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Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Interdependency Trends in a Multi-Polar World

Summary: The article discusses the issues of unitary and multiple polarities in relation to state inter-dependency in the Central Asian region. The author makes the case that regionalism among nation states will be the determining factor in implementing long term policies for human security and cooperation. The article proposes that regional associations, such as the UNRCCA, can act as a structural arbitrator setting norms, organizing collective actions, sharing information, assessing risk and spreading inter-linkages. Examples from Central Asia are offered throughout the article.

Preamble to Global and Regional Challenges

With the break up of the Soviet Union almost two decades ago, the end of the Cold War brought glimpses of optimism that peace was viable. Yet, those looking for potential conflict fault lines that could replace the East/West confrontation and arms build up did not rest in peace.

Since 1990, a number of different scenarios of potential conflict fault lines have been advanced, many of them through American scholars in notable academic institutions. For Francis Fukuyama (1992), the major conflict line in future global politics would be the struggle between democratic, liberal and non-democratic illiberal states. Samuel Huntington (1996) focused on culture-driven conflicts between the Christian-Jewish cultures of the West and other civilizations in the non-Western world. John J. Mearsheimer (1990) forecasted that the era after bipolar confrontation would see the re-emergence of conflicts between

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nation states, fuelled by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Paul Kennedy with Robert D. Kaplan focused on the re-emergence of the North/South rift in a world where socio-economic asymmetries between the western world and the rest would potentially create international conflicts. All these scenarios of doom and gloom had in common the idea that the traditional security paradigm that had characterized Cold War politics no longer applied. There was however no consensus on what it was going to be replaced with: whether global insecurity would stem from a clash of systems of governance, of culture and religion or from socio-economic inequalities. At the same time, the most optimistic scenarios coming out of the end of the Cold War took into consideration not the potential

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of conflicts but the imperative of cooperation. These discourses rallied around the new global governance that had been heralded by globalization: Economic and security interdependence between countries meant that a new global architecture was needed, one based on cooperation for the prevention of downturns in insecurity in the broad sense of the word.

Similarly, analysts also built scenarios for the future of Central Asia in the immediate aftermath of the break up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Four assumptions, or doom theories, tried to explain the potentiality of conflict in the region. First, to those who witnessed the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the break up of the Soviet Union presented similar dangers of ethno-nationalist conflicts erupting on its former territory, leading to the Balkanization of Central Asia. Second, the presence of a mosaic of ethnic and Islamist groups preoccupied many scholars who inked numerous books on the need to 'calm' the Ferghana Valley. Third, there were fears that the civil War in Tajikistan which erupted for six deadly months in 1992, would spread horizontally across borders. Fourth, experiences with proxy wars during the Cold War in Africa had prepared the international community for increased tensions when super powers coagulate on a single territory, a fact that did not escape observers of Central Asia who noted the revival of the Great Game in pursuit of natural resources and transit routes once the republics gained independence. And yet, all these doom scenarios have so far proven fictitious.

The expected doom scenarios did not materialize beyond strategy papers, so called scholarly articles, and fictitious espionage novels. Peace has prevailed in Central Asia, despite all odds, largely due to the political will of the states of the region and to the constructive relationship between international organizations and regional and national actors. The potential for conflicts, however, has not abated either at the regional or at the global level.

The question remains as to whether the world is moving towards the domination of one or a few global powers over the rest by virtue of their economic or military force, or towards a new form of internationally shared governance, in effect an interdependent multi-polar world where each nation would find its added value through cooperation. Within such a new global architecture, what then is the role of regionalism and that of the nation states?

In order to discuss the context of these changes at the global level and their effects regionally in Central Asia, the author proposes to look at three competing, yet interdependent hypotheses:

- First, the question is posed as to whether we are witnessing a return of conflicting power politics which lies at the core of discussions on whether we live in a uni, non or multi-polar world.
- Second, we shall consider the alternative scenario, where the interdependence of threats, and potential gains from the pooling of efforts, makes cooperation and collaborative arrangements an imperative.
- Third, we shall argue that globalization, far from having forced the centralization of power, has in fact allowed more space and provided renewed impetus for regionalism and for the strengthening of nation states.

Turbulent Multilateralism: Conflict or Cooperation?

Multi polarity refers to a world where more than two nation states have equal power in terms of military, economic and cultural influence. The question of polarity seems far from settled today. A few facts to illustrate: Until the break up of the USSR, we lived in a bi-polar world where the two superpowers competed for influence. We assumed that during the first decade after the break up of the Soviet Union, the United States rose as the most powerful nation, both in terms of military and economic influence, and acted unilaterally in a number of global events, the Iraq invasion being the most notorious example. We however also observe that today, the rise of India and China and the revival of Russia are leading towards a multi-polar constellation.

Contemporary arrangements seem to be moving towards an international system that is complex, in transit and multi-faceted. At the end of the first

decade of the twentieth century, opinions differ as to whether we live in a uni or multi-polar world.

According to some realist scholars, the United States is still the most powerful nation in the world. In this view, predictions of American decline have been overstated: half of global military expenditures are still spent by the USA, and although the financial crisis has hurt the American economy the most, the alternative still does not seem to be viable: According to this point of view, China, with its shortcoming in democracy and its internal regional socio-economic inequalities, is not in a position to catch up with the US in the near future. Russia depends too much on one commodity, energy, and the European Union is still hesitant on the global military scene, has low defense spending and is far from being genuinely united.

Liberal scholars however argue that the United States, powerful as it may be economically, culturally and militarily, cannot be self sufficient. It cannot bring

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legitimacy for its military operations and diplomacy if its actions are not synchronized with others. The US dependency on foreign investors and foreign trade has created a mutual economic dependency between developed and developing nations. Hence, inter-dependence and coalition building explain better contemporary arrangements than polarity or competition.

A third school of thought believes that the use of discourses on polarity is in fact misleading. Joseph Nye argued in 2002 for example that to describe the world as 'uni-polar' or 'multi-polar' was to confuse different types of power. "Uni-polar is misleading because it exaggerates the degree to which the USA is able to get the results it wants in some dimensions of world politics but multi-polar is misleading because it implies several roughly equal countries."¹ But if Nye's argument was based on the non-viability of alternative actors replacing the US power back in 2002, the genuine reason why polarity is no longer the adequate discourse is because globalization has outdated classical power politics in contemporary arrangements. The free movement of people, capital and information, including virtually through the internet, means that real power remains in fact outside of the control of states, even of the most powerful ones.

¹ J.S. Nye *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 38-39.

If the first two positions still believe in classical power politics, where states are urged to compete or become allies in their quest for more power and influence, the third position advances the rise of transnational issues and non-state actors, which are supposedly shifting order away from power politics to modes of cooperation. At the core of these different viewpoints therefore lays a fundamental division on whether *conflict or cooperation* characterizes the global world order.

The Conflict Scenario

In this scenario, the return of power politics explains the behavior of different states. The question is whether the old and new hegemon can be gradually integrated into a system of effective multilateralism, or whether their competition will result in rampant disputes. The United States, through its unilateral aspirations and behavior under the previous administration, is supposed to have set a bad example for other aspiring powers to follow: Competing for power politics explains then Russia's war with Georgia, China's crushing of economic competitors around the world, and India's quest for the nuclear 'deal'. Neo-realists would argue that this behavior is normal. After all, aspiration towards a multi-polar constellation pushes nations to engage in competition over power, influence and resources through projecting traditional economic and military might. Competition over resources by major powers creates adjustment pressures on others, leading to further instability. In this scenario, the transfer of global power to multi-polarity is conflict-ridden.

This scenario also explains the potential pressure on Central Asia. Competitive behavior for influence in the region by the major hegemon, the US, Russia and China, can constrain the development of regional cooperation. The absence of coordination of interests and unity among the Central Asian countries would then create a fertile soil for the acceleration of geo-political struggles between external powers.

The Cooperative View

An alternative view however argues that because of the inter-dependency of new global threats and mutual vulnerabilities of systems, institutions, nations and people; global cooperation is the more likely scenario. If deterrence was able to fend off traditional security concerns of the Cold War era, the new threats of the 21st century require effective engagement instead.

The new global threats, for example, can be clustered around six areas:

1. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the asymmetry between those countries that have them and those that do not;

2. common problems of poverty and inequalities among people;
3. environmental disasters, which not only endanger lives but also could lead indirectly to migration and conflicts;
4. terrorism and crimes, including trafficking in people, narcotics and arms;
5. health pandemics such as HIV/AIDS; and
6. resource depletion in terms of energy and water in the future.

These have several characteristics in common. Each has a global dimension beyond the reach of the nation state and requires global solutions, each is interconnected with one or more other world problem areas, and action applied to one has an impact on one or more of the other threats. No nation state acting unilaterally, including the US, possesses the competence, the jurisdictional legitimacy, or the economic capacity to provide an adequate and effective response to these multi-dimensional challenges. In a multi-faceted, multi-polar world, collective management of international affairs makes far greater sense than the hegemony of a solitary superpower. Collective management is a necessity, driven by the complexity and urgency of today's problems, and collaboration becomes an imperative rather than a luxury. The existence of these new threats, in essence, eases tensions and conflicts among nations because they require cooperative arrangement for mitigation.

It is through this lens that the phenomenon of globalization needs to be assessed, a phenomenon that has both contributed to multi-polarity and stemmed from it. Globalization in fact did not start in the West. It was the advances in technology, especially information technologies, that led to spontaneous diversification from different regions of the world. The results have been positive growth for those countries which have been able to take advantage of economic and information transfers. However, mutual interdependence has also meant that when crisis hit the global system, no region was immune. Within a few weeks in 2008, for example, the financial crisis that began in the mortgage and banking sectors in the United States led to declines all over the world. The IMF predicted in March 2009 that the world economy would suffer its first global recession in 60 years, declining by between 0.5% and 1.0% in 2009. Interdependence has meant that failure to cooperate comes with a high cost.

Challenges and Threats in Central Asia

The future of Central Asia can similarly be viewed through various lenses: One would be to analyze the potential for conflict as a direct result of pressure built up by external power politics, taking advantage of internal and regional vacuums. In this scenario, the Great Game played out in the past century in Afghanistan

continues to be sustained, this time transposed on the territories of the new republics and with new global and regional actors. This scenario, however, actual as it may be, sees national and regional politics as being redundant and powerless. It ignores the potential prevention mechanisms that could be set in place if coordination is improved, and it especially overlooks the potential conflict that may exist around new types of security threats that exist within the region. The geopolitical and geo-strategic factors should, of course, not be denied, but they do not operate in a vacuum. Regional and local conditions can accelerate or hamper their primacy.

Few parts of the world are as interdependent as in Central Asia. Inter-connectivity comes not only from shared security concerns, but also common economic, communication, ethnic, cultural and religious factors. If these factors do not sufficiently facilitate the transformation of this inter-dependence into full-fledged integration, cooperation is needed at the very least. Benefits of cooperation are many: Improving trade and transport, efficient use of water and energy to boost regional economies, joint preparation for coping with natural disasters, etc. The price of non-cooperation is also high: Cross border conflict of course, but also loss of economic opportunities, natural disasters, environment destruction, spread of disease, illegal migration to name a few.

That the Central Asian countries have avoided open conflicts is a testimony that political will, mutual dialogue and supportive measures for prevention are in place, operational and successful in the region. Yet, the existence of common threats requires common responses to eradicate potential destabilization in the region. In terms of common threats, the following for example, could be mentioned:

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International Terrorism and Extremism

The stability of Central Asian countries has increasingly been threatened by armed insurgencies and threats of terrorism. Often, these have been fueled by instability in the wider region and cross border armaments such as arms and drug trafficking. Yet, combating terrorism must be conducted within the framework of the international treaties and relevant United Nations Resolutions while respecting human rights. Otherwise, repression could fuel renewed cycles of conflict. Dealing with terrorism in a sustainable manner also requires

a thorough examination of root causes, motivations, as well as incentives, ranging from political grievances to economic gains and greed.

Drug Trafficking

Since the 1990s, the Central Asian region has been caught between a hub of production (Afghanistan) and a hub of consumption (Europe, Russia, China). Drug trafficking provides a major financial income for organized crime, money launderers, extremists and terrorists, posing a potentially serious threat to the stability of states. In addition to increased criminalization of cross-border trade, drug transiting Central Asia is increasingly associated with corruption and consumption within the region. An integrated, complex solution needs to be found that involves both national governments, regional entities as well as international markets and criminal networks.

Cross-Border Threats

Organized crime related to trafficking in drugs, small arms and light weapons and human beings could have potentially destabilizing impacts on internal political systems, on regional and international trade as well as on the security and safety of communities. Restrictions over border regimes, combined with lack of procedures, technical facilities and with cases of corruption, however, remain emotional and costly issues for Central Asian populations, used to sharing schools, hospitals and households during Soviet times. Border conflicts can be exasperated through inter-ethnic tensions, illegal migration, disputes over water, and even ecological problems. At the same time, an integrated border management without limiting the flows of legal trade, cultural and community ties across borders can facilitate trade and exchanges in the region and help combat regional criminal activity while bringing economies out of isolation.

Mismanagement of Common Goods: Water and Energy Distribution

The need for improved management of common resources, especially of water and energy, is an urgent need. Competition over water remains one of the most likely sources for potential conflicts in the region. Regulated by markets, water is not enough for fuel in winter, especially in drought years. The even distribution of energy and water sources has also been complicated by the decentralization process after the break up of the Soviet system. Despite a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, the system remains fragmented and compliance to agreements lag behind. There are also no agreements on costs and how to divide the rivers' bounty. There is a need to have an integrated water and energy management policy that would answer the needs of upstream and downstream countries.

Instability Bleeding from Afghanistan

Continued instability in Afghanistan is a substantial source for threats from bleeding extremism, terrorism, and organized trafficking of arms and drugs in Central Asia. At the same time, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan through international peace-building strategies could offer new opportunities for Central Asian countries. Benefits could include the opening up of new trade routes, and new security arrangements, cooperation over electricity, gas, roads, pipelines, hydro electric power, equipment, technology transfer, agriculture know-how and technical support. Instead, today, conflict is spreading vertically within the state, engulfing province by province, threatening the legitimacy of the Afghan government and the new state. The regionalization of the Taliban has also meant that the Afghan conflict has escalated horizontally, spreading beyond Afghanistan, to Central Asia.

The Prevention Cure

These are new security challenges that conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy strategies have to deal with in this region. Conventional wisdom tells us that the challenge with conflict prevention is that because it deals with a potential, it is a hard act to measure. After all, how can we judge something that has not happened and remains a fear in our collective nightmares. Yet, a situation where conflict is expected, and does not happen, or when it does, it is quickly contained, is by itself a most telling sign. In Central Asia, one may say, despite all the doom and gloom predictions throughout the nineties, large scale violent conflict has not materialized. The Tajik Civil War, the brief and unfortunate interruption of this norm, can also be considered one of the most successful cases of containment from a horizontal and vertical explosion of violence. That was not a pure act of coincidence, but witness to the fact that preventive measures had been in place, operational and successful. However, this does not mean that prevention mechanisms can sit on their glories and not be continuously renewed and expanded.

In most instances, the term conflict prevention is qualified by the antecedents 'violent' or 'deadly' as if to suggest that non-violent conflicts are not in need of immediate attention or are at least less threatening. However, in contemporary arrangements, peace and security no longer only refer to the end of wars or of deadly violence. The end of violence is merely called a negative peace. Positive peace instead is what we should strive for, and that means a peace where individuals are able to go about their lives taking advantage of opportunities offered to them. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military

terms.² In the words of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: “The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.”³

Preventive strategies, therefore, should not only deal with responding to the rapid escalation of emergent crisis, disputes and inter-states hostilities.

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Effective prevention is not a short term response but a medium and long term proactive strategy intended to respond to new security environments where not only military, but economic, social, environmental and cultural policies pose threats that dangers the survival of individual, groups and states. It should eradicate structural forms of violence, i.e., “violence built in the structure and [showing] up as unequal power and consequently unequal life chances” (Galtung, 1969), as well as structural inequalities and distributional injustices. It should recognize, and then distinguish, between underlying causes of conflicts, which could be factors such as poverty, high population growth, resource scarcity, discrimination, inequalities, and humiliation, and the proximate causes that trigger conflict escalation, which are usually considered to be deliberate acts by leaders and demagogues to make use of grievances to make violent responses.

Today, effective prevention requires a comprehensive, multidimensional and coherent strategy. It also requires multilateral approaches: the comparative advantage of each organization or nation can in aggregation make the difference needed to defeat threats.

² See S. Tadjbakhsh, A. Chenory *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*. (London: Routledge, 2007).

³ K. Annan *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. (New York, 2005).

The Opportunity for Regionalism

The success of a global preventive architecture very much lies on the sustainability of regional arrangements. Globalization has, in effect, opened up vast opportunities for regionalization. Since the end of the Cold War, the notion of ‘regionalization’ in many parts of the world, including in Central Asia, has undergone, and is currently still undergoing, a process of transformation that includes reassessing roles, capabilities and design.⁴

Regionalism refers to a ‘project’ that constructs common policies based on shared regional identities and objectives and inspires the formation of the regional institutions needed to implement these plans.⁵ Regionalization therefore is a step forward in international cooperation between states, and a stepping stone for the creation of sustainable institutions with autonomous status in the global arena.

It was Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver who coined the idea of Regional Security Complexes (RSC), which they defined as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”.⁶ The Regional Security Complex adapted today means that countries are tied not only through geography, but also through their joint interests and vulnerabilities towards economic, military, societal, environmental and energy goods. Regionalism, therefore, is the preferred modality for cooperation in a Regional Security Complex. But it must be stressed that regionalism and regional cooperation are not the same thing as full regional integration.

Countries can benefit greatly from cooperation when they share common resources such as borders where trade takes place, rivers, hydroelectric power, rail connections or the environment. Cooperation presents an economy of scale, while failure to cooperate can be very costly. Yet, regional cooperation is not easily achieved. Countries are sometimes unwilling to cooperate because of national pride, competition for leadership, political tensions, lack of trust, high coordination costs among a large number of countries, or the asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits. International and regional cooperation

⁴ The author would like to thank Julien Kitipov, MA Student of the University of Pretoria, South Africa, for his research assistance.

⁵ J. Hentz, “Introduction: New Regionalism and the Theory of Security Studies”, J. Hentz, M. Bøås (eds) *New and Critical Security and Regionalism. Beyond the Nation State*. (Ashgate, 2003), p11.

⁶ B. Buzan, O. Weaver *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 44.

agreements are typically harder to achieve than national ones especially given the absence of courts or higher authorities to which to appeal. In such cases, cooperation can benefit from the presence of specialized institutions which support mechanisms to enforce provisions and support disputes on how to share benefits.⁷

Institutions to the Rescue

Countries sharing a resource, such as peace, may willingly cooperate and share the gains from cooperation, but if they believe partners are not sharing, as defectors or free riders, they are unlikely to reach a cooperative solution. Failure to cooperate is not due to unwillingness to share but the unwillingness to trust, especially when some partners are expected to lose.

Regional and international institutions are therefore needed to foster trust. To be able to fulfill this role, such institutions need to be independent, transparent, beneficial so as to do a cost benefit analysis of gains made from cooperation and losses from defection, and provide expertise, information, and financing to find cooperative solutions to regional and global public goods such as positive peace and cooperation. Organizations can use their credibility, technical expertise, broader perspective, neutrality and financial resources to broker and enforce deals.

Global Institutions

International organizations have been striving to deal with potential structural causes of negative peace in the past decade while building trust in Central Asia.

For example, if, in the early 1990s the United Nations had some difficulties preventing genocide from taking place in Rwanda and Bosnia, its success in brokering the peace process in Tajikistan goes down in the annals of history as one of the most successful peace making missions. It was thus under the concert of the United Nations that the contact groups of Russia, Iran and Central Asian countries became the guarantors of the peace process in Tajikistan. The UN was able to provide win-win situations for balancing the fears and interests of internal and external actors to broker a deal.

