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"France is returning to Europe!" This statement made by N. Sarkozy right after the results of the May 7, 2007 presidential elections were announced can be viewed as a kind of an epigraph to the new president's European policy. Indeed, the negative outcome of the May 25, 2005 referendum on the draft European Constitution not only caused an institutional crisis within the EU, blocking European integration mechanisms for a long time, but also up to a certain point marginalized France's positions in Western Europe. The French "no" had an equally bad effect on the political situation in the country, and its political elite felt divided, more than ever, into "euro pessimists" and "euro optimists," as a considerable part of the French establishment became more "demoralized."
Not surprisingly, N. Sarkozy put forward (still during the election campaign) a plan for overcoming the crisis as soon as possible by adopting "a mini-constitution" or "a mini-treaty" as a priority of his European policy. One needs to give credit to the political will and perseverance of N. Sarkozy, who managed within a relatively short time span to hold consultations with the country's EU partners and persuade them to join the "French format" of the treaty. He managed to overcome disagreements, in particular to persuade the intractable Poles to take into account the Britons' special - as always - interests. Within a very short time - as early as June 2007 - the EU heads of state and government approved the text of a new agreement and then signed its final version at the EU Lisbon Summit in December. The text of the Lisbon Treaty was ratified by the French parliament (although not without some problems, caused by the stance taken by the socialist MPs) in February 2008. It is noteworthy that French diplomacy managed to take out of the text many points that had irritated the French people, in particular any reference to the supra- national status of the EU institutions and the provision on the freedom of competition as one of the EU's general principles. At the same time all the fundamental provisions of the rejected draft Constitution remained in the text of the Lisbon Treaty.
It is also important to note that although the failure of the referendum in France dealt a serious blow to the positions of President J. Chirac, it played into his successor's hands. N. Sarkozy derived maximum dividends from the situation then prevailing, confirming the well-known proverb that every cloud has a silver lining. First, the French president once again proved to himself, as well as to the country's neighbors, that "there is no Europe without France" and that Paris remains a key EU player. That was psychologically very important. Second, due to the successful promotion of the "mini-treaty" idea, N. Sarkozy managed to gain the political initiative at the EU and become its de facto informal leader.
It seemed that there was nothing that could prevent the fulfillment of N. Sarkozy's plans to overcome the EU's institutional crisis. The French leadership hoped to complete the Lisbon Treaty ratification procedure during its rotating EU presidency. However, N. Sarkozy's success as the No. 1 politician in Europe was marred by the discouraging results of the Irish referendum. Although the French parliament formally ratified the Constitutional Treaty and "returned France to Europe," paraphrasing French Prime Minister F. Fillon, it would be appropriate here to ask the question: "Did Europe return to France?" There is no certainty about that, taking into account the public opinion polls showing that had the Lisbon Treaty been put to a referendum in France, it would not have received the majority of votes.
Will the French president now be able to reconcile France with Europe and overcome not only the institutional but also the moral crisis of the European project? N. Sarkozy's European policy is designed to answer this question. True, there is no need to dramatize the situation: After all, such crises have happened before. All of them were caused by France's rocky relationship with Europe.

The Dialectics of the EU-French Relationship

Although France was among the EU's founders, playing, together with Germany, the role of a "driving force" behind the European integration process, its relationship with Brussels has never been easy or cloudless. France's European policy has been marked by some immanent duality and contradictions. On the one hand, France has sincerely advocated the building of a united Europe, justly believing that it will only be able to preserve its role in the international arena as part of a "European concert." On the other hand, France has been rather sensitive about the imminent limitation of national sovereignty as a result of integration. As is known, the main vector of France's foreign policy, as laid down by de Gaulle, was the course toward the preservation and multiplication of "France's greatness," its role as a "great humanitarian power," and "defender of human rights, common sense, and progress." Europe was an instrument in the pursuit of that course. The aforementioned conflict was neutralized (at least in theory) by the concept of "Europe of Motherlands" that was followed by all leaders of the Fifth Republic starting with de Gaulle, as well as by the principle of subsidiarity, adopted in the EU. However, it was an open secret that under this convenient slogan, France had for decades been effectively "promoting" its integration project in the united Europe. It regarded "Europe-building" as a kind of an external continuation of France, as its social model. Its EU colleagues understood the French specifics. Sometimes these specifics annoyed them, but on the whole they have never raised objections, since France's political weight in the world was indubitable. It was based on France's status as one of the victorious powers, its nuclear status, economic might, and influence in Africa and the Middle East, which enabled France to claim the role of a great power. France's leading role within the EEC was further strengthened by its moral superiority over Germany, humiliated by its Nazi past, as well as by de Gaulle's reluctance to allow its main competitor, Britain (the U.S.'s Trojan horse), to join the community. France had an added moral superiority in the EEC due to its special role as a mediator in the relationship between the East and the West, its moderate "Atlantism" and its equidistant stance with regard to the superpowers. The well- known slogan "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," which in its time was regarded as a breakthrough, eloquently testified to France's unique position on the international arena.
The collapse of a bipolar world order, which coincided with a course toward the strengthening of European integration (a crucial turning point was the signing of the Maastricht Treaty),* and the subsequent unprecedented enlargement of the EU, which
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*Incidentally, the course toward the acceleration of European integration, which emerged in the second half of the 1980s, was to a very large degree predetermined by the fact that France had proved unable single handedly to find a way out of the prolonged socio-economic depression that had affected the West from the late 1970s; the failure of the "socialist experiment" in France in the early 1980s confronted the country's ruling circles with the dilemma: either isolationism or further integration.

