

The Yugoslav Tragedy

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History of the Balkan Slavs can be described as never ending disunity and disagreements frequently developing into mutual repulsion and even enmity. Throughout the last six centuries the states of the Southern Slavs have not merely failed to consolidate - they distanced from one other. Slovenia was developing first under a strong German influence and, from the 13th century on, under the Austrian Habsburgs. Venice dominated over the Adriatic coast, mainly over what is now Croatia. In the 12th century, Hungary established its influence in the continental part of Croatia and later in Bosnia. By the mid-15th century, the Turks had captured Serbia, by the end of the century they established themselves in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In an absence of the pivotal factors - common history, confessional and mental identity and shared ideas about national self-determination - the common origins and kindred languages were of little importance. It was early in the last century that prominent Russian diplomat who specialized in the Balkan issues A. Petriaev predicted the latest Balkan crisis: "A Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state would have been the most desirable solution to the Yugoslav problem and a useful element of our West European policies. Yet none of the peoples will achieve domination over another kindred people with the religion and culture of its own, and unwilling to accept any domination."

It is commonly believed in Russia that the history of its ties with the South Slavic nations was limited to its contacts with Serbia and Montenegro. This is not true: from the very beginning Russians maintained contacts with all Slavic nations. The national movements in the Balkans were not alien to capitalizing on Russia's authority and strength to pursue their own, frequently contradictory, interests. All of them, however, were dead set against Russia's greater role in, let alone domination, over the Balkans. The conflicts stirred up by Serbia and Bulgaria with Russia after the latter's liberatory mission in the Russo-Turkish war serve an ample illustration of how the Southern Slavs treated Russia, its efforts and its sacrifices for their sake. Fedor Dostoyevsky left us the most apt comment: "I am convinced, and this is the fullest and the strongest of my convictions, that Russia will have, and have not yet had, more bitter and envious enemies or even downright foes as these small Slavic tribes as soon as Russia liberates them and Europe agrees to recognize their freedom."

Russians were guided by the idea of liberty and well-being of the fraternal Slavic nations; their rulers were naturally more concerned with the straits and the key strategic areas. The idea of a Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state based on their common ethnic origins and patronized by Russia (as part of the wider plans for Southeastern Europe) looked tempting. We should never forget, however, that in World War 1 Serbs and Croats fought on the different sides: the Serbs, together with the czarist army; the Croats, as part of Austria-Hungary, against Russia.

Disintegration of Austria-Hungary forced the Croats to take up the South Slavdom idea: on 24 November 1918, in Zagreb the People's Veche of the representatives of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia announced that it united with the Kingdom of the Serbs and Montenegro.

The first half of 20th century proved far from easy. The Yugoslavs driven by the fear of the Soviet threat and the White émigrés who established themselves in Belgrade and across Serbia (the White Guard army alone was over 60,000-strong) and lulled by the 1935 visit of Hermann Göring and Hitler's personal messages accepted economic and political cooperation with Germany.

The Munich deal of 1938 added fire to the extremist sentiments in Croatia; Berlin was not alien to encouraging the idea of independence and a union with Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the 11-day-long military campaign of April 1941 fascist Germany routed the Yugoslav army; the Croat nationalists set up an independent pro-fascist state; in April, the Cyrillic script was banned in Croatia and the Christian Orthodox churches closed together with Serbian schools and offices. The Orthodox Christians were forced to embrace Catholicism; in six months about 20 thousand Serbs lost their lives. In four years about 800 (!) thousand Serbs, Gypsies and Jews were murdered in the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia - this can be described as one of blackest pages in the history of fascism.