In Central Asia, there has also been a consensus among international institutions that transparent and open systems of governance and the market

⁷ M. Schiff, L.A. Winters, "Regional Cooperation, and the Role of International Organizations and Regional Integration", *Policy Research Working Paper 2872* (2002).

economy, put at the service of security and welfare of human beings, is the best recipe for the prevention of intra and interstate conflicts. This consensus around the Liberal Peace model has been implemented by a variety of institutions, ranging from organizations that worked on transport and trade, like ADB, those that worked on poverty reduction like UNDP, those that worked on institutions of good governance, and democratization, like the EU, OSCE, and USAID, those that worked on human rights like the OHCHR, those that worked on macro economic issues, like the WB and IMF, those that worked on the very important issue of labor migration and trafficking like the IOM, or preventing the spread of HIV like UNAIDS and UNDP among a host of issues.

Among the various players, the United Nations, by virtue of its experience, neutrality, provision of the Charter, and its global mandate to foster collective security and systems, remains today a relevant organization for fostering trust and practical preventive mechanisms for positive peace. The major change in UN operations in the past decade has been in the constant engagement in peace building and in prevention. The old debate between security or and development and the pact between the North and South, is becoming increasingly outdated now that the international community has come to understand that these are not in zero sum trade offs, but are directly related. The UN in Central Asia was able to broker the peace deal for Tajikistan and move from peacemaking to peace-building to prevention. In 2008, the UN set up a Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), based in Ashgabat, with the explicit goal of fostering regional dialogue.

Another reason why peace has been maintained in Central Asia should be attributed to the coordination between the variety of regional organizations that are currently engaged on the territory of Central Asia.

The mushrooming of regional institutions around the world has given a new impetus for regionalism. Regional organizations may have limitations in their charters, financial; organizational and resource constraints, and lack of mediation and enforcement of agreements. Their legitimacy cannot match that of the United Nations. Yet, the United Nations alone can also not work in isolation to carry out

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specific kinds of prevention. More coordination is therefore needed between the UN and regional actors, as stipulated by Chapter VIII for the UN to delegate part of its responsibilities to international and regional arrangements.

In Central Asia, at least two regional organizations have proven their capabilities in terms of conflict containment during the Tajik civil war; and have contributed to peace-building ever since. The CIS diplomatic efforts largely contributed to the regulation of the conflict in Tajikistan. Since 1991, membership in the CIS has also allowed countries in Central Asia to benefit from the coordination of external and internal politics. It has given them access to the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Community for collaboration on customs and free trade agreements, transport, power, labor migration and agro industries, as well as to the CSTO, which is currently engaged in developing and strengthening its peacekeeping forces.

Membership in the OSCE has also opened up opportunities to collaborate with the only European regional organization which has normative and operational capabilities in conflict prevention. Set up by the *Helsinki Final Act* in 1975, the Organization received a new mandate in 1990 through the *Charter of Paris* for conflict prevention and includes now 55 partner countries. It is today the only European Security Forum that includes the US, Canada and Russia as well as most of the countries of Central Asia. The success of the OSCE is largely attributed to its cooperative and comprehensive approach to security which puts emphasis on Human rights, rule of law, gender, freedom of religion, elections, monitoring, parliamentary support and as of late economic development as issues of human security. Its success in conflict prevention lies however more in normative and soft security dimensions, and its ability to deal with more structural causes of conflict directly with the parties concerned.

Besides the CIS and the OSCE, a number of new regional organizations have been created in and around Central Asia with a variety of methods but which converge on their overall goals towards peace and stability in the region.

Cooperation through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) since 2001 has offered member states the opportunity to come together on the basis of synergy around regional security concerns. SCO countries began with enforcing mutual trust and good neighborhood policies through border cooperation, then converged around common principles of combating with separatism, terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration, and are now moving together to balance economic gains, social and cultural development, and strengthen their coordinated method to integrate into the world economy. Besides the success in creating confidence around demilitarization of borders and solving border disputes, the SCO success can be attributed to:

- a. shared norms, such as respect for non-interventions and sovereignty;
- b. shared interest to mitigate against risks;

- c. progressive approach that builds on the pace and will of member states;
- d. and increased economic cooperation that will see the region enter into WTO from a position of strength; and
- e. opening up to other organizations like CACO and CIS/CSTO.

Other regional organizations that are engaged with the region include the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which, since 1985 is the successor to regional cooperation for the development of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and concentrates on economic development, trade barrier removal, transport, investment, energy, transport and telecommunication. NATO has engaged some of the CIS countries in a Partnership for Peace since 1996 and is increasingly seeking cooperation for transit routes for the Afghan operation. The EU has devised a strategy for Central Asia based on its strategic interest in security, stability and prosperity, in line with the European Neighborhood policy. The goal of the EU is to support a stable, just and open society adhering to international norms and supporting good governance, rule of law, human rights, democratization and regional integration.

A number of international organizations have also set up regional and sub-regional programs and entities. Among them include the ADB led Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) which finances infrastructure projects and policy environment for trade, transport and cooperation on energy and water; the EU's border management project BOMCA, implemented through UNDP which strives for modernization of border management to create border security and legal trade and transit, the Special Program of Economic Cooperation of CA (SPECA) under UNECE and ESCAP and UNDP's Silk Road initiative which concentrates on trade, investment through UNCTAD, and tourism thorough the World Tourism Organization.

The most important lesson learned is that international and regional organizations need to tackle a new security environment where not only military, but economic, environmental and cultural policies can also pose threats that dangers the survival of individual, groups and states.

Return of the Nation State: Political Will as the Prerequisite

Ultimately, though, the effectiveness of institutions, as well as that of regionalism, in mitigating new threats depends on the states and how they integrate and coordinate common policies. In the final analysis, states remain the most important players in today's international system.

Prevention is neither risk-free nor without costs. One of the reasons why political leaders may be reluctant to take on comprehensive preventive

statecraft is because of the perception that costs to be born and risks to be run are too high and the interests at stake are too low. Realist international relations theories tell us that states prefer to act unilaterally or in concert with few other states in order to maintain their freedom of action and ensure their effectiveness. Yet, states will act in concert when they have a common interest in security/stability and progress/prosperity. They will find the incentive to cooperate around norms and rules, pool risks and reduce transaction costs. The common interests could also be based on negative fears of conflicts and crime, including trafficking of drugs, arms and people spreading over their borders as a consequence of failure of one of their neighboring states. But cooperation can also be on positive intentions, of wishing to see secure access to energy resources, water and environmental protection of common goods.

On the one hand, it seems that the authority and even sovereignty of the nation state eroded with globalization. As Daniel Bell argued: “the nation-state has become too small to deal with the big problems and too big to deal with the small problems.”⁸ It seemed that under globalization, the nation was dead. Yet, the key player in the theatre of regionalization and globalization is in fact the nation state. It is the nation state that can facilitate the transformation of the global to the national policies and vice versa and it is at the nation state level that regionalism and globalization can become effective and free of conflict. Contemporary arrangements mean that we are not witnessing a battle between the global and the national, but a transformation in which the global is constituted inside the national.

The question therefore is not whether the nation state continues to exist in this world order; but how it can be made more effective and legitimate, from the inside and from the outside. There are a number of potential policies and capabilities that the nation state can enact in order to play a more legitimate and effective role. These include giving up part of its independence for the benefit of all by cooperating with others: Externally, it means taking steps towards cooperation if not regional integration and internally towards sharing power with non-state entities, but all within limitations to protect the human security of its citizens. The Regional Security Complex accommodates the nation-state as a key player, but not as the only actor involved in conflict prevention and regional development. The influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business, the media and interest groups becomes much greater than ever before. Information technology and resources are contributing factors to the rise of nations.

⁸ D. Bell, “The World and the United States in 2013”, *DØdalus* Vol. 116, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 14.

The success of the new security cooperation depends on the way states formulate, integrate and coordinate their common policies. New regionalism therefore requires regional cooperation as a strategy, the involvement of non-state actors in polity as well as well coherence between policies. It requires, in short, thinking globally while acting locally. More than ever before, the nation state has the opportunity to use soft power in order to influence global trends in non-traditional ways.

Central Asian states realize the high costs of potential conflicts, what with the patchwork of ethnic groups they inherited, the proximity of an unstable Afghanistan, their weak institutions and low starting points. The governments engaged in a steady policy of stability at any cost. The most successful ones implemented nationality policies that rejected ethno-nationals in favor of an all inclusive policy of civil nationalism. They strove towards gradual economic reforms and selective approach to democratization in order to guarantee basic rights and equal economic opportunities to all groups. To avoid the eruption of ethnic and social tensions, strong national security councils and prevention policies were set up while the potential of existing traditional structures within communities were tapped into to cater to local demands. Informality and labor migration was allowed to happen on a large scale as a coping mechanism to make ends meet, and that by itself, can be considered a unique and rather unusual deliberate mechanism to prevent social tension from incapacitating transition countries.

Conclusions

Inter-dependence and not independence characterizes the world in which we live. Talk of polarity, unitary or multiple, makes little sense when threats and opportunities tie big and small nations, developing, transition and industrialized countries together. Yet, contemporary arrangements still face an insecure transition, either towards conflict inducing competition for more resources by big powers or towards more cooperative frameworks to prevent and mitigate common threats. Regionalism and the return of nation states which are able to implement the right kinds of policies for human security ultimately decide to what extent conflict or cooperation will prove as the most enduring responses.

Within Central Asia, the response so far has been a framework of cooperation with international institutions while consolidating sovereignty, a trend of engagement for taking advantage of opportunities while mitigating the risks diffusion. There has also been convergence within diversity on behalf of international and regional organizations operating within or with Central

Asian countries. If pessimistic realist theory tells us that states fear their loss of independence and sovereignty by cooperating through international and regional organizations, in the Central Asian region, states have been willing and able participants in collective and regional security so far. Yet, the prevalence of common threats in the region present a fork in the road ahead. This makes it even more imperative for international organizations, such as the UNRCCA, to pave the road with good and capable intentions for cooperation and dialogue.

The Regional Center can, as a neutral and structural arbitrator, help in norm setting, organizing collective action and sanctions against non compliers, information sharing, risk assessment, early warning, and most important of all, taking from the local to the global, spreading of lessons and inter-linkages. For this, it has to take on a broad and comprehensive view of peace and security, and as such, engage with a variety of tools and strategies, ranging from quiet diplomacy, track two activities, local networking and capacity building, on the one side, and high level carrot and stick policies on the other.

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Martha Olcott

Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Improving the Western Track Record

Summary: As the twentieth anniversary of the independence of states of Central Asia approaches, it is appropriate to review what the international community has learned about the efficacy of regional cooperation in responding to the challenges that the Central Asian region has faced. The article attempts to answer the question why the international community; particularly western defined or dominated institutions, have only been partially successful in working with the countries of the region to work towards the amelioration of these issues, and regional cooperation, cooperation between the five Central Asian states has been disappointing.

As we begin to approach the twentieth anniversary of the independence of states of Central Asia it is appropriate to review what we have learned about the efficacy of regional cooperation in responding to the challenges that the Central Asian region has faced. The author of this article has written extensively on the causes of the difficulties of regional cooperation in the region, and the difficulties that the Central Asian leaders have in cooperation with one and another. This material is readily available on Carnegie Endowment's website, and would rather use this opportunity to ask the question why the international community; particularly western defined or dominated institutions, have only been partially successful in working with the countries of the region to work towards the amelioration of these issues, and regional cooperation, cooperation between the five Central Asian states has been disappointing.

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There is both good news and bad news as we look at what has occurred in this region over the past two decades, which should give us renewed incentive to figure out how these international efforts could be enhanced.

The Good News

It is important to underscore that developments in the Central Asian region have been far less dire than was initially predicted by many outside observers.

First, there have been no armed conflicts in the region since the end of the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997). This war, which was largely an inter-elite struggle, in which ethnicity played no real role, did not, as some warned prove to be a harbinger of other similar events in other countries in the region.

It is important to underscore that developments in the Central Asian region have been far less dire than was initially predicted by many outside observers.

Second, fears that strained interethnic relations would lead to wars or outbreaks of major instances of interethnic conflict within countries or across borders have also not been realized. These concerns were based on the unrest in the late Soviet period, which included clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic minorities in their portion of the Ferghana Valley (1989), weeks of fighting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh and Jellalabad Oblasts of Kyrgyzstan (1990), cross-border clashes between Kyrgyz and Tajiks over water rights, during this same

period. Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz continue to live in close proximity without major incident, [minor incidents have occasionally occurred, provoked in part by Uzbekistan's mining of this border]. Also, despite the fact that at the time of independence there was over seven thousand kilometers of un-delineated border between the two countries, with millions of Russians and Kazakhs living in intermixed fashion near the borders of both of these countries, there have been no serious outbursts of inter-ethnic tension between the Russian and Kazakh populations. Also, the large outmigration of ethnic Russians from the Central Asia region has also occurred without violence in region or retribution from Russia, who had wanted this population to remain in region, as dual citizens.

At the same time, keen inter-state rivalries do exist, and these also reflect existing rivalries between ethnic groups. But inter-ethnic relations at the communal level, even in border regions, has been pretty good by anyone's standards, and certainly much better than anyone anticipated.

Thirdly, all the talk about the tenuousness of the Central Asian states, that they were based on artificial political creations by Stalin and would be unable to make the transition to functioning nation-states have also proved to be empty pronouncements. While state loyalties have not keenly tested there does seem to be a basic form of civic patriotism developing throughout the region.

Fourth, while Islam is playing a major social and cultural role throughout the region and in many countries it has also become a force or defining morality, there is very little evidence to suggest that the risk of radical Islam is an imminent one. It seems highly unlikely that the 'talibanization' of any of these countries is likely to emerge in the region for at least another generation and maybe longer. Whether or not a theocracy will develop in the region, depends a great deal upon whether the crisis in education can be addressed.

Fifth, the break-up of the Soviet Union has occurred much more smoothly than many expected, including the division of assets. While many of the economies in the region are still heavily dependent upon Russia, most of these states are much less dependent upon the former mother country, than were the former colonies of France at that same time in their history. Part of the reason for this was Russia's own weakness at the time of the USSR's collapse.

The Bad News

There are numerous potential risks to the security of this region. Some of these are 'overflows' from the crisis in Afghanistan. Central Asia is a critical transit route for Afghanistan's opium and heroin trade, and the camps in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan serve as training grounds to for Central Asians eager to learn terrorists' crafts.

There is also the risk of conflict over water resources, which appear to have been becoming scarcer in recent years. The old Soviet-era water distribution system has broken down but no long-term management structure has emerged to regulate the varying needs of upstream water producers who want to use water for energy and downstream consumers who depend on water to support their irrigation-based agricultural economies.

Partly for this region, several Central Asian countries are suffering from acute energy shortages, especially in winter. While world prices of oil and gas have increased multi-fold since these states gained their independence, most consumers in the Central Asian countries have had only marginal increases in utility prices, and overall the gap between local utility prices and international prices is greater now than when they received their independence.

The borders between the Central Asian states have not been fully delineated, nor have they not been fully demilitarized or demarcated, and there are serious difficulties in moving people and goods. There is an absence of a free trade regime and as a result there is no easy movement of non-TIR trade across national borders (by road and by pipeline). Labor migrants who work within and those working beyond this region lack proper legal protections.

The Lack of Success of Western Multilateral Organizations

Many of these problems exist despite the efforts, sometimes quite extensive efforts, by Western multi-lateral organizations to try and solve them. Why have western dominated institutions been only partially successful?

First, it is hard for western-dominated institutions to disassociate themselves from one and another. For example, if a country in the region is sanctioned by the European Union, all of the other western-dominated institutions (including NATO as well as the international financial institutions) find it difficult to disassociate themselves from this action, as they are seen as representing the same constituency.

Secondly, the goals of western institutions are sometimes unrealizable because they compete with the agendas of other organizations in which the Central Asian states are members. For example, the Central Asian states participate in Partnership for Peace, and the NATO parliamentary assembly, and seek training through the auspices of NATO, but they are also members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). The latter two organizations (SCO and CSTO) had very different responses to the August 2008 fighting between Russia and Georgia, with the SCO response much closer to that of NATO than it was to the CSTO, attesting to how much more powerful Russia is in the CSTO than in the SCO. In some ways even more interesting was the gap in attitudes in the wake of the Uzbek government's crackdown of protestors in Andijian in May 2005, which left several hundred unarmed civilians dead. The EU sanctioned the Uzbek government for its actions, and the US introduced some restrictions on the Uzbeks as well, but the SCO nations genuinely supported the Uzbek response, sharing a definition of security that is linked to 'three evils' secession, terrorism and extremism. And in addition to this shared definition of threat is a shared belief that non-democratic countries have same rights of response to terrorism as democratic ones do, and in the case of the SCO states, that the rights of the population potentially threatened by these security risks, than those charged with being responsible for them.

Third, western institutions are sometimes perceived as taking sides in regional disputes. Until quite recently the strategy of the World Bank (and other multilateral institutions) to address the water-energy nexus has been made more difficult by the quasi-on the record statements that

Uzbekistan was the cause of the problem (especially in the area of water usage), and that the problem could be addressed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Fortunately there does seem to be a growing western awareness that this is not a very fruitful strategy.

Fourth, international financial institutions sometimes pursue competing or not fully compatible projects. This has been the case with projects for the creation of new transport corridors, where some transport projects are designed to serve Afghanistan's development needs, or to by-pass Russia and/or Iran, or to favor Kazakhstan, or alternatively to favor Uzbekistan.

Fifth, on a related issue, international financial institutions rarely provide full funding for a project, offering partial funding through grants and low interest loans. They require a local ownership that weak, and oftentimes not fully transparent corrupt (and not all weak regimes are equally corrupt) are unable to give. At the same time the international financial institutions are very inconsistent about making effective use of conditionality, applying what many in the region see as uneven standards and on the one hand criticizing some of the poorer governments in the region quite harshly for their lack of transparency, and then turning around and giving these same governments additional assistance.

Sixth, the challenge of pacifying and rebuilding Afghanistan has created a distorting lens through which many international actors view developments and construct their priorities in Central Asia. This has been particularly true of the U.S. and USAID, but has also been true of the international financial institutions and their infrastructure and priorities for hydroelectric projects. But they have not done this by developing a win-win regional strategy for all concerned.

Seventh, many of the development priorities that have been set by western institutions for this region have focused on the challenges of long-term development while regimes in the region (not surprisingly) are concerned with coping with short-term consequences. For example, when the idea of an undersea Trans-Caspian pipeline was first broached, no western institution

The challenge of pacifying and rebuilding Afghanistan has created a distorting lens through which many international actors view developments and construct their priorities in Central Asia.

offered to forward purchase Turkmen gas to compensate Ashgabat for the loss of revenue that would occur if Russia cut off gas purchases to punish them for signing up to ship their gas over an alternative route. By contrast, China's authorities offered the Turkmen government a low-interest loan to cover lost revenue to divert additional gas to the still being constructed pipeline to China.

Eighth, and finally, while energy security has been a priority of the U.S. and EU in particular in relating to this region, while framing the discussion in terms of helping to secure the independence of these states, the entire discussion has been shaped by the foreign policy priorities of U.S. and EU. For example, although the U.S. and EU advocate multiple pipelines, emphasizing that they by-pass Russia, they have never seriously considered the Iranian option (which is potentially much cheaper and easier to build than the Trans-Caspian option). While the EU countries are generally in conformity with the US (ILSA) sanctions against Iran, all of the Central Asian states maintain normal diplomatic and trade relations with Teheran.

How Can Western Nations and Institutional Actors Be More Successful?

Western institutions are losing their credibility in Central Asia. They are in woeful need of some successes in order to restore confidence in them as a source of advice as well as project funding. One way to help achieve this is to break problems into solvable pieces, in order to build confidence and enhance regional cooperation using a stepping stone approach to resolve some of the largest problems that the region faces. This is particularly true in the series of problems linked to the water-energy nexus.

