

Russia-U.S.: Resetting Relations

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“THE STATUE OF LIBERTY as a symbol for America was replaced with Guantanamo” – this is how Zbigniew Brzezinski described his country in a recent interview with the *Der Spiegel* magazine. The former U.S. presidential national security advisor, now a respectable political expert and foreign policy consultant for the B. Obama administration, made such a grim assessment of the eight-year performance by George W. Bush, the 43rd U.S. president.

Which of this is reality and which is rhetoric is a question that has yet to be answered. Wide-ranging, harsh criticism along many lines should be expected to continue. Positive shifts should be expected to become somewhat more pronounced. The “pro” and “con” arguments will take final shape. Without laying claim to an exhaustive analysis, I would like to offer some personal judgments on this score in so far as concerns Russia and Russian-U.S. relations in the foreseeable future.

George W. Bush’s two presidential terms coincided with a period of development that was very special to us. Without repeating some well-known truisms, I would like to reiterate that it was a period of stabilization, a period of political, economic and intellectual “straightening out,” or “concentration” according to Gorchakov, which our country went through after the critical period of the turmoil and upheavals of the 1990s. We returned into the world’s top 10 economies, acquiring quite an impressive, international political weight, although not regaining our former weight, and finally, proceeding with our creative internal reform.

Needless to say, the primary source of that was an effective combination of a well defined administrative course, public consolidation around the national priorities, and an array of favorable external factors. The last mentioned, in my humble opinion, include not only a favorable market situation with regard to our indigenous mineral riches. Without seeking in any way to play down the importance of our diplomatic service, I will nevertheless venture to suggest that equally important to us was the prevailing international environment – despite its contradictory nature – a determining factor in which was, perforce, the United States, more specifically the George W. Bush administration. The latest version

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of Russia's foreign policy concept, as formulated on July 12, 2008, describes the U.S. as "a key factor of influence on the state of global strategic stability and the international situation as a whole."

Exactly in what areas did that manifest itself? As a matter of fact, in everything that is generally understood as an objective reaction by the world system to what with regard to the Americans is commonly called arbitrariness in respect to norms of international law, domination based on the threat or use of force, unilateralism, and disregard for or even outright interference in emerging world realities in an effort to advance their own interests. Also, in that which largely evolved as an antithesis to the U.S. foreign policy and which enables us today to speak about the fundamental and dynamic changes that are currently occurring in the international political landscape and which gave Russia an opportunity to play an increasing role in global affairs. Furthermore, the emerging multifariousness of the world with a diversity of cultural and civilization related values. Prerequisites for the evolution of a new architecture of international relations with the prospect of achieving an internal regulation system, more immune to crisis. The declining role of unilateral factors in favor of an objective growth in the importance of multilateral factors in the strengthening multi-polarity of globalization processes. And finally, the establishment of flexible, network-like systems of cooperative ties and expansion in the general potential for international cooperation that predetermines the growing interdependence not only of the problems facing mankind, but also of the states responsible for their resolution.

The shifts that have occurred in Russian-U.S. relations are obvious although not as big as we would like them to be. There is hardly any need to prove that the past eight years have imparted an additional impetus to the dialogue – from the expert to presidential level on a broad range of issues. True, with a changing configuration and exposed to the same pressure of political considerations of expediency, but on the other hand, as a constant component of political discourse between our two countries.

The scope and forms of interaction on the international arena have expanded considerably. This does not mean that rivalry has become history (to think otherwise means to indulge in illusions). Nevertheless, elements of complementary (for example, within the framework of the Middle East Quartet or dialogue mechanisms on the nuclear problems of Iran and the Korean Peninsula) or even essentially allied actions (cooperation within the anti-terror coalition that emerged following the September 11, 2001 events, and coordination of efforts in fighting international piracy) have evolved and developed – in some ways for the first time since World War II. That laid the groundwork for the evolution of a basically new philosophy of relations between our countries – one based on an increasing interdependence (albeit still rather sporadic) on converging interests amidst the striving (which exist not only on paper but also partially in reality) to resolve disagreements that arise by non-confrontational methods.

Finally, the third positive outcome is a new level of economic ties. Trade has increased 250% while the total volume of mutual investment has reached \$16 billion. A number of large scale integration and cooperative projects have been launched, including long-term projects, especially in high-tech fields (space, energy, the aircraft industry, and the motor industry). Needless to say, all of this is far from a breakthrough, but it provides strong evidence of emerging trends showing that economic cooperation will in the future become a sound and effective factor in the stabilization of the entire system of bilateral relations.

Granted, some of the expectations have failed to materialize. Some of the structures under construction have obviously collapsed. But then some of the positive developments have resulted from clearly negative trends. Russia has not been an exception in that respect. It should be recalled that eight years ago, when the George W. Bush administration first came into office, it brought a concept – unattractive by contemporary standards – of relations with us, one that was built on some serious postulates that were largely negative with regard to us.

Almost like in the Soviet days, we were identified with a potential threat to the United States. It was proposed that political interest be focused on issues of security, including nuclear security and nonproliferation. Established coordination structures were being folded. Assistance programs were being scaled down. Provisions were being made for the reproduction of U.S. standards in our domestic and foreign policy approaches. One of the goals that were being set at the time was to review strategic guidelines with the prospect of Russia losing its priority status. Cooperation was built on “pinpoint” interaction in areas of overlapping interests. There were two underlying criteria – U.S. global leadership and the extent of our “attractiveness,” i.e., our submissiveness and susceptibility to U.S. approaches.

Perhaps, such a line could have worked in the past, but not with regard to Russia, which had embarked down a basically new path of development. As a result, Washington had to repackage its forces as it moved along, and adopt more pragmatic approaches, making them more balanced. That was followed by a gradual and complex process of building a constructive framework for interaction. Its political high point was the Sochi declaration of April 6, 2008, which faithfully and realistically recorded the progress made on the basis of openness, transparency, and predictability as fundamental principles of relations, outlining priority areas and modalities of cooperation, and most importantly, the mutual commitment toward building it within a format of strategic partnership.

The contrast between the concept of Washington’s strategy and the outcome on the ground is striking. The same probably is true for the entire eight-year policy of the previous administration with its erratic and controversial behavior. Unlawful actions with regard to Iraq and Kosovo, the virtual dismantling of the arms control system, the growing potential for new geopolitical conflicts, the general destabilization of the system of international relations, especially in terms of security and crisis management, and finally, retreat in the

Russian-U.S. segment of those relations over the August 2008 events in the Caucasus – such are only some of the negative developments of the period in question.

Nevertheless, there are also other examples (some of them mentioned earlier) related to the strengthening of global mechanisms to cushion systemic glitches, the development of elements of global cooperation, and prerequisites for achieving a new level of interaction, more in tune with the modern world order.

All of this, in effect, leaves unanswered a host of questions over George W. Bush's political legacy, not least in our relations, especially in terms of their ultimate balance. There is ample reason to believe that this legacy is of an extremely problematic nature, focused on contradictions, and on the strategic level is mainly linked to a trend toward further aggravation of our relations. In accordance with this negativist concept, the entire modern bilateral agenda is being reduced to three blocks of issues – security and arms control (primarily theater missile defense and the START Treaty), NATO expansion (the advance of the bloc's military infrastructure toward our borders and dragging Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance), and the geopolitical implications of the events in the Caucasus. The existing disagreements are said to be systemic, too deep to be resolved, and, therefore, crucial for the entire system of our further cooperation. They draw a line, as it were, under the modalities that have existed to date, confronting the two countries with a choice between moving back toward stagnation in relations or organizing these relations on some fundamentally new principles.

This approach was summed up by S. Sestanovich, a special adviser to the secretary of state for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 2001, under President B. Clinton. In the sunset days of the George W. Bush administration, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, he stated bluntly that “suddenly, saying that Washington has to cooperate with Moscow when possible and push back emphatically when necessary no longer seems a fully satisfactory formula.” Determining the right balance between cooperating and pushing back – “between selective engagement and selective containment” – has become the main task of the U.S. policy toward Russia.

It is not difficult to see the underlying goal of this logic. This, essentially, involves yet another throwback to negativism, albeit in a somewhat new package. We are being offered a system of relations based on the principle of connected but different-sized flasks with a strictly controlled flow into the smaller one. Or a kind of a scale with a displaced balance. I do not think that there will be too many different opinions over which of the two countries gets what in this system of coordinates, or what the chances of building such a structure are. Experience, not least the experience in the eight years of the Bush administration, shows that this approach is unviable. It is not that Russia is a difficult and aggressively paranoid partner, as former secretary of state C. Rice said not so long ago. It is that the proposed pattern is absolutely inapplicable to the realities

of the 21st century without devastating consequences, going far beyond the bounds of bilateral relations.

The signals that are coming from the new U.S. administration in the context of the general new-look approaches that it has proclaimed are widely viewed as reassuring. Indeed, there is good reason for that. B. Obama's 2008 election platform, approved by the Democrats, contains some objective, well balanced passages with regard to Russia, devoid of highfalutin rhetoric. For example, it absolutely objectively records the natural need to take into account Russia as growing factor in building a national security strategy, and strengthen cooperation in areas of overlapping interests with a special emphasis being put on countering new threats and challenges, arms control, and energy security.

The comments made by the new U.S. president in the context of the Caucasus events with regard to Russia were marked by a significant measure of restraint, although in the framework of the U.S. critical canons then prevailing.

Their contacts by telephone and their exchange of messages point to a clear understanding by Russian President D. A. Medvedev and U.S. President B. Obama of the fact that Russian-U.S. relations are important not only for the peoples of our two countries but also for the world as a whole. These relations have been defined as a very high priority, requiring constructive and open dialogue on critical issues, such as global economic development, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the war on terror. It is noteworthy that amidst the existing disagreements, the U.S. president suggested that our two countries are united by common goals, and that their joint efforts will help strengthen Russian and U.S. security, as well as international security and stability.

Finally, B. Obama is the author of the now famous remarks about the need to reset Russian-U.S. relations with the aim of strengthening our cooperation and facilitating progress in search of joint solutions on an array of issues that are of mutual interest to us.

Such theses are matched by remarks made by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The latter, as is known, has put forward the concept of "smart force" as the main instrument of the new administration's international activity, which – provided that it is applied predominantly in the sense of "force of reason" – could also have a contributing effect on the Russian track.

Not surprisingly, the B. Obama team's rhetoric is to a very large degree close to our approaches. D. A. Medvedev has stressed on many occasions that it is in the interest and within the power of our two countries to alter the strategic context of Russian-American relations so as to turn them into a true partnership. That is incomparably more important than gaining some unilateral advantages.

In their foreign policy comments, V. V. Putin and S. V. Lavrov have more than once announced the country's readiness for a change in relations with the U.S., closer cooperation, and constructive continuity. These assumptions also underlie the relevant section of Russia's foreign policy concept mentioned above.

On the whole, the formula that we are proposing is as follows: not selective cooperation but cooperation on the entire bilateral and international agenda, based on principles of equality, and honest and mutually respectful dialogue, taking into account each other's interests with priority to be given to the steady expansion in the spheres of concurring interests, the narrowing of differences and the prospect of achieving real strategic partnership.

A considerable share of commonality is also characteristic of the evolving scale of cooperation priorities. American priorities are still at the stage of "strategic review," traditional of each new administration. Nevertheless, their general outline with regard to the approaches that the sides have already presented can be discerned even now.

First of all, there is a mutual understanding that the two parties need to restore trust in their relations as soon as possible. Trust cannot be allowed to dissolve in contradictions. Hence this important conclusion: Priorities in our political dialogue should not be confined to security issues, but also encompass the entire spectrum of ties, including trade and economic cooperation. Needless to say, this is nothing new, but it is highly relevant in this context if we are to achieve a breakthrough in our relations, away from the constant walking in circles, the continuous ups and downs, and secure a firm basis for stability, imperious to any considerations of political expediency.

In the area of security per se, priority still belongs to such issues as missile defense, arms reduction, and nonproliferation, including in the Iranian and North Korean contexts.

The two parties have already confirmed their commitment to working out a new, legally binding agreement replacing START I and its finalization before the treaty expires, that is to say, before the end of 2009. Obviously, much work lies ahead in harmonizing approaches on verification issues, the modalities applied to the warheads and delivery systems, and the threshold limitations as such. However there is a basic understanding that this agreement will retain an effective control regime and will be aimed to ensure the further reduction of nuclear arsenals. Negotiations on all START related issues are expected to resume in the very near future.

"Windows of opportunity" on missile defense issues – albeit still rather misty – are beginning to emerge. Perhaps for the first time, the US administration has declared so straightforwardly its readiness to review its approaches on theater missile defense in Europe if the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions is resolved. There is a clear recognition of the need for joint efforts on the Iran track, as well as cooperation with Russia in developing a new architecture for a missile defense system, which would take into account the existing assets on both sides.

On the verbal level, the formula is fairly close to the well-known array of proposals that we put forward earlier on joint assessment of missile threats and collective forms of response to such threats with the participation of all countries

concerned and with the existing military and technical infrastructure in place.

Commitment to expanding cooperation is reiterated in the nonproliferation record, including through further cooperative efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and the provision of access for responsible members of the international community to achievements in nuclear energy technology. In this context, the U.S. readiness to establish a direct dialogue with the Iranians is praiseworthy, since this could be highly instrumental in producing positive effect on the situation around Iran's nuclear program and stabilizing its regional influence. Another high priority among the array of international issues is an Afghan settlement in the broad framework of global anti-terror cooperation. Washington has put a greater emphasis on multilateral efforts and coordination, also declaring its interest in advancing cooperation with Russia. We formulated our position on the issue as "a common cause" in February, when we opened the transit of non-military U.S. cargoes across our territory for the coalition effort, expanded bilateral consultative dialogue, and recorded our readiness for new organizational forms of interaction, including the possibility of our joining the group of countries providing contingents to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the implementation of joint economic reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, and so on.

Both parties agree that a settlement in Afghanistan could become a key element in rectifying and reformatting Russian-U.S. relations. Some hopes in this respect are being pinned on an international conference on Afghanistan under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which will open in Moscow on March 27.

From every indication, the war on terror remains one of the key areas of cooperation. Positive experience here is evident, which reinforces the mutual commitment to strengthening and developing the appropriate mechanisms. Both sides are committed to active joint work both along bilateral channels – such as the Russian-U.S. working group on the fight against terrorism – and in multilateral formats. The latter includes the implementation of the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia and the United States were the first to sign, in September 2005. The groundwork is already in place: The Russian-U.S. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has acquired a comprehensive scope with 75 states joining it already.

There is a general recognition of the need to coordinate efforts in countering the entire range of new challenges, including drug trafficking, climate change, energy security, environmental protection, and international piracy. Needless to say, one of the key areas is cooperation within the framework of multilateral efforts to overcome the global financial and economic crisis.

From every indication, the issue of Euro-Atlantic security, which we have been actively promoting, will also eventually be included in our political dialogue. So far there are different approaches here. There is still a divide between the background assumptions and concepts. We would like to see the

security architecture moving generally toward the establishment of uniform rules and practices. The American approaches are somewhat half-hearted, rather aimed at preserving the status quo. The road to a rapprochement is evidently long. Even so, there have been some shifts for the better. B. Obama has agreed to a serious discussion of the relevant issues.

It is perfectly obvious that NATO expansion, the situation in the Caucasus, Georgia and Ukraine are issues that will remain on the agenda. Without indulging in illusions, it is nevertheless important to point out that even on these super-sensitive issues one cannot rule out shifts if only in the tonality of dialogue, based on mutual respect, and perhaps even in achieving more balanced approaches. In any event, it is obvious that a pause has been taken on some of the related issues, which could help achieve a cooling off effect, the rhetoric has been visibly toned down, and there are no signs of a new standoff. This also gives hope that things could turn out well in the end.

Finally, regional conflict management. Even before, this process was based on principles of complementarity. There is every reason to expect the positive dynamics that have been achieved here to advance further, which primarily applies to the Middle East peace process, but also has a significantly broader potential.

Needless to say, all of the aforementioned only provides sketches to a general picture. The list of Russian-U.S. "joint efforts" will evidently continue to be adjusted and expanded. The process is still at the very beginning. Some critical mass – in the positive sense of the word – has yet to be accumulated, which would help lay the groundwork for a breakthrough. The most important thing in this context is that our American partners have finally recognized their historical responsibility and the need to reset our relations along a more productive route. Understandably, the "resetting" function per se is purely technical. This requires a kind of "a hard disk" with the necessary volume of consolidating memory to prevent glitches and losses of setup information. This involves primarily putting in place a foundation for all-round economic ties and a cooperation philosophy based on mutual recognition. We would like to hope that the emerging stage will become truly innovative, or "system forming." It is now time to look into the future and move forward, on the basis of mutual interests.

The March meeting between our foreign policy chiefs, S. V. Lavrov and H. Clinton, in Geneva and the upcoming meeting between Presidents D. A. Medvedev and B. Obama in London on April 1-2, 2009 on the sidelines of a G-20 summit are expected to provide the essential start-up guidelines.

An Asian Addition to European Missile Defense

V. Kozin

THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION, which has departed from the political arena, has left new President Barack Obama not only a host of unresolved regional problems, but also an array of issues concerning such a sensitive subject as arms control. The White House has effectively shelved such problem areas as further reduction of strategic offensive weapons (capabilities), tactical nuclear weapons, and control over five key types of conventional weapons in Europe, failing, together with its NATO partners, to ratify the well-known Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

Now Moscow and Washington will also have to deal with such a sensitive issue as the so called European missile shield – i.e., the deployment of U.S. strategic missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, planned by the previous Republican administration for deployment by 2011 – if established, they will account for around 25% of the U.S.’s entire strategic missile defense capability.

In this context, special attention also needs to be given to such a problem as the strategic and tactical missile defense system¹ that the United States has widely deployed and constantly upgrades in the Asia Pacific region – a system that has been left, as it were, outside the international debate due to the prominence given to Washington’s plans to extend its “missile shield” to eastern Europe, closer to the Russian borders.

As far as one can judge by his public remarks, U.S. President Barack Obama’s position on the U.S. plans for a strategic missile defense system in Europe is based on its difference from the system that the United States deployed in the Asia Pacific region a long time ago.

In a letter to the editor of the *Arms Control Today* journal for September 10, 2008, he suggested that his administration could adopt a more balanced approach on the “European missile defense” issue, although with certain provisos. “As president, I will make sure any missile defense, including the one proposed for Europe, has been proven to work and has our allies’ support before we deploy it,” he wrote. He also was critical of a setup where the U.S. spends more

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than \$10 billion a year on missile defense, but far too little on securing nuclear materials around the world and improving security (including detection) at its ports and borders.

On the other hand, in none of his public remarks either before or after the presidential election did the new U.S. leader say a word with regard to the deployment of a combined missile defense system in such a vast part of the world as the Asia Pacific region.

Even though power has changed hands in the United States, Washington continues making considerable efforts to expand the strategic and tactical missile defense systems in the Asia Pacific region, which were established in the 1970s and the 1980s.

During the years that the George W. Bush was in office, the United States had made significant progress in upgrading its multistage missile defense system in the Asia Pacific region, giving it the capability to effectively engage any types of ballistic missiles, at any range, and at any part of their flight path (during the boost stage, the midcourse or the terminal stage of the flight – i.e., their reentry into the atmosphere).² This is evident, among other things, from the U.S. Missile Defense Agency's budget request for FY 2009, which includes \$9.3 billion for missile defense programs, 75% of which was to be spent on the further modernization and deployment of key components of this immense structure.³

The United States has deployed in the Asia Pacific region all the 11 key components of its strategic and tactical missile defense system – six in the Air Force, four in the Ground Forces, and one in the Navy (two new missile defense elements have yet to be “attached.” The U.S. regional center for global command and control of information, reconnaissance and combat assets is based in Hawaii.

The U.S. strategic missile defense system in the Asia Pacific region includes missile attack early warning systems, specifically strategic radar stations, capable of detecting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at a range of more than 5,500 kilometers. In particular, with the aim of providing reconnaissance and information support for the strategic missile defense system based in the Pacific, the Pentagon has deployed two major phased array radars. One of them (SBX Band Radar is deployed on a 50,000 ton displacement sea platform off Alaska, while the other (AN/TPY 2), a ground-based radar, is in Shariki (Japan).⁴

In the Asia Pacific region, the United States also has strategic missile defense missiles – 34 three-stage ground-based interceptor missiles deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska (at present, their total number is 30; by 2013 it is to be increased to 40), as well as at the Vandenberg Air Force base near California (four missiles; it is not ruled out that their number will subsequently be augmented). To compare, it should be recalled that the George W. Bush administration had plans to deploy 10 interceptor missiles on Poland's Baltic coast near Słupsk, capable of shooting down Minuteman class ICBMs.

Unlike Europe, where the United States so far is planning to deploy a ground-based strategic system, its efforts in the Asia Pacific region are mainly aimed at boosting the naval component of the tactical missile defense system that has already been deployed in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. A specific feature of this missile defense component is that U.S. Navy ships with a multifunctional sea based missile defense system (Aegis) can operate in the world oceans unhindered, carrying “forward based missile defense elements” that can intercept ballistic missiles in the midcourse and the terminal stage of their flight.

The U.S. tactical missile defense system in the Asia Pacific region includes sea-based radars, SPY 1 and SPY 2, which have capability to track tactical ballistic missiles, as well as interceptor missiles as part of the Aegis sea-based ballistic missile defense system established on some types of cruisers and destroyers, on which a total of up to 100 such missiles were deployed as of late 2008.

The U.S. Navy in the Asia Pacific region has 10 warships equipped with the Aegis missile defense system, built by Lockheed Martin Corporation, based on three-stage solid fuel propellant SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) missiles, manufactured by Raytheon Company, with an effective range of 1,200 kilometers.

By the end of 2009, the U.S. Navy will have Aegis missile defense systems deployed on a total of 15 Arleigh Burke class destroyers and three Ticonderoga class cruisers.⁵ The U.S. Navy as a whole will have Aegis systems deployed on all of its destroyers (52 currently in service and 10 under construction), as well as on a significant number of its guided missile cruisers – 65 warships in all. The question of rearming all the 22 cruisers, according to U.S. Navy officials, remains open.

By 2015, another 12 destroyers equipped with Aegis missile defense systems could be put into service. A decision has been made to install these systems on a new generation destroyer – the Zumwalt DDG-1000 class (construction of the first such warship was started in 2007).

In 2008, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency conducted three tests of the Aegis missile defense system, including the interception of a medium range ballistic missile at an altitude of 200 to 1,000 kilometers, a high speed data transmission system, and the system’s testing together with the Japanese Navy.

From January 2002 until December 2008, the United States had conducted 16 successful interceptions of ballistic missiles out of 20.⁶ By now the United States has mastered interception and destruction of ballistic missiles at different flight stages, with the participation of one or two warships with onboard Aegis systems. The Pentagon constantly upgrades the electronic equipment and software to ensure a more accurate detection and identification of ballistic missiles in flight. A new Aegis SM-3 modification is expected, known as the SM-3 Block II.

Furthermore, the United States has plans to test this system for use as an anti-satellite weapon. On February 21, 2008, it launched an SM-3 missile

from the USS Lake Erie in the Pacific Ocean to shoot down a US spy satellite, USA-193/NROL21, 4 by 5 meters and a weight of about 5 tons, which was incapacitated while in orbit at an altitude of 247 km. It could serve as a prototype for an anti-satellite weapon to be launched from warships armed with Aegis systems. The United States already has airborne ATL (Advanced Tactical Laser) systems installed on Boeing 747 400F and C-130H airplanes, which will be used to effectively engage ballistic missiles in flight.

In November 2008, Boeing Corporation announced the successful ground testing of a “laser gun,” installed on board a modified Boeing 747 airplane. A high energy MW class chemical laser, capable of destroying ballistic missiles in flight, was tested on November 26 at the Edwards Air Force base in California. The testing involved the shooting down of an imitation ballistic missile from a turret installed in the plane’s nose section. Aiming and guidance was provided by the Boeing crew. Aerial “shooting” has also been scheduled for 2009. “Laser guns” deployed on board Boeing planes are expected to become key components in the future missile shield with capability to effectively engage ballistic missiles at the boost stage of their flight at a distance of up to 460 kilometers. Development tests of the laser were conducted in December 2005: At the time a laser beam exceeded the 10-second threshold of operation, which is necessary to ensure the destruction of a missile hull. The Pentagon plans to have seven Boeings with on board combat lasers. Each aircraft will cost around \$1.5 million.

The United States provides extensive assistance in building a missile defense system to some of its allies in the Asia Pacific region. Washington develops close military cooperation with three countries in the region (Japan, Australia and South Korea) with the aim of further improving their tactical missile defense systems, and has also reached an agreement in principle on the provision of ground based elements of a similar system to Taiwan. In 2007, with a view to coordinating the efforts in deploying missile defense systems in the Asia Pacific region, the United States established a tripartite missile defense forum with the participation of Australia and South Korea.

The tactical missile defense system of Japan, Australia and South Korea is comprised of sea and ground-based radars designed to detect tactical ballistic missiles; ground-based interceptor missiles, specifically, advanced third generation Patriot PAC-3 missile defense systems; and interceptor missiles to destroy tactical ballistic missiles at the terminal stage of their flight, at an altitude of up to 500 kilometers from the earth’s surface (THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, previously stood for Theater High Altitude Area Defense.*

The three aforementioned states also have sea-based interceptor missiles that are part of the U.S. Aegis missile defense system, installed on some of their destroyers.

*The first successful interception with this system took place in June 1999 although its testing had started back in 1995.

In October 2008, it was announced that early warning radar systems and advanced Patriot PAC-3 missile defense systems would soon be delivered to Taiwan (so far Taiwan does not have a sea based naval component of the tactical missile defense system).

The U.S.-Japanese cooperation in missile defense in the Asia Pacific region is by far the most advanced: In 1999, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding, while U.S. strategic command regards Japan as a country that is “in a unique position” for missile defense systems to be deployed on its territory. In accordance with a new memorandum of understanding between the two countries, which was signed in 2006, the United States has modernized four Patriot PAC-3 batteries and SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missiles as part of the Aegis missile defense system for Japan, to a tune of more than \$2.5 billion in total.

Tokyo first started showing interest in a national missile defense system after North Korea had tested a Taepodong-1 long range ballistic missile, on August 31, 1998, whose flight trajectory passed over the northern part of Japanese territory. The Japanese government made the decision to develop a missile shield in conjunction with the United States in 2003. In 2006, following yet another test of a more powerful ballistic missile, as well as an imitation test of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang, the Japanese Defense Ministry intensified the work to deploy a tactical missile defense system.

By now Japan has established four ground tactical missile defense position areas using the Patriot PAC 3 system – two to defend Tokyo and two to cover key military bases. By 2011, the total number of ground-based missile defense position areas on Japanese soil is expected to grow to 11 (three launch pads in each battery). Their data transmission and reconnaissance component includes seven J/FPS-3 Japan/Phased Array Radar Sites, which will soon be supplemented with another four radars of the same type.

At the same time work is under way to equip Japanese warships with Aegis missile defense systems. On December 17, 2007, Japan first tested such a system using indigenous software installed on the Kongou destroyer (the tests were code named JFTM 1, or Japan Flight Test Mission 1; version 3.6 of the Aegis system, Block 1A modification). It was the first test conducted on board a non-U.S. warship.

An interceptor missile launched from the Kongou, which has the capacity to effectively engage targets at a distance of up to 5,500 kilometers, intercepted a training ballistic missile at an altitude of 161 kilometers over the Pacific Ocean, which had been launched by the Americans from the island of Kauai (one of the Hawaiian Islands). At a news conference after the tests, a high ranking representative of the Japanese Defense Ministry described the experiment as “an important landmark in the development of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation,” while Japanese military experts said that the tests were a major step toward building the country’s own missile shield.

In the course of the tests, Japanese Navy officers exchanged with their U.S. colleagues data about the missile's flight path via a U.S. navigation satellite, "demonstrating a high level of interaction on the operation scale between the seaborne missile defense systems of the two countries."

On November 20, 2008, Japan's Chokai destroyer participated in testing a tactical missile defense system. It was assigned a more challenging mission – to shoot down not a training missile but a warhead that had separated from it. In the course of the experiment, code named JFTM 2, the target was not in fact engaged: The interceptor missile launched from the destroyer flew past the missile that had been launched from Barking Sands, a US missile test range off the Hawaiian island of Kauai.

By 2010, Japan plans to install the Aegis missile defense system on four of its guided missile destroyers. Importantly, the software for the system will be fully interoperable with similar US sea-based missile defense systems. At the initial stage of the program's implementation, the Japanese Navy will have the capability to intercept and destroy medium range ballistic missiles both soon after liftoff and at the terminal stage of the flight.

The United States and Japan also actively cooperate in the joint development of a new interceptor missile system for the Navy. It should replace the SM 3 missile system with a more advanced version – SM 3 Block IIA, whose warhead and engine will be modernized, giving it the capability to effectively destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles – that is to say, missiles with a range of more than 5,500 kilometers.

The Pentagon has made repeated attempts to have Tokyo clarify its position on the idea of the joint development of airborne laser missile defense systems – i.e., systems deployed on board aircraft that could then be used against ballistic missiles at the highest possible sections of their flight trajectories.⁷

In 2003, Australia expressed the wish to participate in developing the U.S. missile defense system. In 2004, it signed a 25-year cooperation agreement with the United States on research, development, tests, and deployment of missile defense systems. Since then the Australians have made significant headway along these lines, in particular buying three destroyers equipped with Aegis missile defense systems from the United States. Australia has deployed on its soil a missile early warning and space surveillance system – SBIRS (Space Based Infrared System) to detect ballistic missiles at the highest points of their flight, and its modification, STSS (Space Tracking and Surveillance System, 2002), to detect ballistic missiles at the launch and boost stage. These systems are used in the interest of enhancing the combat capabilities of the US strategic and tactical missile defense systems in the Asia Pacific region.

An important role in Australia's reconnaissance and data transmission support for missile defense systems is played by the Pine Gap military base in Western Australia. It has a satellite based early warning system that can monitor telemetric information about the launches of ballistic missiles from various parts

of the world. There are two JORN (Jindalee Operational Radar Network) type long range radars (with an effective range of more than 3,000 kilometers) with a considerable field of vision (up to 37,000 square kilometers), deployed in Longreach, Queensland, and Laverton (Western Australia).

The Republic of Korea also has ground and sea-based elements of a tactical missile defense system (the Patriot system with 210 missiles and the Aegis missile defense system), worth a total of \$1.2 billion, which were delivered by the United States. Moreover, Seoul can provide to its allies in the region data about ballistic missile launches received from early warning systems deployed on South Korean territory.

Under an October 2008 contract, the United States is to deliver to Taiwan four Patriot PAC-3s with 24 launchers and 330 missiles, worth a total of \$3.4 billion. Taipei also could subsequently receive US THAAD missile defense systems.

In addition, the United States has plans to build an active multitier tactical missile defense system in the Middle East, primarily in Israel, as well as in adjacent maritime areas with the participation of naval forces from Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France, all of which have their own national missile defense systems. In July 2008, two U.S. warships, one in the eastern Mediterranean and the other in the Persian Gulf, conducted an exercise rehearsing action to counter Iran's ballistic missile threat. According to Jane's Navy International, such exercises are to become regular.⁸

Responding to critical remarks with regard to the U.S. strategic and tactical missile defense systems deployed in the Asia Pacific region, Pentagon representatives claim that these systems are indeed being established to counter "nuclear missile threats" from China and North Korea. At the same time U.S. military officials do not rule out a kind of a "division of labor" where, at the initial stage, Washington will ensure the operation of a strategic missile defense system, mainly against North Korea, while Japan will operate its tactical component against North Korea. Eventually Washington and Tokyo could jointly use both systems, which over time will be transformed into an integrated universal strategic tactical missile defense system of the U.S. and its close allies in the region.

THE U.S. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX is exerting intensive pressure on President Barack Obama to ensure that he does not abandon the plans to expand missile defense systems on a global level, including in Europe and the Asia Pacific region.⁹ Representatives of the military industrial complex say that whereas in 1972, eight countries had ballistic missiles, in 2008 there were about 30 countries, which had carried out more than 100 test launches of such missiles.

In November 2008, Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly was appointed the new director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, replacing Lt. Gen. Henry Obering,

who had retired. Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly has become the eighth head of the Missile Defense Agency and its forerunners – the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) – all of which have been tasked by U.S. presidents, starting from Ronald Reagan, with creating a missile shield. Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly has extensive experience with the missile defense program. From mid-2005 he was in charge of the development and deployment in Alaska and California of the system's main component – silo launched interceptor missiles as part of the strategic missile defense system.

Will the U.S. military industrial complex manage to convince the new head of the U.S. administration about the inexpediency of expanding missile defense systems absolutely everywhere? Time will show. Meanwhile, it is important to note that along with the remarks about the possibility of adjusting the course of the previous U.S. administration with regard to the deployment of missile defense components in Europe, Barack Obama has also observed that a U.S. global missile defense system could become an important component of the plan to eliminate the danger of ballistic missiles being used as delivery means for nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

The impression is that Washington is set on preserving and expanding the Asian component of its global missile defense system, which is a significant addition to the U.S. strategic missile defense system due to be deployed in Europe not far from the Russian borders, as well as to its global missile defense system.

It is quite obvious that the "Asia Pacific" missile defense system of the United States and its allies will operate in close connection with its early warning systems that were created a long time ago and were recently modernized in Great Britain, Denmark and Norway, as well as those planned for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, unless the new U.S. administration abandons such dangerous projects, which destabilize global strategic stability.

The threat posted by the U.S. and allied strategic and tactical missile defense system in the Asia Pacific region is not hypothetical but, from every indication, quite real. Significant changes of a qualitative nature have occurred over the past few years in the development of the strategic and tactical missile defense systems in this part of the world: The capabilities of the reconnaissance and data transmission components of this system and its capability to effectively engage ballistic missiles have improved considerably. Interoperability between national missile defense systems and same type systems in other countries of the region is increasing. The U.S. strategic and tactical missile defense systems in the region are being assigned the functions of offensive space weapons with anti-satellite systems, primarily by enhancing their combat and effective engagement capabilities.

Among the Asia Pacific states, China has been increasingly concerned by the prospect of the further proliferation and modernization of strategic and tactical missile defense systems in the Asia Pacific region, especially the possi-

bility of Taiwan's acquiring a tactical version of a missile defense system.

The U.S. multitier missile defense system in the Asia Pacific region, which will close the circle of the global missile defense system that the United States is building, presumably will be aimed not only against China, North Korea, Iran and Syria, but also against Russia. Attempts are being made to squeeze the Russian Federation, as it were, with "a missile defense vise" from European, East European and South Asian directions.

Speaking at a meeting with representatives of Japanese political, academic, and public circles in November 2008 in Tokyo, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: "Russia is closely watching the intensive deployment in the Asia Pacific region of a theater missile defense system. A number of countries in the region regard these plans as a direct threat to their national security. This is to say nothing about the fact that it jeopardizes global strategic stability: It is an open secret that the missile defense system in the Asia Pacific region is part of a global missile defense system that is being created by our U.S. colleagues. Our assessment of this global line is well known."

NOTES

¹ The term "strategic missile defense system" refers to ballistic missiles with an effective operational range of more than 5,500 kilometers, while the term "tactical missile defense system" (sometimes "theater missile defense") refers to combat systems designed to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of up to 5,500 kilometers.

² According to U.S. classification, ballistic missiles spend 3 to 5 minutes, 20 minutes, and up to 30 seconds at each of these three stages of their flight, respectively.

³ Missile Defense Agency. Fiscal Year 2009. Budget Estimates. Washington, January 23, 2008, p. 26.

⁴ The United States transferred a similar radar facility to Israel. On September 21, 2008, it was delivered to the Nevatim air base in the Negev desert, together with 100 US specialists, who will install and service it. See: Stratforces Online, www.stratfor.com; December 16, 2008.

The new CENTCOM commander has requested additional antiballistic missile assets – Patriot, THAAD and SM 3 interceptor missiles to deter a potential missile threat from Iran and Syria. See: *U.S. Military Seeks BMD assets in Mideast*. Middle East Newline, May 26, 2008.

⁵ Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering, Director, Missile Defense Agency. Testimony before House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. Washington, April 30, 2008, p. 11.

⁶ Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing. U.S. Missile Defense Agency. Washington, November, 2008, p. 1.

⁷ Skinner T. and Hodge N. "Seeing the Light". *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 45, issue 16, April 16, 2008, pp. 23-24.

⁸ Hollosi Ch. "Defence Mechanism: Naval BMD Comes Into Its Own." *Jane's Navy International*, vol. 113, issue 9, November, 2008, pp. 22-27.

⁹ Harrington C. "Obama "must not reject" European missile defence." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 45, issue 47, November 19, 2008, p. 8.

Security in the Persian Gulf

A. Zasyplin

IN THE MIDDLE EAST Russia concentrates, to a great extent, its political-diplomatic efforts at creating a sustainable and reliable security system in the zone (or sub-region) of the Persian Gulf occupied by eight states: Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAR), Oman and Saudi Arabia. Its mineral wealth — about two-thirds of the world's explored reserves of oil and about one-third of the world's gas reserves — has made it critically important for global economic and energy security.

The current situation that has taken several decades to reach the present stage is best described as permanent instability worsened by repeated crises. The best illustration of many faults of the unipolar world, it was shaped by a series of bloody armed conflicts: the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988; the Kuwait crisis and the Desert Storm of 1990-1991 and the 2003 war in Iraq.

Since the early 1980s, the United States has been positioning itself as the main source of stability in the Gulf zone, a sphere of its vital interests.

The military conflicts and the latest of them — the U.S.-initiated war in Iraq started to remove the undesirable regime — have been gradually drawing America into the sub-regional developments.

Iran finds it hard to reconcile itself with the U.S. dominating role that relies on its wide-scale military presence (occupational forces in Iraq, the military bases in Kuwait, the air base and the base of the U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain, the forward command point of CENTCOM in Qatar and air and naval bases in Oman and UAE). More than that: this situation provokes extremism as a response to American domination. Tension around Iran may develop into another large-scale conflict with unpredictable results for the entire region. The Gulf zone might find itself especially vulnerable. Occupation of Iraq resulted in the threat of the country's disintegration and a much higher level of terrorist activity. The American allies from among the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) — Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — cannot feel completely safe in the situation fraught with new crises. The tension will hardly subside if the plans to extend the ties between NATO and some of the CCASG countries with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative activated in 2004 are realized.

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Tension in the Gulf created by the hot spots of tension is further increased by territorial disagreements that might develop into conflicts.

Russian diplomacy proceeds from the conviction that time has come to halt the negative dynamics in the Gulf zone and move away there, and elsewhere for that matter, from the state of affairs in which some countries dominate others; we should abandon the practice of confrontational bloc approaches, one-sided decisions that do nothing but aggravate the situation and do not ensure security. Consolidated efforts, multi-sided approaches and a realization that security is indivisible are the demands of the time. The Gulf zone needs a security complex based on the sides' mutual desire to strengthen regional security.

Starting with the late 1990s, Russian diplomacy has been working on a wide scope of approaches to normalize the situation in the Gulf sub-region and has suggested specific measures to be addressed to the zone's most burning issues. In 2004, Russia came forward with a conception of the Gulf security with an emphasis of settling the Iraqi crisis; in 2007, it was readjusted to new realities. Its main message can be put in a nutshell in the following way.

The security system in the Gulf zone should be universal and comprehensive; it should be based on equality of and respect for the interests of the regional actors and all other sides in all security spheres including military, economic and energy security. These are important propositions that can ensure a sound foundation of the security system without exclusions and exemptions. There is no such thing as a hierarchically arranged security system in which some members are either pushed to the side or left out in the cold. The Russian conception treats the multisided nature of security as a mechanism that invites all sides concerned to assess the situation, make and fulfill decisions. This gives all sides a chance to voice their concerns and insist on their legal rights and interests.

The conception rests on a sound international-legal basis: one of its provisions envisages that settlement of conflicts and other problems that might destabilize the situation in the region should rely on political-diplomatic methods based on the norms and principles of international law registered in the UN Charter. The conception stipulates that all peacekeeping operations should be based on corresponding resolutions of the UN Security Council; the use of force outside the Security Council and the use of double standards should be excluded. This is especially important in the Gulf zone where aggressions have been a frequent feature (occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and, later, occupation of Iraq).

We are convinced that all problems of the Gulf can be settled through negotiations and other peaceful means, therefore it should be registered that political-diplomatic efforts have no alternative in the area. This will create a much healthier atmosphere in the sub-region and reduce the existing concerns. The same applies to the provision under which the sides should follow the international legal documents (bilateral and multilateral agreements, UN resolutions, and decisions of regional and international organizations) that regulate the rela-

tionships in this part of the world.

The Russian conception is pivoted on stage-by-stage realization. Indeed, the problems that have been accumulating in the region for a long time cannot be resolved promptly. To achieve the desired aim, we should proceed gradually and address the most burning issues on the priority basis. Today, this is the crisis in Iraq and the Iranian nuclear file with their own dynamics and the areas to which the settlement efforts should be applied. For this reason the conception offers no prescriptions yet stresses that they should be addressed as priorities to open the road toward a regional security system.

At the same time the conception offers its considerations related to the packet of security, confidence-building and control measures encompassing both confirmation by all sides of conscientious observation of their international-legal obligations and adoption of mutually binding transparency obligations in the military sphere (information about military exercises, exchange of observers, obligation not to deploy large armed formations on a permanent basis, exchange of information about purchase of armaments and armed forces) as well as agreements on arms control (setting up demilitarized zones, banning destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons, balanced reduction of armed forces by all sides).

It should be said that some of the confidence-building measures can be realized with the sides' mutual agreement at a very early stage: military exercises should not necessarily be taken for demonstration of force. The sides can agree on deploying their armed forces so that to reduce mutual fears and concerns.

Building the security system will create the necessary prerequisites for cutting down foreign military presence in the region; by the same token the regional states and other countries will move toward working on the confidence-building measures, one of the most sensitive issues in the Gulf context. So far, while the GCC looks at America's military presence as the main guarantor of sub-regional security Iran regards it as a destabilizing factor. In Iraq, the coalition forces can be described as occupation forces with ensuing grave consequences. In principle, Iran and the GCC countries believe that the Gulf security should be maintained by the local actors. The GCC members, however, are convinced that this is hardly achievable because of Iran's obviously stronger positions. Iraq is another potentially dangerous neighbor. This means that a really effective well-balanced security system demands that all concerns should be taken into account and that progress in the desired direction should be smooth and that dramatic moves should be avoided. This is especially true of the balance of forces.

This explains why the conception believes that the foreign military presence in the area should be fit into the entire set of confidence-building measures; this is needed to exclude suspicions of or doubts about security guarantees for each state or groups of states.

The sides should pool forces to fight transnational terrorism, illegal arms trade and migration, drug trafficking and organized crime as part of the security system. The conception has pointed to the need to achieve a corresponding agreement at the sub-regional level.

The threat of terror is a serious factor that stirs up concerns in the Gulf states about their national security and stability. At the same time Iran remains practically outside the coordinated counterterrorist measures; Iraq with its strong terrorist underground is obviously excluded from the common efforts. This means that multisided contacts in the counterterrorist sphere should be gradually established. As distinct from the West Russia enjoys certain trust among the regional states and Iran which means that it can contribute to the process.

There is another important aspect of the security system in the Gulf zone: it should be free from WMD; this has been registered in the conception together with the task of strengthening the non-proliferation NPT-based regime; it is obviously necessary to coordinate the situation in the Gulf zone with that in the Middle East where nuclear weapons and WMD are concerned.

It should be said that the Gulf security system should become an inalienable part of the post-crisis Middle Eastern context which, sooner or later, will become a reality. This will happen when the Arab-Israeli conflict, the region's headache of many decades, is resolved on a comprehensive basis. The conception has obviously approached the priorities issues and the entire body of the regional problems in a very constructive way: progress in one direction (in the Gulf zone, for example) is expected to stimulate positive shifts in other directions (potentially a settlement between Arabs and Israel). Those who insist on the opposite are wrong.

The security system in the Gulf zone should be crowned with a Gulf Regional Security Forum (GRSF.) The conception describes this as the central long-term trend of political-diplomatic efforts. It will bring closer the Gulf states as well as Russia, the United States and EU and all interested sides as observers or associated members. Significantly, integration will develop together with the security system as well as the system of trade-economic, investment, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation, including creation of united energy and transport networks, free trade zones, etc.

The GRSF cannot be set up soon; today, the sub-region should start moving in the right direction by setting down to building up the Gulf security system through bilateral and multilateral consultations among all sides concerned, including the regional and extra-regional states, the UN Security Council, G-8, the League of Arab States, OIC and the Gulf Cooperation Council. For this reason the conception was transferred along the diplomatic channels to a wide range of interested sides; during the last few months the ideas of the Russian conception were discussed in detail at different levels, with the Gulf countries in the first place.

The response to the Russian conception was positive which means that

the key ideas (multisided, universal and equal involvement of the Gulf countries) together with the principle of stage-by-state realization will be accepted. The conception can be described as a pragmatic and realistic document yet there is a clear realization that the road toward a balanced security system in the volatile context will not be easy. The document, however, believes that it is possible to move away from confrontation to the balance of interests based on international laws.

This proved acceptable for all yet before moving toward the realization stage many serious problems should be addressed on the priority basis and mutual mistrust accumulated in the CCASG-Iran-Iraq triangle should be dissipated. The security system suggested by Russia would have suited the interests of the United States and all other sides if America's vital interests consisted in building up stability and security in the Gulf zone through joint efforts rather than maintaining permanent tension there and military domination at all costs in the face of a wide range of regional opponents. Let us hope that the Obama Administration that has already mentioned a dialogue on international issues will be more perceptive to Russia's approaches. The stake on force has its limits: it piles up problems and creates new seats of tension. The CCASG countries are aware of this: prevention of another large-scale conflict in the region is one of their priorities. Iran, on its side, repeatedly approved the collective security idea for the Gulf zone. In principle, its ideas have much in common with Russia's position that gives hope that both countries might strengthen their cooperation in working toward a security system.

The process of matching approaches and looking for a common denominator is underway; we should continue working painstakingly with all those who share our ideas about the future architecture of the relationships in the Gulf.

It should be said that we have never regarded the Russian conception as an ultimate truth; amendments and adjustments suggested by life and future regional and worldwide developments are inevitable. We hope that in the process of discussion our partners and other regional actors will make creative contributions to our conception: the more authors it will finally acquire the better. This will expand the security platform and make the document the fruit of collective effort.

On the whole, says the conception, the idea of a Gulf security system may play the key role for the more consolidated political-diplomatic efforts in the region. This will develop, in fact, into multisided revision of the obtaining situation and lead to a collective quest of compromises. This will trigger realization of a long-term program of action designed to normalize the situation in the Gulf zone, strengthen stability and security there, and identify future landmarks and parameters of the post-crisis order as well as the roads leading to this, as is stipulated by the convention.

An international conference on security and cooperation in the Gulf is devised as an important result of the efforts described above. This will help the

interested states confirm their mutual understanding related to the basics and principles of the security system for the sub-region and harmonize the specific steps leading to it. An initiative groups set up to agree on the geographic frameworks of the future security system, the range of participants, the agenda, the representation level, the place of the forum, draft decisions including the confidence-building, security and control measures could serve the best possible introduction to the conference.

The August 2008 events in the Caucasus and the world financial and economic crisis created a new situation in the world. Having defended the right of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to life, Russia resolutely posed the task of invigorating the international political-diplomatic efforts designed to create a more just multipolar world. On 8 October 2008, speaking in Evian at the World Policy Conference President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev outlined Russia's ideas about a positive agenda for the Euro-Atlantic expanse with a special stress on the European Security Treaty. It is based on the same principles that have been already stated in the Russian conception of security for the Gulf which is only natural because international security is indivisible and continuous. As such it should know no exceptions. At the same time some of the Russian president's ideas, in particular those that guarantee security — no ensuring one's own security at the expense of others; no allowing (from within military alliances or coalitions) acts that undermine the unity of the common security space; no development of military alliances that would threaten other parties to the Treaty — can be added to the Russian conception of security for the Gulf zone.

In future Russia will continue promoting its conception; it will proceed from the idea that the conception might develop into a long-term vector of regional and international efforts to create a new model of the relationships in this strategically important region.

UN Doha Forum: The Results

G. Gatilov, V. Zagrekov

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS put a noticeable imprint on the preparations for the International Conference on Financing for Development, held at Doha, Qatar, from November 29 to December 2, 2008, and even made certain countries doubt the timeliness and expediency of that undertaking. But eventually a responsible approach prevailed, which made it possible to inscribe that high-level conference within the planned timeframe, with delegations from 169 UN and EC member-states (40 of them led by the heads of state and government) attending.

Thus, despite the intensification of the financial and economic crisis, the world community confirmed its resolve to work for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set by the UN 2000 Summit. Yet another important step forward was made that secured the consistency of the course launched during the high-level events on assistance to Africa and on the MDG progress, which were held within the framework of the 63rd Session of the UN GA in New York on September 22 and 25, 2008.

The Doha Conference held a special place among those events. There is a growing awareness in the world that an effective solution to the development funding problems is crucial to success in all other vectors, be it the halving by 2015 of the numbers of people living in extreme poverty, reduction of child and maternal mortality levels, the fight against dangerous infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB, or universal elementary education, access to drinking water, gender equality and sustainable ecological development parameters.

