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A wave of so-called "color revolutions" has swept the world, including the post-Soviet space, over recent decades. They followed the same scenario although they had different names ("the Rose Revolution" in Georgia, "the Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, "the Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan or "the Potato Revolution" in Belarus).
The first phase of such revolutions - the preparatory phase - takes a fairly long period of time when every effort is made to mobilize the forces to be involved in planned actions. The preparatory phase begins with the establishment and promotion of active contact with the country's internal opposition which is assigned the role of the subject of the "revolution." U.S. diplomatic and consular missions take an active part in these activities.
The focus of work with the opposition is on persons expected to hold key government posts after the "revolution." As a rule, they are invited to take courses of study at U.S. institutions of higher learning.
Another important aspect of preparatory work is contact with the political elite and members of law-enforcement bodies. The purpose is to paralyze national bodies of government during the "revolution."
Much attention is also given to young people - they provide the basis of paramilitary organizations capable of carrying out forcible operations if they become necessary.
Considering that each "revolution" is timed to coincide with parliamentary or presidential elections, some categories of the electorate too are in the focus of attention. They are supported financially to prompt them to vote for the right candidate and take part in actions bringing pressure to bear on bodies of state power.
Generous financing of opposition forces normally carried out through U.S. public foundations is an integral part of preparations for such "revolutions." The Soros Foundation played the most active role in preparing and staging "democratic revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. U.S. press reports give a rough idea of the financing of the "revolutions." $65 million was spent on preparations for "the Orange Revolution" in Ukraine and another $18 million during it.
Nevertheless, Washington maintains that "color revolutions" cost less than the toppling of regimes through military intervention, because it entails huge financial outlays needed to rebuild a country destroyed by military operations. Speaking at the International Republican Institute in Washington in mid-May 2005, President George W. Bush cited the following figures: since 2001 the United States had spent $300 billion on warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq but only $4.6 billion in support of "color revolutions."1
The "revolutions" themselves are a combination of peaceful and violent methods designed to topple regimes disagreeable to the United States. As a rule, charges of election rigging brought against public bodies serve as an excuse for the start of a "revolution." The charges are supplemented with efforts to unite the electorate as well as opposition forces and organize mass protest demonstrations.
At the same time executive and legislative authorities come under massive pressure which includes outright threats of violence against their official representatives and relatives if they make decisions unacceptable to the opposition.
Washington sets the scene for "color revolutions" by creating new structures within the U.S. government. Speaking at the International Republican Institute in Washington in May 2005, the U.S. President called for the establishment of a network of new agencies dubbed democracy's special-purpose force by the U.S. press. George W. Bush suggested the establishment of what he innocently called the Active Response Corps to "spread democracy around the world." He said it would be deployed to crisis regions to put the local state machinery in order in without delay. Besides there were plans to set up a Conflict Response Fund that would react to conflicts arising from "color revolutions." $100 million was to be earmarked for it from the budget.
The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization established in the State Department would coordinate the work of new structures created in support of "the new democracies." George W. Bush made it clear that in their work the new agencies would rely on embassies and other official U.S. agencies abroad."2
How then were the "color revolutions" carried out, what sorts of forces were involved and what was their political aftermath?
"The Rose Revolution" in Georgia was the first revolution on the post-Soviet space. In terms of concept, goals and technology it was significantly different from subsequent "revolutions." The experience gained from "the Chestnut Revolution" in Serbia when President S. Milosevic was deposed was applied in Georgia. The distinguishing feature of "the Rose Revolution" was that it resulted in the deposition of a former ally of Washington - President Eduard Shevardnadze - rather than its adversary. He was deposed simply because Washington felt he had not been championing American interests actively enough.
Another distinguishing feature of the Georgian "revolution" was that it was not timed to coincide with presidential elections. The internal opposition led by M. Saakashvili was actively involved in staging mass actions by the population demanding E. Shevardnadze's resignation, and indeed he was forced to resign under pressure of demonstrators.
"The Orange Revolution" in Ukraine followed a different scenario. V. Yushchenko, a pro-American politician, was elected president by winning eight percent more votes than his opponent - former Prime Minister V. Yanukovich.
The vote unfavorable for the ruling circles that were then in power was seen as the result of their leaders' wavering and inconsistency - in the course of "the Orange Revolution" they missed a chance to turn around the tide of events in their favor. Nothing was done to stem the formation of a "fifth column." The government yielded to the opposition because it feared that resolute actions by the population of South-Eastern Ukraine might entail civil war and split the country.