First, it will also be easier to achieve successes, if we think smaller and short-term. There are some hopeful signs in this regard, as both the UNDP and the World Bank are realizing a small project approach to enhancing energy security in the short term must accompany projects that are directed to address national energy shortages over the medium and long term. In large part these projects focus on renewable energy resources, which are also used to enhance access to clean water projects at the household and community level as well. To date, though, outside of Kyrgyzstan, these projects remain limited in scale, and they are not supported by projects that are designed to stimulate investment in the production of component parts for renewable energy systems in region, a step which is necessary for the expansion of such efforts from pilot projects to mass access.

In general there needs to be an effort to reduce dependence upon national grids to meet energy needs in localities. There needs to be more community based projects, and work on developing a legal environment that is supportive of

the development of renewable energy, including the right of communities to sell surplus energy. This would be an important step towards reforming the structure of utilities more generally, a critical problem, but still a political minefield as well.

This same approach should be applied to water usage in agriculture. The international community has failed to incentivize several countries in the region (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) to engage in fundamental agricultural reform as it affects the cotton sector. Until there is a change in the basic economic philosophy of the regimes involved (and a move away from the purchase of cotton by state-dominated monopolies) it is unlikely that there will be dramatic changes in water usage patterns in the region. This means that we will need to focus on changing water usage patterns through small steps, by encouraging improved usage at the household level, wherever possible in ways that encourage economic diversification.

These efforts can serve as a building block for greater political engagement of the populations at the local-most level, and could make them more effective in pressuring their national governments for economic and social reforms.

Second, the international community should think more regionally, identifying a number of problems that are region wide, but that are not especially politicized, and work to get national ownership of projects that may not be their priority, but that they are willing to engage with.

Two areas in which there are real opportunities for more regional approaches are the challenges posed by returning labor migrants and in education. All of the countries in the region, save Turkmenistan, are facing the challenge of economically and socially reabsorbing returning seasonal laborers who have lost jobs in Russia or Kazakhstan, due to the economic downturns in these countries. Retraining programs could have a regional focus, could be in Russian as well as in the local languages, and could focus on skills which are in short supply in all of the countries in the region.

Similarly, all of the educational systems in the region, save possibly that of Kazakhstan (and then only in select urban areas) have deteriorated sharply over the past two decades, both in the physical plant of schools and in the quality of instruction. Every nation wants the freedom to set its own curricular guidelines and content. At the same time there are an enormous number of common projects that would potentially receive widespread government support especially as it relates to instruction in the fundamental sciences and mathematics. The internet is currently an underutilized network for sharing educational resources. All of the Central Asian states have supported the idea of expanded use of the internet in education, but most lack the funds (and often the electricity) to introduce it on a comprehensive basis. Moreover there are a series of inter-state agreements for cooperation in education already in place,

which currently do not handle many substantive issues, but which could serve as the basis of internationally-funded enhanced cooperation.

Thirdly, western institutions have to be more inclusive in designing projects for implementation in the Central Asian region. Russia has long been and is likely to continue to be a major actor in the area, and given China's growing role in the region there has to be more direct engagement with policy-makers in Beijing as well. But there is a basic contradiction between the commitment to transparency of most of the western-dominated international financial institutions and China's practice of giving assistance without strings to increase economic interdependence with China (in advancement of their national interests rather than the goals of sustainable development in the region).

In Conclusion

It is important to be realistic about how many Central Asian countries are likely to ever incorporate 'European values' in their governments or polities, goals which

Whether or not the Central Asian states get to Europe or not, they are still going to share Eurasia with the Europeans (as will the Russians), and this more need for dialogue across differing value systems than all the communities are fully comfortable with.

are implicit to some of the organizations that all of these states belong to, such as the OSCE. And there is an assumption in many of the development projects that western donors have supported in this region that the successful introduction of their projects will lead to a broader embracing of these very values. A state like Kazakhstan has gone so far as to declare its policies as putting the country 'on the road to Europe'.

It is important though for Western actors to be realistic about what can be achieved in the near or mid term. Let us not assume that pursuing policies that place their countries on a road to Europe will make the people of the region European or that in fact the Western nations are eager for these nations to 'become European'.

Europe has changed by incorporation of Central (former Eastern Europe and Baltic) Europe. And Europe would be changed as much as Caucasus and Central Asia, if these countries are integrated into Europe

That doesn't mean that the Central Asian countries can't participate meaningfully and on an equal basis in some European institutions, but don't

assume that all the Central Asian countries want to fully adopt all of the European cultural and political value system, even if they are completely comfortable living temporarily or working in European-style environments. And over time they may move to adopt 'European' political norms. But for now, and possibly for the next generation, there will not likely be the kind of strong domestic roots for political reform that would be necessary to sustain them.

Elite commitment to political reform is critical, as well, and we should not presume that a transfer of power to a new generation change will produce pro-western elites, in some places (and author does not include Kazakhstan in this group) generational change may lead to a group of people coming to power less commitment to western values among the elites. And in many countries (again Kazakhstan is rather an exception), the bulk of the population is becoming less pro-western over time, in large part because of the deterioration in the quality of education.

Finally, we cannot assume a static situation, neither in Central Asia, nor in the broader community beyond it. Not to diminish the importance of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the region, and the enhanced role that they could play. But the 21st century could well turn into an Asian century, or the beginning of Asian centuries.

Whether or not the Central Asian states get to Europe or not, they are still going to share Eurasia with the Europeans (as will the Russians), and this more need for dialogue across differing value systems than all the communities are fully comfortable with.

Miroslav Jenča

Developments in Central Asia and the Role of the UNRCCA

Summary: Global processes have influenced the Central Asian region and exacerbated existing problems, although the impact of these processes has not been the same for all Central Asian states. The idea of creating a UN structure for Central Asia constituted a defining moment for the region. An understanding was reached that Central Asian countries faced common challenges and threats which, if left unaddressed, could cause tensions and become obstacles to their sustainable development. The positive image of the United Nations, considered by Central Asian states as an impartial body, able to create conditions conducive to finding mutually acceptable compromises and to support their implementation, was also a determining factor.

Central Asia, defined as a geographical region uniting the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is increasingly attracting the attention of the world community. The proximity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, a soil rich in energy resources and exposure to international terrorism and other trans-boundary threats are all factors that have contributed to a growing awareness of Central Asia and the states that compose it.

Although the Central Asian region is sometimes viewed as a new player in the geopolitical processes affecting the Eurasian space, the emphasis placed during the post-independence period on political consolidation and state-building has left little room for the affirmation of a 'Central Asian way' deriving from collective action. The result has been that solutions to regional challenges have

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been sought by each state individually and on the basis of perceived national interests.

Among the most serious challenges are illicit cross-border threats associated with terrorism and organized crime. Central Asia, and specifically the Ferghana Valley region encompassing Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, has been the target of military incursions by armed extremist groups in recent years. Although the governments of the region have so far managed to effectively thwart attempts at destabilization, these groups are still active and their actual strength and following among the population remains an object of speculation.

Adding to the threat of armed groups is the existence of organized crime, generating profits through the drug trade, with the ability to influence the economic and political life of the countries, reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement, and undermine the rule of law. The Afghan conflict and the regional implication of a potential spill-over are also current concerns. The security conditions in Afghanistan, the production and export of illegal drugs, and the associated challenges posed by terrorism and organized crime have an immediate impact on Central Asia. Efforts have been made by the governments of the region to enhance border controls, but the multiplicity of trafficking networks and routes has not allowed to substantially reduce smuggling of drugs and weapons. Occasional armed skirmishes involving traffickers and border guards, notably on the Afghan-Tajik border, are a reminder that the security environment remains volatile.

Of considerable importance to the region are issues related to environmental security and management of common resources such as water and energy. Environmental problems in Central Asia are the result of a number of factors, including the fragmentation of the unified system that formerly governed regional water and energy exchange, and past industrial practices. The effect on populations is severe and, in such cases as nuclear contamination and desertification, has no regard for borders. The five countries experienced particular difficulties over the allocation of energy and water resources, while global environmental and financial trends led to worsened conditions for agriculture and food shortages. In the case of the Aral Sea disaster, the consequences extend beyond the Central Asian region. Despite numerous efforts among the Central Asian countries, no

Of considerable importance to the region are issues related to environmental security and management of common resources such as water and energy.

comprehensive solutions have been found. The absence of workable agreements in this area has become an obstacle for cooperation in other spheres as well.

Global processes have influenced the Central Asian region and exacerbated existing problems, although the impact of these processes has not been the same for all Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has been severely affected by the global financial crisis because of the country's strong integration in the world economy. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have seen their GDP plummet, due to a decrease in remittances and a return of part of the labor force to these countries. By contrast, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with their limited exposure to globalization and specific economic development, appear to have been less affected. Experts put their expected growth rates for 2009 at 7%-8%.

The idea of creating a UN structure for Central Asia constituted a defining moment for the region. An understanding was reached that Central Asian countries faced common challenges and threats which, if left unaddressed, could cause tensions and become obstacles to their sustainable development. The positive image of the United Nations, considered by Central Asian states as an impartial body, able to create conditions conducive to finding mutually acceptable compromises and to support their implementation, was also a determining factor.

On the occasion of a visit by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to Kazakhstan in October 2002, President Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested that the UN could facilitate the emergence of a regional security mechanism in Asia and called for the creation of a UN center for the prevention of regional conflicts.¹

Late Saparmurat Niyazov, the first president of Turkmenistan, was the original advocate of a peace center in Ashgabat. In an article published in 2004 he wrote: "In the context of strengthening the effectiveness of the instruments of preventive diplomacy, it is necessary to establish in Central Asia a United Nations Center on preventive Diplomacy. Turkmenistan is ready to provide all assistance in its establishment in its capital"².

The principle of a UN Center based in Ashgabat was rapidly endorsed by the other four Central Asian states. The agreement between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on friendship, strengthening of trust and development of

¹ "UN Secretary-General Visits Kazakhstan", *Eurasianet.org* (October 2002); <http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200210/0029.shtml>.

² S. A. Niyazov, "Strategic Partnership in the Ideals of Peace and Humanism", *UN Chronicle* No. 2/2004 (online edition), p. 5; <http://www.wwan.cn/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue2/0204p62.asp>.

cooperation, signed by Presidents Niyazov and Karimov on November 19, 2004 in Bukhara contains an explicit reference to the UN Center.³ On December 29, 2004, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan sent a letter to Turkmenistan, expressing his full support for the peace center in Ashgabat.⁴ Tajik President Emamoli Rahmon was present during the inauguration of the Center⁵ and Kyrgyzstan also offered its support in no uncertain terms.

The establishment of the Regional Center has been preceded by several years of consultations between the United Nations and the governments of Central Asia, which were successfully concluded in 2007. In that sense, the Center is an example of political engagement and preventive efforts by the United Nations, in support of Member States. In informing the UN Security Council in May 2007 of his intention to set up the Center, the Secretary General noted that the five governments of Central Asia had reached a consensus on the creation of a United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) in Ashgabat. Elaborating on the reasons underpinning this decision, he stated: "While initiating this proposal, the Governments of the region took into consideration the multiple threats that face Central Asia, including international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, organized crime and environmental degradation."

The inauguration took place on December 10, 2007 at the outset of a two-day international conference on *International Cooperation in Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution* hosted by the new President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimukammedov, and attended by the Tajik President and the Foreign Ministers of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The United Nations were represented by B. Lynn Pascoe, Under-

³ "The high contracting parties attach special importance to the further strengthening of the role of the United Nations and its Security Council [...] in the task of prevention and settlement of conflicts, questions related to safety and stability, strengthening of trust. In this connection the high contracting parties recognize the necessity to create a Regional Center of the United Nations on Preventive Diplomacy with its headquarters in Ashgabat and a Central Asian Regional Information Center of the United Nations on the struggle against trans-national crimes connected with trafficking in narcotics, in Tashkent."

⁴ "Our countries need to select the most convenient location for the Center. Given Turkmenistan's important geostrategic position in the region, its consistent policies of neutrality and developing friendly relations with neighboring countries, I would like to confirm Kazakhstan's previous support for locating this center in Ashgabat."

⁵ The Tajik leader defined opening the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy as an "event of exceptional significance for the countries in the region and another vivid evidence of Turkmenistan's adherence to the policy of peace and good neighborliness".

Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who delivered an inaugural message on behalf of Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.

The UNRCCA became operational in June 2008. The Center is a unique entity in the UN system. It is entrusted with a mandate to assist the Central Asian states to address common regional challenges and threats of a trans-boundary nature by using the tool of preventive diplomacy. The UNRCCA is mandated to liaise with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; to provide monitoring and analysis; to maintain contact with regional organizations and facilitate coordination and information exchange. In addition, the Center is to provide an overall framework and leadership for the preventive activities of the UN country teams and to maintain close contact with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) is entrusted with a mandate to assist the Central Asian states to address common regional challenges and threats of a trans-boundary nature by using the tool of preventive diplomacy.

During an initial phase, active consultations were conducted with the leadership of Central Asia, regional organizations (SCO, OSCE, CIS, CSTO, EU, NATO, EurAsEc), and the UN system (UN Resident Coordinators, UN Country Teams, Heads of Programs, Funds, and Agencies both in the region and at Headquarters). Given the need for a comprehensive approach to the region, consultations also took place with senior officials from neighboring countries, representatives of civil society, and the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. In addition to establishing the proper channels for coordination and information exchange, the purpose of these discussions was to identify

the main challenges for peace, security, and development in the region, the existing mechanisms and capacities, and priorities for preventive action.

These meetings confirmed the need for a regional engagement, given the cross border nature of the challenges facing Central Asia, and emphasized the catalytic role that the Center could play in developing initiatives with the UN system, regional organizations, and Member States. Equally important, these interactions led to the development of a *3-Year Program of Action (2009-2011)* that constitutes the basis of the UNRCCA activities.

The program has three priorities:

- promoting an integrated approach to the management of essential common resources such as water and energy in order to prevent tensions and environmental degradation;

- supporting regional cooperation to counter cross-border threats such as terrorism, organized crime and drug-trafficking;
- supporting the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

In implementing its *Program of Action* the Regional Center maintained close coordination with UN agencies and relevant regional organizations to ensure better synergy and complementarity of action. Specialized meetings were organized with members of UN Country Teams operating in Central Asia to discuss strategic approaches to emerging challenges. Regular exchanges were held with representatives of OSCE, CIS, SCO, EurAsEc, EU, CSTO, NATO, ECO and other organizations.

UNRCCA implements its programmatic priorities through the conduct of joint activities involving Central States. It bases its approach on the following principles:

- It acts as a platform for dialogue and exchanges between Central Asian states with a view to assisting them in finding solutions that would be equally acceptable to all.
- It is neutral and impartial. It does not insist on pre-determined models, but tries to foster the elaboration of local solutions based on models that conform to the development and traditions of Central Asian societies. This increases the chances that solutions found will be sustainable.
- It favors an inclusive approach. UNRCCA reaches out to all relevant domestic and international stakeholders to foster international cooperation and ensure transparency in the conduct of its activities.
- It seeks to equally involve all five states in regional projects by organizing events in each of them.

The activities conducted so far ranged from a specialized forum for dialogue building among the Central Asian countries to targeted projects for capacity building and technical assistance. In designing these activities, the UNRCCA coordinates closely with regional organizations and UN entities that have ongoing projects. The Center has neither the intention nor, given its small size, the possibility to duplicate their work. Rather, the political engagement and preventive efforts by the Center, in support of the Central Asian Member States, have already brought some positive results.

Water Energy and Environment

The sector of water and energy is critically important for the development needs of Central Asia and long-term stability. About 80% of the region's water supply originates in mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These

two countries, which suffer from lack of electricity during the cold winters and have little hydrocarbon resources, have been pursuing the construction of hydropower projects on the upper streams of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers as a means of becoming energy-independent. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, situated downstream, rely on water from their neighbors for their important cotton industries, as well as for agriculture. They fear that the construction of hydropower stations and new dams will reduce the flow of water for their farming industries. In Soviet times a system of exchange enabled the five states to share water and energy resources, such as electricity and gas, but this barter scheme is no longer active and the five states have been unable to devise a new one.

In order to assist in finding workable solutions, the UNRCCA has been exploring various approaches. Its actions have been aimed at stimulating an

In Soviet times a system of exchange enabled the five states to share water and energy resources, such as electricity and gas, but this barter scheme is no longer active and the five states have been unable to devise a new one.

exchange of ideas, reducing barriers to constructive dialogue and inspiring effective decisions taking into consideration the interests of all the parties concerned. The Center has been working to establish a common understanding within the region of the causes of the problem and the processes that may contribute to its resolution.

An international seminar was organized in Kazakhstan on *International Water Law and the Negotiation of Mutually Beneficial Multilateral Water Agreements in Central Asia*. The event provided a forum of discussion about water problems where representatives of upstream and downstream countries in

the Central Asian Region and international experts shared best practices in negotiating successful trans-boundary water agreements in light of existing international water conventions and interstate agreements. As a result of this initiative, a consultative process was launched. Its purpose is to facilitate the search for a common approach to water management issues by encouraging local ownership and the elaboration of long-term sustainable solutions.

The UNRCCA was a regular guest of regional forums where water-energy issues were discussed. It was the only international structure to attend the special consultations of the five heads of the Central Asian states in Bishkek, in October 2008, dedicated to the management of water and energy resources. The Presidents reached a number of preliminary understandings on regional arrangements in advance of winter and the planting season. In April 2009,

it was invited to the Summit of the founder states of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), and delivered a message on behalf of the UN Secretary-General. The Joint Statement of the Summit called on state parties to strengthen the IFAS and develop cooperation with the UNRCCA, other UN structures and international organizations. The express reference to the Regional Center was tantamount to an explicit mandate given by the Central Asian states to the UNRCCA to pursue its preventive mediation efforts in the water and energy sphere.

The Center also worked to establish partnerships through its participation in international events⁶, advocating enhanced regional cooperation in the management of energy resources and its link to sustainable development. Future activities will be aimed at facilitating the search for a common approach by highlighting the potential shared benefits of an efficient management of natural resources. It is hoped that by providing a permanent platform for multilateral and bilateral exchanges, the Center will secure a dynamic that will allow moving from *ad hoc* to more durable solutions to water/energy problems based on consensus between the countries of the region.

Using its convening power, the UNRCCA provided a political framework for the preventive activities of UN country teams and promoted an integrated approach to environmental challenges facing the region. One of the greatest risks to the region is posed by dozens of uranium tailings throughout Central Asia left as a legacy from the former USSR military-industrial complex. These tailings contain massive amounts of toxic uranium and other extremely hazardous wastes. The state of virtually all the sites where the wastes are stored has significantly deteriorated. The risks are exacerbated by the location of the majority of tailings near populated areas, in the upper watersheds of trans-boundary Rivers and in areas that are vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides and mudflows. Should significant volumes of toxic waste contaminate the waters flowing through the Valley, the possibility of a major catastrophe for the communities located near these sites as well as for the broader Ferghana Valley, with its 12 million inhabitants, is real.

In order to support streamlining of international efforts to address this regional security concern, the UNRCCA co-chaired with the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan an international forum dedicated to the threat posed by uranium tailings in Central Asia⁷. The forum gathered high-level delegations from all

⁶ It participated in the *5th World Water Forum* (Istanbul, March 16-22, 2009) and the international conference on *Reliable and Stable Transit of Energy for Sustainable Development and International Cooperation* (Ashgabat, April 23-24, 2009).

Central Asian countries and donor countries, high-level officials of Headquarters, regional bureaus and representative offices of international organizations and finance institutions, representatives of the expert community and private sector. By highlighting the urgency of the problem and prioritizing preliminary proposals elaborated to-date, the event generated support and momentum to move the uranium tailings cleanup initiative forward.

Trans-Boundary Organized Crime

The overall security situation in Central Asia can be considered as generally stable but fragile. The Governments of the region have shown determination to prevent criminal trans-boundary activities. Border controls were stepped up. Isolated but deadly armed incidents were reported on the Afghan border. Against

The continued threat posed by terrorist groups in Central Asia remains at the center of attention.

this background, the *Agreement on the establishment of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC)* entered into force on March 22, 2009 following its ratification by the parliaments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. CARICC is a regional interstate agency working under UNODC auspices that will assist in coordinating joint

international operations to combat illicit drug trafficking and in exchanging information on trans-border crime. The UNRCCA provides political support to the work of CARICC and facilitates streamlining of international assistance in support of its activities.