was largely of a geopolitical nature, drastically changed Europe's political architecture, which came to incorporate France's European policy. Such tectonic changes could not have passed painlessly: According to the majority of analysts, they caused "an identity crisis," as well as a crisis of France's European policy.
Indeed, France found itself in the position of a person who had sawed off the bough on which he had been sitting. The struggle - often not publicized - for "the liberation of Eastern and Central Europe from Communist dictatorship," which made it possible to "bring the forcibly separated brothers back into the family of European nations" (including the Baltic states, which France had always considered to be "unlawfully occupied"), proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for France. The "blood brothers," as it turned out, did not share the French conceit and were following, rather, the Anglo-Saxon liberal model of reform than the French model. As for their security, the "young Europeans" linked it not with Europe but with the United States, the sole superpower.
Yet another significant factor in the change that occurred in the European political landscape was the reunification of Germany. Deep in its heart, France had never been thrilled by the prospect of German unity (the well-known joke that the French like the Germans so much that they want there to be two Germanies offered a good illustration to the French vision of the issue). Being unable to stop the reunification of the German nation, the French still managed to link it with Germany's obligation to join the euro. That, to a certain extent, limited the independence of the reviving "European giant," but could not stop the obvious shift in the balance of forces in the France-Germany tandem in favor of the latter. Furthermore, by the start of the new century, the Germans had to a significant degree gotten over their historical guilt complex over World War II, depriving the French of high moral ground. The EU enlargement benefited Germany more than it did France.
In short, by the end of the 20th century, France had largely lost its accustomed role of "the first among equals" within the EU, with its voice being heeded less and less. For a long time, the French saw the Community, conceived according to their design, only as a super-state French style, a super hexagon [the French colloquially refer to their country as "hexagon"], which they viewed as their mirror reflection. However, over time and as the Community expanded, which brought about changes and overlaps in the political architecture, jurisdiction, rules, powers, borders, and traditions, the distinct identities of Europe and France lost their similarity,1 according to a survey conducted by the Notre Europe foundation ahead of France's rotating EU presidency in the second half of 2000.
The signing of a new EU treaty in Nice and the subsequent enlargement of the Community could not reverse the growing French skepticism about the European project. The geopolitical ambitions of the EU leadership were of little concern to the average French person. France pinned some hopes on the Lisbon strategy as Europe's response to the challenges of globalization. However, devised in the Brussels offices, it turned to be as unrealistic as it was removed from the pressing daily problems of the French people. In short, the failure of the referendum on the draft European Constitution in May 2005 was largely a foregone conclusion. It drew a line under an entire era of the EU's development and its relationship with France. N. Sarkozy understood that very well ahead of his presidential campaign. "After the French 'no' to the European Constitution, we cannot continue building Europe as before," the future president of the French Republic kept saying.
Therefore, N. Sarkozy's entire European policy, after his coming to power, was aimed at giving the EU new dynamics and building a new rapport between France and Europe. According to the French leader's plan, the Lisbon Treaty was to clear "institutional debris" in the way of further European integration. France's rotating presidency at the EU and its priorities were designed to give that movement toward integration a concrete substance and show to the "euro skeptics" that the EU leadership was able to address people's concerns. According to the French, it was to become a kind of a prologue to a new stage in the EU's development.