It must be said that half the MDG term on, the world community has managed to achieve some significant progress. At the same time, its level was different in different vectors and in concrete regions. For example, the UN MDG Report 2008 claims that, given some appropriate additional efforts on the part of the world community, it is quite feasible to halve the numbers of people living in absolute poverty by 2015 as planned. Some decent prospects are emerging in a number of other areas as well. In particular, a 90% elementary education coverage of school-age children has been achieved almost in all regions with

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the exception of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; child mortality from measles has been reduced threefold; AIDS death and proliferation rates have declined significantly.

But this is clearly insufficient. The situation is being aggravated by the fact that the global financial and economic crisis has not only called into question the chances of further MDG progress but also increased the likelihood of a rollback, something fraught with greater social tensions. It is also on the cards that the existing conflicts may become aggravated and new ones spring up. All of that gave Doha an added importance. Prior to the crisis, its objectives were formulated primarily as identifying the bottlenecks in the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, the final document of the previous International Conference on Financing for Development, held at Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, and elaborating measures to deal therewith. Under the new circumstances, the UN Doha Forum was due not only to address those problems but also to enhance the level of effort coordination in the fight against the global financial and economic crisis. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in his Doha address, the Conference was due to build a bridge of sorts from the G20 Washington Summit to efforts being undertaken by the rest of the world community. In this context, it was necessary to arrest the negative consequences of the crisis and to avert a replay of the early 1990s situation, where the world recession led to an almost 20% drop in development financing. In effect, the case in point was accepting political decisions directed, among other things, at inducing the developed countries not to cut their Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending totaling around 100 billion dollars a year, while allocating trillions of dollars for their own anti-crisis relief measures.

It must be noted that achieving that level required much effort. The ODA amounts, which had declined considerably before the Monterrey Consensus was approved, were growing at a rather fast rate between 2001 and 2007, when they increased by 40%. As is evident from the UN MDG Report 2008, they peaked in 2005 at 106.8 billion dollars, though, of course, at the expense of Nigeria and Iraq debt write-off. In 2006-07, when the write-off amounts diminished, so did the general size of ODA (down to 103.9 billion dollars).

Early in the century, development assistance provided by individual countries was growing as well. The U.S. increased it twofold. Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden brought it to the Monterrey Consensus' donor community landmark of 0.7% of the GDP. Russia, too, was building up its international development assistance amounts.

Along with G8 partners and other leading donors, the Russian delegation to Doha confirmed its commitment to the earlier obligations to help the developing countries. Moreover, Russia had achieved considerable progress in terms of both increasing its assistance amounts from 50-100 million dollars a year between 2003 and 2005 to 210 million in 2007 (without the debt write-off)

and invigorating its involvement in the implementation of international initiatives. She was also active in developing new approaches to and mechanisms for development assistance delivery.

At Doha, we announced steps undertaken in order to implement the Concept of Participation by the Russian Federation in Assistance to International Development (AID), the first programmatic document defining the main national policy vectors in this sphere, which the President of the Russian Federation approved in 2007. As it was stressed at the Conference, Russia had assumed commitments to assist the poorest countries in the period from 2010 to 2011 in such Concept-designated priority areas as anti-proliferation of infectious diseases, elimination of the “energy poverty,” and the strengthening of the personnel and functional educational-system potentials in developing countries to a total amount exceeding 1 billion dollars, of which more than a half had been allocated to date. It was also declared that notwithstanding the global financial crisis we had no intention to renounce the plans unveiled at the 2008 G8 Toyako Summit (Japan) to bring the Russian AID to 400-500 million dollars a year within the next few years.

Thus, Russia made its important contribution to the material framework to be created for the donor community’s intention, one confirmed by the Doha Declaration (the final document of the Doha Conference), to persevere with efforts for the implementation of the commitments regarding the assistance amounts, including the above GDP 0.7% indicator as envisaged by the Monterrey Consensus.

The Doha Declaration was coordinated after some prolonged and intense negotiations, during which the donor countries had emphasized the priority of greater efficiency in using the assistance they provided, and the need for the recipient countries to strengthen the democratic institutions at home, to adjust their public administration systems at the due level, and to secure gender equality. The developing countries, for their part, insisted on assistance amounts being increased and on its sources being diversified. Under these circumstances, Russia’s position was determined by the necessity of building up national donor potentials and implementing assistance efficiency measures.

The Doha Declaration actualized a number of key precepts of the Monterrey Consensus, with account taken of shifts in the dynamic inter-relation of new challenges and threats that the world community has to face and of a bigger arsenal of countermeasures. Specifically, aside from the introduction of an anti-crisis component, a much stronger emphasis was placed on the necessity of more energetic antiterrorism. With regard for the recently accepted UN Convention against Corruption, some more detailed measures were formulated for the uprooting of this phenomenon through cutting short the illegal money flows and money laundering as well as by preventing the transfer abroad of criminally acquired funds and assets and returning these to countries of origin.

The range of priority assistance recipients, which prior to the

Declaration was limited to the least developed countries, the landlocked developing countries, the small island developing states, and African countries, was extended by the addition of countries in course of rehabilitation after conflicts or natural calamities. More attention than in the Monterrey Consensus was given to matters of assistance to Africa. In this connection, the necessity was stressed of monitoring on the permanent basis the performance of obligations assumed by all parties.

Included in priorities of the first order was phasing out the discrimination of women in all spheres, including the labor market, financial markets, property problems and property management.

The Doha Declaration proved an important step forward by comparison with the Monterrey Consensus in developing the theme of social responsibility of business in the context of attracting foreign private capital. The necessity was stressed, for example, of using local production infrastructure, transferring advanced technologies, instituting productive training for women and young people, and performing business-assumed obligations on human rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption, as formulated by the UN Secretary-General's Global Agreement and the tripartite declaration of employers, employees and ILO unions.

Doha confirmed the world community's line for continued efforts directed at removing the obstacles to trade, specifically trade barriers, subsidies and other tariff and non-tariff practices distorting conditions of equitable trade, particularly in areas of priority concern for developing countries' exports.

A considerable improvement in key development debt acceptability indices was noted, this despite a grown total debt amount. According to the Doha Declaration data, 41 countries were granted a total of 71 billion dollars within the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, and another 28 billion is going to be provided under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. It is admitted at the same time that the current global financial and economic crisis is likely to put paid to whatever resulted from the latter-year efforts in that area. It is stressed that the situation requires the realization of both the initiatives in the course of implementation and any new bold and universal suggestions aimed at a fair settlement of the current debt problems of the developing countries and particularly the least developed of them, primarily in Africa, including via writing off the debt. The recommendation to the donor countries is that they should adopt measures against debt relief resources being allocated at the expense of funds earmarked for ODA.

The Doha Declaration assigns to the UN, specifically the ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum, the central place in a restored global AID architecture. It also reaffirms on the UN authority the recommendations issued by the high-level OECD forums on higher assistance efficiency that approved the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Plan of Action (2008). Support is pledged to such assistance principles as national responsibility of recipient countries,

coordination of assistance vectors with their national priorities, harmonization and orientation to results. A task is set to enhance the quality of assistance through a wide use of the program approach, involvement of recipient country organs in public-sector spheres of responsibility, reduction of overheads, enhancement of reciprocal donor-recipient accountability, and a maximal increase in untied assistance.

The importance of South-South cooperation is stressed, which should not be viewed as the substitution for North-South cooperation but rather as its supplement. Figuring among other innovative sources of financing are a number of variously advanced initiatives put forward by the Technical Group established by the Global Group of Action against Hunger and Poverty and by the Leading Group for Solidarity Levies, in particular the International Finance Facility for Immunization, the experimental initiative on advanced market commitments, the solidarity contribution on air tickets levied to finance health programs in a number of developing countries, etc.

The Doha Declaration entrusts the UN with elaborating a more systematic and universal method of monitoring the amounts, quality and efficiency of assistance with due account taken of the existing patterns and mechanisms. The UN Secretary-General is advised, jointly with the appropriate UN organs, the World Bank, regional and sub-regional development banks, OECD Development Assistance Committee and other parties concerned, to prepare a report on that matter for the ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum.

Doha's important step forward on system matters was supporting the course for a wider representation of the developing countries in the Bretton Wood establishments and the main organs determining standards and norms in the financing area. Singled out in this context was, specifically, the Financial Stability Forum established in 1999 by the G7 Treasuries and Central Banks to improve coordination and information exchanges between national and international financial stability watchdogs.

In summing up, it must be noted that the Doha Declaration envisages the holding, later this year, of a UN summit on the world financial and economic crisis and its impacts on development, which essentially will be able to estimate the first results of the approved decisions and, if necessary, to adjust them. The work in this vector is moving into the practical plane.

Russia from the start backed the initiative, because she believes it necessary to use with a maximum effect the unique potential of the UN as the universal international organization so as to convey some additional political impulses to crisis relief efforts and to minimize crisis consequences for development. The order of the forthcoming conference will be soon determined. But already at the present stage its organizer, President of the UN General Assembly Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua) established a preparatory Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System with Nobel Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz at the head. There is a Russian representa-

tive on the Commission.

There is also a world media debate on as regards development financing in a crisis environment. A case in point is a Financial Times article (January 26, 2009) by World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick suggesting that the developed countries should allocate about 0.7% of their anti-crisis spending to the most vulnerable countries' fund to be established under the WB auspices. In all evidence, some other initiatives will follow, which ought to be taken into consideration during preparations for the UN Summit-Level Conference. At the same time, it is obvious that the priority focus should be on the continued regular work to implement the Concept of Russia's Participation in Assistance to International Development.

Some priorities in this sphere are amending the Russian legislation with the concepts "preferential credit, or credit granted on official development aid terms," and "official development aid budget." That legislative innovation will create additional capacities for a Russian ODA buildup not only through emergency humanitarian aid and contributions to UN operational activities and to the international financial institutions, but also through financing development projects in countries of priority importance for Russia.

Besides, the time has come for putting into practice a number of planned organizational measures directed at creating a national personnel and expert potential for assistance to international development and at forming mechanisms for inter-agency coordination in that sphere, mechanisms orientated to a would-be establishment of a Russian International Development Agency.

We believe that further progress in this vector would confirm Russia's prestige as a leading world power and strengthen its positions in matters of assistance to international development, which, considering the current crisis phenomena, have climbed higher in the hierarchy of priorities on the global agenda.

How to Read the Middle East “Map”

O. Pavlov

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT In the Middle East has been one of the most sensitive international political issues for the past 60 years. Looking back over the years, one cannot help recognizing that during this period the Middle East, like a train running at full speed, has not once been on the verge of war, but at the same time it has also passed the stations called “Peace” without stopping.

There are many reasons for that, and it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that mountains of books have been written on the subject by now. By the early 1990s, the majority of analysts and participants in the events agreed in that one of the most serious external impediments to the process of ending the Arab-Israeli confrontation – i.e., the Cold War – was over, and the traffic lights on the road to peace had turned green. Reality, however, proved to be far harsher and grimmer. Since then the region has at least twice been on the edge or even over the edge of new wars and man-made disasters, drinking from the cup of hostility, not friendship.

Without delving too far into history, I would like to consider briefly the stages that the Middle East has gone through since the end of the Cold War (the Cold War period is a special subject), and why peace is still elusive.

The first and most important stage was the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, which in effect became a “reincarnation” of the Soviet idea of a comprehensive settlement through collective efforts. Needless to say, under the influence of the United States, which by that time had started feeling the master of the world, it transformed – and it obviously did not transform for the better.

On the positive side, there was a broad level of representation, a generally recognized international legal basis for the peace process, including UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the “land for peace” principle, and Russian-U.S. co-sponsorship. The idea to create a multilateral negotiating track alongside a bilateral one was quite reasonable and constructive.

There were, however, also negative developments. They included the joint representation of the Palestinians and Jordanians (a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation), which limited the PLO’s negotiating mandate, as well as the extremely limited authority of the conference itself, which did not in reality decide anything, but only played the role of a jumping-off point for negotiations.

Oleg Pavlov, political commentator

The conference did not become a permanent mechanism with its own long-term mandate or instruments to influence the situation. That effectively undermined the capabilities of the international community and the great powers to influence the peace process on a permanent basis, and achieve really balanced and long-term solutions, conforming to international law.

The time limit for holding the conference, as well as its limited mandate, called into question the principle of a comprehensive settlement, while after the conference all delegations were back on their own again. Thus, the Madrid forum failed to become an agency for the integration of solutions achieved on bilateral tracks. As a result, there was no interconnection between the negotiating tracks whereas in reality they had an objective and profound impact on one another.

Those shortcomings, as well as the fact that the U.S. administration attempted to monopolize the peace process after the conference, and started using it as a kind of a "bribe" to the Arabs in exchange for their support of its Middle East policy – Desert Storm at the time (1991) – could not but affect the quality of the negotiating process and its outcome.

Yes, peace was achieved between Israel and Jordan (at the expense of Jordan's dropping its claims to the West Bank in favor of the Palestinians), the parameters of the Syrian-Israeli peace agreement were developed very well, and as a result of the "Oslo process," which had hived off Madrid, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established as a core of the future Palestinian state. A good deal was also accomplished on the multilateral track: A sound groundwork was laid for cooperation on regional security, economic interaction between the Middle East states, resolution of the problem of water resources, etc. Nevertheless, a comprehensive and durable peace had failed to materialize. Following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, the implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements (reached, incidentally, in 1994-1995 in the course of secret bilateral negotiations in Oslo without the participation of the great powers) began to stumble. The 1995 Paris Protocol (economic aspects of Palestinian-Israeli coexistence) failed to take off and work as it should have; the redeployment of Israeli troops in the PNA zone, as stipulated in a number of Israeli-Palestinian agreements, was not brought to its logical conclusion, nor had the negotiations on the status of Palestinian territories – that is to say, the resolution of such fundamental problems as borders, settlements, water resources, refugees, and Jerusalem – begun by 1996. The ideology of the peace process per se – first, resolve "easy" problems and then proceed to deal with the "difficult" ones – was put in jeopardy. Nor did the priority that the Palestinians gave to bilateral mechanisms of achieving peace with Israel, with the virtually exclusive supervision by Washington, justify itself.

As a result, they made some very serious mistakes in the course of the negotiating process, the main one being the failure to incorporate international

law (UN Security Council Resolution 242) as a basis for peace in the Oslo agreements, and the adoption of a principle whereby the Palestinian-Israeli peace process was to be determined by bilateral agreements, whereas other parties would have to accept whatever the PLO and Israel agreed on. The Palestinians also weakened their positions by the fact that having established the PNA, they started giving far less attention to the PLO, which had originally been a negotiating party representing the interests of all Palestinians, not only of those living on the PNA controlled territories.

The Palestinian delegation was let down not only by the arrogance and excessive ambitions of some negotiators, which had been successfully encouraged by Israelis and Americans, as well as the reluctance to listen to advice from good old friends, but also by the international situation as such, where the Soviet Union had dropped off the world arena, while its reborn successor, Russia, was preoccupied with its own domestic political and economic problems. As for the United States, as many experts and even participants in those negotiations now admit, it did not always act as an "honest broker," often upholding Israel's interests more than Palestinian interests.

The last spasmodic effort in the peace process on the Madrid platform came in the form of negotiations at Camp David in the summer of 2000 and in Taba in December 2000 and January 2001. Right from the start, despite the negotiators' declared commitment to achieve a breakthrough, they proceeded in a poisoned atmosphere. At the time, as mentioned earlier, many provisions of the agreements reached in Oslo (Oslo 1 and Oslo 2), as well as after Oslo (the Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998 on the redeployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank), had yet to be fulfilled, and the old Israeli settlements on the West Bank were being expanded, and new ones built. As a result, radical groups (Hamas & Co.) were strengthening their positions, and terrorist activity was on the rise. In the final analysis, that undermined the already fragile trust that existed between the parties concerned.

Another impediment was the Americans' ambition to achieve peace exclusively under their own aegis, excluding Russia, the second co-sponsor of the peace process, from real involvement in the peace process. They did not want to see it even as an extra. Neither the key Arab states nor the Europeans were present at those negotiations. The talks were proceeding in secrecy, behind closed doors, and their exact agenda is still unknown.

All of those factors, compounded by a tough time frame (Bill Clinton wanted to achieve success before the end of his presidential term), as well as the negotiating procedure per se – the Palestinians were offered ultimatum like solutions of the "take it or leave it" kind – worked against the peace process, eventually leading to the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the U.S. aegis. Many of the participants, including the United States, subsequently tried to put the blame on one another. As for the Americans (according to Dennis Ross, then U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, writing in his controversial

memoirs), they mostly blamed Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and PNA head. The Palestinian leader may have borne his share of responsibility for their failure, but surely no more than the others.

Today, in hindsight, it should be recognized that the Palestinians had their own reason for rejecting the solutions proposed to them. First, as one of the participants in the negotiations told this author, a plan for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under discussion envisioned the Israelis returning 97% of the West Bank, but that territory, including East Jerusalem, was dissected by strategic highways that would remain under Israeli control, was extremely difficult to administer, and the plan was generally unviable.

Figuratively speaking, you are being offered an almost complete car – all of its elements and parts are in place, but it cannot move because it has been cut into separate pieces. Will you accept such a present? Furthermore, the Israelis and Americans, while discussing the final arrangements, were saying that once they were signed, the agreements would not be subject to review. Another reason for Arafat's intransigence was his concern that the agreement as it was drafted could not be "sold" to his own people, especially refugees (their number today, according to the UNRWA is almost 4.5 million), who were in effect receiving no right to return to their homes. According to participants in the negotiations, they were offered compensation, while they were not able to return to their homes, but only to the territory of a future Palestinian state. Only a limited number of Palestinians (different figures are cited today) could return to Israeli territory to reunite with their families. The Palestinian leader doubted that he would be able to convince the Arab world about the acceptability of the solutions on the division of the Jerusalem shrines that had been discussed at the negotiations.

With the benefit of hindsight, one could suggest today that perhaps the Palestinians should have accepted the U.S. and Israeli proposed solution (the so-called Clinton plan), even despite the possible difficulties of its implementation. With a dialectic approach, the difficulties of its implementation could subsequently have helped in practice overcome the "take it or leave it" principle and compelled the parties, even regardless of the agreements, to hold additional negotiations about possible adjustments by relying on the solid basis of international law. Meanwhile, by rejecting the agreement, the Palestinian side gave the Israelis cause to say ironically that the Palestinians "never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity."

Needless to say, this is purely hypothetical reasoning, but it has a right to exist, since retrospective analysis shows that the negotiating situation subsequently only became more complicated, and in 2007 the parties resumed negotiations on the final status on terms far worse for the Palestinians, as well as for the cause of peace in general – terms that were even more separated from international law as a basis for a settlement.

The failure of Camp David and Taba, as well as of Clinton's last meeting with Hafez al-Assad in Geneva on March 26, 2000, where the parties did not

succeed in finding mutually acceptable solutions on the Golan Heights (furthermore, at the time it was only a matter of finalizing the details), became a tragic junction for the peace process, after which the situation plunged into the maelstrom of violence and terror. The rather valuable results that had been achieved at multilateral tracks were also effectively wiped out: The Arabs refused to conduct those negotiations with no progress made on the key Syrian and Palestinian tracks. The process of normalizing relations between the Arab countries and Israel stalled, and began to move in the opposite direction.

Today – again on a purely hypothetical level – one could speculate on whether all of that could have been avoided if Ariel Sharon, who had become prime minister soon after that, had not gone to the Temple Mount (also known as al-Aqsa) in East Jerusalem on September 28, 2000, and if Arafat had been willing and able to restrain Hamas militants from terrorist attacks against Israelis (one theory has it that by choosing not to restrain the Islamists, he purportedly sought to exert pressure on the Israelis so as to improve the peace terms proposed at Camp David; if that was indeed the case, he badly miscalculated). There is no getting away from the fact that the impasse in the negotiations and the remaining wide gap, if not a glaring chasm, in the sides' expectations from the upcoming peace agreement, coupled with the resultant tensions, brought about the second, almost five year long Palestinian intifada – far more bloody than the first one.

The Israelis drew their own – radical, it has to be said – conclusions from the failure of the negotiations and the subsequent intifada. From their perspective, Arafat was no longer a relevant partner for negotiations (in November 2004, he died under mysterious circumstances). Israeli leaders accused him of duplicity and sponsoring terrorists. In Sharon's view, there was no one on the Palestinian side to negotiate and so Israel should proceed to draw borders with the Palestinians "on the ground," building a "dividing wall," creating new topographic reality, and thus barring itself from the Palestinians.

Thus the "unilateral division" plan emerged. On December 18, 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon made a policy speech in the city of Herzliya outlining its basic parameters.

If within the following months the PNA proved unable to implement the Road Map (for details see below), the Israeli prime minister said at the time, Israel would take a number of unilateral "division measures." Those measures included:

- redeployment of Israeli troops along the "new temporary security lines" (the lines were not specified);
- dismantling of some smaller settlements that would not become part of Israel under any future agreement with the Palestinians (the Israeli media referred to 14 settlements in the West Bank and three in Gaza);
- tightening security around the settlements that the Israelis would like to retain; and

- accelerating the construction of a "security fence."

On the strategic level, that was an attempt – with a *fait accompli* policy and building a "dividing wall" – to create new reality on Palestinian territories, which would enable the Israelis to impose their own terms on the Palestinians, including the annexation of a substantial part of the West Bank (no less than 10-12%), and preventing the creation of a viable Palestinian state.

That this was in fact the plan was demonstrated by the crippling strikes that Sharon and the Israeli military machine dealt to the administrative infrastructure that had been created in the PNA during the years of the "Oslo process" – under the slogan of the fight against terror and the alleged involvement of Palestinian security agencies in terrorism.

Sharon's plan completely ignored the Arab peace initiative that had been approved by the Arab League Summit in Beirut in 2002, which had proposed to Israel a simple but effective trade-off: a complete normalization of relations with the Arab world in exchange for Israel's complete withdrawal from the territories that it had occupied in 1967. The Israeli prime minister rejected a strategic deal, promising Israel durable peace and security, in favor of a *fait accompli* policy even at the price of a "100-year war" with the Arab-Muslim world.

Sharon's line toward unilateral separation did not lead to peace with the Palestinians, and could not possibly have done so. The "guarantee" that there would be no return to the 1967 border lines, which the Israeli prime minister received from George W. Bush in April 2004, during his visit to Washington, were not real guarantees and could not possibly have been such, since the United States is not a source of international law. On the practical level, Sharon's policy boiled down to two far-reaching steps taken by Israel – building a wall in the West Bank and annexing a substantial portion of territories (57,000 hectares) occupied by Israel in 1967 (by late 2007, 397 km were built and another 242 km were to be built in 2008)¹ and Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005, and the dismantling of Israeli settlements there and another four in the northern section of the West Bank.

Sharon's subsequent illness and coma, in which he remains to date, make it impossible to find out exactly how the then Israeli prime minister, nicknamed Bulldozer, saw a final settlement. Whatever the case, it is obvious that the plan of reaching a "unilateral" peace with the Palestinians has been buried by history and is unlikely to be implemented now.

Why then, after moving along a dizzy parabola, did the history of the Middle East peace process now, by the fall of 2008, return – at least so it seems – largely to the classic principles and foundations on which it had originally been built? Why is the question of calling international conferences on the Middle East, creating a Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and negotiations along all Middle East tracks is again being discussed?

The cause of the zigzags in the Middle East peace process should evis-

dently be looked for in what in the not-always-elegant diplomatic jargon is known as “extraregional factors.” This refers primarily to the U.S. policy, which requires a special analysis.

After Clinton, who had craved a Nobel Prize, which would have made public forget the “Monica dress,” failed to carry out his plan, the new Republican administration in the White House distanced itself from the Middle East problem as far as that was possible (leaving Sen. J. Mitchell and Gen. A. Zinni to micro-manage the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation), and then September 11, 2001 brought about a U-turn in the U.S.’s Middle East policy. In the eyes of the U.S. administration, which had ended up under the ideological control of the “neocons,” the Arab-Israeli conflict had shifted to the bottom of the list of international priorities. Center stage was taken by a new stratagem, namely that the Middle East should be given a good “shake-up,” starting a war on terror under the slogans of democratization. A decision was made to start, as is known, with a “re-division” of Saddam’s Iraq.

Through that prism, the Arab-Israelis conflict was viewed as a particular instance of a general plan to “redesign” the Middle East. The “land for peace” slogan – a constructive interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 at the time of the Madrid process – was replaced by the “peace for security” slogan. U.S. foreign policy periodicals, including the main one – Foreign Affairs – started a trend of publishing articles about what the new borders in the Middle East would be (including the printing of detailed maps of new countries, built, like Lego, from pieces of old ones) and how American-style democracy could be introduced there in short order.² From the foreign policy perspective, that added up to a G8 partnership initiative with a Greater Middle East and North Africa region that the United States put forward at a G8 summit at Sea Island in 2004.

The international community did not quite share Uncle Sam’s opinion to that effect, and, amidst the Palestinian intifada and the White House’s near paranoid obsession in connection with the war on terror (to mankind, that resulted in humiliating searches at airports throughout the world, including the removal of shoes and belts, like in prisons), attempted to preserve at least some international support for the Arab-Israeli peace process for the duration of the intifada and the freeze on negotiations.

Owing to Russia’s energetic efforts, backed by the European Union, in late 2001, a “quartet” of international mediators was formed, including Russia, the U.S., the EU, and the UN, which committed itself to preventing the collapse of the peace process. From every indication, the United States agreed to its creation because the wound inflicted by the devastating failure of Camp David was still raw, and the Americans did not want to bear the burden of Clinton’s onerous legacy single handedly, especially at a time when suicide bomb attacks had become common practice in the Middle East.

In the summer of 2002, the United States revisited the issue of the Arab-Israeli peace process. On June 24, George W. Bush put forward a proposal to

work out a Road Map for Peace in the Middle East, in which the American president, for the first time in history, stated in no uncertain terms that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should result in the establishment of an independent state living side by side with Israel within secure and recognized borders. True, prior to that, it had voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1397 that contained similar provisions, but that was a collective document.

The Road Map's program for a three-stage advance to peace – through the resolution of security problems to the discussion of the final status – was wide ranging and on the whole quite logical, although, needless to say, it also contained quite a few elements that the Palestinians and other Arabs viewed as an obvious pro-Israeli bias, and the intention to "reduce" the Arab-Israeli conflict to the problem of the West Bank and Gaza.

Due to the active efforts by Russian diplomacy and EU assistance, it became possible to round off many of the sharp edges although, naturally, some conceptual shortcomings remained. The principal one of those was the lack of clearly defined parameters of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, which once again took us back to the flawed logic of Oslo, leading away from international law as a foundation for peace.

Nevertheless, that document, which was finalized in December 2002, was a significant step forward following the failure of the 2000 negotiations, since it created a more or less coherent track for movement toward peace, and clearly stated that the peace process should lead to the creation of a Palestinian state although it did not specify its territorial boundaries. Israel's approval of the Road Map in April 2003 came a breakthrough (prior to that Israel had rejected all documents stipulating the creation of a Palestinian state, taking cover behind the "final status" euphemism). That approval, as well as its approval by the Palestinians, made it possible to adopt the document – on Russia's initiative – in November 2003 by UN Security Council Resolution 1515, and start the work on its implementation.

However, right from the start, it came into conflict with the Israeli plan for unilateral separation. The "quartet" tried to cast Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in September 2004 as a kind of implementation of one of the Road Map's provisions. But its positive value was effectively wiped out by the fact that Israel had accomplished it outside the framework of the negotiations and without seeking UN Security Council approval (unlike the 2000 situation where it had also unilaterally left Lebanon outside a negotiating framework, but asked the Security Council to treat that as implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425). As a result, the beneficiary was not the Road Map or the cause of peace, but extremists from radical Islamist groups, who viewed Israel's step as confirmation of that it was only possible to compel Israel to retreat by force of arms. Hamas was getting stronger and stronger.

All attempts to put a square peg into a round hole and reconcile those two concepts – so glaringly at odds with each other – proved futile. As a result,

neither plan really worked, and by 2007, it had become obvious beyond any doubt that the peace process had reached an impasse.

The high ground reached along this way shows very well that as previously in the case of Madrid, one of the main reasons for the failure to carry out the Road Map according to plan was that the “neo-cons,” who had seized control of US foreign policy, unfortunately, were more preoccupied not with peace in the Middle East but with ensuring politico-diplomatic justification for their operation in Iraq, in the course of which international law, which Washington likes to cite so much after August 8, 2008, was trampled upon and dragged through the mud.

Another motive was to check the growing regional influence of Iran, which was the second victim of Washington’s policy, after Iraq, and had a diversified network of allies in the region acting under the green flag of the liberation of Israeli occupied lands and Muslim shrines. In addition, there was an aspiration to promote and advance some democratization schemes – in effect, new technologies for replacing uncooperative regimes, which was reflected in the very close attention that the Road Map gave to elections on the Palestinian territories. The Americans preferred to ignore the fact that organization of elections under occupation is a rather risky undertaking.

They only remembered that in 2006, when parliamentary elections in the occupied Palestinian territories brought victory to Hamas, which had received a majority in the Palestinian legislative assembly. Russia insisted on postponing the elections so as to gain time to advance the peace process. The Americans reluctantly agreed to a six-month delay (from July 2005 to January 2006), but during that time very little had been done to strengthen the positions of the Palestinian supporters of “a historic compromise” with Israel, primarily PNA head Mahmoud Abbas, who had taken Arafat’s place.

The outcome of the “over the top” democratization was deplorable. As a result of contradictions between the executive (Fatah) and the legislative (Hamas) branches of government, the Palestinian National Authority, for the first time in its 10-year history, was divided, which gave the Israelis cause to isolate Gaza, which ended up under Hamas’s complete control from June 2007. The attempts to achieve reconciliation made by Saudi Arabia in February 2007 and then by Yemen and Egypt, produced no results. It became obvious that any solution reached within the framework of Palestinian-Israeli talks would be extremely difficult or impossible to carry out amid the Palestinian split. The Israelis themselves are now saying this quite openly.

Furthermore, during these past few years, the other tracks of the Arab-Israeli peace process (Syrian and Lebanese) have been blocked. Sharon kept saying until the very last moment that Israel would be unable to work on two tracks, the Palestinian track being all that it could realistically handle. Nor were there any talks with Lebanon, and even if there were, they were conducted through the grids of the gun aim. Within its line toward a “unilateral” search of peace, Israel

was trying to resolve its security problems on its own, conducting a large-scale and extremely unsuccessful operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

And then, when everything seemed to have reached yet another impasse, the U.S. administration came up with a new initiative. On July 16, 2007, George W. Bush made a wide ranging speech, in which he proposed calling an "international meeting" on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the fall of 2007.

It was not a bad idea, but it was obviously a borrowed one – furthermore, it was borrowed from Russia: V. V. Putin had put it forward in April 2005, during his visit to Cairo. Since the Americans defined the goal of the meeting as restarting the stalled negotiations with the Palestinians and opening a prospect for peace in the region as a whole, Moscow could not but endorse it.

What happened to U.S. diplomacy if it all of a sudden started tapping the Moscow arsenal for ideas? The explanation is very simple. Toward the end of 2006, the U.S. policy in the Middle East had come up against a blank wall. Almost nothing was working out – Iraq, Afghanistan, "democratization" plans (unless the Hamas victory in the PNA could be regarded as a success), or the Arab-Israeli peace process. The war on terror and the imposition of its own ideas about a new world order on the entire region were going nowhere. W. Burns, U.S. undersecretary of state and U.S. ambassador to Moscow at the time, said: "We pretend to no monopoly of wisdom in the region, and we have made more than our share of mistakes... The truth is that the grinding difficulties of post-war Iraq, the abuses at places like Abu Ghraib, and the continuing gap between our best intentions and progress on the ground towards Arab-Israeli peace have undermined American credibility and prestige."³

The U.S. started the excruciating work to review the fundamental principles of its Middle East policy, leading to a series of recommendations to the U.S. administration by the Baker-Hamilton commission in November 2006. Those reasonable recommendations from professionals were formally rejected by the White House, but from every indication, they are being followed in practical politics. In particular, the point concerning the need of giving a higher priority to the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The subsequent change of the U.S. diplomatic course emerged at the Annapolis Conference (November 2007), which was attended by foreign ministers from 49 countries, including Russia. The conference restarted the deadlocked negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian on the Road Map – furthermore, what was especially important, not only on its Stage 1 but also Stage 3, i.e., all six issues related to the final status of the Palestinian territories as a package (borders, refugees, Jerusalem, water resources, settlements, and security).

At the same time, the conference managed to ease regional tensions and deal with outstanding issues. In 2008, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and

Hamas in Gaza started working; a constitutional crisis in Lebanon was resolved, a new president was elected there, and a national unity government was formed. Relations between Syria and Lebanon normalized: The two countries established diplomatic relations and agreed on the delimitation of their border. There was yet another remarkable development – the launch of direct peace negotiations between Syria and Israel with Turkey’s mediation.

All of those steps, together with the resumed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians on the establishment of a Palestinian state (after a seven-year hiatus), as well as the U.S.’s obvious reluctance to go ahead with a military operation against Iran, created a new, more positive atmosphere in the Middle East. They showed that there is nothing fatal or predetermined about the perennial tensions in the region, and that many issues could be effectively addressed if no pressure is exerted on the Middle East.

The events of late December 2008 and early January 2009, when Israel retaliated to the resumption of Hamas rocket attacks on its territory with massive air strikes and a full-scale ground operation in Gaza, which caused numerous casualties among civilians, showed that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a long way from resolution.

The consequences of that bloody confrontation proved to have a devastating effect on the peace process. The Arab world, prior to that united on the platform of the Arab peace initiative, divided. One part of it backed Hamas and started promoting its methods of fighting Israel. Another, led by Egypt, adhered to the old, moderate positions, which at the moment were rather unpopular in the Arab world, where the idea that coexistence with Israel is impossible started gaining ground.

However, in Israel, too, the process of radicalization, precipitated by the military campaign in Gaza, also went a bit too far, as shown by the February 2009 elections that strengthened the positions of the rightist (Likud) and ultra-right (Israel Our Home) parties, which favored the continuation of the course toward the development of Israeli settlements and preservation of “a single and indivisible” Jerusalem under Israel’s control, if not the outright rejection of negotiations with the Palestinians.

As for the Palestinians, they also had their share of problems. Hamas, which for some reason decided that it had won in Gaza, sharply toughened its rhetoric, including with regard to Fatah opponents advocating a historical compromise with Israel. The ideas of armed resistance and a new intifada began to spread not only in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. Peace between Jews and Arabs became even more elusive than previously.

However, all of those events showed once again that the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved by military means, that it is impossible to ignore Hamas or remove it from the political arena with bombs and tanks, and that Israel is a political reality, attacking which with homemade rockets only means a prelude to new casualties and bloodshed.

There is an obvious and pressing need for negotiations. But they are only possible when the Palestinians realize that their internecine feud deprives them a vote and hinders the creation of a Palestinian state, and when the understanding prevails in the Arab world that despite the passions, the solution proposed in the Arab peace initiative is by far the most realistic peace option. They will be possible and productive when the main political forces in Israel come to the conclusion that the settlements policy and failure to deal with such acute problems as the Palestinians' right to decide their own fate and ending the occupation that started in 1967, are not strengthening but weakening Israel's security. And, needless to say, everyone badly needs an end to violence.

With this approach, the international community – if it acts in a coordinated manner and on a collective basis – will have a chance to set the region on a course for peace, effectively facilitating peace negotiations.

NOTES

¹ Ministry of Defense of Israel, September 2007.

² For details, see: Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for the "New Middle East." *Global Research*, Canada, Nov. 22, 2006; also a map provided by Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (Ret.) from the U.S. National Military Academy: *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006.

³ See: the web site of the U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg; presentation by the U.S. Ambassador at a seminar entitled *Dialogue of Civilizations and the Future of the Middle East*, Nov. 9, 2007.

Combating World Drug Trafficking

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GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION help to erase economic distinctions between nations and continents, eliminate trade barriers and offer broad opportunities for further progress. It is unfortunate, however, that these changes in international relations and state systems are being skillfully used in drug trafficking, which has taken on transnational proportions. As a reflection of these opportunities, it is to a certain extent both a cause and an effect of important changes in global politics and economics.

A number of experts in Russia and elsewhere see many factors that help transnational drug trafficking to have such great influence on today's world.

The first factor is the political and economic instability in some countries. The organized drug-related crime weakens the protective functions of systems that form the state and government institutions and worsens the crisis in these countries through the use of considerable sums from drug trafficking for attaining political and economic objectives and through instigating and maintaining ethnic conflicts.

Furthermore, there are either no laws or there are flawed laws, or the observance of laws is not monitored while the socioeconomic problems worsen and there are corrupt officials accepting kickbacks from drug traffickers. In their attempts to keep their business and evade punishment, drug dealers stoke up corruption by funneling a large proportion of their proceeds into bribing officials, obtaining the necessary information and creating conditions for laundering the money made through drug trafficking.

There is finally coordination of the criminal activities of regional and transnational drug cartels to create conditions for smooth cooperation in order to derive immense profits from drugs trade.

This sort of expansion of transnational drug dealing can be attributed to the huge amounts of money, which the owners seek to increase and protect. According to the UN and IMF, the sum made through trafficking around the world every year is about \$600 billion or 7.6 percent of the world trade. Besides, up to \$1.5 trillion made by drug trafficking gets laundered. This is 5 percent of

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the gross world product to show that there has emerged yet another independent branch of shadow economy named the economy of drug trafficking: 70 percent of the money in the hands of criminal groups today has been made by drug dealing.

Heroin, opium, cocaine and synthetic drugs are delivered by drug dealers to narcotics markets around the world through the earlier established channels, in particular: from Afghanistan to countries in Central Asia, Iran, China, Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and Europe; from Laos to neighboring countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania; from countries in Latin America to North America and Europe; from Europe to CIS countries and Asia. In every region these channels branch off to form a network covering individual countries and groups of countries. Opiates from Afghanistan reach Russia mainly from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan; synthetic drugs – amphetamine, methamphetamine, Ecstasy and LSD – come from the Netherlands, Poland and Germany via its western and northeastern regions. Cocaine is brought directly from Latin America or via other countries by air and in sea containers.

UN experts have found that narcotics are used by more than 200 million people aged between 15 and 64 around the world, including marijuana by about 140 million; cocaine by 13 million; heroin by 8 million; amphetamine-type stimulants by 30 million people. In Russia 90 percent of drug addicts opt for Afghan opiates (100 percent of heroin in the Russian illegal market comes from Afghanistan).

The number of drug takers in the world is growing every year with young people – the more vulnerable part of the population – forming the greater proportion of new addicts.

Operations with drugs yield between 300 percent to 2000 percent in profits making them attractive both to transnational criminal organizations and local groups of criminals whose objective is to make as much as possible and as soon as possible. Colombian drug cartels alone derived from drug trafficking at the end of the 1990s in the USA \$20 billion in annual profits which total nearly the same as the budgets of the countries in some regions in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

According to U.S. law enforcement bodies, a drug addict spends every day \$30 to \$50 to buy narcotics. In Germany a taker of heroine spends on average 150 euro a day. In Ukraine, an opium extract taker spends to buy it between 600 and 1000 hryvnia every month. Since most drug addicts cannot afford such sums, 95 percent of them earn by stealing or selling narcotics.

In Great Britain, drug addicts commit 75 percent of all crimes. To buy narcotics, an addict in that country needs nearly £43,000 a year.

A heroine addict in Russia spends between 1,200 and 2000 rubles a day. According to expert estimates, up to 60 percent of all offences against property (thefts, muggings, robberies and rackets) are committed by drug addicts who need money to buy narcotics. In 2007, Russia's law enforcement bodies solved

nearly 156,000 drug crimes, and more than 145,000 in January-November 2008.

Since drug trafficking encompasses all regions around the world and practically every nation, the laundering of the money thus earned has taken on transnational dimensions. For instance, the Financial Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) says that nearly \$85 billion gets laundered in the USA and Western Europe every year. According to UN experts, the sum exceeds GNPs of 75 percent of countries around the world. In particular, it exceeds GNPs of Portugal or Poland and is slightly lower than GNP of Hong Kong. More than \$3 billion is laundered in Australia every year; in Russia, between \$2 billion and \$7 billion.

The work of Russian drug police is characterized by the following example: in 2007, there was an investigation into a group of criminals involved in illegal banking activities and money laundering through the illegal international remittance system known as Hawala, which laundered every year and transferred to other countries up to 400 million rubles. They discovered illegal operations involving 3 billion 805 million rubles. The investigations turned up 11 active members of the criminal group made up of Russian and Afghan nationals.

Experts conclude that blocking the main channels of money laundering would render drug dealing unattractive to the transnational drug ring. But this can happen only if the drug ring's running costs exceed its earnings. According to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), drug business could become unprofitable if 75 percent of all narcotics produced get impounded. Given the existing scale of illicit trade in narcotics totaling \$600 billion a year, drug business will remain profitable even if it spends \$400 billion a year to keep itself running.

This conclusion confirms the existence of a stable tendency towards expanding the drugs segment in the shadow economy based on the deep-rooted system of governance and control, markets, smoothly operating infrastructure for the distribution of narcotics and protection of drug businesses from government bodies. All in all, it means the emergence of new specific threats to national and collective security. The narcotics threat is a combination of conditions and factors threatening the vital political and socioeconomic interests of individuals, society and the state.

Those who study this problem say that the narcotic threat manifests itself in the negative impact on international relations, in the growing scale of transnational crime and the funding of acts of international terrorism. It influences the making of political decisions and stimulates the growth of corruption by lavishing funds for bribes. It harms the economic security of individual states and communities of states, debilitates the single economic space, destroys traditional economic relations, and undermines the making of economic decisions. It increases the mortality rate and the incidence of drug-related diseases, speeds up polarization of society, causes decline in birthrate in areas with a high rate of drug use. In the cultural sphere, narcotics come through as a destructive subcul-

ture.

All this calls for concerted efforts of the world community to combat the growing narcotics threat. This is especially important to know because the existing international law institutes and organizations, due to a number of objective reasons, are unable to effectively meet the challenges of transnational drug trafficking. Despite the many international conventions, recommendations and resolutions there is still no single legal framework for combating transnational crime. National legislations are yet to be brought into line with the current international laws while the measures taken by international police agencies are still not effective enough against the highly adaptable drug trafficking.

Even the highly authoritative international and intergovernmental organizations combating transnational drug criminals are too slow due to the need to observe the formal procedures of national legislations. There are also problems in cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of different states.

There is no arguing about the fact that narcotics from Afghanistan are decisive in the expanding drug production around the world. The escalation in their production and delivery in recent years is the key source of threat to the world community. According to UN experts, Afghanistan produced 820 tons of heroin in 2007 and between 900 and 1,000 tons in 2008.

The size of land area used in Afghanistan to cultivate poppy is bigger than the total land used for growing coca in Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined). Afghanistan accounts for 93 percent of the world's opium production – more than China produced in the 19th century whose population was 15 times bigger than the population of today's Afghanistan.

According to some sources, 15 percent to 19 percent of heroin produced in Afghanistan is illegally transported across countries of Central Asia and Russia to Europe, with the exception of the amounts that end up in the transit countries. The 88th session of IDCB in Vienna in 2007 announced the results of a study of the drugs situation carried out in 508 Afghanistan's villages by 150 special monitors. They found that 550 tons of heroin were taken out of Afghanistan in 2006 mainly through Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia nations.

This of course can attest to the ineffectiveness of measures taken by these countries' law enforcement bodies to block the routes whereby heroin is smuggled out and to the poor protection of the borders of the states across which drugs are carried. It is true that much has been written and said in recent years alone about the need to fortify the borders and increase control over the drugs routes, but there has been no real action yet. There has been no headway. It is unfortunate that neither the government of Afghanistan nor the international forces stationed there are proving able to cope with drug trafficking. Still worse, the production of opiates in Afghanistan has increased by several times since U.S. and NATO forces entered it, which suggests the need for monitoring the situation in a more appropriate manner.

The countries in Central Asia directly affected by the flood of Afghan

narcotics have registered a growth in the use of opiates, experts note. For example, confirmed drug addicts account for more than one percent of the region's population or nearly 600,000 people, whereas the corresponding figures in Western European countries are 0.75 percent and in Asia, 0.32 percent. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan report a growth in drug addiction and attendant diseases among young people, a growth in the number of crimes attributed to drug trafficking, and the amounts of various types of narcotics being seized. Synthetic drugs, constituting a small proportion, seized in recent time are indicative of a new element of the drug situation in the region. This is also evidence that drug runners have begun to use the "North Route" to carry synthetic drugs to countries in Central Asia.

An inalienable part of the world community, the Russian Federation is facing its share of the narcotics threat. Drug addiction and crime it breeds have turned into one of the key issues of Russia's state security. The number of only officially registered regular users of drugs stands at 537,000. The unofficial figure must be much higher: if one is to believe UN counting methods, it is usually four or five times higher. According to the director of the Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN), V.P. Ivanov, who spoke in early December 2008 at a press conference on drug problems, the amount of drugs used in Russia is eight times as much as in countries of Europe with 10,000 drug users dying every year of overdose. Drug abuse costs Russia 1.5 trillion rubles, and 2.5 percent in terms of GDP. In addition to the fact that, according to the RF Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 40 million people in Russia live in unfavorable conditions and one million live in areas with dangerous levels of environmental pollution, the situation is depressing because of the likelihood that the army of drug addicts will further swell.

Of great importance in combating the narcotics threat coming from Afghanistan is the decision adopted by the heads of state of members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Dushanbe in April 2003 on stepping up the war on drugs and drug business constituting the financial foundation of transnational and other organized crime. This decision made it possible to launch broad-based anti-narcotic activities, develop and implement a series of measures to oppose the narcotic threat, create and put into operation mechanisms of integrating the law enforcement systems in countries of Eurasia.

In 2004, they set up the Coordinating Council of heads of relevant agencies to combat drug trafficking (KSOPN) of CSTO states (chaired by the director of Russia's FSKN). The key objective of the Council is to integrate anti-narcotics activities of the law enforcement departments of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan (Uzbekistan joined in 2008), prepare and hold international anti-narcotic operations involving all parties interested in blocking the drug smuggling channels.

At the moment, KSOPN is a veritable headquarters coordinating anti-narcotics forces of states in the region and an effective center of a multi-pronged

system of international cooperation. It has produced a strategy for combating the rising narcotics threat as well as methods and mechanisms for combating drug trafficking.

This strategy was being shaped proceeding from the changing drugs situation in the region, analysis of the measures taken by the parties concerned to prevent drug-related crimes and joint operations aimed at combating drug trafficking. The strategy also takes into account the specifics of the legislation and regulatory documents of CSTO member states and practices of their relevant agencies, and also of cooperation between regional and subregional organizations that have emerged in recent years.

The strategy hinges on a set of measures aimed at integrating the law-enforcement systems of CSTO member states, developing organizational and administrative mechanisms and the legal foundation of coordinating control over drug trade, upgrading the relevant agencies' investigation and search operations against organized crime, including the use of integrated data bases on the production, transit, use and sale of narcotics in Eurasia, the training of personnel and scientific and technical cooperation.

Implementing this strategy and the Russian initiative to create anti-narcotics and financial "security belts" around Afghanistan in 2003-2008, KSOPN carried out 11 stages (each of five-day duration) of an international anti-drug Operation Canal which discovered and blocked 80 new drug smuggling routes between countries, regions and continents, solved about 51,000 drug-related crimes, seized 106 tons of narcotic drugs, psychotropic and potent substances, including 22 tons of hashish, 6.5 tons of heroin, about 1.6 tons of cocaine, considerable amounts of marijuana, opium and synthetic narcotic drugs in addition to 2,817 tons of drug precursors, 5,797 pieces of firearms and 194,000 rounds of ammunition.

It is worth noting that while the only participants in the operation in 2003 were CSTO member states, in 2007-2008 the work of the international operation coordination center involved 21 countries of Latin America, Europe, Asia and the USA as well as Interpol, OSCE and EAG (Eurasian Group on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism). This is a steady and ongoing process.

There is no doubt that regular operations Canal make Russia (the organizer and the only project donor at the moment) an international coordinator of anti-narcotic activities of law enforcement agencies and special services of the states in Eurasia.

The heads of specialized agencies of international and governmental organizations and law enforcement bodies of many states have noted more than once the current and long-term importance of this anti-drug operation. Of interest is a recent report of the U.S. Department of State on the subject. It stresses that regular operations Canal involving the relevant agencies of CSTO member states and observers make it possible to timely detect and block the routes of

smuggling from Afghanistan.

One of the principal outcomes of the meeting in Vienna in December 2007 of the Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan “Paris 2 – Moscow 1” political group is the decision to expand the geographic reach of Operation Canal by including China and the Balkan states, which points to the growing international status of this regional anti-drug project.

The implementation of Operation Canal was preceded by massive organizational efforts by members of competent authorities of CSTO member states to hammer out a system for preparing and fulfilling large-scale international anti-drug projects. They had to set up a coordinating and administrative body and finetune mechanisms of multilateral cooperation. As a result we have now the International Coordination Staff for organization and efficient control of all forces and resources involved in the operation. Coordination of activities pertaining to the operation in individual countries is the responsibility of their national interdepartmental headquarters made up of specially designated representatives of their anti-drug departments, customs and border services, security and internal affairs bodies of CSTO member states. There is an operations board of the International Coordination Staff headquartered at the FSKN of Russia. It coordinates activities of the national interdepartmental headquarters in line with the policy of the International Coordination Staff and provides cooperation of all parties concerned.

The resulting system of controlling international anti-narcotics operations makes it possible to take prompt decisions without numerous endorsements.

In September 2008, the CSTO Collective Security Council decided to lend Operation Canal a permanent status. The KSOPN Executive Office is working together with the relevant agencies of CSTO member states to mobilize sizable forces and resources to combat transnational drug business in the areas covered by the operation.

