

## **Confrontation of Two Blocs in the Korean War: Historical Context**

*A. Fomenko*

IN THE LATTER HALF of the 1940s, due to Japan's defeat in World War the political landscape in the Far East significantly changed the balance of forces seeking political domination in this part of the world.

Leaders of all democratic victor nations, simultaneously but for different reasons, shifted their support from Chiang Kai-shek and his government of "reactionary" Nationalists to "progressive" Chinese Communists.<sup>1</sup>

Back in summer 1944, when as a result of a strong Japanese offensive Chiang's Chinese army (in fact, the Kuomintang army) lost its superiority over the armed forces of the Communist Party of China, both Washington and Moscow increased their pressure on both sides in the Chinese conflict to push them to "mutual understanding."<sup>2</sup> The communiqué issued by the Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in December 1945 in Moscow, said that the Americans, British and the Soviet Union were "in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife."<sup>3</sup>

In the twinkling of an eye Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who headed the internationally recognized government of the Chinese Republic (one of the victor nations and, therefore, one of the permanent members of the Security Council of the newly established United Nations) lost his previous status of the hero of the war with Japan, a friend and ally of the United States and an official ally of the Soviet Union<sup>4</sup> to become the leader of one of the sides involved in civil strife in China.

Today, it is hard to say to which extent this U-turn was suggested not only by geopolitical considerations and political expediency, but also by

---

**Alexander Fomenko**, historian and political scientist, Deputy of the Fourth State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly; alexanderfomenko@inbox.ru

what Truman and his closest circle thought about the moral qualities of their clients: "President Truman wrote that the Chiangs, the Kungs, and the Soongs were 'all thieves,' and had stolen \$750 million of American aid."<sup>5</sup>

For several years while the Korean Peninsula was slowly moving toward a military conflict and the Chinese Communists were spreading their power far and wide across mainland China, the Soviet Union and the United States, former allies in anti-Hitler coalition, were contending for the right to "control" the new Communist regime.

The British Empire, another member of the Big Three, left the political stage after its Pyrrhic victory in World War II; in 1947, it lost India (it was actually India that turned Britain from kingdom to empire) and could no longer pursue global politics on its own.

It should be said that Chiang, a political and religious Westerner, whose regime directly depended on the United States, was at heart a Chinese nationalist and an ideological foe of foreign imperialisms of all hues, that is, "exploitation by the imperialists" whether Japanese, Soviet or American<sup>6</sup>: this much was clear to all.<sup>7</sup>

In 1930, Chiang had joined the Methodists, one of the Christian Protestant confessions<sup>8</sup> yet it was his government stationed in Nanking which a year later, in 1931, ended the Europeans' legal extraterritoriality, a privilege of long standing.<sup>9</sup>

It seems that members of the Big Three nurtured all sorts of delusions about Mao Zedong and his "agrarian reformers"<sup>10</sup>; Chiang Kai-shek, their main military ally and head of the National Government, was much more realistic. In 1944, he explained to American Vice President Henry Wallace that the "earnest agrarians"<sup>11</sup> of Mao were much more ardent Communists than their Soviet brothers.<sup>12</sup>

Throughout 1946, General George Marshall, future Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, whom President Truman sent to China as his special representative, acting in full conformity with the decisions of the Interim Conference mentioned above, tried in vain to broker a coalition government of Communists and Nationalists and unnamed Chinese "liberals."<sup>\*</sup> (Secretary of Defense James Forrestal alone resolutely opposed this.<sup>13</sup>)

While Chiang Kai-shek half-heartedly accepted the ceasefire and even invited the Communists to the National Assembly, Mao and his peo

---

<sup>\*</sup> At that time this vague term was widely used in American diplomatic correspondence.

ple remained resolved to seize power in mainland China. Significantly, the U.S. representative blamed, very much against the obvious, the Kuomintang: "On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of genuine coalition government."<sup>14</sup>

The failure of Marshall's mission<sup>15</sup> caused no great changes in what Washington wanted to achieve in China. Having deprived the generalissimo of financial and military support and having stopped the training program for his army<sup>16</sup> the Truman Administration, in fact, ensured, by 1949, the Communist military victory on the continent.<sup>17</sup>