The Priorities of the French Presidency: Between Dreams and Reality

France attached special - even symbolic - importance to its rotating EU presidency (12th). This has to do with the fact that it is the last presidency in the old format, so to speak: Starting in 2009, the permanent EU president and his high representative for foreign policy will be elected to a term of two and a half years. The institution of six-month rotating presidency will remain, but it will be technical rather than political.
True, all of this will only happen if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by all the EU countries. The failure of the referendum on the new "mini-treaty" in Ireland on June 12, 2008 not only issued yet another reminder about the possible recurrence of an EU institutional crisis, but also threw the plans of the French rotating EU presidency into disarray. The French hoped that their EU presidency would put into operation the mechanisms of a new treaty that will take the Community to a basically new level, also leading to European parliamentary elections. In short, the Irish seriously marred the French "return to Europe." The situation was aptly described by Prof. Bertrand Badie of the Paris Institute of Political Studies: "The difficulty for France is that President N. Sarkozy cast the Lisbon Treaty as his personal victory and the success of French diplomacy. There was hope that the French presidency would serve as a platform for bringing in new EU institutions as of January 1, 2009. Nothing came of it, and it seems that the upcoming six-month period will once again be spent on searching for new opportunities to reanimate the paper mastodon into which the constitutional treaty has transformed. The impulse that France hoped to give to the European Union with its rotating presidency was, if not disrupted, at any rate weakened or complicated."2 True, Prof. Badie's critical mood is not shared by President N. Sarkozy and other French leaders, who believe that the Irish "no" should not be over-dramatized and seen as "the end of the world," or of European integration, in particular. N. Sarkozy plans to visit Dublin at the start of the rotating EU presidency and find a way out of the deadlock.
Although the Irish "no" came as an unpleasant surprise and a blow to the French leader's prestige, it did not alter the strategic plans of the French rotating EU presidency, largely predetermined by its choice of priorities. This choice was based on N. Sarkozy's guidelines for a European course, designed to search for new dynamics, to overcome Europe's moral depression, and finally, to demonstrate the ability to effectively address European concerns.
For these reasons, France has prioritized such issues as energy, environment, immigration, defense, security, and agriculture policy. These should also include the creation of a Mediterranean union that was not formally included in the agenda of France's rotating presidency.
What goals does France set within its array of priorities, and how feasible are they?

Energy-Environment

Not surprisingly, this priority of the French rotating presidency is seen as part of a "package," since it relates to a comprehensive energy problem and the associated problems of greenhouse gases and therefore, the struggle against climate change. In their entirety, all of these matters are part of the problem of sustainable development, defined as a pattern of resource use that aim to meet human needs comprising environmental sustainability, economic sustainability and sociopolitical sustainability.
The rather challenging goals of this part of the French presidency's "agenda" are to a certain degree simplified by the fact that there are no significant differences here between the EU member countries. In addition to that, the EU summit in March 2007 adopted a plan of action to work out a common energy and climate policy. France will need to start working to put these decisions into practice, which is not at all an easy thing, considering the ambitious nature of the goals that have been set. Thus, apart from such goals as ensuring the security of energy supplies, lessening dependence on energy supplies from abroad, and making this sector of the economy more competitive, the EU countries set themselves the goal of reducing greenhouses emissions by at least 20 percent by 2020, compared with 1990. This goal can be met by reducing energy consumption by 20 percent, increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU's overall energy consumption to 20 percent, and by increasing the proportion of bio-fuel in each EU member state's consumption to 10 percent.
France's rotating EU presidency plan features not only EU meetings on issues under consideration but also major international forums. These include an EU-Mediterranean meeting (July), a meeting of a permanent council on EU-Russia energy dialogue (October 8), an EU-Russia summit (November 14), and a meeting of energy ministers of countries from the Caspian-Black Sea region as part of the "Baku process" (October-November).
The EU countries are expected to put forward new coordinated proposals on the struggle against climate change at a conference in Poznan in December 2008. The conference will become an important stage in the preparation of a UN conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 that is to review the Kyoto Protocol.
Negotiations on the further liberalization of the natural gas and power market in the EU will become a difficult question for France, taking into account its special commitment to the "public sector" in its economic infrastructure.
In short, under France's rotating presidency, the EU will, according to N. Sarkozy, devise a "new model for sustainable development," to avoid two extremes - either economic growth and environmental pollution or stagnation and a conservative environmental policy.