The Russian Orthodox Church in the Modern World

Patriarch Alexy II

THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY of the Russian Orthodox Church today has four main areas of development. The first priority is to preserve the unity of the Church and ensure the spiritual life of the extensive church diaspora living outside the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The second priority is to develop fraternal relations with all local Orthodox churches. The third priority is of a religious-public nature, and it is to maintain dialogue with other Christian confessions and organizations, as well as with representatives of Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism on matters relating to the preservation of moral values in the modern world. Finally, the fourth priority could be defined as the ROC's cooperation with the foreign policy agencies of various states, as well as with international public and interstate organizations in the interest of preserving peace and the fundamental values of public life.

Presently, the ROC is the largest local church in the Orthodox world. Orthodoxy is not an ethnic religion of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans or other peoples. It is global Christianity committed to preserving apostolic faith. It is open to the individual of any ethnic background. The church is a living and tangible embodiment of this principle, since it comprises representatives of numerous nationalities. The ethnic diversity of the Russian Orthodox Church is a source of its vitality and its wealth.

One important goal of the Moscow Patriarchy is to preserve and uphold church unity, which is currently being confronted with some challenges. The unity of the church, bequeathed by the apostles, is a great value and should be appreciated as such not only by the bishops but also by each cleric and lay person. Church unity is the treasure that our predecessors preserved despite the ordeals that they had had to go through. This gift, augmented over centuries, cannot be dissipated overnight for the sake of time-serving political considerations. Unfortunately, presently, there are ongoing attempts to destroy the sacred space of Holy Rus', created by St. Prince Vladimir, and spread discord and disharmony between millions of Orthodox Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans, and representatives of other ethnic groups comprising the multiethnic flock of the Russian Orthodox Church.

There are also challenges posed by certain national elites in the newly independent states that have emerged on the territory of historical Russia. There

is a view in some of these states that without creating a national and independent church, the formation of a nation/state is incomplete. For some reason, the leadership of these states is convinced that the church center in Moscow can weaken their state independence and is by definition hostile toward them. However, the Russian Orthodox Church is concerned about the well-being of every people who are part of its flock. And if such a people have chosen the path of building a sovereign statehood, the church will accept that choice. Its concern is not political organization but the spiritual well-being of the people as well as loyalty to the canonical foundations on which church life is built.

At the same time it is impossible to deny the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church has created a unique civilizational space – one that unites the peoples who are part of its flock. It comprises common objects of worship, a common spiritual tradition, a common system of moral values, and a common language of concepts and symbols. This common legacy must not be destroyed. Quite the contrary, it is necessary to preserve and augment it. We believe that this is possible in a situation where the Belarusians, Ukrainians, Moldovans, and other peoples have made the choice in favor of national independence.

A good example of the kind of unity that the Moscow Patriarchy seeks was the reunification with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR). On May 17, 2007, the Day of the Ascension of the Lord, an Act of Canonical Communion between the ROCOR and the Mother Church was signed in the Christ the Savior Cathedral. To many people, that event showed that a line was finally drawn under the civil war in the hearts and minds of compatriots split by political views and persuasions. The church disharmony caused by the 1917 revolutionary upheavals and fratricidal bloodshed became history. The reunification of the church took place with due respect being paid to the reality that had evolved historically. We have never sought to impose Moscow's control on the ROCOR. As a result, the integrity of the Russian community has strengthened significantly.

Presently, outside the bounds of its canonical territory, the Russian Orthodox Church ministers to the large diaspora of believers who reside, permanently or temporarily, in more than 70 countries of the world. The need to provide full-fledged, effective spiritual support to its flock predetermines the ROC's interest in establishing and maintaining contacts with the state agencies of those countries where the Moscow Patriarchy's believers reside. As for contacts with the diaspora, there are well developed relations with Russia's state institutions. At the same time the Russian Orthodox Church is interested in developing similar cooperation with state agencies in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and other countries. The Moscow Patriarchy's missions abroad seek active contacts with the diplomatic missions of these states, and that, as a general rule, brings positive results. As for regions where ethnic Ukrainians and Moldovans make up a significant part of ROC believers (for example, in the south of Europe), clergy who are sent there typically come from respective countries. This helps to

improve contacts between pastors and their flock, and this practice will continue to develop and improve in the future.

To many members of the ROC flock, our churches are the focus not only of their religious practice, but also of their spiritual activity, a kind of a center for cultural dialogue on the basis of a common faith and a common system of moral and spiritual values, created by Russian Orthodoxy. The number of our flock in non-CIS countries is rapidly growing. This is linked to the openness of state borders and the opportunities for studying and working in other countries, and building families there. The increasing number of churches outside the ROC's canonical territory is unrelated to any missionary strategy of conversion to Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Church seeks to respond to the spiritual needs of believers who are linked to it. At the same time, it needs to be noted that local residents also show interest in Russian Orthodoxy.

In some parts of the world, church activities sometimes involve considerable difficulties. I would like to point to China, where the majority of Orthodox believers are the descendants of ethnic Russians who started settling there as early as the 17th century. As a result of long-term and extensive activity by the Russian spiritual mission in Beijing, the Chinese Orthodox Church was born, which was granted autonomy 50 years ago. However, its present situation is rather difficult, since it does not have its own head or clergy working there on a permanent basis. In these conditions, dialogue is ongoing with the Chinese authorities on normalizing the situation of Orthodox believers while taking into account Chinese laws. Meanwhile, ROC clerics regularly perform religious services for our compatriots wherever possible – in particular, on the premises of Russian diplomatic missions in China. Much research, translation and publishing work in the realm of Chinese Orthodoxy is also being conducted.

Another important area of the Moscow Patriarchy's international activity is the development of contacts with other local Orthodox churches.

The subject of church unity is also highly relevant for this area of work. Unfortunately, the existing level of inter-Orthodox relations is not quite satisfactory. Church unity is especially jeopardized in a situation where, under the impact of political, nationalistic or other factors, some religious leaders grossly violate the fundamental principles of relations between Orthodox churches, as enshrined in the holy canons. The Russian Orthodox Church is doing all it can to consolidate fraternal relations with all local Orthodox churches, showing readiness to deal with outstanding problems patiently, in the spirit of Christian morality. The desire to establish positive dialogue with local Orthodox churches is yet another feature of ROC's activity, helping to assert traditional Orthodox values, common to all of our churches.

Presently, the Russian Orthodox Church, guided by the fundamental principles of relations with other faiths, which were adopted by the jubilee Bishops Council, is promoting dialogue and interaction with various Christian churches and communities.

Thus, contacts are maintained with old Eastern churches of the pre-Chalcedonian tradition. The Russian Orthodox Church participates in the general Orthodox theological dialogue with these churches, as well as in bilateral communication with specific churches – for example, the Armenian Apostolic Church, as well as with three pre-Chalcedonian churches of the Middle East – the Coptic and Syrian churches, and the Armenian Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia. Theological subjects are commonly discussed as part of general Orthodox dialogue with the pre-Chalcedonian churches, while in the course of bilateral contacts, religious historical subjects as well as topical issues of Christianity are addressed. Fortunately, the opinions of our churches coincide on the majority of these matters.

As of late, there has been productive dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church on a number of topical issues, especially such as the protection of traditional Christian values, the role of religion in communal life, moral problems, and family matters.

At the same time, there are some outstanding problems on the agenda of bilateral relations with the Roman Catholic Church. These include the issue of Catholic missionary activity on the Orthodox territory of Russia and other CIS countries. These subjects are discussed within the framework of a joint working group on problems that exist in relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, which was established in 2004. Nevertheless, there has been little progress on the issue of the Greco-Catholics' attitude toward the Orthodox believers in those parts of Western Ukraine where followers of the Uniate are in the majority. From the ROC's perspective, positive dynamics have yet to be achieved on this issue. Resolution of this problem is significant for the church's international activity.

In the sphere of bilateral contacts with Protestantism outside Russia, the church has preserved a stable, good relationship with its long-standing partners – the Evangelical Church in Germany and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, with theological dialogue ongoing. Regular discussions and joint social activity with these churches serve as a model in relations with the non-Orthodox Christians of other Protestant denominations.

At the same time, new difficulties have arisen in recent years. Unfortunately, the Protestant world is seeing a deepening and expanding trend toward the abandonment of the fundamental moral principles established by the Gospel and the holy apostles: For example, practicing homosexuals are ordained into priesthood and same-sex marriages are recognized.

Contacts with non-Orthodox Christians in Russia and other countries that are part of the ROC's canonical territory are an essential component of inter-Christian dialogue. It is noteworthy that our views in respect of moral values are very close, and we are able to achieve common positions in standing up to immorality. This especially applies to the preservation of traditional family values. Furthermore, the majority of non-Orthodox confessions in Russia are ready

for cooperation in the realm of relations between the church and the state. At the same time it should be noted that proselytizing attempts by some Protestant groups still impair their relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. The situation is compounded by the fact that many Protestant missionaries engage in proselytizing activities under the guise of charity, and anonymously, without disclosing their confession.

The ROC's participation in the activity of international Christian organizations such as the World Council of Churches and the Conference of European Churches continues to raise many questions, requiring serious consideration. In particular, in the 1990s, doubts arose as to the expediency of the further participation of Orthodox churches in the World Council of Churches. That led to the establishment of a special commission on the participation of Orthodox churches in the activity of the World Council of Churches. Meanwhile, at this stage, contacts with inter-Christian organizations are considered to be possible. The church's main goal in this case is to attest to the truth about Christianity and preach traditional Evangelical values to the Protestant world. At the same time, we can observe a commonality of our positions with many churches that are members of the WCC or the CEC – for example, on economic globalization, settlement of local conflicts, preservation of the environment, and other socially important issues. True, the church's future relations with these organizations depend on their ability to stop siding with the forces that are attempting to revise the foundations of Evangelical ethics.

Another important area at this stage is the development of constructive relations with such religions and Islam, Judaism and Buddhism – not only in Russia but also on the international level. A large number of problems, the resolution of which is important for entire mankind, are subjects for discussion and cooperation with representatives of these religions. Decline in moral values, the replacement of spiritual aspirations with material considerations, and the threats that are carried by religious and national extremism are just a partial list of these problems. Successful dialogue with representatives of non-Christian religions helps normalize ethno-confessional relations in both modern Russia and outside the country, in conflict zones, for example, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Over the past decade, cooperation with the principal non-Christian religions in Russia and the CIS has been conducted within the framework of the Interreligious Council. This organization helps address problems in relations between the state and the church, develop contacts between the church and the public, and promote respect for people from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds, especially among young people.

The church is in dialogue with Islamic organizations in Russia and worldwide on cooperation in the armed forces, human rights, and theological subjects, for example, within the framework of the Russian-Iranian Commission on "Islam-Orthodoxy" Dialogue. The church regards inter-religious dialogue as

very important in creating an environment of peace and accord in modern society, as well as in the joint search for answers to current problems and challenges. As for the ROC's international activity, including its cooperation with foreign policy agencies in different states, international public and interstate organizations, it should be noted that in this case, the church does not serve as an instrument of the state or some political group. Needless to say, the foreign policy interests of many states and the church coincide in some areas, such as peace-keeping, protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens who are members of the ROC flock, and preservation of the cultural and historical legacy of the peoples who are ministered to by the Moscow Patriarchy.

Russia is the largest state that is on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian capital is also home to its spiritual and administrative center. That is the reason why the church has a well developed relationship with the foreign policy agency of the Russian state. This relationship is based on long historical tradition. In the Russian empire, the affiliation of the overwhelming majority of the population with Orthodoxy was not only an essential factor in the prioritization of the empire's foreign policy course, but also set high standards for the work of its diplomatic staff. For example, under the influence of Orthodox thinking, Emperor Nikolai Aleksandrovich (Nicholas II) initiated the well-known Hague Peace Conference of 1899, which introduced new principles into international law, based on Christian humanitarianism.

New opportunities for the development of relations between the church and the state emerged in post-Soviet Russia. However it took a little more than a decade before, on March 6, 2003, the patriarch of Moscow and all Russia made a visit to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the first such visit in the country's history. That event took cooperation between the ROC and the Foreign Ministry to a fundamentally new level. An agreement was reached with I. S. Ivanov, Russian foreign minister at the time, on establishing a permanent cooperation mechanism – a working group.

Presently the ecclesiastical part of the working group is headed by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, head of the External Church Relations Department at the Moscow Patriarchy. On behalf of the ministry, the group's co-chairman is Deputy Foreign Minister G. B. Karasin. The two sides drew up and signed a document entitled Procedure for Interaction between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The group meets in regular sessions. In between its plenary sessions, sub-groups deal with problems related to the organization of the religious life of Russian citizens abroad, contacts with Russian fellow countrymen, and interaction with international organizations. Therefore, the long-term and productive cooperation between the church and the ministry has served as an example of successful interaction between state and religious institutions for the good of society at large. The Moscow Patriarchy is open to building similar relations with other countries, primarily with Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

It is essential to mention yet another important area of the ROC's international activities. It concerns the ROC's profession of Orthodoxy in the modern world and the norms of life that evolve on its basis. In this context, there are opportunities for developing relations with international public and interstate organizations.

Interstate organizations play a highly significant role in the modern world. Therefore, the church develops dialogue and cooperation with the UN, various EU agencies, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe. As of late, human rights have been one of the principal issues in our dialogue with international organizations. Respect for human rights reflects the value of the personality and is designed to ensure the freedom, inviolability, and development of each individual. However, international human rights organizations have been increasingly seeking to separate these rights from moral constraints and make them a tool in the exoneration of sinful passions, stimulating egoism and vanity. The position of the church on this issue is definitive and firm: Such "freedom" is slavery to sin, destructive to the individual and society as a whole.

In October 2007, I had an opportunity to address the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and present the Orthodox view of human rights and human dignity. In my remarks, I sought to remind the Europeans that it was within the bounds of the Christian system of values that the concept of human dignity was formed, and the way it evolved, and that the Christian ideas of dignity, freedom, and morality, in their interconnection, create a unique environment for European consciousness that has an inexhaustible potential in the realm of individual and public life.

Presently, however, the connection between human rights and morality is being broken, and a new set of rules is emerging, in conflict with the moral norms, which is ruinous for European civilization: After all, morality ensures the viability and development of society, as well as its unity. From the ROC's perspective, secular worldview cannot insist on its monopoly over the assertion of public values either in Europe or in the whole world. Therefore, it is time to recognize that religious motivation has a right to exist, not least in the public domain. But the church does not want to enter into confrontation, respecting the freedom of nonbelievers' persuasions. It is open to dialogue with them. My visit and presentation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe showed that dialogue between representatives of traditional religions and the secular world is possible and should continue.

It should be noted that the ROC's position is also backed by other Christian confessions, primarily the Roman Catholic Church, conservative Protestant circles, and traditional religions, such as Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. The building of constructive relations with their representatives and the formation of a common position on publically important matters as well as joint representation in international organizations are the priorities of interreli-

gious dialogue.

The Russian Orthodox Church is sending the message about the inseparable link between human rights and morality from many rostrums at highly respected international organizations. The Moscow Patriarchy highly appreciates the level of understanding and support that we are seeing from representatives of state and international structures. For its part, the church has considerable capabilities for presenting its views to the world public. The ROC has missions in Brussels, Strasbourg, New York, and Geneva that maintain contacts with the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU, the OSCE, and other international organizations. There are also a number of other important areas of cooperation with international organizations. This cooperation applies, in particular, to a law on religion, the fundamental principles of which are reflected in international law. Cooperation with international organizations is also conducted in such areas as interreligious dialogue, prevention and resolution of conflicts, and discussion on the role of religious tradition in the education system.

Islamic Radicalism: Russia and Central Asia

EXPERTS, ACADEMICS, political scientists and politicians gathered for a round table discussion at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to talk about Islamic radicalism, one of the hottest issues on the Russian and Central Asian agenda.

A. Pushkov, Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies at the Diplomatic Academy(ICIS), pointed out that the transition from unipolar America-dominated world to a multipolar world order added even more urgency to the issue under discussion.

Below is the whole range of opinions offered by the guests at the round table.

S. Nikolaev (Deputy Director, Third Department of the CIS Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) deemed it necessary to point out that Russia wants stability and security in Central Asia to be able to strengthen its strategic and allied relations with the local states, to address together the entire range of regional problems including terrorism, extremism and illegal drug trafficking.

Russia is also involved in bilateral humanitarian cooperation; it pays particular attention to the defense of the rights and interests of compatriots, is doing a lot to preserve the positions of the Russian language in these countries, to expand the Russian educational, cultural and information space in all of them. Those involved in these activities are fully aware of the potentials offered by the civil society as a whole and the Russian World Foundation in particular.

The political heavyweights — China, America, Japan, and the European Union — are displaying more interest than before in Central Asia. This does not worry Russia: for objective reasons sooner or later Central Asia will be integrated into wider cooperation formats which will add vigor to competition in all spheres. The Russian Federation does not claim the role of a monopolist in all Central Asian developments and is open for cooperation with other states.

Today, however, it has become clear that the United States and its allies will offer stiff rivalry in the energy sector: oil and gas extraction and transportation to the external markets by-passing Russia. Russia, in its turn, can offer weighty counter-arguments in this sphere, too — the high level of cooperation with the Central Asian countries in the energy sector. If the Caspian pipeline project and modernization of the regional gas pipeline system are accomplished cooperation will become even closer than before.

The current stability in Central Asia should not dupe anybody: the challenges and threats to regional security are very real. The situation in Afghanistan is going from bad to worse; the local states' domestic problems are responsible, to a great extent, for the fact that extremists, terrorists and drug dealers are very much interested in Central Asia.

Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT) (formerly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) are going on with their clandestine sabotage activities across the region. Under the slogan of restoring "pure Islam" in Central Asia they stake on propaganda of radical ideas previously practically unknown in the local countries. This undermines domestic stability in individual countries and is fraught with negative effects for the region as a whole.

In his contribution **A. Malashenko** (member of the Expert Council of the Carnegie Center) concentrated at the spread of radical Islamism in the Central Asian countries. He is convinced that Islamists' activities are the result of the local people's dissatisfaction with their rulers, corruption, the low living standards and lack of real reforms in their countries. The Islamic form of protest is a result of the fact that secular forms of protest are either banned or limited. He also pointed out that the decline, under Soviet power, of the traditional Hanafi Islam allowed Islamic radicalism flourish. The radical religious trends that have been gaining momentum can be described as a response to the weakness of traditional Islam, its degradation, its opportunist clerics and the non-existing system of religious education.

He also mentioned that even though foreign influence is strong enough it should not be overestimated as the Central Asian leaders often do. Its influence should not be underestimated either. First, the local Islamic radicals are part of the worldwide Islamist system; second, they are tightening the already close ties with coreligionists elsewhere; third, the basic ideological patterns widely spread in Central Asia are foreign products. Finally, Central Asia cannot, and should not be discussed outside the situation in Afghanistan that is frequently regarded as part of the region.

The majority of the regional Islamist organizations are nothing more than small groups; only two structures — Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and the more recent Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Islamic Movement of Turkestan) — can be described as real force. The former consists of small cells, not more than 3 to 5 members in each their average age being around 30. It is gradually spreading to new areas: in Kyrgyzstan, for example, it goes up north that until recently remained free from its cells. Currently, HTI is successfully coping with the task of penetrating state structures, the security services in the first place.

A. Malashenko went on to say that the ruling elites exploit the issue of Islamic radicalism to suppress opposition; this is especially typical of Uzbekistan. The Civil War in Tajikistan was the most important factor used by all Central Asian presidents to point to the negative results of excessive democ-

ratization and the advent to politics of Islamic forces.

In the wake of 09/11 the Central Asian leaders were out to present their countries as the bulwark of antiterrorist struggle. The local regimes were concerned with al-Qaeda's success; at that time, however, they were sure of their strength and overestimated the threat of Islamism mainly to become eligible for greater material assistance.

On the whole, Islam in Central Asia is still part of the local political landscape; all assessments of its role, however, should avoid overstatements. There will be no "green revolution" in Uzbekistan; in the near future secular leaders will remain in power yet Islamism as a political and religious phenomenon will be still visible and may grow stronger.

A. Podtserob (Department Head, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS) concentrated at contacts between Russian Muslims and foreign religious non-governmental organizations (RNGOs) obvious in several spheres. Their cooperation with Russia's Muslims in the sphere of religious education can be described as ambiguous, at the very least.

Some of the foreign RNGOs paid for construction and restoration of mosques, Muslim cultural centers, religious institutions, madrasahs, etc and their functioning even though the scope of financial aid was modest by necessity: the donors were aware that part of the money was either siphoned off by commercial structures or was stolen. They were involved in lavish charities: publishing activities, organizations of forums, support to the poor, refugees, people who suffered in armed conflicts or natural calamities, food and medicine supplies to these regions, building of hospitals, etc.

Some of the structures were determined to ignore Russia's official religious structures. The situation improved in the late 1990s when under pressure from Egyptian, Algerian and Tunisian structures the Saudis reshuffled the heads of the Russian branches of the Muslim World League, Al-Igasa and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. From that time on they have been working together with the official Muslim structures of Russia.

The author said further that missionary activities were going on in Russia and other CIS countries. Some of the missionaries (including the Domsday Warning and Islamic Call Association (At-Tablig wa-ud-daawa) promoted the ideas of religious renaissance and gave money to groups of Islamist-minded young people.

He also pointed out that international Islamic organizations (Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the first place) extended their support to the Chechen separatists.

In post-Soviet times Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Arab countries developed an interest in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, the resultant situation being very similar to that in the Russian Federation. The Turks who capitalized not only on cultural and linguistic closeness but also on the Hanafite

Mazhab (which can be described as a tolerant school not alien to reforms) they shared with the local nations were especially active. Iranians operated in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan; Islamic organizations tapped all their resources. Very much like in Russia it turned out that the coreligionists were not prepared to extend wide-scale assistance. The leaders of the foreign RNGOs were very much disappointed with the secular orientation of the local political elites.

A. Podtserob pointed out that ideologies can be defeated by alternative ideologies and suggested that reformist or secularist Islam might be used to oppose the fundamentalist ideas.

G. Rudov (head of the Center of World Economy and Global Problems, ICIS) analyzed political Islam otherwise known as Islamism. He pointed out that in the context of globalization Islamic societies were living through two different yet mutually penetrating processes. First: emergence of a global Islamic political system and second, Islam's rejection of Westernization and consumerism. Islamic renaissance that is rapidly reviving its traditional foundations amid the West's obvious pressure responded to it in Central Asia and elsewhere by (1) going back to the fundamentals of religion, "pure Islam" and the search for answers to the present challenges in the corpus of the already collected knowledge and (2) reform of Muslim society and search for new answers to the present challenges.

Islamic renaissance has fitted this religion into a political context. The problem of religious extremism of the transitory societies of Central Asia consists of several aspects:

Religious renaissance that is natural in transitory societies;

The use of the religious factor by internal and external forces for the purposes of their own.

We should learn to tap the positive potential of the former and downplay the negative effects of the latter. G. Rudov spoke at length about terrorism and anti-terrorist struggle in Central Asia and pointed out that it had become clear that terrorist activities slow down economic and political development in some of the world's regions.

He also said that some of the governments tend to exploit "Islamic threat" to justify the bloated security structures of their countries, slow progress to democracy and infringement on the freedom of speech.

The reports were followed by general discussion.

R. Landa (Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS) deemed it necessary to point that not everywhere fundamentalism bred violence and terror: the majority of the Muslim fundamentalists were "moderate" Islamists who preferred peaceful methods. Together with the Muslims far removed from fundamentalism they comprise an absolute majority in the Islamic world.

Islam grows political under the burden of the ever exacerbating social

and economic contradictions in the Muslim world and the not always acceptable modernization results, demographic pressure and technological backwardness that widen the gap between the West and the East.

He also said that in Central Asia the new political elite had to move away from the Communist past to get rid of the corresponding image, which pushed them toward Islam. In 1991-1992, political leaders of the CIS Muslim republics had to take the Islamists into account until, toward the end of 1992, Tajikistan's example convinced them to move against the Islamists. Stability was achieved through consistent juxtaposing radical Islam to moderate Islam, fundamentalism to nationalism, nationalism (in the countries where the opposition armed itself with nationalist slogans) to regionalism, and "enlightened authoritarianism" to the national leader's charisma.

A. Fursov (Russian Studies Center at the Moscow University of the Humanities) argued that Islamic radicalism did not mean the riot of the tradition against modernism. Olivier Roy has pointed out that fundamentalism differs greatly from traditionalism; it is a negation of traditions and can be described as a travel toward the sources, the original cornerstone free from the later superstructure of traditions. Archaic by its form Islamic fundamentalism rejects not only traditions but also modernism which looks into the future.

By rejecting or overcoming tradition Islamic fundamentalism (radical Islamism) enters into fairly complicated relations with globalization. It looks as its negation that fights it. In fact, it is its basis — it is hard to imagine Islamic radicalism of today without or outside globalization.

G. Kadymov (Diplomatic Academy) raised the question of new self-identification of the Central Asian population where three identities are living side by side: the cultural-civilizational (Islamic), national-ethnic (state) and clan-territorial (local).

Deprived of the Soviet values people turn to traditions; religion is seen as a compass in their quest for a new identity. The national Central Asian elites have to accept the Islamic and clan, or local values and interests and to create a legitimate and controllable alternative to the ideologies and political practices of the radicals.

A. Vavilov (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) spoke about worsening or at least stagnating economic and social situation in the majority of Central Asian countries and about the weakening of and, in the near future completely disrupted, ties with world culture and civilization (previously maintained through the Russian language) as the second factor behind the spread of Islamic radicalism. The Central Asian authoritarian regimes were described as the third factor.

The Muslim world is still the world's countryside that supplies the capitalist city with raw materials and cheap (frequently illegal) workforce. This cannot but breeds hopelessness and social dependency and instability in the Muslim world. Islamists profit from lack of democratic freedom of expressions

and bans on all secular activities that diverge from the official line.

R. Bobokhonov (Center of Civilizational and Regional Studies, RAS) concentrated at radical Islam in Tajikistan. He drew the audience's attention to the so-called men's clubs and their role in spreading the ideas of Islamism. During the Civil War in Tajikistan (1992-1997) many of them became centers of Wahhabism that called on regime change and establishing an Islamic state. In recent years, said the speaker, many of the clubs stopped disseminating fundamentalist ideas.

A. Sadur (St. Filaret's Orthodox Christian Institute) suggested that radical Islam was a response of Islamic society to the religious trends that had moved too far from the ideal — the Muhammad community, which the majority of the Muslims believe to be the standard. This related, first and foremost, to the Sufi and the cults that had taken shape inside the Sufi tarikats. In fact, some of the Sufi trends and their practices contradicted the Muslim orthodox practices. This and the mounting Western influence together with the secularization of the Muslim world caused a fairly strong response known as Salafi.

Traditional Islam can be regarded as an answer to Islamism and Islamic radicalism.

A. Kanaeva (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) spoke about Hizb ut-Tahrir, the membership of which is mainly Uzbek even though there is sprinkle of Kyrgyzes and Tajiks. The Karimov regime is the party's main aim; recently it stepped up its involvement in Kyrgyzstan.

The majority of members are young and unemployed yet recently the party has been steadily improving the quality of its membership and increasing its numerical strength. Today, it is seeking well-educated young people; it is working among civil servants and law enforcers.

V. Cherny (Federation Council, RF Federal Assembly) called the attention of all present to the fact that centuries-old cultural and everyday specifics are crumbling under globalization pressure. A new type of neocolonialism is becoming obvious while societies become clearly divided into the poor and the rich. Criticism and protest became the hallmarks of the traditionally conservative societies of the Islamic states.

Despite its repeated political and military defeats extremism in Central Asia does not die: poverty and the prospect of death of starvation are responsible for this.

A. Mitrofanova (Diplomatic Academy) deemed it necessary to draw the line between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a religious ideology. In Islam religion and politics are practically indivisible; the Sharia is a religious and civil law at one and the same time; umma is a religious and political community at one and the same time. Political quietism looks alien to Islam yet the distinctions among the supporters of "simply Islam" (quietists) and politicized Islamists are obvious to the latter.

Homeini conducted one of the most revolutionary transformations of

Islam: he filled the traditional dogmas with modern political content not infrequently revising these dogmas. He transformed the Shahadat conception which in traditional Shiism was limited to the saints of the old days and was one of the first to apply the term “shahid” to people from the street who died for their convictions.

V. Matiash (Diplomatic Academy) spoke about America’s influence in the region and said that Russian analysts did not exclude the possibility that there were plans of creating a “sanitary cordon” of pro-Western countries around Russia. Today, China is much more apprehensive than before of America’s designs to limit China’s influence in the world and Central Asia. America’s war in Iraq and its actions in Afghanistan have already caused a negative response among the Central Asian Muslims.

Russia relies on two foreign policy pillars: first, the former Soviet republics are the natural and exclusive zone of its influence since the role of the leader in the region bound to it by common historical and cultural roots is its by right; second, its security policy in Central Asia is geared at anti-terrorist struggle.

O. Peresykin (Diplomatic Academy) expanded on this subject and pointed out that the United States and its allies had started an active brainwashing campaign to plant the idea about Islamic threat to other civilizations in people’s minds. This was devised by the neocons in search of a new enemy to replace the Soviet Union and the socialist system. An analysis of American actions in the Middle East reveals that Americans wittingly and unwittingly encouraged extremist Islamic elements. It was the United States which created seats of tension far from its borders under the guise of struggle against international Islamic terrorism.

The discussion was summed up by **G. Rudov** who pointed to the following factors behind the spread of radical Islamism in Central Asia:

Socioeconomic problems triggered by the failed modernization projects;

Decline of traditional Islam under Soviet power that created a vacuum filled in by radical conceptions;

The mainly authoritarian local regimes that suppress secular opposition;

Influence of the non-regional actors: both states and international Islamic movement.

The participants agreed that even though radical Islamism presents a serious threat to the region’s security it should not be overestimated since the region’s total Islamization is hardly probable.

Weapons of the 21st Century

V. Belous

The main mistake people make is that they fear current problems more than future ones.

Carl von Clausewitz

General information about new types of weapons of mass destruction

IN CONSIDERING MANKIND'S CENTURIES OLD HISTORY from a certain angle, it needs to be acknowledged that it is, essentially, a history of wars and weapons. Each era of world civilization is characterized by specific types of weapons. This primarily is due to the fact that parties involved in political, economic, ethnic or religious conflicts have sought to resolve them by force. The development of military technology has especially accelerated over the past two centuries, when the combat characteristics and casualty and damage producing elements of weapons started to be linked to the advancement of science and research, as well as the emergence of new technologies and materials. That naturally led to changes in forms and methods of warfare. In the 20th century, fundamentally new types of weapons appeared – chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear – capable of causing mass destruction.

The start of the third millennium confronted mankind with an ever more pressing problem: What is the future of human civilization? How to avoid major upheavals, which could confront mankind with the danger of losing its immortality? The awareness of the reality of the threat and the dire consequences involved in the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has brought about a wide ranging movement in the world in favor of the prohibition and complete destruction of all the existing types of WMD. Significant steps have been taken along this difficult path. In 1975, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was adopted. In 1977, the international community adopted a similar convention with regard to chemical weapons. A number of Russian (Soviet)-U.S. agreements were signed on nuclear arms control and limitation, and an entire class of nuclear weapons was completely

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destroyed – intermediate range missiles. The international community, concerned by the threat of natural disasters, in 1977 adopted the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

At the same time, the international community is still concerned by the existing deep divide caused by differences in the level of economic development, the intensification of the struggle for sources of raw materials and energy, and in the not so distant future also for fresh water reserves, as well as environmental safety. Therefore, the question of how the development of weapons will proceed is very urgent indeed. What types of weapons can fill the vacuum that will imminently emerge following the elimination of the existing types of WMD? Scientists and military experts note that fundamentally new types of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, could appear very soon. According to them, even now it is possible to predict the creation of some new types of weapons based on scientific and technological ideas that are already known. An important factor here is that to date there are no international agreements or treaties banning the development or production of new types of WMD, while there is a pressing need to erect reliable barriers in the way of their creation and proliferation.

The realization of the emerging danger prompted the USSR foreign minister to address the 30th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1975 with a proposal that UN member states should sign a legally binding agreement undertaking not to develop or produce new types of WMD and not to encourage any such activity. The USSR submitted to the UN General Assembly a draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new WMD delivery systems.

That brought into focus the need for the uniform interpretation and legal definition of new terminology. As a follow-up to these provisions, in the spring of 1976 the Soviet Union submitted a preliminary draft definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction: “New types of weapons of mass destruction include such weapons that are based on fundamentally new principles of operation and the effectiveness of which can be commensurate with that of conventional types of weapons of mass destruction, or surpass them.”¹ However, at that time the attention of the international community was focused on the threat posed by the nuclear and chemical arms race, the huge stockpiles of which were weakening international stability and security, and the new problem did not receive an adequate response from the world community although its discussion continued at the UN disarmament committee.

Since virtually all hypothetical types of WMD will be based on dual purpose technology, this significantly complicates their identification and development, and production oversight, making it difficult to reach an agreement on their prohibition. Evidently, a formula describing each specific weapon system will need to be worked out so that it could be correlated with the general defini-

tion of WMD. This correlation should not contain any internal contradictions. The “scale of destruction,” which underlies the definition of WMD, is very closely linked to the notion of “scale of use.” As is known, during the Anglo-American bombing of Dresden during World War II, tens of thousands of people were killed, which is comparable with the effects of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this case the scale of the use of conventional weapons is comparable with the scale of destruction characteristic of WMD. Such classification helps estimate the scale of destruction caused by the use of a particular type of weapon to achieve specific combat goals – strategic, operational-tactical or tactical. The higher the level of combat missions, the more grounds there are for classifying a specific type of weapon as WMD.

Decades later, speaking in the fall of 2006 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged with great concern: “The arms race is reaching a new level, and there is a threat of new types of weapons emerging.”² These remarks, presumably, were prompted by reports about the development of new weapon systems, capable of destroying strategic stability in the world and undermining the international security system. The use of new types of WMD and even the threat of their use will be aimed primarily at achieving important political and economic goals, quite possibly even without any direct contact between opposing forces or without the conduct of combat operations in their traditional definition. This can lead to a situation where there will be no large army battles or physical destruction of people directly on the battlefield. They could be replaced by “slow action” systems and combat assets producing a latent damaging effect on the human organism, gradually destroying it, eroding the vital organs, impairing protection against meteorological and infectious impacts, and thus gradually killing it or causing its long-term incapacitation.

As mentioned earlier, essentially new types of modern weapons are based on the results of fundamental scientific research and the development of new technology. Herein lies the objective nature of the potential emergence of new types of weapons, since it is impossible to stop the advancement of science, while its consequences could be very tragic indeed. At one time Winston Churchill warned that the Stone Age could return on the gleaming wings of science. It is not very difficult to anticipate the appearance of new types of weapons based on the established scientific principles that have yet to be applied in practice, but it is almost impossible to anticipate the appearance of weapons the underlying idea of which does not exist as yet or is still extremely vague. Meanwhile, experts warn that the appearance of new types of weapons will naturally have a major impact on warfare methods and procedures, the definition of combat goals and the concept of “victory” as such. Marshal Igor Sergeev, former Russian defense minister, said: “The appearance of weapons based on new physical principles, especially on the strategic and tactical level, means yet another qualitative change in the essence of warfare and the evolution of forms and meth-

ods of warfare.”³

One of the main goals of future warfare could be to use certain types of weapons to make a psychological impact on the adversary – individual and collective, to destroy public and state institutions, to provoke mass unrest, to destroy the state, and to erode society. To achieve victory in these conditions, it will be necessary to have a very good knowledge not only about the adversary’s armed forces but also about the specifics of its state and political system, military-political decision-making mechanisms, the specifics of thinking and culture, possible reaction to a certain course of events on the part of state and military leaders, and their impact on public mentality. This lays the groundwork for transition from direct military confrontation and attempts to destroy an adversary’s military personnel and non-combatants as soon as possible to covert warfare methods. A certain measure of selectivity in the impact produced by such weapons could enable an aggressor to practically avoid losses among its military personnel and at the same time ensure effective incapacitation of the adversary’s personnel while preserving materiel, installations, facilities, and infrastructure. The effects from the use of certain types of weapons of the future may appear quite a long time after the impact took place – months and even years – when cause and effect connections and relationship will have been irrevocably lost.

Historical experience shows that serious efforts to prohibit a particular type of weapons, which can cause massive destruction or great human suffering, were only made after such weapons were used for military purposes, and the international community was able to see with its own eyes what severe consequences they had had. Thus would come enlightenment with regard to the need to ban all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, the use of such a “trial and error” method in respect to new types of WMD today – not to mention in the future – is fraught with far reaching, serious consequences, possibly of an irreversible nature. Therefore, the international community has been confronted with a rather challenging and pressing problem of preventing the development and production of new types of WMD. Its relevance is also linked to the fact that international law now, as in the past, lags behind the pace of military weapons technology. Yet even in those cases where limitations and bans were imposed on the use of certain types of weapons in accordance with international law, effective verification mechanisms as a general rule were lacking.

Within the next few decades one can anticipate the appearance of new types of WMD, the underlying scientific and technological ideas for which are already known, while some of them are actually being developed now. These include the following types of weapons: ⁴

- geophysical weapons;
- laser weapons;
- genetic weapons;
- ethnic weapons;
- particle beam (directed energy) weapons;

- high energy radio frequency (HERF) weapons;
- sonar weapons;
- antimatter weapons;
- asteroid de-orbiting;
- information warfare, and
- psychotronic weapons.

There is no doubt that as natural sciences develop and as fundamental discoveries are made, new ideas will appear that could be used for creating new types of weapons. The numerous evidence of “unidentified flying objects” (UFO) suggests that in this case we have to deal with such types of energy that do not lend themselves to explanation from modern scientific positions. At the same time it is not ruled out that as the development of science and technology accelerates, mankind could gradually master these types of weapons, which could subsequently be used for military purposes.⁵

A brief description of possible types of WMD based on known scientific and technological principles

Geophysical weapons

EXPERTS NOTE THE DANGER related to the possible development of “geophysical weapons,” based on the use of systems capable of causing natural disasters (earthquakes, torrential rains, tsunamis, etc.) and the destruction of the ozone layer, which protects animal and plant life against deadly solar radiation. Geophysical weapons are based on the military use of systems that can impact on processes occurring in the earth’s solid, liquid and gaseous mantle. Special attention is given to the state of unstable balance where a relatively small “push” can cause a disastrous effect and impact on the adversary as a result of devastating natural forces (the so-called trigger effect). A special role here is played by an atmospheric layer between 10 and 60 km. By the nature of their impact, geophysical weapons are subdivided into meteorological, ozone and climatic weapons.⁶

Meteorological weapons

IN THE NORTH OF ALASKA, 320 km from Anchorage, at the foot of the mountains, there is a veritable forest of 24-meter antennas, which, not surprisingly, attract the attention of environmentalists and weather experts. The project is officially called High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HFAARP). According to official reports, this project is designed to study ways of enhancing communications technology. At the same time a number of prominent scientists believe that it is essentially a military project, controlled by the Pentagon. In particular, experts have suggested that directional antennas are used

for “shooting” focused beams of high frequency waves into the ionosphere, which heat it up at high altitudes, leading to the formation of plasma. This causes energy destabilization in the ionosphere, which changes the wind rose and creates natural disasters that are difficult to predict: tsunamis, storms, floods, and snowfalls.⁷

The most well studied impacts caused by such weapons are torrential rains. To this end, in particular, silver or lead iodide is dispersed in the rain clouds. Such actions can complicate the movement of troops, especially of heavy arms and equipment, and flood sizable tracts of land. Meteorological impacts can also be used to disperse clouds in an objective area to facilitate targeting and aiming, especially on pinpoint targets to be attacked from the air. A cloud the size of several thousand cubic kilometers and carrying about 1 million kWh of energy can be so unstable that 1 kilogram of silver iodide can change its condition drastically. Several airplanes with 100 kilograms of this substance can disperse clouds over an area of several thousand square kilometers, causing heavy precipitation. To this end, during the war in Vietnam, the United States dispersed silver iodide in rain clouds to cause floods to submerge vast tracts of land and breach water dams.⁸

The work to develop meteorological weapons has a long history. Soon after World War II, the United States started conducting intensive research of atmospheric processes under external impacts: Skyfire (the formation of lightning), Prime Argus (methods of causing earthquakes) and Stormfury (hurricane control). Although the results of those projects were not widely publicized, it is known that in 1961, U.S. scientists conducted an experiment to send more than 350,000 copper needles, each 2 cm long, into the atmosphere, which changed the thermal balance of the ionosphere.

It is thought that as a result of that, an 8.5 point earthquake struck Alaska while a part of the Chilean coast slid into the ocean. An abrupt change in the thermal processes occurring in the atmosphere can cause a tsunami. The scale of the danger posed by a tsunami hitting coastal areas is evident from the havoc wreaked by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and Louisiana in September 2005. It was a natural disaster but scientists do not rule out the possibility of creating an equally devastating tsunami near enemy territory by exploding a high-yield thermonuclear device in an ocean, several hundred meters below the surface.⁹

A group of Russian Federation State Duma deputies, worried by the mounting threat of new types of WMD, in August 2002, issued a statement to Russian President V.V. Putin about the potential danger posed to mankind by the continuation of large-scale experiments in the United States designed to produce focused and powerful impacts on the near earth environment by high frequency waves. They said, in particular that “the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, adopted on May 18, 1977, should become one of the fundamental acts in inter-

national law and should be applied to the experiments already conducted or planned as having a military orientation.”¹⁰

Climatic weapons

CLIMATIC WEAPONS are regarded as a variety of geophysical weapons, since climate change is occurring as a result of interference in global weather formation processes occurring in the earth's atmosphere. The use of such weapons can be aimed at impairing agricultural production in the territory of a possible adversary, affecting food supplies to its population and disrupting the implementation of socio-economic programs, which should ultimately lead to the destruction of political and economic institutions. Such external impacts could bring about the desired political and economic changes in the country so affected, without the need to start a war in its traditional understanding. Some experts believe that lowering the average annual temperature in the middle latitudes, where most of the grain is produced, by just one degree could have disastrous consequences. The waging of large scale wars for control over fertile soil with the help climatic weapons can cause heavy losses among noncombatants across vast areas. However, taking into account the close interconnection between climatic processes occurring in various parts of the world, the use of climatic weapons will be difficult to control, which could cause substantial damage to neighboring countries, including the country that uses such weapons.

Ozone weapons

AS IS KNOWN, the ozone layer of the earth's atmosphere is in a state of dynamic equilibrium with the environment, which involves such processes as ozone formation from molecular oxygen under the impact of solar radiation and its decomposition under the influence of different impacts related to human activity: the emission of industrial gases into the atmosphere, motor vehicle exhaust, nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the discharge of nitrogen oxides from mineral fertilizer and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) from various cooling and air conditioning devices. This shows that the ozone layer is rather sensitive to external impacts.

Therefore, ozone weapons can comprise an assortment of means and facilities (for example, CFC rockets) designed to artificially destroy the ozone layer over designated parts of enemy territory. The formation of such “gaps” will provide conditions for the penetration of hard ultraviolet (UV) radiation from the sun with the wave length of about 0.3 mcm. It has a ruinous effect on live organism cells, cellular structures and the hereditary system, causes skin burns, and is a factor in the sharp rise in cancer incidence among humans and animals.

It is believed that the most tangible effect from such impacts will be higher mortality and the lower productivity of animal and crop farming in areas over which the ozone layer has been destroyed. The disruption of processes

occurring in the ozonosphere could also affect the thermal balance of these areas, as well as the weather. A decline in ozone content should lead to a reduction in the average temperature and an increase in humidity, which is especially hazardous in regard to areas with unstable and unsafe crop farming conditions. In this respect, ozone weapons can produce similar effects as climatic weapons.

High energy radio frequency weapons

AS OF LATE, high energy radio frequency (HERF) weapons, which impact on humans as well as on technical facilities with a powerful electromagnetic impulse (EMI), have often been mentioned among non-nuclear (conventional) weapons. A significant factor here is the proliferation of military purpose and civilian technology, which is used to achieve some extremely important goals, including in the realm of security. Information about EMI, which could damage a variety of technical systems, became known in the course of first nuclear weapon tests in the United States and the Soviet Union, when a new physical phenomenon was discovered – i.e., the formation of a powerful impulse of electromagnetic radiation, which immediately attracted considerable interest. However, before long it turned out that EMI was created not only as a result of a nuclear explosion. In the 1950s, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, one of the “fathers” of Soviet nuclear weapons, proposed a non-nuclear “electromagnetic bomb.” In its construction design, the magnetic field of the solenoid is compressed by the explosion of a chemical agent, which produces a powerful electromagnetic impulse.

Soviet specialists could not possibly ignore the possibility of EMI weapons being developed and used against the USSR (Russia). An important role in the research into EMI weapons and methods of protection against them was played by the Institute of Thermal Physics of Extreme States, affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences, led by Academician Vladimir Fortov. V. Fortov stressed that at a time when the armed forces and infrastructure of many countries were saturated with electronics, while that trend would only grow in the future, the focus on the means and methods of disabling electronic equipment was highly relevant. He also said that although EMI weapons were referred to as “non-lethal,” experts classed them as “strategic” weapons, which could be used for disabling key elements of the state and military command and control system and various types of weapons, thus accomplishing strategic goals.¹¹

In the past several years Russia has achieved considerable success in developing fixed-site research generators creating highly intensive magnetic fields and the maximum current. Such generators could serve as a prototype for an “electromagnetic gun,” which could have a range of several hundred meters or more, depending on what kind of equipment it will be used to impact. The existing state of the art technology enables a number of countries to provide their armed forces with various modifications of ammunition with powerful EMI radi-

ation, which can be used in combat operations. During the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf, the United States used Tomahawk cruise missiles, generating EMI radiation of up to 5 MW, to suppress the enemy's electronic systems, especially air defense systems. At the start of the war in Iraq, in 2003, an EMI bomb was dropped on a TV center in Baghdad, instantly disabling all of its electronic equipment. Prior to that, a similar bomb had been tested in 1999 in Yugoslavia, which also demonstrated its highly effective use against electronic systems.

Russia also attaches great importance to the creation of such weapon systems. Thus, the Moscow Institute of Radio Engineering at the Russian Academy of Sciences has successfully carried out the Ranets-E and Rosa-E projects. The first is a project to develop a mobile microwave protection system, designed to ensure the defense of the most important installations and facilities against precision-guided weapons. It should be comprised of an antenna system, a high power generator, and control equipment systems and measuring instruments. The entire system is to be mounted on a mobile base and ensure the prompt and effective redeployment of the Ranets-E system to a designated objective area. As it became known, this weapon system will have an output capacity of more than 500 MW, will operate in the centimeter frequency band and will generate 10-20 nanosecond impulses. Ranets-E's microwave gun is designed to effectively engage targets at a range of up to 10 kilometers. The system's weight will be more than 5 tons. First data about the new weapon were disclosed to visitors to the Russian pavilion at the exhibitions in Singapore and Lima in 2001.¹²

Studies into the impact of electromagnetic radiation on the human organism show that even exposure to low intensity EM radiation results in an array of functional changes and disturbances. In particular, EM radiation can disrupt the heart rhythm and even, according to some scientists, can cause cardiac arrest. There are two types of impact: thermal and non-thermal. The thermal impact causes an overheating of tissue and organs, and with sufficiently long radiation can cause irreparable pathological changes. The non-thermal impact mainly leads to functional disorders in various organs of the human organism, especially in the cardio-vascular and nervous systems. The results of microwave weapon tests conducted on humans in October 2001 at the U.S. Kirtland Air Force base proved to be rather indicative in this respect. Three-millimeter rays penetrated the human body just 0.3-0.4 mm deep, but water and blood molecules in the subcutaneous layer immediately started to boil. At the same time a person subjected to such impacts experiences an extremely acute pain, well above the pain threshold, which forces him to leave the area of microwave radiation as soon as possible.¹³

Laser weapons

SPECIALISTS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES have for many years been working on laser weapons, while the results received so far suggest that these

weapons will soon have practical application. As is known, lasers are devices that emit intensive electromagnetic (EM) energy in the optical band – quantum generators. The damage effect of the laser beam is achieved by heating a target to a very high temperature, causing its material to melt or even evaporate, disrupting sensitive elements of weapon systems, blinding humans, causing irreparable damage to the eyesight, and inflicting serious damage in the form of skin burns.

The use of laser weapons is marked by the element of surprise; concealment; the absence of external signs such as fire, smoke or sound; high accuracy; linear dissemination, and an almost instant effect. Military laser systems of various modifications and designations can be created – ground, sea, air or space based, and different range, rate of fire, ammunition and other characteristics. There are plans to use low and medium power lasers to disable command and control posts and weapon aiming and guidance systems, and to blind tank crews, motor vehicle drivers, helicopter pilots, and gun crews. High power lasers are to be used against enemy warplanes and missiles.¹⁴

In substantiation of the aforementioned, it needs to be said here that the U.S. has spent years working on laser rifles that can effectively engage a target with a thin and low energy beam at a range of up to 1.5 km. A shot from such a rifle is almost unseen and unheard. The beam can seriously damage the eyesight, and even cause complete blindness. Special goggles can only protect against radiation of certain wavelengths. In the mid-1950s, more than 1,000 tests were conducted in the United States to comprehensively study the damage and casualty effects of laser radiation, and methods of defending against it.

Specialists believe, not without reason, that laser weapons will have the most wide ranging application in the U.S. missile defense system. In 1996, the United States started developing the Airborne Laser (ABL), designed to effectively engage missiles in flight, especially at the boost stage, where they are the most exposed and vulnerable to attack. A powerful laser system with dozens of tons in fuel supplies will be deployed aboard Boeing 747 aircraft. In a crisis situation, the Boeing will circle above at an altitude of 10-12 km with the capability of detecting an enemy missile within seconds and effectively engaging it at a range of up to 300-500 km.

