in the following eight years.

From the uncritical support of the US in advance of the invasion of Iraq in 2002/2003 and from the following participation of Slovak troops at the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq in 2003-2007, there ensued a political (oppositional) resistance ending with an abrupt withdrawal of the remaining Slovak troops in Iraq and with a relatively strong support of the Russian side during the Georgian-Russian military conflict in August 2008. Officially, at the level of the Headquarters of the Government and of the strongest party of the ruling coalition, Slovakia also strongly criticized two of its neighboring Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic and Poland, for their willingness to allow the anti-missile shield at their territories.16

On the other side, Slovakia has expressed a support for the initiative of the new US president and for his calls to increase allies’ troops in Afghanistan. It is, however, not clear if this is a signal of Slovakia’s realization of an ‘undivided’ responsibility in security issues or simply a declared support for the new US president.

**Conclusion: Common Visegrad Interests and Common Visegrad Identity**

Still before the last parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 2006, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to produce two program documents, in which the foreign policy and the security policy of the country was closely linked to the alliance with the USA. In the first document adopted by the Government – *The Medium-Term Strategy of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic until 2015* – NATO is seen as the main instrument of peace and stability in the world and as the guarantee of national security and territorial integrity of the country (the EU has not been mentioned at all in this context). The USA has been explicitly mentioned as the ‘strategic’ partner in the document.

The second document – *The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* – was adopted in the Slovak Parliament (National Council) in September 2005. Here one finds that “the relations with the USA will have a special place in guaranteeing the security interests of the Slovak Republic.”

After the parliamentary elections of 2006, the emphasis on the security and foreign policy cooperation with the USA practically disappeared from official documents and declarations. One of the building up of a common Visegrad identity must be based on a common language, addressing common security threats, positions toward Russia, toward the transatlantic relations and a common vision of one geographically and culturally shared political view of European and Euro-Atlantic affairs.

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19 Ibid, par. 73.
the first steps of the new government headed by the Social Democrats as its strongest element, the foreign policy of the USA has been many times criticized like the ‘pro-American’ policy of the previous government. At the same time, the distrust of both NATO and the USA in public opinion polls continued to increase. From this point of view, the above mentioned two documents, with the help of which the previous government wanted to secure the continuity of foreign and security policy of the country, do not correspond either with the prevailing opinion in the population, nor with the foreign and security policy as implemented by the present (2009) government [with one exemption being recently the decision to strongly increase the engagement of Slovakia in Afghanistan].

In other words, the building up of a common Visegrad identity – regardless of the desirable methodological moves and covetable steps to be undertaken by non-governmental organizations and the respective state agencies [first of all by the ministries of foreign affairs] – must be necessarily based on a common language, in which one addresses common security threats, positions toward Russia, toward the transatlantic relations and a common vision of one geographically and culturally shared political view of European and Euro-Atlantic affairs. Only under these conditions, the security identity of the Visegrad Group may be both, internationalized and institutionalized.

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Divided We Stand: Limits of Central European Atlanticism in the New Era

Summary: The article starts with the assessment of Central European ‘regionalism’. First of all, the author argues that common regional wisdom has a strong geopolitical background that has also essentially informed Alanticist views of the Central European foreign and security policies. Secondly, the author examines Alanticist perspectives more in detail to identify different shapes and dynamics of this idea. Finally, the article attempts at putting forward an idea that geopolitical discourses heavily burden the Central European states’ security identities and clearly complicate and limit strategic moves that would reflect the characteristics of the coming times. The authors concludes that instead of identifying geopolitically-informed threats and an unrealistic searching for ways through which the leading world superpower would provide some extra-guarantees, the countries should with a greater stress identify themselves as firm parts of European projects.

It has been often suggested recently that the world approaches a new less secured era reshuffling the power relations as well as deteriorating the situations in various regions. While from the general perspective the security of the Central European states has been guaranteed by the most powerful military organization, the upcoming situation might lead to the redefinition of some long-term patterns defining the countries’ security and foreign political identities since the end of the Cold War.

This article will start with the assessment of the Central European ‘regionalism’. We will argue that common regional wisdom has a strong geopolitical background that has also essentially informed Alanticist views of the Central European foreign

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and security policies. Having done this the article will examine Atlanticist perspectives more in detail to identify different shapes and dynamics of this idea. The article will differentiate between the ardent geopolitical Atlanticism and strategic Atlanticism. As an illustration this section will confront recent Czech and Polish positions vis-à-vis the latest crucial transatlantic projects. Finally, the article will attempt at putting forward an idea that geopolitical discourses heavily burden the Central European states’ security identities and clearly complicate and limit strategic moves that would reflect the characteristics of the coming times. Instead of identifying geopolitically-informed threats and an unrealistic searching for ways through which the leading world superpower would provide some extra-guarantees, the countries should with a greater stress identify themselves as firm parts of European projects.

Geopolitical Rebirth and Decline of Central Europe

Central Europe has for a greater part of the last century disappeared from the political maps and vanished from the perspective of Western analysts. Indeed, “the disappearance of this part of Europe from the consciousness of the western intelligentsia after 1945 represents an astonishing act of collective cultural amnesia, matched only by the delight with which the other half of the continent was rediscovered in the late 1970s.”¹ It is not without an interest that the idea of a Central Europe was re-opened again by the Communist-era dissident intellectuals who saw a chance of mobilizing the civil society through the common regional framework.²

Immediately after the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe crumbled, the states of the region started the emancipatory processes to ‘return them to Europe’ while the West began rediscovering the region. The crucial challenge of these states’ internal transformations was naturally accompanied by endeavors to re-establish political, economic and security links with the West, and to secure future development by participating

in Western institutions. A reference to regional commonalities was natural due to both the influence of the dissident networks as well as current historical context.\(^3\) Nevertheless, it became soon clear that despite having sense as a framework for possible cooperation on the return to Europe, the Central European region was neither geographically nor politically self-evident and was almost devoid of any meaning.\(^4\) In a similar vein Vladimír Handl has pointed out that regarding the most often mentioned criteria defining the preconditions for a region – the shared historical experiences, power and wealth distributions, cultural, social and ethnic traditions, and ideological/political preferences – the Central European states, generally understood, share only the last one.\(^5\)

**Geopolitics Secured: Atlanticism as the Principal Orientation**

Whereas the Central European geopolitical discourse apparently declined among the students of geopolitics and regional cooperation, it essentially survived within one of the principal orientations of foreign policy. The foreign policies of Central European states have been often analyzed through the concepts of Atlanticism, Europeanism, internationalism, and autonomism.\(^6\) As the title suggest the geopolitical influence is fundamentally present as a supporting background of the Atlanticist preferences.

In general, Atlanticist positions could be summarized as follows. Atlanticists emphasize the importance of transatlantic relations at both bilateral and multilateral levels. More precisely they endeavor to strengthen the relations with the US and attempt to reinforce their position in Europe. Atlanticists are anxious about the EU playing a more important role in providing a security guarantee in Europe and in stabilizing its neighborhood as a stronger EU could lead to the withdrawal of the US. More importantly for this article, the rationalization of the US presence is based on a perception of threat coming from Russia. The crucial role attributed to the US on the basis of a unique

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historical experience is to balance this possible threat. Central European Atlanticism takes various shapes. Some of them will be addressed more in detail below. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned notes create a general framework for Atlanticist ideas.\(^7\)

It is not necessary to search for a long time for a clear illustration of the geopolitical foundation of the legitimization of US presence in (Central) Europe. In July 2009 a group of 22 greatly respected public figures from the Central East European states including Václav Havel sent an open letter to president Obama.\(^8\) In a premature reaction on president Obama’s future decision to redefine the strategic framework of the ballistic missile defense project (BMD), the signatories expressed their feeling that the US is losing interest in Central and Eastern Europe. According to them this fact could lead to the gradual estrangement and decrease of Atlanticism in the part of Europe that has always been very close to the US and consequently to the value crisis in the region itself. Facing current dynamics of Russian activities and ambitions the US should follow the historical experience reflecting the negative implications of disengagement in the region. Interestingly, the ‘Letter to Obama’ was a second open expression of these attitudes initiated in central Europe after the ‘Letter of Eight’ published as the article ‘United We Stand’ in the Wall Street Journal in January 2003.\(^9\) Although both texts reveal some similarities, the more recent attempt could be considered as a crystal clear manifesto of Central European Atlanticism.

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\(^9\) The article “United We Stand”, Wall Street Journal (January 30, 2003) declared support for President Bush administration in the Iraqi issue. It was signed by seven Prime Ministers: Jose Maria Aznar (Spain), Jose-Manuel Durão Barroso (Portugal), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), Tony Blair (Great Britain), Peter Medgyessy (Hungary), Leszek Miller (Poland), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark), and Czech President Václav Havel.
Diverging Atlanticisms in Central Europe

It is a market dream to publish a book that would define several months of frequent discussions in the transatlantic area. One of the authors with a great sense for timing is apparently Robert Kagan, whose fairly simplistic metaphors became widely discussed during the first major post-Cold War transatlantic dispute surrounding the beginning of the war in Iraq. Kagan’s ideas did not only influence scholars and analysts but determined a context in which Donald Rumsfeld could express his idea about the new/old Europe division. Although these discussions have been fortunately deeply buried, it should be understood that the idea of the new Europe is the American geopolitical mirror image to the Central European Atlanticist conception.

Ironically, this perspective has appeared to be reflected by the current American administration that tends to view the Baltic and Central European states as accomplices of the former Bush’s administration. This became quite apparent from the US treatment of the former Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski’s candidacy for the post of NATO Secretary-General. One of the senior Obama administration officials reportedly commented on his endeavor expressing a belief that “Radek Sikorski now wishes that he had chosen Brookings over AEI.” The signs of symbolic diplomacy could be also recognized in other Obama’s moves. For the official commemoration of the outbreak of World War II organized in Gdansk on September 1st the administration selected William Perry, a former secretary of defense, who became known in Central Europe as the staunch opponent of the Polish NATO membership. Finally, president Obama’s long awaited and perhaps postponed announcement about the future of the third pillar of the American missile defense came on September 17th, which is the date of the Soviet invasion to Poland in 1939. No

From a broader perspective all Central European countries have a tendency to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic link.

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13 Ibid.
matter how suspicious one wants to be, these events reveal a substantial lack of interest at best.

It has been already mentioned that from a broader perspective all Central European countries have a tendency to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic link. Indeed, for a substantial part of political elites as well as intelligentsia the interests of the US have served as a sufficient legitimization for their own countries’ foreign political attitudes and decisions. Nevertheless, the Atlanticist positions differ in various countries. The following lines will analyze the Czech and Polish reactions on the two recently important themes of the transatlantic cooperation. The first will be the Iraqi issue that has already been mentioned in a context of the new/old Europe split. Then, the other topic will concern the American plan to build the components of the third pillar of the ballistic missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland.

From a general perspective Poland has revealed a higher political and societal consensus on promoting a special relationship with the US. All relevant political parties have supported this tendency, which also reflects the Polish elites’ geopolitical perception of a particular role of their country given its size and location. Regarding the war in Iraq Poland established itself to the role of an avant-garde in terms of the support for the US endeavors in the Middle East and provided a substantial number of troops, which later transformed to the leading responsibility over a multinational contingent dealing with one of the Iraqi districts. Despite the coherency with the Atlanticist notions, the idea of a special relationship also had a pragmatic and material side. The Polish Prime Minister at the time, openly expressed hopes that excellent political relations with the US may translate into technical and economic partnerships and that participation in peacekeeping forces will boost chances for companies and help them win a sizable amount of reconstruction work. It should be noted that Polish ‘bandwagoning for profit’ was realistically evaluated as illusive soon after the decision.

Central European Atlanticist do not feel comfortable with the first months of Obama’s administration.

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14 M. Rhodes, “Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Bandwagon, or Bridge”, Orbis Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 431-432.
Whereas the Polish decision to fully support the US did not become an issue of the internal political debate due to the high level of domestic political and societal consensus, the situation in the Czech Republic was different. The Atlanticist ideas have been unquestionably backed only by the dominant rightist formation, Civic Democrats. The other supporters have been less visible as being dispersed in other relevant parties with the exception of the Communists. Similarly, the public is much less receptive towards Atlanticist ideas, although the most visible proponents have been highly respected intellectual figures including the former president, Václav Havel. As a result the government, led by mostly Europeanist Social Democrats, appeared in an uncomfortable position illustrated and underlined by the arrogant expression of the French president Jacques Chirac on one side and Donald Rumsfeld’s attempt to divide Europe on the other. The government more or less successfully managed to maneuver between the conflicting positions, sending non-fighting groups to Iraq and rather avoiding any direct expression of its participation in the coalition of the willing.

The Iraqi issue revealed some differences that became fully visible during the negotiation over BMD. Poland clearly preferred a bilateral framework of the negotiation and did not follow any attempts to coordinate the positions of the two Central European countries. Contrary to this attitude the Czech diplomacy under the particular circumstances defined by the pressure coming from the Green Party, the smallest ruling coalition partner, opted for a strategy of the ‘NATOization’ of the third pillar. This move was essential from a strategic perspective as the American national system was meant to be complementary to the Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system to be developed by NATO. The successful ‘NATOization’ was confirmed in the Bucharest NATO Summit Declaration in April 2008.

Apart from the stubborn stand on the bilateral special relationship the Polish elite put forward a different legitimizing discourse. Whereas the Czech governmental representatives almost mechanically transferred the original

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19 Personal interview with high-ranking governmental official, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, March 20, 2006.
20 Cf. N. Hynek “Protiraketová obrana v současném strategickém a politickém kontextu: vztah k odstrašování a dopad třetího pilíře na dynamiku mezi relevantními aktéry”, Mezinárodní vztahy Vol. 43, No. 4. (2008), pp. 5-31.
American discourse finding a crucial potential threat in Iran\textsuperscript{22}, The Polish discourse was dominated by emerging Russian threat. This issue was critically linked to the notions of negotiation bargains. The Czech Republic concluded the negotiations achieving an agreement on the research and technological cooperation and co-development in the area of missile defense. While pursuing very different interests Poland demanded a battery of the Patriot missiles (PAC-3) that could be deployed near the Russian border: Besides other reasons the American refusal logically followed from the context of negotiation with Russia as one of the crucial challenges for the US and NATO was to convince Russia that she was not a primary target of the third site. This diplomatically costly process was heavily complicated by the Polish attitude. Being as such it serves as a great example of geopolitical Atlanticism that could be differentiated from a more strategic version of Atlanticism which was pushed forward by the Czech diplomacy.