Immigration

France has often spoken out in favor of a unified EU immigration policy. As is known, N. Sarkozy has always followed a hard line on the issue of immigration in his own country, thus winning the sympathy of a considerable number of the French people. Taking into account the increasing flow of immigrants (including illegal immigrants) to EU countries, especially from developing countries, and the need to attract foreign labor due to a demographic crisis in the majority of West European nations, such a firm stance is well justified. The French leader believes, with good reason, too, that without a single immigration policy there can be no question about the free movement of people between the 27 EU member countries. Indeed, immigration problems cannot be postponed any longer. According to Eurostat [the Statistical Office of the European Communities] between 1.5 million and 2 million legal immigrants come to the EU each year. As for illegal immigrants, their estimated number varies between 8 mln and 12 mln. In the first half of 2007 alone, 200,000 illegal immigrants were detained in the EU, 90,000 of whom were subsequently deported.3
Under the mandate of its rotating EU presidency, Paris is proposing the adoption of "a European pact on immigration and the granting of asylum" - i.e., a kind of an EU 27 code of conduct on immigration policy. A draft pact, presented to the public by Brice Hortefeux, the minister of immigration, integration, national identity, and co-development on June 18, contains five provisions on a unified EU immigration policy. First, prioritizing the so-called selective immigration depending on the needs of the labor market, and introducing strict control of immigration related to family reunification. Second, adopting obligations on fighting illegal immigration and abandoning the practice of mass legalization of illegal immigrants. Third, reinforcing border controls and mutual assistance between frontier services, completing the transition to the issue of biometric visas from 2011. Fourth, working out unified standards on granting asylum and organizing the sharing of information between the member countries about asylum seekers in the EU. Fifth, strengthening the "co-development" policy - i.e., cooperation with "immigrant supplying" countries in the interest not only of planning immigration flows but also of preventing possible immigration.
It is noteworthy that the official presentation of the "pact" coincided with the adoption by the European parliament, on June 18, of a directive on the procedure for the deportation of illegal immigrants from the EU. The document, which was slammed by European leftist forces, significantly enhances responsibility for illegal presence on EU territory. In particular, the authorities have the right to detain illegal immigrants for up to 18 months and ban those guilty of violating immigration regulations from entering the EU for a period of up to five years.
This coincidence suggests that the French draft immigration pact has good chances for success even though the positions of some EU countries do not necessarily coincide on all points (for example, on the legalization of illegal immigrants).