At that time, Washington's Eastern policy differed very much from what America was doing in the West. In Europe, divided into the Great Powers' influence and responsibility zones, the Americans did not hesitate to squash the Communist mutiny in Greece and guarantee the inviolability of the Turkish borders. In fact, in his speech at Congress in March 1947 the American president outlined the policy of financial, economic and military-technical aid to Greece and Turkey in the form of the Truman Doctrine.<sup>18</sup>

Washington had all and every means at its disposal to shore up any regime anywhere in the world: The Bretton Woods financial system allowed the United States to go on a spending spree. In the first four years at the White House, Truman sanctioned spending of \$191 billion – more than 32 of his predecessors spent all together (\$179 billion).<sup>19</sup> As could be expected, American military spending rose exponentially: 155 million Americans shouldered an obligation (albeit formal) to defend against possible attacks 41 countries with the total population of 560 million. The United States had military missions and bases in, or extended military assistance to, nine more countries with the total population of 170 million.<sup>20</sup>

For several years, the United States was deliberately avoiding a full-scale opposition to the spreading zone of Communist influence in Asia. This fact cannot be explained by individual failures and blunders – it

**What happened does not rule out the possibility that the Kremlin deliberately pushed the United States into the trap of a bloody undeclared war (like the future Vietnam and Afghanistan conflicts).**

seems that the federal government was deliberately following a foreign policy strategy backed up by a doctrine of some sort.

There was a strategy and there was a doctrine, a highly undogmatic foreign policy doctrine known as the Acheson Doctrine, formulated in January 1950 by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.<sup>21</sup> The American politician preferred diplomatic, ideological and cultural methods to the use of force in geopolitical confrontation, oversights and errors of the strategic enemy should be consistently exploited while the very natural contradictions smoldering in the camp of the opponents should be fanned into a fire.<sup>22</sup>

Unlike many of the American military, the chief American diplomat was very much aware of the meaning and consequence of the culture of Oriental martial arts which taught how to use the adversary's strength against him.

At that time, the American anti-Communist patriots never concealed their skepticism: "Dean Acheson... clings to the outworn belief that the Chinese communists can be expected eventually to turn into anti-Russian communists."<sup>23</sup> Mao Zedong, however, never abandoned his habit of playing against both superpowers at one and the same time.<sup>24</sup>

\*\*\*

WITH THE RELATIVELY PEACEFUL, diplomatic, stage of the "struggle for China" between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. coming to an end in mid-1950s, struggle on the Korean Peninsula from which the Americans had pulled out by January 1, 1949 was gaining momentum.

On June 25, 1950, after a series of South Korean provocations<sup>25</sup> the troops of Communist Kim Il Sung crossed the dividing line between the South and the North. The so-called Korean War began.<sup>26</sup>

Communists advanced at a fast pace mainly because the Americans had neglected combat training and arming of Syngman Rhee's army: on May 4, 1950, President Truman had announced that there would be no shooting on the Korean Peninsula. To avert an inevitable and prompt defeat of the South Korean anti-Communist regime, the United States had no choice but to move to the peninsula American units from among the occupation forces stationed in Japan which were trained and armed exclusively for police operations. This was done on President Truman's direct instructions without clearing the Congress or declaring a war.

This war or a UN peace enforcement operation, as this bloody armed

conflict was described by international law, produced hundreds of thousands of killed and wounded. Officially, the UN SC as a whole supervised the operation; direct supervision was entrusted to Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs and the corresponding department of the UN Security Council.

According to an agreement between the permanent members of the UN SC the quota to this post belonged to the Soviet Union (the UN structure was developed by the founding nations with due account for the interests of all sides). This explains why between 1949 and 1952 the Department for Political Affairs was headed by Under-Secretary General Konstantin Zinchenko and later by Ilya Chernyshev.<sup>27</sup> The UN Military Staff Committee, likewise, was headed by Soviet representatives.