\textbf{Towards a New Strategic Framework: US Foreign and Security Policy under Obama}

The article has already mentioned that Central European Atlanticists do not feel comfortable with the first months of Obama’s administration and that the current American leader does not seem to invest much energy into Central and Eastern European affairs. Though rather expected\textsuperscript{23}, his decision regarding the redefinition of the timeline as well as strategic framework of the third site of the BMD evoked a harsh reaction. While Polish politicians talked about unexpected arrogance and even ‘betrayal’, their Czech counter-parts, who supported the project, regretted investing so much political capital into the unsuccessful issue.\textsuperscript{24} Although president Obama has been in office only for months, it is already possible to recognize his crucial foreign political strategies. Having a great respect to many figures, who signed the above-mentioned ‘Letter to
Obama’s appeal appears to be a result of a fairly limited regional view omitting crucial strategic context.

The accession of president Obama has been associated with a ‘Change’ bringing a new dynamic to the environment of the late-Bush fatigue. In the area of foreign policy the change is most visible on the rhetorical and procedural level as president Obama does not hesitate to utilize celebrity diplomacy or the power of apologetic discourse. On the other hand a closer look at the thematic content suggests that the level of discursive change clearly surpassed the actual changes. This point has been raised by Nik Hynek, who has recently analyzed the continuity and change of the US foreign and security policy. However, despite a certain shuffle in priorities, many of the electoral promises have been substantially mitigated. Moreover, his clearly pragmatic attitudes, which are visible particularly in relations to China or Venezuela, as well as from the uncertain fate of the Guantanamo prisoners leaves most of the idealism only in rhetoric.

Most importantly, however, as Hynek has further convincingly shown, despite its multilateral rhetoric, current American administration has seemed to prefer the international order based on great powers’ parallel bilateral relations. Although recently Obama’s absolutely accommodating journey to China has rightly attracted attention, the crucial connection has appeared to be established between Washington and Moscow reflecting one of Obama’s top priorities – disarmament. The emerging strategic condominium based on solely

The current situation is about a definition of different rules of the game that will become binding for (Central) Europe but which will be defined externally.

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26 Cf. Ibid.
27 Cf. Ibid.
28 For an interesting analysis see, for example, “The Quiet American”, The Economist [November 28, 2009].
bilateral strategy in dealing with crucial security and strategic challenges was, beside the series of US-Russian consultation that started with the Bush-Putin meeting in Sochi after the NATO Bucharest Summit, confirmed by the abandonment of the BMD that was reframed from the multilateral strategic issue to the political bargaining chip.31

The crucial point for the conclusion is that the current situation is not about the US leaving the Central European region or the whole of Europe. It seems to be much more about a definition of different rules of the game that will become binding for [Central] Europe but which will be defined externally. It should be noted that some of the leading Atlanticists have already recognized the contours of the future settings.32 Regardless of strong ideological preferences the only relevant solution seems to be the re-focus on Europe and its, indeed unsatisfactory, security projects.

This endeavor would be conditioned by the successful approximation to the leading European powers that have often been sensitive to the manifestation of geopolitical attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. This is particularly true for Germany that is the leading country of all relevant European multilateral projects and which has behaved as a tireless proponent of reflexive multilateralism, which rests in efforts to develop a multilateral platform for relations with Russia. While some of the recent activities reveal a strategic understanding, other desperate attempts to resuscitate the Atlanticist corpse show little reflection. The former could be associated with the emerging dynamics within the framework of ESDP, the later could be illustrated by the recent Polish demand to station US troops creating a geopolitical shield against Russia.33 The response to the US foreign policy in the new era still remains open.

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Visegrad Security Policy: How to Consolidate its Own Identity

Summary: From the Polish perspective, the link between the security of Central Europe, including the Visegrad Group, and transatlanticism comprises probably more threads than for the remaining countries of this region. According to the author, the first such factor is the country’s specific geographic location. Another factor distinguishing Poland from amongst the remaining states is eastern policy. The third factor determining Poland’s identity in foreign and security policy is its belonging to the democratic West, perceived as a community of values and objectives as well as Euro-Atlantic structures. The author therefore states that in the field of security Poland’s identity is being shaped by past and present occurrences and phenomena taking place along the East-West divide. As for the Visegrad Group, the author argues that precisely now three chances have emerged enabling Visegrad to consolidate its own identity and assert its presence within the transatlantic community: a common position on allied security and defense issues, a contribution to European security and defense policies and, last but not least, an attempt to find a common denominator in issues of conventional arms control.

Good-Neighborhood Policy

For Poland, the link between the security of Central Europe, including the Visegrad Group, and transatlanticism comprises probably more threads than for the remaining countries of this region. That statement does not stem
from arrogance linked to the fact that it is Central Europe's largest state in terms of population and area, nor from an ambition to be a regional leader. It stems from several objective factors constituting the point of departure of Poland's foreign and security policy. At times it comprises paradigms and at time merely involves the convention within which one should proceed.

The first such factor is the country's specific geographic location. The painful experiences suffered by Poland in its more than thousand year history, especially the consequences of being wedged in between Germany and Russia, have so deeply engrained themselves in the Polish mentality that even full membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union have failed to overshadow them, even though those organizations to a huge extent guarantee our independence, borders and territorial integrity. But Andrzej Mleczko, a leading Polish cartoonist, once sketched God saying from behind a cloud: “I'm really going to pull a fast one on you Poles: I'll situate you between Russia and Germany...”

Poland is ever more clearly asking the North Atlantic Alliance to provide our country with a contingency plan, a scenario of the concrete military assistance we can expect in the event of foreign aggression. That attest to our security policy, behind which is a sense of threat [most recently as a result of vast Russian-Belarusian maneuvers along Poland's borders].

Therefore Poland’s foreign and security policy has to be ‘seen’ through the prism of the nation’s and country’s historical experience, probably more so than in the case of other countries.

Another factor distinguishing Poland from amongst the remaining states, at least in our perception – something that should be stressed – is eastern policy. It had taken shape even before an independent Republic of Poland re-emerged, when the Solidarity movement in 1981 issued a message to the nations of Eastern Europe, which earlier would have been regarded as an act of interference in the internal affairs of third countries. From that time, Poland’s eastern policy has been developed into the Eastern Partnership Program.

The third factor determining Poland’s identity in foreign and security policy is its belonging to the democratic West, perceived as a community of values and objectives as well as Euro-Atlantic structures.

The conviction that in joining the West Poland took advantage of an historic opportunity is accompanied by the fear that probably for quite some time
Poland will remain at the crossroads between the stable and highly developed NATO and EU area and the unstable, much less advanced in terms of economy and civilization post-Soviet zone whose future is unknown. That fact determines many concrete solutions in the realm of external, internal (domestic), economic and ecological security.

In general it may therefore be stated that, in the field of security, Poland’s identity is being shaped by past and present occurrences and phenomena taking place along the East-West divide. (Such East-West concepts may now seem somewhat outdated, but they sporadically re-emerge in connection with recurring geopolitical thinking.) The next factor influencing Poland’s stable and secure surroundings is a good-neighborhood with Germany, the Visegrad Group, the Baltic Sea region, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.

Central Europe is therefore playing an important role. But in foreign and security policy it is probably not an independent value. However, when some vital issue needs to be resolved within NATO or the European Union, Central Europe, above all the Visegrad Group, can create a strong albeit informal alliance or at least a pressure group. That impression was reinforced in the position paper of Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski.1 As one of the goals of Polish foreign policy, he listed deepening cooperation with the Visegrad Group as well as with the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria.

Younger Europe

There are three basic reasons why Central Europe is not a top priority in Poland’s thinking about security policy. The first is of an historic nature. For Poland, ‘Mitteleuropa’ has never been as important a concept as it has for the region’s remaining states, for instance Hungary, although it did interest Polish intellectual and to some extent political elites already in the late 1980s.

I recall how during an elegant dinner at the Polish-German Forum2 taking place in Kiel in 1987 timid enquiries were whispered as to whether a return to the ‘Mitteleuropa’ concept might not incline us Poles and other inhabitants of

2 The abovementioned Polish-German Forum had been set up by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Edward Gerek and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki during the summit of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its purpose was to provide an annual platform to exchange ideas and views. The prevalent opinion at that time was that Polish-German relations constituted a barometer of Europe’s situation in the détente era.
The concepts 'Central Europe' and Visegrad Group are generally used interchangeably.

And finally, the third reason is – as mentioned above – the concentration on the East-West cooperation, although the Visegrad countries in our perception start to belong to the West and also Poles prefer to regard themselves as being from ‘Central’ Europe rather than ‘Eastern’ Europe, as the West graciously referred to this region in the previous era. (To them it has always been ‘the East’.)

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3 Quotation as recorded at the conference of the Stefan Batory Foundation, held in Warsaw in 2006, and reproduced in the leaflet “Continuity and Change in Polish Foreign Policy”.

4 The author will never forget when in the mid-1990s Poland ‘started’ lying in ‘Central’ Europe and a political scientist from one of the Scandinavian countries, and at the same time a husband of a famous politician, chuckled that he can’t understand it all. Poland’s borders got shifted from the east far to the west, but Poland nonetheless lies at the centre of Europe.
An observer of Polish foreign and security policy may notice the following phenomenon: the concepts ‘Central Europe’ and Visegrad Group are generally used interchangeably. However, until recently on various occasions Germany and Austria were included in ‘Central Europe’, and now the Baltic States and the Western Balkans are increasingly being included as well. Experts, however, differentiate between what in Polish is called ‘Europa Środkowa’ and ‘Europa Centralna’ (in English both mean Central Europe). The former has to do with geographic location or history and tradition, whilst the second rather refers to conventional-arms control (in connection with the terminology used in CFE conventional-arms limitation negotiations and treaties). That differentiation is possible only in Polish, since in English in both cases only the term ‘Central Europe’ is used. Within the context of security policy, the Visegrad Group symbolizes Central Europe both when it refers to the ‘Four’ or the more extended version. From our perspective, the Visegrad Group is the core of that part of Europe that has joined the Euro-Atlantic structures, Rumsfeld’s notorious ‘new’ Europe or to make it sound better – ‘younger Europe’.

**Political Instrument**

Our identity as the Visegrad Group actually began developing whenever we envisioned the similarity of our nations’ fate during the period of their membership in the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), although that was never articulated that time. But it did not begin to sprout until the years 1989-1991 (marking the start of the political transformation to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact). I recall the autumn of 1990 in the Polish Tatra Mountains, when the then three states’ national defense deputy ministers in charge of social and educational affairs met in Zakopane. It was then we began to realize that three independent neighboring states can constitute some type of then still unspecified community. Later it gradually became clear — as Bronisław Geremek put it — that the notion of Central Europe is not only a display of nostalgia for a space filled with similar cafés, a space of similar cultural traditions but a ‘political instrument’ as well.

The crux of the matter is in the very formulation of a ‘political instrument’.

‘Political instrument’ is a concept that may be variously interpreted depending on circumstances and permitting any definition of its geographic and political scope. Hence ‘Central Europe’ has not ceased to be a community of

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5 That concept, coined by Professor Jerzy Kłoczowski of the Polish Academy of Sciences, is often used at conferences and seminars in Poland.
fates. But, depending on political will, it can also become a community of states accentuating similar or common interests in security policy, both vis-à-vis ‘All-European’ structures (NATO, EU, OSCE) as well as states and other entities. That instrument makes it possible to shape eastern policy (viewing things from a Polish perspective) or other areas such as, for instance, Southeastern Europe (if Hungary's security interests were being taken into account). The countries of Central Europe are able to conclude both tactical and strategic alliances on which their significance in the international area may depend.

The Visegrad Group has proved its clout in European politics on two occasions. The first time was when the three countries were making a bid for NATO and EU membership, although the Group undermined its own political credibility and negotiating position rather than consolidating it. The ‘race of negotiators’ at the EU Summit in Copenhagen showed that each state had its own national priorities and has been led by them since that time. We should remember those years and not confront our group with inflated expectations. The second time was when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary sent the West signals of how much they wanted to introduce post-Meciar Slovakia to the same structures. That was a great experience!

The situation of the entire ‘Four’ has its roots in each of them. Since the time it has achieved its strategic aims, NATO and EU membership, Poland has had a hard time defining subsequent objectives and developing internal consensus round them.

**Two Sides of the Coin**

Our common identity may develop under three conditions: if a fundamental collision between the four states’ national interests does not occur; if bilateral relations, for instance between Slovakia and Hungary or Poland and the Czech Republic do not internally destabilize the V4; and if those in power display the resolute will to cooperate.

Now the Visegrad Group constitutes a community — partially a ‘default’ one, partially an institutionalized one. The premises exist for its identity to become consolidated and for its importance for Europe’s security policy to grow. Cooperation to date may be described as relatively successful. At the same time, its deficiencies are easy to notice.

The plus side includes its positive evolution: from an exchange of views begun with the Bratislava Declaration to the first concrete measures. At present the subject of consultation and cooperation are issues of managing and financing armed forces, their training and testing-range base within V4, the Visegrad
Battle Group area, experience in cooperation in multinational structures, for instance in the creation of a strategic air-transport fleet, peacekeeping and stabilizing operations, including the operation in Afghanistan, NATO Response Forces and regional security. It is unclear, however, whether our cooperation will mature to the point that our states will decide not to duplicate many security and defense efforts and will move to cooperate in the defense industry.6

At the same time it can be noticed that the Visegrad Group has not concentrated on such key issues as: dissonance in the transatlantic alliance and possibilities of overcoming it, the policy of energy security and critical infrastructure as well as Russia’s policies towards our region. Those matters may even be the subject of intensive discussion (if the official communiqués about meetings at various levels are any indication). However, with regard to those issues consensus can be seen to justify the claim that Visegrad has got its resolute, unambiguous political identity. Why is it that the Visegrad states, particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, did not work out a single approach to the American anti-missile shield?