Defense and Security

Building a European defense system is France's long standing plan into which N. Sarkozy is attempting to breathe new life. N. Sarkozy's logic is simple and convincing. It justly assumes that it is impossible to make Europe politically united and economically prosperous without ensuring its security. France's position is nothing new. Perhaps the only difference is that today the French leader is proposing the creation of a military European structure not as a counterweight but as an addition to NATO.
The French action plan in the realm of defense and security during the country's rotating EU presidency was laid out in detail in early June by State Secretary for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet in his presentation to the 54th Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union. Efforts are to be concentrated on four areas.4
First, update the European security strategy program adopted in 2003, taking into account the new threats (immigration, environmental risks, cyber crime, and so on) and the experience of more than a dozen military and civilian operations conducted by EU forces or with their participation. Adjustment of defense and security strategy is also necessitated by the striving to reach a consensus among the member states on this major component of European integration following the EU enlargement, which will help to finally overcome the division between the "old" and "new" Europe, provoked by the Iraq crisis.
Second, strengthen the EU's civilian and military capabilities in dealing with crisis situations. This involves defining the format of the EU's participation in such operations and identifying the mix of assets that the EU can make available for the fulfillment of specific missions. In this context, the French propose creating a European air and naval group based on a French or British aircraft carrier, and a fleet of A-400 M aircraft for airlift operations and mid-air refueling. France believes that the Europeans should be ready, through collective efforts, to deploy and maintain the presence of a contingent of up to 60,000 troops (a kind of a rapid response force) in any part of the world for a year.
Third, the creation of a common internal market of arms and military equipment is to become an important stage in the development of a European defense system. It should be facilitated by the liberalization of the defense contract awarding procedure in the EU.
Fourth, France believes that in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, a number of EU countries that have sufficient military and financial capabilities should embark on a deeper integration in the realm of defense and security.
The French president has repeatedly said that defense should become a common cause for all the EU member states, not only France and Great Britain, which account for more than two-thirds of the EU's military spending. Closer cooperation in this sphere involves the development of joint military planning. In particular, the operations center in Brussels, created in 2007, is to start working. There are also plans to create a joint officer training and exchange program in the EU (similar to the Erasmus civilian program).
How feasible are France's plans to build a European defense system? After all, similar attempts were made in the past, but without much success. It would seem that the most "pro-U.S." president of all of the Fifth Republic's presidents has more chances for success than ever before. Indeed, France plans to fully integrate into NATO by 2009, it has reconciled with the United States, and it is committed to the ideals of "Atlantism" like never before. Furthermore, at the NATO Bucharest Summit recently, George W. Bush effectively endorsed N. Sarkozy's ideas about creating an independent "European defense" system. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the French position on the issue shows that the situation is not as unequivocal as it might appear to be at first glance. Thus, N. Sarkozy links France's return to NATO with hopes for reform of this military-political alliance (according to French Defense Minister H. Morin, NATO should become less "American"). True, it is not clear yet in what direction this reform should go.
In addition to that, as it becomes apparent from a recently published white paper on defense (a reviewed national security doctrine), despite France's return into the joint NATO command structure, it will remain committed to de Gaulle's tenets and retain considerable freedom of maneuver: nuclear forces independent of NATO, freedom to make independent decisions on the use of its armed forces within the NATO framework, and independence in the use of the country's intelligence capability and in appraising possible threats to national security.5 From every indication, the success of France's European defense initiative will depend on the extent to which Washington deems it acceptable with regard to its own interests in Europe. However, it is also important to take into account the position of rank-and-file members of the alliance, primarily the East European "newcomers," who are not over eager to spend too much on defense as long as they have such a reliable protector as the United States.
European agricultural policy is an important priority for the French presidency at the EU. Its close attention to agricultural matters is due to the fact that France is a major producer and exporter of agricultural produce. For decades, debate (at times rather sharp) has continued at the EU over the granting of subsidies to agricultural producers, as well as over production quotas. The main goal of the French presidency will most likely be to achieve compromise on the EU agricultural funding policy after 2013. Furthermore, Paris plans to highlight such matters as customs tariffs on the agricultural imports to the EU, preserving agricultural funding volumes, and compliance with strict sanitation requirements, especially with regard to imports. The issue of common agricultural policy is taking on added relevance in the context of the world food crisis.
During an agricultural exhibition in Paris in September 2007, N. Sarkozy offered his vision of European agricultural policy, which should ensure Europe's food security and independence, help resolve the world food crisis, preserve farmlands, struggle against climate change, and improve the environment.
Furthermore, in his speech in the Polish Sejm on May 29, 2008, the French president reiterated the high priority that the country's leadership gives to agricultural policy issues. In his opinion, common agricultural policy was a key to European integration, while food security is "an element of the EU's might."