The trials are to be completed in the near future so as to create a squadron of seven airplanes in 2009. In February 2000, Martin-Boeing-TRW, one of the leading military-industrial concerns, signed a contract with the Pentagon for the development of principal elements of a space based laser station with on-site tests to be conducted in 2012. The work to create a space based military laser system is to be completed by 2020. Finally, it needs to be said that laser weapons will have quite a broad and diverse scope of applications, while specialists should be expected to come up with a variety of methods for their use and the type of targets that they can effectively engage.

Sonic weapons

IN ADDRESSING PROBLEMS involved in the development of sonic weapons and in considering their damage factors and effects, it is important to take into account that they mainly use three frequency bands: infrasound, below 20 Hz; sound, between 20 Hz and 20 kHz; and ultrasound, above 20 kHz. This classification is based on the specifics of the sound impact on the human organism, primarily on the hearing system. It has been established that the hearing threshold, the levels of pain and other negative impacts on the human organism decrease as the frequency of sound increases from several Hz to 250 Hz.

In the past several years the United States has been conducting an array of projects related to non-lethal weapons, including sonic weapons, in particular at the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC), Picatinny, NJ. Huntington Beach based Scientific Applications & Research Associates, Inc. (SARA) carried out a number of projects to develop sonic "bullets" emitted by large diameter antennas. According to their developers, the new weapons should expand the scope of military force used not only on the battlefield but also in some situations that can evolve in the course of police or peacekeeping operations. Research is in progress on developing infrasound systems based on large PA and powerful amplification systems. Joint projects conducted by SARA and ARDEC are aimed at creating high power, low frequency sonic weapons designed to protect U.S. agencies abroad.¹⁵

With a view to disabling personnel in bunkers, shelters and infantry fighting vehicles, very low frequency sound "bullets," formed by merging ultrasound waves generated by large antennas, were used. According to U.S. specialists on "non-lethal weapons," Russia is also conducting a series of projects in sonic weapons and has already produced some impressive results. In particular, they claim that Russia has developed an operational device generating an infrasound 10 Hz pulse "the size of a baseball," with a power sufficient to cause serious damage to a person at a distance of hundreds of meters.¹⁶

The use of infrasound waves with a frequency of several hertz can produce a very strong impact on the human organism. The insidious nature of these weapons also consists in that infrasound waves below the threshold of human perception can create a subconscious feeling of alarm, despair and even terror. According to some experts, the impact of infrasound waves on people can lead to epilepsy while high power radiation can cause death. Death can occur as a result of a malfunctioning of certain human organs, especially when they resonate with the sound waves. This can destroy the cardiovascular system, blood vessels and internal organs. According to experts, a certain frequency of radiation can, for example, cause heart attacks among enemy personnel and noncombatants. It is also important to take into account the ability of infrasound waves to penetrate concrete and metal shields, which further increases the interest of military specialists in these weapons.

At the same time it needs to be noted that experts are divided over the assessment of the damage effect of sonic weapons on humans. A case in point is the analysis of the damage effects caused by a variety of non-lethal weapons, in particular a study made by Daimler Benz Aerospace. It produced some rather conflicting results, showing a need for further comprehensive studies and experiments.

Information warfare (IF) weapons

IN ANALYZING THE PROBLEM of information weapons, it is important to note the rather broad content of the definition of this concept, comprising an array of warfare methods, means and assets. This type of warfare is based on action and counteraction in the information realm, both of an offensive and defensive nature. In the course of combat action, the opposing sides seek to destroy the adversary's information system and protect their own to the maximum degree possible. According to Russian experts, this element of warfare should be described as "information warfare" (IF). Information warfare will start with the onset of combat operations or will even precede them, and move along several lines simultaneously: electronic warfare (EW), active reconnaissance, disruption of command and control systems, deception, conduct of psychological operations against enemy troops and noncombatants, the use of special software and technical means to produce the required impact, the use of professional hackers to assault and disrupt the automated state and military command and control systems, etc.¹⁷

Information warfare planning and conduct includes psychological operations, which can be carried out on a different scale. The main goals of operations on the strategic level are: to discredit a state's foreign and domestic policy and the socio-economic status of its population, to exacerbate ethnic contradictions, to distort its history, to foment religious strife among representatives of different confessions, to demoralize the population, to encourage antisocial behavior, and so on. Information warfare operations on the tactical level are aimed at demoralizing military personnel and noncombatants, especially in areas adjacent to zones of combat action, supporting opposition elements within enemy ranks, encouraging noncombatants to stage civil disobedience acts and desertion among military servicemen.

Outstanding military leaders of the past were well aware that a clear-cut and convincing explanation to enemy soldiers of the pointlessness of resistance could yield a good result. During Alexander Suvorov's Italian campaign, his address to the enemy troops, explaining the plight in which they had found themselves, caused Piedmont Army troops to defect to the Russians by entire detachments and units. Napoleon also gave high priority to feeding special (often misleading) information to the enemy. At the time he had a mobile print shop with a capacity of 10,000 leaflets a day. He used to say that four newspapers could

cause more trouble than a 100,000-strong army. A good indication of the possible scale of psychological operations is provided by the experience of World War II, where the Western allies used a huge amount of propaganda material against the Nazi coalition: Great Britain dropped 6.5 billion leaflets and the United States 8 billion.¹⁸

The rapid development of the mass media, especially television and the Internet, creates objective prerequisites for its intensive use for military purposes. As is known, the Internet global network now comprises about 1 billion users in more than 150 countries. In the future, the battlefield should be expected to shift increasingly into the intellectual realm, impacting on the consciousness and feelings of many millions of people. By deploying space-based relay stations in low earth orbits and using the great potentiality of television and the Internet, an aggressor country can work out and, under certain conditions, carry out a scenario for continuous, round-the-clock information warfare against a particular state, in an effort to blow it up from within. Provocative programming will be designed to affect not only the people's intelligence but primarily their senses, especially with the public's low political awareness, insufficient information and unpreparedness for such warfare.

The dosed provision of ideologically and psychologically charged provocative material, the skillful use of an assortment of truthful information ("confidence building") and lies, and the disingenuous montage of a variety of real and fictitious explosive situations can turn into a potent tool of psychological offensive. They can prove to be especially effective against a country affected by social tensions, interethnic, religious or social conflicts. When it falls on such fertile soil, carefully selected information can shortly cause panic, mass unrest and riots, and destabilize the political situation in a country. An enemy can thus be forced to surrender even without the need to use traditional weaponry.

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, 1994-96, is a good illustration of the use of the Internet to produce effective IF and psychological impacts. The broad use of telephone calls to military servicemen, warning them against offering resistance to U.S. troops, was accompanied by threats to cabinet members who had personal computers. In the course of combat operations against Yugoslavia in 1999, the NATO forces attacked television and radio transmitters, disabling them. At the same time, in accordance with Washington's orders, the Internet network was preserved with the aim of feeding "appropriate" information to the country's population.¹⁹

In the mid-1990s, there were reports of Virus 666, which could produce a deeply harmful impact on the psycho-physiological condition of computer operators, including their complete incapacitation. The virus generates special imagery on the screen, which can put a person into a hypnotic trance. The background assumption is that the subconscious perception of such imagery will sharply alter the operation of the cardiovascular system, including the blockage

of blood vessels in the human brain. State and combat command and control personnel can therefore, be subjected to extremely dangerous impacts.²⁰

Genetic weapons

THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT of molecular genetics in the 1960s-70s laid the groundwork for a recombination of DNA, the main carrier of genetic information. It proved possible to use genetic engineering methods to separate and recombine genes, producing recombinant DNA molecules. These methods can also be used to disseminate genes with the help of microorganisms and produce potent toxins of human, animal or vegetable origin. By recombining different bacteriological and toxic agents, it is possible to create biological weapons with a genetically modified apparatus, featuring a high damage capability. Genetic material with strong toxicity can be introduced into virulent bacteria or human viruses, thus creating bacteriological weapons that can kill large numbers of people.

Scientists believe that by 2010-15, genetic engineering will make significant progress in the realm of molecular biology, which will make it possible, among other things to disclose the toxin action mechanism and start the production of toxins that could be effectively weaponized. This could bring about a fundamentally different strategic situation where the main goal of a “genetic” war will be to destroy not the enemy’s armed forces, but its population, which is declared “redundant.” Experts believe that this could drastically change the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the world, which will become similar to the onset of the atomic era of the 1940s-50s.²¹

Scientists believe that a new strategic feature in the evolution of the international security system, which will continue to strengthen in the future, is the gradual transition by the world community from traditional armed conflicts with the use of advanced arms and equipment to “genocidal” wars. Remarks about such wars have been made by official representatives of some countries. As far as the U.S. military-political leadership is concerned, taking into account the birth rates among various population groups and the imminent natural disasters (for example, New Orleans), priority is to be given to saving the white Anglo-Saxon population, although such plans are not publicized.

U.S. author Tom Hartmann cites a report entitled *Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*. The report addresses scenarios related to drastic changes in forms and methods of warfare in the future. The revolution of the military will produce a diversity of approaches toward warfare forms and methods in specific conflicts, ensuring the achievement of victory by non-traditional methods – an area where any potential adversary will inevitably lag behind the United States. Meanwhile, according to some reports, U.S. national laboratories at Oak Ridge and Livermore, as well as some others, have thoroughly studied the genetic consequences of the nuclear attacks

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, making a significant contribution to the development of the well-known international Human Genome Project, also advancing the Genomes to Life project. At the same time it should be noted that the development of modern science has already crossed a critical line affecting international security. This means that a small team of researchers could, in theory, create a "research product" that can cause huge damage to mankind. Herein lies the special danger involved in the creation and use of genetic weapons, including by international terrorist forces.²²

Ethnic weapons

STUDIES OF NATURAL AND GENETIC DIFFERENCES between people, the blood composition, and the biochemical structure of the organism of individuals from various ethnic groups have prompted some scientists to consider using these distinguishing features in developing the so-called ethnic weapons. According to some experts, such weapons, using special agents, will target some ethnic groups while sparing others. Such selectiveness will be based on differences between the blood groups, skin color and genetic structure of people. Research into ethnic weapons can be aimed at identifying the genetic vulnerability of certain ethnic groups and the development of special agents making an effective use of these features. This means, for example, that the use of some special biological agents with selective action against different DNA carriers in a city with a multiethnic population may not have any visible effect for a while. However, over time representatives of certain groups of the population will start to be affected. They may develop serious chronic disorders, experience a reduction in the life span, or lose the reproduction capability completely. This will eventually lead to the gradual disappearance of a particular ethnic group in an area that has been subjected to the impact of special biological agents.

In the estimation of Dr. R. Hammerschlag, ethnic weapons can destroy 25% to 30% of a country's population subjected to such an attack. It should be recalled that such losses in a nuclear war are considered to be "unacceptable," leading a country to defeat. At the same time it should be taken into account that the conduct of ethnic warfare requires a thorough analysis of the DNA of specific ethnic groups and the identification of fundamental differences between them.

According to some reports, some time ago a team of Israeli researchers considered the possibility of waging an ethnic war against the Palestinians. In the event of the project's success, they thus expected to rid Israel of its "troublesome" neighbors. However, they were disappointed with the results, which showed that the two ethnic groups in question have the same descendants as well as an identical genetic makeup. Therefore, by starting an ethnic war against the Palestinians, Israel would at the same time affect the Jewish population.

In assessing the present international situation, one cannot rule out that some terrorist groups possessing nanotechnology could secretly develop ethnic

weapons (for example, Aum Shinrikyo) and use them to achieve certain economic and political goals.

Beam weapons

THE MAIN damage factor of beam weapons is the directed beam of charged or neutral high energy electrons, protons and neutral atoms of hydrogen. A high-intensity flow of energy carried by particles can have an intensive thermal, shock or mechanical impact on a designated target, or generate x-rays. The use of beam weapons is marked by an instant effect and the element of surprise that they create. Impediments to the effective use of such weapons include atmospheric gas particles whose atoms interact with the accelerated particles, which gradually lose their energy. The use of beams of charged particles is also complicated by the fact that their movement among charged particles generates repulsion forces.

The most likely targets can be personnel, electronic equipment, various military hardware systems, ballistic and cruise missiles, warplanes, spacecraft, and so on. According to U.S. experts, the use of directed energy beams to effectively engage missiles will require an increase in acceleration, the duration of the impulse and mean power by a factor of one or two compared with the levels achieved so far, which poses serious impediments to the use of such weapons.

The work to develop beam weapons reached its maximum scope after President Ronald Reagan announced the SDI Program. The Los Alamos National Laboratory became the center of research in the field. Experiments at the time were conducted on the ATS accelerator and then on more powerful installations.

Specialists believe that such neutral particle accelerators could become an effective means of distinguishing enemy warheads in flight against amid a "cloud" of decoys. Research into beam weapons is also being conducted at the Livermore National Laboratory. Some scientists say that successful attempts have been made there to generate a flow of high energy electrons, hundreds of times more powerful than those generated by research accelerators. In the course of another related project, called Antigone, which was conducted at the same laboratory, it was experimentally established that a beam of electrons almost ideally, without scattering, moves along an ionized channel created by a laser beam in the atmosphere, which makes it possible to significantly increase the damage effect of this type of weapons. Beam weapon systems have large weight characteristics and dimensions so they can be created either as fixed site installations or mounted on heavy lift mobile facilities. This imposes certain limitations on their combat use.²³

De-orbiting asteroids

THE EXTENT TO WHICH the search for new types of WMD can go is evident from a project conducted by a group of US scientists in the 1960s, working on a

veritably fantastic scenario involving the de-orbiting of the asteroids moving between Earth and Mars. It was assumed that an asteroid could be de-orbited with nuclear explosions in a special chamber set up on an asteroid's surface. An explosion will give an asteroid a powerful boost, transferring it to an orbit crossing the earth's path. Modeling could be used to simulate an asteroid's fall on enemy territory. An asteroid's collision with the Earth would produce energy equivalent to the explosion of many thousands of nuclear bombs, capable of wiping out an entire mainland.

Needless to say, the practical use of such a weapon system is unlikely, and it is therefore of purely theoretical interest, demonstrating the possible bounds in the search for new weapons, as well as the possible consequences of the Earth's collision with a celestial body. In the past several decades, scientists have given considerable attention to the possibility of a meteorite colliding with the Earth. Should such a threat be detected – which is extremely unlikely, although its cost is unacceptably high for human civilization – the reverse task will have to be addressed: using nuclear explosions on an asteroid's surface to prevent its collision with the Earth, even though the success of such an operation is rather dubious. Nevertheless, so far no one has proposed a more effective method of dealing with this threat.²⁴

Antimatter weapons

NUCLEAR PHYSICS RESEARCH conducted in the first half of the 20th century demonstrated the theoretical possibility of the existence of antimatter. Subsequently the existence of antiparticles (for example, positrons) was proved experimentally. It turned out that interaction between particles and antiparticles releases a significant amount of energy in the form of photons. Scientists estimated that interaction of 1 mg of antiparticles with matter generates energy equivalent to an explosion of dozens of tons of TNT. This makes the creation of an antimatter weapon system featuring a huge destructive power quite an attractive proposition. However, despite the great efforts made by researchers, nature thoroughly protects its secrets, which stand in the way of this fundamentally new type of weapons. One of the principal impediments today is the acquisition and preservation of antiparticles. It is known that attempts are being made at the European Center for Nuclear Research to preserve antiparticles under a very low temperature in vessels with liquid helium. These difficulties make the creation of antimatter weapons as a type of WMD in the foreseeable future rather an unlikely scenario.

Psychotronic weapons

THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE INTEREST recently in bioenergy research, linked to the so-called paranormal human abilities. Work is in progress

in a number of countries on developing a variety of technical devices based on bio-field energy – i.e., energy generated by a special field that exists around a living organism. Research into the possibility of developing such weapons is proceeding along several lines: extrasensory perception – i.e., perception of objects, their state, sounds, smells and human thoughts without contact with them and without using the conventional sensory organs, outside of normal sensory capability; telepathy – communication between minds by some means other than sensory perception; clairvoyance – the paranormal power of seeing objects or actions beyond the range of natural vision; psychokinesis – the ability to move inanimate objects by mental power; and telekinesis – the ability to move your mind while your body remains motionless. Scientists single out four basic lines of applied military research into the bio-energy field:

1. Development of methods to make targeted impacts on humans' psychic activity with the aim of creating "a new era army."

2. In-depth study of paranormal phenomena, which are the most interesting in terms of their potential military application – clairvoyance and telekinesis. Experiments have been conducted into the human ability to observe objects beyond the range of natural vision. This phenomenon has a very broad scope of possible application: on the strategic level, access to the enemy's main military command and control agencies to study its plans.

The use of psychokinesis to disrupt the enemy's military command and control systems. Human ability to irradiate a certain type of energy has been confirmed by a photo of man's radiation field (the Kirlian effect).

3. The study of the impact of bio-energy on command and control and communication systems, and electronic equipment, as well as the development of artificial energy generators to impact on enemy personnel and noncombatants with the aim of inducing an abnormal psychic state. Some research along these lines was conducted with the aim of identifying the extent to which paranormal abilities can jam computers, among other things.

4. Development of systems to detect and monitor artificial and natural hazardous radiation, as well as methods of action and passive protection against it. Work is under way to develop technical devices to detect bioenergy radiation and study bioenergy interaction between people. According to some Western media reports, psychotronic weapons²⁵ already exist although their potentialities have yet to be determined, while many scientists have serious doubts about the effectiveness of such weapons.²⁶

Even a brief overview of prospects and possible implications of the appearance of new types of WMD shows that they pose a great danger to the world community. It is therefore, necessary to closely watch the work that is conducted in this area (especially in the field of dual-use technology) so as to take timely preventive action, for example, via the UN, to avert the emergence of a new threat. The world's leading countries should come up with comprehensive international initiatives to put in place an effective mechanism, based in interna-

tional law, to effectively block the creation of new types of WMD.

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Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

S. Nikolaev

COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL ASIA are exposed to a number of conflict-provoking threats: terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime. Turning to the UN for good services in this context looks logical since the UN has many tools to react to such threats and experience in settling the most diverse conflicts.

This led to the establishment in Ashgabat of the new international agency – the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA).

As early as November 2004, Turkmenistan proposed the creation of UNRCCA. The initiative was backed by Kazakhstan. Next there followed a series of consultations between representatives of all five Central Asian states who gave this idea their unanimous approval and agreed to headquarter the Center in the capital of Turkmenistan.

On May 7, 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon informed the chairman of the UN Security Council Zalmay Khalilzad that, in line with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change pertaining to the need to boost the UN potential for the prevention of conflicts, he intended to establish UNRCCA in Ashgabat.

The Center was inaugurated on Dec.10, 2007 and attended by Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister A.I. Denisov.

UNRCCA is headed by UN Secretary General's Special Representative Miroslav Jenca, Slovakia, whose deputy is F. Klimchuk, Russia. The Special Representative in Central Asia is granted wide-ranging powers of a political coordinator of all UN agencies in the region.

The term "preventive diplomacy" came into wide use among politicians after the publication in 1992 of the report written by then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." Increased attention was given – within the framework of conflict-prevention, reacting to crises and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts – to questions of international cooperation in the implementation of

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preventive diplomacy making it possible not only to react immediately to situations of crises but also nip them in the bud.

The UNRCCA mandate (UN documents S/2007/279 and S/2007/280) says that its objective is to assist the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in boosting the potential of peaceful resolution of disputes and prevention of conflicts through dialogue and international assistance in the implementation of appropriate projects.

Drafting the mandate, UN experts had carefully analyzed the various aspects of the current situation in Central Asia. As a result they summed up their findings as follows.

There are few regions in the world where countries are so much dependent on one another as in Central Asia. Despite the presence of old and new security threats the Central Asian nations have managed to avoid open conflicts between them, which shows that there is a political will in the region to engage in dialogue and prevent conflicts. At the same time there are threats and challenges calling for joint reaction and cooperation in the interests of stability in the region. This is why UNRCCA's attention should be focused on identifying existing and potential threats, expanding cooperation in opposing them between the five states of Central Asia and the regional and international organizations active there.

Their analysis of the situation and subsequent consultations with the governments of the Central Asian countries helped to define three groups of UNRCCA's priorities.

Group one includes transborder threats – terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. It was at the same time noted that stability in the states of Central Asia is vulnerable to threats of armed attacks by terrorists and extremists largely provoked by instability in a vaster region, transborder drug trafficking, gun running and organized gangs of criminals.

They also singled out the other important thing – Central Asia is geographically situated between the drug producing center (Afghanistan) and the main regions where they are sold (Europe, Russia, and China). Drug trafficking is the key source of income for organized groups of criminals, money launderers, terrorists and extremists. The transit of drugs across Central Asia has also caused their increased use in the region and growing corruption.

This pointed to the need for regional broader cooperation to protect the borders and establish effective border control vital for stability and development in Central Asia. This cooperation makes it possible to erect barriers to outside threats and create normal conditions for trade and economic cooperation considering the fact that most states in Central Asia are landlocked and have limited access to the world market.

Group two includes problems related to the worsening environmental situation and the shared use of the region's water and energy resources.

The worsening environmental situation in Central Asia results from the

unsatisfactory management of water resources and the recycling of various types of waste, including toxic and biological waste, the impacts of radiation and uranium pollution. The inefficient agricultural methods stressing the growing of monocultures (especially in the past) caused desertification and proved harmful to health through the excessive use of pesticides.

The rapid development of extractive industries is boosting the economy and at the same time destroying the region's biological diversity. The tragedy of the Aral Sea is causing climatic changes far outside it.

The problems of water use are also fraught with conflict. Considering the presence in Central Asia of transborder rivers, lakes and seas, it is especially important to approach the distribution, use and protection of the quality of water resources on the regional basis. The rebuilding of Afghanistan will call for even a greater amount of water for agricultural use and pose more problems to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan situated in the lower reaches.

The decentralization and collapse of the Soviet system has seriously hampered the distribution of energy and water resources in the region. A number of bilateral and multilateral accords in this sphere are fragmentary and are not always acted upon.

This calls for a strong regional regime for the management and procuring of water resources to meet the interests of all states in Central Asia and for the creation of an integrated system to regulate water use between the upper and lower watercourses, including in Central Asian states and Afghanistan. The region should develop its extractive industries in a manner which is safe for the environment and people.

Group three includes the ramifications of the unstable situation in Afghanistan.

The continuing instability in Afghanistan is a serious source of threats to security in Central Asia.

The worst threats are terrorism, extremism, organized crime, drug trafficking and gun running.

At the same time, stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan and rebuilding it may create new avenues of cooperation in the region in areas including natural gas, hydropower, the building of roads and pipelines, equipment, transfer of technology, technical assistance, and the introduction of modern agricultural methods.

International efforts to stabilize and develop Afghanistan should meet with all-out support to prevent the Afghan conflict from spilling over into Central Asia. At the same time it is necessary to make use in Afghanistan of the experience gained during the peacekeeping efforts in the region and in particular in Tajikistan in the area of border control, prevention of drug trafficking and talks on these problems.

The analysis of the situation and the identification of the main groups of threats in the region give a sense of what is happening in the region and form,

what can be called, a theoretical foundation for future activities of UNRCCA.

The first six months after the inauguration of the Center were used for setting up housekeeping before moving in.

The Center opened for business after the head of UNRCCA, Miroslav Jenca, and several of his staff arrived in Ashgabat in June 2008.

The special representative of the UN Secretary General held a series of consultations with the leaders of the Central Asian states. He was received by the presidents of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, talked with the foreign ministers of all five Central Asian republics. He also established contacts with senior officials of the regional and international agencies based in Central Asia – the European Union, OSCE, NATO, SCO, CIS, CSTO, and EurAsEC. The UNRCCA head discussed the situation in the region with representatives accredited there to UN institutions, agencies and programs, met with the leaders of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). All these contacts aimed at finding out about current threats in Central Asia to peace, security and development and existing mechanisms and real possibilities to oppose them, including through preventive diplomacy.

The first serious test for UNRCCA was the meeting in Ashgabat, on Oct, 23, 2008, of deputy foreign ministers of Central Asian countries. On its agenda were three sets of questions: the combating of terrorism and drug trafficking, the situation in Afghanistan; rational use of water resources.

The meeting focused on the water use issues whose mere presence, according to UN experts, aggravates relations between states in the region.

The problems consist in differences between the exporters of water (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and importers (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), or countries in the upper and lower reaches of the transborder rivers.

According to UNRCCA, focusing on these problems is likely to help reaching an agreement on the use of water and energy resources in the 2008-2009 agricultural season (the so-called winter and vegetation periods) between the leaders of the Central Asian states attending the CIS summit in Bishkek on Oct.10, 2008, where Miroslav Jenca was invited*. This is why UN officials offered to the high-ranking Central Asian diplomats gathered in Ashgabat their assistance in further expansion of the political dialogue for finding mutually acceptable solutions to the entire range of problems in the sphere of water use. UNRCCA voiced readiness to draft a framework document that could serve as the starting point for solving these problems on the basis of UN conventions on the use of transborder watercourses of March 17 and May 21, 1997.

The Ashgabat meeting also discussed the Center's draft program of actions in 2009-2011. The program listed in sufficient detail both top-priority

*In elaboration of the Bishkek understandings, the vice premiers of the five Central Asian countries signed in Almaty on Oct. 18, 2008 the intergovernmental protocol on the use of water and energy resources of Central Asia in the fourth quarter of 2008 and in 2009.

tasks before UNRCCA and forms, methods and means for their implementation with due regard of the UN potential and the region's specific nature.

The program sets the following main objectives:

- to strengthen preventive activities and preventive potentials of the countries in Central Asia and recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of numerous threats, including international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, organized crime and the deterioration of the environmental situation;
- to promote, accelerate and coordinate the operation of regional and international organizations in harmonizing their efforts aimed at preventing conflicts in Central Asia and spearhead the UN's prevention activities in the region;
- to monitor and analyze the situation in Central Asia with a view to giving early warning of risks and threats.

Without going into details of all the program provisions, it would be appropriate to mention the duties of the UN special representative. He is supposed, in particular, to keep in touch with the Central Asian governments and, with their consent (this point should be stressed), with other interested parties on questions of preventive diplomacy. In this connection, the special representative will:

- pay regular visits to the capitals of the region and the representative offices of regional organizations for consultations with a view to identify situations that can generate conflicts and to assist in making appropriate political decisions;
- carry out good services missions on behalf of the UN Secretary General in the region;
- consult the Central Asian governments on conflict prevention measures and coordinate national strategies on integrated border control, distribution of water and power and combating all forms of illegal traffic;
- alert the governments and political leaders to the potential danger of conflicts and the advantages of their early prevention;
- create various consultative groups, including a forum of deputy foreign ministers of the region's countries (to be held twice a year), arrange regular meetings of ambassadors of the Central Asian states, and assist in the founding a "Friends of Central Asia" special group made up of "interested international and regional figures."

The program significantly contains a science and education component. For example, the tasks facing UNRCCA include the organization on the permanent basis of training sessions and seminars involving policymakers and experts in preventive diplomacy; the keeping in touch with diplomatic academies, institutes of strategic studies and international relations both inside and outside the region; the creation of new opportunities for young people in Central Asia to learn the fundamentals of conflict prevention diplomacy; the building of contacts between the region's brain trusts with a view to improve the situation analysis skills and develop mechanisms of cooperation. This form of UNRCCA activities

seems very promising.

On Dec. 10, 2008, Miroslav Jenca addressed a consultative meeting of the UN Security Council to report progress achieved by his Center over the six months, since last June.

He stressed that the Center focused on coordinating regional and multi-lateral efforts to effectively solve Central Asia's problems primarily in the sphere of security.

The special representative said the unstable situation in Afghanistan continued to aggravate the situation in the region. This increases the importance of greater cooperation in averting the menace of terrorists and drug traffickers based in Afghanistan.

He also mentioned that UNRCCA contributed to promoting dialogue inside the region to settle the energy and water problems in Central Asia which hamper "food security" and greater cooperation in a number of other fields.

Miroslav Jenca said the deputy foreign ministers meeting in Ashgabat endorsed on the whole the Program for 2009-2011 and stated their readiness for close cooperation with UNRCCA to implement it.

He stressed that the initial results of UNRCCA's efforts indicate that this new agency has proven a useful mechanism for timely reactions to situations of conflict at the stage where full-blown conflicts can be prevented.

At the end of the meeting, the Security Council chairman made a statement for the press welcoming the efforts being made by UNRCCA in cooperation with the governments of Central Asian states and their regional organizations to resolve its problems through preventive diplomacy.

As a strategically important area with considerable human resources, vast deposits of oil and minerals, fairly developed industrial and transport infrastructure, Central Asia continues to grow in importance in world politics and economy.

There is a growing interest in what is happening there. The UN lays a stronger emphasis on the problems of Central Asia which is justified in this context. It is also natural for the UN to pay special attention to security and stability in the region. Considering the fact that the United Nations already has sufficient experience in preventive diplomacy, there are grounds to believe this experience will prove useful in Central Asia.

The principal goals of UNRCCA, including those found in the Program of Action in 2009-2011, are largely the same as those of Russia. Of the greatest importance is the need to increase the potential of Central Asian states in thwarting the new challenges and threats to regional security, terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime. Russia also has similar assessments of Afghanistan's destabilizing impact on the situation in Central Asia.

We should add that Russia has valuable achievements in each of UNRCCA's three top-priority areas. This is only logical because the situation in Central Asia has constantly been in the focus of Russian diplomats.

Central Asia, situated along the southern border of Russia, is of special importance. We have relations of strategic partnership and alliance with its countries, and we cannot help being concerned at their problems in the sensitive area of security. More, we regard them as our common problems which ought to be resolved in close cooperation.

There is active cooperation in this area between the military and law enforcement agencies of Russia and Central Asian states and between their anti-narcotics and special services.

Appropriate work is in progress with support from the multilateral agencies – CIS, CSTO and SCO.

Measures are being taken to improve the operation of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center. Its regional operations team based in Bishkek collects and systemizes data on various terrorist and extremist organizations and groups active in Central Asia.

IDKB's antiterrorism potential is being strengthened. This is served by augmenting the operational capability of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of Central Asia. "Canal" is an anti-drugs operation launched in 2003. Plans call for conducting it on a permanent basis from an intergovernmental headquarters.

There is the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which coordinates cooperation between the relevant agencies of its member countries and their war on terrorism, separatism and extremism. There are plans to hold, under the auspices of SCO, a special conference on Afghanistan to discuss campaigns against terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. Work is in progress to develop an antinarcotics strategy of SCO to lend a systemic nature to regional cooperation in thwarting the growing stream of drugs from Afghanistan.

CSTO and SCO are gradually becoming the key supplementing agencies in meeting the challenges and threats to security of Central Asia.

International cooperation to combat drugs in Central Asia is widening. Russia is its active participant. Back in the 1990s, it put forward a plan for "anti-drug security belts" around Afghanistan with a view to pool efforts against the drugs threat from Afghanistan. Addressing in August 2007 the SCO in Bishkek, the RF President proposed to supplement them with the belts of financial security to undermine the economic foundations of drug trafficking.

From the Russian viewpoint, we can say the following with regard to Central Asia's water and energy problems that UNRCCA intends to help resolve.

Without belittling the importance of the other areas of Russia's cooperation with countries in Central Asia, we should single out energy. Its role is constantly growing. It is becoming the locomotive of our cooperation. This is the key to multilateral cooperation with Central Asian countries; it is a touchstone of the promising integration plans and specific large-scale projects.

Work is going on to implement the agreement signed on Dec. 20, 2007

in Moscow between the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on cooperation on the Caspian gas pipeline project. When in operation, it will undoubtedly expand ties in the field of energy and strengthen energy security of Russia and Central Asia countries.

Most certainly, Russia is fully aware of all the problems pertaining to water use in Central Asia, which were successfully resolved from a single center in the USSR. Russia thus has a substantial body of experience, the necessary documents and experts in the field. This potential is already being put to use to resolve the region's water management problems. Appropriate efforts are being taken on a bilateral basis and within the scope of EurAsEC.

As for possible forms of cooperation on water use with other states and international organizations, this question can be examined if we get specific proposals from our partners in the region and outside it. The most important thing is that one should work on the Central Asia's water management dossier with extreme caution owing to its extreme complexity.

At the moment, UNRCCA is in a formative stage and is looking for its niche in Central Asian affairs. Much will depend during this difficult period on the way the Center builds its relations with the other international and regional agencies operating in Central Asia so as not to parallel them but to harmoniously augment them. From Russia's viewpoint, UNRCCA would profit from broader ties with organizations like CIS, CSTO, SCO and EurAsEC. They seem to have adapted to a great extent to the region's realities and thus they contribute in a big way to solving the problems existing there. Another important point is that UNRCCA's activities should be brought into line with the vital needs of the countries of Central Asia. The Center's prime task seems to help the region to shaping a new culture of relations between states based on the balance of interests and their mutual concerns. This will create in Central Asia a political climate conducive to a civilized resolution of existing problems and progress toward shared goals. The latter consist in ensuring a steady social and economic development of the region in conditions of security and stability.

The Special Representative has by now established and maintains working contacts with specialized departments of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russian ambassadors in the Central Asian states and the Russian ambassador to the UN. In November 2008, Miroslav Jenca was received by Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia G.B. Karasin. The two men discussed in substantial detail the overall situation in Central Asia, the challenges and threats to regional security and further cooperation of the new UN agency with the Russian Foreign Ministry and its representatives in other countries.

Combating terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime is no longer the sole responsibility of separate regions, including Central Asia. It calls for joint efforts of a broad-based international coalition. Russia believes that the UN should take the lead in these efforts.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation says in part:

“The United Nations, an organization for which there is no real alternative and which has a unique legitimacy, should continue to serve as a clearing house for the coordination of international relations and world politics in the 21st century.”

Russia regards as natural, in this connection, wider cooperation in Central Asia with the UN and its agencies. This fully applies to UNRCCA. Besides we already have a positive experience of cooperating in Central Asia with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and its regional office in Tashkent.

Law and Force

B. Tuzmukhamedov

THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS that was started by the current Georgian leadership in August 2008 is a textbook example of an unlawful use of military force by one party and the lawful use of force by another.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a definition of aggression: Although the document is not legally binding, it has a great political weight. In accordance with this definition, “an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State” constitutes an act of aggression.¹ Only the UN Security Council may decide on whether a particular act falls under the definition of aggression, but the sheer use of force first entails the right to use force in response. Indeed, one of the targets of a premeditated attack by Georgian troops was a Russian unit as part of the Joint Peacekeeping Force. The Russian battalion in South Ossetia was under Russian command, in contrast to the coalition force deployed on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution to conduct peacekeeping operations as part of national contingents, placed under the UN’s operational command. As a matter of fact, the attack was made against a Russian state power agency that was outside the Russian Federation on legal grounds, which aroused legitimate counteraction on the part of the latter.

The events in the Caucasus have aggravated the problem of establishing the limits on the legitimate use of force in international relations that are often tested to breaking point, which calls into question their viability and applicability in practice.

The Letter of the Law

THE UN CHARTER REGARDS the prohibition of the threat or use of force as

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The author is grateful to Ambassador O. N. Khlestov, Professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, discussions with whom helped formulate some of the ideas put forward in this article. Some of the conclusions were published previously: see, for example, Tuzmukhamedov B. R. “Uprezhdaishchee primeneniye sily: vozmozhnye kriterii dopustimosti.” *Rossiiskii ezhegodnik mezhdunarodnogo prava* - 2005. SPb, 2006, pp. 36-55.

one of its fundamental principles. Article 2 (Para 4) reads: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The letter of the UN Charter identifies two situations for the legitimate use of military force: collective action to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 42) and the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations (Article 51).

The first situation calls for sanction by the UN Security Council, which acts on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, while in the second, a Member State or States exercising the right to self-defense are to inform the Security Council without delay about the measures that are taken. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, also utilize regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

The armed struggle carried on by national-liberation movements representing nations and nationalities seeking independence – i.e., the application of the right to self-determination, in particular the establishment of an independent state – constitutes a separate case of the lawful use of force. This was the fundamental premise underlying the domestic doctrine of international law for a long time. Furthermore, it regarded such a use of force as a method used by a national liberation movement in exercising its right to self-defense. “Colonial occupation, regardless of when it took place, is an act of aggression with regard to the state or the people whose territory has been occupied. Therefore, the states and peoples so affected have a right at any time to use any means, including military force, to resist the aggressor. Such actions are a legitimate act of national self-defense.”² Today, however, not even every textbook in international law makes a reference to this form of the legitimate use of force.

A variation of the use of force by a national-liberation movement, which was also recognized by this country, is the armed struggle waged by a movement that has transformed into a lawful and full-fledged government for restoring its jurisdiction over territories controlled by forces opposed to the central government and claiming full independence. Amid the historical and political conditions of the evolution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet doctrine of international law only upheld the PRC’s right to restore its jurisdiction over Taiwan through the use of force, while referring to the actions of external forces in support of the Kuomintang members holed up on the island as “acts of aggression.”³

Finally, it has generally been forgotten that the UN Charter allows the use of force also against “enemy states” – i.e., those responsible for starting World War II [“any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter”]. Such measures may be taken on behalf of the UN (Article 106) or under regional arrangements or by regional agencies

without the authorization of the Security Council (Article 53/1), and finally, by states that were allies in resisting aggressors (Article 107). Needless to say, states that were referred to as “enemy states” at the time the UN Charter was being drafted have long occupied a respectable place in the international community. However, not all the formalities needed to completely exclude the concept of “enemy state” from international law have been fulfilled yet.

Reading between the Lines

DOES THE LETTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW answer all questions?

For example, do the provisions of the UN Charter allowing for the use of force enshrine in law a State’s inherent right or do they make an exception from the prohibition on the use of force (stipulated by the same Charter as a fundamental principle of international law)? There are followers of either approach among Russian experts. The view that the use of military force in the two cases mentioned in the UN Charter is only an exception from the prohibition on the use of force has been upheld by such prominent Russian experts in international law as V. K. Sobakin, N. A. Ushakov, and V. N. Fedorov.⁴ The opposite view has been presented by their no less respectable colleagues – D. B. Levin, E. I. Skakunov, and G. I. Tunkin.⁵

Furthermore, according to one school of thought on modern international law – which is as extravagant as it is unsubstantiated – international law completely lacks any formal prohibition on the use of force *per se*.⁶ Based mainly on the premise that the UN Charter literally demands that States “refrain” from the use of force, it is utterly untenable in so far as it is built on the misperception of the general understanding and application of this provision of the Charter (including in the generally recognized acts of international law and rulings by the UN International Court of Justice).

The part of the Charter that speaks about “refraining from the use of force” establishes prohibitions and their bounds, while the provisions defining the parameters of self-defense have the status of permission. The right to self-defense had been formulated long before the UN Charter was adopted. It codified this right and thus limited it, while within certain limits it continued to exist in its conventional law form – a realm into which the Charter did not intrude. Thus, Article 51 stipulates that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” In this context, one could refer to Emer de Vattel, an expert on international law, who back in 1758 wrote that it is easier to avert evil whenever possible; a nation has a right to repel the evil that a certain force wants to visit upon it, and it may use all indigenous means against the force that is acting against it, and even act ahead of it, refraining, however, from making an attack purely on the basis of some vague and unconfirmed suspicions lest it cast itself as an aggressor.⁷

As for the proscription of the threat or use of force, it should be recalled

that Article 2/4 of the UN Charter establishes it with regard to action aimed against three elements: first, against the territorial integrity of any state; second, the political independence of any state, and third, action that is in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

It is noteworthy that the term “territorial integrity” in the English version of the Charter (as well as in the French and Spanish versions) is rendered in the Russian version as “territorial’naia neprikosnovennost” (“territorial inviolability”) although it would probably be more appropriate to say in Russian: “territorial’naia tselostnost” (“territorial integrity”). That was not accidental, however. The initiative to include into the UN Charter a reference to “territorial integrity” was put forward at the UN conference in San Francisco by the Australian delegation. The head of the Soviet delegation, A. A. Gromyko, informed the central authorities that the “group of five” – the future permanent members of the Security Council had endorsed the Australian move to include in the draft Charter a special obligation on the non-use of force against “*territorial integrity* (italics mine. – *B. T.*) and the political independence” of the Member States.⁸ Later, however, during the harmonization and finalization of the texts, the term “tselostnost” [integrity] in the Russian version was replaced by the word “neprikosnovesnost” [inviolability].

The use of Russian equivalents of the English term “territorial integrity” in UN documents and international treaties following the adoption of the UN Charter has not been consistent enough. Thus, the Russian term “territorial’naia tselostnost” [“territorial integrity”] was used in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514/ XV), the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN General Assembly Resolution 3314/XXIX), and the United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted in 2000 (UN General Assembly Resolution 55/ 2). Meanwhile, the term “territorial’naia neprikosnovesnost” [“territorial inviolability”] was used as an equivalent for the English term “territorial integrity” in the 1970 Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (UN General Assembly Resolution 2734/XXV), the 1974 definition of aggression (UN General Assembly Resolution 3314/ XXIX), and the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations (UN General Assembly Resolution 42/22). “Territorial’naia tselostnost” [“territorial integrity”] is used in the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, while the term “territorial’naia neprikosnovesnost” [“territorial inviolability”] is used in the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. In the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the term “territorial’naia neprikosnovesnost” [“territorial inviolability”]

ty”] is used, while in the 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the term “territorial’naia tselostnost” [“territorial integrity”] is used. Finally, in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the term “territorial integrity” in the Preamble is rendered into Russian by the term “territorial’naia neprikosnovesnnost” [“territorial inviolability”], while in Article 8 (Para 3), by the term “territorial’naia tselostnost” [“territorial integrity”].

The concepts of “neprikosnovesnnost” [“inviolability”] and “tselostnost” [“integrity”] are not exactly equivalent: They reflect the distinguishing features of the two different phenomena that they describe. The prohibition of encroachment on the former assumes the inadmissibility of capture, seizure or partitioning of territory, while the prohibition of encroachment on the latter implies the categorical inviolability of territory that belongs to another state. Originally, the architects of the UN Charter sought to prohibit any encroachment on territorial integrity.

There is yet another consideration linked to the limits of the prohibition in Article 2 (para 4) of the UN Charter. Some experts believe that regardless of the exemptions stipulated in provisions of Article 51, this particular provision does not contain an absolute prohibition on the use of force: The threat or use of force is prohibited with regard to the aforementioned three elements and therefore, outside of this prohibition “the possibility of the use of force, in accordance with the Charter, is recognized.”⁹ Furthermore, situations may not entirely be ruled out that would demand a timely use of force to uphold them [these elements] and thus to avoid the use of force at a later stage and with totally disastrous consequences.¹⁰

Thus, as a follow-up to our earlier considerations about the essential difference between the concepts of “integrity” and “inviolability,” the following assumptions could be made. Some forms of the use of force (for example, with the aim of neutralizing the leaders of a large terrorist group who have found refuge in a state that is not in a position to deal with them on its own) will without any doubt violate a state’s territorial integrity. However, the use of force in a precise – “surgical” – way will not constitute an infringement on the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.

The Truth of Life

ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE needs adapting to real life conditions, while the application of theory in practice often raises questions and doubts.

As mentioned earlier, the armed attack on South Ossetia is a textbook case of an unlawful use of force. However, international practice abounds in examples of the resort to force not only in an unlawful armed attack or for legitimate self-defense, but also for other purposes. Furthermore, the threat or the use of force is increasingly practiced by the most powerful of nations.

In June 2008, Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to use troops against the Taliban militants (who were taking shelter in border areas in Pakistan and carrying out raids into the neighboring country). H. Karzai's remarks instantly produced an angry reaction from Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani. He said that no one will be permitted to intrude into his country's territory or interfere in its internal affairs. True, the United States, both with and without the knowledge of the local authorities, keeps conducting air and ground operations in Pakistan against purported Taliban and al Qaeda targets, sometimes operating from the territory of neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan today lacks the will and clout to influence the actions of its senior partner in the area, especially in "tribal areas," over which Karachi had little or no control even in the past.

These examples are not at all isolated instances of the threat or use of force by states outside their territory in a situation where they have not been subjected to an armed attack by another state. In 2008, Turkish troops intruded into Iraq under the pretext of neutralizing the threat posed by Kurdish separatists; Colombian armed forces carried out an operation to eliminate FARC leaders who had taken refuge in Ecuador; the United States delivered missile strikes on supposed "terrorist" targets in Somalia, while Israel continued its long-running practice of the "surgical" elimination of militants from opposing Arab groups. Such actions do not fit into the established principles of the legitimate use of force, as interpreted in accordance with the letter of the UN Charter. States taking such action often invoke the right to self-defense, as, for example, did Colombia in justification of its intrusion in a neighboring country. True, in that case, a regional association – the Organization of American States – came to the conclusion that Colombia had violated Ecuador's sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹¹

Since the right to self-defense does not provide a watertight justification for the use of force, other grounds are sought. For example, the use of force is said to be directed not against a state or its territorial integrity, but against a terrorist or other threat posed by a "non-governmental entity." The background to this could be the inability of ruling authorities or their reluctance to control the situation in a country where hostile "non-state" groups have established a base for attacks. Needless to say, Turkey would hardly have moved into Iraq before the military occupation regime, enforced there by the U.S.-British coalition, was lifted; moreover, it is probably not the Colombian intelligence service alone that should claim credit for the almost perfect operation carried out in the neighboring jungle.

In theory, justification for such use of force by states against non-state entities on foreign soil could be found in UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001), which was adopted the day after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It should be recalled that the preamble to the document acknowledged the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. In a related provision, the Council called on all States to work together urgently to "bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of those

terrorist attacks” and also called on the international community to redouble its efforts “to prevent and suppress terrorist acts.”

We will venture to suggest that this resolution, which did not even give the United States sanction to use force but expressed some implicit consent, was perceived as *carte blanche* for the start of the coalition operation in Afghanistan with the aim of searching for and punishing (eliminating) the purported “organizers and sponsors.” Such wording led many experts to suggest that states acquire the right to self-defense in response to unlawful actions by criminal non-state groups.

Is that really so? The resolution, which strongly condemned the attack, only referred to the inherent right to self-defense in the preamble, but did not state directly and unambiguously that such a right occurs in response to terrorist acts.

Is it expedient to declare some non-governmental group, for example, some criminal organization, as “a subject of armed attack” and therefore, as “an object of the application of the right to self-defense”? Does this not thus enhance the status of such a group (organization) to a level on a par with a State, and is this legitimate in the first place? Let us analyze the content of the counter-terrorist resolutions of the UN Security Council in conjunction with the jurisdiction of the UN International Court of Justice, primarily in findings on the Republic of Nicaragua vs. the United States of America (1986), the Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Uganda (2005), and Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro cases.

Analysis shows that the right the right to self-defense in response to an armed attack carried out by a non-state entity arises in the event that it acts, as a minimum, with the knowledge and connivance and as the maximum under the control of a certain State. If there is no conclusive evidence of a link between a non-governmental entity and a foreign State, would it not be better to leave relations between that State and non-governmental entity (if its only goal and *raison d’être* is terrorist and other unlawful activities) in the realm of criminal law and not to tie one’s hands with the constraints imposed by international law? It would not be inappropriate in this context to recall that in its advisory opinion on the “separation wall” built by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, the International Court of Justice, finding no legal grounds for the building of the wall, noted in passing – quite rightly so – that the right to self-defense only evolves and is applied in relations between States.

It is another matter if the UN Security Council issues to States a specific, unambiguous mandate, with a clearly defined time frame, to fight against criminal groups. This was the case when the world’s main body responsible for international peace and security sanctioned the use of military force against pirates running rampant in the territorial sea and in the high seas off the coast of Somali, whose authorities are unable to bring the situation under control.¹²

These and other facts necessitate a search for ways of adapting the fun-

damental principles of law to international reality, while at the same time avoiding their drastic revision. In each of these principles, States sought to follow specific legal norms, while Russia was only involved in making the decision to use force in Somali waters, and its legal argumentation was by far the most convincing.

It should be noted in this context that Russia has developed a sufficiently flexible approach toward self-defense, as reflected, in particular, in documents presenting its position at UN General Assembly sessions. Russia acts on the premise that the parameters of self-defense are clearly laid out in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which is in conformity with reality and does not need any reviewing. A State acquires the right to self-defense following an armed attack against it, while to apply this right, the State need not in principle wait for the negative consequences of such an attack to occur. What is of key importance here is to establish the exact time of an attack, when the right to self-defense may be legally applied.¹³

As a follow-up to this position, the following scenarios for the application of the right to self-defense as defined in Article 51 could be proposed: the “statutory” [Charter mandated] use of force, in exercise of the individual or collective right to self-defense in response to an armed attack that has caused damage. If, however, the start of an attack is defined as the final materialization of a source of threat, impact on it can be *preemptive* – that is to say, it can precede the onset of an active phase of attack; *interdictory*, when a threat has become obvious and imminent; and *reactive*, with the aim of minimizing the consequences of an attack. In the case of the statutory, interdictory and reactive use of force in exercise of the right to self-defense it is not possible to obtain a Security Council sanction, nor is this necessary.

Nevertheless, the UN Charter makes it binding on a State applying this right to notify the Council without delay about the measures that have been taken. Preemptive self-defense can be preceded by a call from the State that is about to become the target of an armed attack for an emergency meeting of the Security Council with a view to approving collective measures or receiving individual sanction for the use of force, after which the State will in any event have to fulfill its obligation to inform the Council about the action it has taken to counter the armed attack.