A Visegrad incapable of presenting itself as a true political unity — as a pressure group or a group advancing concrete initiatives — also exerts limited influence on the outside world within NATO, EU and OCSE frameworks. However, neither within the North Atlantic Alliance nor the European Union does there exist a union of states one could recognize as a permanent (rather than tactical) group of similarly defined interests.7 That is indirect evidence of the significance of the Visegrad Group which may be compared to the significance enjoyed by Benelux in the past. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were the actual precursors of European integration and were able to achieve a kind of currency union, but have ceased functioning in the public mind and as a group no longer play any significant role in international politics, partly probably also because their identity has been ‘consummated’ in the process of European integration.

Moreover, Visegrad is facing a certain dilemma: it has adopted a formula of cooperation allowing other countries of our region to be invited. On the...

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6 The project to modernize the Mi helicopter has turned out to be unrealistic, hence for the time being at least other projects must be approached with skepticism.

7 In reference to the OCSE that is the case, e.g. Central Asia.
one hand, that is a good formula because it allows the ideas, conceptions and achievements amassed along the road of our ‘Four’s’ integration with the West to be shared with others, including post-Soviet countries, among them strategically vital Ukraine. It has rightly been emphasized that support for democratic transformation in Ukraine by the Visegrad Four was ‘the first manifestation of undertakings by the new member states addressed to a direct neighbor of the EU’.8 On the other hand, it is more difficult for our Western partners to unambivalently perceive V4, especially at a time when there is little practical interest in enlarging European or Euro-Atlantic structures to the east.

In developing their eastern policy, the Visegrad states launched their first attempt to influence the European Union’s foreign and security policy, whilst simultaneously voicing the region’s specific interests.

and security policy, whilst simultaneously voicing our region’s specific interests. Visegrad is determined to continue its involvement in developing the EU’s eastern dimension. But to some extent, does V4 eastern policy not reflect certain barriers arising in the cooperation of the four states, hence for our identity it may be more advantageous to turn to external partners?

9 In the document “Joint Political Statement of the Visegrad Group on the Strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (January 22, 2007); http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=1&articleID=6743&ctag=articlelist&sid=1, the Visegrad States emphasized their determination “to contribute to the strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy... /and/ to prepare detailed proposals for reinforcement of the ENP in coming weeks”. In March, V4 made joint statement presented at a meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on the Visegrad Group contribution to the discussion on the strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy in which it called for strengthening the EU’s eastern dimension.
Some observers were surprised that the Eastern Partnership was presented in the European Union forum as an initiative of Poland and Sweden, even though eastern policy is and should over the long term be one of the priorities of the ‘younger’ part of Europe. “It was of course notable that the EaP proposal was tabled in the EU as a Polish-Swedish and not a joint VG initiative. That shows that while the VG’s part in helping to bring the EaP to fruition seems indisputable, it has been a qualified involvement in that the VG itself played an endorsing and supporting rather than a leading role,” stated one of the observers.10

**Big Opportunity**

In the realm of security policy, the Visegrad Group has found itself at an important juncture. In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty’s acceptance, European relations are evolving, however, the future of a common security and defense policy remains unknown. The nature of transatlantic relations and of bilateral relations between the United States and individual regions, such as the Central European one, as well as our continent’s strongest states, chiefly France and Germany, are changing. Solutions in the field of arms control, including control of conventional weapons and non-proliferation, remain unclear: There exists a considerable risk of destabilization beyond the eastern border of NATO and the EU. The basic question of V4 identity is whether our states are up to inspiring solutions capable of influencing the course of events in a direction they themselves regard as beneficial?

The Decalogue of the new Central European debate encompassing the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary and possibly also the countries of South-Eastern European and Lithuania, which is important from the Polish point of view, should include: a re-analysis of various kinds of threats, ways of protecting against them, available instruments, rationalized defense spending, the armed forces model, the role of Russia in our security surroundings and reactions to all new security initiatives regardless of which organization was its author.

The Visegrad states could stand out for a harmonized approach to the American presence in our region. More attention should be devoted to discussing that matter because it combines numerous political and military issues. Ever since the Washington Administration scrapped plans to install European components of the anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic and replace it with

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a different plan involving SM3 anti-missiles, a different perception of the United States and its role as a guarantor of Central Europe’s security has emerged.

In Poland, many questions are being asked about the consequences of the American-Russian dialogue for our region. There are fears they will be disadvantageous and that Central Europe is being marginalized by the United States compared to its previous involvement in our region’s affairs. Criticism of the new American foreign policy is fairly widespread.

It is therefore worth considering what the consequences of American policy for the entire Visegrad Group will be and what new elements should be included in expanding cooperation with the United States.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk says that “Polish-American cooperation, including that in the military field, has very deep substantive foundations, rooted in values, projects and views... In the eyes of the USA, we have become a partner of which is expected involvement and co-responsibility for whatever good can occur in the world.”11

To what extent would, for instance, Hungary share such an approach, having granted the Papa air-transport fleet access to its military base? Such an analysis could help better understand the direction in which relations between America and Europe [the European Union] as well as the role Central Europe could play in that context. Transatlantic relations will undoubtedly evolve considerably and it will be impossible to apply to them the criteria of an earlier period. But the deficit of cohesion and solidarity within the Euro-Atlantic will never be a good thing for the Four.

But there are fears that key issues for European security will continue to remain beyond the mainstream of collaboration. An example may be demands Poland has addressed to NATO, mentioned here at the outset.

At least according to media reports, Poland has not consulted the remaining Visegrad states nor proposed to them a common approach. Instead it has done so in concert with the Baltic States. That particular case does not indicate that Visegrad is being slighted or sidestepped. It does show the existence of natural limits of cooperation in specific situations. It does not attest to our divergent security interests (because such a situation does not exist). It stems solely from the conviction that in view of the sense of threat from Russia and Belarus (as a result of the ‘Zapad 2009’ maneuvers held 150 kilometers from Poland’s eastern frontier during which a nuclear attack on our country was simulated), allies should be sought who may be threatened the same way.12

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11 Remarks by the Polish government chief following talks with US Vice-President Joe Biden on November 21, 2009 as quoted by PAP news agency.

12 Gazeta Prawna (November 13, 2009).
Recently one of our politicians stated that “Poland is being subjected to Russian military pressure”.\(^{13}\)

But when one takes into account the main objective of Poland’s efforts, namely the New Strategic Concept of defending the territory of member states being prepared by NATO in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the question arises whether that concern is shared by all the Visegrad states. If so, then it should be the subject of in-depth consultations, because it directly applies to the identity of the Visegrad Group in the security realm and to an organization in which V4 could stand out for its consolidated position. Are all the Visegrad states prepared to have NATO’s new strategic document change the references that have characterized Russia to date? Would Czech, Slovak and Hungarian commentators share the perception of one Polish observer who said: “Poland has become a frontline state of the Euro-Atlantic community, against which is pitted a military bloc directed by the Kremlin. Today’s Russia would not be itself if it did not attempt to impress that upon us. Meanwhile, Poland, threatened by a hypothetical attack, intimated with nuclear weapons, has no NATO defense plans. Nor any buffer states, because neither Ukraine nor Georgia fit that description.”\(^{14}\)

Does the question ‘How to overcome European differences with Russia’, raised at a recent seminar, mean there exist differences between Western and Central Europe or maybe even that the Visegrad countries are themselves divided?\(^{15}\)

Eventually, the key question pertaining to the future of the Visegrad Group and Central Europe in general must be raised: is it even possible to build an identity in the security realm if agreement in a crucial matter cannot be achieved? Does such a situation obliterates, or not, the consolidation of V4 identity, if agreement can easily be reached on matters of minor significance, as well as more important ones [which has already occurred]?  

\(^{13}\) Witold Waszczykowski, deputy chief of the Bureau of National Security during a panel discussion on “The Political and Military Aspects of Poland’s Participation in Foreign Peacekeeping and Stabilization Missions”, held on November 24, 2009 in Warsaw.


\(^{15}\) The seminar was organized by the international affairs institutes of our “Four” on November 13, 2009 in Prague.
At any rate, one should not forget that the stability and security of our Four
are directly co-dependent on the potential and operational efficiency of the Euro-
Atlantic Community. But it should also be realized existing dissonances in the US-
EU relations continue to overlap with particularities of European states, which
can also be seen in Visegrad countries for some time now. Lack of cohesion in
the actions of states belonging to the community may pose a political risk, whilst
cohesion is especially important in the case of small and medium states [like
Visegrad countries].

What is known as the ‘Concert of Powers’ does not lie in the interests of any
of our states. Poland is categorically opposed to that option, at least officially. And
here another problem arises, already mentioned above, namely the freedom of
Visegrad countries to choose other European partners to achieve their national
objectives. For each of the countries of the Four as well as the Visegrad Group
and Central Europe as a whole, a first-rate partner is the Federal Republic
of Germany. In the case of Poland that may also be France and the Weimar
Triangle or in future belonging to the five or six of the most influential European
states. Despite Poland’s opposition to the ‘Concert of Powers’, according to
its diplomatic chief, Poland seems to fancy being ranked in the ‘European first
league’.

Regardless of possible constellations of cooperation with the remaining EU
states, it would be good if the Visegrad state now holding the presidency of the
27 EU Member States would remember the Visegrad Four. That demand should
now be addressed to Hungary and Poland. Following the adoption of the Lisbon
Treaty, those two countries will exercise EU leadership in succession in 2011.
Poland has announced that its priority will be security and defense, including
the development of crisis-reaction capacity. That is an area in which the Czech
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary have had considerable success, although
it is not widely known to the public.

Beefed-up cooperation within the NATO and EU framework are two
opportunities the Group now faces. The third may turn out to be cooperation on
various emerging aspects of European security, chiefly as regards the issue of
conventional arms limitation. That issue may be revived after the United States
and the Russian Federation agree new nuclear-arms reduction principles and
other areas of cooperation.

Since the OSCE meeting in Corfu (June 27-28), a chance of ‘reanimating’
the CFE Treaty has emerged. According to Wolfgang Zellner, the head of the
Centre for OSCE-Research CORE and a seasoned observer, “One item that is
likely to be high on the agenda is arms control, with particular reference to the
future of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which
was signed in 1999 but has never entered into force. Along with the Open
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Skies Treaty, the original 1990 CFE Treaty is the only legally binding document underpinning European security structures. Indeed, cooperative security in Europe is unthinkable without the survival and further development of the CFE regime.16

And so, in the view of a Polish analyst, precisely now three chances have emerged enabling Visegrad to consolidate its own identity and assert its presence within the transatlantic community. A common position on allied defense issues, a contribution to European security and defense policies and an attempt to find a common denominator in issues of conventional arms control would not be easy to achieve. But it would nevertheless provide a new, exceptionally vigorous and most likely long-term impulse for the further development of the Visegrad identity. None of the advocates of our group negates the need for such a new impulse.17

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Gergely Varga

**Central European Security Identity and Transatlanticism – a Hungarian Perspective**

Summary: The article focuses on the evolution of the security identity and the Atlanticism of Central Europe over the last two decades with a special emphasis on Hungary. First, it provides the regional overview, and then discusses the developments of Hungarian security identity and transatlanticism, with a reference to domestic politics as well. In the end, the author looks at the current prospects of Central European security.

With the accession of Central and Eastern European states to NATO and the EU in the last decade, the common notion is that transatlanticism has been given a major boost within the Euroatlantic institutions. The former members of the Warsaw Pact are finally free from the grips of the Soviet Union and communism, but they still feel weak and vulnerable against big European powers – primarily Russia, hence they are desperate to seek security from Europe’s and the world’s still number one military power, the United States. The paper focuses on how the security identity and the Atlanticism of Central Europe has evolved over the last two decades with a special emphasis on Hungary. The paper starts with a regional overview and discusses the developments of Hungarian security identity and transatlanticism, with a reference to domestic politics as well. In the end it analyzes the current prospects of Central European security.

**The Terminological Questions of Central Europe, Identity and Atlanticism**

Central Europe is primarily a geographical term, which does not have a clear rule as to where it starts and ends, but where ever we peremptorily draw

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borders to it, we do that with political perceptions and with reference to a specific historical context. In this article under the term Central Europe I will refer to four countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. If we were to analyze for example Central European security identity in the late 19th century, with the Austrian-Hungarian Empire still standing, our focus would have been wider with the Balkans, with the Polish question and the Italian frontiers on the table as well. So when we speak about Central European security at the beginning of the 21st century, it is legitimate to speak together about the four above mentioned countries for several reasons. The communist dictatorship with Soviet occupation, the peaceful political changes in 1989-1990, the ‘frontrunners’ status of the former Eastern bloc, the early accession – with the exception of Slovakia – into NATO, and regional co-operations as the Visegrad Four (V4) and CEFTA1 (before EU accession) all contribute to a relevant distinction of these countries from the rest of Central Europe.

Identity is a theoretical framework, which separates entities from one another. The primary question of identity is who we are, and from whom are we trying to distinct ourselves. Therefore the security identity of a state or a region can be only interpreted vis-à-vis other states and regions, and in the context of the wider security architecture in play. So when we discuss Central European security identity and transatlanticism, our starting point should be the overall security landscape of Europe. But before we look at the post-cold war Central-European security issues, we must also examine the term transatlanticism – or Atlanticism – as well. Atlanticism is rooted in shared values and ideas common in both sides of the Atlantic, but in a more limited sense, it is a collective goal of European NATO members to ensure US involvement in Europe and safeguard NATO’s position as the cornerstone of European security and defense policy.2

It is rather an orientation, which has its roots in the core elements of the security identity of these countries: geographically located between stronger powers in the middle of Europe, political, economic, military vulnerability from them and – with reference to the first half of the 20th century – from ‘small state competition’. Transatlanticism is above all a security umbrella against the past and future threats, but with it comes the obligation to orient towards Washington’s policies. Nevertheless if we examine the term ‘Atlanticism’ on the

1 The Central European Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1992 by Poland, Hungary and the late Czechoslovakia, later other Southeastern European countries joined the Agreement as well.
whole, it is not – or at least it should not be – just a one way street. Atlanticism means that every member of the North Atlantic community should share the notion that the primary forum for discussing security issues affecting the members of the Alliance is the North Atlantic Council. In this sense Atlanticism could sometimes contradict with the US government’s policies, or at least there could be some doubts about the exact meaning of the term. Not just in the way the Bush administration often neglected NATO, but also when some European members would want more US engagement in Europe than the US government itself – as it is the case with the current Obama administration.