The Mediterranean Union

Although the creation of the Mediterranean Union, strictly speaking, goes outside the geographic bounds of Paris's European policy and is not among the priorities of France's rotating EU presidency, nevertheless, according to the majority of analysts, it is perhaps the main foreign policy innovation of N. Sarkozy's presidential mandate, directly affecting his European policy. Such assessment is not an exaggeration. Formally, the goals of this regional organization (promoting closer cooperation in such areas as the environment and sustainable development, the dialogue of cultures, economic and social development, security matters, etc.), are quite traditional for such associations. Furthermore, the Mediterranean Union is not starting its activities from scratch, but will build on what has already been achieved within the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Forum. However, not everything is quite so simple in reality. It is no accident that France's Mediterranean initiative has caused serious political friction within the EU, in particular strong objections on the part of Germany. Thus, Germany stood firm on changing the organization's original name, Mediterranean Union, for the Union for the Mediterranean. In addition to that, EU official documents refer not to a new union but stress that this union is a continuation of the Barcelona Process. According to French State Secretary for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet, it is not simply a semantic change. His EU colleagues substantially altered N. Sarkozy's original plans. Paris proposed inviting only 22 countries from the Mediterranean region for Mediterranean cooperation. However, in the end France had to agree to the participation of all the 27 EU member states in the Mediterranean Union. To compare, the southern Mediterranean was only represented by 12 countries.
There are several factors in France's active promotion of this foreign policy project. First, the Mediterranean is a major "nerve center" of global politics. It is not only "the cradle of European civilization" but also the crossroads of the East and West, the Christian and Muslim worlds (French diplomacy considers the possibility of a clash between the West and Islam to be one of the main threats of the new century), and the region of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Second, French influence in this part of the world has always been strong. Many Mediterranean countries were part of the French colonial empire (for example, the Maghreb countries) or were French mandated territories (Lebanon, Syria).
Third, the countries of the Mediterranean basin are not only major "suppliers" of immigrants to Europe, in particular to France, but also a region that can potentially fall under the influence of radical Islam (Algeria is a case in point).
Fourth, the creation of a free trade zone in this region can provide an impetus to the EU's economy, as well as to the economy of its member states, primarily France. Nuclear power development programs (Morocco, Algeria, and Libya) offer promising prospects, especially to the French, who have highly advanced technology in the field.
Fifth, getting Turkey involved in cooperation within the framework of the Mediterranean Union (true, it has yet to decide on the format of its participation) makes it possible to take off the agenda, if only for the time being, the delicate issue of the country's EU membership (which is unequivocally opposed by the French leader).
Finally - and this is probably the most important thing - the creation of the Mediterranean Union, which N. Sarkozy likes to compare with the process of euro integration, enables France to find a kind of an asymmetric response to its declining influence within the EU. True, speaking at a press conference in Brussels on March 13, following the official presentation of the Mediterranean Union at a European summit, the French president said in no uncertain terms that he had never entertained the thought of competition between the European Union and the Mediterranean Union.
Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the idea of creating the Mediterranean Union is an interesting move by French diplomacy and President N. Sarkozy in particular, enabling the country in the future to derive substantial political and economic dividends. True, it is also a rather risky move, taking into account the intractability of many, if not the majority of regional problems.

***

Needless to say, the ambitious goals that France has set for its rotating EU presidency are rather difficult to achieve. What can be accomplished within a space of six months, two of which are a vacation period? Especially considering that France does not see eye to eye with other EU countries on almost all of the declared priorities. For example, it will be very difficult to reach a consensus on the "energy-climate" dossier due to the special stance adopted by Germany and the East European countries. While the first mentioned disagrees with Paris's course toward the accelerated development of nuclear energy, the "young Europeans," who are inferior to their Western neighbors in technology, are not so eager to spend extra resources on industrial modernization taking environmental needs into account. Even the adoption of the "immigration pact" will, as it turned out, not become a pure formality: Spain and France have disagreed on the issue of the legalization of immigrants. Finally, the state of uncertainty over the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is rather unsettling for France's rotating EU presidency.
In this connection, one can understand the media's irony with regard to the French president, who told a news conference on January 8 that he expected, by the end of France's rotating EU presidency, to lay the groundwork for a common European immigration, defense, energy, and environment policy. Reporters saw it as an obvious exaggeration by a temperamental president. Even so, it appears that they failed to appreciate the main thing. There is no doubt that N. Sarkozy knows very well that the goals of France's rotating EU presidency are indeed unfeasible. But that is not the point. The most important thing for him as a politician is to set "high goals" and to identify the vector of movement for a long term. When all is said and done, a politician's talent is to keep track of the public mood and transform it into a political course. This is precisely what the ambitious French leader does by building the program of France's rotating EU presidency and its priorities into a more large-scale "policy of civilization" project.