As for the situations covered under the provisions of Article 42 of the UN Charter, the following scenarios for the legitimate use of force could be singled out here:

- preemptive or preventive impact on potential or anticipated sources of threat to international peace and security, not necessarily including armed violence, but limited to a demonstration of readiness to use it;
- deterrence action – impact on existing sources of threat of armed attack, which, however, is not obvious or imminent. These measures are admissible only as collective action with UN Security Council sanction.

Preventive Use of Force

THE DISCUSSION about the possibility of force being used in the absence of an armed attack with the aim to prevent it has intensified considerably in the past few years. This discussion is nothing new: Suffice it to remember Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot), an international law classic, who back in 1646 wrote that the prime cause of a just war is the threat of damage being caused to persons, their body or their property; however, he made the use of force contingent on “a direct threat.”¹⁴

An important stage in the evolution of international-law concepts on such a use of force was the 1837 Caroline Affair. A group of Canadian rebels had been forced to flee to the United States after leading the failed rebellion in Upper Canada (now Ontario). American sympathizers supplied them with money, provisions, and arms via the steamboat SS Caroline. British forces seized the Caroline, towed her into the current, set her afire, and cast her adrift over Niagara Falls. The tensions were ultimately settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. This incident has been used to establish the principle of “anticipatory self-defense” in international politics, which holds that it may be justified only in cases in which the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”.

The official Russian position does not rule out completely such a use of military instruments of power. In an interview with Italian media on November 3, 2003, V. V. Putin said that “if the principle of preemptive use of force is asserted... in international practice, Russia will reserve the right to act in a similar manner to protect its national interests.”¹⁵

More and more influential States are seeking the right to use force not only in response to an armed attack that has taken place, but also to avert an attack that they consider to be imminent or even to eliminate the conditions under which such a threat could materialize. As a result, the groundwork could be laid in international law for a new common (i.e., codified in a formal document) norm of behavior. Our State should be ready to be confronted with a situation – albeit extremely undesirable – both on the logistical and organizational level (i.e., have reliable and credible military assets) and on the intellectual level (i.e., propose coherent, well argued conditions for the use of such assets).

As mentioned earlier, in the ideal realm of the UN Charter, the right to use force occurs either with Security Council sanction or as self-defense in response to an armed attack. The Charter does not state unequivocally that such an attack is only carried out by a State, but the authors of the treaty did not anticipate any other scenarios. Practice shows, however, that a surprise strike – comparable in its consequences with large-scale actions by regular armed forces – can be delivered by a terrorist group, which does not necessarily have a State sponsor and is based on a territory that is not under the control of a formally sovereign State. Anticipation of such consequences – i.e., the formal application of

the criterion of “armed attack,” where there is no reasonable doubt about the imminence of a strike – comes into conflict with the constitutional obligations of the head of State and government to defend the right and well being of their citizens, as well as the security of the country.

Nevertheless, state leaders will be confronted with numerous problems. It is one thing to personally believe in the accuracy and reliability of information about an upcoming attack but quite another to make it (as well as the methods of obtaining such information) public, convincing the electorate, the international community, and its institutions about the appropriateness of the course of action chosen (the United States did not unduly concern itself with the last mentioned consideration prior to attacking Iraq in March 2003). There should be complete and well justified confidence that the armed forces and other implements of power are sufficiently prepared, motivated and equipped to deliver an effective but proportionate strike. Proportionality presumes not only a well substantiated estimation of the necessary resources and assets but also a clear idea about the territorial limitations, the duration of an operation, and the procedure for the withdrawal of personnel involved in such an operation back to their national territory.

The target of this strike must not be civilians or national economy, but only a hostile force poised for attack. Even this is not as simple as it might seem at first glance: The experience in modern asymmetric conflicts shows that distinctions between noncombatants and militants are often blurred, with the last mentioned often relying on civilian infrastructure.

From the legal perspective, the situation involving international efforts to counter piracy off Somalia is almost ideal: The State acknowledges its inability to counter the threat and therefore, turns to external forces for assistance. However, a different situation is also quite possible, where a State passively connives at the source of threat to international peace and security that exists on its territory, being unable to resist or control it somehow or even encouraging it. In this case, responsibility should be borne both by the State sponsor and the “host State.”

The rapid, snowball like growth of a threat cannot free a State from the obligation to notify the UN Security Council without delay about the measures that it takes – even if the body bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in similar situations in the past proved unable to effectively and completely exercise its powers arising from the Charter.

The aforementioned conditions and criteria proposed as guidelines should probably not be spelled out in real politics, since each specific situation will require a case-by-case approach, and there is also no need to make one’s plans and intentions known to everybody. In any event, the use of force is secondary with regard to diplomatic and other means of averting a conflict or the evolution of a source of threat, provided that these means are used in a target specific manner and with due respect for the norms of international law. On the other

hand, empty declarations about the readiness to use last resort measures are counterproductive and only undermine trust toward the State that makes such declarations.

NOTES

¹ Dok. OON A/Res. 3314 (XXIX), Dec. 14, 1974, Article 3, (d.).

² Sobakin V. K. *Kollektivnaia bezopasnost' – garantiia mirnogo sosushchestvovaniia*. M., 1962, p. 69.

³ Tunkin G. I. "Amerikanskaia agressiia na Dal' nem Vostoke – gruboe narushenie mezh-dunarodnogo prava." *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1958.

⁴ See: Sobakin V. K. Op. cit., p. 301; Ushakov N. A. *Pravovoe regulirovanie ispol'zovaniia sily v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh*. M., 1997, p. 15; Fedorov V. N. *Organizatsiia Ob' edinennykh Natsii i drugie mezhdunarodnye organizatsii i ikh rol' v 21 veke*. M., 2005, p. 794. Incidentally, this view is shared by some respected foreign experts, for example, Italian A. Cassese, German C. Muller, and American O'Connell. See: Cassese Antonio. *International Law*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 56; Müller Christoph. "The Right of Self-Defense in the Global Fight against Terrorism." *International Law Studies*, Volume 81, Newport, RI, 2006. p. 353; O'Connell Mary Ellen. "Defending the Law against Preemptive Force." *Peace in Liberty*, Baden-Baden, Zürich, 2008, p. 239.

⁵ See: Levin D. B. *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo i sokhranenie mira*. M., 1971, p. 145; Skakunov E. I. *Samooborona v mezhdunarodnom prave*. M., 1973, p. 85; Tunkin G. I. *Pravo i sila v mezhdunarodnoi sisteme*. M., 1983, p. 39.

⁶ Maleev Iu. N. "Reabilitatsiia adekvatnogo i proporsional' nogo primeneniia sily." *Moskovskii zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava*, 2004, # 3, p. 37.

⁷ De Vattel' Emer. *Pravo narodov ili printsipy estesvennogo prava, primeniayemye k povedeniiu i delam natsii suverenov*. M., 1960, p. 244.

⁸ *Sovetskii Soiuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiakh perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyny 1941-1945*, vol. V. M., 1980, p. 472.

⁹ Chernichenko S. V. *Teoriia mezhdunarodnogo prava*, vol. 1. M., 1999, p. 220.

¹⁰ Julius Stone. *Aggression and World Order. A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression*. London, 1958, p. 42.

¹¹ See: Waisberg Tatiana. "Colombia's Use of Force in Ecuador against a Terrorist Organization: International Law and the Use of Force against Non-State Actors." *ASIL INSIGHT*, August 22, 2008, Volume 12, Issue 17.

¹² Dok. OON S/RES/ 1816 (2008), June 2, 2008.

¹³ See: *Dokumenty o pozitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 61-I, 62-I, 63-I sessiakh General' noi Assamblei OON*.

¹⁴ Grotsii Gugo. *O prave voyny i mira*. M., 1956, p. 188.

¹⁵ www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/ 2003/11/ 54926/shtml

Multilateral Diplomacy in Unilateral Interests

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ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS of American officials, the United States is committed to multilateral action in foreign policy. Now that a new administration moved into the White House, it is worth recalling the approaches of the previous administration. President George W. Bush said that American interests are best served by addressing problems with strong partners.¹ The USA thinks multilateral diplomacy is essential for such efforts. These strong partners include the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum or many other international organizations where the United States plays a part and its diplomats work hard for.²

The U.S. National Security Strategy issued in 2002 said: “We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances.”³

The National Security Strategy of 2006 presented the following stance of the White House on multilateral diplomacy: The U.S. relations with the other main centers of global power “must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them.” This document also said that the USA is supporting “United Nations reform to improve its ability to carry out peacekeeping missions and enhanced accountability, oversight, and result-based management practices.”⁴

George W. Bush administration spokesmen regularly stated the United States’ commitment to the United Nations and the ideals it was founded on. The same is stated in official American documents. “The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful,” President George W. Bush told the 57th session of the UN General Assembly in 2002.⁵

The United States has been the leading contributor to the UN budget

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since its foundation. It contributed to the UN system \$5.3 billion in each 2005 and 2006. ⁶ Owing to the fact the USA expects the UN to spend this money effectively, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Kristen Silverberg said in September 2006 that the United States spends more than \$5 billion a year and wants to be sure that the money from its taxpayers is spent sensibly and goes to improve the situation in the developing countries for people suffering from human rights violations and dangerous diseases. ⁷

As the biggest contributor of finance, the United States expects that UN actions are not going to basically contravene the U.S. interests. Thus, the U.S. voted only for those peacekeeping operations that accorded with its national interests and backed them financially while the number of American military personnel among the UN blue helmets accounts for a seventh of one percentage point. ⁸

The George W. Bush administration admitted that its UN membership is among the U.S. national interests. The argument in the USA over the advantages and disadvantages of being a UN member heated up during its rule. One can still hear in the USA arguments against UN membership arguing that it undermines the United States national sovereignty and harms the powers of Congress with regard to its budget. Still, the realization of its advantages has grown. One of the key advantages for the USA of being a UN member is the opportunity to influence the passing of decisions in this world organization and thus advance the objectives of its own foreign policy. Further unquestionable advantages are coordination of actions for the maintenance of international peace and security, promotion of friendly ties between nations, expansion of international cooperation with a view to resolve economic, social and humanitarian issues, and dissemination of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The U.S. also believes that the 1953 truce in Korea or the peaceful resolution of crises in Salvador, Mozambique, Bosnia and Eastern Timor would have been impossible without the collective actions under the UN auspices. Further advantages for the U.S. of UN membership is cooperation between nations in combating infectious diseases through the World Health Organization, in combating hunger through the World Food Program, in combating illiteracy through UN specialized programs, coordination of air and mail transportation and telecommunications. ⁹

The United States follows a broad agenda in the UN reflecting the global problems before its foreign policy and diplomacy: the prevention of HIV/AIDS, combating hunger, humanitarian aid for the needy, peacekeeping in Africa, the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq, Palestine-Israeli settlement, the problems of nonproliferation of WMD (nuclear problems in Iran and North Korea), combating international terrorism, arms control and disarmament, and global climate change.

The United States under President George W. Bush rejoined UNESCO which it quit in 1984 thinking it was spending American money irrationally. The

U.S. rejoined UNESCO in 2003 because, in its opinion, it had carried through significant financial and administrative reforms and resumed efforts to strengthen its fundamental principles. Furthermore, full UNESCO membership of the USA is important from the viewpoint of its national interests, and it could not afford stay out for a long time. The UNESCO Education for All Program aiming at primary education for all helped advance U.S. objectives in the sphere of education.

The rivalry between the two ideological alliances and the threat of war between them with the use of nuclear weapons have been replaced in the 21st century by new challenges and threats: international terrorism, trafficking in people, proliferation of international drug networks, infectious diseases, poverty and environmental degradation. U.S. President George W. Bush and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice unveiled in this connection a new type of diplomacy – transformational diplomacy. The administration's logic was that weak states are unable to address these problems, for which reason there should be measures aimed at strengthening civil society, promoting the rule of law and free elections, encouraging economic openness by reducing the opportunities for corruption, eliminating barriers to business initiatives and increasing human capital through education. The new diplomacy focuses on responsible governance, economic reform, and the development of strong regional and local organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental.

In this connection, the United States' cooperation with the UN is guided by three principles.¹⁰

The USA, according to White House statements, would like to see the UN correspond with the intention of its founders to make it binding on all member states to contribute to international peace and security by guaranteeing their citizens freedom, good health and economic opportunities.

The United States further tried to adopt an effective multilateral approach. In its view, this diplomacy should not be limited to empty declarations but appreciably move forward peace, freedom, sustainable development, public health and humanitarian assistance for the good of ordinary citizens on every continent. Should the UN fail to play its intended role, the United States considered it its duty to say so. It thought the other countries should do likewise.

Finally, the USA is working for rational management of UN resources. An effective UN is supposed to spend its money sensibly. Those granted aid under its programs should really receive it. The United States intended to work together with the other member states to achieve informed management and funding of UN organizations and programs, as well as help with reforms to enhance the efficiency of the UN.

These three principles of U.S. cooperation with the UN, according to the White House, determined five American priorities:¹¹

- To maintain peace and protect civilians threatened by war and tyranny;

- To put the multilateral approach to the service of democracy, freedom and effective governance. These goals were to define nearly all of UN activities. The United States attached priority to the creation of a situation where all those involved in the UN system should come to realize that the strengthening of freedom, the rule of law and effective governance formed a component part of their mission. In exactly the same manner, the United States thought it necessary to vigorously support UN efforts to provide aid to emerging democracies in their elections, the training of judges, the strengthening of the rule of law and reducing the opportunities for corruption;

- To help the countries and persons experiencing the extreme need. The United Nations often approved UN actions in the provision of humanitarian aid;

- To promote result-based economic development. In the U.S. view, it is essential to have free market, economic freedom and rule of law for sustainable development. Besides, foreign financial assistance can promote growth only if the governments in the developing countries first carry through the necessary reforms;

- To insist on budget discipline in the United Nations. Stressing the main tasks, the fulfillment of the goals set and sensible use of donations from member countries will not only improve the UN institutions but also enhance its image and support in the United States and other countries. The United States will join forces with the other members to reform the poorly functioning institutions and close down the ineffective and obsolete programs. Furthermore, the United States is going to see to it that senior positions are awarded only to countries that honor the fundamental ideas of the UN.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has been an important foreign policy tool for the United States in its efforts to disseminate the values the Americans believe in. The USA believes that, as a founding state, the host and the most influential UN member, it is essential for the successful functioning of the organization. Thus, it believes, it is very important to preserve the leading role of the USA in the UN.

The United States thinks it must form the priorities and guide the various UN activities, oppose initiatives contradicting the American policy, and try to attain its goals at the minimum cost to the American taxpayer. In its view, the American leadership is necessary for advancing the fundamental American and UN principles and values.

The United States positively assess the UN activities as a peacemaker, mediator and representative of the world community in Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, Haiti, Lebanon, Syria, Western Sahara, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia. Furthermore, it thinks the UN plays an important part in combating HIV/AIDS, tidal wave disaster relief, elimination of illiteracy, spreading democracy, human rights protection, combating trafficking in people, freedom of the media, civil aviation, trade, development, delivery of food, vaccination and immunization, and monitoring elections.

At the same time, the United States singled out some of the UN drawbacks like programs launched inspired by best intentions but which have since become useless and wasting enormous resources that could have been used more efficiently. It also includes among the drawbacks the excessive politicization of some questions making it impossible to find solutions to them; situations where states can only achieve minimal agreement for agreement's sake; and situations where countries violating the rights of their citizens, sponsoring terrorism and involved in the proliferation of WMD are permitted to determine final decisions.

In the opinion of the United States, many UN problems are caused by the lack of democracy in member countries. Undemocratic states, Washington believes, do not follow the universal human rights principles of the UN; besides, such states are big in number and they wield considerable influence. According to the USA, a UN made up of democracies would not face the problem of divisive contradiction between state sovereignty and the universal principles of the UN (for example, the White House did not welcome the electing of Libya as chair of the Human Rights Commission and Syria, listed by the USA among the countries supporting terrorism, as member of the Security Council).¹²

State Department statements noted that one should avoid blaming UN failures on its individual agencies or member countries: the UN is as effective as its members want it to be, but this does not signify they are the source of all of the UN troubles because there are problems inside its individual bodies and agencies.

Washington thought the UN had no indisputable record and legitimacy and is not the only mechanism for making decisions on the use of force. Those who believe this ignore the obvious and misinterpret the UN Charter – this is a political association whose members protect their national interests, said Kim Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He also explained that the UN Security Council is not the sole and principal source of international law even where it concerns international peace and security. We still live, he said, in a world organized in accordance with the Westphalian international system where sovereign states conclude treaties. To follow the terms of these treaties, including those signed within the UN framework, is the inalienable right of the states and its peoples.

In 2007, Kristen Silverberg, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, said that excluding the UN from the competitive process with the other foreign policy tools should be avoided. When the United States confronts a foreign policy problem, it uses the foreign policy tool it deems most suitable for itself. The UN system in this sense is not always a top priority choice: In order to work effectively via the UN system, we should realistically assess its potentials. UN critics often fail to appreciate the value of multilateralism and universalism and ignore the enormous work done by various UN agencies. But a multilateral approach is only effective when applied amongst relatively similar countries, as those of NATO members, for example. Adding universal member-

ship increases the difficulties. Adding the wide scope of bureaucracy further aggravates the position.

The George W. Bush administration's approach to the United Nations combined numerous assurances of commitment and support of the world organization with advancing the view that the UN is not the key instrument of collective regulation of international relations and resolution of issues of international peace and security. The White House believed that the UN should be competing as an equal with the other foreign policy tools, like NATO, for example, and when the USA became confronted with a foreign policy issue, it opted for a means it thought most suitable and effective under the concrete situation.

None the less, the United States did not forego multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations, which is quite successfully coping with various problems through the network of specialized agencies. The UN is important for the United States to serve its national interests like the dissemination of its ideals and values around the world. With George W. Bush in office, the United States attached special importance to the UN role in supporting and expanding the democratic movements and institutions in all countries and the building of democratic states in line with its "democratic change" concept. In its view, UN activities are simply indispensable in countries like Burma, Sudan and North Korea.

Importantly, the Bush administration's approach reserved for the United Nations the solving of mainly humanitarian, social and economic problems like hunger, poverty, illiteracy, infectious diseases, natural disasters and sustainable development. The US after all reserves for itself the prime right to solving military and political issues arguing that success of the multilateral approach is not measured by following the procedure but by scoring results and that it is important to view the UN and other multilateral institutes as one option out of many. This approach favors above all else the reaching of the United States' own goals to the prejudice of the principles and standards of international law.

NOTES

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National Archetypes of Russia's Foreign Policy

E. Lashchenova

NATIONAL ARCHETYPES PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE in foreign policies of all countries; in case of Russia it is the historical traditions Muscovy inherited from Byzantium that determined, and still determine, the general development trends of the Russian statehood. The Byzantine heritage manifested in the idea of “Moscow the Third Rome,” determined, to a great extent, Russia’s mission in the world. Realized in foreign policy it produced amazing results: a vast state that gathered Russians and Orthodox Christians together with other ethnic groups and religions under the wing of the Russian and Soviet empires. However every time the Great Russia idea was rejected—in the early and late 20th century — the Russian statehood collapsed resulting in “a major geopolitical disaster of the century.”¹

Byzantine Heritage and Russian Messianism

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE was a product of many internal and external circumstances, which explains why its cultural and civilizational self-identification, its role and place in the world have never left the political, diplomatic and philosophical agenda. Discussed throughout Russia’s history these questions were never purely rhetorical — at all times they strongly affected the state’s political practices. In the 1830s-1840s, they became part of the historiosophic traditions of Slavophilism and Westernism. Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev had the following to say about Russian national consciousness and all-Slavic consciousness for that matter: it “was born amid discords of Slavophiles and Westerners” and “the Slavic idea should be sought for in Slavophilism — Westernism is absolutely free from it.”²

The Slavophilic tradition lives on the Byzantine heritage planted on the Russian soil in the form of the historiosophic conception of “Moscow the Third Rome” that inspired Patriarch Nikon to formulate his “universal state” theory. The religious and ideological roots of the Russian state’s messianism and imperial mission can be traced down to Muscovite Rus, the first Russian national state.

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Russian messianism is closely associated with Russia’s national identity and the antinomies of the Russian soul — nationalism and super-nationalism,

universalism and imperialism. The clash of the national and messianic, two conflicting lines, repeatedly blows up Russian history. This happened in 1917 and was repeated in 1991.³

An heir to Byzantium Muscovite Rus inherited its cultural, historical and legal traditions that determined, in the final analysis, the historical vector of the Russian State. Konstantin Leontyev, a Russian diplomat and philosopher, described Byzantinism as “education, or culture” of sorts charged with autocracy as a cornerstone of the state order, Orthodoxy in religion, etc.⁴

Muscovy mastered its Byzantine legacy through the Church that moved to Russia its experience of spiritual and political organization it had acquired in Byzantium. “By binding people with the common faith” Christian Orthodoxy “ensured the unity of people’s self-awareness,” an indispensable prerequisite of a single state.⁵ In Russia the Church hierarchy was more than a center of spiritual enlightenment — it was the center of national and political unity. Having assumed at first the role of the gatherer of the Russian lands it gradually developed into the founder of the Russian statehood that it enriched with moral, ethical and autocratic principles.

The borrowed idea of “the Grand Prince as the God-chosen sovereign” was of fundamental importance for the Russian state’s political organization; Ivan the Terrible relied on it to create a model of Russian autocracy.⁶ The sovereign, God’s representative on Earth, follows the covenant of Christ in his policies and concentrates power in his hands. Vladimir Solovyev believed that this Byzantine tradition echoed in the Russians’ Orthodox consciousness as being close to the primordial Russian idea of “master of the house” or “absolute master” that later, under Ivan III was transformed into czarist autocracy.⁷

The “symphony of the clergy and the state,” the relations between the spiritual and secular powers also belong to the Byzantine tradition; this is of fundamental importance for any discussion of the history of autocratic Russia. Any attempt at discussing the problem within Caesaropapism or Papo-Cesarism (domination of secular or spiritual power) smacks of oversimplification.

The Justinian’s principle of the “symphony of kingdom and the Church” means that the state should be a worthy partner and ally of the Church since they have a common aim in view. Only the unity of the Church and autocracy can deal with the domestic and foreign policy problems; this means that the Church is directly involved in state administration strictly within its competence. Having borrowed the Byzantine tradition of symphony the Russian state accepted its interpretation. The Church hierarchy was rich (vast-landed possessions of the monasteries and other sources of income) and therefore independent and highly critical of power. Spiritual power was expected, first and foremost, to provide the moral and ethical yardstick of secular power.

Orthodoxy and the Byzantine traditions of Russia’s state order predetermined its mission in the world; this mission liberated Russia from national egotism. Russia is a very unique country because its nationalism took the form

of super-nationalism, or universalism.

Messianic self-consciousness does not oppose national self-consciousness—the former thrives on the latter. Russia’s messianism is of religious origins and is Christian by nature. In fact, in Russia Orthodoxy, messianism and imperialism became one single whole. Aleksandr Panarin, for example, dated the beginning of Russian identity, which he described as “confessional-civilizational”⁸ to the Muscovite State. The fall of Byzantium left Muscovy with an awareness of being the world’s center of Orthodoxy. Having shouldered the responsibility for the purity of Orthodoxy Russia entered the road of messianism.

A prominent Slavophile Ivan Aksakov identified the component parts of Russian messianism. He wrote that Russian imperialism as a manifestation of Russian messianism is moved not merely by rational reasons; it also had an “internal engine” responsible for the “unity of popular spirit” that Aksakov described as the “spiritual organic force” of the Russian statehood.⁹ With baptism Rus acquired “a universally imperial” and “religious-historical calling” as opposed to its former status of a national state.¹⁰ As an empire Russia is called upon to set up a single state and gather together Russian lands and peoples. It is called upon to head the Orthodox-Slavic civilization opposed first by the Roman-German and later Anglo-Saxon worlds rooted in the Latin spiritual context and, therefore, alien to the Russian people. In the final analysis, world history is moved ahead by the never ending struggle between the East and the West for their free and unhampered historical development.

Ivan Aksakov said in his time that “creation of itself” was Russia’s only aim and that what it wanted of the West was the “recognition of its right as the Russian-Slavic world.”¹¹ The West looks at Russia as an alien civilization with a more or less equal potential and probably superior to it where its spiritual wealth and staunchness are concerned. Russia can be destroyed only together with its religious and civilizational principle. To do this, a negative image of Russia in the world has been created; in fact at all times Russia was and is presented to the world as a threat to the West’s continued existence.

This means that Russian messianism is a product of its Slavic-Orthodox content and spiritual culture of the people. Its religious roots have predetermined Russia’s world-historical mission: creation of an Orthodox-Slavic world as coherent as Western civilization. This global mission could be realized only through an empire.

The Slavophiles in their time were however convinced that bit by bit Russia was moving away from its true mission and neglecting its role. They blamed Peter the Great under whom “life of state power and life of people’s power”¹² parted ways.

Let us have a closer look at two epochs in Russian history associated with the names of Patriarch Nikon and Emperor Peter the Great. A clear idea of what happened is of fundamental importance for a correct understanding of Russia’s later development.

Patriarch Nikon relied on the Byzantine written tradition close to the Russians while Peter the Great planted the Western civilizational tradition to the detriment of the Russian national identity. Russian philosopher Aleksandr Panarin justly pointed out: “Nikon created a spiritual model of polyethnic universalism that Peter the Great realized as an earthly empire.”¹³ This is how historical-logical continuity of the Russian state is realized; this means that we should not set off one historical epoch against the other.

Patriarch Nikon developed the messianic idea of “Moscow the Third Rome” (first formulated by monk Philotheus of Pskov) in his conception of “universal kingdom” and carried out reforms to put it on a firm theoretical basis. Part of Russian society rejected the reforms; the patriarch was deposed yet his ideas lived on to be claimed first by autocratic, then by Soviet power to be consistently realized throughout Russia’s history. Twice, in 1917 and 1991, continuity was disrupted.

Peter the Great realized the messianic idea formulated as “Moscow the Third Rome” in Russia’s imperialism.¹⁴ Throughout his life he followed in the footsteps of his predecessors; he continued building up a huge state and, therefore, had to obey realities. The major result of his domestic and foreign policy was the Russian Empire; in 1721, Peter the Great was crowned as the Emperor of All Russia.¹⁵

The Empire: Russia’s Instrument of Survival and Development

GREAT PHILOSOPHER VLADIMIR SOLOVYEV admitted, within his global humanistic conception that it was permissible to move away from Christian principles in politics for the sake of continued existence of a “historical people.” Survival is possible solely within a state,¹⁶ no politics is possible outside it which means that the Russian people of the pre-Petrine period had to build a strong state capable of independent policies.

Geography itself offered all necessary prerequisites for the Russian Empire; philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev associated with this “the dualist structure of Russian history.”¹⁷ On the one hand, Russia’s size predetermined its imperial destiny; on the other, it burdened the Russians with the task of developing the vast expanses. This process never stops, it goes on in highly negative contexts; in fact, it is far from being completed.

This reveals another *raison d’être* of the Russian Empire — the constant external threat to the Russian statehood. Ivan Ilyin was quite right when he described Russia’s geographic location as being similar to “continental blockade.”¹⁸

Nikolay Danilevsky, the founder of the contemporary civilizational approach described the Orthodox Slavic civilization as a cultural-historical type on its own right. He was convinced that this civilization should preserve and

develop the Russian people's spiritual potential; Peter the Great proved his worth by going outside the national limits to show the imperial road.¹⁹ An attempt to move away from the idea of Slavdom might doom all Slavs.

Konstantin Leontyev looked at the Slavs as a historian, philosopher and diplomat. Unlike other Slavophiles he never idealized the Slavs as a community. Meanwhile he concluded that Russia was the factor capable of binding the Slavic world by religious rather than state bonds.

An heir to Byzantinism Russia embodied its main features in the Russian Empire — an Orthodox autocracy. Byzantinism is the cornerstone of Russian Orthodoxy and autocracy which means that it can be destroyed only together with the foundations of Russian statehood. Russia's historical mission can be described as full realization of the idea of Byzantinism as a “new variety in unity, flourishing of Slavdom with Russia as a separate subject at the head.”²⁰

Aleksandr Panarin's method “challenge — response” can be used to explain the historical logic of the Russian state's development: the Russian Empire was a “response” to the “challenges.” It was called to life by the tasks the Russian statehood had to address: continued existence and external security that demanded that the Russians should complete their unification and expand their state territory; the process started by Peter the Great's predecessors.²¹

This means that the Russian Empire was created under the impact of internal and external factors, the religious factor in the form of Orthodoxy that predetermined Moscow's role of the Third Rome, being the main of them.

Messianism embodied in the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome runs through the entire history of the Russian statehood (from the baptism of Rus to the present). Great humanist Vladimir Solovyev provided the most apt description of Russia's mission: “Wide and generally reconciliatory — imperial and Christian — is the only national policy of Russia. It alone completely corresponds to the best sides that distinguish the Russian national character. Peter the Great who remained Russian through and through despite his admiration for Europe and Catherine the Great that became completely Russian despite its original Europeanism left one behest to our Fatherland. Their images and their historic deeds tell Russia: remain true to itself and your national specifics and be thus universal.” The logic of Russia's historical development is unshakeable.²²

Having inherited imperial traditions from Byzantium and having shouldered the messianic role of the carrier of Orthodox Christianity the Russian state thus accepted the vector of its territorial development.

A clear understanding of Russia's role as an independent state capable of a proactive foreign policy is the Slavophiles' one of the greatest services. They interpreted it through the prism of the Orthodox Christian tradition within the “Moscow the Third Rome” formula. It determined the meaning of the Russian state and created the Russians' mentality. Two retreats from this — in 1917 and 1991 — can be described as catastrophic for the Russian statehood as the core of the Russian Orthodox civilization.

Territorial Expansion and Foreign Policy Tasks of the Russian Empire

ANY ATTEMPTS at setting up an empire and acquiring new territories were inevitably opposed by the alien Roman-German civilization. For centuries all attempts at gaining access to the Black and Baltic seas and ensuring the state's security were accompanied by protracted conflicts. This explains why at all times the problems of the meaning of Russia's existence were regarded through the prism of East-West confrontation. Ivan Aksakov had the following to say about the West's intentions in relation to Russia: "To weaken our national positions at the Western border, contract the sphere of our interests in the Balkans and shift the center of gravity of our policies to Asia."²³ The truth of this can hardly be overestimated: today the West as represented by NATO, EU, etc is actively cutting into the CIS geopolitical expanse and is pushing Russia back from its vitally important zones of influence. Russia has already lost its positions in the Balkans while in Asia the new power centers — America, China, Japan, etc — have already developed an interest in the Russian mineral-rich lands.

The global clash of two civilizations is unfolding within the Eastern Question. Despite the fact that Russian historiography treats the Eastern Question as an international problem born in the 18th-20th centuries by the decline of the Ottoman Empire; the continued existence of the Russian state and its international weight depended, to a great extent on the answer to this question.²⁴ The Russian Slavophilic thinkers treated the Eastern Question as a dispute between the Western and Eastern Rome; the political representation of the latter had been transferred to the Third Rome, Russia, back in the 15th century.²⁵

As distinct from our contemporaries Danilevsky identified three stages of the Eastern Question accompanied by the struggle with the West that served a consolidating factor for all Slavic peoples. When answering his opponents who spoke of the Slavic peoples' disunion he said that they could unite only when fulfilling their mission.

The never-ending civilizational clashes occurred at the western and southern borders of the Russian state. According to Russian historian Vasiliy Klyuchevskiy throughout its history Russia had to deal with two extremely important tasks that determined, to a great extent, its foreign policy vector: "First, we had to complete political unification of the Russian people nearly half of whom still remained outside the Russian state; second, we should correct the border of the state territory which, in certain parts — southern and western — remained vulnerable."²⁶ The Russian czars and the Bolsheviks had to deal with these tasks; today they remain as topical as ever.

Nikolay Berdyaev described the external task of Russian imperialism as "possession of the Straits and access to the sea" and "liberation of the oppressed peoples." He regarded Constantinople as the key to the seas through the Straits and believed that this could potentially become "one of the centers of unity

between the East and the West.”²⁷

It should be said that Marx and Engels, two inveterate Russophobes, looked more or less soberly at the policies of the Russian czars and were fully aware of the strategic importance of capturing Tsargrad (Constantinople). They wrote in “The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism” that this would have meant not only spiritual domination over the Eastern Christian world. This would have been a decisive stage leading to domination over Europe. This would have meant unlimited domination over the Black Sea, Asia Minor, and the Balkan Peninsular. They further said that the new south-western border, however, would have remained vulnerable and surmised that Russia should have moved its entire Western border and considerably extended the sphere of its domination.²⁸

This means that in practical terms a clash with the West presupposes solution of the Eastern Question that can be seen as a string of specific problems: first, the future of the Ottoman possessions in Europe; second, the problem of the Black Sea Straits and patronage of the Orthodox subjects. This is related to the Balkan aspect of Russia’s foreign policies. At its western border Russia fought Sweden and Poland for the access to the Baltic and joining the Slavic lands to Russia.

Konstantin Leontyev admitted that states could form an alliance with the closest possible cooperation of local Orthodox churches; a single Slavic state, however, would have been pernicious for them, and Russia in the first place. This means that Russia should build its eastern policy around Orthodoxy, the spiritual linchpin of Slavdom. Tsargrad and the Black Sea Straits were described as two priorities of the Orthodox-Slavic world; the former should have become center of a “Great Eastern-Orthodox Union.”²⁹ This was described as a very remote perspective and the final aim of Russia’s eastern policy.

Nikolay Danilevsky, in his turn, believed that an All-Slavic Federation should be created “under the rule and hegemony of a single and indivisible Russian state” stretching from the Adriatic to the Pacific...³⁰ This makes the question of Constantinople a principled one. He was consistent in his assertion that Constantinople res nulis and for objective reasons should belong to Russia: this would secure Russia’s southern borders, make it possible to control the sea routes from Europe to Asia and from Europe to Africa and would enable Russia to spread the influence and protection of the Orthodox holy places there. He did not mean to say that Constantinople should have been joined to Russia: it should have become the center of the All-Slavic Union under Russian’s hegemony.³¹

In his article “Where are the Limits to the Growth of the Russian State?” Ivan Aksakov outlined the historical borders of the Russian state.³² Peter the Great in his time attached great importance to the access to the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas, while “the southern wall of the Russian state house” should have run along the Straits.³³ Russia could not ensure security of its southern borders without a union with Afghanistan, Persia and India to which it had no territorial

claims and where it ran across its main rival, Great Britain. (Today, this role belongs to the United States.)

Poland held a special place in the Eastern Question; according to Danilevsky this problem, one of the components of the Slavic Union issue, could not be resolved within the Great Eastern Question.

The Polish question for Russia was determined by the constant threat of the “vanguard of the Catholic West” to the Russian western borders.³⁴ At all times Poland was a religious-spiritual entity alien to the Russian people which meant that the far from friendly relations between the two countries were nothing more than an outcrop of the primordial Russia/the West confrontation.

When dealing with the Polish question, wrote Ivan Aksakov, and when pursuing foreign policy “Polish patriotism per se is not as dangerous for Russia as an absence of patriotism among the greater part of Russian ‘intellectuals’” comparable with “national apostasy.”³⁵ This is very true: both in 1917 and 1991 the Russian statehood disintegrated under pressure of the “fifth column” part of which arrived from abroad, the other one being home-grown.

This means that the imperial interpretation of Russia's role and place is rooted in the history of the Russian statehood permeated with the Byzantine traditions which determined Russia's imperial nature. Having become an empire Russia became an active player on the international stage; its Orthodox Slavic nature determined the key trends of its territorial expansion intended to gather together lands and peoples. Today this is described as “imperial ambitions” — in actual fact territorial expansion is part and parcel of any empire. This is the cause of the never ending confrontation between the East and the West within the Great Eastern Question where the interests of two civilizations clash. To produce an adequate and sober assessment of international relations, to bury the illusions of the 1990s and to be able to pursue an independent foreign policy geared to the national interests of the Russian statehood, the core of the Orthodox-Slavic civilization, we should place Russia's foreign policy problems of today into the context of the East-West clash.

NOTES

¹ Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. 25 April 2005 [<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/04/87049.shtml>].

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³ A.S. Panarin, *Pravoslavnaia tsivilizatsia v globalnom mire*, Moscow, 2003, p. 10.

⁴ K.N. Leontyev, “Rossia i slavianstvo: Filosofskaia i politicheskaia publiksistika,” *Dukhovnaia proza (1872-1891)*, Moscow, 1996, p. 94.

⁵ V.S. Solovyev, *Vizantizm i Rossia*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1989, p. 420.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 589.

⁸ A.S. Panarin, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹ I.S. Aksakov, *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe prizvanie Rossii*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1886, p. 798.

- ¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 800, 802.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 804.
- ¹² A.S. Khomiakov, "O starom i novom," *Izbrannye trudy*, Moscow, 2004, p. 422.
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- ¹⁴ N.A. Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 43.
- ¹⁵ *Ocherki istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossii*, Vol. 1, 1860-1917, Moscow, 2002, p. 158.
- ¹⁶ V.S. Solovyev, op. cit., p. 568.
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- ²¹ A.S. Panarin, op. cit., p. 257.
- ²² V.S. Solovyev, op. cit., p. 603.
- ²³ I.S. Aksakov, op. cit., p. 805.
- ²⁴ See: *Vostochny vopros vo vneshney politike Rossii. Konets XVIII-nachalo XX veka*, Moscow, 1978, p. 4.
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- ²⁶ V.O. Klyuchevskiy, *Kurs russkoy istorii*, Vol. 4, Part 4, Moscow, 1989, p. 46.
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- ²⁸ See: K. Marx, F. Engels, "Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsarizma," *Sobranie sochineniy*. Vol. 22, Moscow, 1962, p. 8.
- ²⁹ K.N. Leontyev, "Khram i tserkov," *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, p. 516.
- ³⁰ N.Ia. Danilevskiy, *Rossia i Evropa: vzgliad na kulturnye i politicheskie otnoshenia slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu*, Moscow, 2003, p. 396.
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- ³² I.S. Aksakov, "Gde granitsy gosudartvennomu rostu Rossii?" *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe prizvanie Rossii*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1886, p. 781-797.
- ³³ Ibid., p. 788.
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- ³⁵ I.S. Aksakov, "O neposledovatelnosti nashego pravitelstvennogo deystvia v Polshe," *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe prizvanie Rossii*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1886, p. 626.

Diplomatic Academy: 75 Years in the Service of Motherland

A. Panov

ASIDE FROM INSPIRING WELL-UNDERSTOOD EMOTIONS, any anniversary, be it state, public, or personal, gives a pretext for looking into the past, evaluating the present, and thinking about the future.

The Diplomatic Academy boasts a glorious and remarkable past. Its rightful precursor, Tsarskoe Selo Lyceum, was where the diplomatic cadre began to be trained on the systematic basis for the first time in Russia's history.

In the Soviet period (which started with experiments in the spirit of Leon Trotsky's "guideline" that ordered to "shut down this shop" (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs), it was soon realized that diplomats could not be trained in a haphazard manner and that no less reliable a system was needed than the one that existed before the October 1917 revolution. But the appropriate decision was long in coming. It was not until 1934 that an Institute for the Training of Diplomatic and Consular Workers under the USSR PCFA was formed.

The move was an extremely timely, if not belated, one. As is evident from the archives, there was a massive in-rush of aspirants, with 600 applications per 40 vacancies. But the level of knowledge demonstrated by the entrants left much to be desired.

The Institute's lecturers were, among others, Alexandra Kollontai, Lev Karakhan, Ivan Maisky, and Solomon Lozovsky. There were many prominent diplomats – ambassadors, deputy ministers, etc., like Ya. Malik, G. Pushkin, A. Roshchin, F. Molochkov, G. Arkadyev, and others – among its first graduates as well. Numerous names failed to reach us because of the reprisals in 1937 or wartime death.

In 1939, the Institute was reorganized as the Higher Diplomatic School (HDS) that was due to become the alma mater of thousands of diplomats from Russia, all other USSR republics, and people's democracies. Its main task was to convert Party, Soviet and industrial administrators to diplomats. The effort was rather successful, with hundreds of graduates proving excellent diplomats. The

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Soviet diplomatic star, Anatoly Dobrynin (HDS 1946 graduate, later USSR Ambassador to the U.S.A. for 24 years under six presidents, currently Honorary

Doctor of the Diplomatic Academy) describes in his book *Strictly Confidential* how at a 1944 Central Committee Politburo meeting Joseph Stalin suggested to FM Vyacheslav Molotov that the diplomatic cadre training should be expanded with regard for postwar needs. He specified, writes Dobrynin, that industrial engineers could be recruited as well, particularly those in rapport with subordinates. This was how Anatoly Dobrynin himself (graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute), M.N. Smirnovsky and many others were singled out for the HDS.

The School was keen to enlist the best specialists in the country as its lecturers, scientists and publishers. In different years, it employed such leading authorities in international relations as Eugene Tarle, Vladimir Khvostov, Sergei Krylov, and Vsevolod Durdenevsky.

Yet another characteristic feature was the HDS being exceptionally intent on preparing and publishing fundamental works on international relations (for example, the multi-volume *A History of Diplomacy*) that to this day are books of reference for Russian diplomats.

In 1974, given the higher level and grown scale of HDS activities and this country's foreign policy objectives and needs, the School was given a new status with the name of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such it continues to perform its main function that consists in the training and refresher training of the middle and higher echelons of Russian diplomats and other specialists in international relations employed by the government agencies, public organizations, subjects of the Russian Federation, and the private sector.

Seventy-five years is much time for any higher educational establishment. It means that under different historical conditions, despite sometimes drastic shifts in home and foreign policies, the Academy remained in high demand and was seen as essential in the matter of training, retraining and refresher training of diplomatic workers as well as the international relations cadre as a whole.

The Diplomatic Academy is by right proud of its traditions, its rich teaching experience, its highly skilled teachers, and, of course, its graduates, many of whom are authoritative diplomats widely renowned at home and elsewhere. Displaying an enviable maturity, the Academy was riding the crest of modern tendencies. The versatility of its work is indeed impressive, as is its ability to face challenges of the times.

In recognition of its services, the DA was decorated, in 1984, with the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

IN HIS LETTER OF GREETINGS to the Diplomatic Academy on the occasion of its 70th anniversary, President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation expressed confidence that the DA would continue training specialists endowed with fundamental knowledge and practical skills in most different areas of inter-

national life, professionals capable of working efficiently for the good of Russia and for the strengthening of her positions and prestige in the world community.

Five years on, it can be stated that the presidential directive was followed to a T. The Diplomatic Academy was even more assiduous in performing its main mission as a higher educational establishment within the MFA fold, one engaged in professional retraining and refresher training of diplomatic workers and scientists, as well as in the drafting of analytical materials on the most important theoretical and practical aspects of Russia's modern diplomacy and foreign policy.

To this end, for example, we have expanded the thematic gamut of the courses for diplomatic workers. As of today, 36 courses for different categories of ministerial diplomatic and administrative staff have been devised and introduced. The work to improve the courses continues on the permanent basis. Later this year, courses for embassy press attaches and employees in charge of cultural ties will be launched. In 2008, a total of 420 diplomats were put through the courses.

The Higher Diplomatic Courses are being improved as well, with some high-ranking civil servants from a number of ministries being invited as teachers.

In keeping with the Decree of the President of Russia of December 26, 2006 "On Additional Professional Training of Civil Servants of the Russian Federation," some active and purpose-oriented work was done to provide more educational services in different forms to civil servants engaged in the sphere of international activities.

Long-term agreements were signed with federal and regional agencies and organizations.

We widened the range of educational services on international and foreign economic agendas for employees of regional administrations, members of the public and business persons.

In 2008, the DA extended refresher training to employees of 21 federal agencies and representatives of 44 regions. In spring 2008, a cooperation project with the participation of St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk administrations was implemented in the form of courses for administrative employees engaged in the international sphere in those cities. There was a very positive response from the students.

In 2008, the DA signed cooperation agreements with ten major companies, such as LUKoil, Aeroflot, Russian Railways, Rostechologies, Roscosmos, Rosoboronexport, and Rosatom, envisaging training in accordance with different curricula. Last year, the DA trained employees of 42 companies, focusing on comprehensive preparation for foreign mission work.

MUCH EFFORT, in that period, was undertaken to improve training on the basis of the main three-year curriculum (international relations and world economy). As is evident from the practice of the last few years, this kind of education is increasingly in demand, including in the governmental, political, diplomatic and business circles. There are MFA, MOD and MIA officials, State Duma and Federation Council deputies, lawyers, economists, CEO's, and Olympic champions among those who enrolled in 2008. Last year saw graduation of the first group of athletes with Olympic champion titles, who passed their final examinations with flying colors.

In 2008, the DA released a total of 340 students, some of whom are being hired by the MFA. One should note in particular the reactions coming from many graduates, who not only thank the Academy for the top-level education they were able to receive but also point to the fact that their years at the Academy were when their worldview as patriots of Russia reached a stage of maturity.

Three new departments have been established in order to raise the educational process level, and the structure of existing departments has been modernized. Academic councils have been established, 17 new subject courses have been introduced, and advanced teaching methods have been adopted.

Not long ago, we unveiled a LUKoil-sponsored cluster of new auditoriums with state-of-the-art multimedia and computer equipment, this resulting from the Academy's policy of signing educational agreements with the leading companies. A role was played by the Board of Trustees (established 2008) with Minister of Culture A.A. Avdeyev at the head and prominent politicians, CEO's, cultural figures and business people, including foreigners, as members. The Academy is grateful to those of them, who helped to implement a number of important undertakings within the framework of celebrations devoted to its 75th anniversary, including the publication of the anniversary edition *75 Years for the Good of Motherland*.

THE DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY is a major scientific center that pursues fundamental and applied investigations and trains scientists and teachers.

In the period from 2003 to 2008, 176 text-books and teaching aids were published, which are used by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (U), Russia Friendship University, Moscow State University, and other establishments of higher learning. The same period saw the publication of 128 monographs and scientific collections. Publication continues of the Diplomatic Yearbook and the Classics of Diplomacy Series.

On orders from the MFA of Russia, the DA scientists practice writing analytical memoranda on topical problems of Russian foreign policy and present-day international relations. Analytical materials are also prepared for the Administration of the RF President, the Security Council, the State Duma and the

Federation Council at their requests. Between 2003 and 2008, over 500 papers of this kind were accomplished.

Scientific advances are put to test in the course of conferences, symposia, seminars and situational analysis sessions. During the five years, the Academy held 200 different scientific forums, including ones with the participation of scientists from the Republic of Korea, Iran, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, and Armenia. Although we have incontestable achievements in the scientific sphere, there are considerable reserves for enhancing the level of scientific investigations.

The DA Post-Graduate Department is in much demand as well. More than 170 persons (40 MFA staff, 26 foreigners) are enrolled in this department including correspondence students. Between 2003 and 2008, 310 candidate and doctoral theses were defended, many of them a major contribution to the Russian science.

Some of the dissertationists are Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary N.N. Spassky, V.B. Lukov, and V.D. Nikolayenko; Kazakhstan Minister of Foreign Affairs K.K. Tokayev; and State Duma International Affairs Committee chairman K.I. Kosachev. Theses were defended by representatives of Kyrgyzstan, UAE, Armenia, Libya, Tajikistan, Yemen, Syria, Republic of Korea, and Palestine.

Mauritania's ambassador in Moscow is one of current post-graduate students.

THE DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY is increasingly a well-known and authoritative educational and scientific establishment internationally. Contacts within and without this country are stimulating the evolution of the educational process. Every year we accept from 40 to 50 students sent for a second higher education by foreign ministries of other countries, both CIS states and others, such as Mongolia, Bulgaria, DPRK, and Romania.

Indicatively, there are numerous DA students, who are simultaneously staff members at foreign embassies in Moscow. Later they usually are given sufficiently high-ranking foreign ministerial positions in their countries and handle relations with Russia. A case in point is the Moscow ambassador of the Dominican Republic, who signed up for a three-year course last year.

Lately, foreign ministries in a number of countries have been increasingly keen on sending their staff to the DA for short-term courses. In 2008, such courses were organized for diplomats from Bulgaria, Indonesia and Iran.

We have signals from foreign ministries of a number of Arab, Asian and Latin American countries on their wishing to send some staff to DA courses. What prevents them from doing so is the lack of money. Were this financial problem solved through allocation to the DA of targeted funding, the Academy might

considerably expand its training of foreign diplomats.

The DA holds annual “diplomatic courses” for foreign diplomats (mostly embassy staff, but also representatives of foreign ministries) that are devoted to the Russian foreign policy, the domestic situation in Russia, and an improved knowledge of Russian. The number of students grows with each passing year, with 32 diplomats from 17 countries attending since 2008.

The DA maintains relations with its counterparts in 67 countries, many of which were established on its model and use its teaching methods.

Attesting to its international prestige is the fact that it is visited by a growing number of high-powered foreign delegations. In 2008, the DA was visited by foreign ministers of Israel, Cuba, Mexico, and Bulgaria, by the General Secretary of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, by the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Vietnam, and by many ambassadors accredited in Moscow, all of whom delivered addresses to teachers and students.

The Academy is proud of its role as a recognized cultural center. For example, it was the venue for over 100 art exhibitions during the last ten years.

The Diplomatic Academy is celebrating its anniversary without slackening the pace of its activities. What was achieved over the last 75 years enables it to look into the future with optimism.

How Sustainable Growth Replaced Viable Development

S. Dolmatova

THE WORLD HAS COME TO THE LINE beyond which there are changes, probably much more radical than those of the late 1980s. The financial and economic crisis that in some countries is developing into a political one made this abundantly clear to the expert and analyst communities; political establishment, too, has finally arrived to the same conclusion: election of Barack Obama confirms this. The energy of liberalism swept aside, under the “end of history” banner, the dividing walls, regimes, social and cultural models, ethnic traditions of national economies, ideologies and even the efforts to sort out the developments giving no chance to those who tried to find other, better ways of civilizational development. This tactics can no longer be used.