Central Europe in Search for Identity and Security after the Cold War

One of the main common linchpins of Central Europe is the common heritage of the 20th century. A peripheral stance, a buffer zone between great powers and small states with considerable minorities were the basics of the region’s rugged 20th century history. In the first half of the century this resulted in a fragmentation defenseless from Germany, and as WW II was fought and won by the allies, from the Soviet Union. So in the second half of the century, the whole region was forced to remain under the Soviet sphere of influence, with the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance serving as formal legitimizing institutions for the status quo.

The fall of the Berlin wall and the break up of the Soviet Union brought a new chapter in the history of Central Europe. Integration was one of the most important new phenomena, but not just European integration. The whole region was subject to three types of integration, and these processes are still at work: Euroatlantic integration, globalization and national integration3, all three having fundamental impact on security. It is worth reminding us that from 1989, fourteen new states were created from the Baltic – to the Aegean Sea (not counting the Caucasus), and one state, the German Democratic Republic disappeared, and was replaced by a unified Germany. It was mostly a peaceful process, except in the Balkans, where ethnic competition for land resulted in enormous bloodshed. The countries in the region had to cope with the consequences of the three types of integration at once, which was a difficult task. The process transformed the socio-economic landscape, resulting in free markets and free societies, but we have to remind ourselves, that all transformations go along with convulsion

3 P. Tálas, “Kelet-Közép Európa az integrációk szorításában” [Central Eastern Europe within the Grip of Integrations], Német és Biztonság Vol. 1, No. 3 (March 2008).
and costs. For nations, societies under turbulent times, security is especially an important and rare value. The driving force behind the emergence of regional institutions in the early 1990's was this desire for security. The CSCE\textsuperscript{4}, CEFTA, Central-European Initiative, the Visegrad Four—they all contributed to the region's security, but they did not have the potential to fulfill the true needs and aspirations of Central Europe. Although not immediately, but full membership in the EU and NATO became the strategic objectives.

The European Union was seen as the prime tool for modernization, which would bring economic security, social security, the rule of law, and would also contribute to regional security. NATO was seen as the prime guarantee for hard security. With the Balkan wars, the prospect of a destabilized or a re-emerging Russia, and Western-Europe with less pressure on it to restrain its national agendas (especially the unified Germany), keeping America involved institutionally and militarily in Europe developed as a common Central European issue. Transatlanticism became the unquestionable imperative for hard security issues, even overwriting the European agenda. Hence in the 1990's, regional cooperation was primarily seen as an anteroom for EU and NATO membership. The Visegrad Cooperation, launched in 1991 was especially essential in this regard, but for Hungary, it was important for other reasons as well. With the Balkans in turmoil, and Hungary just next to the former Yugoslavian states, the V4 represented a clear detachment from the Balkans. Secondly, nationalism was on the rise in all Eastern European countries, and with nearly 3 million Hungarians living in neighboring countries, it was important for Hungary not to have any form of a revitalized 'small entente' around itself, as between the two world wars.

Although the Visegrad Group played an important political role in the region, it did not evolve into a deeper integration. The prime target for the V4 members was always Brussels, and all of them hoped it could get special deals from the west, and join the elite club first. On the other hand, the western powers

\textsuperscript{4} Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
never really wanted a truly powerful and deep cooperation within its eastern neighbors. Hence Euroatlantic integration became the centers of gravity for Central European politics. It was a long, sometimes frustrating process, and few would have envisioned that the security dimension of the process – NATO accession – would come first. The European Union choose in the early 90’s to deepen the integration first – with the Maastricht Treaty, Schengen Treaty, the euro – and then open its doors to the Eastern neighbors. The prospect of joining the Euroatlantic organizations, the ‘elite club’, was the ultimate common political goal, and was the main driving force for political and economic reforms in the Central and Eastern European region. Hungary was no exception, moreover, it was considered to be a front runner and for some extent a model for other countries in transition.

The Principals of Hungarian Foreign and Security Policy

Considering that the three pillars of Hungarian foreign policy emerged in the new political – security environment: Euroatlantic integration, good neighborhood – relations and the responsibility for Hungarian minorities living in neighborhood countries. Although there was never a formal order between the three principals, Euroatlantic integration was considered to be primus inter pares. According to general understanding – at least in the mainstream political parties –, the EU and NATO membership, with their norms, institutions and tools, were the frameworks in which the other two principles could be fulfilled. The three principles were truly based on consensus, but there was no real agreement on what the core national interests are and how to best promote them within these three pillars in the new political-security environment. One significant heritage of the Kádár-regime has to be mentioned in this respect. Contrary to all the surrounding communist regimes in the neighborhood, which had significant nationalistic agendas, in Hungary the national issue was a taboo. Not just because of the soviet crackdown of the Hungarian revolution and freedom fight of 1956, but more importantly because of the Hungarian minorities living under repression in ‘friendly’ socialist countries. It was extremely difficult after such an era to have a consensus on what are the legitimate and viable national interests, and this debate has not settled yet.

As NATO and EU accession was complete, Hungary found itself in a qualitatively different position. The three main new directions of Hungary’s external relations – as stated in Hungary’s 2007 External Relations Strategy – became Competitive Hungary in the EU, Successful Hungarians in the Region.
and Responsible Hungary in the World.\textsuperscript{5} The naming of the Strategy, external relations instead of foreign policy, represents the complexity of today’s widely interconnected world, in which Hungary, as an EU member, has to operate. This interconnected, multilayered quality of external relations is especially true for the EU, where politics, economics, culture and even hard security issues are present at once, having a deep and decisive impact on the domestic affairs of the member countries. Furthermore all these types of issues are subject to package deals and linkage techniques within the EU decision making process. With the expansion of security-related issues – energy, immigration, ethnic strife, organized crime, climate change – in the last two decades, and with the launch of ESDP, the EU has gained significant relevance in the field of international security. This is important to note for us not just because of the ESDP, which clearly has an influence on security policies in Central Europe as well. Progress or failure in each EU related area inevitably affects other fields, including security. Therefore political and public perceptions about the whole state of the European Union have relevant impact on the security identities of the member states.

This is important because there is considerable delusion in the Hungarian public about the EU for two main reasons. First, the much awaited fast economic development did not occur; in fact, Hungary slipped back in the regional competition considerably in the past six-seven years. Second, the disputes with neighboring countries, especially considering Hungarian minority issues, have not disappeared. Furthermore, the gas disputes between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, to which neither the EU nor NATO could respond effectively, made our remaining vulnerability crystal clear. In result of these developments there is some delusion in the Hungarian public – and to some extent in the political elite as well – about the EU. This is important because in democracies successful

policies – even security policies – can only be built on legitimacy in the long run, which means public support. On the other hand the delusions reemphasized the importance of regional cooperation, especially the V4 within the EU, and to some extent in NATO. As new security threats emerged in the last decade, from energy issues to the reemergence of Russia, it became obvious that the Central and Eastern European countries still have special common interests and concerns within the Alliance and the EU, which often separate them from the old members.

Hungarian Atlanticism and Domestic Politics

As the communist regime crushed and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, Atlanticism became a determining factor in Hungarian foreign policy. This policy had wide range public support, due primarily to the general notion that the US played a constructive and decisive role in defeating the communist regime and helped democratization afterward. From the beginning of the 90’s Atlanticism went hand in hand with Europeanism – European integration – as the main focus of Hungarian foreign policy, regardless of the color of the governments. In 1997 the Hungarian citizens overwhelmingly (85%) voted in favor of NATO membership, although only 49% participated at the referendum. NATO accession on March 12, 1999 was considered a joint success of the four successive governments from 1990. The first real baptism of fire concerning Atlanticism was the Kosovo war, which broke out just days after accession ceremonies. Hungary was the only NATO member bordering the then still Yugoslavia, with 300,000 ethnic Hungarians living in Vojvodina. Despite these difficult circumstances, the conservative government led by Viktor Orbán, held on to its support of the military campaign. Public opinion about the war in Hungary was not as unambiguous, and the opposition’s unconditional support seemed faltering at times, but on the whole, Hungary’s Atlanticist stance was strengthened by the war and through Hungary’s contribution in KFOR later on.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks both, the government as well as the opposition highlighted their solidarity with the US, and were very supportive in implementing Article V of the Washington Treaty. But the date also marked the beginning of a more complicated relationship between the US and the conservative Hungarian government. On September 10, 2001 the government decided to modernize the Hungarian air force with Swedish SAAB Gripen planes instead of US F-16s, and obviously the decision did not delight the US administration. The far reaching and more important element was the Hungarian public’s growing skepticism about the Bush administrations
unilateral foreign policy, especially the war on terror and its Middle East policy. On the domestic political scene, the Hungarian right was always more open to a critical view of US foreign policy, not least because of the general opinion that US governments had rather preferred the political left and the liberals from the late 1980’s. The main reasons for this were the perceptions that the political right was considered to conduct a more confrontational foreign policy with neighboring countries, it was more critical towards neoliberal economic policies favored by Washington, and the Hungarian left and liberal elite had closer relations and similar world view with not just the liberal ‘establishment’, but also the neoconservatives. The domestic split was further strengthened during the Iraqi war; the right, by then in opposition, publicly criticized the Prime Minister for signing the ‘Letter of Eight’. But the opposition’s argument was that it opposed the Bush-administrations policy because it pushed aside the Atlantic framework, therefore in this interpretation, it was the US which undermined Atlanticism. Nevertheless Hungarian politics about the Iraqi war was noticed in Washington as well, but as a Central European county, this had only limited political importance in both capitals.

The bigger and more far reaching challenge for Hungary and its transatlantic relations is Russia. If we are to examine today’s common security challenges of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia is obviously a top priority. It has the largest territory, the biggest population, the largest standing army and the most nuclear weapons in Europe, it is the number one gas exporter with the largest natural gas reserves in the world – and it is just next door to Central Europe. As Russia reemerged with the help of the booming petrol prices in the last seven – eight years, the leaders of the Kremlin became eager to keep and expand some of their lost influence in Russia’s neighborhood. The primary tool for promoting their interests is the energy weapon, but financial investments in strategic companies are important as well. Furthermore, as the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 showed, Moscow is willing to use its military power as well, if according to their calculations, vital interests are at stake.

Perceptions about the new Russian expansion is not homogeneous not just in Europe, but in Central Europe as well. In this respect, the overall Hungarian view on Russia lies somewhere in the middle. The society and political parties are not as united on this question as in the Baltic or Poland. The conservative view is more skeptical, partly due to the anti-communist past, and especially to the memories of 1956. We have to note this does not mean by far the left is

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6 The letter, in supportive of US policy against Iraq, appeared in the Times newspaper on January 30, 2003, and was signed by eight European Prime Ministers.
pro-Russian in general only that it is usually more cooperative and open towards it.

Hungary is one of the most vulnerable countries in Europe from Russian energy exports. Over 80% of the gas import comes from Russia, through one county, Ukraine, and through one pipeline. With energy issues emerging as a strategic issue in European affairs, the socialist Hungarian government also began to look for ways to ease this vulnerability. From the second half of 2006, Hungarian-Russian relations began to intensify and deepen. With the Hungarian government openly backing Russia’s Blue Stream pipeline, while referring once to the Nabucco pipeline as a ‘dream-world’, Russian-Hungarian relations seemed to get too warm for many in the US government. By the year 2006-2007, the Bush administration’s neo-containment policy against the reemerging Russia was beginning to take shape, with the promotion of Ukraine and Georgia towards NATO and the missile defense issue on the front line. In substance Hungarian-Russian cooperation did not bring any strategic breakthroughs concerning energy pipelines. In fact, the core of the problem is that Hungary has never been and never will be in a position to determine energy security for itself alone, and far from that of the whole region. It is worth mentioning that Germany, Italy or Austria signed much more significant energy deals with Russia in the same years.

But political declarations and perceptions do matter; therefore US-Hungarian relations cooled down by the end of the Bush presidency. Moreover, the Hungarian government’s position on Ukrainian and Georgian MAP membership and the South Ossetian war was much closer to the German or French position, contrary to Washington’s views. It was the conservative opposition which stressed for a strong Atlanticist policy against Russia’s growing influence, from energy security to NATO enlargement. The logic behind this policy was, and will remain to be not just fears about Russia, but also regional cooperation.

All the other Central European countries, along with the Baltic states, represented a much more anti-Russian policy in recent years, and Hungary seemed to loll out of the line at times. One noticeable example for this took place before the Bucharest summit in 2008, when ten NATO members – including
the other Visegrad countries – wrote an open letter to the NATO secretary general in support of Ukrainian and Georgian MAP membership, but Hungary was not in the group.7 It is true that all the mainstream political parties have emphasized the importance of the V4 from the beginning of the 1990’s, but the most successful period of the V4 was during the conservative government between 1998 and 2002. Of course there are various reasons for this, and not just Hungarian politics come into play, but one important factor is that the Hungarian right tends to give greater emphasis on the traditional friendship between Hungary and Poland. Indeed, the relations between Warsaw and Budapest were especially cold during the administration of the Kaczynski twins, in March 2006 the Polish president was not even hosted by Prime Minister Gyurcsány while on a visit in Hungary, which was quite unusual in light of the two countries historic relations. We can suggest that if the conservatives form a government after the elections in 2010, Hungarian-Polish cooperation will strengthen.

With the arrival of the Obama administration, the Hungarian government’s policy suddenly converged with US regional policy, but in reality the change was much more in Washington. The resetting of relations with Russia, the more cautious approach about Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership represented a shift from the previous administration’s policy, which was favored especially by Poland and the Baltic states. Nevertheless, the replacement of Prime Minister Gyurcsány with Gordon Bajnai in 2009 also brought some changes, with the new Hungarian cabinet being more critical towards Russian policies in the region, especially regarding not fully transparent Russian investments in strategic Hungarian companies. With the political right likely to win next spring, a pragmatic relationship based on common economic interest is likely to be the most we can expect from Hungarian-Russian relations.