The situation, to a certain extent, was contradictory: Soviet citizens supervised the UN peace-enforcing operation in Korea while there were no Soviet troops among the UN peace enforcers. One cannot but be baffled by the fact that authors of many well-substantiated works on the UN aspect of the Korean War do not mention the names of these international bureaucrats with Soviet passports.<sup>28</sup>

It is anybody's guess whether the reports about the military operations under united command which American commanders presented, in full accordance with the procedure,<sup>29</sup> to the UN SC were strictly confidential. Today, the importance of official information supplied to the Security Council is doubted<sup>30</sup>; at the same time, the memoirs of General MacArthur,<sup>31</sup> the first commander of the UN contingent, reveal that Chinese and Korean Communists knew enough of what the enemy was doing and, most importantly, planned to do.

It is a well-known fact that the Soviet delegate missed the UN SC sitting and, therefore, the crucial voting on the military operation in Korea.

According to the official version, the Soviet Union boycotted the sittings allegedly to protest against the fact that Chiang's Nationalists (their power reduced to Taiwan after Mao's victory in mainland China) still represented China at the UN SC.

This explanation barely holds water: diplomatic missions or even foreign ministries are not entrusted with consequential decisions; an absence was not an unsanctioned oversight which pushed the Soviet Union into a diplomatic no man's land better described "neither war, nor peace." Stalin obviously preferred this to an open and uncompromising confrontation with the United States or public agreement with what they suggested: the status of the UN contingent for the American troops under General

MacArthur which had been already moved to the peninsula.

What happened next does not rule out the possibility that the Kremlin deliberately pushed the United States into the trap of a bloody undeclared war (like the future Vietnam and Afghanistan conflicts). Stalin's leeway in the Far East limited by his problematic or even dangerous allies (Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung) did not allow him to go too far in his deliberate provocations of Americans. Both allies wanted to play their own game while expecting that the Soviet Union would come to their aid in case of a direct military clash with the United States.<sup>32</sup> Syngman Rhee expected the same from the Americans.<sup>33</sup>

As distinct from their Korean satellites neither the U.S.S.R. nor the U.S., the two Pacific nuclear powers, wanted mutual destruction.<sup>34</sup> In 1951, George Kennan put in a nutshell the general mood of the American diplomatic establishment: "Can it really be that all this bloodshed and sacrifice was just the price of sheer survival for the Western democracies in the twentieth century?"<sup>35</sup>

Reality clashed with the sides' rhetoric: The course of the Korean War and the behind-the-scene talks which accompanied it<sup>36</sup> testified that from the very beginning President Truman did not want to go to the end in a conflict with the Soviet and Chinese Communists and never sought a classical military victory for the American units fighting under the UN banner.

This explains Truman's seemingly "illogical" steps. On June 27, 1950, he ordered the Chinese Nationalists to discontinue hostilities against mainland China (and warned the Communists against capturing Taiwan); he also avoided combat use of Chiang Kai-shek's armed forces against Chairman Mao's "internationalists" in Korea.

By that time, the Nationalist government had built up an army of over half a million in Taiwan. At the early stage of the war, Washington declined Chiang's offer of 33 thousand trained troops; at the height of a severe crisis when in November 1950 Communists crossed the Yalu River, MacArthur once more did not get a permission to use the 60-thousand strong contingent of Chinese Nationalists.<sup>37</sup> (Washington, which was obviously trying to avoid an image of a Western imperialist, could have profited from the conflict's internationalization by drawing Chinese contingents into the war.)

On the other hand, the President of the United States could not accept a defeat of his South Korean satellite because of unacceptable reputational losses for the United States. In November 1950, at a press confer-

ence Truman answered the question: "Will that include the atomic bomb?" with "That includes every weapon that we have"<sup>38</sup>; this meant that the American political establishment was ready to use nuclear weapons.\* In 1950, the hypothetical need to use atomic weapons was suggested not by the resolution to destroy the Communist North no matter what, but by the resolution to avoid defeat of the South.