The continued threat posed by terrorist groups in Central Asia remains at the center of attention. Almost every month, law enforcement officials in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan announce new arrests of suspected terrorist militants. Individuals accused of propagating extremist ideas are tried. Measures are taken to prevent the spread of religious extremism, particularly in schools. The UNRCCA has closely followed all security-related developments in the region and plans to support Central Asian states to jointly address the threat of terrorism in all its forms and through enhanced international cooperation.

In order to facilitate cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism, it will organize, together with the UN Department of Political Affairs and the UN

⁷ International Forum *Uranium Tailings in Central Asia: National Problems, Regional Consequences, Global Solution*, Palais des Nations, Geneva (June 29, 2009).

Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force, a series of expert meetings dedicated to the implementation of recommendations contained in the *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. The expected outcome would be the adoption, at a regional Ministerial conference to be held in 2010, of a joint plan of action on implementing the *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia*. The EU, SCO and other relevant organizations have shown interest in this project.

On March 21, 2009, in a landmark development, the treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia came into force. The treaty was ratified by all five Central Asian states. By agreeing to adhere to a legally binding instrument, Central Asian authorities demonstrated clear commitment to address the greatest potential threat to human security. The UNRCCA is associated with efforts aimed at strengthening regional security against terrorist threats coming from weapons of mass destruction. It will mobilize efforts to raise awareness about international and regional legal instruments related to the suppression of acts of terrorism, be it nuclear, chemical or biological. For that purpose, a joint workshop on non-proliferation and international legal cooperation against biological, chemical and nuclear terrorism will be organized with UNODC in December 2009 in the presence of senior legal experts and Central Asian Diplomats.

Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan is one of the essential factors for the stability of Central Asian countries. Although there has been no noticeable deterioration of the security environment in connection with the war in Afghanistan, the threat of destabilization is taken very seriously by all Central Asian states. In order to ensure a comprehensive and integrated analysis of the situation in the region, in line with its mandate, the UNRCCA has maintained close contact with UNAMA.

A series of events was also organized. The UNRCCA and UNHCR highlighted problems related to Afghan refugees in Central Asia. They held a joint seminar in March 2009 with the participation of law enforcement officials of the five Central Asian states, during which security developments were also discussed. The UNRCCA promoted the role of preventive diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool by holding a workshop on global challenges in Central Asia. Experts from various Institutes of Strategic Studies in the region debated the situation in Afghanistan and the effects of the global crisis. The UNRCCA also used its participation in various regional and international forums dedicated to the situation in Afghanistan (Moscow, Islamabad, Rome, Tashkent) to advance regional security cooperation and its preventive diplomacy activities. In its future

initiatives related to Afghanistan, and coordinated with UNAMA, the UNRCCA will emphasize the positive contribution that Central Asian states can play in stabilizing and reconstructing the war-torn country through joint ventures, development projects and capacity building support.

Conclusion

The UNRCCA is operational and fully engaged. It has acquired visibility, gained acceptance and found its place in the regional landscape. It is a regular guest of international and regional events focusing on the multifaceted threats facing Central Asia. It cooperates with entities of the UN system as well as other international and regional organizations active in the region and has demonstrated its convening power in the area of preventive diplomacy. It has played a role in reducing tensions on the divisive water-energy issue by creating an atmosphere conducive to the search for mutually acceptable solutions. It plans to strengthen the ability of Central Asian states to address potential causes of conflict and use mechanisms to diffuse them, by organizing a series of trainings in Central Asia about preventive diplomacy. All in all, the UNRCCA has a *Program of Action*, initial achievements, future plans, and a clear sense of the direction its activities should take. Building upon this solid foundation, the Regional Center will continue acting as a neutral facilitator and mechanism for preventive mediation, fostering dialogue and cooperation in support of peace, stability and development in Central Asia.

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Elnara Bainazarova

Central Asia Faces New Security Challenge: Illegal Migration Flows

Summary: The issue of illegal migration is relevant for Kazakhstan and Central Asia in general. As for the migration policy initiatives undertaken in the framework of CIS, CSTO, researching the European way of solving the problem will, eventually, need to elaborate the best suitable way to meet the challenges facing the region. The Central Asian states are conducting a rather negligent policy for asylum-seekers, labor migrants and refugees. These factors stimulate people to search for another way of entering the country. Because it's not only immigration laws and return policies, it's a real dilemma and issue of morality – when rejected asylum-seekers or refugees are not granted the refugee status they are also illegal. Illegal migration created a lot of contradictions and obscurity among the states involved in it.

The worldwide growth in international migration in recent decades has been accompanied by an increase in what is variously called 'irregular migration', 'undocumented migration' or 'illegal migration'. That is, there has been an increase in the number of people living in the higher-income countries who have either entered the country in violation of that country's laws or who have done something to violate a condition of a legal entry. The latter may arise from staying longer than permitted or from working in spite of a visa that prohibits or limits working, such as a tourist, student or temporary worker visa.

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The problem of illegal migration has been one of the vital issues for the economically developed states for some time now. Experts consider that illegal migration turned into a successful business of international criminal groups. Relying on some sources, the yearly income of the transnational criminal groups which specialise on illegal human smuggling is about \$7 billion, in Europe- more than \$1 billion. The profits of human smuggling are close to that of illegal drug trafficking.

There is every reason to believe that this illegal migration from the developing countries of the 'South' to the high income countries of the 'North' (including Australia) will intensify in the coming decades if present policies continue. The more increasing diversity between 'South' and 'North' cause a real gap in developed and less developed countries.

The issue of illegal migration is relevant for Kazakhstan also and Central Asia in general. As for the migration policy initiatives undertaken in the framework of CIS, CSTO, researching the European way of solving the problem will, eventually, need to elaborate the best suitable way to meet the challenges facing the region.

The Central Asian states are conducting a rather negligent policy for asylum-seekers, labor migrants and refugees. These factors stimulate people to search for another way of entering the country. And the huge role of smugglers and traffickers should not be ignored. All these cases created the problem of illegal migration, which is a really burning question of our time. Because it's not only immigration laws and return policies, it's a real dilemma and issue of morality – when rejected asylum-seekers or refugees are not granted the refugee status they are also illegal. Illegal migration created a lot of contradictions and obscurity among the states involved in it.

Geographical Aspects of Illegal Migration Flows

At present, the Central Asian states are searching for a proper balance between internal security and external stabilization that is acceptable to all sides. In recent years, the CIS has assumed a greater role in dealing with security concerns within Central Asia. In response to nation states' decreasing capabilities to deal effectively with problems at the national level, domestic policy fields such as asylum and migration have been at least partially transferred to international responsibility. And illegal migration is emerging as one of the vital issues at the sub-regional level. Every year, an estimated 30 million people cross an international border illegally, of which, according to the Migration Police of the Republic of Kazakhstan, between 400,000 and 500,000 enter Kazakhstan.

Picture 1. Illegal Migration Transit Routes through Kazakhstan



The stock of illegal residents in Kazakhstan is currently estimated to be around two million (Migration Police Department, 2008). In recent years, Central Asian states have come to the conclusion that they are no longer able to properly react to the phenomenon of irregular migration on the domestic level and instead need to combine their efforts regarding return policies on a regional level. Measures against illegal migration hence, became a focal point in the CIS' efforts to establish an area of security.

Increasingly both policy makers and society are coming to realize that tensions and problems within societies are growing (and will grow) by virtue of the presence of illegal labor migrants.

In the global scale of migration processes the countries of Eastern Europe and CIS, and Central Asia itself, are emerging as transit regions. But on a sub-regional scale, in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is a state of transit and origin at the same time. Hence, we can define the following groups of countries:

- origin-transit-destination countries: Kazakhstan
- origin-transit countries: South Asia (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, India), Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), China and Mongolia. In the last decades, an illegal route by the Caspian Sea

from Azerbaijan has emerged. The citizens of the abovementioned countries consider the territory of Kazakhstan as a transitory way to Russia and Europe.

Intra-regional migration is an indication of how well a country/area is doing, even if statistics do not reveal it. Increasingly people go to Kazakhstan for work. The pattern seems to be as follows (Picture 1):

- Kyrgyz from the north of Kyrgyzstan go to Kazakhstan,
- Kyrgyz from the south go to Chui Valley in the north of the country
- Uzbeks and Tajiks in the Ferghana Valley go to southern Kyrgyzstan.
- Uzbeks from the west go to work in Turkmenistan as cheap labor force at construction sites, such as presidential palaces and luxury hotels.

In the International Organization for Migration 2007 Annual report, Central Asia is regarded as a region of transit, with the note that if the main flow of migrants stocks to West Europe, the Baltic states and the USA, illegal migrants from Central Asia follow up to UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey or South Korea.

Illegal immigration overall involves different categories as regards the people concerned and the different networks through which they pass before arriving and remaining illegally in Kazakhstan. The people involved are mainly:

- those who illegally enter the territory of a state either with no documents at all or by using false or forged documents;
- those who have entered with a valid visa or residence permit but have 'overstayed';
- those whose legal residence becomes illegal when they take up employed activity;
- those with a residence and work permit who overstay their period of legal residence or violate residence regulations in other ways.

The Current State of Interaction on Combating Illegal Migration

The period of 1992-1997 was characterized by the process of entire migration in the region, taking into account that about 4 million people have changed their place of residence. The main reasons were local military conflicts, the deterioration of economic and social conditions, which eventually forced people to search for a better life outside the borders. It should be noted that Russia, being the largest labor market in CIS, is still emerging as the main center for migrants' destination since 1999. However, in the last decades, the economic growth in Kazakhstan stipulated its' status as a migrant destination country, because the labor market in the Republic

has become attractive for citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

Despite the numerous adopted international treaties, laws and normative acts since the 1990's, in general, the juridical basis cannot face the realities of the present time.

The existing problem of illegal migration is considered a threat for national security. In terms of this suggestion the overall migration policy of the CA states is built on the principles of border control restriction. However, as it was witnessed in practice, frequently the border control restriction is not the most effective way to tackle the problem. Lots of migrants manage to cross the border posts and reach not only the Russia-Kazakhstan border, but the western border of the Russia, as well.

Evaluating the current state of interaction in the field of migration, we can see the following trends:

1. The absence of a common approach to solve the problem in the framework of CIS. We can dare say, that there's no practical interaction between states, apart from adopting declarative documents.
2. The duplication of functions, goals and administrative organs. The fight against illegal migration was stated as one of the main goals both in CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC. In all of these structures the special councils of migration police senior officials are organized. During the summit in Dushanbe the plan of cooperation in migration control between CSTO and EurAsEC was declared. In this connection the role of CIS is obscure.
3. The next sign is that the cooperation will sooner develop between destination countries rather than between destination and donor-countries. Therefore we can positively evaluate only Kazakhstan-Russia cooperation, where the common actions as 'Border', 'Canal', etc, are being implemented.
4. The policy of migration control depends on the internal national-religious aspect and external relations as well, which leads to some difficulties in migration law restriction. The last time, in the media the number of publications on the role of illegals in the distribution of xenophobia and extremism are instantly growing. But, according to statistical tabulation, we can see only single facts of that kind. Maybe the purpose is to tackle illegal migration and border management. But in this case there's a danger of

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xenophobia in frontier districts. The distribution of these phenomena in multi-confessional, multi-ethnic region is a real danger for international security.

So, in the absence of a properly managed mechanism to fight with illegal migration in Central Asia, it's likely to enhance the following tools to control labor migration:

- elimination of corruption in local migration control bodies
- adjustment of a special article on criminal responsibility of human traffickers and employers using an illegal labor force
- common actions conduction between involved states
- the control on migration amount depending on employers request
- the drafting of a single universal international treaty, which will cover all of the aspects of illegal migration
- preventive measures implemented on an internal level.

Central Asia in the Highlight of EU Migration Policy: Combating Common Threats and Challenges

Many challenges facing the globalized world affect Europe and Central Asia alike, and warrant common response measures. Security questions and regional economic development require close cooperation with the EU with each Central Asian state, taking into account their geographical location, in particular, with respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. This applies to developments in the areas of proper border management, as well as combating illegal migration.

To date, the EU has played an active role in Central Asia. The initiative by the German Presidency of the EU to launch a process of rethinking the involvement of the EU in Central Asia, culminating with the production of a Strategy on Central Asia, is thus timely. The EU has the opportunity to strengthen its presence at a strategic moment for Central Asia.

Through the Strategy and Commission's Assistance Program for the period of 2007-2013, the EU has defined priorities for its cooperation with each Central Asian state according to its specific needs. Within the new external assistance instruments, based on the EU budget 2007-2013, the EU has planned to double the financial means for assisting Central Asian states.¹ With the EU enlargement process, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the

¹ "European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013"; http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf.

European Neighborhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU are moving closer together.

Modern border management creating open and secure borders could facilitate trade and exchange in the region and help combat regional criminal activity, especially illegal migration flows. The EU at present is seeking for enhancing dialogue and cooperation on migration with regions of transit, origin and destination through the EU's Global Approach to Migration. As part of the Global Approach the EU proposes to launch a close dialogue on migration with eastern and south-eastern neighboring regions. The EU is going to step up its support for the development of modern border management in the region of Central Asia, including the borders with Afghanistan, which will be seen by broadening BOMCA activities and seeking synergy with projects under implementation to reform customs services. The EU will:

- Provide organizational assistance to support the transformation of border guards from a conscript to a professional service; and support efforts to strengthen control mechanisms;
- Update the legal framework in accordance with international law in the field of organized crime, with a focus on illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, preventing and countering drugs and precursors trafficking.²

However, the EU should continue to offer its assistance to help the interested Central Asian states – both on the national and regional level – to manage migration in a more balanced manner, which implies setting up well operating systems to match labor demand and supply, facilitating integration of legal migrants and providing international protection to asylum seekers and refugees.

It was stated, that based on the principles of this Strategy, the EU will work with each of the Central Asian countries to develop individual approaches to implementation, but we can see a large gap between the amounts of financial support for Central Asian states, which is not clear, by what reason the EU decided to lack the donations for Turkmenistan, for example. (See Table 1).

The EU should continue to offer its assistance to help the interested Central Asian states – both on the national and regional level – to manage migration in a more balanced manner.

² "European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership" (October 2007); https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU_CtrAsia_EN-RU.pdf.

Table 1. Budget Allocated for CA Countries 2007-2010³

National Programs	Indicative Budget (€)	of which:
Kazakhstan	44 million	20%
Kyrgyzstan	55 million	25%
Tajikistan	66 million	30%
Turkmenistan	22 million	10%
Uzbekistan	32,8 million	15%
		100%
Total Bilateral Central Asia	219,8 million	70%

Nevertheless, the progress made on implementing the Strategy will be reviewed and the cornerstones of the EU assistance for Central Asia will be changed. What is more, in the highlight of France's presidency in EC, we have seen the shift of priorities to Mediterranean, taking into account President Sarkozy's proposed Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), which has so far been poorly convinced and, to say the least, awkwardly presented politically. However this doesn't mean that nothing good can come of it. Both Italy and Spain as well as South Mediterranean countries themselves appear concerned not to undermine the existing structures (Barcelona and ENPI). The EU will want to maintain a balance between the Northern and Southern priorities, and if the UMed becomes a new impetus for the South, an equivalent but more adaptive policy move can be implemented for the EU's East European and Central Asian (CA) neighbors.

Coherence of EU policies and other donor countries is planned to be pursued in all areas of cooperation. This issue is particularly relevant for linking the *Central Asia Indicative Programs* with the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements that have been agreed with each of the region's five states are built around the same two major commitments, namely to align their respective frameworks with that of the EU, and to undertake regulatory convergence.

With the EU enlargement and the new external policies concerning Russia and neighboring states, the countries of Central Asia have become essential neighbors of the EU Neighborhood and Common Spaces areas, where the shift towards approximation with the EU should be accelerated.

³ "Central Asia Indicative Program 2007-2010"; http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/nip_07_10_en.pdf.

The EU Strategy for the region is an important step for the EU-CA relationship but also, potentially, a signpost to the future direction of EU engagements in other parts of the world. Much will have to be done to ensure the implementation of the Strategy and to ensure that CA receives increased resources in the years ahead. What is equally important is that if the EU is to strengthen its influence in CA, the Strategy will have to be underpinned by a clear, consistent and long-term political approach to the region that is in accordance with European values. It is only on this basis that the EU will be able to build an effective, sustainable and credible presence in the region mutually beneficial for all sides concerned.

During the 2007-2010 period covered by this *Indicative Program*, a total EC grant of 314 million euro is planned for Central Asia under the regional CA program, with an average annual budget of €78.5 million per year.⁴

Security concerns in Central Asia can have an impact on wider international relations in the region, especially on Russia and China, and on the EU as well. The EU has an interest in cooperation with Central Asians to make advances on these questions. Serious problems, if they happen, would be impossible to ignore, as they can trigger refugee flows, disrupt investment and create wider destabilization in the region. Lastly, despite external aid, the ability of the states to cope with security challenges remains weak, and they may require outside security assistance in the event of an outbreak of acute violence.

What is more, Afghanistan is experiencing high population growth. It is a matter of time before the Afghans start to become interested in labor opportunities in Central Asia and cross-border migration follows.

To sum up, trans-regional security threats are growing, but political obstacles to genuine security cooperation are too great. Moreover, national capabilities for dealing with illegal migration are also weak. The EU can play a greater role in helping to create alternative solutions to cope with the human trafficking challenge.

The BOMCA is a flagship EU regional program. Closely related are CADAP (*Central Asia Drug Assistance Program*), NADIN (anti-drug measures) and *Development and Modernization of Efficient Central Asian Customs Administra-*

The EU can play a greater role in helping to create alternative solutions to cope with the human trafficking challenge.

⁴ Ibid.

tions. The overall objective of BOMCA is to assist the five countries with the effectiveness of border management. It is the largest EU intervention in border management and drug action in the CIS with a total expenditure of about €44 million for 2004-2009. The programs have been designed as technical projects managed by TACIS and are implemented by UNDP in partnership with the OSCE and the IOM.

Although the program has led to the implementation of many good projects, the critical view is that BOMCA's approach has been mainly technical and lacking in political direction. The pitfall of the program was that the BOMCA/CADAP overall strategy and the EU's political role remained unclear. Although the EC provided a technical expert to monitor and advise UNDP on implementation, political oversight has been lacking. Prior to agreeing on BOMCA, the Commission did not negotiate the terms and mutual obligations with the beneficiary governments due to time pressure in preparing the Action Plan. This allowed the governments to obtain assistance for their security

agencies without reciprocal commitments, for instance, to alter their border regimes or to fight corruption. This also gave the EU an opportunity to insist that measures should be implemented as a package, but instead allowed the governments to pick and choose a la carte.

Nevertheless, such activities should continue because they are important both for the EU's security and for promoting

stability in Central Asia, especially given the effort it took BOMCA to get to this point. However, it is a legitimate question to ask how the ongoing engagement with the appropriate governments in the security sphere relates to the EU's overall political stance.

The rotating EU Presidency is a key actor in scaling up or down the significance of a particular issue on the EU agenda. Although Central Asia never really had a lobbyist in the EU, lately it has begun to attract more attention. In 2004 the Dutch Presidency launched a regional political dialogue between the EU and Central Asia, in which the EU was represented by its *Troika*. The Austrian Presidency (first six months of 2006) has been active, and made Kazakhstan as centerpiece of EU policy, seeking to promote Kazakhstan as a regional leader.

To sum up, the following conclusions can be made:

- The EU should take to ensure that it sticks to its definitions of security challenges and remains vigilant to the differing definitions used by CA governments. The EU should target for engagement those areas where

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it can make progress on illegal migration challenges as they are explicitly defined within the EU.