In the latter half of the 20th century, the never ending conflicts between Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia were accelerating to reach one of the peaks in 1968. Each of the republics responded to the events in Czechoslovakia in its own way. Belgrade was not so much enraged with WTO invasion as feared that the Warsaw Treaty Organization might spread its military operations to Yugoslavia. Zagreb that feared similar actions from Serbia that might try to suppress the "Croatian Spring" was much more concerned and, as it turned out, not without reason. The CPSU leaders who pretended to care about the country's integrity and security tried to convince Tito to move against the Croatian liberal-democratic movement. Later, Belgrade formally recognized the republics' right to form independent states within ethnic territories. This meant that if the SFRY fell apart the Serbs would have acquired the right to form their states in all territories with the predominant Serbian population. The idea of the administrative borders between the republics being recognized as state borders was rejected in principle.

It should be said that Yugoslav economy was in a fairly bad condition that added urgency to the confrontation between Serbia and all other republics. Year after year inflation remained Europe's highest; the level of unemployment was appalling, while the state owed over \$20 billion. Structural economic disproportions and the country's division into the developed northwest (Slovenia and Croatia) and the less developed southeast (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia) developed into another bad headache. The state could not bridge the economic gap, settle ethnic contradictions and prevent disintegration.

Early in the 1990s, when the Yugoslav conflict was just gaining momentum Ljubljana and Zagreb were prepared to set up a confederation within the old administrative borders. Belgrade rejected this approach outright; in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia passed all the laws they needed to leave Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) interfered on the very first day of their independence.

Russia could not remain a passive observer of the crisis that spread like wildfire. In October 1991, on an initiative of the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry leaders of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia Franjo Tudjman came to Moscow to discuss the situation. They squandered last chance history gave them to avoid bloodshed and human tragedies. The "discontinuation of all armed conflicts" and "direct negotiations between the highest representatives of Serbia and Croatia" of the joint communique remained on paper. Three months of the bloodshed cost the sides over 10 thousand lives; over 700 thousand Croats became refugees; the economic losses were no less appalling; agricultural lands were abandoned, Vukovar was completely destroyed.

The short October 1991 visit of the high Croatian delegation to Moscow created one positive result: it laid the foundations for good relations between Russia and Croatia. On 17 February 1992, Russia recognized the independent Republic of Croatia. Belgrade that unleashed the armed conflict obviously counted on the Soviet Union's more active support and even interference into the conflict because of the traditionally good attitude of the Soviet state and the public to the fraternal country. This did not, and could not, happen: friendly feelings rooted in history notwithstanding Russia had already learned the inevitably tragic repercussions of the attempts to stem centrifugal trends by force.

Russia was fully aware of the fact that neither the pan-Slavic idea, nor the deep roots of the mutual attractions between the Serbs and the Russians could serve a yardstick of Russia's contribution to the international efforts of settling the Balkan crisis. At the same time Russia could not accept the anti-Serbian sentiments of the West European partners in the settlement.

The Foreign Ministry of Russia demonstrated a well-balanced and competent approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia oriented at comprehensive international cooperation. The Foreign Ministry insisted on its approach that excluded emotional approaches to the settlement yet recognized and even recommended to use the traditionally close historical ties in the interests of peace settlement with due account for the realities and the interests of all sides involved. The events in the former territory of Yugoslavia, meanwhile, were going their own course.

Slovenia with its ethnically homogenous population easily disarmed the small YPA garrison and left the SFRY. In Croatia the situation was much more complicated: there were several Serbian areas in Eastern Slavonija and Serbian Krajina, two historical regions in Croatia's 'soft underbelly.' The bloody ethnic conflicts that had begun practically on the very first day of independence drove away practically the entire Croatian population. The YPA crossed the Croatian border to invade Eastern Slavonija; cities were shelled; tens of thousands of Croatian refugees moved to the West.