There is no moral, intellectual and economic authority of global or national development in the world in need of an economic development pattern rather than of an economically dominating leader (the United States, however, will remain the world’s strongest economy).

Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman, the world’s most influential economist and financial guru regarded in America as the infallible architect of two decades of prosperity admitted at a hearing in U.S. Congress (convened to look into the crisis’ roots) that the crisis “left him in a state of shocked disbelief” and “it revealed a flaw in a lifetime of economic thinking.”¹

Today, the United States has to mend its prestige as the world’s leader; the search for the best possible scenario has, in fact, brought it to the New World Economic Order ideas that have remained on the agenda since the 1950s. They are discussed at various levels; indeed, a paradigm of changes needs good prove-nance.

The latest World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos “Shaping the Post-Crisis World” opened by the speech of the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin inevitably riveted the attention of the world (and Russia in the first place). When presenting Putin the Forum founder and Executive Chairman Klaus Schwab pointed out that one of the key roles in the world belonged to Russia and that

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none of the global problems could be settled without its contribution.²

An upsurge of anti-globalist activity at the turn of the third millennium forced the Forum to seek a wider niche no longer limited to strategic liberalization solutions for the big business but looking beyond them, to the key global development issues. Discussions of wider subjects involve wider social and geographic strata; they are no longer limited to the top crust of the Western business, political and intellectual elite.

Back in January 2000 the WEF riding the wave of triumphant liberal globalization filled Davos with TINA slogans (There Is No Alternative). Its ideas of the real world developments were obviously fairly short-sighted. Outside anti-globalists were raiding the streets under the slogans "Another World is Possible" and "The World is not a Commodity." Nobody stopped them even though they had emerged as an organized force only a month before that in Seattle where they had practically disrupted a WTO session.

Today the WEF in Davos pays more attention, partly under pressure of the global crisis, to the urgent issues raised by the World Social Forum.* Time will show whether the WEF 2009 will find an alternative to crisis economy or will go down to history as another get-together of neo-liberal zealots.

In his report Vladimir Putin pointed out that Russia's way out of the crisis was often considered as either isolationism or the free market. He went on to say that the ideal free market was an illusion while economics had become global to the extent that its destruction would be much more shattering than the destruction of the Soviet Union's unified national economic complex. This means that the solution is common even though differentiated.

It is much more important to answer the question: Which of the crises are we resolved to overcome? Prof. Schwab offered the following comment: "We are in the midst of a 'transformational crisis'" and added that the world would be very different by the time it got out of it. Hence two tasks: first, to cope with the crisis and, second, to picture the post-crisis world.³

If the tasks are addressed consecutively rather than simultaneously (in the new common context) the euphoria of a successful solution of the former would deprive the international political and business circles of resolution to address the latter in earnest. If we look for the old solutions of the 2008 crisis situation the global problems that in the last decade had reached catastrophic levels will further exacerbate.

All responsible politicians should use the chance supplied by the crisis to look for a paradigmatic (the term suggested by the expert community) way out, that is within a new paradigm of civilizational development. Response to

* The World Social Forum was organized in 2001 as an alternative to the WEF in Davos, with the different objectives and more democratic organizational principles. It attracted attention of some grandees of global economy, including Joseph Stiglitz, advisor of President Clinton and the WB Chief Economist in the latter half of the 1990s. critical situations should be replaced with their prevention. As a global commu-

nity we have the entire range of instruments at hand — ideological, resource and, most importantly, useful — to address the critical (or even catastrophic, according to some sources) situation in a systemic way.

It was nearly twenty years ago that the world community reached a consensus on the measures designed to forestall negative developments in global ecology, economics and the social sphere that was producing acute social conflicts and terrorism as their extreme form. I have in mind the UN-formulated “sustainable development” conception monopolized by economic neo-liberalism that practically destroyed it while adapting to its own needs and discredited it as a global development model. Time has come to analyze how and why this happened, why we should go back to it and how can Russia help realize it.

THE EXPERT COMMUNITY has, on the whole, agreed that as one of the immediate causes of the crisis — expansion of cheap crediting under virtual assets that started in the United States — has already exhausted itself. For ideological reasons there is much less harmony when it comes to an analysis of the deeply rooted causes of the crisis.

Seen from the Marxist positions capitalism remains a crisis-prone system that furnished its new productive forces with certain specific features mainly in the form of dominating fictitious capital. The present crisis is a cyclical one that speaks of the final aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism. It postponed its death by destroying the world socialist system and prolonged its life by being “hooked” on high tech industries the potential of which has been exhausted. As distinct from the 1990s this approach is gaining popularity in the West, strange as it may seem. Marx has become a bestselling author; in Germany he comes third in the list of the most important personalities of German history.

Those loyal to the mainstream are ready to admit that the financial and political elites are guilty of technical errors that caused temporary problems on the market. Julia Finch’s contribution to *The Guardian* can be described as the most typical presentation of this approach: she enumerated (with photos attached) all those guilty of the crisis with Alan Greenspan high on the list.⁴

She did not escape certain left, yet not radical, conclusions very popular among the experts. They argue that finance capital moved too far from its material foundation, the industry. The journalist blames British Premier Brown for “putting the City interests ahead of other parts of the economy, such as manufacturers. He backed ‘light touch’ regulation and a low-tax regime for the thousands of non-domiciled bankers working in London and for the private equity business.”

It is commonly believed in Russia that the crisis is rooted in the objective course of world economy that made the United States the world’s financial citadel and placed the world financial system on the dollar. The Bretton Woods

Agreements and especially 1971 when the United States eliminated the fixed gold price of the dollar armed the American financial system with unprecedented possibilities of increasing the end demand for money, both public and private, by using virtual financial instruments. This was practiced since the 1980s, after a long recession, within the so-called Reaganomics and, since the 1990s, on a much greater scale until the world plunged into the crisis.

The above convictions suggested corresponding conclusions. The confirmed Marxists expect that a world socialist revolution will come soon to remedy the 70-year-long Soviet socialist practice warped, to a great extent, by the hostile capitalist camp. This will confirm that Marx rather than Lenin (acting under conviction that socialism could triumph in one country) was right.

The “mainstream” is living in a conviction, bred by the United States’ large economic potential that the financial destabilization of the last 18 months will end soon without causing structural economic changes.

Social-Democrats pin their hopes on the Keynesian model as a way out of this particular crisis. They are convinced that the world needs instruments to achieve the best possible balance between the market self-regulating mechanisms (private initiative) and state regulation to set up a sustainable world financial system.

The Russian economic establishment tends to agree with this. The inevitable parallels between the Great Depression (in 1929-1933, the Soviet Union was not merely an “island of stability” but demonstrated rapid economic growth) suggest a fairly popular conclusion that the crisis in Russia was caused by an absence of a sovereign monetary system outside Western control based on the principles used by the Soviet independent economy.

Demonopolized monetary market, a stronger position for the regional financial systems and transfer from one reserve currency to several strong regional currencies are seen as adequate solutions. The varied and seemingly mutually exclusive suggestions pursue the same aim: economic revival conducive to economic competitiveness both in the commodity and services spheres through sustainable economic growth of the productive branches. It is commonly believed that competitiveness and stability of the national currency can be achieved by moving away from the raw material to industrial development vector and by supporting it with commodities and services. This strategy, however, will exclude any “civilizational-paradigmatic” changes. The country will remain dependent on the morally obsolete crisis-prone economic model supported by the historically conditioned financial domination of the United States. Russia is convinced that in the conditions conducive to its competition with the United States in the world financial sphere it will become financially independent and liberate itself from the financial and fuel export dependence and, on the whole, will become free from Western economic diktat.

This leads to the trap into which the Soviet Union fell in the post-Yalta bipolar world. It tried to compete with the most effective, capitalist, model meet-

ing the expanding consumer demand with commodities and services. A new society that wanted to build communism and was guided by a different system of values entered into the struggle with a rival on the paradigmatically alien field. It should have competed with capitalism in the axiological sphere. The other pole of the bipolar world turned out to be “not very different” economically. The Soviet system was hooked by the motivations typical of consumer society and the free market which were functioning in the United States and other Western countries in the maximally favorable economic and political contexts. At the turn of the 1990s, we found ourselves, all of a sudden, in the rapidly developing global consumer society caught in a net of an ecological, social and financial-economic crisis.

For similar reasons Russia’s intention to compete in the sphere of world finances with the historically conditioned financial might of the United States is senseless. Russia should keep away from the quagmire of ideological and practical imitation: the “end of history” ideological monopoly has already produced negative results for the globalized world. Future might have something else in store.

One of the problems is created by virtual financial capital that detached itself from the real sector (over \$500 trillion) — an absolutely inadmissible thing. It covers merely 2 to 3 percent of material production which can trigger a colossal financial collapse. There is another, and probably more dangerous, problem: the same 2-3 percent of material production has reached gigantic proportions in relation to the planet’s ecological capacities and may produce another, no less terrifying, climatic collapse incompatible with man’s continued physical existence on Earth.

Wider circles of the academic, expert, business and political establishments have joined the critics to recognize the fact that the dominant development model is profoundly unstable. This means that strategic innovation decisions for the post-crisis world and emergence of a fundamentally different, humanistic and eco-compatible axiological system are possible.

The ideology of consumer society geared at the practical aspect ignores the past, present and future as an indivisible whole. The way out of the systemic crisis is found in the sustainable development ideology, the world community elaborated and accepted long ago. This is an ideology that relies on the inter-generational development criterion to create an integral holistic and dynamic picture of the world.

WE ALL KNOW THAT to escape its financial and raw material dependence Russia should overcome the dominating trends; this is confirmed by its struggle for reforms in the world financial sphere.

It is suggested that the unipolar conflict-prone economic model should

be replaced with a multipolar development model. Russia's political leaders have identified innovational economic development as the country's main goal; by extension this means that society will be transformed into a post-economic society in which industrial production is no longer the main instrument of progress.

Hence several questions: first, none of the development projects for Russia raised the question of ecology-economy correlation. Caught in the unipolar logic all of them, on the whole, care geared at unbridled economic race (albeit without the market's excessive reliance on finances). They are normally referred to the Chinese economic model of gaining positions in the world market system. In view of Russia's role as the planet's biospheric reserve the industrial overloading of its ecological carrying capacities makes the optimism of those who prefer large-scale assembly-plant-type projects obscurantist and ignoring the blessings of the international division of labor. Second: Why do we speak about multipolarity? Polarity presupposes clashing of opinions which means that multipolarity runs the danger of being replaced with a simple regionalization of the financial system.

What we really need are different philosophical principles of the national development model. If applied to Russia it might channel global processes toward sustainable development of human civilization.

It was for 20 years (starting with the UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment of 1972) that the Western society was readying itself for "de-materialization" of production to match the level of the planet's ecological capacity (ecologization of public consciousness). The process proved fairly successful with the intermediary result in the form of the "sustainable development" conception.

It could still breed fruit after the UN Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 held in Rio de Janeiro at which the Agenda 21 was adopted by majority. Consensus about "sustainable development" was possible because it embraced the ideas about world regulation held by ideological rivals (liberal and social-reformist trends) which throughout the 1970s had remained locked in confrontation over the NIEO.

Globalization surged ahead when the Cold War ended and the former socialist camp became part of the world market. One could imagine that in the 1990s both global phenomena — technological (globalization) and ideological (sustainable development) — could have supplied a powerful impetus for the human civilization's positive development once the confrontation of two social systems was over. The world community, however, did not move to the sustainable development rails.

The very term "globalization" that had become part of the academic parlance in the 1980s gained much more popularity in the early 1990s when the negative trends of globalization began coming to the fore and because of a sudden eruption of the anti-globalist movement. The majority of discussions normally deal with two globalizations: on the one hand, it is "objective," "positive"

and “natural” which makes the achievements of the scientific and technical progress accessible for all together with the international division of labor, rationalization of labor, optimization of the production costs, higher living standards, etc. On the other there is “subjective,” “negative,” “corporate,” “unipolar,” “imperialist,” etc globalization responsible for unsustainable development, unequal distributions of the advantages globalization produces, unbridgeable technological gap, social polarization, depleting natural resources, etc.

The methods expected to oppose the negative effects of globalization are different yet the causes that create these effects are mainly found in the second, subjective component of the globalization process. It is still believed that there is no alternative to globalization despite the generally accepted conviction that it is developing in two forms.

The objective processes of scientific and technical progress promote international economic integration yet do not inevitably produce the present model (structure, form, superstructure, etc) of sociopolitical and economic relationships.

The term “sustainable development” is still alive yet it is applied to the financial system which emasculated the idea of authentic “sustainable development.”

The fact that after Rio-92 the neo-classical “mainstream” theory monopolized the conception is very important. At the turn of the 1990s, the neo-liberal theory having transformed the socialist development criteria into consumerist triumphed not only over Marxist ideology but also over the emerging “sustainable development” ideology from which it excluded the social-reformist approaches that accepted a possibility of post-industrial convergence between socialism and capitalism on the basis of their changed attitudes to the natural environment.

The U.S. where by the late 1980s Reaganomics had already considerably raised the standard of living and the UK did not need systemic ecological limitations suggested by the “sustainable development” conception that in 1992 was transferred to the UN for adoption. The limitations easily blocked the possibilities of the free movement of capitals Reaganomics had opened and even those that allowed the world socialist system to join the world capitalist economy. To avoid this, the United States insisted that the planned Rio summit should be called The UN Conference on Environment and Development rather than the UN Conference on Sustainable (read Viable) Development. The agreements were reduced to limited issues and declarations.

The Club of Rome ideologists contributed to the emasculation of the “sustainable development” ideas by reducing them to the “global regulation” level. It was on the recommendations supplied by A. King and B. Schneider in *The First Global Revolution: A Report to the Club of Rome* of 1991 that global regulation “should be applied to regional, district and local administration and to other social system: education, armed forces, private businesses and even the

family.”⁶

Neo-liberals reduced the sustainable development conception to serving permanent economic growth.

This was the triumph of those who believed that investments into two production factors — basic assets and human capital — should be taken into account and correctly assessed. It was believed that the ecological, or nature, capital requires no special approach and should receive the leftovers of investments. To ensure sustainable development it was enough to keep the aggregated capital reserves at a certain level for a fairly long time. In principle, granted the adequate scientific and technical development level it was believed that they could be used to replace natural environment with technetronic.

The complex and multidimensional world was reduced to the production factors and their periphery; this perfectly fitted the logic of the market. In the mid-1990s, the transnational “global regulation” conceptions rooted in the liberal approaches of the 1970s to the NIEO gained currency. It was believed that the states’ socioeconomic policies should be regulated by all sorts of the institutes of influence based on network cooperation.

It was generally believed that the spread of the market economy on the global scale will make the world homogenous and therefore easy to manage. For this reason the transnational corporations seen as the most efficient management structures were assigned the role of the main managing subject. They, however, can manage only the production factors: energy raw materials (land), mainly highly qualified workforce (labor) and finances (capital). Globalization offers another production factor — the global economic rent — formed by the latest technologies through the mechanism of TNC and international organizations that support them. This is how TNC create super-profits. The TNC shoulder another function: they ensure the infrastructure of the production factors and informational and political backup of their unhindered functioning (the periphery of the production factors.) By extending their financial, economic and political support international institutions add to the management efficiency.

This world, however, is far removed from realities. TNC can only manage the virtual world while the real world is much more complicated. In real life a large part of the urgent global problems (social, ecological, economic, demographic, energy raw material, ethnocultural, etc) find themselves outside the management sphere. To borrow a neo-liberal term they are externalia in relation to TNC.

Instead of “sustainable development” as a new form of world economic relations globalization gave rise to negative processes: *monopolization of the idea of sustainable development of human community as sustainable economic growth and the practical realization of the idea by reducing the entire complex of social relationships to production and consumption; globalization is a strategy of economic monopolies engaged in a rivalry with national states for the production factors — land, capital and labor — for the sake of a uninterrupted flow*

of super-profits created by the services to world economy which ensure permanent economic growth.

This strategy is incompatible with ecology, it decreases the planet's economic capacity; the limits of its natural rehabilitation were exceeded long ago.

For a long time serious Western scientists have been very much concerned with the prospects of mankind's physical survival; this means that a different development paradigm is needed. When writing about sustainable development the idea of which had been described by the Brundtland Commission 20 years ago, ⁷ before the first signs of the global financial crisis appeared Immanuel Wallerstein offered the following conclusion: "This is not an ecological but rather a political problem. Is sustainable development possible within the capitalist social system? If we remain within the capitalist system this will be our only choice. On the other hand, our social order ... is affected by a structural crisis; there is a transition to a certain different system."⁸

The conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changes convened by the UN Secretary General in December 2007 under a formal pretext of prolongation of the principles of the Convention formulated the task of theoretical and practical "adaptation of the national development strategies to shocking and complex changes" in the form of an inevitable increase of natural calamities.⁹ This means that the UN members were informed about the coming global ecological catastrophe. This probably forced the United States, the main environmental "polluter" and the ideological inspirer of "polluting" development accept the convention on the common terms.

Globalization demonstrated to us all that the old ideas about the higher level of ecological awareness of the Western social system which allows it to successfully cope with many ecological problems on their territories is nothing more than a myth. No longer a "highly polluting economy" this system in the capacity of *global economy still functions within the limits of backward primary economy*. The base of the pyramid with its fuel and energy, agricultural-industrial, forest and fishing complexes as well as the highly energy- and material-consuming industrial sectors is merely removed to the periphery of world economy. This explains why the scope of the global problems against which the national borders cannot protect is mounting rather than decreasing.

Important results of the post-Brundtland period of the development of world system suggest themselves. It was ushered in by the Agenda 21 (sustainable development of individual countries based on "prediction and forestalling" of negative effects of global development) and ended when in 2007 these strategies were adapted to the shocking and comprehensive changes which, in fact, corresponded to the development according to the principles of (delayed) responding, something that the "sustainable development" conception had been intended to prevent.

First, the climatic system was transformed from the constant into a variable of the natural environment. This means that the number of ecological exter-

nalía of neo-liberal economy acquired a new quality: the fourth, main (as distinct from the conventional factor in the form of global economic rent) climatic factor of production.

Second, there is an unequivocal answer to the theoretical question about the ecology-economy relationship: viability of economic development depends on the climatic resource, or wider, ecological resource. Its exhaustion revealed its systemic nature.

Third, by offering their services of maintaining permanent economic growth the economic monopolies triumph in the rivalry for the production factors (land, capital, labor) with the states. This, however, imposes on them the duty of contributing to the efforts of restoring the climatic factor of production to its former status of the constant. This means that they are forced to correlate their desire to maintain a permanent flow of super-profits with mankind's physical survival. The state regains its main role in the national socioeconomic development; it gains a subjectivity of a higher level in global processes. In this way the period of domination of the free market forces in world economy comes to an end; this is inevitable even in an absence of a full-scale global financial crisis.

Everything that is suggested as a remedy for the negative manifestations of globalization is hardly adequate. Radical prescriptions are interpreted as a call to de-globalization and an attempt to forestall objective development processes. Protectionism and/or left-Marxist revanche as the only alternative to globalization can hardly be described as productive. The administrative-command planned economy, likewise, is capable of monopolizing the sustainable development idea interpreted as economic growth. When criticized from Marxist positions globalization is accused of abusing labor as one of the production factors; the ecological approach accuses globalization of abusing land as another production factor. The authentic sustainable development conception criticizes excessive exploitation of both.

Meanwhile, the world community has already accepted a theoretical solution in the form of sustainable development. Before the crisis the EU and the U.S. "rested on the laurels" of the globally progressive nature of their economic and political systems; China was engaged in its unprecedented industrial breakthrough to keep the "consumer society," one of the nature wasters, permanently busy. India was following in China's footsteps. The Third World countries with no necessary resources were left outside the global modernization tasks. For objective reasons, before the crisis, none of them could accept as expedient a systemic radical U-turn to eco-compatible economy which would limit consumption to necessary and sufficient for human civilization's sustainable development. So far nobody knows whether they are ready to accept this is the context of the new, crisis, realities.

The transnational economic subjects are even less able to arrive to this conclusion on their own. Their functioning stems from the postulate of unlimit-

ed and growing demands and unlimited possibilities of their satisfaction.

Today, the Nobel Committee offers an opinion that in the 1980s the anthropogenic factor of global warming was nothing more than an odd hypothesis. This is not true. The academic community raised the alarm, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Changes within Rio-92 being the direct outcome of these efforts. The concerned scientists were dismissed as alarmists interfering with the natural course of business activities. This brings to mind the fact that the economists who felt no loyalty to the “mainstream” warned about the current financial crisis.

Later, the globalizational breakthrough of the West and China’s phenomenal contribution to it in the 1990s made global warming obvious for all.

The globalizing world economy did nothing to turn to more ecologically-friendly investment policies. Nothing of the kind happened in the so-called strategy of the Russian economic breakthrough either. (The new Cabinet did not restore the corresponding ministry.) If realized this breakthrough patterned on China will produce synergetic effects that might push climatic changes beyond repair.

Russia’s position in this context is a unique one: as a result of the failed neo-liberal reforms it lost much of its previous nationally organized economic basis to become the only country with a powerful intellectual potential that because of deindustrialization relieved itself, to a great extent, from the ecologically incompatible “industrial burden.” Russia owes nothing to the dominant neo-liberal model: compared with Soviet times it gained nothing in the economic and social respects. It sustained gigantic economic and social losses, the fact admitted by the Western economic and political heavyweights Joseph Stiglitz¹⁰ and Zbigniew Brzezinski. ¹¹

Likewise, Russians owe nothing to the ideological “mainstream” intellectually; in fact it was Russia that made its intellectual contribution into the theory of noosphere — from V. Vernadsky, K. Tsiolkovsky to N. Moiseyev — of which the “sustainable development” ideology is, actually, the first step. Seventy years of Soviet power were dominated by Marxist ideology that claimed to be a universal theory. First deputy of the head of RF Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov in many of his works appeals to the Russian cosmists to trace down the ideas underlying this ideology: Russian culture needed holistic approach to the world; it could flexibly cooperate with other cultures, integrate, without destroying, the variety of their customs and preserve the integrity of the patchy common world. ¹²

Russia has a unique and an advantageous chance of going along the Agenda 21 route. It should abandon the idea of modernizing its economy according to the Chinese industrialization pattern that is rapidly exhausting the planet’s ecological carrying capacity. Russia should stake at the investments into more advanced technological order and technologically advanced and ecologically friendly agriculture. We should tap to the maximum the advantages of the inter-

national division of labor and move away from import substitution and “semi-knock-down” productions based on imported technologies. This means that Russia should not develop the globally mastered technologies and productions with similar consumer properties of which car industry is one of the examples. At the same time, in view of Russia’s spatial and other characteristics civilian branches should develop their own production facilities indispensable, for example, for air and marine transport infrastructure.

Economic subjects can be attracted by change of priorities. Until we restore the planet’s natural ecological carrying capacity we should use the advantages created by scientific and technical progress to serve society mainly by offering it a favorable and healthy environment. In the first place we should purify and return to nature the territories now used for production purposes. Here I have in mind, first and foremost, the ecological collectively owned objects, with no individual value in the “dominant” economy. This is typical, for example, of the small autochthonous peoples of the North.

The post-crisis transformational model should not strive to “manage” the crises (which cannot be done due to their cyclical nature). It should serve the economy that should become “organismal,” that is, developing through pulsating growth, which, in turn, should become “viable.” To achieve this we should set up productions with mobile workforce. When the market reaches the saturation point production should be able to move to the “sleeping regime” to be revived or closed depending on the situation or, similarly, to a “cocoon” regime. Once revived it starts producing commodities of a new generation to completely satisfy the demand in previous products. These projects should be supported with corresponding financial institutions.

It is important to make civil society an active part of consumer society where its key factor — demand-supply — is involved. To achieve a sustainable consumption model the development vector of mass culture should be changed. It should move away from the “ideology of gloss” adjusted to artificial festivity to the ideology of man’s natural state and its historical belonging to culture and nature. This is typical, for example, of the autochthonous small peoples of the North, Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Civil society that stands on the positions of preservation of the environment should be involved into preservation and development to balance out the forces behind economic growth. This corresponds to the idea of a national structure with the following prerogatives:

- initiating legislation;
- ecologizing public consciousness; forming eco-systemic awareness in power, business and society;
- changing the development indicators (transference from the aggregate financial growth indicators, such as GDP, to the indicators reflecting the ties between various aspects of society’s functioning);
- identifying the development aims.

To achieve this, the set of measures suggested at the UN conferences in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002 should be realized: society should become ecologically aware; the following points should become part of legislation: first, the three aims of sustainable development, the most important of them being ecological entity (long-term preservation of ecosystems and biological variety); second, the three basic principles of sustainable development, of which “the polluter pays” principle alone is so far taken into account; third, the corresponding axioms of ecological management and the rules related to sustainable use of the reserves of nature.

The ecological factor should become the priority and the key criterion when assessing, realizing and using investment projects and as well as assessing how macro- and micro-regions are developing their main industries. We need conditions conducive to capital flow into eco-compatible productions.

We need an Ecological Stabilization Fund (patterned on the already functioning Stabilization Fund) designed to restore the planet’s biospheric stability and prevent ecological risks. The project might attract the countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol which means that its mechanism might be applied on a wider scale.

The Fund should consist of two parts: one of them, physical, should contain a list of territories on which eco-incompatible activities should be banned; the number and sizes of natural territories with a special protection regime should be increased. The other part should contain money necessary for recultivation and restoration to nature the ecosystems and territories damaged by economic activities.

The Russian forests deserve special attention. Deforestation has been already identified as one of the main causes behind global warming: it is responsible for at least 20 percent of greenhouse gas emission. In connection with the Bali Conference the World Bank initiated preservation of forests to cut down greenhouse gas emission; this is very important for Russia. President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick is convinced that the world has recognized the global value of forests and is prepared to pay for it. The most developed countries pledged to invest about \$160 million to pay for the initial stage of the 10-year-long program.

Strange as it may seem attention is riveted to the developing countries (South America, Africa and Indonesia); the deforestation scale there is large enough to affect the planet yet its immediate effect is mostly felt in the Southern Hemisphere.

In the Northern Hemisphere where the industrially developed countries are situated the wetlands and the forest ecosystem of the Russian Federation play the role of bio-reserves (analogues to the role played by the tropical forests of the Amazon in Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere). By the end of the Soviet Union the forest ecosystems constituted one-fifth of the world’s forest reserves. According to the international expert community merciless tree felling in the

tropical forests the “planet’s lungs” function is moving from South America and Equatorial Africa to Siberia and the Russian Far East where the world’s largest territory untouched by economic activity is found.

During the years of market reforms Russian forests were intensively, mercilessly and mainly illegally felled. It is expected that quotas on tree-felling will be included in a new agreement designed to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which means that they will be enacted after 2012. Much was said at the Bali Conference, in particular by the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul that the world could not afford losing a single day in protecting climate and forests.¹⁵

This means that Russia should voluntarily shoulder an obligation to immediately change its forest-related policies. It should also pool forces with the other interested sides: the Western countries, the WB, UN and the participants in the Climate Change Convention to remedy the situation. In view of the highly criminalized and corrupt wood business Russia should establish temporal state monopoly on and it introduce temporal moratorium on forest felling until the situation in forestry is clear and a forest reproduction strategy is formulated. It will be necessary to offer alternatives to wood-related businesses which can be done with the help of the mechanisms suggested by the WB and on the basis of international cooperation (with China’s participation especially in the Far East) and to begin forest reproduction on the basis of the Kyoto Forests idea.

Time has come to stop using timber for packaging and printed matter; we should create new packaging materials and encourage the use of electronic carriers. We should stop looking at domestic and industrial refuse (paper in the first place) as rubbish and learn to recycle them. It is advisable to move to refuse economics which opens wide possibilities for small and medium businesses. This and other ideas should be actively promoted through the WTO mechanisms and social adverts to lower the materialization level of public production to the amounts comparable to the ecological capacity of the natural environment. The UN Millennium Declaration enumerated several fundamental values and stated that “the current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed.” Since 2000, this situation went from bad to worse: today we are talking not of the future but of the present generation. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is optimistic about the Bali agreements that, he says, will usher in the epoch of “green” economics and “green” development yet when speaking about sustainable development he limited himself to mentioning the economy “based on ecologically pure technologies and the economy with a low emission volume.” He never went deeper, to the roots of the consumer society economy which can be described as highly unproductive.

This means that Russia should pursue responsible policies: it should lead the world in sustainable development in the full meaning of the term and move from the “market as a priority” to “sustainability as a priority” development model in the terms of GEO-3 timed to the World Summit on Sustainable

Development in Johannesburg.

Post-crisis global economics and Russia's economics in the first place should create economy of sustainable development as an economy responsible to future generations.

NOTES

¹ Washington Post. Staff Writers. Friday, October 24, 2008; p. A01.<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/23...html>

² <http://www.svobodanews.ru/Article/2009/01/29/...html>

³ <http://www.svobodanews.ru/Transcript/2009/01/28...html>

⁴ Julia Finch, "Twenty-five People at the Heart of the Meltdown," *The Guardian*, January 26, 2009.

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ A. King, B. Schneider, *The First Global Revolution: A Report to the Club of Rome*, N.Y., 1991, p. 182.

⁷ *Our Common Future: The Report of the World Commission on the Environment and Development*, Oxford, N.Y., Oxford University Press, 1987.

⁸ I. Vallerstein, "Ekologia i ekonomika v globalnom kontekste," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 2006, p. 98.

⁹ <http://www.un.org/russian/climatechange/2007highlevel/index.shtml>

¹⁰ See numerous works by J. Stiglitz on the results of Russian reforms.

¹¹ Z. Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*. N.Y., 2007.

¹² See; for example, V. Surkov's report at the meeting of RAS members of 21 June 2007 "Russkaia politicheskaia kultura. Vzgliad iz utopii" <http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=114851>

¹³ <http://www.un.org/russian/news/fullstorynews.asp?news ID>

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ <http://www.un.org/russian/document/aids/sumdect.htm>

Looking From Sofia

Ivaylo Kalfin

LET ME FIRST OF ALL thank the heads of the Diplomatic Academy for the invitation to elucidate some matters connected with the foreign policy of the Republic of Bulgaria with an emphasis on regional cooperation. I accepted the invitation as a great honor and simultaneously as a real challenge, considering the level of information and competence that this audience enjoys.

In the early 21st century we are facing a number of challenges, old and new, with the realities urging us to be not only well-informed but also, and primarily, equal to the considerable changes in the world as a whole and, in particular, ones in the areas and manifestations that we designate as the field of diplomacy.

The end of the Cold War became a source of unprecedented processes of political, economic, social, cultural and technological transformation, resulting in a grown number of participants and problems on the international stage and their interconnection. Despite the fact that the nation-state still keeps its central place in international relations, the traditional interstate diplomacy is becoming fragmented and more complex in consequence of the increased number of public and nonpublic entities aspiring to territories, resources, markets and legitimacy. On the other hand, the revolution in information and communication technologies is helping the democracy and globalization processes, is introducing new tools and new organizational mechanisms, and is generating shifts in the existing hierarchical relations. In the modern world, information is the main source of power and influence, while national governments find it increasingly difficult to control the movement – occasionally instantaneous – of different kinds of resources as well as the interaction between the numerous participants in international life. More specifically, Internet has wrought a fundamental change in how we understand time, space and speed. Those technologies are emerging as one of the most powerful means of selecting, handling, analyzing and synthesizing information that thus becomes operational knowledge in the various areas of human activity, including diplomacy.

Historically diplomacy always used to adapt to the international system's requirements and changes. Traditional diplomacy adapts to changes in

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This article is based on the lecture the Bulgarian minister delivered at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in Moscow

society – a higher level of democracy, more media and civic influences, greater importance of ethical matters – by paying more attention to public preferences, human rights, cultural differences, transparency and responsibility. Issues like human rights, organized crime and international terrorism, environment, international trade, intellectual rights, negotiations respecting technological standards and protocols, and others are turning into the main problems of interstate relations, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, etc.

In the early 21st century the international medium is characterized by the asymmetry or new challenges, and an escalation of new tensions between the principles of inviolability of borders and the right to self-determination, between non-interference in foreign affairs of sovereign states and the need for international human rights protection. States like Bulgaria that have neither a large territory nor a numerous population are exposed to traditional and new risks and are being affected negatively by regional conflicts, instability resulting from disintegration of states, terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, information security risks, and suspension of deliveries of vital resources, particularly energy. As is to be regretted, some instances of those risks are in direct vicinity of my country – I mean Kosovo, South Caucasus, and others.

As a nation possessing limited resources and unable to independently guarantee its security in an increasingly globalized world, Bulgaria abides by the principles and standards of international law and seeks better integration in international political, economic and military structures, where it has a new opportunity to pursue an active policy defending both its own and collective interests.

Bulgarian diplomacy's strategic aim is to practice an advanced foreign policy based on the Bulgarian national interests and European values, one that secures a maximally favorable foreign environment for the development and well-being of the Bulgarian nation.

Small nations can influence the external environment by conducting a purposeful policy at the local and regional levels. Within its region, Bulgaria maintains and develops active relations with its neighbors. Bulgaria consistently supports the European perspective opening to West Balkan countries not only as something stimulating the establishment of stable institutions, consolidating the democratic processes and developing the market economy but also, in a broader sense, as an important factor of security in South Eastern Europe. Of key importance for the Republic of Bulgaria's interests are processes that strengthen regional security and develop regional cooperation in all its aspects.

Regional Cooperation Initiatives in South East Europe

BULGARIA'S SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE POLICY is directed at consolidating trust, stability and security, and at asserting the European standards in relations between states in the region. Regional cooperation is not an alternative to

European integration; rather it is its integral part.

Bulgaria was a constructive participant in the transformation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) and the implementation of the regionalism principle. As an active participant in the Stability Pact and chairman of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) between 2007 and 2008, Bulgaria took the necessary steps to attain some workable results as a consequence of the SP transformation.

The Bulgarian SEECP chairmanship saw a successful termination of the Stability Pact and the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in its stead. Bulgaria believes that the SEECP should become the leading political format for regional cooperation and a platform of European and Euroatlantic integration. The RCC is a crucial result of the transformation of regional initiatives, being what expresses the South East European nations' wish to decide their future on their own.

We are firmly convinced that all countries in the region should participate in regional cooperation. No black holes should remain in the Balkans. The SEECP should be preserved in the format of dialogue, discussion and compromise. At the same time, the RCC should assume the interlocutor function, mediating between the region and the EC and concentrating on the practical implementation of approved priorities.

Against the background of controversial signals in connection with Kosovo independence, the SEECP's latest Pomorie summit (May 2008) managed to approve the regionalism theme and the need to unfold its potential.

European Prospect for Western Balkan Nations

WE SHARE THE VISION that EU enlargement is a powerful tool for security stability and regional conflict prevention.

Bulgaria supports European integration of all Western Balkan countries, because we are deeply convinced that this will lead to a protracted stabilization and sustained economic development in the region.

The EU commitments vis-à-vis the Western Balkan countries, via the Stabilization and Association Process, played the decisive role in progress those countries made in recent years. At the same time, the Western Balkan countries are still facing serious challenges, and this calls for serious EU attention.

The EC conclusions in December confirmed that the future of the Western Balkan countries is connected with the EU. The latter must elaborate a policy shortly that would not only confirm but also reinforce the Thessaloniki Agenda that granted EU membership prospects to all Western Balkan countries. But accelerating the European integration process must not be at the expense of complying with the existing terms and requirements.

It is only the implementation of the needed institutional and political reforms as well as the specific requirements in respect of individual countries

that will enable the Western Balkan nations to make progress in relations with the EU.

Black Sea Synergy and BSEC

THE BLACK SEA REGION is of strategic importance for the European Union and a priority element in its foreign relations. It is where such key partners as Russia, Turkey and states of the Eastern Dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy are located. It is also the main element of EU's energy security and an important transport corridor between Europe and Asia.

Before late 2006, the European Union lacked a purposeful policy vis-à-vis the Black Sea region. Starting with Bulgarian and Romanian membership, the European Commission's definition of the main principles of the Black Sea Synergy initiative and its prioritization by the German chairmanship in the first half of 2007, the Black Sea has been emerging as an independent EU foreign policy region on a par with the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea.

Currently the Black Sea Synergy is defined solely in terms of its general parameters; it is sooner a framework for cooperation, where a number of initiatives and projects can be included. From the institutional point of view, the evaluation of Synergy activities is expressed in EU and Black Sea foreign ministers holding a meeting in Kiev, Ukraine, on February 14, 2008, and in it establishing direct contacts with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), where the European Commission has an observer status.

Bulgaria is in favor of Russia's participation in regional cooperation, primarily the Black Sea Synergy. The Russian side is entertaining doubts as to the intentions behind this initiative but Russia's isolation or self-isolation will tangibly diminish the chances of success in the implementation of the plans. In this respect, Bulgaria believes it makes sense for Russia to participate in concrete sectors and projects in the priority cooperation spheres. Thus, Synergy might become a successful example of cooperation between the European Union and Russia, particularly in the context of negotiations on a new agreement.

To concentrate effort and resources, the Black Sea Synergy designated these five priority sectors:

Energy:

- preparing general legal framework for cooperation in this area;
- promoting the region's priority energy projects;
- developing renewable sources and energy efficiency.

Transport:

- protecting critical infrastructure;
- establishing transport infrastructure;
- facilitating transport on EU's external borders;
- preparing coordination transport framework.

Environment:

- working more effectively within the existing interaction framework;
- elaborating strategy for climate change and coastal zone control;
- developing general cooperation framework for fishing.

Soft Security:

- establishing an information exchange system on organized crime;
- starting a migration platform in the Black Sea region;
- elaborating cooperation mechanism for calamities and accidents.

Civil Society and Local Authorities:

- establishing a network of scientists, researchers and non-governmental organizations;
- intensifying student and teacher exchanges;
- promoting parliamentary cooperation;
- optimizing contacts between local authorities.

In June 2008, Bulgaria circulated its position on the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy that contains the following main elements:

- Bulgaria seeks to develop the Synergy as an all-embracing initiative that unites EU's eastern neighbors that have joined the Neighborhood Policy, Russia and Turkey. At the same time, the Synergy's flexible format makes it possible to initiate both projects common for all countries and specific activities, such as ones intended solely for ENP countries or solely for littoral countries.

- The Synergy is open to all regional organizations that really benefit regional cooperation, primarily to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

- The Black Sea Synergy is insufficiently familiar as an initiative, and it is therefore necessary that it gains a broader popularity and visibility in the region and within the EU framework.

- The Synergy's aim is to lay emphasis on regional problems that cannot be solved within the framework of bilateral relations between the EU and Black Sea zone countries. It must not become a direct tool for solving bilateral problems or security problems, such as conflicts in the Black Sea region.

- Bulgaria believes that the Synergy implementation process must be orientated to concrete results and lead to the initiation of joint projects by the EU and countries in the region. In this context Bulgaria states its readiness and wish to participate, jointly with other member-states, in implementing project partnerships in the priority areas for the region and my country.

- How to fund the Black Sea Synergy is an important matter that will largely determine its efficiency. The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is one of the main Synergy funding channels, but its geographical coverage is too extensive and it has numerous thematic priorities. The

Black Sea Cross Border Cooperation Program with a budget of 17 million euros for 2007-2013 mostly embraces local activities and civil society. Some external sources of funding should be looked for, because at this point in time the available funds are insufficient for significant regional projects. In the mid-term, independent funding for the Synergy should be looked for.

- It is undesirable to institutionalize the Synergy. Despite this, a special coordinator for the Black Sea should be determined within the European Commission to attract political resources and attention.

The European Commission produced Communication on Eastern Partnership in early December 2008, and the European Union is due to decide on it in March 2009.

The Eastern Partnership Initiative is a continuation of the European Neighborhood Policy, and is aided by a new generation of agreements and implementation action plans. The purpose is to intensify the economic and political cooperation between the ENP countries and the European Union. The Initiative is an expression of the bilateral wish and real capabilities for the intensification of relations between the EU and the said countries.

The Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy should not be regarded as policies directed against Russia, because the ENP countries' common interest is in achieving security, stability, transparent control and sustained development.

In relation to regional organizations and initiatives, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Black Sea Commerce and Development Bank must remain important partners in a reinforced Black Sea Synergy as well. The BSEC is the most representative and institutionally developed intergovernmental organization in the Black Sea region, which indirectly helps maintain good-neighborly relations and create mutual trust in the region.

True, the BSEC has no tools or capabilities for addressing the political agendas linked to bilateral problems and conflict settlement, but the organization makes its contribution to security and stability in the region by establishing good cooperation between the member-countries in the soft security area.

Bulgaria positively estimates the recently accomplished round of institutional reforms aimed at turning the BSEC into a more efficient organization. We believe that those reforms, along with the revaluation of the organization's financial instruments, are the necessary steps towards its greater efficiency. Guided by this conviction, my country presented, in May 2008, a non-paper for energizing the declared-interest BSEC activities in such areas as environment, trade, energy production, transport, telecommunications, science and technology, as well as for more effective fight against organized crime. It was also suggested that BSEC chairmanship should be rotated twice a year – January to June and July to December – that the number of foreign ministerial meetings should be optimized, that a preliminary agenda for planned meetings should be accept-

ed, and that silence procedures should be used on a wider scale, particularly where the preliminary agenda acceptance for planned meetings is concerned.

Proving that the BSEC member-states are ready to draw up projects of regional importance is the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway and the Memorandum of Understanding for the Development of Black Sea Shipping Lanes.

Bulgaria supports pragmatism in relations between the BSEC and the European Union within the framework of a reinforced Black Sea Synergy, as well as a more visible EC observer participation in the organization.

To conclude, Bulgaria's policy in South Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region is directed at promoting regional cooperation; in years to come this remains one of the main priorities of my country's foreign policy.

The Diplomacy Prodigy

A. Bessmertnykh

THE YEAR 2009 marks the birth centenary of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. Most diplomats of my generation and an important number of current ambassadors, top- and medium-ranking Foreign Ministry officials worked under him in some or other capacity. They were learning the ropes of the intricate art of conducting foreign policy under very harsh Cold War conditions in the illustrious shade of the Master of Diplomacy of the 20th century. Each of us must remember him in their own way.

I was fortunate to have had a chance to learn from many people the hard job (if you take it seriously) of a diplomat who must acquire the knowledge of many sciences and skills, special techniques (not unlike those of a musician) of this largely unique trade, erudition, logic and verbal skills. A.A. Gromyko was someone you could learn all these from.

From a distance, Andrei Gromyko seemed to be the cold and inaccessible summit of the Himalayas. At a closer range he was different – an attentive and calm person with a gentle sense of humor which he was trying to conceal. He wasn't dour by nature and more often than not he was concentrated and lost in his thoughts. At the same time he was of course a multifaceted character. I was fortunate to be one of his subordinates to see him at work at a close enough range. At first I was member of his secretariat and then worked under him as member of the Foreign Ministry Collegiums and head of the USA and Canada Department.

As luck would have it, I got a job as one of Gromyko's aides at the start of my diplomatic career. Admittedly, my career could have been different and quite happy, but it would have hardly been as full of historic events.

Having worked for nearly one year for the translation service of the UN Secretariat in New York and then four and a half years as aide to deputy UN Secretary General who also headed up the Security Council Department of Political Affairs (in my time this position was filled by prominent diplomats like E.D. Kiselev, V.P. Suslov and A.E. Nesterenko), I returned to Moscow in 1966 looking forward to taking up a new job, after a two-month vacation, at the USSR Foreign Ministry department for international organizations. It, however, turned

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Foreign Ministry department for international organizations. It, however, turned out that they assigned me as member of the foreign minister's secretariat on the seventh floor where I reported with trepidation two days upon my return from New York.

Several weeks on, I took up my duties as an assistant to Andrei Andreevich presenting to him documents and urgent telegrams, carrying out assignments, driving to his dacha and apartment to fetch materials he examined, taking down his comments and instructions addressed to his deputies, department heads and ambassadors.

At first I had difficulty remembering all the twists and turns of the events regarding which he requested information from the ambassadors, or from his fellow foreign ministers, or from the Politburo. His questions to us were laconic: Have the British replied yet? Is Cairo still silent? Have the Americans reacted in any way to our statement? Gromyko could keep in mind dozens, if not hundreds, of issues and problems most diverse in importance and scope. He remembered everything and that overwhelmed me at first. Entering his office I thought I was entering a minefield: can a human keep in mind so many things?

Gromyko did understand it was simply impossible for a greenhorn to get in the swing of things at once, but he made no allowances and said nothing when I answered "I have to check it out" (a milder form of saying "I don't know").

Pondering involved problems he, as a rule, sought clever offbeat ideas from those responsible for one or other area of politics. On occasion, he engaged in deliberations naming possible moves in a particular issue and expecting honest and direct reactions from his audience. He accepted some things and rejected others and took disagreement with some of his ideas in his stride. Georgii Markovich Kornienko, his first deputy, used to say in such cases with his southern accent: "It would be good also to consider the following option..." and voiced an idea different from that of the minister. Once, as the head of the USA and Canada Department, I was asked to join G.M. Kornienko and V.G. Komplektov to thrash out together with the minister questions related to the nuclear arms limitation, the talks with the USA on regional and bilateral relations, the situations of crisis where "Washington's hand" deemed to be present. Experts in other fields were also involved and attended such brainstorming sessions, where Gromyko didn't so much seek support as new robust ideas leading up to the right solutions.

THE 1970S AND 1980S were a unique period of unparalleled intensive talks with the United States to achieve deeper and stricter limitations of offensive nuclear weapons touched off by the signing in June 1979 of the SALT II Treaty. The problem became seriously worsened by the real threat of taking the arms

race into outer space, the prospect (even if distant) of the emergence of space-based weapons with unpredictable consequences for our state's national security. Soviet diplomats were obliged to go into all, including strictly technical, aspects of the balance of nuclear forces between the USSR and USA, consider the correlation of not only the quantitative but also the qualitative characteristics of our own and American strategic weapons: land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, cruise missiles, missile-armed submarines, nuclear warheads etc. Especially hard to handle were systems of control that were being developed, the problems of correlation between the offensive and defensive weapons and dozens of other questions that made more sense to engineers and physicists. But diplomats also had to delve deep into them.

Concrete discussions were conducted via the USSR Embassy in the USA and by disarmament delegations. But the fundamental strategic talks were up to the foreign ministers. In the early phases, I was present and later took part in the talks and special contacts on these matters. I remember watching with what was initially near consternation how Gromyko was discussing these very involved questions with American presidents and secretaries of state. I admired his ability to detect in the pattern of his opponents' semantic combinations the finest nuances and sometimes very clever tricks that had to be responded to.

In addition to his indisputable mental capacity, Gromyko always relied also on the tried and tested methods of preparing for negotiations. He meticulously studied all the nuances of the negotiating parties' positions recruiting for this purpose not only Foreign Ministry experts but also, if need be, the chief of the General Staff, heads of the military-industrial complex and members of the intelligence community. Thus, the Americans faced across the negotiating table a minister who was also an expert.

Gromyko, I should say, was regarded by many political figures abroad as a living monument to the tragic and at the same time great era of victory over Germany's Nazism, Italy's fascism and Japan's militarism. They were excited at the mere thought that he had been in company with Roosevelt, Stalin, Truman, Churchill and De Gaulle, rubbed shoulders with them and conducted talks, that he attended the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the leaders of the great powers, added his signature to the UN Charter and voted for the founding of Israel.

There was a whiff of history and even some mysticism emanating from him. That is why many diplomats and policymakers felt somewhat shy before their meetings with Gromyko. I witnessed many such situations.

The first secretary of state appointed by President Reagan was Alexander Haig, a four-star general (there were no more than seven such generals in the USA at that time), he was NATO commander earlier, a man of decision initially with little diplomatic experience: it was he who claimed soon on taking the diplomatic office "There are more important things than peace." Moscow's relations with the new administration were being adjusted with difficulty. Washington was setting a course for ending the United States' alleged lagging

behind the USSR in strategic forces, or, in other words, for an arms race unprecedented in its scale. It was expected under these conditions, that the meeting between Haig and Gromyko, scheduled to take place during the UN General Assembly session in New York in September 1981, would be a hard clash whose sparks would further enflame the tense situation in the world.

In advance of the meeting, Moscow made extensive diplomatic preparations. In August, it published the draft treaty prohibiting the stationing of all weapons in outer space. Concurrently, Gromyko sent a letter to UN Secretary General Waldheim calling for the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

The meeting took place at the USSR mission on the 67th Street in New York City. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and I (a minister at that time) attended it. A few days after Haig's appointment as secretary of state, I shook hands with him at a reception tendered by Sylvan Marshall, a friend of mine and a noted Washington lawyer, at his posh residence, a favorite haunt of the Washington elite. He was full of go at that time. I was curious to see how his discussion with our minister would turn out.

Waiting for the visitor, Gromyko was pacing the office and asking Dobrynin questions about the balance of forces in the Reagan administration, never mentioning the subject of the upcoming discussion with the secretary of state. Such was his habit. He kept in his mind his carefully considered plans of discussions and thought they should not be further discussed at the last moment.

Haig walked in as a general he was and. Gromyko greeted him courteously. Once everyone sank into their chairs, Gromyko paused momentarily as if reflecting and dead silence fell over the room. Haig perched on the edge of his chair putting his arms on the rests. He was visibly excited and could not help it. Besides, he had not gotten used yet to diplomatic talks and clearly felt ill at ease in the presence of the formidable Soviet foreign minister.