- The record of regional cooperation in CA suggests that the regional approach to these issues should be subject to regular review with an eye to alternate bilateral approaches.
- The EU should focus primarily on the quality of governance in the fight against illegal migration, and not on efforts to bolster existing approaches to these problems. In other words, the emphasis should be on qualitative change, not quantitative.
- Moving from the regional to the national context, Kazakhstan presents the most attractive options for heightened EU engagement on illegal migration issues. Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship in 2010 will eventually give more opportunities for illegal migration policy optimization, which will be seen as more joint operations and programs, establishing coordination centers on information exchange.
- The EU should engage Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but with realistic expectations of what can and cannot be achieved. As Turkmenistan begins to open up to the outside world in the wake of Saparmurad Niyazov's death, opportunities for limited cooperation will certainly arise.

The Emerging Role of CICA

The role of regional cooperation on the fight against illegal migration is crucial and in this connection the enhancement of cooperation in the framework of CICA (Conference of Interaction and Security building measures in Asia) should become the cornerstone issue in all of the regional organizations. Kazakhstan gaining the chairmanship in the OSCE in 2010, could eventually initiate the link between CICA and OSCE to solve the existing intraregional problems more effectively. As it was stated by the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, CICA should become 'an OSCE for Asia', taking into account the growing significance of Asian countries and the non-traditional security threats the states are facing today.

The CICA process is unique because it aims to create a meaningful security environment covering the entire continent of Asia through dialogue, cooperation and confidence building measures among the member states. Member States of CICA come from all parts of Asia covering nearly ninety percent of the area and the population of the continent, and are the resource for a real potential to deepen the cooperation.

Member States also realized that in order to accomplish the ultimate goal of making Asia a region of peace and security, it is necessary that CICA should

have active cooperation with other Asian regional and sub-regional organizations and fora. A two pronged strategy has been adopted for this purpose. On one side, CICA is on the way to establish an institutional level relationship with other regional organizations. On the other hand, CICA will be organizing a conference of all the Asian regional and sub-regional organizations and fora in April-May 2009 to discuss Asian security challenges at the time of globalization, interaction between regional entities as well as other issues.

Apart from this, CICA has also considered the issue of interaction with NGOs. This is exactly the field where the knowledge and experience of the participants of today's conference can be applied. This direction has a very promising future.

Based on the conclusions, the following policy-related recommendations can be given:

Continue efforts to prevent unauthorized entry through smarter border and entry controls. This element must include extending and tightening visa requirements, establishing increasingly substantial carrier sanctions for the transportation of improperly documented passengers, and making even greater investments in physical, electronic, and human controls at the borders. It must also incorporate more aggressive initiatives such as insisting that states identified as weak links in the effort against organized unauthorized migration accept 'targeted technical assistance' (which may include the stationing of immigration officers at their main ports of exit) and pursuing agreements with source countries to take back their illegally resident nationals.

Develop and implement smarter interior controls that focus on organized rings, immigrants that commit crimes, and 'bad' employers. No state has been effective in their interior control efforts against illegal immigration. Improving the payoff from this response entails three elements. The first, interior enforcement, requires intense cooperation and coordination among a variety of police and police-like branches in agencies with enforcement mandates (such as labor, tax revenue and social welfare ministries). The formation of multi-agency task forces focusing particularly on organized criminal activity that relates to illegal immigration must receive increasing attention, as is giving enforcement agencies such additional legal powers as asset-seizure authority so that they can confiscate the property and other resources of those that engage in trafficking. The second element focuses on holding employers liable for habitually employing those who are not authorized to work and for exploiting them. The likelihood that such hires are often used to skirt employer responsibility toward their required social contributions, and may also violate other fundamental social, human, and labor rights, provides additional enforcement incentives while placing non-complying employers under multiple moral and legal hazards that may be more

difficult for them to ignore. The third element targets unauthorized workers themselves with a system of penalties that combine forms of 'asset forfeiture' (in the form of substantial fines) with incarceration for repeat offenders. (Only Japan currently uses this extreme enforcement tool.)

Strengthen and tap into the resources of the intelligence community far more systematically. This response relies on intelligence resources to disrupt and dismantle organized criminal trafficking networks. Among its tools are classic police tactics, such as the use of informants and the penetration of criminal networks by undercover officers, and greater international cooperation among intelligence agencies. Understanding better how the various networks are organized and relate to each other, their infrastructure and resource bases, their routes and support systems, and their 'clients' at destination must become priorities. Furthermore, it cannot be pursued effectively by intelligence-heavy law enforcement in a single country alone; it requires the cooperation of other targeted countries, as well as of sending and transit countries.

Invest much greater amounts of diplomatic capital in strategies to contain organized forms of clandestine migration. The thrust of this response is to engage key sending and transit states in truly bilateral negotiations, offering items of high interest to them in exchange for their 'organic' cooperation in a common front against organized forms of illegal migration. This foreign-policy/diplomacy-heavy response should also pursue the more robust implementation of the UN Convention against trafficking and the development of regional mechanisms for addressing asylum.

It's a vital issue to see if conditions can be improved locally so that there will be no need for people to seek a better and safer life outside their home country. Political, human rights and development issues in countries of origin and transit must be tackled. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular the rights of minorities, and of women and children. Some processes are much easier to stop or reverse in their early stages before they have become established, and this is an important characteristic of illegal migration.

The fact is that globalization is a reality, one that is gathering pace as we speak, whether we like it or not. The high-speed dynamic of the contemporary world sweeps individuals along in an overwhelming, and often confusing, matrix of interaction, information and exchange. The former PM of Russia, Yevgeniy Primakov, has said: "We are all the passengers of a single spaceship, called Earth." This is specifically why we need a new conceptual and practical framework that encourages a rational, moderate and sustainable globalization.

Most of the non-traditional challenges have trans-national linkages aided by the ease of communications and transportation. Illegal human trafficking prospers on account of trans-national linkages. It is, therefore, becoming increasingly clear that both traditional and non-traditional security challenges cannot be addressed in isolation and require collaborative multilateral responses for their resolution.

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Sayfiddin Juraev

The Uzbekistan's Role in Central Asia

Summary: The list of global problems is something which concerns all cities, countries and continents. In fact, the origin of many of them can often be traced back to Asian countries, which particularly suffer from these current security threats. In other words, the security of the Central Asian countries and their sustainable development have become hostage to all the dangerous tendencies confronting the world today. The article deals with the selected problems of regional security, as well as the policy on the use of natural resources from the perspective of Uzbekistan. It also focuses on the EU-Uzbekistan relations and prospects for their future development.

The changes taking place in the world recently are fundamentally altering international relations. Globalization is disturbing the settled world order and altering former conceptions of reality, yet it is also bringing with it several new positive trends in terms of development. At the same time, the processes of transformation present us with many new challenges and threaten the security of the countries and regions of the world. The list of global problems is something which concerns all cities, countries and continents. In fact, the origin of many of them can often be traced back to Asian countries, which particularly suffer from these current security threats. The majority of experts would agree that the center of world politics is gradually shifting from Europe to Asia.

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The Guarantor of Regional and Global Security in Afghanistan

Central Asia, located at the crossroads of the West and the East, has now become a transit region facing substantial security risks and the potential destabilization of the situation. In this way, the security of the Central Asian countries and their sustainable development have become hostage to all the dangerous tendencies confronting the world today. Afghanistan remains a continual factor in the security threats that Central Asia now has to contend with.

Pressure is being exerted on Central Asia's security system by the instability in Afghanistan; the as yet incomplete anti-terrorist campaign of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) against the Taliban; the problem of drug trafficking in a region which has become the base for the transportation of drugs to Europe; the threat of terrorism and religious

extremism; and the problems concerning its borders.

Uzbekistan is one of the leading countries which has continually participated in the restoration of Afghanistan.

During the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, member-states of the military-political alliance accepted a new strategy on Afghanistan, which noted that in order to stabilize Afghanistan, it is necessary to strengthen the laws and legislation in the country, reinforce the position of the central government in Afghanistan and resolve the issue of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The members of the NATO thereby recognized that achieving long-term stability in the country could only be done through implementing social and economic reforms. In this respect, decisions taken on the issue of Afghanistan interconnect with various factors, on which the security of the countries of Central Asia depends.

The Central Asian countries have always played an important role in ensuring security in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is one of the leading countries which has continually participated in the restoration of Afghanistan. However, given that a complex approach to settling the situation in Afghanistan is required all interested countries should be involved.

During the NATO Bucharest Summit, the President of Uzbekistan, Islam A. Karimov suggested creating a cooperation mechanism for stabilizing Afghanistan which would unite the efforts made by all sides and assist in instituting peace in Afghanistan. The Uzbek leader suggested renewing the activities of the 6+2 contact group on Afghanistan, enlarging it to include NATO and thus transforming it into a '6+3' contact group. Most experts believe that

the 6+3 contact group should concentrate on the following areas: preparing recommendations for pressing socio-economic and humanitarian problems; realizing the program for restoring and reconstructing the socio-economic infrastructure of Afghanistan; expanding the economic and humanitarian aid provided to Afghanistan within the context of the UN program; involving other international organizations and financial institutions in ascertaining common principles and approaches with the aim of realizing step by step reforms on state and social construction; creating civil institutions and strengthening vertical power and authority in the country.

It was noted that the present group could include countries which border with Afghanistan, such as Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and which should realistically include Russia, the USA and NATO. The contact group could be formed and act under the aegis of the UN and become the primary negotiation platform for discussing general principles and approaches to resolving the Afghan problem, for improving general understanding on the issues concerned and outlining the interests of all sides in achieving peace and harmony in Afghanistan. The Uzbekistan position on the issue of Afghanistan holds that it is necessary to ensure that priority is given to compelling social and economic concerns, employment, strengthening vertical power and resolving the problem of authority in Afghanistan. Achieving these will lead to an improvement in the people's trust in the international coalition forces and it will become a powerful factor in deciding the struggle against the production and supply of narcotics, which is the main source of funding for the militants.

One of the most important factors in stabilizing Afghanistan is ensuring respect and support for traditional religious and national-cultural values and respect for the minority interests and customs of the multiethnic population of Afghanistan. In reforming the state and constructing the social sphere, it is necessary to ensure that the reforms are realized stage by stage as this affects the political stabilization and economic prosperity of Afghanistan. Following on from this is the need to immediately resolve the border problems in cooperation with the leadership of Pakistan.

When considering the present situation in the region of Central Asia we unfortunately have to recognize that along with the positive processes regarding the stabilization of the situation and the rebuilding of Afghanistan, there is still a vagueness in terms of strategy in the region.

When considering the present situation in our region we unfortunately have to recognize that along with the positive processes regarding the stabilization of the situation and the rebuilding of Afghanistan, there is still a vagueness in terms of strategy in the region. Here, the interests of the world powers and those of the neighboring countries still collide. Analyzing the situation in the country is of decisive importance in liquidating the threats of terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking.

Today isolated groups of international terrorists and religious extremists are still active in Afghanistan. When we look at the partial neutralization of the movements of the Taliban, we can see that the tasks allocated to the participants of the international anti-terrorism coalition have not been fully accomplished yet. The military and terrorist threats originating from Afghan territory, which the Central Asian region faces, have simply been minimized. The forces of terrorism are still regrouping in Central Asia. These forces have not been destroyed and represent a serious potential threat. Another problem is the large number of weapons and military machinery available. According to United Nations estimations, more than 2.5 million small firearms are owned by the population of the country.

With the reorganization of the Afghan army, the number of illegally held weapons in the country has considerably surpassed previous levels, both in terms of numbers and quality. These problems are compounded by the lack of official state control, on the one hand, and the existence of reliable supply runs of new arms on the other; both of these can be considered preconditions for the development of conflicts at the local level involving the regional military opposition, possibly even on a global scale.

The difficult social and economic conditions and the absence of alternative sources of existence amongst the Afghan population represent some of the main conditions allowing the prosperous drug trade to flourish in Afghanistan. In 2007, the volume of various kinds of drug production reached record levels – 8,300 tons annually. One hectare of opium poppy brings in 10 times more income to Afghan peasants than a hectare of wheat. Moreover, heroin reserves and mini production plants were not destroyed during the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. The location of Central Asia as a drug trafficking route to the West remains one of the main reasons for the activity of the terrorist forces in the region.

The words of Antonio M. Costa, Executive Director of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, should be recalled here: “Opium in Afghanistan is a security problem rather than a drug problem”. It is clear that the activity of international terrorists is aimed, in many respects, at forming stable drug trafficking channels from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Russia and further on to Europe. If earlier it was the trans-border criminal groups that

controlled the majority of transit routes, now it is the religious extremist and international terrorist groups, for whom drugs are a significant source of funding, and who have played a significant role in drug trafficking in recent years.

Drug trafficking, in its turn, leads to an increase in drug consumption in the countries of the region. Central Asia has already shifted from being a transit point to being a region of active drug users.

It is necessary to note that effectively counteracting these threats, resolving other security-related issues and improving the sustainable development of the region can be ensured only by the active participation of the countries in this region. Therefore, it is important to achieve mutual understanding and create an effective mechanism to solve common regional issues concerning the economy, water, energy, transport, communication, and the environment; all of which affect those living in the region.

In this context, we should mention that Uzbekistan was one of the first countries to join the international anti-terrorism coalition and became practically the only country in the Commonwealth of Independent States to have already presented its position at the initial stage of the anti-terrorism operation in Afghanistan. The two main issues that characterized the Uzbekistan position were:

- not to allow ground military operations against Afghanistan to be conducted on the territory of Uzbekistan;
- not to allow bomb-assault operations on the territory of our country.

Today Uzbekistan actively participates in humanitarian programs providing assistance in the post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan, including various projects on reconstructing and developing road and rail infrastructure, and the creation of an irrigation system. At the end of 2001, Uzbekistan offered the use of Termiz airport and opened the bridge at the Uzbek-Afghan border for international supplies of humanitarian cargo. It also signed the *Protocol between the Government of Uzbekistan and the UN on assisting in the supply of humanitarian aid from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan*. Uzbekistan supports proposals for the accession of Afghanistan to the *EU Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia Program (TRACECA)* to ensure the effective transportation of humanitarian cargo from the EU to Afghanistan. Uzbek specialists were involved in construction and rehabilitation work, including the reconstruction of irrigation systems, the oil and gas industry of Afghanistan,

Uzbek specialists were involved in construction and rehabilitation work, including the reconstruction of irrigation systems, the oil and gas industry of Afghanistan, and the construction of significant social projects.

and the construction of significant social projects. In particular, Uzbekistan rehabilitated and constructed 10 bridges on the Termez-Mazari-Sharif-Kabul route. Uzbekistan is ready to construct the railway stations from Hayraton to Mazari-Sharif, the electricity supply line from Hayraton to Puli Humri, and to assist in rehabilitating the water system and constructing energy structures in northern and central regions of Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan is interested in increasing UN participation in resolving problems of regional and global security and other current issues. At the same time, modern challenges and risks require that the UN adapts to modern realities and perspectives in developing modern approaches to ensuring peace, security and stability. On the other hand, although the UN requires modernization and reform, there are no alternatives to this organization today.

Uzbekistan realizes the importance of stabilizing and rehabilitating the situation in Afghanistan in terms of security and the sustainable development of Central Asia and the countries of the region, and will continue to support and assist in any peaceful efforts and practical steps aimed at the peaceful settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, using the existing opportunities provided by its own state policy as well as the potential of other interested countries and international organizations.

The Philosophy behind Uzbekistan's Policy on the Use of Natural Resources

The long history of human development is also the history of the use of natural resources, the development of production and the way in which the laws of nature and society are perceived by human beings, and how that in turn leads to changes in economic structures. Therefore, it is only logical that the relationship between human beings and nature and its resources is determined, on the one hand, by the nature of those resources in the widest meaning of the word and by the size of the territory in relation to the natural resources, and on the other hand, by the nature of production, including the level of science, technology and production attained in that specific society during its history.

The Central Asian region is rich in natural resources and has relatively good potential in terms of economic and scientific-technical development. Uzbekistan produces about 2 million tons of cotton fiber and ranks fourth amongst the world's cotton producers. It ranks second in gold mining production and has gold reserves in excess of 4,000 tons. The country has large deposits of gas, lead, uranium, zinc, wolfram, lithium and other non-ferrous and rare metals.

In addition, the fruit and vegetable produce of Uzbekistan has great export potential.

The natural resources of Central Asia not only continue to be of importance to Russia, but they are also attracting the attention of other countries in the world, and not simply those countries with few natural resources, such as Turkey and Pakistan, but also richer ones, such as China, India, the developed countries of Europe, the USA, Japan and South Korea.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the Central Asian countries became independent states with the opportunity to select their own paths of development and became independent subjects of international relations. They adopted a new role in the international arena, determined by their geographic location, economic and demographic potential and shaped by the character of their relations with other countries, particularly their neighbors, and the nature of their participation in regional and global international organizations.

Bearing this in mind and taking into account the pivotal changes and events in international economic relations, as well as the increasing roles of the EU, the USA and the Asia-Pacific region, the leadership of Uzbekistan formulated a long-term and considered policy on the use of its own natural resources, based on the understanding that the country is of strategic importance for the economies of these three economic development centers due to its riches.

Uzbekistan's position on the use of natural resources is primarily based on the belief that existing resources should serve the interests of those who live on the territory of Uzbekistan. Only the people of Uzbekistan have the right to build its relations with external world, based on the existing realities and its own national interests.

Naturally, the country does not seek to isolate itself from the external world, especially given the fact that the Central Asian region is located at the crossroads of the Eurasian railways. Through Iran, the region has access to the Persian Gulf, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean, and through China to the Asian-Pacific region. However, each country reserves the right to rule its own destiny. Thus, the fair and clearly defined philosophy of Uzbekistan on this issue is the effective and rational use of its own natural resources to safeguard future generations. This fundamental position serves

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as a logical base for a whole series of other corresponding norms, which guarantee not only stability in the long-term perspective, but also protects against claims of other states, which could consider it simply in terms of a 'raw materials source'.

At the same time, the existence and use of natural resources should not affect the stability of the ecological balance in any way. The catastrophic state of the Aral Sea today has a significance that goes beyond the regional framework and its consequences are felt globally. Unfortunately, the ecological imbalance has yet to stabilize; indeed, the situation is deteriorating each day. The fatal decisions taken in the last century by the USSR that led to its policy of 'great constructions' have meant that the natural processes have been crudely disrupted by the hasty, ill-considered use of water resources and irrevocable changes to the natural courses

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the of Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers have resulted. All these have contributed to the single largest ecological catastrophe: the shrinking of the Aral Sea.

The Aral Sea crisis is the largest ecological and humanitarian catastrophe in the modern history of humanity. Over 35 million people living in the Aral Sea Basin are directly affected by this catastrophe. Currently, the desiccated seabed of the Aral Sea extends to over 28,000 square kilometers. Two thirds of this territory is now heavily salinated land. Annually, this area produces over 75 million tons of sand

and dust and 65 million tons of fine dispersed salts, which are scattered thousands of kilometers by the wind. The desiccated Aral seabed has become one of the main sources for the release of particulate pollutants, pesticides and herbicides into the atmosphere. These salts and particulate pollutants from the Aral seabed impact upon the health of the population and the environment, and contribute to the melting of the glaciers in the Tian Shan, where the Syrdarya and Amudarya originate.

In September 1991, the Central Asian countries adopted a decision to create a special body to regulate water allocation in the Aral Sea Basin. The Interstate Coordination Council of Water Management (ICCW) was founded in February 1992. The ICCW developed an *Action Program on Improving the Situation in the Aral Sea Basin*. In 1994, the heads of states in the region founded the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the International Aral Sea Council (IASC).

In January 1994, a meeting in Nukus was convened where the main regulations on overseeing the work of the IFAS were adopted and an action program and the main regulations on improving the ecological and social-economic situation in the Aral Sea Basin were proposed. The UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and World Bank allocated funds to support the Aral Sea Basin Program.