On April 10, 1951, General MacArthur lost his posts of commander-in-chief of the Allied troops in Japan and commander of the UN forces in Korea probably because the president and his advisors preferred, if the case turned out to be tough, a less ambitious and more loyal general: "Truman did not remove MacArthur simply because of his repeated insubordination, but because he wanted a reliable commander on the scene should Washington decide to use nuclear weapons."<sup>39</sup>

It is commonly believed that the general's bellicose nature and his dreams of a personal military victory no costs spared (up to and including the use of the bomb) caused his resounding removal. On the other hand, generals commonly fight for victory and cannot, therefore, wage a war in which no victory is expected.

It seems that both sides sought for an honorable draw and the state of ante bellum; this explains why public confrontation between Soviet and American diplomacy during the "phoney war" and especially the amazingly neutral Soviet draft resolution offered to the Fifth UN GA in 1950<sup>40</sup> today looks like more a diplomatic game than anything else.

For example, at a sitting of the GA Political and Security Committee head of the Soviet delegation Andrey Vyshinsky merely feigned surprise that the American diplomat who accused the Soviet Union of urging the North to aggression and making "possible continuation of aggression" was "pushing at an open door."<sup>41</sup>

When the same committee discussed a possibility of "restoration of Formosa to China" and making the People's Republic of China a UN member to promptly resolve the Korean problem, the American delegate voted for it.<sup>42</sup>

In fact, even the public invitation to peace talks was made in the form which allowed both Great Powers to look good to their allies and satellites: on June 23, 1951, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Yakov Malik made

---

\* Back in 1945, unbiased observers realized that from that time on the White House was prepared to go to all lengths to live up to its "manifest destiny" up to and including the use of nuclear weapons against obvious non-combatants – civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.



an announcement on New York radio. In this way the opposite side asked America for peace talks while the Soviets got the laurels of peace initiators.

In fact, in the summer of 1950, the talks on discontinuation of armed confrontation in Korea already started behind the scenes in Moscow between British Ambassador David Kelly and Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. Andrey Gromyko but ended in nothing.

In June 1951, the Soviet-American talks held in strict secrecy in New York proved more successful. The Soviet Union was represented by Yakov Malik, the Americans, by prominent American Sovietologist, former diplomat and Princeton Professor George Kennan who acted on an unofficial instruction of Secretary of State Acheson.<sup>43</sup> These talks made possible Malik's radio address and direct talks between the American commanders of UN troops and the military of North Korea in July 1951.

It should be said that those who came to power in the Soviet Union after Stalin and General Eisenhower who replaced Truman in the White House in 1953 made their best to conclude the military confrontation in Asia to mutual satisfaction.

The Soviet Union sustained no political losses, while ambitious Asian Communists, official allies of the Soviet Union, became aware of the dangers of a direct confrontation with the American imperialists. The United States demonstrated to all doubting anti-Communists that its permanent military presence in this key region was absolutely necessary; Japan realized that its geopolitical situation offered no other options.

The British, Washington's official allies, who were fully aware of the dubious nature of Anglo-Saxon "brotherhood and unity," also profited from an absence of victors in the Korean War especially because of fairly important ideological disagreements inside the Atlantic Alliance between the British establishment which moved to the left after 1945 and the American establishment which moved in the opposite direction after Roosevelt.

The collection of articles *New Fabian Essays*\* published at the height of an armed conflict in Korea reveals what the British left intellectuals and politicians thought about the Cold War. Richard Crossman\*\* who

---

\* The Fabian Society, British left-center and socialist organization founded in 1883-1884 which laid many of the foundations of the Labor Party set up in 1906. George Bernard Shaw edited the first collection of the Fabian Essays on Socialism published in 1889.

\*\* Prominent Left Labor politician; an MP since 1945; at different times was Minister of Housing and Local Government, Lord President of the Council, Leader of the House of Commons, etc.



compiled and edited the collection wrote in his own article "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism": "We are members of the Atlantic alliance; but this does not mean that we are enemies of every communist revolution. [Sic! – *A.F.*] We are opposed to Russian expansion, but also to an American victory. Our object is to keep the Cold War cold, in particular, so that to restrain rearmament that it remains at a level which both sides can sustain over a period of years. If this object can be achieved, there is no inherent reason why the power conflict between the two great blocs should not gradually exhaust itself during the next twenty years. The success we seek is a balance of world power, and in that balance the restraining influence of a communist China on Russia may be as vital as that of a socialist Britain on the U.S.A. If neutralism is a blind alley, ideological detachment is a requisite for those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who are seeking to strengthen the social conscience in its struggle against totalitarianism.