Gromyko opened the discussion in a gentle manner. He said he regretted the U.S. stance on nuclear arms and stressed the USSR's desire to restart the negotiating process so important for the whole world and proceed toward cooperation in areas benefiting both sides. He suggested that common ground should be found for joint solutions in the limitation of nuclear weaponry. He spoke of the need for a broad look at the issue of strategic security that also included demilitarization of outer space.

Haig had not expected this gentle style of discussion. He had been prepared for a tough debate. This is perhaps why he expressed agreement with some of the Soviet minister's ideas by saying 'yes, sir' and 'OK, sir' in a military sort of way. The Secretary of State was presenting the prepared U.S. positions in the same moderate tone of voice. There emerged coinciding approaches and the sides agreed to try and produce a joint document of intent with regard to the strategic arms talks. The working team set up for the purpose spent the night drafting its text which, after the two ministers fine-tuned it, became the joint U.S.-Soviet statement calling for the limiting of weapons, including nuclear

weapons which the USSR and USA discussed earlier in Geneva.

Gromyko's negotiating style (from what I could gather) consisted in particular in that, before engaging in talks, he formed the precise idea of their final objective and assessed fairly well the existing potential compromise. His arsenal included many techniques to get him to acceptable results. Their choice depended on the way his negotiating partner acted, the nature of talks and the situation in which they were taking place. His tactic could change as the talks progressed. Having prepared several alternative solutions, favorable to us, to one or another problem, the minister didn't hasten to switch to the next alternative unless he became convinced that the other side wouldn't accept our previous solution. To make sure he (and our delegates controlled and guided by him) wrung from his negotiating partners proofs to show that they could not agree on the proposed terms. Some counterparts thought this was a trick to drag out the talks. But I can't think of an instance where we would profit from dragging out important talks.

To my mind, few people abroad managed to come close enough to understanding some of the points of Gromyko's diplomatic art. Henry Kissinger is perhaps one who did. His observations result from the numerous and as a rule difficult discussions with the Soviet foreign minister on key issues of world politics. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that he saw in Gromyko an expert who shaped policy for the Politburo. During the talks, he writes, there inevitably comes a point where his competence prevailed in the discussions. Gromyko knew every shade of the subject being discussed and it was suicidal to conduct talks with him without having studied the background and the essence of the issues. Kissinger correctly observed that Gromyko used to prefer sustained pressure to abrupt moves and that he patiently scored points which gradually added up to an important result. He finally admitted that this technique proved exceedingly effective with regard to inexperienced negotiators and, compared to Gromyko, most negotiators were inexperienced.

Pointing out the positive aspects of Gromyko's diplomatic style, Kissinger then launched into a ritualistic discourse about Moscow's obstinacy, its abhorrence of appearing spineless and accusations of abandoning its ideological principles.

I would like here to point out the fact that some of our current diplomats have uncritically subscribed to the usual American view of Soviet diplomacy as "ideological" and thus unacceptable in the new Russia's "pragmatic" foreign policy.

There's no denying, the Soviet Union's foreign policy contained a strong ideological component with regard to relationships with the "capitalist world" and the socialist countries of west and east which was the responsibility of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee whose positions often differed from those of the Foreign Ministry. Understandably, some of its diplomats candidly believed in the final "triumph of communism." Gromyko

states in his memoirs: "Since my mature years, I have been a devoted communist worshipping the potent strength of the Marx-Engels-Lenin teaching." Such was his faith.

But does this signify that Gromyko and Soviet diplomacy used to uphold "ideological" interests in world politics more than the national interests? It doesn't of course. Any belief, be it belief in God or Marx, is part of the spiritual makeup of man rather than an instruction to carry out a particular sort of policy. I know of no single agreement, treaty, understanding or of any crisis and estrangement in our relations with the leading powers that were dictated by someone's belief in Marxism-Leninism. The entire enormous array of international legal documents amassed by Russia since the times of the Ambassadors Department (under Ivan the Terrible) and expanded by diplomats of the 20th century is the realistic and serious foundation built on the principle of promoting national interests to be also used by Russian diplomats today while they prove a bit shy recognizing the importance of this life-giving continuity.

Inevitably condemning the "Soviet system," Kissinger sums up his appraisal of the Soviet foreign minister: Gromyko was without a doubt one of the most capable diplomats I had to do with ... He defended his country at the time of turbulent change and confusion, and advanced its interests. He scored important goals and rarely made mistakes that could be avoided. There are few foreign ministers who could be so praised.

Gromyko's talent was praised highly by many of his friends and enemies in the global processes that shaped the fortunes of mankind during 50 years of the past century.

GROMYKO CAREFULLY SELECTED the ranking personnel for his ministry, or his general staff, to use the military term. His appointees stayed on in their positions even if some of them proved not quite up to the professional standard. The minister grew accustomed to those around him and was very reluctant letting them go to work abroad. Many of his deputies stayed on in their positions for decades. They included, in particular, his first deputies G.M. Kornienko and A.G. Kovalev, both gifted professionals.

He especially valued diplomats who had the gift of words and pen and could quickly and competently draft documents, statements, notes and formulate proposals. A sophisticated journalist or even a poet with a God-given talent can hardly produce a high-level diplomatic text. This is a special genre and special art.

Gromyko was very skillful in his use of language and able to pick the right words to convey the meaning of documents. I would say he worshipped speech. There are many instances to confirm this. I was fortunate to observe him at work and sometimes get involved in it.

During the intensive and difficult talks with the Americans on medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, strategic and space-based weapons, missile defense, chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Foreign Ministry used some additional tools to explain our approach and influence the negotiating process like suggesting to the other side “unofficial ideas” to offer which on the official level was for some reason thought to be premature or disadvantageous. I have in mind the publication of unsigned articles in government mouthpieces. These articles were closely studied both by the general public and important agencies abroad. Besides, our negotiators read these texts for getting valuable hints on how to conduct informal exploratory discussions. These articles were also published at the end of every year in the form of compendiums on disarmament matters.

Working on them was a broad circle of people including G.M. Kornienko, V.G. Komplektov and I as head of the USA and Canada Department – prior to the formation of the special Disarmament Directorate it was responsible in the ministry for nuclear armaments – V.F. Petrovsky, who was head of the Department for International Organizations, responsible for questions pertaining to conventional weapons. Invited experts included Viktor Karpov, Aleksei Obukhov and Georgy Mamedov. Asked to draft an article, the three of us (when it had to do with the strategic arms talks) came to the minister’s office where he supervised the meticulous work on the text, weighing every phrase and accurately formulating the planned concept. He was looking for the right words and urged us to come up with clear and concise words. The end document was in an unusual genre – a newspaper article imbued with a serious negotiating sense.

WHEN I WAS STILL MEMBER of his own team, I could see the minister at his home or dacha. He usually was at his desk reading papers and signing some of them “A.G.” using his favorite blue pencil to mean he read them or, if they were a draft of an official document (a letter to the Central Committee, a note, instructions to an ambassador), that he endorsed it. These initials in a blue pencil often determined a foreign policy trend or some people’s future.

On occasion when, ending work and handing me the leather-bound case with the checked materials, Andrei Andreevich took time out and leaning back wearily in his chair could touch on some “common subjects.” Once he saw me looking at his desk with stacks of books that only left a tiny square space for work and said: “My habit is to keep the books on the desk while I’m either reading or browsing through them. It’s quite a pile. I wish I had more spare time...” The pile contained not only books on politics, science or fiction but also art albums. Gromyko’s interests ranged very widely. His special interest at the time I’m writing about was history, ancient and recent.

GROMYKO WAS A DIPLOMAT of positive action. Even in seemingly hopeless situations, he tried to find paths to agreement, to at least a modicum of common ground in diverging positions. He realized it was counterproductive to corner his opponents which could bring about unpredictable or sharply worsened situations. When his opponents happened to step into their own trap, Gromyko thought it was best to help them out for the sake of continued relations and the normalization of the international situation. A good example is what happened in the final phase of the Vietnam War. Moscow was helping Washington build contacts with Hanoi, when it became clear that the U.S. emphasis on a military solution and later on Vietnamization (transferring responsibility for the war to Saigon and giving it all possible support by lavishing supplies of American weapons) was becoming dangerous for the world peace. This approach was also useful in settling a number of conflicts in Africa and Latin America.

Gromyko was convinced that mankind could not be secure unless there was a radical turn toward limiting the arms race. The relaxation of tensions in the 1970s with the first substantive accords in that area would have hardly happened had not Gromyko been its active architect and advocate. Not only did he say “yes” to those qualitative changes in world politics but he did say “no” to the opponents of disarmament and peace in the world.

He was a vigorous advocate of the strategy of expanding comprehensive ties with the USA realizing that the latter could be both a positive and negative force. His idea – I say this based on Gromyko’s numerous statements before his own people – was to work to have the USA grow positive in its relations with Russia, provided these relations be based on equal rights and accord with the interests of both countries and excluding interference in each other’s internal affairs.

Churchill once said he wasn’t a lion but he had the luck to give the roar. As for Gromyko, he had to react in a tough way to actions of the opposite side when he thought they damaged the honor and dignity of the state he represented. It is therefore unfair to label him “Mr. Nyet” as Western journalists constantly did what was echoed uncritically by some political scientists in this country. Historical records say that he, more often than others, could hear “no” from American and European politicians to Moscow’s peaceable offers.

ANDREI ANDREEVICH GROMYKO’S DEATH in 1989 was hard to accept for he seemed to stand as an indestructible rock.

In the morning of July 4, I was summoned by Shevardnadze, whose first deputy I was. “Owing to Gromyko’s death,” he said, “a government commission is being formed to arrange the funeral. Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachev] thinks

the funeral should be on a sufficiently high level. This is also my own opinion. Andrei Andreevich has deserved it ... You will be one of the commission members representing the Foreign Ministry. The commission will be headed by Politburo member V.I. Vorotnikov.”

The commission met to discuss and agree on details of the funeral. My impression was that members of the commission were not quite certain about the appropriate scale of the funeral for a retired state figure. The head of the commission was inclined to confine himself in his eulogy to Gromyko’s biography “which is self-evident.” I said I was going to speak of Andrei Andreevich as an outstanding diplomat of our country and of his role in world politics. No one objected.

The mourning ceremony was held in the building owned by the Ministry of Defense across the road from the Soviet Army Theater and went on for several hours. Those on the guard of honor at the coffin included high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials, some Politburo members (Gorbachev conveyed his condolences to Gromyko’s widow Lidia Dmitrievna, when he went to see her at her dacha). The funeral ceremony took place at the Novodevichy cemetery. Gromyko’s family had decided that he should be buried there next to his mother’s and brother’s graves. Then came my turn. I stepped onto the elevation in front of the coffin with the man I was very curious about as a student and whom I deeply respected. I was fortunate to work together with him and learn from him the art of being a diplomat and human being.

A light drizzle started and the droplets forming on his hair rolled down the cheeks like tears. Gromyko’s waxen face seemed to be in tears.

My tribute was to an outstanding person who had a keen sense of the real tremors of history and who was shaping policy as he looked forward into the future. He was skilled at the unique art of diplomacy, an intelligent and successful negotiator, a shrewd strategist.

I can’t recall what precisely I was saying; I only remember the general sense of my eulogy. Then they finally put the lid on the coffin and lowered it into the grave, it soon turned into a mound of flowers and wreaths. I said goodbye to the bereaved family – Lidia Dmitrievna, Milia, Anatoly, their children and grandchildren – and walked alone away to the exit along the path of wet asphalt.

I felt sad – this ended an era, whatever it was – an era of global diplomatic wars, an era of terrestrial worlds which, for nearly a full century, were clanking their monstrous mechanisms of death, putting life on the brink of terrible and irreversible destruction. They were opposed by diplomacy. Our diplomacy was headed up for more than 20 years by Gromyko. It is thanks to him, among other people, that the Molochs of the two ideologically irreconcilable civilizations didn’t clash in a destructive agony.

HERODOTUS MUST HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY RIGHT to observe that man is merely the plaything of chance. Sometimes, the chance takes over to bring about what is necessary. This is what happened to Gromyko. When in 1943, at the insistence of President Roosevelt, who disliked the active public campaign by our ambassador to Washington M.M. Litvinov for the opening of the second front, Moscow recalled the ambassador and replaced him with Andrei Gromyko, the embassy minister. Averell Harriman wrote in his memoirs: Litvinov has been replaced in Washington by a diplomacy prodigy, Andrei Gromyko.

The necessity broke the stalemate.

Politicians around the world appreciated that.

Four Years with Gromyko

A. Zaitsev

WITHOUT ATTEMPTING ANY SWEEPING GENERALIZATION, even less, assessment (let my fellow diplomats, who used to work under Gromyko in higher positions, do that), I'll venture to describe some episodes that remain in my memory when, 30 years ago, I was fortunate to work under this outstanding person, a past master at diplomatic art and a gifted scholar.

I hope my account will add a few lively touches to his portrayal in many Russian and foreign publications invariably as a dry-as-dust individual.

My Baptism of Fire

MY APPOINTMENT TO THE SECRETARIAT of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early July of 1979 came shortly before the 70th birthday of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko at the peak of his popularity and influence as one of three CPSU Central Committee Politburo members whose word, at that period, was decisive in laying down the home and foreign policy of the country with a universally recognized great power status.

Before taking up my new duties I had, as was the rule, to learn, from inside and in a brief span of time, about the workings of the Secretariat beginning with the duties of a night duty officer. I will never forget the few anxious nights I spent on my own in the deserted and securely locked up portion of the building outside the open door to the minister's office (to hear if any of the hotline telephones installed inside and nowhere else should ring, * in permanent readiness to respond to any, often unexpected calls coming to the impressive battery of phones of the government communication line at the side table of the minister's senior aide.

* The most important of the bank of phones was the one with the state emblem and emitting a ring that one was supposed to learn from day one and pick up its receiver without delay – it was a direct line to the General Secretary himself. I still remember the first such ring that came late into the night on my duty. I made a dash across the long ministerial office and grabbed the receiver panting: “Andriusha?” I heard the familiar tired drawl. “Leonid Il'ich,” I called briskly, “Andrei Andreevich has left for his dacha.” There was no reply.

Anatoly Zaitsev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Candidate of Sciences (Economics)

It was proving quite an effort to correctly react to the phone calls. For example, when our ambassadors put in urgent calls, one was supposed to decide whether to call out of bed the minister or first consult his first deputy who often was of help to us, night duty officers, or to wait till morning and the arrival of the minister.

Soon I started on my minister's aide's duties sorting out early in the morning the telegrams sent in from the embassies over the night. I arranged them in the order long established by the minister with top priority given to cables from Washington which were put in a separate file and on the minister's desk before his arrival.

I was "accredited" to the Secretariat upon the completion of my first important assignment – to prepare for the minister's return from vacation a draft of his acceptance address during the upcoming ceremony to award him the Hero of Socialist Labor order.

I was pretty nervous waiting for what the great man would say and, you should know, was I flattered when the senior aide smiled approvingly when he handed me the copy of the address approved by the minister. (I still keep these pages typed in big characters on laid paper with the minister's corrections in his invariable blunt blue pencil and "A.G." on the margin, his own seal of approval.) I had yet to pass many more tests to win the minister's recognition. My first calls to the minister proved a real test because he often used to ask most unexpected questions and expected immediate and precise answers. Improvised answers, as my seasoned associates cautioned me, would be unpardonable mistakes. The only formula the minister could accept at first, but which I could not use too often was: "I don't know the answer at the moment but I'll find it right away and tell you, Andrei Andreevich."

I found myself in situations like that mostly when on weekend or holiday duty. The formula only gave me five or ten minutes at best to figure out the answer before the minister was back on the phone: "What've you found?"

Recognition came after I scored a series of hits right on the target. "ZaitseU" (the ending betraying the light Byelorussian accent) was the fatherly way of addressing me by my last name when the minister was giving me yet another assignment. My associates concluded in chorus: "He's recognized you."

Apprenticed to Gromyko

MY YEARS WITH THE SECRETARIAT and more than two further years "under Gromyko" as a section head of the Foreign Ministry, proved a veritable school of diplomatic skills.

I realized the full value of that experience when already an ambassador of the USSR and Russia and head of various Foreign Ministry departments. On more than one occasion, this experience helped me out in difficult situations caused by conflicting instructions from Moscow in the early 1990s when I was

making arrangements in Brazzaville to get the families of our diplomats from both parts of Congo at the height of hostilities between the political factions there, and when I was ambassador to a northern NATO nation during the NATO air and missile attacks on Belgrade.

Those who came to work closely with Andrei Andreevich were amazed at his great capacity for work he retained until his last days. This largely resulted from his self-discipline and having no bad habits: He didn't smoke and could not stand smoking in his presence, including by people from other countries, and he didn't tolerate alcohol. I cannot remember him being on sick leave even once in the four years. Always fit and in good shape, the minister exercised and walked much. Whatever the weather, he went back to the government dacha, where he lived all the year round, and walked kilometer after kilometer along the asphalted path around the house followed, a short distance away, by one of the security officers (we used to call them "attached"). We refrained from needlessly distracting him from these walks.

The minister also liked hunting. At the height of the hunting season, he was provided, every Friday, as were the other Politburo members and primarily Leonid Brezhnev known for his passion for hunting, with detailed weather forecasts specially prepared by the State Committee for Hydrometeorology detailing weather conditions on weekends in the Moscow region and the neighboring regions. These weather forecasts were always conspicuously put on the minister's desk next to the most important documents. Based on them, weekend plans were made and hunting outings arranged, more often than not, at the Zavidovo hunting lodge outside Moscow, including with visiting dignitaries from other countries.

The weather people did their best, of course, but screw-ups happened now and then ("weather forecasts are always right, but they only cover the wrong days"). One can easily imagine what the weather service heads must have felt fearing being blamed for ruining the bosses' hunting expeditions. Luckily for them, these expeditions were not all that frequent.

The minister was exceptionally punctual and always arrived at the office in the morning and left for his dacha at the same time, unless something extraordinary happened. Unlike his successor, he wasted no hours for daily afternoon naps and he did not sit up very late unless the situation called for it. Unlike his predecessor, he followed a tight working schedule with brief pauses for lunch at the back of his office and sometimes for brief spells of physical exercises.

The minister worked with documents even on weekends and holidays. It was usual for him to call his aide on duty Sundays to hand in the material he signed or edited and told him what to do about them and received from him a sizable number of more papers to work on. Even if he was an extremely busy man, he always used his spare time for reading and keeping himself up-to-date.

Summoned to his dacha, I usually found the minister in the small hall fronting the bedroom on the second floor sitting at a big round table in the cor-

ner with piles of books with many bookmarks and copies of the latest issues of newspapers and magazines.

When he took time out in his office on Smolenskaia Ploshchad, he read books he ordered from the library which was regularly borrowing books mainly from the Foreign Ministry academic library and through the interlibrary loan system. When on duty on weekends, I looked over the bookshelves in the minister's office and was amazed at the scope and variety of his interests. He was especially interested in Russia's history and always had in his office complete works of N.M. Karamzin, S.M. Solovyov and V.O. Kliuchevsky, pre-Revolutionary and contemporary encyclopedias, his favorite books of Russian and foreign classics, a vast collection of memoirs in Russian and English.

There were great many books on economics by prominent Russian and foreign scholars. The minister was on the lookout for new books on economics when he worked on his monograph "External Expansion of Capital: History and Modern Times." The work published in 1982 won Gromyko the USSR State Prize.

I treasure, as part of my family archive, a gift edition copy of this book inscribed by the author in his invariable blue pencil:

*To Anatoly Safronovich Zaitsev with fond memories. With great respect,
Yours,*

A. Gromyko, 24.XII.85.

The minister was equally thorough in preparing both draft memos on major issues for the perusal by higher authorities and transcripts of discussions for in-house circulation. His discussions jotted down by interpreters or dictated by him at the end of talks were remarkably concise, clear in style and with clear formulas. This is why preparing them for circulation was a merely a matter of proofreading.

He was especially fastidious about preparing his annual UN General Assembly addresses. He started working on them months ahead of the session by dictating the first version shortly before leaving on vacation for the Crimea dacha at Mukhalatka. There he edited and re-edited the copy touched up by his speechwriters for the duration of his stay there before flying back to Moscow. He worked on them also on the plane en route to New York and shortly before he mounted the podium. The night before his speech was a veritable test of strength for us all, especially translators and typists, when the minister kept sending in his last corrections and amendments. Accompanied by endless streams of cups of coffee and cigarettes, this honorable work drew to an end toward morning with all buoyed up by the sense of being part of big-time politics.

The minister preferred getting information from our embassies in the key countries in the West and he rarely visited Asian and African countries (Egypt and Japan were rather an exception) and that did not signify at all, as some contended, that our political activities abroad were lopsided.

When, as head of the Foreign Ministry's South Asia Department, I took

part in Gromyko's talks with the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries, I was amazed every time at his knowledge of the regional problems (one of the worst during that period problem was the Kampuchean problem). He had an admirable way of skillfully finding very convincing arguments based on his thorough knowledge of the positions of his interlocutors and their national peculiarities.

I was equally amazed at the minister's ability to set in lucid form the Soviet Union's stance on the most complex international issues, including disarmament in his interviews here and abroad. At that time we saw him undoubtedly one of the few, if not the only, high-profile public figure who could talk without notes.

He was equally exacting toward his subordinates regardless of their rank. At first glance he treated with equal reserve those he dealt with and did not know much about and those he contacted every day and valued for their professional qualities. It is in fact mostly the latter (be it his first deputy or Collegium member guilty of drinking or one of the Secretariat) that he dressed down, criticized or called on the carpet always for a good reason and in the absence of anyone else. He fired them very rarely and did not bear grudge while his rebukes smarted for a long time.

Although very exacting, the minister always paid much heed to the needs and problems of his subordinates. Once on duty on a Sunday night in 1982, I was summoned to the dacha where I found Gromyko signing off on the resolution the Central Committee just passed (the minister initiated this resolution and made much to have it passed) on appointing as his deputies two Collegium members who were heads of two important Foreign Ministry divisions and of whose professionalism he spoke very highly. "Get this order processed immediately. When you are back to the Secretariat, ask both to call me – I want to congratulate them," the minister instructed me.

The young and not so young, we in the Secretariat liked the style of clothes the minister wore and even tried to wear similar clothes if we could. His austere three-piece business suits (he wore them invariably in all kinds of weather), his carefully selected and tasteful fashionable ties of unobtrusive colors and his always highly polished black shoes have long been for us the unalterable attributes of the diplomat's exemplary style. Entering his office, the minister neatly put his jacket on the clothes tree left of his desk wearing his vest which, in the eyes of his visitors, lent him an especially neat and official look.

"We Have No Use for Drunken Diplomacy"

THE ANTI-ALCOHOL CAMPAIGN launched in the country under the notorious May of 1985 CPSU Central Committee resolution and the subsequent legislation couldn't but have affected the operation of the Foreign Ministry's central protocol department and its agencies abroad causing restrictions on the rules of

hospitality that had been in effect since the beginning of Russian diplomatic service and the opening of first ambassadors departments.

The minister pioneered the new rules in the Foreign Ministry and its agencies abroad by arranging a reception at the House of Receptions on Kosygin Street on 26 June 1985 to mark 40 years of the signing of the UN Charter. (It was signed for the USSR by Andrei Gromyko when he was Soviet ambassador to the USA.)

There were questions in the eyes of those invited at seeing tables loaded with goodies and no sight of the usual rows of bottles which suggested attending a typical reception at the embassy of a Muslim country.

Soon after, this burning subject was discussed at a meeting of the Collegiums which I attended together with other Foreign Ministry division heads. The meeting was chaired by the minister.

The chief of the personnel department cited the latest instances of members of the diplomatic missions abroad being recalled for “close friendship” with alcohol. There followed a lively discussion.

Some of the bolder speakers, who knew about the minister’s position on the pastime widespread among the diplomats, were cautiously skeptical about getting adapted to new rules based on the anti-alcohol legislation without some damage to the long-tested professional practices.

The speakers referred to the practices existing in most of the countries of residence and predicted “a decline of interest among foreign visitors in attending ceremonial occasions arranged at Soviet embassies,” “a lower media effect” of the discussions held there, etc.

The minister summed up the discussion with this memorable maxim: “We have no use for drunken diplomacy.”

The minister, a confirmed teetotaler, never betrayed this principle. I’m not sure the rest of us could strictly follow his example, but none of the Secretariat staff touched alcohol both before and after the anti-alcohol legislation during the office hours or on weekend and holiday duty. Facing the minister in his office or at his dacha even with a whiff of alcohol was for us, his aides, tantamount to losing our face or job.

I think the atmosphere prevailing within the minister’s inner circle can be best described by citing the memorable episode during Gromyko’s talks with Ireland’s foreign minister in September of 1981 at Shannon Airport during the refueling stopover en route to New York for the scheduled UN General Assembly session.

At the end of the working breakfast, they served Irish coffees. Absorbed in the discussion, the minister didn’t see the glass mug with coffee put before him. Taking one sip he said, looking at his escorts: “Now I know why they call it the Irish coffee.” While his hosts appreciated the remark, we knew it did not bode well for us who knew about the minister’s rejection of alcohol. “What did the minister had in mind? Didn’t he know how that coffee was made? If he did-

n't or wasn't paying attention when they served it, why wasn't he warned?"

These questions raced through our minds when we rose to follow the minister and his Irish counterpart to board the plane. Adding to our worries was Viktor Sukhodrev who, as the minister's interpreter, stayed closer than the others to the minister during the discussion. Noting the minister's lightly flushed cheeks, he whispered in my ear: "Mind you don't blurt it out in front of the minister about whiskey in the coffee." We all were much relieved that the minister never referred to this episode again – whew ...

Last Goodbye to Andrei Gromyko

I HEARD THE SAD NEWS when amid preparations for a long tour of duty. I spent the days remaining before the funeral at home in front of the telephone and TV, scanning newspapers for details of how it had happened. The deliberately short and scant news reports of Gromyko's death and the authorities' decision to hold the public funeral rite and his funeral on the same day were glaringly at variance with the outstanding services of the great man. At the same time I thought that was quite logical considering the way the then leadership treated Andrei Andreevich during his last years after leaving the Foreign Ministry.

The next morning, July 5, I went to the Soviet Army House, where the public funeral service was to begin, to see lots of people outside lining up along the fence of the park adjacent to the building and down to the Olympic Complex a considerable distance away. Most of the mourners wore plain clothes but didn't look like office workers. Conspicuous against their backdrop were the extremely small number of Foreign Ministry people whom I could see as I was walking toward the end of the line, which clearly reflected the new rules and atmosphere reigning in the ministry with the arrival of the new minister.

Entering the building I walked up the stairs to where A.A. Gromyko was lying in state and became aware of someone glaring at me. It was the personnel chief and deputy foreign minister who disapproved of the presence of so many Foreign Ministry people, far in excess of the authorized limit perhaps, and showed it. Inside the darkened room, I could discern with difficulty the silhouettes of the then-foreign minister and of several deputies, mainly those who worked together with Andrei Andreevich.

I was going back home together with a former Secretariat associate. At the trolley-bus stop we saw the minister's former senior aide nicknamed Vasily the Terrible for his harsh temper, now greatly aged and leaning on a cane. We couldn't find words to say to one another and parted in silence.

All the way home I was thinking of this irreplaceable loss. The departure of the patriarch of Soviet diplomacy marked the end of a great period in its history.

The Baltics: The Pre-War Years

R. Simonian

THE OCCUPATION DOCTRINE adopted by the Baltics serves as a legal basis for resolving a whole array of many practical and ideological issues. Discrimination against hundred of thousands of those who permanently live in the region is one of such issues. In Estonia where certain posts are banned for them they are also kept away from the polls in parliamentary elections; Latvia has gone even further — certain population groups cannot elect local administrations. The financial claims to Russia are also part of the occupation doctrine.

The very much discussed and deliberately fanned occupation issue contradicts common sense. Can we describe as occupation the regime under which the “occupied” enjoyed the same rights as the “occupants”; there was no “occupation regime” in the Baltic republics and no military administrators (Germany, for example, appointed its *Gauleiters* in the occupied territories); there were no other attributes of an occupation regime. In fact, it was the legally elected parliaments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that in 1940 passed a decision to join the USSR. The fact that the 1991 decisions on independence were passed by their Supreme Soviets, bodies of the “occupation regime,” makes the discussion of occupation a political oddity.

It was thanks to the so-called occupation that Lithuania acquired over 30 percent of its present territory together with Vilnius, its old capital. The so-called occupants consistently poured money into the occupied territories and were keeping the living standards at the level much higher than in their own lands. They showed more concern for the national culture of the Baltic peoples than for their own culture that was degrading before their eyes. For example, under Soviet power “occupied” Latvia with the population of 2.5 million got three times more state budget money than the Voronezh Region with the population of 2.6 million. Personal incomes in the Soviet Baltic republics were higher than anywhere else in the Soviet Union; ideological pressure was much lighter there.

Under Soviet power the Center made the accelerated development of national republics and autonomies its strategic priority. Under the USSR Budget Law during the first post-war decade Russia could dispose of 50 percent of its

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income; Ukraine and Byelorussia, 55 percent; all other republics, 100 percent replenished with subsidies from the Center. This was done during the period when the donor republics that had suffered more than the others during World War II were rebuilding their economies.

Workforce indispensable for the Baltics' economic development was another important element of the same strategy. Under Soviet power there was a so-called "organized recruiting" which brought into the Baltics tens of thousands of people from neighboring regions (Pskov, Novgorod and Leningrad). Let me be clear: Russians were not occupants, they came to work at construction sites and factories to contribute to the republics' development.

It should be said that common sense does not allow the Baltic peoples to completely ignore the absurdity of the occupation doctrine. When confronted with realities the political community and the media, the most enthusiastic users of the "occupation regime" term, have to bridle their zeal. For example, in the fall of 2005 when Estonia widely celebrated the 60th anniversary of its system of musical schools (non-existent in bourgeois Estonia) even the extreme right press related it to the Soviet rather than "occupation" period; Estonians speak of the magnificent national encyclopedia (small European nations cannot boast of similar publications) as part of the "Soviet period." The same happened when the republic celebrated the 60th anniversary of its male choir and the 20th anniversary of the National Library of Estonia (the best in the Soviet Union and still unrivaled across the post-Soviet expanse). The same applies to other cultural achievements of the Soviet (not occupation!) period such as the 50th anniversary of the Estonian ballet known all over the world. Estonian writer K. Käsper has written on this score: "Can you imagine Hitler pouring money into the French ballet while in Bavaria the burghers were queuing for sausage?"¹

The list is much longer; the "occupation regime" definition invites unbounded irony. We all know that the Russians in the Soviet Union had no advantages over the titular Baltic nations. In fact, in the USSR the Russians were in a much worse position than the titular nations in the union republics. This has been recognized by Western sociologists: "Many Russians looked at the non-Russians as a privileged group in the system of the national republics while many of the non-Russians called the Soviet system the Russian empire."²

The Soviet Union was rather a topsy-turvy empire in which the "colonies" lived at the expense of the "metropolitan country." Such are the facts. Legal approach, the only one to be used when dealing with the terms related to the legal system of any state, demands that we should rely on the internationally recognized legal acts of the corresponding period. Is there a document related to the period under review? There was such document and those who promote the "occupation" conception are undoubtedly aware of it.

I have in mind The 1907 Hague Convention signed by 44 states that defined occupation as a consequence of an international military conflict, which means that it follows a war between states. In 1939-1940, neither of the Baltic

states was involved in hostilities or an armed conflict with the USSR. This means that according to The Hague Convention there was no occupation; this does not justify, however, the atrocities of the Stalin regime.

The present practice of confusing concepts, their inaccurate use or even ignorance when it comes to concepts with negative connotations leads to the abuse of the terms “occupation,” “fascists,” “genocide,” etc.

E. Zubkova of the Institute of Russian History, RAS, who worked a lot in Russian and German archives, has written: “The term ‘occupation’ has nothing in common either with the long-term plans of the Soviet Union in the Baltics or with the real developments in the region.”³

The Hague Convention that strictly defined the internationally important legal category of occupation was supported by two other documents in force in this crucial period of world history. I have in mind the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the London Convention of 1933 signed by the Soviet Union as well as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. They provided a definition of aggression as “invasion” by armed forces of one state, “with or without a declaration of war on the territory of another State”; movement of land, sea or air forces onto the territory of another state without permission of the government of this state or in violation of the previously agreed conditions; “naval blockade of the coasts and ports of another State.”

This suggests the question: Were the preliminary conditions of moving in and stationing of troops at military bases violated? Violation can be defined as aggression but not as occupation. In 1940, none of the three republics were occupied; they were joined to the Soviet Union by force with an active support of the local communist parties and cooperation of part of the local population. Formally, it was the local parliaments rather than the Kremlin that initiated this. In the summer of 1940, this did not contradict the public opinion in these countries that guided itself by the European realities of the time. The “phony war” was underway with unpredictable results. This could not but alarm the heads of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia who knew only too well that the chances of preserving their statehoods were slim. In these conditions they used them as they saw it fit. The Baltic political establishment knew that in the current European contexts their countries mattered too little. According to the available documents they more or less agreed that the Soviet Union was more preferable than Germany.

What happened to Eastern Europe after World War II? The victors divided the zones of influence in Europe. In this way Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and others found themselves in the Soviet zone, while Finland escaped this fate. Both Baltic and Russian historians are fond of exploiting what they see as an analogy of the 1940 situation. Those who do this tend to neglect an important thing: public opinion in these countries was not as unanimous as in the Baltic states in the prewar period.

“In the context of the Great War the possibilities were limited by neces-

sity,” writes E. Zubkova, “which should not be taken to mean that they were non-existent. The extent to which Stalin could realize his intentions depended not only on the degree of ‘pressure’ but also on the degree of ‘resistance’ — the position of the Baltic states and the response of the influential Western powers to what the Soviet Union was doing in the Baltic.”⁴ Resistance was fairly weak. Germanophobia typical of these countries at all times became even more pronounced when the Nazi came to power in Germany. Many of the Baltic historians (Lithuanians L. Leonas and A. Stromas to name a few) point to the mounting anti-German feeling in the region. As distinct from Latvia and Estonia that remained under German domination for centuries Lithuania had its share of problems with Poland, it even hoped to return the Vilno area with Germany’s help. In this sense Lithuania was “pro-German” which makes what the Lithuanian historians say and write extremely interesting. Here is what A. Stromas has to say about the prevailing sentiments among the Lithuanian intelligentsia: “In view of the mounting Nazi threat the ‘progressive-minded intellectuals’ were toying with a possibility of incorporating their countries into the internationalist-minded Soviet Union as an alternative to being swallowed by the Third Reich.”⁵

In his memoirs Foreign Minister of Latvia Vilhelms Munters admitted that while signing the treaty with the USSR the Latvian delegation “was guided by the conviction that this alone could preserve the Letts and prevent their annihilation by Germany.”⁶

The repressions that followed cast doubt on the sagacity of the leaders of the three republics and the prevailing public opinion. This explains massive resistance to the Soviet Army in 1944. Lithuanian historian R. Misiūnas and Estonian political scientist R. Taagepera ask: “Why do the same people who had responded fairly calmly to the first Soviet invasion in 1940 took up arms in 1944?” By way of explanation they refer to the terror of 1940-1941 and the punitive practices of the Soviet regime in the postwar years.

In the summer of 1940, however, the Soviet Union looked as lesser of two evils; the Baltic countries joined the Soviet Union because continued independence was impossible. This explains why the Baltic states with well-trained and well-equipped armies made no attempt at defending their sovereignty (as Finland had done) and peacefully joined the USSR. In 1945, the Soviet Union returned to the prewar frontiers of 1941 with acquiescence of the U.K. and the U.S. in Yalta.

Even if we accept the term “aggression” we should admit that at that time it was nothing else but export of revolution that the Bolsheviks had been practicing after 1917. Today, another no less ambitious country is engaged in the same by exporting democracy. This, and many other examples, testifies that export of revolution was determined by class, that is, social rather than ethnic criteria. What happened in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia when they joined the Soviet Union was a crime. At the same time, it was not the Letts, Lithuanians and

Estonians who suffered most but the “socially alien” elements, mostly Russian White émigrés and their families. The present rulers of the Baltic countries prefer to ignore the fact: the substitution of the national for the social proved to be the keystone of the political construction being built since the fall of 1991.

In the Baltic countries there is any number of serious historians and jurists whose opinions of the 1940 events differ from the present “general line.” Such are M. Sinijärv, L. Mälksoo and M. Ilmjärv from Tartu who summarized their studies about the President of Estonia Konstantin Päts in their book; E. Soovik who offered his opinion in the article “It is not the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that Matters but Aggression”; historians from Riga V. Blumja, I. Bishers, I. Sneidere, and others. Their voices can be hardly heard in the chorus; they even risk persecution.

Here is an example. At the turn of 1992, the future first president of Estonia, then Foreign Minister of Estonia Lennart Meri (who had got the post in April 1991, under Soviet power) and his deputy, Prof. Reni Müllerson, a lawyer of international fame, failed to agree on the conclusion Prof. Müllerson had drawn from the documents related to the time when Estonia became part of the Soviet Union. He deemed it necessary to point out that legally this was not occupation since the relevant documents carried the sides’ signatures. President Päts, the legal head of state, signed the documents without reservations, comments or later statements. The enraged minister fired his deputy. This started a scandal because he could not fire Prof. Müllerson without the sanctions of the republic’s Supreme Soviet.

This speaks volumes about the post-Soviet situation in the Baltic states. The term “occupation” was canonized and serves the foundation of the legal side of civil relations in Estonia and Latvia. A new generation never questions the idea; it has been firmly planted in people’s minds. This brings to mind the stories about the “horrors” of czarist Russia accepted by the post-1917 generations. This is what brainwashing — the favorite instrument of totalitarian regimes — can do. In the Baltics the problem no longer belongs to the cognitive, logical and rational sphere — it has become highly emotional and irrational. Arguments are no longer accepted therefore any attempt at putting the problem into a balanced academic context stirs up a storm of inadequate emotions. Any invitation as a rational discussion is seen as an encroachment on the national symbol or a sacrilege. In the late 1980s, the newly published Viktor Suvorov’s *Icebreaker* invited similar emotions; the same can be said about attempts by some Russian historians of literature to question the authenticity of *The Lay of Igor’s Campaign*.

The cruel Baltic reality can be described as following: even if it is proved beyond doubt that there was no occupation (this is legal fact) nothing will change for the Russian speakers of Latvia and Estonia. These countries are convinced of the opposite. They cannot discard the occupation doctrine — the cornerstone of their legal systems. This is why Latvia and Estonia consistently reject all accusations of massive violations of human rights coming from Russia.

In fact Russian experts in international law are not alone — many of their Western colleagues agree with them. For example German expert in international law M. Vigand correctly assumes that the Baltic countries were forced to join the Soviet Union yet no violence was used. Another German specialist K. Tille equally believes that the term “occupation” cannot be used to describe the events of 1940 and that “Soviet annexation” is a much better term. French historian Dominic Lieven refers to the Soviet Baltic area as the “regions annexed by Stalin.” His works are very popular in the Baltic countries; M. Graf, one of his Estonian colleagues, an enthusiastic supporter of the “occupation doctrine” lavishly quoted Lieven in his recent book *Estonia and Russia. 1917-1991: The Anatomy of Parting*. The French author who is very critical of Soviet terror has never used the term “occupation” — he speaks of “annexation” instead, something that the Estonian author preferred to ignore.

Today, some Russian historians also tend to describe the process as an annexation. Professor of Tartu University S. Isakov (member of the Russian faction in the Estonian parliament in 1994-1999) uses this term. I believe that “incorporation” is much more exact. It has gained currency among the Baltic historians. One of them, Antonijs Zunda writes: “The Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union with Britain’s tacit agreement.”⁷

An analysis of the relevant definitions looks more like Hesse’s “Glass Bead Game” than anything else — it is just as useless. It should be said that in 1938 Czechoslovakia was incorporated into Germany by force yet in full accordance with the Munich Agreement that predated the MRP. The political and legal implications of the two documents put them on the same footing; in moral respects the Munich deal was obviously much more reprehensible. By the way, in the League of Nations Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia enthusiastically supported occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The MRP can be described, by form and by nature, as an agreement of two powers on the spheres of influence. The document contained no details of how this should be done. Had the Soviet Union dropped the idea of extending its zone of influence or had it used politically correct instruments to achieve its goal (this could have been done) the Pact would have never been describes as a crime. The secret protocols the existence of which was no secret to the public in the Baltic republics complicated the situation: the Soviet leaders stubbornly denied their existence till the end. On 19 December 1989, head of the International Department of the CC CPSU V. Falin denied their existence; five days later, on 24 December 1989, the 2nd Congress of the People’s Deputies of the USSR admitted that they existed and resolutely condemned them.

This hardly intelligent practice of concealing information and stubborn denial of the obvious (execution of the Polish elite officers in Katyn may serve an example) typical of all authoritarian regimes played a nasty trick on the system. With time the Pact (nothing more than a common, if cynical, agreement between two powers) was transformed in the minds of the Baltic peoples into a

monster. Herbert Marcuse pointed out in his time that the totalitarian systems were built on myths and created myths. "Even before perestroika the 'secret protocols' were an open secret for the majority in the Baltic republics," wrote Sergei Stankevich, advisor of Mikhail Gorbachev. "Everybody interested in this period of history knew about them; the rumors about a deal between Hitler and Stalin were passed from one generation to another; from parents to children. All sorts of foreign 'radio voices' were keeping the issue boiling."⁸

The Pact and the fact of its signing cannot be described as a crime. Stalin's repressions were criminal which means that the Pact and its repercussions should be correctly assessed. In the past decades mass consciousness in the Baltics mixed up the fact of the Pact and what it entailed. In other words, the results of joining the Soviet Union eclipsed the procedural issue and pushed it to the margin of public interest. These results caused a cultural shock. Much later this was described in a letter of a Latvian agronomist to Nikita Khrushchev: "We were suddenly pushed out of civilized Europe to the cruel kingdom of Tamerlane."⁹ The Letts bitterly joked that the Germans had failed to conquer their hearts for 700 years while Stalin accomplished this in twelve months.

The circumstances and the procedure of joining the Soviet Union are pushed to the side. There is an opinion about these events that has become nearly sacred. It represents the collective idea nurtured by several generations. This can be referred to the sphere of faith rather than logic let alone critical discussion. As a myth it has two aspects: the diachronic (the story of the past) and synchronous (explanation of the present). The national radicals of the three Baltic republics are successfully exploiting both.

This myth, like any other, plays several socially important roles. First, it consolidates the nation; historical memories of the Baltic peoples are actively exploited and "refreshed" with new details of Soviet terror. Each and every occasion is wrung dry. Russia's recent complaints about the rehabilitation of the former SS legionaries and their marches in the center of Riga invited a series of emotional accounts of the deportations of 14-15 June 1941 (a week before German's aggression) in the media. The readers and TV viewers were reminded that people had been deported in freight cars; parents had taken small children together with them when embarking on a trip to nowhere; teenagers had been sent to the forests in a hope that they might survive. When Germans came the boys joined the SS not because they shared the fascist ideas. They were moved by hatred and the burning desire to set scores with the Soviets. This is one of the many human tragedies of World War II. An appeal to shared sufferings brings nations together.

Second, it creates political advantages. The right national-radical parties capitalized on the "occupation conception" at the parliamentary elections. They skillfully convinced the electorate that the political and the ethnic were intertwined: the left meant Russia; Russia meant occupation. Politics in the Baltics, in Latvia and Estonia in the first place, are ethnically tinged. As soon as the polit-

ical left and center acquire chances, no matter how slim, to win parliamentary majority the voters are warned about possible Russian occupation. The scars left by the Stalin regime are deep enough to make this fairly primitive propaganda effective.

Third, there is a psychological aspect. Today, the national-radical politicians look nostalgically back into the 1990s when their countries were regarded as martyrs. With time the halo dimmed; the European Union has different, much more recent associations. Today the Baltics is a dynamically developing part of the European Union with the standard of living unrivaled across the post-Soviet expanse. The republics paid cheaply for their independence: Lithuania lost twelve lives, Latvia, one while Estonia escaped lightly with none. In an absence of “suffering for the common cause” the republics are zealously guarding the image of the victims by putting emphasis on the “atrocities of the occupation regime” and preserving the fear of the awful and unpredictable neighbor.

Fourth, for propaganda purposes the voters are kept in a pleasant anticipation of Russian billions as compensation for occupation. The occupation doctrine keeps the “enemy image” alive; it is a handy instrument that justifies the blunders, errors and incompetence of the Baltic leaders of all political hues. Content-analysis of much what is said in the three republics suggests that their leaders tend to ignore the fact of World War II; they concentrate at occupation. This is hardly conceivable in Russia. This is probably acceptable in the Baltics: small nations have logic and range of ideas of their own; they may find some processes overwhelming to be accepted as true.

Mass consciousness of the Letts, Lithuanians and Estonians has chosen occupation (Soviet followed by German and then by Soviet) as the central event of the vast drama of the 1940s. The national-radical media of the Baltic countries insist that “Russians are to blame for everything.” This is the Baltic version of the “Jewish and Freemason intrigues,” etc. The blunders of Russian officials (the statement of the head of the RF State Duma delegation on the eve of the visit to Estonia that the Estonian premier had resigned; the hardly adequate explanation given by the mayor of Khimki why it was decided to move the monument to the Soviet pilots who had fought at the approaches to Moscow in 1941; the action of the Nashi youth movement outside the Estonian Embassy in Moscow in violation of the Vienna Convention, something that neither the Russian Empire nor the Soviet Union had indulged in).

These and other blunders, that to quote Talleyrand, “were worse than a crime” connected to the scandal of March-May 2007 around the Bronze Soldier were carefully registered and used for anti-Russian propaganda. There is a paradox: the fewer are the reasons for anti-Russian sentiments that more intensive is propaganda of the occupation idea. This is quite understandable: the Baltic countries have made it the cornerstone of their policies to be retrieved at opportune moments.

Fifth, there is a legal aspect. I have already written that the occupation

doctrine served a justification of the ethnocentric states. Under the civil laws of the early 1990s those who arrived to Latvia and Estonia after the war and their descendants do not constitute a national minority. They are the visible results of Soviet occupation with corresponding consequences.

The attitude of the Baltic ethnoses to the tragedies of 1940, 1941, 1945-1949 and Stalin's crimes in general are understandable and should be respected yet the historical process should not be romanticized. In fact, it was quite recently, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries that small and even not so small European states (Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Poland, etc.) were incorporated into European empires by force. Everything happened according to the political norms accepted in Europe as recently as in the first half of the 20th century.

At all times geopolitics was, and remains, cynical. It takes a lot of naiveté to believe that there are no secret agreements between the great powers related to the destinies of smaller nations. Great powers tend to ignore the laws when they see it fit. This happened in 1979 when the United States captured Grenada; in the 1940s, British and Soviet troops entered Iran; American troops landed in Morocco contrary to the will of its government; Madagascar, the colony of the Vichy regime was captured; on 3 July 1940, the Brits destroyed the French navy in Mers-el-Kébir during Operation Catapult that cost France over 2 thousand lives. This is part of a much longer list.

When analyzing the situation at the Soviet western borders in the early summer of 1940 we should bear in mind that by that time the international context had changed beyond recognition. On 9 April 1940, Denmark capitulated; Wehrmacht conquered the Netherlands in five days; Belgium, in 19 days; Norway, in two months. Paris fell on 14 May. Having occupied practically entire Western Europe Germany concentrated 35 divisions in Poland and 12 divisions in Eastern Prussia, right near the Soviet borders. It should be said that earlier, in the spring of 1940, additional mobilization had been announced in Eastern Prussia. The Soviet Union had to reciprocate by demanding the Baltic countries' agreement on increasing the number of its troops stationed on their territories. The threat of war was absolutely real; later developments merely confirmed this. The leaders of the Third Reich repeatedly declared that destruction of the Soviet Union was their ultimate goal. On 11 August 1939, several days before the MRP was signed Hitler was very open about his plans when talking to High Commissioner of the League of Nations for the Free City of Danzig Carl Burckhardt: "My plans are spearheaded against the Soviet Union... I have to sign an agreement with it; as soon as I attack the West and defeat it I shall turn my forces against the Soviet Union."¹⁰ Any self-respecting state would have to act to protect itself.

The Baltic governments accepted the Soviet demands; ten rifle divisions and seven tank brigades moved into the Baltic republics were seen in the West as necessary precautions. Foreign Secretary of Britain Lord Halifax

believed that the Soviet Union concentrated its troops in the Baltic states to defend itself; German diplomats stationed in Latvia and Lithuania were of the same opinion.

One might argue that the Baltic republics were given no choice. They had to accept the demands and they did this. Finland, in its turn, declined them and took up arms to defend its independence. The situation in the Baltics in the summer of 1940 is best illustrated by the following. The Lithuanian government accepted the Soviet demands in the morning of 16 June. In the evening of June 15, President of Lithuania Antanas Smetona dismissed Premier Antanas Merkys and fled the country. Under the law the dismissed Cabinet was expected to continue working until a new cabinet was formed which means that from the legal point of view the situation was impeccable even though President Smetona who by that time had already left the country rejected the ultimatum and called to armed resistance to the Soviet Union. In fact, nobody wanted to put up resistance. Taken together the three republics had a bigger armed force than Finland. According to Latvian émigré historian Edgar Anderson they had 900 artillery pieces, 102 tanks, 410 aircrafts and could mobilize at least 600 thousand troops. In 1940, population of Finland was twice as small as the combined population of the three Baltic countries.