As for the future relationship between Washington and Budapest, we can expect continuance in general. The current opposition is also committed to Alliance responsibilities, including the Hungarian participation in the Afghan mission. Concerning security issues in general relations, it will likely remain good, the more problematic fields could be in economic policies – the control of budget deficits and debt in accordance with the IMF agreement – and perhaps political – largely symbolic – disputes with neighboring countries about Hungarian minority issues. But the conservatives will have a new kind of domestic difficulty with the strengthening of the far right. There will be a significant opposition who

will demand the harsher promotion – whatever that may mean – of national interests from economic policies to security issues, including issues affecting transatlantic relations.

Prospects for Central European Security Identity

The future of Central European security will much depend on NATO’s future. The debates surrounding the new strategic concept highlight the divisions within the alliance. If we look at recent developments in NATO, we can see that basically the members can be separated into three groups. There is a ‘status quo’ group with France and Germany in the lead, who would keep the Alliance a regional defense organization with limited roles. The reformists, primarily the United States, would like to have an Alliance with a global perspective and global tasks, in accordance with the global US strategy. The third group, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, would like to revitalize the traditional anti-Russian stance of NATO. The members in the third group are in a somewhat paradox situation. Since these are Eastern European countries with less interest in global affairs than even Western European nations, they are the least interested in a globally active Western Alliance. Nevertheless because of their vulnerability, they rely much more on US security guarantees, hence they need to accommodate better with Washington’s policies. This could also mean accepting there is less attention from Washington. As it is noticeable from the Obama administration, the Central and Eastern European region is not any more in the focus of US foreign policy, and this trend will likely strengthen in the coming years. The US would like to see these countries as reliable, mature partners, who share their part of the burden – and this also means having a greater responsibility in strengthening their own defense capabilities. With the United States increasingly focusing on other parts of the globe, while the EU making another important step with the Lisbon Treaty, and Eastern members of the Union accommodating ever more to European structures, there might be some new thoughts on the ‘European security option’ in Central Europe.

Here it is worth a look back to the development of the European security identity in the past twenty years, which was born under the umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance. The experiment to redefine the European security with a larger

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European role emerged in the framework of European Security and Defense Identity. It wanted to strengthen the European pillar of NATO with the revitalization of the Western European Union, which was an instrument and an institutional framework for both NATO and the EU’s CFSP. NATO could provide the necessary military capabilities, the EU could conduct a mission on its own. But with the incompetence and failure of the European powers in the Balkan wars, the major European nations – including Great-Britain – finally agreed to do more. They launched the Saint Malo process in 1998, which quickly materialized in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Although the ESDI framework died, the main design was copied to the ESDP and to the Berlin Plus agreement signed by EU and NATO in 2003. The institutional framework achieved is far from perfect, and political strains are still present due foremost to Turkey’s opposition, but the main reason the ESDP and Berlin Plus is slowly progressing is simply the lack of capabilities. Mutual interests and common political will is not enough to project power; capabilities are essential too.

The disputes about burden sharing within NATO are as old as the alliance itself. The accession of Central and Eastern European countries made the defense budget gaps even wider, and the current financial crisis will likely affect European budgets more than the Pentagon’s. But in times of crisis there should be more room for cooperation: joint investments, integrated capability developments, national specializations. Furthermore in these practical aspects the European dimension, foremost the European Defense Agency (EDA) should play a larger role, but within these EU structures, regional co-operations as well should strengthen. There are certainly huge obstacles currently in front of this prospect, one obviously is that Central Europeans are in lack of resources, even much more than Western allies, therefore they are more likely to cooperate with richer partners. But without steps taken in this direction, common regional security will just remain in theory. Nevertheless the building of relations, interdependencies and trust in the field of security and defense could have a positive spillover affect into politically more delicate fields, similarly to the history of European integration. A common security identity will not emerge just from political statements and institutional frameworks, but from common work, sacrifices and shared responsibilities.
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Dagmar Popjaková, Martin Plešivčák

Current Character of International Migration

Summary: Migration together with the economic, ecological problems, famine, peace and security, is one of the most recent social phenomena that is affecting with more or less intensity each state. Therefore, in view of its international-political and geographical dimension, it is known as the current global geopolitical problem of the international community. This contribution aims to analyze the current situation of international migration, focusing on an achieved position of its leaders as well as to present a classification of countries in the world based on the relationship of indicators of migration and economic development.

Migration together with the economic, ecological problems, famine, peace and security, is one of the most recent social phenomena that is affecting with more or less intensity each state. Therefore, in view of its international-political and geographical dimension, it is known as the current global geopolitical problem of the international community. This old-new population phenomenon reflects, in its fundamental nature, a tendency of people “to seek adventure together with desire to be elsewhere”; persistent socio-economic disproportion and actual threats in the world.

The present contribution aims to reach two objectives:

a. to analyze the current situation of international migration, focusing on an achieved position of its leaders; and

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b. to present a classification of countries in the world based on the relationship of indicators of migration and economic development.

These leading objectives are embedded within a framework that begins with a short introduction to migration issues.

**Theoretical – Methodological and Empirical Approaches Excursus**

The current definition of limitations, understanding and evaluating the nature, conditions and trends of international migration can be summarized briefly in several points:

- **Migration:** The character of migration in recent years is defined not only by dynamic growth of its volume, but also with the increase of the variations of types of migratory flows, as well as by changes in its regional models. In today’s practice, the traditional general concept of migration\(^2\) of population spatial mobility has a much wider scope. Terms such as circular, family migration, student mobility, and many others are beyond the understanding of migration as a mobility process associated with a definitive change of residence and include a rather more extensive understanding of mobility. Regarding the Salt\(^3\) “growth in diversity of migratory flows challenges the traditional understanding of migration, as contemporary migration flows are dynamic, involve different types of people and motivations, have different meanings and differential

\(^2\) The traditional concept of migration is based on perceptions of migration or population mobility as one of the types of mechanical, i.e. spatial, geographical movement. Unlike the other spatial turbulences, such as commuting to school and work, mobility for services, including tourism and others, is characterized by migration that is associated with the crossing of administrative boundaries, international migration, crossing borders with countries with the goal to remain in the host country. There is absence of a unique definition and types of migration. The problem arises in determining the consistency of the shortest interval, length of stay of people abroad and the reasons and motives of their migration. Today, already classical terminology resource, study of the UN from 1998 “Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration”; [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_58Rev1E.pdf](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_58Rev1E.pdf), includes 50 terms and definitions of international migration. Similarly, the last terminological dictionary of IOM from 2004 “Glossary on Migration”; [http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/IOM-migration-Glossary.pdf](http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/IOM-migration-Glossary.pdf), modulates more terms and expressions, but does not offer a ‘universally valid definition of international migration’, only notes that ‘the definitions of migration are often vague, controversial and full of contradictions’ and so forth.

impacts on source and host countries and are influenced and controlled by various intermediary agencies and institutions”.

- **Migrant** – The above mentioned changes of the nature of migration are directly linked to increasing variations of types of migrants and their migration incentives. Since the 80s there is increased interest in the immigration countries of highly skilled migrants, particularly in the IT field, as well as in the field of so called scarce specific skills, primarily in health (nurses) and science. On the European migration market, a relatively under valuated unqualified number of migrants with handicrafts skills, seasonal workers in agriculture, catering services, etc. who are economically motivated and re-migrate and circulate often as so called ‘false tourists’. The current issue is the social status of immigrants’ children (second generation) and their integration into some European countries as well as the growth of isolated young immigrants, etc.

- **Migration Theories** – The scientific community makes an effort to identify and understand the spatial mobility of people and find its regularity and overview in the form of simplified models. There is no single theory of migration, regarding the significant diversity of the mentioned forms, causes and consequences of migration. Nevertheless, according to Johnston

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4 Inconsistencies and overlapping of categories also affects the classification of migrants. On the other hand, there are exactly selected categories of individuals that do not belong among migrants - tourists, business travelers, diplomats and military personnel posted along with their families, cross-border workers, nomads (see above “Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration”, pp. 17-24). J. Parker gives in his study published in 2005 by the GCIM (see “International Migration Data Collection”; http://www.gcim.org/attachements/TP11.pdf) overview of 22 professional terms commonly used in the practice of international migration to describe migrants from longterm migrants to stateless migrants. Parker’s aim was to present the results of survey which was carried out on a sample of selected worldwide countries in order to accomplish unification of terms and data on international migration.

5 IT – Information technologies. In the 80s, Australia and Canada start to compete for these first highly skilled immigrants in this field; they were followed by the United States during the 80s. Europe until recently has not introduced special measures to recruit highly skilled workers, but now interest in these migrants in the European countries is growing (see G. McLaughlan, J. Salt, “Migration Policies Towards Highly Skilled Foreign Workers”; http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/mobility-identity-and-security/migration-research-unit/pdfs/highly_skilled.pdf, p. 4).


Migration has been successfully incorporated into economic, social theories, spatial analysis and behavioral theories. Among the classic and the most famous migration theories are the following: Ravenstein’s ‘rules of migration’ (1885), Hicks’s neo-classical macroeconomic theory (1932), Zipf’s ‘gravity model’ (1949), Lee’s theory ‘push-pull factors’ (1966), etc.

- **Migration Recording** – The movement of population is not always easily objectively controllable, and by records and statistics are difficult to apprehend. States do not have completely effective tools and methods of evidence. Available data which are used as a basis for the evaluation of migration are inconsistent, incorrect, and dependent mainly on the opportunity of different countries to collect actual data, methods of collecting and processing methodologies. OECD statistical practice and its efforts to harmonize national databases summarized the two most popular categories of migrants (allocation based on the criterion of nationality and place of birth):
  1. immigrants as persons born outside the host country, and
  2. foreigners, e.g. persons having the nationality of the country of origin but may have been born in the host country.

- The other current key topics include migration – supervision or migration management and migration policy, asylum seekers and refugees, migrants for work and remittances, integration of migrants, factors affecting emigration, re-emigration, repeated migration etc.

- **Migration without Borders** – The migration of the 19th century until World War I was characterized by almost absolute extent of free movement across borders. Twentieth century political developments as well as political decisions of countries, brought regulation and limitation that often were impulse to migration. In recent years, with respect to human rights and immigrant rights, we encounter certain renaissance ideas concerning ‘migration without borders’. Although, that today those ideas within a global scale have a utopian nature (in difference to the regional scale, we encounter with a tangible example of their implementation – mobility within the

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European Schengen area), the world with further globalization and opening of societies will not avoid what are likely developments in this direction.12

Data Sources and Methodology

The selection of data sources were based on criteria of reliability of the source, objectivity, and time of data compatibility, and consecutive data actuality. In the first part of the present study, data was used on the number of migrants13 and the extent of the migration balance14 for the years 1990-2005 in five-year intervals. The number of migrants15 is one of the basic indicators of migration. The sources defined a number of immigrants as the sum of all immigrants, respectively, foreigners, people who are born within the borders of the current country, including refugees and asylum seekers. Background data on the number

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12 At the European demographic conference Classification and Geography of European Mass Migration that took place in Milan in 1995 it was presented and later on was also made available on the UN Information Network on Population (POPIN), the report of R. Münz, in which he mentioned, among other things, that “spatial mobility is a fundamental feature of an open society ... and that democratic societies advocate the democratic right of citizens to choose freely their place of living”. Initiatives of the rights of migrants that are directly related to the right of free movement of persons, are already known from the time after World War I, when was established in 1919 International Labor Organization (ILO), with the goal to protect migrants. In 2003 was adopted The UN International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Labor Migrants and Their Families after 13 years of launching its ratification [see A. Pécoud, P. de Guchteneire, "Migration, Human Rights and the United Nations: An Investigation into the Low Ratification Record of the UN Migrant Workers Convention"; http://www.gcim.org/gmp/Global%20Migration%20Perspectives%20No%203.pdf]. During this period, the UN and UNESCO published several studies on the free movement of persons. The last was the text book from 2007 [in 2009 in Russian mutation] published book Migration Without Borders. Essays on the Free Movement of People [see A. Pécoud, P. de Guchteneire [eds] Migracii bez granic. Essje o svobodnom peredviženiji ludej; http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001557/155779R.pdf]. This publication is actually a kind of scenario of migration without borders. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the free migration of many aspects.


15 The indicator ‘number of migrants’ in the above mentioned sources identified as ‘migrant stock’ is identical to the above-mentioned categories of migrants ‘foreign borns’ and thus from a global perspective represents the volume of migration, i.e. the number of migrants. From the perspective of individual states that figure actually reflects the number of immigrants. In the text, the contribution in this sense has common characteristics with the use of migrants and immigrants or foreigners.
of immigrants is based mostly on a national census that is usually conducted within a ten-year interval and has been recalculated and estimated by various statistical methods (interpolation and extrapolation) on July 1 of that year.\footnote{16} Migration balance (or net migration) is generally defined as the difference in the number of immigrants (people that enter a country) and emigrants (people that leave a country) for a given administrative territorial unit in a particular year or during a specific period of time. If the number of immigrants is over the number of emigrants, we are talking about the positive, otherwise the negative migration balance. An indicator of crude rate of net migration is actually a calculation of the migration balance per 1,000 inhabitants. Nation Master’s migration balance data has been calculated for the period of 1990-2005. In the case of indicator, the rate of net migration has been used as a source in the latest published facts for 2007. The second part of this report is based on a simple comparison of two types of data – migration balance, calculated per 1,000 inhabitants and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for 2007 processed by the International Monetary Fund.\footnote{17}

**International Migration after 1990 and its Leaders**

Assessment of migration based on the number of migrants. The number of migrants worldwide has a growing trend. Since 1990 (155 million migrants) to 2005 (191 million migrants) the number has been increased by nearly one quarter in the absolute representation by 36 million people. (Table 1) Migrants are currently involved in 3% of the total world population (in 1960 their share was at 2.5%). The intensity of growth in the number of migrants varies. Compared to the 60’s of the last century, when the recorded increase was about 4% for the five-year period, the number of migrants has increased almost twice as fast over the next 15 years. At the turn of the 70s and the 80s, this increase was, on average, three times higher than during the mentioned 60s. However, the highest increase in the number of migrants was in the early 90s. The growth index 1990/1985 reached 40%, which means the absolute increase in the number of migrants was nearly 44 million over five years. The greatest impact (almost 3/4 of the total number of migrants) on this radical change was made


Table 1. Trends in the Migration Stock for Selected Countries and Regions, 1990-2005

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>23,251</td>
<td>28,522</td>
<td>34,803</td>
<td>38,355</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>3,212</td>
<td>141.5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5,062</td>
<td>9,092</td>
<td>9,803</td>
<td>10,444</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>19,96</td>
<td>2,256</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7,097</td>
<td>7,063</td>
<td>6,947</td>
<td>6,833</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5,907</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>6,277</td>
<td>6,471</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>4,743</td>
<td>4,611</td>
<td>5,136</td>
<td>6,361</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>5,555</td>
<td>6,106</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7,493</td>
<td>6,951</td>
<td>6,271</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>-23.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,753</td>
<td>4,198</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3,984</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>4,097</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6,556</td>
<td>4,077</td>
<td>4,243</td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>-50.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>World 154,945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by ‘the migrants’ from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Under the influence of political and social changes at the turn of the decade – 1980s to 1990s, the collapse of some states of the socialist block has occurred in this region. Mainly, within the new successor states of the former Soviet Union, as well as within Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, millions of people found themselves in the category of migrants without changing their place of residence.