Acutely aware of the situation and its possible consequences, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov initiated and ensured the adoption in 1999 of the GEF (Global Environmental Facility) project *Management of Water Resources and Environment in Aral Sea Basin*, the main executor and donor of which became the UN Global Economic Fund.

The scale and difficulty of the problem of the Aral Sea requires a complex, multi-industrial approach involving all the states of the region. To overcome the problems connected with the Aral Sea crisis all the Central Asian states must have a clear understanding of the prime causes of these problems so that they can boost their efforts in overcoming the critical situation, and adopt adequate measures on both regional and national levels. However, the situation has been further complicated by an imbalance in interstate water usage in recent years, connected with the irrational use of water resources.

The location of the Aral Sea Basin at the upper course of the Amudarya and Syrdarya means that water collection on the territory of these states is a 'priority'. At the same time, they are unwilling to take into account the fact that the ecological crisis does not acknowledge the borders of the independent states and that the Aral Sea Basin crisis can be solved only by the rational use of water resources based on generally assured norms and a decrease in water use by all states in the region.

The existing situation has been exacerbated by actions which will further upset the existing mechanisms for water regulation in the region. This applies, above all, to the intention to build new large-scale hydropower plants rapidly in keeping with 'the best' Soviet traditions; violence over nature.

For these reasons, Uzbekistan, along with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and other states located at the lower reaches of Amudarya and Syrdarya, have adopted a firm position ensuring that all hydropower projects on trans-border rivers are carried out subject to mandatory expertise under the aegis of the UN. Where the construction of large hydropower stations such as Kambaratin hydropower station-1 and Rogun hydropower station is concerned completely independent specialists should be appointed to carry out objective assessments in line with UN conventions. The conclusions submitted by the independent experts should include an in-depth consideration of several

fundamentally important issues: the projects and solutions put forward should correspond to modern developments; they should take into account the potential consequences of natural and man-made disasters, the extent

Uzbekistan holds the opinion that issues relating to water-energy balance in Central Asia should be solved through mutual understanding, constructive dialogue and achieving consensus among the region's countries. Ignoring these principles can lead to unpredictable consequences in the region.

to which the environment can withstand damage; preserve the water balance in the region; and guarantee the existing river flow regime. Potentially wide-hitting disasters, such as earthquakes, should be taken into consideration. For example, Rogun hydropower station is being constructed near a fault zone, where according to seismologists, seismicity can reach 8 or 9 on the Richter Scale, as is evidenced by the occurrence of several earthquakes in the past.

Uzbekistan holds the opinion that issues relating to water-energy balance in Central Asia should be solved through mutual understanding, constructive dialogue and achieving consensus among the region's countries. Ignoring these principles can lead to unpredictable ecological, economic, social and political consequences in the region.

Ultimately, this is vital for the current and future generations living in Central Asia, connected by historic and cultural roots.

Relations with the European Union: Status and Prospects for Development

Today, Central Asia and the European Union consider each other as stable and predictable partners in politics, the economy and other spheres. The multifunctional, high level of mutual relations, the high frequency of contact, as well as the long-term character of agreements reached, all point to an opportunity to move the Central Asian-EU partnership to a strategic level.

The Central Asian countries consider developing and adopting the EU Strategy on the region to be an important and timely step in ensuring stability not only in the region which is important to Europe, but also on the Eurasian continent as a whole. It is important that when the strategy is implemented a regional and individual approach to each country will also be adopted. It is

clear that the effective and full-fledged implementation of the EU Strategy on Central Asia will not be possible without the support and participation of the countries in the region.

Uzbekistan supports the policies and approaches of Brussels that are directed towards the more active participation of Europe in Central Asia; this is increasingly significant in geopolitical terms for several reasons. The stable and prosperous states of Central Asia, located at a strategically important crossroads of two continents, could be involved in settling global issues and play the role of a reliable partner to Europe in Asia and in the world as a whole. However, based on experience, fruitful cooperation is possible only when the principles of equality and mutual respect are maintained, the interests of all parties are considered and there is no interference in internal affairs. History and current realities prove that only those countries which adhere to these principles achieve real success in the region.

It should not be forgotten that the EU and Central Asia lie some thousand kilometers apart and that the majority of the Central Asian population subscribes to Islam and has a mentality and traditions peculiar to Asian nations. All Central Asian states with a common Soviet past are developing their own paths of political and economic development. In this context, democracy is seen as part of the process of the internal development of society, and not a final destination. Any attempts to impose democratic standards, morals and values from the outside, or act as 'teacher' or 'leader' are not productive and doomed to failure.

The democratic aspect of Uzbekistan's development rests upon, first of all, the historical, national and spiritual values of the Uzbek people, as well as a consideration of the generally recognized principles in this sphere. Today, one can see much evidence for the fact that the model selected by Uzbekistan is fully justifiable as it envisages gradual and evolving reforms, without any experiments or 'colorful revolutions'.

As of January 1, 2008, Uzbekistan has fully abolished capital punishment and introduced *habeas corpus*. The country created a multiparty system and the influence and role of the political parties were strengthened.

It is important for Uzbekistan that the EU states show a greater understanding of the real situation in which the states of the region find themselves, and that they try to see positive achievements and support the efforts of the country.

The dynamic development of the world economy and the increasing deficit of resources create tension in the energy resource markets on which the security of many countries and the stability of the international relations system as a whole depend. This refers particularly to Europe, where there is a steadily rising dependence on energy resources and supply routes.

Lying at the heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan occupies the eighth place in the world on natural gas production and the fifth place in the CIS on production of fuel-energy resources. Potential reserves include over 4 billion tons of oil, 630 million tons of gas condensate and over 80,000 tons of uranium. Explored gas reserves contain over 3 trillion cubic meters of gas. Uzbekistan possesses a gas pipeline system, extending to a total of 13,000 kilometers. Uzbek gas is supplied to the internal market and exported to neighboring states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), and is also exported to the North.

Uzbekistan has also expressed an interest in discussing the EU proposals in this sphere on bilateral and multilateral levels, including the Inogate program. The prospects for energy cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan will depend upon conditions to be proposed by our European partners concerning,

in particular, investment plans and Uzbek-European relations.

The prospects for energy cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan will depend upon conditions to be proposed by our European partners concerning, in particular, investment plans and Uzbek-European relations.

If we are to speak generally about cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan, then the following issues affecting the interaction process should be mentioned.

First. The financial amount allocated by the EU for technical cooperation with the Central Asian region is very low. For example, the total amount of assistance provided within the TACIS program for Uzbekistan from 1991 to 2006 totaled €6.2 per capita, while this figure was €33 in Armenia, and €213 in the Baltic countries. In comparison, China allocated over \$900 million in tax credits over the last three years in addition to grants for over hundreds of millions of US dollars. Projects realized

with the participation of Chinese companies are estimated at several billion US dollars, including the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline. Russia, India, Japan, South Korea and several Arab countries have also demonstrated their interest in cooperating with the region by contributing significant financial investments.

Second. Despite the significantly untapped potential, the turnover volume with the European Union is low. For example, total turnover between Uzbekistan and Russia was \$3 billion in 2007, while the figure was \$1.315 billion with 27 EU states in 2006.

European banks, which have significant opportunities to provide credit, offer conditions to Central Asian states which are unfavorable compared

to those offered by Asian partners. The interest rates set by the European banks vary at around 5.5% per annum, while the Asian banks offered interest rates fixed at 3% per annum. Asian banks, in many cases, do not request payment of insurance premiums, while their European counterparts charge an extra 10-15%, depending on the terms of the agreement and the sums involved.

Third. It is well-known that overcoming the poor transport and communication infrastructure has an important role to play in the sustainable economic development of the Central Asian countries. Unfortunately, the TRACECA program has still not achieved its goals despite significant investments and 12 years of activity. For instance, today transporting cargo from Uzbekistan to Europe via the existing "northern corridor", which passes through Russia, is more profitable. New transit routes to the south through Iranian ports are effective, as evidenced by an increase in the turnover of cargo. Thereby, it is important to review the implementation process to make TRACECA effective.

Fourth. In recent years, some countries have been working actively to realize projects on the construction of hydropower facilities on trans-border rivers in Central Asia with the help of foreign investments, including that provided by European states.

The water resources and trans-border rivers in Central Asia have met the water demands of the states located in the basin of these rivers. Today, this concerns almost 60 million people, working in five states of the region.

As mentioned above, Uzbekistan supports all those decisions on the use of the water flow of these rivers, including the construction of hydropower stations, where the interests of all the countries located along the rivers, including the lower reach as well, are considered. Otherwise, the water supply situation in the lower reaches of the Amudarya and Syrdarya may speed up the ecological catastrophe of the desiccation of the Aral Sea and make life impossible for the tens of millions of people who live here.

Therefore, neutral international audits should guarantee that these constructions will not have a negative impact on the ecology and disrupt the existing water use balance by all states located along the rivers. Only such a complex approach can ensure the successful realization of projects, including those financed by the EU states, on the use of water-energy resources of the region.

A separate point on the further development of the states and the prosperity of the people of Central Asia is ensuring peace and security in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has been concerned with the current situation in this country, which is being shaped by a further worsening of the situation in the context of the military action involving the Taliban and the growth in narcotics production.

Considering the long-term obligations undertaken by the international community in relations with Afghanistan, there is a clear need to further boost cooperation on existing problems by all the Central Asian states, which have long had relations with this state. Uzbekistan positively evaluates the contribution of Europe towards normalizing the situation in Afghanistan and its assistance in rehabilitating the economy of the state. Nevertheless, the current situation proves that it is necessary to boost cooperation between the EU and Central Asia in regards to security and the fight against common threats. For instance, it can be argued that the effectiveness and future prospects of law enforcement increased after more intensive contact was developed between the law enforcement bodies of the Central Asian states

Europe has a role to play in helping Central Asian states combat the drug trade, especially given that the Central Asian states function as a transit route for the supply of Afghan drugs to Europe.

and the EU countries, including the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Europol and Euro Justice. Extensive opportunities for cooperation are provided by the Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA) and Central Asia Drug Action Program (CADAP).

Europe has a role to play in helping Central Asian states combat the drug trade, especially given that the Central Asian states function as a transit route for the supply of Afghan drugs to Europe. Expanding technical and investment assistance to the Central Asian states in terms of equipment and

training customs and border officers and cooperation in handing over wanted persons could be productive.

Efforts should be united in the fight against terrorism, beginning with the adoption of measures prohibiting the activities of terrorist and religious extremist organizations operating in Central Asian and European countries; Hizb ut-Tahrir should be first on the list.

At the same time, the fight against religious extremism should not develop into a fight against Muslims and result in Islamophobia. It is important that the EU takes a neutral position in the region. The OSCE, on which the EU relies in many cases, was unable to fulfill its functions since some organizations, in which some certain countries are involved, are trying to undermine its political activity. Besides, trust in the USA as a main human rights protector was undermined as a result of the abuse at Guantanamo, Abu Graib and Bagram.

Interaction between Uzbekistan and the EU is developing positively and has been strengthened due to the human rights dialogue within the framework of

the Subcommittee on justice, internal affairs and human rights and agreements, which has been holding "EU-Uzbekistan" seminars with the participation of civil society. On October 2-3, 2008, the first EU-Uzbekistan seminar on human rights entitled *Liberalization of the Mass Media – an Important Component in the Democratization of Society* was held.

Cooperation will further intensify in the context of initiatives regarding the rule of law launched at the ministerial conference *EU – Central Asia* in Brussels on November 27-28, 2008. Further events include regional *EU – Central Asia* seminars on training lawyers and on criminal law to be held in Bishkek and Tashkent respectively during the year of 2009. In addition to this new project on the rule of law, support will also be extended in terms of legislative reform and the role of the Venice Commission in democratization. In addition, a dialogue on human rights will be conducted on June 9-10, 2009 in Tashkent by the Subcommittee on justice, internal affairs, human rights and corresponding issues 'EU-Uzbekistan'.

We can see that today there is a political basis for cooperation on many modern international issues between Central Asia and the EU, including security, energy and democracy. Both parties have agreed strategic visions for further interaction and have determined priority directions for cooperation. We believe that it is crucial that political efforts directed towards creating mechanisms and regimes for cooperation should be underpinned by the understanding that the states of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, are sovereign, independent states and that their voice should carry equal weight in the dialogue with the EU.

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Radoslav Jusko

Coalitions of Countries in the GATT/WTO Negotiations

Summary: This contribution analyzes the goal and potential of three types of coalitions in the negotiations on the grounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization including the description of their formation. The growing number of coalitions and the circle of areas concerned indicate that institutions of international trade become significant for a broad range of countries and that they become a significant instrument in multilateral negotiations. Although Pascal Lamy says, "trade is a part of the solution of the global economic crisis", it can rather be expected that the financial crisis will slow the multilateral liberalisation down, but after it fades away, probably in a situation when many countries will have implemented protectionist measures, coalitions of countries can represent a significant instrument leading to their resuscitation. In the definition of the Uruguay as well as the multilateral Doha Round agendas, coalitions played a positive role which could be repeated at the re-intensification of negotiations.

In his contribution at the Regional World Bank Conference on Development in St. Petersburg, which took place in 2006, Francois Bourguignon pointed to the shift in thinking about sources of economic development in the past 50 years. He divided the evolution of economic thought into three phases. In the

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first phase, development was understood as the outcome of the accumulation of physical and human capital (e.g. extensive investment into the construction of factories), as well as exogenous factors such as technological progress. In the second phase, the research focused on macroeconomic policies which create a hospitable environment for these accumulation processes (e.g. quality of macroeconomic policies, export orientation). In the third phase, it focused on the role of institutions as the rules of the game and exogenous attributes of countries.¹ The integral parts of the rules of the game are also the rules of international trade, which, among other things, aim to limit the unpredictability in mutual exchange in accordance with the general concept of institutions by Douglass North.² The meaning of the rules of the game in international trade can be perceived through the gradual extension of the GATT/WTO institutional frame, but also through the coalitions, which emerged on these grounds.

The aim of this contribution is to describe the formation of various coalitions of countries during the negotiations on the terms of international trade. The study analyzes, one by one, the meanings of three different types of coalitions of states, while exploring their up-to-date roles and potential for further negotiations on the grounds of the World Trade Organization.

The Conditions for Coalition Formation

Coalitions are defined as groups of countries whose objective is to achieve a common goal or take a common stand and, on the GATT/WTO platform, promote the common interest in relation to various aspects of multilateral negotiations. By forming coalitions, countries attempt to increase their negotiating potential.

The principles, which form the basis of the negotiations, are an internal factor which determined coalition formation on the GATT/WTO platform. Up to the Tokyo Round, negotiations were based on the liberty of countries to accept commitments stemming from various codes. The so-called single undertaking principle which should guide multilateral negotiations was first included in the Punta del Este declaration. This principle determines that each phase of negotiations is a part of the complex negotiations and may

¹ F. Bourguignon, "Dynamics of Institutions, Development, and Elites", F. Bourguignon, B. Peskovic (eds) *Beyond Transition*. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2007), pp. 12-13.

² D.C. North, "Institutions", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 97.

not be agreed upon separately ('nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'). Including the so-called single undertaking into the principles of negotiations – which was pursued by developed countries to expand commitments in various sectors to all countries, and perceived by the developing countries as an instrument of a better balance in the results of negotiations – had

The so-called single undertaking principle which should guide multilateral negotiations determines that each phase of negotiations is a part of the complex negotiations and may not be agreed upon separately ('nothing is agreed until everything is agreed').

a significant impact on coalition formation. The necessity to participate on the results of negotiations in all sectors increases the likelihood that the negotiations will result in mutual concessions between sectors leading to a final mutual consensus. If countries have different priorities in negotiations, it is presumable they will promote the given priorities attempting to compensate for concessions in a different agenda of negotiations, hence the principle expands the range of areas on which they take positions. Based on this principle, the Punta del Este declaration merged negotiations on customs, tropical products, agriculture, intellectual rights etc., while negotiations in the area of services were separated within this declaration. From this

approach some developing countries expected that the results of negotiations on services would not be a part of the complex package of commitments. The Doha declaration joined all the negotiation areas, with the exception of improving and clarifying the Agreement on Dispute Settlement, into the so-called single undertaking. Despite the fact that this principle continues to be weakened through the possibility of implementing agreements concluded before on a provisional or final basis, it still constitutes a significant condition for the formation of coalitions.

Article XXIV of the GATT allows for the merger of customs unions or free trade areas with the non-discrimination principle. One of the explanations for the existence of this article (advocated by Bhagwati) is that it was created to permit European integration – perceived as crucial for post-war development.³ Customs unions are defined in Article XXIV/8(a) of the GATT as “the substitution

³ *World Trade Report 2007. Six Decades of Multilateral Trade Cooperation: What Have we Learnt?* (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2007), p. 304.

of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories and substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union.” A free-trade area is defined in Article XXIV/8(b) of the GATT as “a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.”

In relation to non-member countries the free-trade areas form implications primarily through establishing standards which the product must meet in order to be subject to the mutually beneficial rules. These standards are meant to eliminate the possibility of using different rules applied by the member country to acquire an advantaged access to the given market. In other aspects the joint position is not explicit. Due to the fact that free-trade area member countries do not share a joint trade policy they do not form a natural condition for the coordination of positions within GATT/WTO negotiations.

Because customs unions behave externally towards non-member countries in the area covered by the customs union (for example SACU does not explicitly include the trade with services) as one entity – they create natural conditions for more complex joint positions on the GATT/WTO platform.⁴

Higher forms of regional economic integration than customs unions (common market, economic and monetary union) create further implications for the formation of coalitions on the GATT/WTO platform. The aim of the common market is to ensure an equal status for commercial entities from the member countries and the home country in all trade aspects. By these means the common market and higher forms of regional integration form natural conditions for complex joint positions on all aspects of multilateral negotiations.

⁴ Among the regional trade agreements notified to the WTO whose goals are the creation of a customs union or a higher form of economic cooperation are: the European Union (EU), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the East African Community (EAC), the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC).

Various forms of regional economic integration create different conditions for the common positions of member states on individual aspects of multilateral negotiations. The fact that free-trade areas constitute 90% of all groupings influences the functioning of multilateral rules (Bagwell and Staiger⁵ state that free-trade areas are incompatible with the efficiency of the non-discrimination principle) but it's primarily the customs unions and higher integration structures that are relevant in the formation of coalitions.

Position formulation and consequently coalition formation is also influenced by the relation to international trade, its liberalisation and the GATT/WTO. This development can also be perceived in the relationship shift of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) towards international trade and its liberalisation. Through their research activities, recommendations, loan focuses, and development strategies these organizations have influenced the current status of liberalisation and the positions of developing countries. There was a broad consensus in the 60's on the fact that the trade policy of developing countries should be based upon import substitution – which was considered to be synonymous with economic growth⁶ and in coherence with the efforts of developing countries to break colonial ties. Import substitution is based on trade protectionism, fiscal

expansion, and an overrated exchange rate. In the 70's policies focused on an adequate macroeconomic environment as the fundamental condition for economic growth. The liberalisation of trade relations only started after Anna Krüger was made the Chief Economist of the World Bank in 1982. This shift resulted into the so-called Washington Consensus which represented the generally implemented recommendations of the WB and the IMF. Its elements were among others – the unilateral liberalisation of trade relations, deregulation, a competitive exchange rate, and the removal of FDI flows

⁵ See: K. Bagwell, R.W. Staiger, "An Economic Theory of GATT", *American Economic Review* Vol. 89, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 215-248.

⁶ T.N. Srinivasan, J. Bhagwati, "Outward Orientation and Development: Are Revisionist Right?", *Economic Growth Center Yale University Center Discussion Paper No 806*. (New Haven: Yale University, 1999), p. 3.

Higher forms of regional economic integration than customs unions (common market, economic and monetary union) create further implications for the formation of coalitions on the GATT/WTO platform.

restrictions. Many countries adopted the liberalisation measures as a result of the recommendations and requirements set in the loans for the structural adaptation of the WB. This is also confirmed by the median (for the year 1991) of the group of countries used in the analysis of Salinas and Aksoy.⁷ Liberalisation recommendations within the Washington Consensus focused on the replacement of quantitative restriction with tariffs and their reduction to a relatively low level with low variance (common customs tariff) according to a pre-set scheme.⁸ This influence can be perceived, for example, in relation to the fact that most developing countries have a smaller gap between the tariff ceilings in agriculture and industrial goods than developed countries.