"In the last place, we must realize that the Cold War brings possibilities of good as well as evil. Under its stress, both communists and anti-communists are overcoming antiquated forms of national sovereignty, developing new institutions or international economic planning, and accelerating the pace of social and technological change. As soon as rearmament is given an absolute priority by either side, the value of these changes is outweighed by the added risk of war and the distortion of the economy. But, while facing this danger frankly, we should not overlook the fact that the interacting pressure of Cold War (provided it can be restrained within limits) can create material conditions for the enlargement of freedom. The task of socialist foreign policy is to exercise these restraints on the policy of the Atlantic powers."<sup>44</sup> This could have been interpreted as the author's personal opinion<sup>45</sup> whose dream of "overcoming antiquated forms of national sovereignty" was obviously ill-timed had not former Labor Premier Attlee concluded his Introduction to the collection with a recommendation of "New Fabian Essays to our comrades not only in this country but overseas."

At that time, this range of ideas was close to the hearts and minds of a fairly wide circle of serious people in the West who in the early 1950s no longer sought a banal victory over Communism but an international convergence of sort of superficially different political regimes.

The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee called "Communist Propaganda Activities in the United States" published early in 1952, hints at the width of this circle. In 1950, over 1 million copies of books, jour-

nals and other printed matter of "Communist bias" were circulated in the country, in violation of American laws, together with over 2 thousand films and over 25 thousand vinyl records.<sup>46</sup> Those who wrote the report pointed to officials of the Department of Justice and the State Department: at that time, many of the left intellectuals of all hues were employed by the Department of State. It was they who, probably for want of a sufficiently large group of true Maoist Communists in the United States, became targets of vehement attacks of headstrong American anti-Communists and patriots.

Today, when the "repentant" Soviet Union has left the stage and when the United States has established relations with unrepentant Chinese and Vietnamese Communists, everybody, even the starry-eyed anti-Communists in the West and the East, can see that the Cold War was waged not for "freedom and democracy" and not against Communism.

It has become abundantly clear that confrontation between the blocs was a complicated and far from straightforward phenomenon.

Several years after Dean Acheson's famous speech before the National Press Club, Washington strategists abandoned his foreign policy logic (which had proved useful and successful in Asia) probably because of "cyclical alternations" of the U.S. foreign policy noted by famous historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.<sup>47</sup> It was replaced with the special operations logic applied in 1953 in Iran to remove nationalist (but not Left) Premier Mossadegh and in 1954 in Guatemala to remove Left (but not nationalist) President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán.

They were followed by direct armed intervention in Vietnam which caused huge psychological damages inside the country and did nothing good to American reputation in the world. In fact, Ho Chi Minh, Communist leader of Vietnam, starting with 1945, even before the First Indochina War with France, repeatedly tried, without much success, to obtain support of the Truman Administration<sup>48</sup>; this makes the Second Indochina War, this time with the United States, a senseless exercise. (Washington obviously overestimated the degree of closeness between Ho Chi Minh and Moscow and, contrary to the Acheson Doctrine which suggested mediation between Paris and Ho, never tried to pull the Vietnamese leader to its side.)

A cynic would have said that Washington profited from the Vietnam War and all its military operations of the latter half of the 20th century: it detracted attention from the other, economic or, rather, political-economic, front of its struggle for world domination.

The Cold War was not about defense of democratic rights and freedoms including the freedom of entrepreneurship (an object of the Founding Fathers' special concerns).

In the fall of 1951, General MacArthur, well known as an ardent patriot of America, pointed to the shift "toward totalitarian rule with the suppression of those personal liberties which have formed the foundation stones to our political, economic, and social advance to national greatness."<sup>49</sup> Charles Erwin Wilson, head of General Motors, shared his concerns: "The emergency of the Korean war and the defense program, however, is being used to justify more and more government restrictions and controls. It is being used to justify more and more policies that are inconsistent with the fundamentals of a free society."<sup>50</sup>

The last two decades, which separate us from the bloc politics which took the form of a Cold War, have thrown into bolder relief the true geopolitical meaning of the numerous programs of "economic aid" carried out by the USAID, the World Bank and other international institutions which share the ideology of the Washington consensus.<sup>51</sup> They helped shape the contemporary economic and political climate in the world no less efficiently than the use of military force as an instrument of global imperialist construction.