Ukraine's law-enforcement bodies made no response to opposition leaders' open bid to seize power, government agencies, banks, and post and telegraph offices. V. Yanukovich kept saying that in the event of bloodshed he would not run for president. Another mistake was his invitation to V. Yushchenko to join forces at the elections on the basis of an agreed program.
The proposal overlooked the fact that the Americans would regard a government formed on a compromise basis as unacceptable. The mere fact that V. Yanukovich put forward such a proposal was seen as a sign of weakness and uncertainty.
When organizing a "color revolution" in Moldavia the Americans had to modify their tactics. Initially they sought the support of parties in opposition to the communist government. In a surprise move, though, President V. Voronin and political forces supporting him turned their foreign-policy orientation around and shifted it toward the United States. As a result, organizers of the "revolution" gave up their plans to stage it.
In the run-up to parliamentary elections Moldavia's leaders took several measures designed to demonstrate that their position was more acceptable to the United States than that of the opposition parties. A group of Russian citizens was expelled from the republic after being charged with subversive activities, observers representing CIS countries were denied permission to monitor future parliamentary elections and a group of observers from St. Petersburg was detained on the border and sent back home.
"The Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan followed a scenario that was a far cry from the one drafted in Washington. Public unrest in the capital led to calls on the president and government to resign. The president left the country and then voluntarily tendered his resignation under an agreement with the opposition. This was followed by the formation of a new parliament and a new government. A new president was sworn in following subsequent elections.
It was a peaceful transition of power except for a spontaneous riot involving looting, the destruction of property and arson.
The representatives of the opposition who came to power had a long record of businesslike cooperation with Russia.
This has determined the policies of modern-day Kyrgyzstan. Its president has repeatedly said that relations between his country and Russia would be raised to a new qualitative level. Other officials have declared the country's commitment to the CIS, saying they regard that organization as "a very important platform linking many countries with fairly diverse foreign-policy orientations."3
The "color revolution" in Azerbaijan was short-lived. One factor was that the country's law-enforcement bodies had uncovered an anti-state plot involving many leaders of the opposition. Their arrest headed off the opposition, and for that reason it failed to organize mass demonstrations against the authorities.
"The Potato Revolution" in Belarus was an even more resounding flop. The internal opposition there had failed to organize mass demonstrations by the electorate against the authorities despite generous U.S. financial assistance. The law enforcement bodies demonstrated complete loyalty to the government and nipped in the bud hostile demonstrations by opposition forces. President A. Lukashenko scored an impressive victory by winning 82.6% of the vote despite a massive Western propaganda campaign against him. Most of the international observers on the spot conceded that the elections had been fair. Only the OSCE representative said that the elections had not conformed to Western standards, but he failed to give any proof confirming that.
What are the political and public consequences of "color revolutions"?
As distinct from classical revolutions they change political elites rather than social orders, given that the struggle unfolds within the framework of an existing state structure on the basis of election campaigns. As soon as it comes to power the new political elite makes maximum use of instruments of the state and the judicial machine to weaken its internal opponents or remove them from the political scene altogether.
Subservient power elite makes it possible for the West to influence the situation in the country, its internal developments and its foreign-policy orientation.
The armed forces and police are in the focus of U.S. attention. The United States provides budgetary appropriations to them and sends instructors to train soldiers and officers. However, the United States normally avoids financing the economy and social requirements.
The nations where "color revolutions" have gained the upper hand are pursuing openly pro-American policies, they want to join NATO and European structures and make their future dependent on the Western world. The policies of Georgia and Ukraine are two most graphic cases in point.
These countries' leaders who have come to power as a result of "color revolutions" have defined new foreign-policy priorities by outlining the following main areas.
One objective is joining the North Atlantic alliance, and hasty steps are being taken to achieve it. The meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Committee held in May 2005 on Kiev's initiative was devoted entirely to the question of what needs to be done to formalize the country's membership of the Alliance. It detailed a new character of relations formulated as "intensified dialogue" on Ukraine's entry into NATO. A special document was signed emphasizing the need for closer cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. It provides for broader ties and contacts in the political and security spheres and aid in the conduct of a military reform designed to make the Ukrainian army conform to the standards of the North Atlantic bloc.
About the same time there were talks in Tbilisi with a special NATO representative who said the Alliance's leaders were ready to discuss at M. Saakashvili's request questions relating to "intensified dialogue" about Georgia's integration into NATO.