A "Civilization Project" for Europe in the 21st Century

The term "policy of civilization" did not appear in the French president's political vocabulary until just recently - during his New Year's address to the nation on December 31, 2007. A week later, speaking at a major news conference, the French head of state laid out in more detail his "policy of civilization" concept, which he had borrowed from French sociologist Edgar Morin.
In N. Sarkozy's definition, the policy of civilization is "a policy of life," "a policy of humanization," when it is necessary to restore the lost guidelines, norms of conduct, rules, and moral reference points.
The head of the French Republic believes that our era, marked by the phenomenon of globalization, can be compared with the Renaissance era, the era of Enlightenment and the Great French Revolution, the industrial revolution of the 19th-20th century and the postwar reconstruction brought about by the civilization crisis of the 1930s-40s. During those transitional periods, mankind was acutely aware of the need to "humanize" society, take advantage of the changes that had occurred, and acquire new knowledge and master new technology. The policy designed to meet these needs is, according to N. Sarkozy, a policy of civilization. N. Sarkozy notes that the policy of civilization at the present stage should prioritize such values as solidarity, the sense of identity, and friendliness, as opposed to isolation and separatism, the lack of identity, degradation of the quality of life, and irresponsibility. The French president is determined to uphold these goals and values in his domestic and foreign policy.
According to N. Sarkozy, France's rotating EU presidency will become a good opportunity for his country to advance the policy of civilization in Europe, which involves new initiatives aimed primarily at "making capitalism moral."
In referring to the policy of civilization, the French leader somehow or other calls on the EU countries to preserve the European social model as a system of values based on the ideals of humanism, democracy, human rights, and solidarity in society. "Moralization of financial capitalism," according to N. Sarkozy, presumes the condemnation of the principle of laisser-faire and "the pervasion of market logic into all spheres of human activity."6 In other words, France advocates a reasonable balance between the market and state regulation. "The fact that I'm a liberal does not prevent me from believing that a liberal economy requires regulation, norms, and constraints such as labor laws, minimum wages, labor union rights and labor representation, consumer rights, and competition, so that it serves mankind, not vice versa."7
Proceeding from this definition, the French politician urges the Europeans to rethink the principles and rules of the economic and monetary union by writing into them "the humanitarian and social dimension that Europe needs so badly today." He calls for a review of the financial policy pursued by the European Central Bank ("the euro must serve economic growth and corporate well being"), support for the real sector of the economy ("de-industrialization of Europe, in the interest of the pseudo-democracy of markets, must not be permitted"8), and reasonable protectionism in response to the unfair competitive practices of the producers who ignore all environmental and social norms and regulations. Competition, according to N. Sarkozy, should "stop being a religion," an end in itself.
On the whole, the socio-philosophical ideas of the French leader, as encapsulated in his "policy of civilization" policy, cannot be regarded as something entirely new. They largely reflect the well-known position of a significant part of the country's political elite that has in the past decade been in the van of opponents of "neo-liberal globalization." In his speeches, J. Chirac often called for "humanizing globalization" and the need to bring it under control. L. Jospin's famous slogan - "Yes to the market economy, no to the market society" - is well-known. Nevertheless, N. Sarkozy's "civilization project" can still be regarded as an independent "ideological product" for several reasons. Its originality, in our opinion, consists in that the French president has managed to project the main slogan of his election campaign, about the break with the past policy, to the European agenda. His predecessors were afraid of changes - at any rate, they were wary and suspicious of them (a good case in point is J. Chirac's reaction to T. Blair's reforms). N. Sarkozy's stance is the exact opposite of that. He is not only unafraid of change - he actually demands it. At the same time he believes that these changes should be accompanied by new forms of security and solidarity in society. He proposes this course to Europe, believing that within its framework, the European nations will be able to preserve their own identity and traditions, and their civilization.
This leads to what is perhaps the most important feature of N. Sarkozy's "civilization project" - i.e., the prioritization of the role of politics as the main precondition to change. ("I am convinced that politics can change the course of things - it only takes political will.") The French leader gives special attention to this aspect in his "European speeches." He has caught the mood of the Europeans who have lost their faith in the European Union, in the European dream that is designed to serve as a source of inspiration and provide protection and security, not arouse additional concern. Hence what we believe is the key slogan was made in the French president's speech in Strasbourg on July 2, 2007: "Europe will become a great ideal, or there will be no Europe!" The French leader stressed: "Europe is not about rules, procedures and frontiers. It is a civilization project (italics mine. - S. F.) Europe needs a revival. We must create conditions for this revival. Create a psychological, intellectual and moral climate to give each of our old nations the confidence that everything is possible and that dreams can come true."9
Yet another important aspect of N. Sarkozy's European policy is that he has managed to return to France its accustomed role of - to use Marxist jargon - the demiurge of the European project, a country that proposes change, not attempts to build Europe according to its own patterns. Thus, the French president has up to a certain point managed to restore the country's political identity, which has always been based on its moral and political responsibility for Europe.
Finally, it is also important to note the coherent and well-thought-through nature of N. Sarkozy's multi-move political combination on the European track that logically integrates into a single whole the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a new legislative base for reforming the EU (true, adjusted for the "Irish failure"), France's rotating EU presidency (EU reform policy), and the "civilization project," which offers the EU 27 an ideology of long-term development.
Analysts often criticize the French president for his foreign, including European, policy, seeing his activity as insubstantial, too spontaneous, and Bonapartist. This criticism is not entirely groundless. True, no one questions the fact that European integration needs a new impetus to move forward, as well as new prospects. As of now they are represented, like never before, by the French leader and his European policy. One is only left to hope that the "European zeal" of the sixth president of the Fifth Republic will have a response in the hearts of the EU citizens, while the European integration project will regain the momentum and its attractiveness to the outside world.