The spatial allocation of migrants in the world is unequal. As it appears on Map 1 and in Table 1, most migrants are concentrated in Europe and North America. The next region with an increased concentration of migrants is the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. Also thanks to the significance of the above mentioned migrants that are registered in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the largest part, one third of the world’s immigrants (34%) live in Europe. At the same time, Europe’s share in the number of immigrants is still slightly increasing. Similarly, the share of North America in the total number of migrants is increasing, particularly since 18% in 1990 to 23% in 2005. Australia and Oceania, along with North America are dominant in terms of the proportion of immigrants in autochthonous population, where immigrants create more than one tenth of their population. The development of spatial differentiation of migrants is moving towards increasing the share of the economically superior part of the world in the number of migrants. In 1995, the number of migrants in developed countries [even without the USSR successor states] for the first time exceeded the number of migrants in developing countries. In developed countries in 2005 there were 94 million migrants, which was 24 million more than 70 million in the developing world. Considering that in Asia and Africa one-fifth to one-sixth of the total number of migrants consists of refugees, whose limited conditions of mobility are enabling them to move only to short geographical distances, that in the global scale leads to an increase of migration flows into the economically strongest regions, and therefore movements in the direction from South to North and also from East to West.

Leaders of migration, in terms of number of migrants (Table 1), can be divided into several groups. First are the traditional immigration countries, where the number of immigrants and foreigners continues to grow after 1990. The dominant position among them is the U.S.A. whose share of the world’s number of migrants is growing progressively. While in 1990 this share was 15% (in 1960 13%) in 2005 this share is increased up to 20%, what therefore

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19 Without successor states of the former Soviet Union.
Map 1. International Migration Stock and Ratio of Immigrants on Population of States of the World (December 31, 2005)
means, that currently one-fifth of registered migrants in the world live in the USA. At the same time, an expanded gap is noticed in the number of U.S. migrants compared to the other world leaders. In Canada and especially in Australia, the states that also belong to the group of so called ‘traditional immigration countries’ the number of migrants is growing at a slower rate than in the U.S.A. Another group of migration leaders is represented by European states, whose number of migrants grew gradually in the 20 century and especially after the Second World War particularly in Germany, France and Great Britain. Regarding the increasing adoption of legislative restrictions on immigration at the beginning of the 1970s, the number of immigrants in France since 1990, grew relatively slowly. In contrast, in Germany during the observed period, the number of migrants grew very dynamically (70% growth), much more intensive than in Great Britain (44%). This was affected not only by immigration of ethnic Germans after the fall of the Iron Curtain, predominantly from the territory of the former Soviet Union, as well as Poland and Romania, but also by opening up the German labor market for Central and Eastern Europe, the immigration of highly skilled IT workers for example from India, increased number of refugees and illegal migrants.\textsuperscript{20} In a case of further so called ‘new’ European migration leaders in terms of the number of migrants – Spain, Italy, we can follow their transformation from typical emigration countries, especially till 1973, to immigration host countries, where a dramatic increase in the number of migrants, mainly from North Africa (in the case of Spain more than a five time increase in the number of migrants during the period 1990-2005), ranks them among the countries with the largest number of immigrants in the world. Russia, Ukraine as well as Kazakhstan also represented a group of leaders in the terms of number of migrants who, as it is mentioned above, affiliated into this category after the political and social changes after 1990. Among the states with the largest and also with the growing number of migrants, mainly labor migrants from Arabian and also from neighboring countries from South and East Asia, are the Asian economically developed countries Israel\textsuperscript{21} and Hong Kong\textsuperscript{22} and two representatives from the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, in which case the immigration is related to their economic redevelopment after the war in the Persian Gulf, that is based on crude oil exploitation and processing. An independent group of leaders in terms of numbers of migrants is comprised of those states where the

\textsuperscript{20} V. Öezcan Germany: Immigration in Transition. (Berlin: Social Science Centre Berlin, 2004).
\textsuperscript{21} In case of Israel, we refer to the above-mentioned migrants (‘foreign borns’), mainly originating from Palestine and Russia.
\textsuperscript{22} From July 1, 1997 Special Administrative Region of China.
number of migrants decreases. Either decreases by reducing the number of refugees, to which they provide refuge, by returning to their countries of origin\(^\text{23}\) (in the cases of Pakistan and India mainly by refugees returning to Afghanistan). Or declining by natural, relatively progressive reduction of the high number of foreigners (for decades, not only after 1990), who became refugees after the political changes or changes in setting of the state boundaries (for example, India and others).

Developed regions in 2005 show a several times higher proportion of migrants in the population (9.5\%) as the developing regions (1.4\%). Within the continents, Australia and Oceania is known for the highest number of migrants in regards to the number of the population (15.2\%, which means that almost every seventh inhabitant of Australia and Oceania is an immigrant), followed by North America (13.5\%) and Europe (8.8\%). Other continents are below average of even 2\% of migrants to the autochthonous population (Map 1).

Comparing the countries in the world, the highest extent of immigrants has been represented by the states with low populations. More than 70\% of the population is foreigners in dwarf countries – Andorra, Monaco, also in Qatar, United Arab Emirates. Approximately 40\% of the population of the country is migrants in Singapore, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel and Luxembourg. In Saudi Arabia, it’s more than a quarter [every fourth resident of Saudi Arabia is a foreigner] in Switzerland more than a fifth [one in five Swiss is an immigrant], etc. A consistently high proportion of foreigners in the population is showed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, the African states Gabon and Libya. After 1990, these are followed by the successor states of the former Soviet Union, but their presence also starts to grow in other European countries, Germany, Ireland, Austria and Spain. On the contrary, a greater number of foreigners, in particular African and Asian countries neighboring with countries with momentary conflicts, have temporary character. For comparison, Table 1 is introduced to show the situation in Slovakia regarding the number of migrants. Slovakia is a type of country that

\(^{23}\) The so-called return migration or re-emigration.
does not participate in the global migration processes in a significant way. Compared with other countries, the share of migrants in their own population (2.3\%) is still maintained at a relatively low level.

Assessment of migration based on the migration balance. Migration balance is an indicator that further specifies whether the country by the migration is gaining or losing a number of inhabitants. This indicates whether in the current year or in a specific period of time is dominated by the migration flows into the country from abroad over the migration flows from the country to abroad, and whether the country enjoys a positive balance of migration, whether the country is gaining population through migration, i.e. so called immigration or, on the contrary, has a negative balance, whether the country is losing population through migration, i.e. so called emigration. By comparing immigration and emigration flows of individual states, the world from the global point of view is divided into two parts – North, gaining due to migration, with the characteristic positive migration balance and South, losing population due to migration, with the negative balance of net migration. Most of Latin America, Africa and especially South and Southeast Asia, as well as Eastern Europe, were creating the regions with negative migration balance, i.e. the regions with the highest emigration flow. On the other hand, Northern America, Australia, Western and Northern Europe and Gulf countries are typical immigration regions.

In assessing the level of net migration of countries worldwide in 2005 world leaders can be divided into several groups. The absolute value of net migration increase is again achieved by the most developed countries in the world – United States of America (with almost 1.16 million migrants), Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, also France, which for several decades belong to the typical immigration countries. After 1990, Spain and Italy are increasingly approaching them. The second group of countries that is gaining the most due to net migration in absolute terms is represented by the Gulf States – United Arab Emirates, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, until 2005 Saudi Arabia as well. The third group is consisted of economically less developed countries, whose position among the world leaders is 'short term', developed as a reflection of unstable economic and political situations in a particular country and acute threat. Often times it is military conflict that forces a population to abandon the conflict area and seek refuge abroad during the first phase of development of an acute migration event – statistically, this phenomenon is followed by the inclusion of that country into the group of leaders with a negative net migration. In a second development phase, after the end of conflict, the above mentioned re-emigration occurs, the return of refugees to their home country – again this phenomenon is reflected in the statistics in a manner that the country appears among the leaders with a positive migration balance. Within statistics “receiving countries” are exposed
in the opposite position, first as migration gainers and after the conflict ends they show a migration loss. In 2005, the third mentioned group of countries with a positive migration balance included Afghanistan, Sierra Leone (later on followed by Eritrea, Chad). In 2000 there was Rwanda with nearly 400 thousand migrants, Liberia as well. In 1990, there were Malawi, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Uganda, etc. On the contrary, this group with the highest level of negative balance in 2005 was represented by Sudan, followed by Tanzania and partially Pakistan. In 2000 were Congo, Burundi, Afghanistan, in 1990 – Afghanistan, Mozambique, Somalia. Another group of leaders in absolute migration increase or decrease are states of the former Soviet Union, which can be related to moving and resettlement of population among these countries whether in the past, within internal migration, or currently within foreign migration, in which in absolute numbers predominates Russians returning for various reasons from the former Soviet republics, mainly from Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (negative balance) to Russia (positive balance). The group of states with traditionally the highest absolute migration outflow, i.e. with the highest absolute decline in population are Mexico, China, also India, the Philippines and Egypt. After 1990 it includes more intensely Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, followed by few Latin American countries as Peru and Ecuador. The named countries are traditionally countries of emigration. Emigration from these countries is usually associated with a desire or necessity of their population to find work abroad or a better quality of life than in their home country. Slovakia is officially, regarding mentioned sources, showing low level of net migration per 1,000 immigrants.

Regarding a relative indicator of net migration, i.e. the calculation of the migration balance per 1,000 inhabitants of the country, similarly as an indicator of the number of migrants, the highest value is reached by states with small populations. Long term strong migration gainers are United Arab Emirates (in 2007 showed 26 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants), Kuwait (16), Qatar (13), San Marino (11), Singapore and Monaco (after 8), Luxembourg (7 immigrants per 1000 inhabitants), etc. Regarding the re-emigration in recent years, relatively high positive values are reached by Liberia (29 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants in 2007), Bosnia and Herzegovina (10), Burundi (7), Botswana (5).
On the other hand, except for negligibly the smallest states, the group with relatively highest negative net migration, in calculation of emigrants per 1000 inhabitants, consists of Jamaica (7 emigrants per 1000 inhabitants in 2005), Guyana (6), Albania (5), Iran (4), Mexico (4), but also former Soviet republics - Armenia (5), Georgia (4), Kazakhstan, Estonia, Turkmenistan (about three emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants), etc. After 2004, the relative high migration loss has Saudi Arabia (6), in 2007, Mali (6), Congo (3), and Gabon (3). The value of this indicator for the Slovak Republic is at 0.3‰ for 2007.

Classification of the Worldwide Countries based on Migration

Presented classification, is based on a simple comparison of migration and economic power of states, allocates group of states with identical parameters of selected indicators, i.e. net migration and gross domestic product (GDP) for the year 2007 calculated per the number of inhabitants. Its objective is to offer a generalized overview of countries sorted according to the nature of foreign migration. Represents just one of several prepared documents, which in the next stage of research shall assist to profound analysis of the types of international migration.

The first step in the evaluation of 180 countries worldwide has been to determine the average values of these indicators. The average of positive net migration crude rate for 101 countries was at 2.6 ‰, the crude rate average for the remaining 79 states, which in 2007 showed a negative net migration, was – 2.9 ‰. Conversion of GDP is based on an average of 1,000 USD per capita for each state. By comparing the size of the indicators due to their average value, six types of states were created (Chart 1). In the first four types were included those countries which showed a positive value of the crude rate of net migration, i.e. states that are dominated by immigration flows. They were distinguished by the intensity of immigration (above the average – type I and type II states, and below the average – type III and IV, immigration rate) and based on the economic power of states (above the average – type I and III, and below the average – type II and IV, GDP per capita).

From the above mentioned follows that within the type I are countries with high rates of positive net migration (net immigration) and a high value of GDP, type II is a combination of the above-average intensity of immigration, the below-average GDP, type III of low net immigration rate, high GDP, type IV of low rate of net immigration and low GDP, for all types per capita. The last two types – V and VI are represented by states with prevailing net emigration, i.e., negative net migration, similar to the distinction between the first types, depending on
whether the aforementioned economic indicator (GDP/per capita) has been achieved in individual states above average or below-average levels, and hence specific combination of high intensity of emigration and high GDP constitutes type V, the combination of net emigration rate and low GDP constitutes last type VI.

Type I, characterized by intensive immigration and high levels of GDP, consists of 20 states (Table 2). Among them are the most developed countries in the world with the long-term highest absolute numbers of foreigners (U.S., Germany, Canada, UK, Australia, etc), further together with them are the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuwait, Brunei, i.e. countries, which in addition to the mentioned attributes stand with an extremely high proportion of immigrants (foreigners) regarding the autochthonous population, in their case is also of significant predominance of the labor migrants. Today, within type I are some less populated, economically developed countries of Western and Northern Europe, which are not among the leaders of migration in terms of
the number of migrants, but which show a relatively high proportion of migrants rather immigrants converted to their population number; i.e. Luxembourg, Switzerland, etc. The average rate of migration of these countries in 2007 was more than 5 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants. The average level of GDP with more than 41,000 U.S. dollars per capita makes this type of states economically the strongest among the six selected types.