Reviving the pro-American association GUAM and giving it a new lease on life is one of the priority objectives. To that end GUAM is to be expanded by incorporating Rumania and the Baltic countries with the aim of creating a belt of unfriendly countries close to Russia's borders. This objective has been formulated under the guise of democracy in a statement adopted at a GUAM summit - "Creating Democracy from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea."
To promote unification, a list of projects has been drafted, primarily economic projects, designed to ensure participants' independence from Russian energy supplies.
This means that active efforts are being made to form an organization in parallel with the CIS, an organization capable of competing with it in the political and economic spheres.
If this trend is sustained it may produce dividing lines on the CIS space which may turn into a deep watershed given active U.S. support and differences between the two organizations.
Georgia and Ukraine have been instrumental in formulating GUAM's goal to deprive Russia of its dominant role in settling regional conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh by inviting new players such as the United States and the European Union and replacing Russian peacekeeping forces.
Washington's long-term policy of staging "democratic revolutions" in CIS countries holds one of the central places in its foreign policy. The notorious speech by the U.S. president in May 2005 at a meeting in Bratislava was of a programmatic character in that respect. The president spoke highly of the "democratic revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine and mapped out the order of subsequent "revolutions." He singled out the struggle against the current regime in Belarus as a top-priority objective.
Washington's close attention to Belarus results from fears that the ongoing integration processes between Russia and Belarus may speed up the formation of a union state, which will impede the implementation of plans for a "democratic revolution" in the Republic of Belarus.
The pertinent question in the aftermath of "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine is whether a similar "revolution" is possible in Russia. The question has been the subject of not only newspaper articles and comments but also theoretical debates which have revealed two groups with opposite views on the issue.
Advocates of one of the groups called "Orange skeptics" take a dim view of the possibility of events evolving in accordance with the Georgian or Ukrainian scenario since they feel that the formats of resolving such conflicts in Russia are different. In their view, the Russian way out of a crisis is fraught with violence, something similar to what took place in October 1993.
The other group - called "Orange optimists" - on the contrary believes that an "Orange revolution" is not only possible but inevitable. In accordance with their theory "the Orange revolution" is not an imported technology - its sources are not in foreign centers - rather it matures in Russia's own political system.
Analysis of the situation in Russia demonstrates that Washington's ongoing preparations for an "Orange revolution" have no chance of success in this country. The components that organizers of "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine relied on are completely or partially absent in Russia.
First, organizers of an "Orange revolution" will fail to gain the support of the federal power elite who are predominately oriented toward Russia's national interests.
Second, they are unlikely to paralyze the work of law enforcement bodies unlike the situation that obtained during "the Orange Revolution" in Ukraine. There is every reason to believe that the security forces and police will remain loyal to state authority and take appropriate measures should this become necessary.
Third, most of the electorate will refrain from supporting the opposition and vote for national-oriented parties instead.
Fourth, the opposition is split, and for that reason will be unable to give effective assistance to organizers of "the Orange Revolution."
Fifth, there is little chance of organizers of "the Orange Revolution" rallying young people around themselves with the exception of several small youth organizations of an extremist type.
Finally, here goes a remark about the response of CIS countries to the challenge presented by the United States.
Leaders of a number of countries are increasingly aware of the impending threat and the need to take urgent measures to strengthen state authority, reform the economy, raise living standards and deal with a backlog of social issues without delay. Once the entire complex of issues has been resolved, this will shore up CIS political regimes and make them less susceptible to "color revolutions." Efforts are being made to block possible channels for foreign organizations infiltrating the population and laying the groundwork for "color revolutions."
A law passed by Kazakhstan's parliament toughens regulations relating to the registration and activities of international nongovernmental organizations. Now they must undergo mandatory registration at government departments. They are not to take part in events aimed at aggravating the socio-economic. Nor are they allowed to take part in fostering interethnic and inter-denominational conflicts, mass disturbances, unauthorized meetings, marches, and demonstrations.
The law stringently regulates the financial activity of foreign organizations and insists that it should be transparent. Anonymous donations shall be banned, and the financing shall be done only with the consent of local authorities.
There is also a mechanism making it possible to suspend the work of any undesirable public association. A court ruling or a decision by the Office of Public Prosecutor may suspend the work of any association for three to six months.
Belarus has adopted a similar law to tighten control over foreign organizations.
The prophylactic measures taken by CIS countries have amply proven their worth.
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NOTES
1 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20.05.2003.
2 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29.05.2005.
3 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19.04.2004.