After a certain attenuation of World Bank activities in trade issues in the 90's the new round of multilateral negotiations in Doha provided a new impulse for the strengthening of the agenda. This shift is, for example, visible in the amount of provided loans with a trade aspect.⁹

The current position of the WB and IMF on trade liberalisation can be seen through the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSP) which they jointly prepare for individual countries. The PRSP largely reflect the principles of the Washington Consensus in this area. The PRSP Sourcebook¹⁰ expresses doubts on the adequacy of regional trade agreements for developing countries which underlines the importance of multilateral negotiations for this group of countries. Furthermore the WB and the IMF prefer simple liberal trade regimes and the realisation of trade reforms maximally in the medium-term horizon (within 5 years). The recommendation of a common

The current position of the WB and IMF on trade liberalisation can be seen through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) which they jointly prepare for individual countries.

⁷ Salinas and Aksoy analyse the relation of trade liberalisation and economic growth. See: G. Salinas, A. Aksoy, "Growth Before and After Trade Liberalisation", *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4062*. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006).

⁸ J. Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform", J. Williamson (ed) *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), pp. 7-20.


⁹ See: R. Jusko, "Úvery Svetovej banky v kontexte liberalisácie obchodných vzťahov rozvojových krajín", *Ekonomický časopis* Vol. 56, No. 7 (2008).

¹⁰ B. Hoekman, C. Michalopoulos, M. Schiff, D. Tarr, "Trade Policy", J. Klugman (ed) *A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies*. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002), pp. 30-57.

customs tariff with a minimum of exceptions – with regard to the fact that in developing countries the tariffs on agricultural products aren't substantially higher than the tariffs on industrial products – encourages overall liberalisation. On the other hand, the effort to target reforms in a manner minimizing the negative impacts on the poorest segments of the population suggests that liberalisation in agriculture must be very cautious. In relation to the Doha negotiations the WB and the IMF explicitly express the need for pressure on the EU and other OECD countries in order to gradually stop export subsidising and the protection of their agriculture markets. In this context they are striving to offer instruments to the developing countries (mainly technical assistance) allowing them to adopt stricter commitments. Assistance to developing countries increases their awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of individual reforms; it leads the countries to a better capability of taking a position on the aspects of multilateral negotiations; and increases their activity in the current round.


A significant change in the export structure of developing countries as a group compared to the developed countries is visible from the 80's (graph no.1 and graph no.2). Concerning coalitions this suggests that broader aspects of international trade and GATT/WTO rules are becoming relevant to this group of countries and that their increased activity can be expected in the area of industrial products as well as services whose exports share are higher than the share of agriculture products from the 80's.

Graph 1. Development of the Export Structure of Developed Countries



Source: Author's calculation based on the data from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008 (<http://stats.wto.org/handbook>) and the WTO Statistics Database (<http://stat.wto.org>).

Graph 2. Development of the Export Structure of Developing Countries



Source: Author's calculation based on the data from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008 (<http://stats.wto.org/handbook>) and the WTO Statistics Database (<http://stat.wto.org>).

Coalition Types

The specified conditions for coalition formation suggest the creation of several types of coalitions. Firstly – coalitions formed on the basis of regional economic integration, secondly – block type coalitions formed on the differences between developed and developing countries, and thirdly – coalitions focused on a particular set of issues whose promotion balances out the other adopted commitments.

Coalitions stemming from Regional Economic Cooperation

The formation of the first coalitions on the GATT platform is connected to regional economic integration. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) set the adoption of a common customs tariff and a common trade policy towards third countries as one of its goals. The development of European integration became one of the motives of the Dillon Round of multilateral negotiations whose objective was to transform the custom tariffs of EEC member countries into one common customs tariff towards non-member countries. From this round of multilateral negotiations onward the EEC states start to operate as one entity. The final Act of the Kennedy Round of multilateral negotiations was also signed by the Commission. With the finished customs union and the goal of a common market, the EEC became one of the most significant actors in future rounds which could already be seen in the Tokyo

Round where the differing positions of the USA and the EEC blocked negotiation progress.

The example of ASEAN can show that the existence of a regionally significant free-trade area does not create clear implications for common positions within multilateral negotiations. ASEAN supported the commencement of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations and the group also expressed its activity through joint proposals on tropical products as well as by the support of the Cairns Group in the field of agriculture. On the other hand, during the preparation and the negotiations within the Doha Round the Group coordinated its positions only marginally and adopted a reserved position on the so-called Singapore issues. These differences can also be seen in the participation of Malaysia in the so-called Group of Similarly Thinking Countries which strived to promote the implementation of commitments adopted at the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations as a condition for the commencement of a new round. On the other hand, Singapore did not perceive this position negatively.

MERCOSUR, which hasn't yet been able to establish a customs union, was able to harmonize its positions primarily in the agriculture sector (participation in the Cairns Group and the G-20) as well as for a short duration in access issues to non-agricultural product markets (own proposal in the year 2003). The formation of the NAMA-11¹¹ Group which is trying to limit the opening of the industrial products market, with only Brazil and Argentina as its members, shows that they are not able to fully unite their positions in a field which should be covered by the customs union.

Furthermore, for example, the Caribbean Community member states (CARICOM), which are forming a common market, are to coordinate their trade policy towards third countries based on the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas from the year 2001. In WTO negotiations they are jointly focusing on the needs of small and vulnerable economies as well as agriculture and services whose trade is partially liberalised between them. Regarding coalitions on the WTO platform – they operate jointly in almost all areas.

Other groups stemming from regional economic integration have not shown significant activity on the GATT/WTO platform through their own proposals, a harmonized participation in coalitions, or their activity was primarily focused on the formulation of the negotiation agenda. The joint position of CEFTA in the preparation for the Ministerial Conference in Seattle in the year 1999 is noteworthy

¹¹ Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, Republic of South Africa, Tunisia, Venezuela.

– together the member countries supported the scope of the negotiations and proposed the realisation of a new round of negotiations within three years.

The development of the number of regional trade agreements (Table 1) suggests their growing importance and at the same time makes the trade rules system less transparent. With regard to coalition formation on the GATT/WTO platform in customs tariff reduction it becomes apparent that the groups start to be relevant only from the customs unions and at least a declaration of the goal to create a common market is necessary for the broader harmonization of positions in multiple areas. The potential of current regional economic groups, with the exception of the EU, to influence the multilateral negotiations with common positions is relatively limited. Their gradual finalization and especially the planned common markets will influence the higher harmonization of positions in some groups of countries.

Block Type Coalitions

The first coalitions which were formed on the GATT/WTO platform and did not originate in regional economic integration were coalitions of developing countries which focused on the coordination of their positions on the entire agenda of the multilateral negotiations.

At the end of the first UNCTAD conference in the year 1964 they formed the so-called Group 77 (G-77) outside the GATT framework. Developing countries perceived UNCTAD as a counterbalance to GATT and presented most of their

Table 1. Summary of the Registered Active Regional Trade Agreements according to Type as of December 2008.

	Customs Unions (No. of Groups)	Free-Trade Areas	Preferential Agreements	Overall
1958-69	2 (2)	1	1	4
1970-79	2 (3)	7	2	11
1980-89	3 (4)	2	3	8
1990-99	6 (7)	36	4	46
2000-08	6 (11)	78	2	86

Source: World Trade Organization Regional Trade Agreements Information System, <http://rtais.wto.org>.

trade intentions in this manner. The joint declaration of the seventy-seven developing countries from June 1964 suggested that the developing countries as a block will especially focus on primary commodity trade, export preferences for their industrial products, and compensation financing for the mitigation of worsening terms of trade.¹² By grouping signatory and non-signatory parties of the GATT the G-77 allowed the countries who have not acceded to GATT to be a closer part of the negotiations.

All the developing countries on the GATT platform formed the so-called Informal Group of Developing Countries (IGDC) which represented the main

The potential of coalitions whose goals include the coordination of positions on the entire negotiation agenda and who do not stem from regional economic integration is minimal due to the probable heterogeneity of interests.

forum for the mutual exchange of information through its regular meetings. During the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations both groups were active and achieved partial successes for example in the adoption of the Enabling Clause through which the developing countries could offer the developed countries a preferential agreement as an exception to the non-discrimination principle.¹³ This marked the fulfilment of one of their fundamental common goals.

Before the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations, also due to the adoption of the so-called single undertaking principle, the IGDC began to disintegrate which didn't allow its broad and diverse coalition to adopt a common negotiating position.

The development agenda from Doha was able to partially renew these coalitions and they were able to adopt common positions on the negotiated issues. In its preparation for the Ministerial Conference in Seattle and Doha the G-77 expressed its support for a new round of multilateral negotiations especially due to the dissatisfaction with the results of the Uruguay Round. Both groups expressed their support for the negotiations especially in the so-called Built-in-agenda from the Uruguay Round (primary agriculture and services), in the tariff-peaks and tariff-escalation agendas, antidumping, technical trade

¹² "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development"; http://www.g77.org/doc/Joint_Declaration.html.

¹³ S.E. Rolland, "Developing Countries at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support", *Harvard International Law Journal* Vol. 48, No.2 (Summer 2007), pp. 489.

barriers, and technology transfer. They also expressed common concerns about the insufficient progress in negotiations related to the Ministerial Conference in Cancun in September 2003 and Hong Kong in December 2005. On the other hand, neither of these coalitions presented their own negotiation proposal (they mainly expressed concerns on negotiation progress) which indicates the low potential of broadly focused coalitions in Doha negotiations. However, the reactivation of these coalitions suggests the deepening negotiation differences between developed and developing countries and the growing dichotomy between them.

The potential of coalitions whose goals include the coordination of positions on the entire negotiation agenda and who do not stem from regional economic integration is minimal due to the probable heterogeneity of interests. Common positions of all developing countries can more likely be expected in individual sector negotiations, especially agriculture, and the so-called Group G-20 is striving to represent the voice of all developing countries in this regard.

Coalitions Focused on a Particular Sector

The so-called single undertaking principle, which established the obligation of implementing all results of the negotiations, increases the efforts of individual countries to promote a particular sector which they consider to be a priority from their point of view and which would balance out the adopted liberalization commitments in other areas. This context created a broad spectrum of coalitions focused on individual sectors of international trade. They were also formed based on the efforts of introducing issues of the specific economic characteristics of various groups of countries – and the specific economic problems derived from them – into the agenda.

The varying interests of individual countries within the IGDC lead to its fragmentation in the period before the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations (1982-1986). The G-10 Group¹⁴ tried to block the service sector from being included in the new round of multilateral negotiations. In this regard the Group, along with 13 other countries, submitted its position representing all developing countries – *The Improvement of World Trade Relations* to the IGDC and the preparatory commission for the Uruguay Round in June 1985. In reaction to this independent G-10 approach the group of twenty developing countries realized that in order to promote their own interests in the services

¹⁴ The G-10 Group was comprised of Brazil, India, Egypt, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Peru, and Tanzania.

sector a dialogue is necessary with those developed countries who share similar interests. The so-called Café au Lait¹⁵ Group was formed by establishing contacts and cooperation with the informal group of smaller developing countries (the so-called G-916). It focused on a specific area – the inclusion of the services sector into the negotiations of the Uruguay Round.

This coalition connected the developing and developed countries; it was positively focused on a concentrated set of issues which allowed it to be flexible and constructive; at the same time, the potential of this group – with the participation of Canada – was relatively significant especially with respect to the fact that GATT negotiations were traditionally dominated by the Four consisting of the USA, the EC, Japan, and Canada. The proposal submitted by Columbia and Switzerland on behalf of the Group to the preparatory commission became the bedrock of the Punta del Este declaration which defined the agenda of the Uruguay Round including the services sector. The only area not mentioned in the Punta del Este declaration, in contrast to the Café au Lait Group proposal, was the reduction of barriers in the trade with modern technologies. The G-10 Group was able to achieve the delimitation of the services sector in a separate part of the Punta del Este declaration which was perceived as an instrument ensuring that the single undertaking principle would not be applied to this sector.

The successes of the Café au Lait Group stem from the specific focus and pro-active approach. In relation to the limited results achieved by the G-10 Group they suggested the significant potential of these types of coalitions in multilateral negotiations which was repeated in the definition of the Doha Round agenda.

The so-called Cairns Group¹⁷ strived to continue in the successes of the Café au Lait Group with a similar strategy in the area of agriculture negotiations within the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations. It incorporated 14 countries exporting agricultural products with the goal of ensuring that this area would gain the highest priority within this round. Like the Café au Lait Group it joined developed and developing countries, focused on a specific area, its positions were based on research and analytical work, and it

¹⁵ A. Narlikar, "Café au Lait Diplomacy", B. Hoekman, A. Mattoo, P. English (eds) *Development, Trade and the WTO, A Handbook*. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2002), p. 489.

¹⁶ Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

¹⁷ The Cairns Group currently consists of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. See: <http://www.cairnsgroup.org>.

simultaneously acted as a mediator between the USA and the EU.¹⁸ Unlike the Café au Lait Group, this group achieved a certain level of institutionalization in the form of regular Ministerial conferences. In the course of the Uruguay Round it presented a number of its own, fairly ambitious, proposals aimed at achieving full liberalization in agriculture trade within the next 10 years in an attempt to apply pressure on the USA and the EU. The Group perceives the results of the Uruguay Round as limited, as stated at its Ministerial meeting in 1995 in Manila. Along with a certain level of institutionalization this fact enabled a longer existence for this group as well as a proactive approach in the Doha negotiations. On the other hand, during the negotiations in Doha the Group did not submit such an ambitious proposal as in the Uruguay Round. The relative reduction of the coalition's role can also be attributed to the formation of other significant coalitions in the area of agriculture, especially the G-20 Group whose goal was to increase the pressure on developed countries to reform their agriculture policies, like the Cairns Group during the Uruguay Round.

The G-20 was formed in reaction to the submission of the Common text on the issue of the agriculture trade system reform in August 2003 to the USA and the EU which was widely criticised for its lack of ambitions and specifics.¹⁹ The potential of the Group, due to the fact that it united all the relevant developing countries, is significant. Another important aspect of the Group lies in the fact that it is the first Group in which China is participating since its accession to the WTO. On the other hand, this Group incorporated countries which are export-oriented such as Brazil, Argentina, as well as countries like India and China whose agriculture sector would be severely damaged by liberalization. The dichotomy in the characteristics of the member countries became visible in the last negotiations in July 2008 in Geneva, which collapsed on the disagreement between the USA and India on the Special safeguard mechanism for the protection of farmers in developing countries. This discrepancy was also visible in India's and China's membership in the G-33 which strived to ensure that liberalization would not affect some strategic products from developing countries. Through its common webpage the G-20 tries to openly present its positions. On the WTO platform it adopts a more pro-active approach and so far it has submitted a number of proposals – some of which were however considered to be rather provocative. It is interesting

¹⁸ A. Narlikar, D. Tussie, "The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO", *The World Economy* Vol. 27, No. 7 (July 2004), p. 958.

¹⁹ "Agriculture: Real Negotiations Start As EC, US Table Joint Modalities Text", *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest* Vol. 7, No. 28, (2003).

that the so-called G-10 Group²⁰ has defined itself in contrast to the G-20. The G-10 consists of primarily developed countries who are large importers of agricultural products and who are striving to maintain protectionist measures in the area for reasons other than commercial interests. The formation of this coalition showed that coalition formation is not only reserved to developing countries.

The operation of the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (ITCB) is another example of the successful functioning of a coalition with a common pro-

The focus of a coalition on a certain specific sector and its pro-active approach are the conditions for its successful conduct in negotiations, but it does not create the conditions for common positions in the final phases of negotiations when individual interests may surpass the original common progress in negotiations.

active and specifically focused approach. In the course of the Uruguay Round the ITCB achieved observer status at the Negotiation commission on textiles and clothing. Until the Uruguay Round international trade with textiles and clothing was regulated outside the GATT framework by the Agreement on International Trade with Textiles. In this area the developing countries formed the ITCB in the year 1984 explicitly with the aim to apply GATT principles on this sector of international trade and allow for effective participation on international forums.²¹ The significance of ITCB proposals presented and discussed within the commission was high especially due to the fact that most of the large developing countries are ITCB members. The result of their activities is the inclusion of the textiles and clothing sector into the WTO rules through the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.

The aforementioned shows that the focus of a coalition on a certain specific sector and its pro-active approach are the conditions for its successful conduct in negotiations, but it does not create the conditions for common positions in the final phases of negotiations when individual interests may surpass the original common progress in negotiations. A defensive strategy can also be an insufficient binding element for a coalition.

²⁰ Island, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Lichtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland, Taiwan.

²¹ Article 2 of the *Arrangement Establishing the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau*, <http://www.itcb.org/documents/ArrangementITCB.pdf>.

The successes of the Café au Lait Group in determining the agenda of the Uruguay Round incited the formation of a wide spectrum of coalitions in the preparation phases of the Doha Round. A number of large coalitions between developing countries were formed in an attempt to bring development issues, which were generally considered to be insufficiently covered by WTO rules, into the agenda of the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations. In the year 1998, the African Economic Community called for a broader coordination of WTO member countries' negotiation positions which supported the lockdown of negotiations in Seattle and consequently led to the inclusion of development issues into the Doha agenda.²² The membership base of this so-called African Group significantly overlaps with other large groups such as the ACP (The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) and the LDC (Least Developed Countries). The development agenda united the ACP Group, the African Group, and the LDC Group in the Cancun negotiations into the G-90 Group with the goal of harmonizing their positions.

The Small and Vulnerable Economies Group²³ and the Small Island Developing States Group²⁴ were formed on a similar principle – the effort of introducing issues of specific economic characteristics, and the specific economic problems derived from them, into the negotiation agenda. These coalitions achieved certain successes in the delimitation of the negotiations content in the Doha Declaration. It explicitly states the need to address the issues related to small and vulnerable economies (Article 35 of the Declaration) and the least developed countries (Articles 42 and 43 of the Declaration).

The Friends of Fish Group²⁵ was formed in a similar fashion as the Café au Lait Group in the year 1998 during the preparations for the Ministerial Conference in Seattle. It united developed and developing countries in promoting the elimination of subsidies in fishing and succeeded in integrating this issue into the Doha Declaration. A number of coalitions also appeared in relation to the so-called built-in-agenda of the Uruguay Round. The Group 24 in the services sector²⁶ was

²² See: "Declaration and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government"; <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Decisions/hog/8HoGAssembly1998.pdf>.

²³ Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago.

²⁴ Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mauritius, Saint Kitts a Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago.

²⁵ Australia, Philippines, Island, New Zealand, Norway, Peru and the USA.

²⁶ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela.

formed in the year 1999 with the aim of supporting negotiations in all the sectors and modalities of services provision.²⁷

These coalitions, along with the Café au Lait Group, show that coalitions are capable of achieving relative results primarily in the determination of the negotiated agenda. They adopt a common commitment in the sense of devoting their attention to the given sector of the negotiations which however does not mean that they will adopt the same positions in the given areas. This creates a certain parallel between the role of the coalition in the Doha Round and the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations.

In comparison with the Uruguay Round the Doha Round differs in a broader formation of coalitions. Beside the aforementioned coalitions

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the Tropical Products Group (G-11)²⁸ was formed with a focus on a very particular agenda. Its objective was to achieve full liberalization in international trade with tropical products which the countries have already explicitly committed themselves to in the Agreement on Agriculture. There was also the Cotton-4 Group consisting of the main African producers of cotton which

primarily strived to eliminate the subsidies in the cotton sector.

An interesting aspect which can be observed in the Uruguay Round is the fact that the coalitions played a positive role in relation to the new issues regulated by international rules (even though the G-10 was against the inclusion of the services sector into the negotiations). The coalitions also adopted rather defensive positions on the so-called Singapore issues (transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, protection of investments, and free competition) which were to be included in the WTO rules. The G-90 Group as well as the Group of Similarly Thinking Countries and the Basic Group on Singapore issues were all against.