Countries included in type II stand high above-average levels of positive migration balance (14.7 migrants per 1,000 population) and low levels of GDP (less than 3,000 U.S. dollars per capita). It’s the least numerous and the least stable countries allocated by type of migration, resulting in a high fluctuation rate of economically poor countries within it. These states have either been previously places of conflict with a huge number of immigrants - refugees, returning during the following period to their countries of origin [the country with the return migration], or the countries bordering with countries of conflict, in which the refugees are given the refuge for the specific period of time. Examples of such countries in 2007 are the Maldives, Congo, Liberia, also Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. Stable representatives of this category are the two states, Jordan and South Africa, which, although are not among the economically powerful countries, has been for a longer period among immigration countries.

In the third type of countries with a relatively low-level of immigration (1‰) and the second highest GDP per capita allocated among the selected types is a group of 21 countries. These are mostly European countries. Some of them are traditionally immigration countries, where in recent years however, the intensity of net immigration is kept just below the average level [for example France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway]. In recent years some countries like Spain and Italy, cross to the group of immigration leaders’ countries, but regarding the lower proportion of immigrants in the number of their population could no longer be included in type I. Other European countries are an example of countries that formally recognized the positive migration balance, but does not participate and do not affect international migration too strongly. These, beside Slovakia, include - Slovenia, Finland, Hungary, also Czech Republic, Malta, and Austria. From non-Europe countries in this type are Japan, Libya etc.

More than 4/5 states in types IV, V and VI are economically undeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. These are states that either does not contribute significantly to global migration processes, does not gain benefit from the relatively low intensity of immigration (that, on very low average level of 0.1‰, is reported only by states in type IV) or are the states which significantly affect international migration flows, however belong among the above mentioned emigration countries that ‘produce migrants’ and by that lose population due to migration and in the wider context lose the overall social potential.
Table 2: Types of the World States by Net Migration and by GDP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of States, Representants**</th>
<th>Net Migration Rate (‰)</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>20 States – Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands, UK, USA, Canada, Australia, United Arab Emirates, Germany, Singapore, Kuwait, Brunei, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Greece, Israel, Portugal, Antigua and Barbuda.</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>41,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>9 States – Maldives, Congo, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Jordan, Botswana, South Africa, Rwanda.</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>21 States – Italy, Malta, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Croatia, France, Iceland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Taiwan, Bahrain, Oman, Cyprus, Slovakia, Libya, Japan.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>31,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>51 States – Angola, Gambia, Costa Rica, Namibia, Belarus, Serbia, Sudan, Russia, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Nepal, Togo, Mozambique, Cambodia, Laos, Kenya, Senegal, Mauritania, Yemen, Cameroon, Syria, Thailand, Belize, Lebanon, Argentina, Malaysia, Turkey, Chile, abbrev. Guinea, Ethiopia, India, and others</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>10 States – Qatar, Barbados, Poland, Latvia, Korea, the Bahamas, Lithuania, Estonia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>21,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>69 States – Brazil, Nigeria, Ukraine, Romania, Egypt, Algeria, China, Pakistan, Peru, Morocco, Bolivia, Venezuela, Indonesia, Moldova, Tajikistan, the Philippines, Ecuador; Guinea, Chad, Uzbekistan, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Iran, Mexico, Armenia, Georgia, Albania, Mali, Jamaica, Montenegro, Zimbabwe, and others</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>3,246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* all dates relate to 2007; ** states ranked from highest to lowest Net Migration
Within the large group of 51 countries allocated in type IV, whose economic power [an average of 2.4 thousand U.S. dollars] is the lowest among the six categories are represented only by a few European countries of the former socialist bloc for example Belarus, Serbia, Russia, which find themselves in this group of states due to its relatively low economic level. Of these, particularly Russia by the nature of migration indicators is closer to type III. The group of small number of countries in category V is the most bizarre or the most controversial, which although may be included in the economically developed countries, but nevertheless are typical with emigration of its population. This category is represented by some of the former socialist European countries (Poland and Baltic countries) and two Gulf States, which only in recent years experienced rapid emigration (Saudi Arabia, Qatar), etc. Typical emigration countries are represented in type VI. These countries have very numerous (69 states) populations and regarding the other parameters of varied groups, are economically underdeveloped countries. This category includes states with the long-term highest rate of negative net migration count and population decline such as Mexico, China, Indonesia, Philippines, as well as states with the highest numbers of refugees or immigrants due to acute or military threat and, unstable socio-political situations (Pakistan, Iran, Zimbabwe further; Montenegro, Guyana, Jamaica, Mali, etc.). A separate subgroup is the Eastern and Central Asian republics of the former USSR and among European countries are Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.

**Conclusion**

Migration conceived in general, and particularly international migration is a social phenomenon that is a very complex and multi caused. At the same time, this social phenomenon is often dramatic and sensitive due to the position of individuals in the migration process and due to the position of societies in interested countries. Currently this is a category that is not comprehensively politically and strategically incorporated, regulated by legislation, objectively documented in statistics and always expertly managed, as well. Despite these limits and obvious problems there is still active interest in the regulation of migration and possible impact on the complexity of its surrounding conditions. This is indicated by the great number of experts, scientific, administrative and executive personnel, professional organizations and associations, specialized non-governmental and governmental institutions on regional, national, international level, whose agenda is migration and the outcomes are specific materials, programs, projects and activities in this area.
On the global scale, it can be talked about the great variability of the intensity of migration, in either temporal or spatial terms or in terms of causes and consequences of spatial population movements. The intensity of international migration has a long-term upward trend. During the period 1960-2005 the number of migrants increased by 115 million individuals, which represents an average annual increase of more than 2%. But what further enhances the severity and acuteness of finding a solution for this global challenge is that from a short-term perspective the number of migrants in recent years has been growing rapidly. After the 1990s the world average annual number of migrants rose by 2.4 million, while the growth index gradually increased their number from 4% (1990/1985) to 8% (2005/2000).

However, the most dynamic increase of the number of migrants was since the early 90s (40%), which was influenced by the opening and connecting of the regions in Central and Eastern Europe to the migration processes, as well as changing the registration of internal to foreign migrants, due to disintegration of some former socialist countries in the region during that period.

As a result of differences in particular the pace of economic development of individual continents and countries and regions within them, is spatially imbalanced distribution of migrants worldwide. The majority of migrants are concentrated in Europe and North America, whereas in Europe that has changed after the Second World War or mainly from the 70s, where typical emigration into the immigration continent, live up to third world immigrants. States with the highest number of migrants, foreigners in 2005 were the U.S. (38 million), Russia (12 million), and Germany (10 million).

Although, most of the international migration takes place between neighboring countries, within the regions, migration towards developed countries is increasing continually. The trend in global development is moving toward strengthening the position of the economically developed countries of the world in the number of migrants. In 2005, in developed countries lived 94 million, in developing countries 70 million migrants. In Asia and Africa refugees create one fifth or one sixth of the total number of migrants. They are the continents with the highest concentration of military-political conflicts and humanitarian crises (famine, drought, natural disasters), a large number of refugees is therefore the logical consequence.

Although, the official number of migrants has increased three times since 1990 in Slovakia, the values of variables reflecting the country’s involvement in international migration have been for a long term at a low level.
In recent decades, have been identified flows of migrants in particular directions from south to north and from east to west, which corresponds to the well-known theory of unequal development of the rich north (plus Australia) and the poor South, in terms of Europe developed West and emerging East. This is also confirmed by presented classification of States based on migration balance. The long-term monitoring of migratory flows identified traditional immigration countries with developed forms of democracy and established market economies, which are long-term migration gainers. Furthermore, there is a group of countries in the Persian Gulf, which became the host countries of migrants in particular; their economic power is based on one sector – the oil industry, but their status as the country of destination may not be sustainable (for example Saudi Arabia). A high share of allochthonous population is shown by a small size, but economically fast-moving world countries, which fully demonstrated the phenomenon of globalization in various aspects, including migration. Opposite to this, losses due to migration are reported mainly by the developing countries of Africa, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia with a number of serious internal and external problems and conflicts, than some countries of Eastern Europe or the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Among the states with the largest number of emigrants are Mexico, China, Pakistan, India, Iran, Indonesia, Philippines, Zimbabwe, Kazakhstan, etc.

As a result of the global economic crisis is the decline in demand for labor migrants from the world’s most developed countries [with the exception of a highly skilled workforce, especially in IT fields], thus considerably reduce the flow of this type of migration at a global scale.

The Slovak Republic does not affect in any substantial way international migration. Although, the official number of migrants has increased three times since 1990 in Slovakia (Table 1), the values of variables reflecting the country’s involvement in international migration have been for a long term at a low level. This is related to the position of Slovakia as a transit country in the process of migration and the lack of an appropriate migration policy and selected migration support. Some trends suggest that Slovakia’s status could change over time. Taking into account differences in the quality of life of individual countries in the world and the migration saturation of the most developed countries or more correctly inevitable good regulation of migration, transit countries of today should in the future be able to actively participate in this process and become destination countries for migrants.
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Finding Common Grounds. Rediscovering the Common Narrative of Turkey and Europe


This is a slim book with a cheerful communicative and ‘inviting’ cover with a sketch of a little dog and a cat. Not entirely those of the famous fairytale by Josef Čapek, but evenly nice and ready to bake their specific cake.

The volume editor, author and ‘soul’ of the whole project, Finding Common Grounds, Lucia Najšlová writes in her introduction that “the common denominator was ‘constructive optimism’ and an effort to deconstruct the clichés…” Before the reader gets to the individual chapters, it may not be entirely clear, what constructive optimism means in relation to the topic that for many years makes a pessimistic and destructive impression. Gradually, however, an essay after essay reader acquires solid ground and begins to understand what Lucia Najšlová meant, and gets completely attracted to the book. Essays – each from a different angle – undermine the walls of prejudices between Europe and Turkey, while doing it easily with humor; and without banging their ideological views on the table or convincing anyone, and particularly the book never says never. Outstanding reading, moreover; it is a recipe that goes beyond the scope of this particular topic.

Let’s have a look at particular chapters, which represent a colorful collection of different perspectives. David Judson, Editor-in-Chief of Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, named his consideration on narration Firing the Imagination in the Narrative Battlespace of Our Age, which he begins in the distant future, when archeologists will look for a “basic narrative of the lost civilization”. This hyperbola is only an introduction and analytically points out “that there are just five ‘narratives’ about Turkey in play in the European media – the Turkish-Kurdish ethnic conflict, the issue of ‘Armenian genocide’, alleged if you ask Turks, a historical fact if you ask Armenians; so-called honor killings of female family members; freedom of expression; and lastly the cultural symbolism of Islam vs. secularism.” And as he stated “this really is the Scrabble board for the 130 or so accredited foreign journalists in Istanbul and 25 in Ankara” (p. 17). But these journalists know that their readers want such cliché, because they live much easier with a ‘stereotyped’ Turkey, than with Turkey, which would be different from the abovementioned anticipation. In other words: they want to
have their phobias confirmed. Does this seem familiar to you? Undoubtedly, this also applies more generally.

Adam Szymański, analyst of a Warsaw-based foreign policy think tank, in his contribution What does the EU Need to Do and What are its Fears?, analytically distinguishes three dimensions of needs and fears – the formal-normative dimension, the political dimension, and the socio-psychological dimension. He congenially agitated the activity of many participants on both sides and in all dimensions.

David Král, from Prague-based foreign policy think-tank Europeum, assesses the Czech EU presidency and Turkey, and asks: is more than the minimum possible? He indicates the limitations of the Presidency which are given not only from the outside but also the possibilities of the Czech Republic in this role. This minimum is to keep the interest and capacity to get things moving in the right direction.

Two authors, Peter Balász (currently on academic leave while serving as the Foreign Minister of Hungary) and Deniz Bingol McDonald (expert on Turkish politics, EU neighborhood policy and related topics), in their piece The EU’s Experiment with Conditionality and Public Opinion Making, deal with the mindset of the public in EU countries regarding EU expansion in general and specifically for Turkey. A noteworthy example in this respect is Austria, a country harboring the most significant public resistance to the enlargement and where an anti-Turkish sentiment is a mandatory part of election campaigns of not only right-wing extremists, but also, in a concealed form within ‘decent’ mainstream parties. Is Austria a barometer or a bellwether for the EU’s willingness to engage in the next stage of enlargement?*, the authors ask and give various reasons for above-average Austrian skepticism, pointing out that in this respect, however, it could be an “outlier” case.

Three Turkish experts Ceren Zeynep Ak, Mensur Akgün and Sylvia Tiryaki ask in their contribution where EU-Turkey relations are heading. The destination is unknown and the authors write about the factors that determine the mutual relations’ “road” – the media, public awareness, mutual perception.

The book is closed with a chapter Talking Turkey in Slovakia: In Search of the Proper Cure for an Uncertain Diagnosis, written by Lucia Najšlová. She explains the initiation of the project, its objectives, and illustrates, based on the personal experience, the relationship of the Slovak public to this issue, expressing her determination and frustration when things did not follow expectations. This personal tone comes from the experience gained during the project of mainstreaming Turkey, combining her lecturing experience which gives a really cruel diagnosis of Slovak society. Based on that she stated, “The complex of inferiority seems to be deeply entrenched in Slovakia” (p. 101). Additionally, materialistic orientation in post communist societies does not give hope that freedoms and tolerance will be priority. Thus, talking Turkey in Slovakia is
more about Slovakia than about Turkey. Trying to understand this might offer some relief to the Turkish public and/or policy makers. The negative message and widespread ignorance are not mainly a reflection of ‘how Turkey is’ or what we think about fitness, but, they are a mirror of who we are, how we, here in Central Europe, interpret the world around”... [p. 101].

Collection of essays is an excellent example of how analysts from independent think-tanks and academics, can ‘destroy the wall’ – competently, openly, inclusively, but also with the commitment to the cause.