---

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> On the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union see: North, Robert C. *Moscow and Chinese communists*. Stanford, 1963, pp. 201-240.

<sup>2</sup> Bagby, Wesley M. *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with China in World War II*. Newark, London, Toronto, 1992, pp. 123-124.

<sup>3</sup> [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/decade19.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade19.asp)

<sup>4</sup> See: Galenovich Yu.M. *Dva generalissimusa: I.V. Stalin i Jiang Zhongzheng (Chiang Kai-shek)*. Moscow, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Bagby, Wesley M. Op. cit., p. 65.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example: Chiang Kai-Shek. *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*. N.-Y., 1947, p. 100.

<sup>7</sup> Utley, Freda. *The China Story*. Chicago, 1951, p. 264.

<sup>8</sup> Ivanov Pyotr, priest. *Iz istorii khristianstva v Kitae*. Moscow, 2005, pp. 72-78.

<sup>9</sup> Legendre A.F. *La Crise mondiale. L'Asie contre L'Europe*. Paris. 1932, pp. 338-339.

<sup>10</sup> This was how Americans called their Chinese partners. See: Utley, Freda. Op. cit., pp. 10, 150, 152, 196.

<sup>11</sup> *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Boston, 1952, p. 522.

<sup>12</sup> Utley, Freda. Op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>13</sup> *The Forrestal Diaries*. Ed. Walter Millis. N.-Y., 1951, p. 177.

<sup>14</sup> Personal Statement by the Special Representative of the President (Marshall) January 7, 1947 // Utley, Freda. Op. cit., p. 246.

<sup>15</sup> See: The mission of General of the Army George C. Marshall to China to arrange for cessation of civil strife and to bring about political unification // *The Papers*. 1946. Vol. IX, X.

<sup>16</sup> At the same time, Americans contemplated sending their military instructors to Mao's army. See: Utley, Freda. Op. cit., pp. 13-14.

<sup>17</sup> Jung Chang, Halliday, Jon. *Mao: The Unknown Story*. Jonathan Cape, 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine. March 12, 1947 // Truman H.S. *Public Papers of the United States*. 1947. Washington D.C., 1963, pp. 176-177.

<sup>19</sup> Lundberg, George A. "American Foreign Policy in the Light of National Interest at the Mid-Century," *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and its Aftermath*. Ed. Harry Elmer Barnes. Caldwell, Idaho, 1953, pp. 615-616.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem, p. 619.

<sup>21</sup> *The New York Times*. 1950, January 13.

<sup>22</sup> See: Fomenko A. "'Doktrina Achesona' i vneshnyaya politika administratsii Baraka Obamy," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 2009, No. 8.

<sup>23</sup> Utley, Freda. Op. cit., p. 85.

<sup>24</sup> Jung Chang, Halliday, Jon. Op. cit., pp. 352-394, 609-623.

<sup>25</sup> Rim Chan En. *Voyna v Koree: voprosy bez otveta*. Alma-Ata, 1993, pp. 7-10, 27-33.

<sup>26</sup> Not only journalists but also researchers wrote a lot about the passions stirred up by this war. See: Stone I.F. *The Hidden History of the Korean War: 1950-1951*. Boston, 1988; Cumings, Bruce. *The Korean War: A History*. N.-Y., 2010; Orlov A.S., Gavrillov V.A. *Tayny Koreyskoy voyny*. Moscow, 2003.

<sup>27</sup> For the list of those who headed this department see: United Nations A/59/856. General Assembly, Fifty-ninth session; Agenda items 53, 54 and 55. 2005. June 27.

<sup>28</sup> Vanin Yu.V. *Koreyskaia voyna (1950-1953) i OON*. Moscow, 2006.