On 27 November 1991, the UN Security Council registered the fact that YPA units continued fighting in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and discussed a possibility of starting a UN peace keeping operation in Yugoslavia. It was only three months later, on 21 February 1992 that the UN Security Council set up the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and asked the UN Secretary General "to ensure its earliest possible deployment." On 7 April, the Security Council sanctioned the UNPROFOR deployment; by that time all Croats had been driven out from (or liquidated in) the territories with the predominant or large Serbian populations. In fact, UNPROFOR was expected to defend the Serbs against the encroachments of the Croats on the Serbian territory. UNPROFOR divided the protected zones into four sectors. The key elements of the plan were the following:

- the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army (YPA) from Croatia
- the demilitarization of the UNPA zones by liquidating the illegal Serbian military units
- the continued functioning, on an interim basis, of local authorities and police under UNPROFOR supervision, in proportions reflecting the pre-war ethnic structure of the population
- UNPROFOR was to provide all appropriate support to humanitarian organizations and facilitate the return of displaced persons to their homes in the UNPA-zones under conditions of full safety.
- gradual restoration of jurisdiction of the legal Croatian authorities.

By June 1992, thanks to international efforts the YPA units had been pulled out of the UNPA-zones; an important yet the only achievement of the international community. All other aims and tasks enumerated above remained pending, while all related efforts produced the results opposite to the desired. UNPROFOR remained in Croatia under a mandate that had nothing in common with reality: it was based on the assumption that both sides wanted a peaceful settlement and needed an intermediary.

A UN Security Council resolution envisaged the deployment of UN forces along the border between Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was planned to use state services of Croatia for monitoring, border guard and custom functions. The Security Council created a document that specified the conditions under which the refugees should be returned to their homes with UNPROFOR support; it was even more important to disarm the illegal military units. None of the above was fulfilled and could be fulfilled while the war lasted. The borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the East and all other sectors and of the regions neighboring on the areas owned by the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina became porous. The UN forces controlled not so much the Serbian armed units but the peacekeepers who had to ask the local Serbian authorities for the permission to move inside the sectors and between them; it was even much harder to cross the state border between Serbia

and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croats were banned from the UNPA-zones, deadly dangerous for them. In the east the Serbs could move their strategic materials and weaponry into Croatia practically unhampered. They used the bridge across the Danube that connected Croatia and Serbia as the strategic artery for the movement of arms and fuel; the Croatian Serbs used it to communicate with Belgrade.

UNPROFOR failed to "facilitate the return of displaced persons to their homes in the UNPA-zones under conditions of full safety" and put an end to ethnic purges. It was during the mission of the UN multinational forces that over 5 thousand Croats left the East sector; over 600 were killed. With no rights and armed with the mandate of "peacekeeping presence" the UNPROFOR military contingent in the sectors not only lost the remnants of its influence; it became a hostage of the local circumstances. The commanders had to coordinate their movements and operations within the control zones with the local Serbian authorities seeking the status of an independent state for Serbian Krajina. In full accordance with the complains of the Croatian side and the UN Secretary General report to the Security Council it authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength to enable it to realize the peacekeeping plan and introduce peace enforcement measures. The Security Council was getting nowhere; meanwhile the Croatian army went into an offensive with tragic results: tens of thousands of Serbian refugees had to flee the UNPA-zones. This could have been avoided if the peacekeeping operation was more effective and the world community more responsible and more aware of its potentials.

The Russian battalion of slightly over 1000 was stationed in Eastern Slavonija with Serbian paramilitary units of 10 thousand in its responsibility zone. Their commanders (career officers of the former JPA), weapons and transport as well as the communication lines with Belgrade were excellent.

The entire peacekeeping operation had one but important fault: the Serbs looked at the peacekeeping contingent as a "living shield" against a Croatian attack. In the East sector, in particular, Croats, in case of the attack would have to trample down the Russian peacekeepers to get to the Serbs. The latter, in an effort to keep the Croats at bay would have shelled the Russian battalion.

There were two peace initiatives directly related to the Republic of Croatia in which Russian diplomacy took an active part. During the crisis Croatia had achieved nothing except the pulling out of YPA units and international recognition. All strategic aims remained unsolved: state integrity, security for the civilians, realization of its own potential and socio-economic development. Together with the other republics of the former SFRY Croatia was the crisis' hostage. Indeed, it lost a quarter of its territory; 250 thousand Croatian refugees still lived in hotels and camping sites on the Adriatic coast with the littoral part practically isolated from the republic's continental areas; the civilian population of coastal cities lived under incessant shelling from Serbian Krajina. This was an extraordinary and volatile situation.