To demonstrate and to prove that today’s discourse and narration cannot stand on ‘we’ and ‘they’. I remember, in this context, the great movie of the German director Fatih Akin of Turkish origin: Auf der anderen Seite [On the other side, the English title of this movie, however, overlay these semantics and is called The Edge of Heaven].

Everything is different as the general stereotype preaches – a young man from a family of Turkish ‘guest workers’ lectures at the leading German University of Goethe and Schiller; the German student, Lotte, helps a Turkish female political activist who is deported from Germany. She is going to look for her in a Turkish prison ... the borders of both worlds are ‘fluid’, the characters’ lives – both Germans and immigrants are taking place on both sides of the imaginary border; the dividing line is not identical with that expectation ‘we Europeans’ (or as Lucia Najšlová creatively uses the ‘EU-peans’), and ‘the others’ – the world outside, the world of cultural diversity. Who then really is ‘On the other side?’

The book Finding Common Grounds. Rediscovering the Common Narrative of Turkey and Europe inspires to such thinking. And the fact that it does so in difficult times makes it even more valuable. Within the EU countries, skeptical and suspicious attitudes towards Turkey in the EU continue to prevail, or actually they are increasing. The European public is feeling ‘enlargement fatigue’ and Turkey is an easy target. Politicians, with great relief, ride on the wave of the majority opinion and collect votes on this issue. The problem is that legitimate complaints against disrespecting minorities and civil rights or other democratic deficits of Turkey are ‘in the same basket’ with the prejudices and phobias. Only their rational differentiation and more mutual understanding can remove barriers and enable searching for common platforms in the areas that are most suitable for both parties. This is important, no matter how the Turkish approach to the EU as well as the Union’s approach to Turkey will develop.

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If somebody told me two weeks ago that it would be possible to get a good grasp of contemporary Arab politics in less than 400 pages, I would have had a hard time stopping laughing. After reading Ottaway and Hamzawy’s book, the answer would be different.

Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy edited a volume which deals with highly pertinent and yet a somewhat understudied feature of Arab politics – pluralism of Arab regimes. It is true that the literature on Muslim Brotherhood or country case studies is blooming. However, a comprehensive overview of political actors in current Arab world is a rare sight.

The editors identify three sets of political actors to deal with: incumbent regimes, secular parties and Islamist movements. They do not deal with civil society because they consider them to be too weak and ineffective. In fact, most NGOs are service-oriented or charitable institutions and as such do not pose a threat to governments. The editors identify incumbency as a strong political asset, with power not generated at the ballot box but with the help of strong security apparatuses instead. Although many Arab regimes are not in love with the opposition in their countries, simple crushing of the opposition parties is no longer a viable option. However, the political conundrum is further exacerbated by apathetic voters who do not turn up in large numbers at the elections.

The volume is divided into three chapters, each one devoted to one set of actors. Each section begins with a general introduction identifying key findings and then followed by a couple of case studies illustrating points made in introductions.

The first chapter deals with the incumbent regimes. With coups d’état out of fashion in the Middle East, most of the regimes tended to ossify in the past decades. Nevertheless, currently, reform actors emerged in all countries. Political laws have changed in almost all countries of the region and electoral competition increased (without making elections free and fair). The goal of the reformers is not to democratize but to modernize. This attempt is partially driven by a discovery that oil wells have their bottoms too and that oil non-producing states need to find their economic niche. In this search for improvement through managed reform, however; political institutions can become seen more as an obstacle than a helpful tool.
(think Kuwait). The authors identify three models of managed reform: reforming political institutions without changing power distribution (Egypt or Bahrain), social reform without a political one (Morocco or Saudi Arabia) and managed reform accepting legitimacy of opposition (Yemen, Algeria). Political reforms then lead to a split between hardliners and softliners within the regime. The key levels of power – military, internal security or intelligence – remain with small exceptions controlled by hardliners anyway. Occasional calls for political reform are aimed at improving the governance with a goal to improve conditions for economic growth, partially under Western pressures.

The second chapter of the book deals with secular parties, caught between restrictive political regimes and Islamist challenge. Their biggest problem is their internal organization which is absolutely unsuited for electoral participation. The secular parties also suffer from the fact that Arab societies have recently become increasingly socially conservative and religious. The authors identify the crisis of the secular parties as the major problem of current attempts for political reform in the Middle East. Many secular parties are tying themselves with the government, in order to win over the Islamists. The authors demonstrate this point with the example of Morocco, where the secularists aligned with the government in a vicious circle where the former opposition parties are actually becoming government parties, creating a kind of background charade to the palace. Another example is Egypt, where secular parties are completely unable to compete with the incumbent regime or Islamists, who are extraordinarily well organized. Although electoral participation in Egypt is low, secular parties fail to identify new potential constituencies and to mobilize them. The secular parties are unable to project a vision, to form a specific message and exhibit extraordinary organizational weakness.

The third chapter is devoted to Islamists. The editors rightly point out that the very fact that Islamists participate in elections means that they accepted the legitimacy of nation states and rejected (for the moment) the idea of creating a state for all Muslims. Furthermore, the participation shows that Islamists came to accept political space as a legitimate space for the fight of ideas. Lastly, by participating in elections, Islamists accept the right to participate in parties with different ideologies. When it comes to Islamists, two major concerns usually appear: firstly whether they are truly democratic and secondly whether the electoral participation can strengthen their democratic norms. As for the first question, the authors say that Islamists are unlikely to sweep elections even if they were allowed to participate and use examples of Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco to support this claim. Islamists can win only in very special circumstances, usually when regimes are perceived as extremely corrupt, as what happened in Palestine in
2006 and in Algeria in the early 1990s. Furthermore, authors claim that evidence does not show that the Islamists use elections only as a ruse – and claim that Islamists do not even want to win the elections in order not to trigger a devastating response from governments. Many Islamist parties have also, in fact, their own internal democratic procedures and their opinions on issues such as women’s rights appear to be similar to those of the Western world of the first half of the 20th century. As for the question whether the electoral participation strengthens democratic values, authors claim that if electoral participation takes place under normal conditions, it leads to moderation. However, if elections are taking place under ‘siege conditions’, then internal politics of Islamist parties will tend to lead to creating more hard-line positions. The main problem of Islamists is to strike the right balance between politics and ideological commitment, coupled with their attempt to strengthen the power of legislatures (the political arenas in which they are allowed to compete).

Despite the fact that the volume offers an excellent primer on current Arab politics, several shortcomings need to be pointed out. Firstly, authors of chapters often seem to ignore widespread rigging of elections and unfair conditions. When they point to the problem free election of Hosni Mubarak in 2005 as a sign of weakness of secularists, they ignore the fact that the elections were far from fair and Mubarak was sure to win. In claiming that Islamists did not win in elections in Jordan as an example of the fact that Islamists would win the elections sweepingly if allowed to participate, the authors forget to mention that the Jordanian electoral system was severely gerrymandered precisely for the purpose of strengthening other constituencies than Islamists. Plus, they forget that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2005 won all positions it competed for. Lastly, some of the conclusions of the authors are hard to grasp – their claim that secularists are not organized properly and thus cannot successfully attempt to rally support in the elections and point to the strength of the Islamist organization, is hard to square with their statement that Islamists would not sweep the elections if allowed to. Free elections would mean that this organizational strength, coupled with lifted restraint on the number of fielded candidates, would probably lead to comfortable victory for Islamists.

The most serious shortcoming of the book is, however, different. It is a virtual absence of footnotes and sources, which makes it impossible for the reader to follow some of the more interesting aspects more deeply or go to the sources of information. This absence of footnotes is baffling and seriously impedes the use of the publication in a more scientific process.

Despite these shortcomings, the publication remains the best offering for an overview of Arab politics. It offers important ideas for policy and also a great
general overview. Accessible language as well as direct flow of information, make the book a comfortable read. Ottaway and Hamzawy tried to present the current political reality of the Arab world in a succinct way to a non-specialist reader. It needs to be said that they succeeded very well.

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The book *Russia and Central Asia after the Collapse of the USSR* deals with the often recently overlooked region of Central Asia, whose importance grew after the U.S. and NATO intervention in Afghanistan as well as in connection with the issue of energy security. Slavomír Horák, member of the Department of Russian and East European Studies at the Faculty of Social Science of Charles University in Prague, is one of the few authors in Central Europe, dealing with this region in the longer term. On this subject he wrote the books *Central Asia between the East and West* and *Afghan Conflict* as well as several expert articles. The reviewed book discusses the actual topic of current and historical relations between the post-soviet republics in Central Asia and Russia. After the collapse of Soviet Union its successor states went through radical economic and social changes. The countries of Central Asia for the first time in history, gained independence and the possibility to formulate their own foreign policy.

The main objective of the work, was the explanation of a complicated evolution of relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia, especially from the perspective of these countries. The basic task was to determine what is the current role of Russia in the region and how it varied after 1991. Is there a crowding out of Russia’s biggest rivals, China and the US, or vice versa to consolidating his position? And how are the Central Asian states linked to Russia?

The work has a clear and well legible structure. The first chapter deals with activity and interests of world or regional powers in Central Asia. The central role is played by three great powers - Russia, USA and China. Significant influence also have powers linguistically, culturally or geographically associated with the region – Turkey and Iran. Of particular importance for Central Asia is also situation in Afghanistan. The second chapter describes the gradual bonding of the region to Russia from the 18th century. It gradually increased its military, political and economic influence on the then centers Samarkand, Buchara and Chiva, which later led to affiliation with Russia. During the soviet period Central Asian states have been formed within the borders and form as we know them today.

The third chapter deals with the integration projects and disintegration in post-communist Central Asia. The author does not analyze the
Commonwealth of Independent States, which he considers to be ‘the factually unworkable organization’. Since the states obtained independence, two tendencies stood against each other: Disintegrative expressed desire to move away from Russia and other central Asian states and attempt to overcome the soviet legacy. The second line expressed the need for cooperation between the republics. Even so, many integration organizations, which include the Central Asian states have remained only a formal or have started slowly, especially reluctant to give up any competencies. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization founded with the Agreement on Strengthening Military Trust in the Shanghai 1996, has grown to one of the most successful organization in the region under the dominance of China and Russia (India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia have observer status). The next important group is the Collective Security Treaty Organization signed in 1992 to provide a common defense to the post-soviet states. Another one is the Eurasian Economic Community, formally the most developed integration organization focused on economic cooperation aimed at creating a customs union. In practice, however, there are still many obstacles that hinder effective cooperation. Central Asian Cooperation Organization was originally a purely Central Asian grouping, which should solve the economic and political cooperation. Because of disagreements between member states it plays a particularly formal role. Russia became a member of this organization in 2004. The above mentioned integration organizations have a pro-Russian character and work under the leadership of Russia as a dominant player (with the partial exception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). The only Central Asian state, which remains outside the integration grouping is Turkmenistan, the reason is its neutral status.

The next four chapters deal with the relationship between Russia and four post-soviet Central Asian states – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It’s a pity that the author of the book did not put a chapter on Kazakhstan but as he writes, because of the intensity of relations with Russia, Kazakhstan is distinguished from other Central Asian states. In these chapters Slavomír Horák deals with the specificities of each country’s foreign policy, development of relations and most important issues of political and diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian relations. Cooperation between Central Asian states and Russia passed several stages of strengthening and weakening, depending on the internal situation in Russia and in specific countries, but also due to external events. In each chapter, the author is focused on the dominant themes. In the case of Tajikistan its military and social issues, in Uzbekistan focuses on political and economic relations, in Kyrgyzstan on the military and the social sphere and in the case of Turkmenistan on economic and energy area.
Kyrgyzstan-Russia relations have been marked from the beginning with the necessity of economic and political orientation to Russia, despite the efforts of economic reforms and intensive economic cooperation with China. After September 11, 2001, the USA came to the region and has been renting a military base. Under new president Bakiev, Kyrgyzstan has approached more to Russia. On the other hand, the country leaves the door open for cooperation with other countries. The situation in Tajikistan was strongly marked by civil war, when Russia supported the government. Russia has become a major economic and political partner for Tajikistan. An important role has also been played by linguistically, culturally and ethnically kindred Iran, especially in the economic sphere. On the other hand, we may perceive a certain lack of confidence in the clerics in Iran, due to an effort to maintain a secular system in Tajikistan.

Turkmenistan with its policy of neutrality and isolation is a specific example in Central Asia. The author marked the foreign policy of Turkmenistan as unpredictable with several major turnovers. The dominant issues are particularly energy and gas. Despite the unpredictability in foreign policy orientation, Turkmenistan is mainly oriented towards Russia. This orientation was reinforced after the new president Berdymuhamedov took office. Uzbekistan’s foreign policy was influenced by the quest for leadership of the Central Asian states. For this reason Uzbekistan was trying to find those partners who have supported this effort, this resulted in frequent and significant changes in orientation of foreign policy. These efforts are mainly affected by relations with Russia, which have passed through phases of warming and cooling. Foreign policy since the end of 2001 to 2005 focused particularly on the U.S. after 2005, mainly to Russia.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the monopoly in Central Asia, and the new players came into the area. Russia began to return to the region after Putin took presidential office. Russia gradually strengthens its economically and politically position in Central Asian states. Traditionally, there are close relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan tried to find new partners, but Russia is still the most important factor in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. The region falls outside the neutrality of Turkmenistan, but they also maintain a pro-Russian orientation. Russia has maintained a very strong position in the region. In the conclusion, the author compares the position of Russia in the region to the position of France and Britain in their former colonies. The Central Asian states have strong ties to it, whether bilaterally or through international organizations, in which Russia plays a crucial role. On the other hand, the Central Asian states are trying to create a ‘multiple vector’ policy, particularly regarding economic relations.

Slavomír Horák’s book is very unique and beneficial to the study of concerning
the relations of Russia and the post-communist states of Central Asia in the Slovak and Czech environments. The publication is well structured and written in a clear style, thus offering a useful analysis of the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries and Russia’s relation to these states. In my opinion, the only significant drawback is that it has not entirely succeeded to analyze the relations with Russia from the Central Asian perspective. But it is understandable, given the closure of these political regimes.

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