The fact that coalitions are becoming an important instrument also for the developed countries is illustrated by the participation of the USA and the EU in some of them. The issue of access to the markets with non-agricultural products in large and dynamically growing economies is very important for

²⁷ M. Patel, "New Faces in the Green Room: Developing Countries Coalitions and Decision Making in the WTO", *GEG Working Paper Series WP2007/33* (Oxford: Oxford University College, 2007), pp. 22-23.

²⁸ Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rika, Ecuador, Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela.

the developed countries. In this context the USA and the EU along with other significant developed economies formed an informal group called the Friends of Ambition in NAMA²⁹ which is striving to achieve maximal tariff reductions and obtain real access to markets in this sector (the reduction of tariff ceilings below the level of applied tariffs). Like in the negotiations on agriculture trade, an opposing group was also formed in this sector. The so-called Group NAMA-11 united the relevant developing economies with the goal of limiting the opening of their own markets with non-agriculture products. The positions of the group are derived from the concept of less-than-full reciprocity in the liberalization of market access to markets with non-agricultural products which should reflect the interests of developing countries. This concept was included in the Doha Declaration and confirmed in the July package in the year 2004. By incorporating among others Brazil and India, the members of the New Four, the potential of the Group is relatively significant and it is able to connect the issue of market access to markets with non-agricultural products with a balanced progress in the negotiations on the agriculture sector as it expressed in the joint communiqué of the Negotiating group on market access in June 2007.

The wide variety and extensive presence of coalitions suggests that their significance in the course of negotiations is growing. With the actors of dominant negotiations being opposing coalitions such as the G-20 and the G-10, the Friends of Ambition in NAMA and the NAMA-11 it is possible that future negotiations will be primarily conducted between individual coalitions. Furthermore with regard to the fact that many coalitions were formed during the preparations or in reaction to the last Ministerial Conference (for example the G-90, the Cotton-4, the G-33, and the Friends of Antidumping Negotiations in Cancun, and the NAMA-11 with the Tropical Products Group in Hong Kong) the formation of more coalitions can be expected if the Doha negotiations are renewed. The current financial crisis which will hinder the negotiations might help this process. The current use of protective measures within the valid WTO rules (especially increasing applied customs tariffs towards the tariff ceilings, subsidies, licensing, and so on), which are according to the World Bank

In the situation of increased protective measures coalitions may prove to be an adequate instrument in the search for mutual concessions.

²⁹ Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, the USA.

report utilized by both developed and developing countries³⁰, can lead to higher motivation to at least achieve the status quo after the crisis has passed. In the situation of increased protective measures coalitions may prove to be an adequate instrument in the search for mutual concessions.

Conclusion

With the growing number of WTO members the ability of individual countries to promote their own interests is decreasing – both in the case of developed and developing countries. The formation of coalitions with other member countries seems as a natural solution. On the other hand coalition formation is influenced by a number of other factors. The inclusion of the so-called single undertaking principle into the Uruguay Round increased the sensitivity of individual countries towards a broader spectrum of negotiation results which they must consequently implement. The increased interest of developing countries in a broader spectrum of negotiations on the GATT/WTO platform, illustrated by their participation in coalitions focused on the services sector as well as other aspects of international trade, can also be explained by the changing structure of their export which is evolving towards the export structures of developed countries. Through the influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund the developing countries achieved a significant degree of liberalization in their trade relations and increased their participation in international trade. The assistance provided to them along with the recommendations included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers both increase the sensitivity of these countries to the results of the negotiations and positively influence their ability to adopt positions on individual issues.

The first coalitions on the GATT platform stemmed from regional economic integration. This aspect must be perceived through the fact that the first rounds of multilateral negotiations were devoted solely to the reduction of customs tariffs where the formation of a customs union created natural conditions for the formulation of common positions. On the other hand, the operation of ASEAN, MERCOSUR, or CARICOM suggests that only real progress towards the establishment of a common market creates conditions for complex common positions in negotiations. A higher number of complexly operating groups based on regional economic integration can be expected with regard to the anticipated customs unions and especially common markets.

³⁰ E. Gamberoni, E. Newfarmer, "Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrying Trends", *Trade Notes*, No. 37 (2009).

Block type coalitions were the first coalitions which weren't based on regional economic integration. The division of the IGDC over the inclusion of the services sector in the agenda of the Uruguay Round as well as the disagreement of the G-20 or the G-33 in the July 2008 negotiations suggest that if a high level of economic integration, or at least economic homogeneity, are not the basis of the coalition in the final phases of the negotiations individual positions of the countries may supersede the original common negotiation position of the coalition.

The successes of the Café au Lait Group in the determination of the Uruguay Round agenda incited the creation of other specifically oriented coalitions. In comparison with block type coalitions these coalitions are capable of achieving more significant results. On the other hand, it is becoming clear that they are achieving more significant results especially in determining the agenda of the individual rounds. The determination of the agenda means a commitment to negotiate on the issue but it does not mean that particular liberalization commitments will be adopted.

The large number of coalitions in the Doha multilateral negotiations in comparison with the Uruguay Round couple with the fact that they are also formed by developed countries suggests their growing importance in negotiations. Despite the challenges of Pascal Lamy that "trade is a part of the solution of the global economic crisis" it is probable that the current financial crisis will lead to the implementation of protectionist measures at least on the level permitted by WTO rules. Increasing protection in relation to the financial crisis (the current reduction in trade is a consequence of economic recession rather than implemented protectionist measures) can create a new situation for negotiations after it is over: The motivation to achieve more liberal trade than before the implementation of the protectionist measures can serve as a new impulse for the adoption or formulation of common positions (pro-active as well as defensive) especially with regard to the fact that in the Doha Round a number of coalitions were formed in the preparation and in reaction to the Ministerial meetings after the start of the negotiations.

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List of Abbreviations

- ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
 CARICOM – Caribbean Community
 CEFTA – Central European Free Trade Agreement
 EEC – European Economic Community

- G-77 – Group 77
 GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
 IGDC – Informal Group of Developing Countries
 IMF – International Monetary Fund
 ITCB – International Textiles and Clothing Bureau
 MERCOSUR – Common Market of the South
 PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
 WB – World Bank
 WTO – World Trade Organisation

The Geopolitics of Emotion: How cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World

By Dominique Moïsi. New York et al: Doubleday, 2009.

French international relations scholars have been studying the more unusual aspects of world politics for a long time now. Bertrand Badie, one of the leading experts on power in its broadest sense, is teaching his students at Sciences Po that actions do not have to be based solely on reason but can also have emotional foundations. At first glance, this proposition might seem odd to those in the field of international relations. However, a deeper look into the reasoning of academics like Bertrand Badie reveals a solid and pertinent line of argumentation. A strong proponent of this approach, Dominique Moïsi, has, for the first time, managed to successfully reunite the study of emotions and politics into one book.

Before delving into the core aspects of Moïsi's work, it should be mentioned that he has not written a scholarly book but rather an extended essay based on his January 2007 article in *Foreign Affairs*. Although geopolitics and emotions appear to be an unlikely mix, Moïsi asserts that we need emotions to understand the world around us – including politics. According to him, globalization is based on a paradox – on one hand, we are witnessing the pervasiveness of US American culture, while, on the other hand, the countries of

Asia are taking the economic lead. This leads to what Moïsi calls *asymmetric multipolarity*, in which unequal actors, with different views of the world, interact. The study of emotions as one of the main factors on the global political stage is, in Moïsi's opinion, justified by the changes in the post-Cold War order which brought about an increased importance of the role of emotions in politics. Such a surge in the weight of emotions can be partially explained by the actions of mass media, which have made the world more transparent, blurring the borders of 'separate worlds'. Nowadays, irrespective of their location, people have access to a large amount of information on even the most remote corners of the globe – leaving aside, of course, extreme cases such as North Korea. Moïsi proclaims that, after 'the century of ideology', 'the century of identity' has come. He then proceeds to define three emotions as particularly significant in shaping the world and outlines three world regions to be respectively shaped by these emotions: hope for Asia, humiliation for the Islamic world and fear for the West.

The first emotion studied by Moïsi is hope. Hope means confidence and, in the author's understanding, hope in the 21st century also designates 'better here

and now', a definition closely related to what Max Weber called the Protestant ethic. During the past two centuries, the roles of Asia and Europe have switched; while in the nineteenth century Asia was fading away and Europe was a symbol of modernity, the 21st century sees a reversal of positions. In Moïsi's view, this hope is translated into cultural openness and confidence. China, as a prime example of the culture of hope, manifests nationalism of two types: the defensive one, which fears the fall of the empire (e.g. Tibet) and the positive one, which expresses the abovementioned hope. Thus, contemporary China can be characterized by Guizot's 'Get rich and be quiet' motto (François Guizot, 1787-1874, was a Minister of Education and, later, Prime Minister under French king Louis Philippe). At the moment, the Chinese regime is damaging its external image through its tense relationship with the Dalai Lama or its support of the Burmese junta. Nevertheless, buds of civil society are very slowly blooming in China in the form of organized protests. All in all, Moïsi predicts that the rise of China will lead to the eclipse of the US, a proposition that is hardly debatable.

Another Asian example of hope comes from India, a dazzling country – from an outsider's perspective – which faces deep internal contradictions. The world's largest democracy is plagued by incompetent and corrupt politicians, an alarming decrease in redistribution and in the destruction of caste differences. Indians, no matter how proud they might be of their achievements, are conflicted

about their identity. Even though China and India share many commonalities, the origins of their pride and confidence are different: the imperial past for China and a bright vision of the future for India.

Japan is perceived as an Asian country only by the West, according to the author. In Asia, it is the same Nippon, with its historical scars intact as Japan has not yet apologized for World War II. To a certain extent, Japan shares the Western culture of fear by being similarly terrified of losing its strong international role to India and China. This sense of insecurity has resulted into high suicide rates at home and into being 'passionately moderate' internationally.

The two Asian giants of hope are facing crucial challenges: India has to decide what type of power it wishes to be, while China must ensure that its current inwardness does not transform into irrational behavior (all-out war with Taiwan, for instance).

However, it would be fallacious to assume that all Asian countries belong to the culture of hope: the author excludes Japan as being 'beyond' the culture of hope and uses Pakistan as an example of a country which has not reached that point yet. These exceptions underline the diversity of the Asian continent and also, to some extent, undermine Moïsi's argument. When he often talks of 'Asia', he actually means just China and India. His analysis does not examine Central Asian countries, the Koreas or successor states of the Raj other than India. It is understandable that, in order to offer a comprehensive picture,

the author needs to simplify his ideas. However, Moisi never truly explains what he means by Asia, preferring ad hoc definitions to a clear-cut delineation.

The culture of humiliation is exemplified by the Islamic world, later redefined as the Arab-Islamic world. For Moisi, humiliation means impotence, being confined to a future that is in stark contrast to the glorified past. The Arab-Islamic world is not the only global region facing such a dichotomy. As the author points out, this dichotomy can induce two types of behavior: One possibility is the 'I'll show you I can do it' behavior; found in South-East Asia, which gives birth to powerful competition. The other side is the despair of the 'if I can't reach you, I will drag you down' kind. According to Moisi, it is here that the Arab-Islamic World finds itself. The French scholar ascribes this despair to the fact that the region is both demographically on the rise and politically humiliated. The region has been plagued with incapable leaders who, instead of taking responsibility, are constantly looking for scapegoats. The main cause of this grave situation is the historical decline of the Arab-Islamic world, a process which started with the failure to capture Vienna, continued with colonization in the region and was ultimately reinforced by the establishment of the State of Israel and by Israel's treatment of Palestinians. The climax was reached during the Six-Day War, when the Arab states lost all hope.

It should be kept in mind that, as Moisi reminds us, the sense of humiliation is not only negative; as seen, it can be

successfully used as a diplomatic weapon by Arab countries against their former colonizers and by Israel against Europe. Moisi however rejects claims that the problem lies in Islam given that Islam has produced many intellectuals who argued against the feeling of humiliation. He also states that the Arab-Islamic world is culturally declining because of 'despots and fundamentalists' sharing interest in curbing free expression. As for terrorists, Moisi claims that they address the legitimate grievances of Arab and Muslim people. Muslims in the West feel segregated, according to Moisi, a sentiment which is augmented by their difficult search for identity and by the lack of significant European leaders of Muslim origin. The way out of the misery is, in Moisi's opinion, hidden in improving the situation of women, taking off the mask of the victim and saying 'no' to cultural relativism.

Nevertheless, Moisi's oversimplified analysis cannot always be justified by an effort to present a comprehensive overview on emotion and politics. To support the argument that the feeling of humiliation in the Arab-Muslim world was caused by a historical decline, he uses the claims of a renowned Middle East scholar, close to the neo-conservative Bernard Lewis. Although he does not cite Lewis directly, Moisi subscribes to his line of thought when it comes to the reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world. While the academic credentials of Professor Lewis cannot be disputed, the analyses in his latest works often reach similarly

oversimplified conclusions. Moreover, in his comparison of Christianity and Islam, Moisi ignores that Christianity also consists of a set of rules and restrictions, if lived as a religion. Moisi ignores significant debates about the morality of terrorist attacks among Muslim scholars and leaders since the early 1990s. When he states that there are no significant leaders of Muslim origin in Europe, he ignores Rachida Dati in France, Sadiq Khan in the UK or public thinker Navid Kermani in Germany. In addition to this, Moisi exemplifies the Muslims' difficulty of integration into Western society through the French suburban riots of fall 2005. However, he fails to mention that Gilles Kepel in his newest *Terreur et martyre* actually demonstrated that most of the perpetrators came from sub-Saharan Africa, where Islam is mixed with animistic religions and, thus, different from Middle Eastern Islam. Furthermore, Kepel, as a scholar who has extensively covered the issue of the integration of Muslims into Western societies, maintains that France is the prime example of Muslim integration.

Finally, the culture of fear pertains to the Western world. The main reason is that, for the first time in the past three centuries, the West is not the trendsetter – globalization no longer belongs to the Western World. It is this fear that unites Europe and the West. Moisi acknowledges that, while fear is indispensable for survival, it can become excessive and incapacitating. The author never explains whether he

means 'fear' in the most salient sense of the word, that of an emotional response to the endangerment of one's personal security, financial condition or political situation; the term is vaguely defined and constantly manipulated to fit with Moisi's claims. The fear did not start with the attacks of September 11, but was rather exacerbated by these events. Moisi asserts that one of Europe's main problems is with its own identity – is it defined by geography, cultural inheritance or is it just a 'gentlemen's club of democracies'? The high point of hope in Europe was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall; the feeling of hope has been deteriorating ever since. The key moment for Europeans to completely change their positions was, according to the author, the breakup of Yugoslavia which brought a war to the backyard of Europe (war that Europeans were not able to cope with). Moisi claims that the youth has changed since 1968 – they do not want to change the world, but rather to be protected from it; he compares Europe to Venice – a nice place to retire but not a source of dynamism. Fear in Europe stems from 'the other' and, paradoxically enough, the more we need 'the others' – as part of the workforce, for example – the more we reject them emotionally. This fear of 'the other' is epitomized by the debate about the accession of Turkey to the European Union. Moisi is pro-accession, stating that the journey to the ranks of the European Union is more important for Turkey than the final destination. If Turkey is denied EU membership, the

nation can be irresistibly tempted by the Middle East and all its failings.

When it comes to the United States, Moisi is clear: for him, McCain was a candidate of fear and Obama a candidate of hope in the past elections. Americans are traditionally more concerned with the future, a future which, at the moment, looks gloomy. As previously stated, the sentiment of fear did not begin in America with 9/11; the terrorist attacks actually served as a reminder and reinforcement of the United States' feeling of its own vulnerability. America has become, according to Moisi, the symbol of oppression in the past twenty years. The traditionally positive image of the United States and the American way of life has been shattered. Americans fear that collectivism may take over individualism, the very idea on which the US was founded. Also, Americans are scared of 'the other', and, focus too much on controlling the borders and neglect internal issues.

The relationship between the two fearful banks of the Atlantic is currently a cold, distant one. In the US, disillusionment with Europeans has prevailed, whereas the Europeans feel that they do not need Americans anymore. The reasons for this estrangement are the contradictory policies of the past two White House administrations. Moisi adds another, very emotional reason – America has lost its appeal because of its noticeable shift from a culture of hope to a culture of fear.

Moisi devotes an entire chapter to hard cases, where all three emotions are entwined. The first examined case

is Russia, a country obsessed with its tragic flaws. Humiliated since the fall of the USSR, Russia exhibits the xenophobic fear of 'the other' (such as Chechnya) and displays hope in its most material form. For the Russian leadership, democracy, according to Moisi, is a sign of weakness. A parallel between Russia and Iran can be easily drawn. Nevertheless, Iran is on the rise while Russia is facing a rapid decline.

The other analyzed hard case is Israel, a state which shares the vulnerability feature with Russia due to its demographic and regional political realities. In the subchapter on Israel, Moisi makes the most surprising comparison of the whole volume: he states that the source of Israel's humiliation is Israel's mistreatment of Palestinians. Apparently, this wrongdoing can be traced back to the mistreatment of Jews in the past in the same way to abused children abusing their own children. This comparison is hard to digest, especially when the scale of the injustice against Palestinians can, under no circumstances, be compared to the mistreatment of Jews during the Holocaust.

Africa is the third hard case, a world region slowly emerging from the abyss. Contemporary deals are, however, signs of politicians' efforts to remain in office. Moisi points to South Africa as a success story and again alludes to the maltreatment of Palestinians by the Israel by expressing his desire for the rise of a Palestinian version of Nelson Mandela.

The fourth case is embodied by Latin America, which shows less despair, but also less hope. Brazil, the only shining example,

especially from a financial standpoint, is unfortunately plagued with violence.

In the final chapter, Moisi offers two possible scenarios for the world in 2025. He states that if fear takes over the globe, catastrophic events would ensue: more unrest in the Middle East, use of biological terror, a shutdown of borders, the weakening of neo-protectionist United States, the almost complete dissolution of the European Union, a partial resurgence of Russia's former empire, wars in Asia, nuclear armament of Japan, the fall of Africa, and chaos in Latin America. In a nutshell, life would be like in the Early Middle Ages. On the other hand, if hope prevails, there would be peace in the Middle East, the UN would undergo a significant reform, the United States would become 'a senior partner' around the world instead of a policeman, Russia would envision its future in the West, China would be on the path of the rule of law, Africa would develop and MERCOSUR would become a full-fledged entity. Strangely enough, Lebanon would unite with Syria.

Although Moisi acknowledges that most of his future scenarios are fictional, some of them are completely unrealistic. It is hard to imagine having borders shut if one takes into account the huge amount of international trade or the fact that some countries' survival depends solely on imports/ exports. It is also quite difficult to conceive of the dissolution of the European Union, given all the strong economic and political ties holding it together. To see MERCOSUR following the path of the European Union in the next fifteen years is merely wishful thinking; the construction

of Europe took much longer and had a significant power actor – the United States – with stakes in the integration of Europe and the remediation of its most serious problems. Another puzzling aspect is why the unification of Lebanon and Syria is regarded as a positive scenario, especially in light of the recent attempts to isolate Syria from politically interfering with Lebanon's affairs.

Moisi has produced a relatively persuasive and well put together book on a little-researched area of international relations. However, at times his arguments are flawed, too general or oversimplified. Moreover, the book is filled with factual errors which could be easily avoided, such as dating the 2005 London Tube attacks in 2006 or classifying famous political economist Francis Fukuyama as a historian.

For an experienced reader with solid background knowledge, Moisi offers great substance for debates. He excels in putting together different pieces of the global political puzzle and creating convincing scenarios. For those without background in international relations or modern history, the book can be misleading, especially because of some crude generalizations. That is why it should be treated as medication: to be taken with care and in small doses. Only then can it bring much needed help to understanding the world of politics – or the politics of the world.

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