Russia invited the sides to start talking about the cease-fire in the Russian embassy in Zagreb and offered Vitali Churkin, special representative of the President of Russia and Charles Redman, special representative of the U.S. President as well as the ambassadors of both countries in Zagreb as intermediaries. The talks that lasted for 13 hours brimmed with enmity and aggression. A week later the sides met again to sign the Cease-Fire Agreement, which stopped shelling. Artillery and heavy weaponry were moved away from the demarcation line; the sides transferred the minefield maps to UNPROFOR and took the obligation to clear them. Shelling of the coastal cities stopped. An economic agreement was planned as the next step yet the Serbian side blocked it.

Russia's mediation mission proceed from the assumption that the joint efforts of Moscow and Washington could return Serbian Krajina to the Republic of Croatia with the Serbs reliably protected by the joint guarantees of Russia and the United States. Driven into the corner the Croatian side had to demonstrate a responsible approach to the Krajina issue. The initiative group known as Zagreb-4 made of a representative of the International Conference for Former

Yugoslavia, the EU envoy and the Russian and American ambassadors came up with a draft plan of peaceful reintegration of Serbian Krajina into the administrative and political context of the Republic of Croatia on the unprecedentedly favorable conditions. The document was a result of joint efforts of Zagreb-4 and one of the most competent UN experts in autonomies. Each of the participants was backed by their respective superiors who were kept informed of the progress.

The Z-4 document offered the Serbs the best possible conditions in expectation that they would abandon their separatist intentions. It was abundantly clear that a clash between the claims of the Serbian provincial leaders and the Croats' nationalist ambitions would inevitable end in sufferings of hundreds of thousands.

Here are several elements of the unprecedentedly favorable conditions offered under the Constitutional Agreement for Krajina:

The government bodies of the Republic of Croatia should regard everything done by the government structures of Krajina as legal;

Krajina may institute its national emblem and flag;

The government of Krajina may enter into international agreements having informed the central government that cannot ban such agreements without sufficient reasons;

The Krajina government can set up its missions in other states and at international organizations completely within its own consideration;

The Central Bank of Croatia will issue equivalent currency for Krajina

The president of Krajina will have the right to appoint ministers in full accordance with the laws passed by the Krajina legislature without preliminary agreements with Zagreb;

The citizens of Croatia living permanently in Krajina will elect the central bodies of power including the elections to the Croatian parliament and the president;

The armed forces of central government will not enter any part of Krajina without a preliminary agreement with the local authorities.

And so on and so forth - the conditions were unprecedentedly favorable.

The Serbs remained uninterested - they even refused take a look at the document. It should be said that those who drafted the Z-4 plan had in mind, implicitly, the settlement in Kosovo as an inalienable part of the Republic of Serbia.

On 4-5 August 1995, Serbian Krajina was destroyed by the Operation Storm of the Croatian army that created over 200 thousand displaced persons who fled to Serbia and the Serbian parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina; their households and all other property were plundered and destroyed. This was the tragedy everybody feared.

The international community proved unable to fulfill its peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. This impotence became even more glaring in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Bosnian Serbs and YPA, the Bosnian Croats and the Croatian army fought against the Muslims. Croats and Serbs fought against each other; the Bosnian Muslims fought against all.

Over 30 reports of the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council and 72 resolutions of the UN Security Council on the Yugoslav settlement have amply demonstrated that the world community had no efficient instruments to be used against aggressors, to discontinue bloodshed or settle large-scale crises. The UN peacekeepers could maintain peace - they could not bring it. Peace enforcement and unambiguous measures are needed to stop ethnic armed conflicts. The international community should avoid biases so as not to create impunity of one of the sides in a bloody conflict. The Yugoslav conflict was finally discontinued yet reports and resolutions turned out pretty useless. It stopped when ethnic purges had been completed and territories captured. If the UN and the Security Council had more efficient instruments of preventing and settling armed conflicts NATO troops would have never come to the Balkans to create what is called the Kosovo problem.