<sup>29</sup> [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/85\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/85(1950))

<sup>30</sup> *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War*. Ed. James I. Matray. Westport. CT, 1991, pp. 267-268, 507-508.

<sup>31</sup> MacArthur, Douglas. *Reminiscences*. Greenwich, Connecticut, 1964.

<sup>32</sup> Matray, James I. "Dean Acheson's Press Club Speech Reexamined," *Journal of Conflict Studies*. Vol. 22. №1. 2002, pp. 28-55; Rim Chan En. Op. cit., pp. 36-37.

<sup>33</sup> South Korean Premier Syngman Rhee's cherished dream was to unite Korea under his rule by force of, he hoped, American arms. See: Vanin Yu.V. Op. cit., pp. 254-259; Rim Chan En. Op. cit., pp. 16-26.

<sup>34</sup> Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. N.-Y., 1969, p. 53.

<sup>35</sup> Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950*. N.-Y., 1951, pp. 55-56.

<sup>36</sup> Griffin, G. Edward. *The Fearful Master*. Boston, Los Angeles. 1964.

<sup>37</sup> Brown, Constantin. "How Asia's Policy Was Shaped: Civilians in the State Department Are Dictating Military Strategy of Nation, Johnson Confirms," *Evening Star*. 1951, June 16.

<sup>38</sup> <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=985>

<sup>39</sup> Cumings, Bruce. "Korea: forgotten nuclear threats," *Le Monde Diplomatique*. 2004, December.

<sup>40</sup> Vanin Yu.V. Op. cit., p. 158.

<sup>41</sup> According to information supplied by a journalist of *Chicago Tribune*. See: Manly, Chesly. *The UN Record: Ten Fateful Years for America*. Chicago, 1955, pp. 82-83.

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem, pp. 67-68.

<sup>43</sup> Yoo Byong-Yong. "Velikobritaniya, SShA i SSSR na putyakh k peremiriyu v Koreyskoy voyne (Sekretnye peregovory derzhav)", *Voyna v Koree. 1950-1953 gg.: Vzglyad cherez 50 let. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii (Moskva. 23 iyunia 1953 g.)*. Moscow, 2001, pp. 164-181.

<sup>44</sup> Crossman, R.H.S. "Towards a Philosophy of Socialism," *New Fabian Essays*. London, 1952, pp. 31-32.

<sup>45</sup> Richard Crossman was fairly independent in his convictions. A well-known Zionist and anti-Communist, in 1961, he nevertheless publicly expressed his mistrust of the Nuremberg Trials because none of the British and American officials guilty of a "real crime against humanity", viz. bombing in February 1945 of Dresden, the jewel of European culture, were brought to court. See: *Sunday Telegraph*. 1961, October 1.

<sup>46</sup> Communist Propaganda Activities in the United States // Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. Washington, DC, 1952, pp. 24-25.

<sup>47</sup> "And American conceptions of foreign policy respond to the old argument between experiment and destiny – between the United States perceived as one nation among many, liable like all the others to angelic impulses and predatory lusts; and the United States perceived as a chosen nation anointed by Providence to redeem the fallen world." Quoted from: Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M. *The Cycles of American History*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston-New York, 1999, p. 51.

<sup>48</sup> Zinn, Howard. *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present*. N.-Y., 1995, p. 461. Back in 1972, the highly eloquent letter Ho Chi Minh wrote to President Truman on February 16, 1945 was declassified // [http://rationalrevolution.net/war/collection\\_of\\_letters\\_by\\_ho\\_chi\\_.html](http://rationalrevolution.net/war/collection_of_letters_by_ho_chi_.html)

<sup>49</sup> General MacArthur. *Speeches and Reports: 1908-1964*. Turner Publishing Company, 2000, p. 187.

<sup>50</sup> Wilson, Charles Erwin. "The Camel's Nose Is Under the Tent," *Information Rack Service*, General Motors, General Motors Bldg., Detroit, MI, 1951, Oct. 10.

<sup>51</sup> Perkins John, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 2004.

*Key words:* Republic of China, People's Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, Korean War, Kim Il Sung, the Acheson Doctrine.