During the early stage of the war Great Britain refused to shoulder political or military obligations in relation to the Baltic states and their security. Some of the Baltic historians (A. Stranga, I. Felmanis and M. Virsis) have written about this. The British ambassador to Latvia later admitted that at that time the Western countries had been unable to support the Baltics. He was convinced, however, that as distinct from Germany, the Soviet Union would preserve the local tongues and cultural autonomy. Historian Antonijs Zunda deemed it necessary to single out this fact.

In 1940, the Baltic nations had to choose between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Russians believed to be the lesser evil. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 demonstrated that the Baltic republics would be left alone to face foreign aggression. Despite the calls of the world public opinion to defend Finland no state hastened to its rescue.

According to Soviet Ambassador to the U.K. I. Maysky, in 1940 Premier Churchill was very positive about the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union. This suited Britain then at war with Germany. This is confirmed by the memoirs of Churchill as well as of de Gaulle and Anthony Eden.

Should we study the past? This is a rhetoric question since any reasonable person will answer in the affirmative. People and countries that either ignore or misinterpret their past undermine their future. Today memoirs of political leaders are widely read and discussed; they help us assess our history. This, however, calls for sober approaches otherwise the demand formulated in 1992 by a man who lived in Kazan that Russia should pay for the routing of the city in 1552

by Ivan the Terrible might invite an equally “intelligent” demand that Russia should be reimbursed for the Tatar-Mongol yoke. In this context the counter-claims to Latvia for the atrocities of the “Red Letts” might be in place. It has been commonly accepted that in 1918-1919 the Bolsheviks retained power (that caused huge tragedies in Russia) thanks to the units of Latvian riflemen.

The adepts of the occupation doctrine are fond of holding forth about Soviet military presence in the Baltic republics during the parliamentary elections of July 1940. German historian B. Meissner has supplied a detailed account of the 1940 election campaign in the Baltics. Red Army units were stationed in all republics under intergovernmental agreements. Let us not forget that during the 2005 election in Iraq there was a 250 thousand-strong army of the United States and its allies which remained there due to hostilities and therefore can be described as an occupation force in strict conformity with the definition of the term. It is noteworthy that the world community never questioned the legitimacy of these elections.

Estonian historian M. Ilmjärv has written the following: “The Baltic countries lost their independence because of the European international political crisis caused by the Munich Pact, the agreements between the Soviet Union and Germany, Germany’s perfidious policy, skilful propaganda and expectations that the Soviet Union and Germany will soon be destroyed. On the other hand, this was a result of an absence in 1939 and 1940 of a realistic and independent foreign policy in the Baltics as well as their domestic policies at the time when the cardinal shifts in European big politics tilled the soil for the lost sovereignty of the Baltic states... This means that the quiet loss of independence of the Baltic states and their complete disappearance from the European political scene were an outcome of a long political process, not only because of an absolutely hopeless situation and of the course of action imposed by the Pact of Molotov-Ribbentrop.”¹¹

There is any number of similar opinions offered by Baltic historians; in fact, the documents and arguments in favor of an objective assessment of the 1939-1940 events are easy to find. In the mid-1980s, during the perestroika and openness years, the Soviet leaders missed a chance of organizing a wide discussion of the problems related to the Baltic republics’ incorporation into the Soviet Union; they should have invited prominent historians and jurists from the Soviet Union and other countries. The Baltic public would have been inevitably impressed with the conclusions that could have buried the problem forever.

The Soviet Union missed an excellent political chance, too. In the late 1988-early 1989, the Baltic republics repeatedly asked the Soviet leaders to sign a new union treaty: it was generally recognized that the state structure of the Soviet Union needed reforms (the leaders of the Soviet Union had recognized this and initiated the process) “to return to the Lenin norms of federalism.” The Baltic republics argued that they had never signed the 1922 Declaration on the Creation of the USSR.

What were potential advantages of the new Union Treaty offered to the Baltic republics?

The signed Union Treaty would have defused the issue of their membership in the Soviet Union, the most painful and the most vulnerable side of the Soviet Union's state order.

The Baltic republics initiated this by offering "their own" treaty, the tactically and strategically highly advantageous for the republican leaders and the Center.

It was on the initiative of the Baltic republics that on 1 December 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decision On Further Realization of the Political Reform in the Sphere of State Development and set up a commission on delimitating the rights and obligations of the Center and the union republics (the G. Tarazevich Commission) at the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. It brought together Supreme Soviet deputies and experts in law, economy and sociology who agreed that a new Union Treaty was needed. Many of the commission members, the Baltic deputies in the first place (L. Kukaine, L. Sepetis, and S. Rajk) were absolutely convinced that the treaty would be signed. All of them were convinced that the Soviet Union should be preserved. In 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev declined the idea; two years later when he finally got used to it the opportunity was no longer there. Well-known journalist Kronid Liubarsky said with a great deal of caustic irony: "Mikhail Gorbachev was prepared to make concessions only when it was too late and concessions were no longer needed."¹²

I would like to point here that the Baltics nations were always reliable, they respected documents and treaties — something that cannot usually be said of contemporary Russians. (This could only be expected from the people whom the state always cheated.) There is a typically Russian opinion: "they would have left us anyway" that comes to my mind every time when I meet young Baltic politicians who treat the political elite of the late 1980s-early 1990s with barely concealed hostility. In Estonia they were J. Allik, M. Lauristin, R. Veidemann, V. Palm, K. Hallik and others. "They wanted to sign a new Union Treaty that would have landed us in the Soviet instead of the European Union." This cannot be forgiven.

In 1991, another chance slipped between the fingers. After the August putsch the Baltic republics (Latvia and Estonia) together with the other Union republics left the Soviet Union; on 24 August 1991, three days after the putsch, the first president of Russia signed the acts that recognized their independence. Haste and a complete lack of professionalism echoed in a bad headache when it came to the withdrawal of troops, demarcation of borders, property problems, etc.

Russia put forward no conditions on which it should have recognized the two republics' independence: it should have demanded that the Russian speakers should be given equal rights with the titular nations. It could be done and it would have defused the occupation idea.

In September 1991, the newly formed legislature — the State Council of the USSR — passed a decision on the withdrawal of the Baltic republics from the Soviet Union without preliminary conditions and more or less serious negotiations and discussions.

The leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia share the guilt for the occupation doctrine with the national-radical politicians of the Baltic states. These leaders first did a lot to create the conditions in which it appeared and, to a certain extent, the conditions in which the myth of the Soviet occupation of 1940 proliferated.

NOTES

¹ *SL Ohtuleht*, Tallinn, 21 November 2006.

² J. Eckbert, *Issledovania problem mira v period i posle konflikta "Vostok-Zapad."* *Statii poslednikh 20 let*, Moscow, 1997, p. 280.

³ E. Zubkova, *Pribaltika i Kreml. 1940-1953*, Moscow, 2008, p. 100.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁵ A. Stomas, "*Pribaltiyskie gosudarstva.*" *Problemy natsionalnykh otnosheniy v SSSR (po materailam zapadnoy pechati*, Moscow, 1989, p. 98.

⁶ Quoted from: A.S. Orlov, "*Pribaltika: 1939-1940.*" *Mezhdunarodnyi krizis 1939-1941 gg.: ot sovetsko-germanskogo dogovorov 1939 g. do napadeniia Germanii na SSSR*, Moscow, 2006, p. 287.

⁷ A. Zunda, "*Strany Baltii i Soedinennoe Korolevstvo v nachale Vtoroy mirovoy voyny (1939-1941 gg.)*." *Mezhdunarodnyi krizis 1939-1941 gg...*, p. 458.

⁸ S. Stankevich, *Krushenie SSSR. Politiko-pravovye aspekty*, Moscow, 2001, p. 81.

⁹ Pismo agronoma O. Eglaysa N.S. Khrushchevu. 1962 g., RGANI, Record group 5, Inventory 30, File 406, pp. 57-59.

¹⁰ C. Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939*, München, 1960, S. 348.

¹¹ M. Ilmjärv, "*Baltiyskie strany v 1939-1940 godakh: zamysly i vozmozhnosti.*" *Mezhdunarodnyi krizis 1939-1941 gg...*, pp. 282-293.

¹² *Novoe vremia*, No. 21, 1993, p. 4.

A History of Two Notes, or Why the USSR Did Not Become a NATO Member

N. Kochkin

THIS COMING APRIL, many countries will be marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The following documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation – a note by the USSR government to the U.S. administration, dated March 31, 1954, and a reply from the U.S. administration, dated May 1954 – refer to a crucial stage in the history of the Cold War. After Joseph Stalin's death, serious changes occurred in the Soviet policy. The USSR's successes in building nuclear and hydrogen bombs ended the U.S. monopoly over weapons of mass destruction. Acute confrontation in international relations, with the former anti-Nazi allies – the Berlin crisis and the War in Korea – gave way to a certain measure of warming in relations.

In March 1954, the Soviet government put forward a proposal to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France concerning the creation of a collective security system in Europe – the signing of an all-European collective security treaty and the possibility of the USSR's joining NATO. In May, Moscow received notes from the Western powers, all of them similar in content, with a negative reply to its proposals. The exchange of notes continued in the following months of 1954: The Soviet note of July 24 was followed by notes from the three Western powers of September 10, to which the USSR replied on October 23.

Following a resolution by the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet press only published the notes exchanged with France.¹ Although the aforementioned documents were unclassified, it was not until recently that they started being partially cited in historical and other specialist literature.²

Neither domestic nor Western historiography has given much attention to the possibility of Soviet participation in the alliance, because the general assumption was that the expression by the Soviet government of its readiness to consider the question of joining NATO together with the countries concerned was a priori of a propaganda nature and that no serious intentions lay behind that

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proposal. Thus, one of the recent publications on the subject cites the speech by N.A. Bulganin, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in August 1955. At that time he cast the March 31 note as an attempt to test the sincerity of the Western powers' intentions with regard to the defensive nature of NATO, saying that "participation in an organization pursuing defensive goals" was completely in line with Soviet interests.³

It could be interesting to revisit the subject and, based on the documents stored at the Russian Foreign Ministry's archives, to attempt to answer the question about goals that the Soviet leadership was pursuing and what kind of reaction it expected from the West over its collective security proposals for Europe. Our attention within the confines of the present article will be focused primarily on two notes, since the fundamental question about the Soviet Union's possible participation in NATO was decided at the time. Further diplomatic correspondence proceeded mostly in a propaganda vein.

It is noted in historiography that the shift in the Soviet leadership's perception of NATO activity occurred at the Berlin conference of foreign ministers of the four great powers in January and February 1954. Analyzing the conference materials, in particular the February 18 meeting, Russian researcher A.M. Filitov justly points to a "radical break with the previous anti-NATO rhetoric" in V.M. Molotov's position.⁴ During the discussion of the Soviet draft of an all-European collective security treaty, aimed against the creation of the European Defense Community and the remilitarization of West Germany, French Minister G. Bidault asked V.M. Molotov whether the North Atlantic Treaty was compatible with the proposed treaty. In response, the Soviet side all of a sudden showed flexibility, saying that it was "ready to study the matter." Furthermore, V.M. Molotov believed that "one should not rule out the possibility of rectifying the North Atlantic Treaty so as to eliminate the existing differences in the assessment of its nature."⁵

It would be appropriate in this context to remember that V.M. Molotov's remarks at a meeting on February 10 contained a characterization of NATO that was utterly different in tonality: "The idea of creating military groups opposed to the Soviet Union and young democracies has started being put into reality. The path in that direction has been made by the North Atlantic bloc," which "is now pushing ahead with its plans of building military groupings in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific, as well as in the Middle and Near East. The North Atlantic pact is largely reminiscent of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which led to the start of World War II. There is no cause to doubt that the fate of the North Atlantic pact will not be any better than the fate of the Anti-Comintern Pact."⁶

Some shifts in the Soviet leadership's approaches are also evident from the well-known speech by G.M. Malenkov, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, on March 12, 1954, when he departed from ideological propaganda clichés and announced that civilization as a whole could disappear as a result of a new world war.⁷ It would seem that the changes in the assessment of the pos-

sible consequences of a nuclear war, as well as in the view of ways of overcoming crises, should have reflected on the Soviet Union's overall approach to NATO. However, the situation was complicated by the existence of serious differences on foreign policy issues in the upper reaches of the Soviet power hierarchy. In addition, a significant factor in the Soviet perception of the North Atlantic bloc as a geopolitical threat was the German issue – specifically, West Germany's growing economic and military capability, and its evolution as a base for Anglo-American aggression.”⁸

Presumably, despite the public criticism of NATO's threatening line of activity, Moscow's view of NATO was not entirely negative. In her article, N.I. Egorova provides a record of Joseph Stalin's conversation with the French ambassador on August 25, 1952. In reply to his question about the nature of NATO from Charles de Gaulle's perspective, the Soviet leader was told about the bloc's peaceful nature and that it had provided a framework for the UN Charter. “Stalin laughed and asked Vyshinsky, who was present during the conversation, whether the USSR should join it then. From every indication, it was simply irony, but it cannot be ruled that *** Stalin had some latent intentions,” Egorova wrote.⁹

One can hardly agree with this thesis about J. Stalin's irony – rather, facts suggest that the Kremlin leader did have some “covert intentions.” At a preliminary meeting of deputy foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France, A.A. Gromyko said on several occasions (May 25 and June, 1951): “If this pact was aimed against the restoration of German aggression, the USSR would join” NATO.¹⁰ It is noteworthy that the main propositions of the aforementioned directives and statements were contained in a memo from the Third European Department to the minister, dated March 29, 1954. In addition, it should be noted that the question about the possibility of the Soviet Union's joining NATO had even been raised before the latter was formally established. For example, in the first few months of 1949, on the initiative of Communist Party and independent Labor MPs, a discussion was conducted in the British parliament on whether an invitation should be sent to the Soviet Union.¹¹

One can get an exhaustive idea about the Soviet initiative of March 1954 from an array of preparatory materials, numerous draft memos to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, and notes from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation. The uniqueness of these documents lies in that they reveal the Soviet leadership's positions on all levels of the decision-making process. The original drafts reflect the view of the senior personnel at Foreign Ministry departments, while the subsequent editing and corrections made by the minister, as well as notes from the CPSU Central Committee, offer a credible picture of the basic assumptions at the top.

On March 10, 1954, A.A. Gromyko sent to V.M. Molotov a draft memo to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, addressed to G.M. Malenkov and N.S. Khrushchev (prepared by G.M. Pushkin, A.A. Sobolev, and A.A. Soldatov,

at the Third European Department, the Americas Department, and the UN Department, respectively). In the framework of the work to promote the draft of an all-European treaty, it read, in particular: "The assertion that the Soviet draft is aimed at squeezing the U.S. out of Europe and that by taking the place of the U.S., the USSR would become a dominant power in Europe is a principal argument that is being made against our proposal."¹² In this connection, the authors of the document recommended making "amendments to include provisions for the United States' equal participation in an all-European treaty." The remark made by V.M. Molotov does not require extensive commentary: "Leaving aside for the time being the issue of U.S. military bases in Europe."¹³ In addition, in a bid "to knock out of the opponents' hands the often cited thesis" that the future collective security system was aimed against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it was proposed that the Soviet government declare its readiness to join the latter. Considerations on the possible course of events after the note was presented to the governments of the three Western powers are especially significant in this context: "Needless to say, it is unlikely that the organizers of the North Atlantic bloc will take a positive view of a statement about the USSR's readiness to join the North Atlantic Treaty. However, if such a statement was to receive a positive reaction from the Western powers, as a result of the USSR's admission to the North Atlantic bloc, the latter would then drastically change its nature and would explode as an aggressive group of states, aimed against the USSR."¹⁴

It is noteworthy that in order to substantiate the proposed draft of an all-European treaty, a variety of propaganda activities were planned in a number of European countries on the understanding that "organization of a broad movement in support of building a collective security system in Europe could significantly impede the implementation of plans by the supporters of the European Defense Community, Europe's split in two hostile camps, opposed to each other, and the resurrection of German militarism."¹⁵

A revised draft of a memo to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium of March 19 provides extended argumentation in support of the proposal on the possibility of joining NATO, while the forecasts also sound somewhat more optimistic: "The Foreign Ministry considers it expedient, at the same time as raising the question about the U.S. participation in an all-European treaty, in the aforementioned note also*** to state the Soviet Union's readiness to join the North Atlantic Treaty. Such a statement*** would complicate the position of the North Atlantic bloc's organizers, who have been stressing its purportedly defensive nature and that it is not aimed against the USSR or people's democracies. Raising the question about the United States' participation in an all-European treaty*** together with the question about the USSR's admission to the North Atlantic bloc is beneficial to us for tactical considerations. The Soviet declaration of its readiness to join*** in this context would be viewed as the demand of concessions over the USSR's acceptance of the U.S. participation in an all-European treaty.

However, it is the Foreign Ministry's opinion, that our acceptance of the U.S. participation*** should not be predicated on the three Western powers accepting the admission of the USSR" to the North Atlantic Treaty. "Rather, the architects of the bloc*** will take a negative view*** and will start making all sorts of provisos." At the same time a positive view of the initiative was not ruled out, which "would mean a great success for the Soviet Union."¹⁶

The authors of the memorandum made a thorough analysis of the conditions on which the USSR could join the bloc. In particular, taking into account the norms of international law, they noted that "the Soviet Union cannot unconditionally accede to the North Atlantic Treaty" and acknowledged the need to put forward a proposal that all NATO member states assume obligations concerning the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the principle of state independence and sovereignty. It is also noteworthy that the draft in question raised the issue of U.S. military bases in Europe, which had never been raised before.

The following passage points to a close interconnection between the geopolitical and propaganda goals in Soviet foreign policy, and the existence of serious concerns that the West could misinterpret the Soviet proposals: "At present*** the issue of our provisos in connection with the USSR's declared readiness to join*** should only be brought up in the most general terms so as not to give the governments of the three [Western] powers cause to say that the Soviet government only made the statement for propaganda purposes, since it had set unacceptable conditions."¹⁷

The final version of the memo, which was submitted to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium on March 26, 1954, included a restrained comment, to the effect that a negative response to the Soviet proposals from the U.S., Great Britain, and France "would affect the prestige of the USSR." There was also more careful wording with regard to an interconnection between two issues – the U.S. participation in an all-European collective security treaty and the possibility of the USSR's joining NATO (so that the Soviet Union would not act "as a supplicant"). Furthermore, while "making a proposal on the U.S. participation in an all-European treaty," the Foreign Ministry advised that "the earlier provision that the People's Republic of China will only participate in a European collective security system as observer not be reviewed."¹⁸

Finally, the most important thing is that in its memo, the USSR Foreign Ministry proposed that the note "should not declare outright the USSR's readiness to join the North Atlantic Treaty, but should be limited to an expression of readiness to consider jointly*** the question of Soviet participation" in the treaty (one of the working drafts contained a significantly differing formulation: "should be limited to mentioning such a possibility, which would not in the future prevent the Soviet Union – if the issue of admission*** is not resolved in a satisfactory way – from continuing the campaign against it as an aggressive treaty").¹⁹

The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to that initiative is evident from the following fact. When a subcommittee at the UN disarmament commission was being formed Soviet envoy A.Ya. Vyshinsky received the following instructions in early April 1954: "As of this moment we are not interested in the disarmament commission resuming its activities*** an attempt to restart the commission*** could be used to divert attention from our note of March 31."²⁰

When the notes from the three Western powers in response to the Soviet note were received, the Foreign Ministry started the work to prepare new diplomatic documents (an outline of the Soviet government's note in response to the US note of May 7, 1954, guidelines for the press, and other documents were drafted). Their content shows beyond any doubt that propaganda was becoming the main line of action amidst the categorical rejection of the Soviet collective security proposals by the West.

The "general message" of the new note was to provide a well substantiated "goal of the Soviet proposals: instead of creating military blocs, opposed to one another, which can only lead to a new war, it is necessary to establish a collective security system in Europe, which will strengthen peace." It was also proposed "refuting the argument by the three Western powers about the North Atlantic pact being an organization of 'like-minded countries,' and demonstrating that it is possible and necessary to cooperate in maintaining peace*** between states with different social systems."²¹ One of the provisions of the draft guidelines for the press stated that "the thrust in press and radio materials should be put on revealing the glaring gap between the peace-loving words and non peace-loving deeds of the U.S. ruling circles." Recommendations that "press materials should be focused and assertive"²² were also quite understandable. A certain element of propaganda appeared in passages of the Soviet draft note explaining the essence of the U.S. "policy of force": "In relations among countries, priority is being given not to the principle of cooperation between countries, but to the principle of dictate, while there are increasing attempts to replace negotiations between states by threats and ultimatums."²³

In conclusion, it is appropriate to quote the rather eloquent description of the situation then prevailing, which was made in one of the first draft notes (May 16, 1954) in response to the note from the three Western powers: "One would expect that in so far as they have declared their striving to advance détente in international relations and to consolidate peace, the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France would have taken a positive view of the Soviet government's initiative. However, something entirely different has happened."²⁴

Thus, a comparative analysis of archival documents (including drafts of memos and related notes) leads to the conclusion that in weighing up the prospects for the implementation of that initiative, the foreign policy department did not categorically rule out the possibility of joining NATO. At the same time, the immutable underlying assumption for the Russians was that this bloc by nature was aggressive and offensive.

Soviet diplomacy displayed exemplary perseverance in working to achieve the set goals: In 1955, at a conference of the four powers' prime ministers in Geneva, the Soviet delegation once again proposed the issue of the USSR's possible admission to NATO for consideration. But this is an entirely different story.

**A Note from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Government of the United States of America**

A typewritten official copy; The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive [AVP RF], folio 06, list 13, sheet 2, file 9, pp. 98-107

No. 16/ OSA

“THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT considers it necessary to draw the attention of the government of the United States of America to the following:

“The Soviet Union has been consistently following a policy of peace, and working to improve relations between States. This has been reflected in the proposals on general arms reduction by all States, as well as on the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, which the Soviet government put forward at the UN.

“Achieving the goal of a general arms reduction, as well as prohibiting nuclear and other dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction, would greatly alleviate the heavy burden that the nations are bearing in connection with the ongoing arms race, and would eliminate the danger of such great scientific discoveries as method of using atomic energy being applied for destructive purposes. Achieving this goal would be of major importance to strengthening peace and the security of nations.

“As is known, relevant international agreements on the aforementioned important issues have not been reached yet, due to the difficulties that have come up. This, however, should not diminish the importance of the efforts made by States, above all, the Great Powers, which bear a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace, toward reaching such agreements. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will continue to insist on the need for substantial cuts of arms and armed forces of States, and reaching an agreement prohibiting the use of atomic energy for purposes of destruction and mass annihilation of people. The importance of these efforts is growing, especially in connection with the fact that the destructive power of nuclear weapons is steadily growing, and in addition, hydrogen weapons have been developed, the power of which exceeds that of nuclear weapons several times over. There can be no doubt that the use of nuclear and hydrogen weapons in a war would bring untold suffering to nations, the mass annihilation of civilians, and the destruction of large cities – centers of modern industry, culture and science, including such long

standing centers of civilization as the largest capitals of world States.

“In working to facilitate the reaching of agreements on these important issues, the Soviet government also operates on the assumption that there are other, still untapped opportunities for strengthening peace.

“In this connection, it is necessary, above all, to note the importance of strengthening European security, since the maintenance of peace in Europe is of crucial importance for world peace and the prevention of a new world war.

“Guided by this, the Soviet government, at the Berlin Conference of US, UK, French, and USSR foreign ministers, submitted a proposal, entitled *On Ensuring European Security*, and put forward a draft all-European collective security treaty.

“The draft treaty provides for the creation of an all-European security system as a result of the collective efforts of all European States. The treaty will be open to all European States, regardless of their social systems, including Germany: furthermore, until the German reunification, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic could become signatories to the treaty. In the event of an armed attack against any of the signatories, the Treaty provides for assistance to the State that been subjected to such an attack with all available means, including the use of military force in the interest of restoring and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

“Therefore, the draft of an all-European treaty is aimed at creating an effective collective security system in Europe in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

“The creation of an all European collective security system would put an end to the establishment of military groups of States in Europe, opposed to one another. The creation of such groups perforce aggravates relations between States, and increases distrust and hostility among them, not to mention the fact that this is accompanied by an arms race with all the ensuing consequences. It should also be taken into account that the establishment of a military bloc by one group of States inevitably leads to similar measures on the part of other States in the interest of ensuring their own security.

“This creates a situation where relations among the States are based not on their striving for cooperation in the interest of preserving peace, but on setting some States against others, which heightens tension in relations among States and, therefore, increases the threat of a new war. In this connection, one cannot ignore the fact that both World War I and World War II were preceded by the establishment of opposing military groups of states and a split of Europe in two hostile camps. At the same time one must not forget the especially dangerous role played by German militarism in such military blocs, as well as in starting World War I and World War II.

“All of this goes to stress the importance of the efforts designed to ensure that a policy aimed at creating opposing military blocs must be counter-balanced by a policy of effective cooperation among all European States in main-

taining and consolidating peace. Such cooperation between all European States, large and small, regardless of their social systems, would make it possible to avoid a situation where Europe become periodically involved in devastating wars, as is obvious from the history of the European States over the past decade.

“This is why the Soviet government has repeatedly drawn the attention of the US administration, as well as that of the British and French governments, to the danger related to the creation of military groups of States. In particular, the Soviet government has drawn attention to this in connections with plans to create the so-called European Defense Community, which are leading to the revival of German militarism with all the ensuing consequences for peace in Europe, especially for the security of States bordering West Germany.

“As is known, the plans of creating a European Defense Community provide for the establishment of a closed military grouping of six European States, under the banner of which the so-called European army is to be built, comprised of French, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, Luxembourg, and even West German forces. The main role in this ‘European army’ is being assigned to the West German armed forces, led by Nazi generals, all of which is being done in defiance of the obligations that the United States, Great Britain, and France assumed, together with the Soviet Union, on the prevention of the revival of German militarism; furthermore, there are plans to form dozens of West German divisions.

“It is also well known that in connection with the plans to establish a ‘European army,’ the ruling circles in West Germany are openly setting the goal of accelerating the re-militarization of West Germany and creating regular armed forces with all arms and branches of services, and no longer consider it necessary to hide their aggressive goals in relation to the neighboring States. The peace-loving peoples of Europe, especially West Germany’s neighbors, cannot help being concerned about their security in connection with the threat that is posed by the revival of German militarism and West Germany’s involvement in the European Defense Community.

“Following the course of reviving German militarism and creating military blocs in Europe means not only doing nothing to consolidate peace but, quite the contrary, heading for a new war.

“Meanwhile, today, like never before, there is a pressing need for all peace-loving States, above all the Great Powers, to direct their efforts toward preventing a new war, so that the European nations do not become involved in a new war, which in the present conditions poses a special danger to nations. This goal can be successfully achieved if, instead of opposing military groups of European States, a collective security system is established in Europe, one based on the joint efforts of all European States. At the same time, the creation of such a collective security system in Europe is in accordance with the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world. This is why the idea of a collective security system in Europe, especially after the Berlin Conference, has already

met with active support from a number of States, as well as in broad international circles.

“Discussion of the Soviet proposal on an all-European treaty at the Berlin Conference revealed differences, which made it impossible to reach a decision. However, taking into account the importance of achieving a relevant agreement on this significant issue, the Soviet government considers it expedient to continue consideration of this proposal.

“The discussion of the Soviet proposal on ensuring collective security in Europe has heard, among other things, the view that it is undesirable for the United States to stay out of a European collective security treaty. Taking that into account and considering the US contribution made to the general struggle against the Nazi aggression during World War II and the responsibility that the United States, together with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, bears for a post war settlement in Europe, as well as taking into consideration the position expressed by the US Administration at the Berlin Conference, the Soviet government can see no obstacles to a positive resolution of the question concerning the US participation in an all-European collective security treaty. Therefore, the apparent impediment to achieving an agreement on establishing a collective security system in Europe should no longer be seen as such.

“Another question raised during the discussion of the Soviet proposal on an all-European security treaty at the Berlin Conference was one concerned with the role and place of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in connection with the establishment of a collective security system in Europe. Importantly, the US representative, as well as the British and French representatives, maintained that the North Atlantic Treaty is of a purely defensive nature and is not aimed against any one State or group of States. Such statements were also made by official US representatives, as well as by British and French representatives, also after the Berlin Conference, in the context of the Soviet proposal concerning the creation of an all-European collective security system.

“The position of the Soviet government with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty is well known. The USSR government has not shared, and cannot possibly share the view that the treaty in question is of a defensive nature. The Soviet government acts on the assumption that the North Atlantic Treaty creates an enclosed group of States, ignores the goal of preventing a new German aggression, and in so far as among the Great Powers - former members of the anti-Nazi coalition, only the USSR is not a party to the treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty cannot but be regarded as an aggressive treaty, aimed against the Soviet Union.

“It is perfectly obvious that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could, under certain circumstances, lose its aggressive nature if all the Great Powers- former members of the anti Nazi coalition became its participants. In view of the aforementioned, guided by the immutable principles of its peace loving foreign policy, and striving to ease tension in international relations, the

Soviet government expresses its readiness to consider, in conjunction with the governments concerned, the matter of the USSR's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.

“In so far as the US Administration, as well as the governments of Great Britain and France, declare their commitment to alleviate international tension and strengthen peace, one could expect that they would take a positive view of the idea of taking measures to ensure a situation where the North Atlantic Treaty would acquire a truly defensive nature and create conditions effectively ruling out the possibility of involving a certain part of Germany in military blocs. In this event, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would cease being an insulated military grouping of States and would become open for accession to other European countries, which, along with the establishment of an effective European security system, could be of crucial importance for peace in the world.

“The Soviet government believes that questions arising in this connection could be resolved in a manner satisfactory to all States concerned in the interest of strengthen peace and security of nations.

“The Soviet government has sent analogous notes to the governments of Great Britain and France.

“Moscow, March 31, 1954.”

**Note of the Government of the United States of America
to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

Received by mail
May 7, 1954

No. 966

THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, upon instructions from its Government, has the honor to state the following:

1. The United States Government has consulted the British and French Governments and the other interested Governments, and in particular those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on those aspects of the problem of European security which were fully discussed by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin and to which the Soviet Government again drew attention in its note of March 31.

2. The United States Government has long been striving for the universal reduction of armaments, to include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of atomic energy. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United Nations Commission on

Conventional Armaments and subsequently in the United Nations Disarmament Commission the United States Government has worked to secure international agreement on disarmament and to put an end to the competition in armaments which is imposing such a burden upon the peoples of the world. Such agreement can only be reached by progressive and balanced disarmament with effective safeguards which would remove the dangers of aggression from any quarter. The United States Government is determined to do everything in its power to bring to a successful conclusion the conversations started as a result of President Eisenhower's initiative as well as the disarmament negotiations which will shortly begin again in the United Nations. It hopes that the Soviet Government will make a constructive contribution to the solution of these problems.

3. If these negotiations are to succeed, a sense of security and confidence must first be established. It is in this light that the United States Government has again carefully studied the Soviet proposals on European security first put forward in Berlin and now repeated in the Soviet Government's note. In these the Soviet Government does not attempt to remove the actual causes of European tension. Instead it proposes a new collective security treaty which is avowedly based on the neutralization and continued division of Germany while leaving unchanged the Soviet Government's close political, economic and military control over the countries of Eastern Europe. This can only prolong insecurity and division in Europe. These proposals, even when amended to permit United States participation, do not provide any foundation for genuine security.

4. The addition to the United Nations of such an organization as that proposed by the Soviet Government, embracing the Soviet Union, the United States and all European countries, would contribute nothing to what is already a worldwide security organization. It would not only be useless but also dangerous because it would inevitably tend to destroy the authority of the United Nations. The United States Government cannot, therefore, accept the Soviet proposal. Collective security would best be safeguarded if the Soviet Government would permit the United Nations to function as the Charter intended.

5. The Soviet Government has also suggested that its proposed collective security pact should be accompanied by an extension of the Atlantic Pact through the adherence of the Soviet Union to the North Atlantic Treaty. It is unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion. It is contrary to the very principles on which the defense system and the security of the Western nations depend. These nations have bound themselves by close ties of mutual confidence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is much more than a purely military arrangement, is founded on the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law. The means of defense of its members have been pooled to provide collectively the security which they can not attain indi-

vidually in the face of the military preponderance which the Soviet Union has attained in Europe since 1945 and of the westward expansion of a political, economic and military system subject to its sole control. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is wholly defensive. There is free and full exchange of information between all its members. All its decisions are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of the organization would therefore be in a position to veto every decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint defense system to be disrupted in this way.

6. European and world security will not be promoted by the disruption of defensive associations of like-minded states and the substitution of new illusory security organizations. The United States Government remains convinced that the only way to remove the sense of insecurity which weighs on the world is through step-by-step solutions of individual problems. It does not believe that a lasting settlement can be achieved by erecting a new facade of security behind which the fundamental difficulties and divisions remain unchanged.

7. With these thoughts in mind, the Western powers at Berlin advocated a plan which would have constituted a first step towards the solution of the German problem. The Soviet Government would not even discuss this plan. The Western powers also put forward proposals designed to reinforce the security of Europe on the basis of existing agreements. The Soviet Government refused also to consider these proposals. The Western powers offered to accept the Soviet text of every unagreed article of the Austrian State Treaty. But the Soviet Government, far from agreeing to sign on its own terms, attached new and unacceptable conditions which would have totally changed the treaty from one of freedom and independence to one of indefinite occupation by foreign troops.

8. The Soviet Government has repeated the criticisms it made at Berlin about plans for a European defense community. The United States Government has already stated its views on this subject. It is quite untrue to suggest that the present plans which are of limited scope are responsible for the division of Europe or aggravate the risk of war. The division of Europe was brought about by the Soviet Government, and its refusal to contemplate the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections is one of the elements that serves to perpetuate this division. In these circumstances the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be allowed to remain without any means of defense when the Eastern Zone of Germany, as its leaders openly acknowledge, possesses substantial armed forces. The United States Government considers that the best and safest way for all concerned to solve the problem of a German contribution to defense is within the framework of an association which by its very nature would prevent Germany from taking any individual armed action.

9. The United States Government remains convinced of the urgent need to improve relations between states and to ensure mutual security. It suggests that progress could best be made toward the elimination of the sources of international tension if the Soviet Government would give concrete evidence of its good intentions by joining with the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in

(i) finding a speedy settlement of the Austrian question that will restore to Austria its full sovereignty and independence;

(ii) seeking a lasting and acceptable solution of the German problem;

(iii) reaching early agreement on general, progressive, balanced and supervised disarmament:

such agreement should specifically include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of atomic energy under adequate safeguards;

(iv) working for solutions of the most pressing problems in the Far East at the Geneva Conference ;

(v) conforming their behavior in the United Nations to the principles of the charter

and so enabling the United Nations to fulfill its true role as an effective organization for collective security.

American Embassy,
Moscow, May 7, 1954.

Translated [from English] by
Tsygankova
Myshkov
Musin

Translator's note: Analogous notes have been received from the British and French Embassies.

Sent to: Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Pervukhin

NOTES

¹ True, on April 1 and July 24, 1954, some of the correspondence with the U.S. was published in: *Sbornik osnovnykh dokumentov i materialov po Severoatlanticheskomu bloku*, vol. 1. M., MID SSSR, 1955, pp. 133- 135.

² Egorova N. I. "Evropeiskaia bezopasnost', 1954-1955 gg.: poiski novykh podkhodov." *Kholodnaia voina. 1945- 1963 gg. Istoricheskaia retrospektiva. Sbornik statei.* M., 2003; Bystrova N. E. *SSSR i formirovanie voenno blokovogo protivostoianiiia v Evrope (1945-1955 gg.)*. M., 2007; Mastny V. "NATO in the Beholder's Eye." *Cold War International History Project. Working Paper No. 35.* Washington, 2002; Roberts G. *The Soviet Union*

in *World Politics. Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945- 1991*. L., 1999.

³ Bystrova N. E. *Op. cit.*, p. 471.

⁴ Filitov A. M. "SSSR i germanskii vopros: povorotnye punkty (1941- 1961 gg.)." *Kholodnaia voina. 1945-1963 gg. Istoricheskaia retrospektiva. Sbornik statei*. M., 2003, pp. 248 - 249.

⁵ AVP RF, folio 06, list 13, sheet 65, file 25, p. 10.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, list 64, file 21, p. 87.

⁷ *Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika v gody kholodnoi voiny (1945- 1985). Novoe prochtenie*. M., 1995, p. 23.

⁸ Egorova N. I. "NATO i evropeiskaia bezopasnost': vospriiatie sovetskogo rukovodstva." *Stalin i kholodnaia voina*. M., 1998, p. 303.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 310- 311.

¹⁰ AVP RF, folio 06, list 13a, sheet 27, file 28, pp. 10.

¹¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons (Hansard). Series 5th, vol. 461, col. 15 - 16 (1949, February 7); vol. 463, col. 2456 (1949, April 11).*

¹² AVP RF, folio 06, list 13, sheet 2, file 9, p. 21.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 36.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 58. The draft of an array of general principles for an all-European collective security treaty, which was sent to V. M. Molotov on January 20, 1954, proposed the following wording: "Recognizing the special responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security that is borne by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the signatories to the treaty will invite the governments of the U.S. and China to send their representatives*** to these bodies in observer capacity." AVP RF, folio 06, list 13a, sheet 27, file 28, pp. 6.

¹⁹ AVP RF, folio 06, list 13, sheet 2, file 9, pp. 46, 58.

²⁰ AVP RF, folio 047, list 9, sheet 59, file 17, p. 17.

²¹ AVP RF, folio 06, list 13, sheet 2, file 10, p. 15.

²² AVP RF, *ibid.*, pp. 26, 27.

²³ The draft sent to V. M. Molotov on June 22, 1954. AVP RF, folio 06, list 13, sheet 2, file 11, p. 9.

²⁴ AVP RF, folio 06, list 13, sheet 2, file 10, p. 33.

Very Big Enterprises and the Modern World

V. Shchetinin

THE ABOVE IS THE TITLE OF A BOOK by Prof. G.P. Chernikov and Assistant Prof. D.A. Chernikova published not long ago by “*Ekonomika*.”¹

Transnational corporations have been described in a vast number of books published in recent years here and abroad.

The book under review is an attempt to delineate primarily the latest trends in the development of TNC. One of the most important new trends is the rapid growth of especially big corporations which are not merely becoming the more influential actors in world economy, but are increasingly claiming for themselves the decisive position in world politics and setting the tone for the entire political and cultural life on the global, regional and national levels.

Company reports, stock exchange bulletins, and appraisals made by many teams of researchers in particular by those of *Fortune* magazine, that have been published regularly since 1954 as well as ratings of 500 biggest companies around the world make it possible to contend that the impact of especially large TNC has been steadily growing between the end of the 20th century and at the start of the 21st century.

Of decisive importance among tens of thousands of TNC (they number 79,000, according to UNCTAD /WIR/ 2008) are currently just several hundred especially big of these corporations.

Based on stock market capitalization data, Thomson Financial Data Base singled out 800 biggest companies. Their total turnover currently amounts to nearly 33 percent of world GDP.

One of the first to analyze these data was Prof. Paul H. Dembinski of University of Fribourg who is also the director of the *Observatoire de la Finance* in Geneva, Switzerland. He was among the first authors to propose the term “very big enterprises” (VBEs) stressing that VBEs should be regarded as ultimate structuring forces of world economy and real drivers of globalization.²

The book under review consists of two main parts. In the first part the authors try to figure out what VBEs are. It opens with describing their peculiarities and their role inside transnational capital and in today’s world economy as

Valentin Shchetinin, Professor at the Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. In 1975-1992, the USSR/RF representative to the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations

a whole. Subsequent chapters characterize VBEs in the leading branches of world economy. The authors analyze in greater or lesser detail data pertaining to some 150 VBEs. Nearly 70 of the companies are analyzed in detail based on data supplied by these corporations and found in official sources, academic periodicals and studies carried out by a wide circle of experts. The book gives much prominence to the latest trends.

The authors' chief accomplishment is without a doubt the development of what can be described as a typology of VBEs. According to them, any VBEs should have all the peculiarities of the conventional transnational corporation (it should have subsidiaries, associated enterprises in various countries on the basis of economic and organizational unity, a relatively high index of transnationalization of at least 10 percent to 20 percent as regards the structure of assets, employment and sales).

But VBEs are most importantly distinct for the extent of their economic might. The authors quite reasonably describe a very big enterprise as an oligopoly holding the dominant position in the appropriate sector, region and in a concrete market. When a TNC turns into a VBE its organizational structures take on some new features. It develops worldwide nets of subsidiaries and holding companies. This turns many VBEs into international financial-industrial groups. VBEs are active participants in the scientific and technical revolution. They account for nearly half the money spent on R&D globally. R&D projects carried out by VBEs are growing increasingly international. One possible example is German VBEs which, during the 1990s in the early 2000s set up more divisions in other countries than during 50 previous years.

The authors are right in arguing that VBEs are in the lead for reorientation towards the service sector primarily through expanding their activities abroad. Another indicator of very big enterprises' growth in the sphere of services is the growing number of international investment agreements (IIA) and strategic alliances.

The second part of the book entitled "VBEs and Problems of Society Today" explores relationship of VBEs with the state and national peculiarities of VBEs in different countries. The authors are correct in saying that the essence of transnationalization of capital and of other categories of the world economy is the same. But, like very big enterprises, transnational corporations take on national features as regards their concrete development. What do they consist in? The book notes a number of factors. Competition is causing a change in the balance of forces between VBEs. Dissimilarities of historical development of this or that country are of great importance, as are social and political relations, in particular, contacts between enterprises and the government. It is equally important to take into account the socio-psychological and cultural traditions of every individual country. Finally, organizational structures of different countries have their own distinctive features.

The American model of TNC and very big enterprises is based on a

free-market-oriented financial system, the highly developed capital market and a wide range of various financial tools. According to expert estimates, there are several dozen powerful alliances operating in the USA at the present time. Many of them are competing for spheres of influence or create joint ventures.

This contradictory and complex process has produced two regional super groups. One of them is linked to the economy of New York and other centers of the country's northeast. The other is a creation of California groupings.

According to the estimates of Russian researchers G.B. Kochetkov and V.B. Supian, there are 82 American corporations listed among 200 biggest world companies.³

Characterizing the American model of VBEs, the authors stress that its linchpin is the corporation as the principal organizational form of business. It ensures effective economic development despite its concrete flaws. They became revealed in particular during the so-called "accounting crisis." The book devotes to it a special section entitled "Corporate Governance Crisis Early in the 21st Century."⁴

VBEs in Japan have important distinctions owing to the specific way Japan's society was being formed throughout history. One of them is "corporatism" which permeates the entire system of business relations. The authors cite convincing proof that Japanese morals and ethics stress group effort. It is traditionally believed in Japan that any social group is higher than the individual.

This manifests itself in particular in the widespread "business-state" relations with the key role played by the major corporations and four organizations of business circles where Japan Business Federation, Nippon Keidanren is the main one.

The corporate structures of countries in Western Europe have a number of similar features that emerged in the course of history. European VBEs are older than those in the USA and Japan which is why banking capital began to emerge earlier. Characteristic of the growth of banks in Europe was the wide use of forming personal unions, which is also characteristic of EU banks today.

Another peculiarity of European-type VBEs is that international economic relations have a big impact on them. The colonial history of EU members is also having an effect.

Of very great importance has been the political factor. The social and class struggle have also left its mark on many aspects of public life in these countries. This is one of the key reasons for the huge role of the state in the political life in countries of Rhein capitalism.

France serves perhaps as a characteristic example. The mechanism of mixed economy in France is sine qua non for normal reproduction of public capital.

A key feature of European VBEs is the impact of the growth of international finance and the process of intensive financial globalization which shows clearly in the growing process of integration, its achievements and contradic-

tions. On the one hand, integration helps closer contacts between VBEs of Europe. Suffice it to think of the laws on mergers and takeovers in the banking sector which are partially in effect and will be in full effect by the close of 2008 in all countries of the European Union. This will be of advantage to the more efficient players on the market.

On the other hand, there are also growing contradictions. The change of leadership in many long-time EU members strengthens their resolve to consolidate the unity of the EU, create a solid foundation of this community. But this at the same time strains relations between the old and new EU members and VBEs of different European countries. In the more competitive environment, European VBEs will have to make a difficult choice between merging with friendly groups or ending up taken over by someone else with the possibility of having their business split up.

Transnational corporations from developing countries have been increasingly active on the world market. They are driven by their high growth rates. Some of them are attaining the level of VBEs and their activities threaten the TNC of industrialized countries.

The future of TNC in developing countries largely hinge on the overall scope of their activities and the growth of their proportion in world GDP.

The authors also write about Russia's VBEs: "Russia is taking measures to protect its national interests. We are moving away from shackling forms of economic cooperation Western companies used to force on our country in the 1990s, a period of general weakness of our economy ... But there still are difficulties and problems ahead."⁵

While I generally assess the book positively, it would be wrong to gloss over its drawbacks. One of the flaws, perhaps found in important scientific studies into major sociopolitical phenomena is that they lag somewhat behind the rapid march of the world economy and its contradictions. But this flaw should not be overestimated. The book, as I have already mentioned, has a section on the crisis of corporate governance.

But life has marched on since. The effects of the accounting crisis became history at the close of 2008. The world economy has plunged into the abyss of a crisis that is the deepest since the Great Depression. The world financial system has in fact ended up without its center where, as journalists write, there is now a giant crater. The U.S. economy is doomed to recession. Europe has actually entered a downturn. The impact of the crisis has been felt also by Asian nations. Nor has the crisis bypassed Russia.

The American financial crash has taken on the traits of a world economic crisis which has radically altered the financial system of the USA and triggered a chain reaction in other countries. The U.S. government has urgently nationalized the giant financial companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These two alone controlled nearly one half of the mortgage market in the USA worth \$11 trillion. It also has nationalized America's major and one of the world's

biggest insurance corporations AIG. The corporation used to have 74 million ordinary holders of shares and insurance policies in the USA. AIG's commercial activities earned it \$110 billion a year. According to former U.S. Treasury Department official Roger Altman, what we have is a universal interdependence, the fear of the unknown and a collapse. People fear the fall of a giant like AIG, which can drag us all into the abyss.⁶

Five leading investment banks with a one-hundred-year history have folded. Bear Stearns was bought back in March 2008 by JP Morgan Chase, and come September, Lehman Brothers crashed; Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch; Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks. The giant corporations Washington Mutual (WaMu) and Wachovia ceased to be independent. The crash of WaMu was caused by a wave of withdrawals and the consequent fall in its rating. Washington authorities had to step in to decide the future of the fourth largest bank holding company in the United States Wachovia because the crash of this bank, as stated U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, would represent a systemic risk for the nation's financial system. But in the final analysis Wachovia was acquired for \$15.1 billion by Wells Fargo.⁷

The USA adopted a plan to spend \$700 billion to bail out the financial system by purchasing distressed assets from banks.

The banking crisis has also seriously affected Europe. The premiers of 15 eurozone countries agreed to pass a package of anti-crisis measures, including recapitalization of banks and guarantees to be given before the end of 2009 with regard to their debts which are more than five-year old. The overall value of the promised rescue package is more than \$2.5 trillion. The aid package in Great Britain is £500 billion; in Germany, 500 billion euro; in France, 500 billion euro; in Spain, 100 billion euro; in Austria, 85 billion euro; in Norway, 55 billion euro; in Portugal, 20 billion euro.⁸

European governments were compelled to nationalize or give financial aid to their major banks Fortis, Bradford and Bingley, Dexia, Hypo Real Estate. In Iceland, the government took control of three major banks. In Britain, the government will furnish £37 billion (\$63 billion) under its nationalization plan to Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and to two further merging banks. RBS was nationalized 60 percent, and the government share in the merging HBOS and Lloyds TSB amounted to 43.5 percent. This actually means that the British government took control of the banks on whose books there are \$4.38 trillion or 50 percent more than Britain's GDP.⁹

European banks have been badly hit by the world financial and economic crisis. They account for \$210 billion of the total of \$585 billion write-offs of the world's banks.

The international financial crisis has revived the end-of-capitalism discussion. This stands to reason because many governments are now obliged to resort to "manual control" of their economies. The markets are being held together through unprecedented financial interventions. Significantly, government

measures to rescue modern economics are being taken in countries with the greatest trends in economic liberalism (the USA and Britain are a glowing example).

The explanations found for the current difficulties strengthen those theories which lead to believe that the world is on the whole growing to be more reliant on governments and social responsibility. The crisis is leading the world to forming new ideas about the future.

The future of the world is of course impossible to predict with certainty. One only obvious thing is that a full return to old practices is impossible. It is necessary to analyze the new phenomena. Very big enterprises belong among them. In this context, it would not be too much to ask that the authors start without delay on a fresh study based on the unfolding crisis with its mature forms. The book under review could be a solid “interim platform.” I wish them success.

NOTES

¹ G.P. Chernikov, D.A. Chernikova. *Ochen' krupnye transnational'nye korporatsii i sovremennyi mir*. M., 2008, 396 pp., www.economizdat.ru

² P.H. Dembinski. *Economic Power and Social Responsibility of Very Big Enterprises: Facts and Challenges*., New York, Geneva, UNCTAD, 2004, p. 43.

³ G.B. Kochetkov, V.B. Supian. *Korporatsiia, amerikanskaia model*. SPb, 2005, p. 9.

⁴ G.P. Chernikov, D.A. Chernikova. *Ochen' krupnye...*, pp. 319-326.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

⁶ M. Sturua. “Vse my v AIG, kak v odnoi lodke.” *Izvestia*, 19 September 2008.

⁷ *Vedomosti*, 13 October 2008; *Ekspert*, No., 6-12 October 2008.

⁸ *Vedomosti*, 14 October 2008.

⁹ *Ekspert*, No. 41, 20-26 October 2008.