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Although the French president on the whole positively assesses J. Chirac's performance in international affairs, including in Europe, and is generally committed to his foreign policy course, nevertheless, there is reason to see the beginnings, if not of a basically new stage, at least of a new chapter in France's European policy. What are its distinguishing features, and how is it different from the previous policy course?
First, whereas J. Chirac's European policy largely bore the imprint of the political course set by the founder of the Fifth Republic, which was formulated in the era of a bipolar world, N. Sarkozy's policy is more in sync with the post-bipolar period and is oriented toward an enlarged and reformed EU, and a new architecture of international relations. J. Chirac's European policy was of a transitional, "wait and see" nature. Paris's present course is assertive and more consistent, geared for the future.
Second, unlike his predecessor, N. Sarkozy has managed to strike the right balance between domestic and foreign policy. The priorities of France's rotating EU presidency amply bear this out. It is important to note that the mandate for the country's radical modernization that the current president received from the French electorate is harmoniously linked with Paris's striving to impart a new impetus to the "Europe building" process.
Third, in order to recover its influence and facilitate the search for political stability in the enlarged EU, Paris will need a certain measure of adjustment in its policy with regard to both "old" and "new" Europe. The complication of the relationship with Germany, which manifests itself in the covert struggle for leadership within the EU between the two countries, will expedite France's rapprochement with the states of "new" Europe and Great Britain, and will also facilitate the efforts by French diplomacy in the south (the Mediterranean Union project).
Fourth, the shifting of Paris's political axis in the direction of Atlantism and its full integration into NATO may eventually force France to abandon its accustomed role of mediator in relations between the West and the East (Russia) by transferring this prerogative to the EU. However, everything will in the final count depend on the degree to which the French leadership manages to put into practice the idea of creating a really independent "European defense" system.
Fifth, France has managed, within a relatively short time span, to reverse the negative trend of "surrendering positions" on the EU's political field and once again to emerge as a political and ideological leader in Europe. These positive shifts have largely been achieved due to the personal qualities of the French president - his unprecedented activism and his impressive rhetorical and communication skills. But perhaps even to a greater extent thanks to the fact that France has managed to make a transition in European affairs from the policy of "passive defense" and the rejection of globalization to a course toward its "active acceptance" and adaptation to the challenges of the new century. France is attempting to regain the role of an "ideological mastermind" of European integration at the present stage.

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It seems that as of today, President N. Sarkozy and his team have managed to become "agitators" in the EU, up to a certain degree restoring the French people's faith in the viability of the old slogan: "To build Europe without destroying France." "France has returned to Europe," while Europe has returned to France. The old confrontation between French "euro skeptics" and "euro optimists" has visibly eased, although it is too soon now to speak about a lasting consensus on the future of euro integration. There is hope that France's rotating EU presidency in the second half of 2008 will consolidate this trend. Even so, the success of the present European course in the long term will ultimately depend on how far France will be able, on the national level, to meet the challenges of globalization, carry out difficult reforms, resolve its serious domestic problems (slow economic growth and unemployment, the budget deficit and the mounting state debt, social insecurity of the large sections of the population, soaring prices, and the declining consumer demand), and back up the fine words and promising projects with real deeds.
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NOTES
1 Arnaud Jean Louis. "Les français et l'Europe (L'état du débat européen en France à l'ouverture de la présidence française)." Etudes et Recherches No. 70, Juillet 2000, p. 10. (Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherches Notre Europe)
2 Le Monde, 17.06. 08.
3 Immigration: le parlement européen adopte le "directive retour". Le Monde, 18. 06.08.
4 54-ème assamblée parlementaire de l'UEO: présentation des priorités de la PFUE pour l'Europe de la Dédense. Intervention de M. Jean-Pierre Jouyet. Paris, 3 juin 2008.//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
5 Le Monde, 16.06.08.
6 Sarkozy N. Ensemble, XO Edition, 2007, p. 89.
7 Sarkozy N. Témoignage, XO Edition, 2006, p. 91.
8 Discours du Président de la République à Strasbourg, 02.07.2007. //www.elysee.fr.
9 Ibidem.