The ethnic conflict in Kosovo, and everywhere in former Yugoslavia for that matter, is rooted in history. Before the 7th century when Slavs came to the Balkans Kosovo had been home of the Illyrians, whom the Albanians consider to be their ancestors. The Serbs came to Kosovo in the 11th-12th centuries; the Serbian statehood was born in the Middle Ages in Kosovo. The

Serbs look at Kosovo as the cradle of their nation. In 1389, Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbs in the battle at Kosovo Polje (at Pristina); in this way Kosovo became part of the Ottoman Empire. Between the 16th and the late 18th century, the Serbian Patriarchate remained in Kosovo, a very important circumstance for the Orthodox Christians.

A Serbian outflow from Kosovo continued throughout the entire period of Ottoman rule, while mountain dwellers from Albania flocked into Kosovo to settle on the abandoned fertile lands. In 1918 when the Ottoman Empire fell apart and Kosovo was incorporated into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians a reverse movement began: Serbs and Montenegrins trickled back to Kosovo. The process had never reached any noticeable dimensions before Kosovo fell into Albanian hands; very soon, however, Albania itself was annexed by fascist Italy. After World War II the Serbs who had learned the lessons of history did not hasten to come back to Kosovo; in the 1960s, about 150 thousand of the non-Albanian population left the area.

It should be said that Albanian nationalism was encouraged by the short-sighted and unprincipled policies of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Belgrade approved of the "open doors" policy between Kosovo and Albania; the Pristina University invited lecturers from Tirana who used textbooks published in Albania; family reunification in Kosovo was stimulated. This was done in a hope of drawing Albania closer and, some time in future, incorporating it into SFRY. Josip Broz Tito's opposite number - Enver Hoja, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Albania, had different plans: "The Berlin congress," said he, "infringed on the interests of Albania and the Kosovo Albanians the only ideal of whom is to merge with Albania."

A demographic explosion and unemployment in Kosovo drove the local Albanians in great numbers to Western Europe and the United States where they managed to convince the public that back at home they had suffered under Serbian oppression. This was partly true: in the latter half of the 20th century Albanians in Yugoslavia were second-rate citizens doing primitive manual jobs; in everyday life they were the target of sarcastic comments and far from kind jokes.

On the other hand, the Yugoslav authorities unwisely tried to segregate the Muslims as a nationality on par with the other ethnic groups (such as Croats, Serbs, Slovenians and Hungarians of Vojvodina) thus breeding an interest in Islam and Muslim traditions in the Kosovo Albanians that pushed them further away from their Christian Orthodox neighbors.

Kosovo developed into a seat of ethnic and religious strife; Albanian nationalists launched anti-Serbian actions. Late in the 20th century they received another weighty argument in favor of rigid confrontation. The Tito Constitution of the SFRY of 1974 shifted the responsibility, together with corresponding powers, for economic and social development to the federation subjects. Inspired by the region's autonomous status and the fact that it acquired part of the Federation's constitutional powers Kosovo Albanians became even more enthusiastic about the independence idea. The new division of powers and responsibilities created a paradox: Kosovo could veto the republic's decisions while the republican structures of Serbia could not interfere into the way Kosovo, a Federation subject, was ruled.

At this time the Kosovo Albanians enjoyed the widest of rights: they filled the posts of chairman and deputy chairman of the presidium of the SFRY Cabinet, deputy chairman of the parliament, chairman of the presidium of the politburo of the CC CPY, chairmen of veves (chambers) of the skupsinas (parliaments) of the republics and territories of the SFRY. Albanians represented Yugoslavia in fifteen countries of the world, three Albanians filled the posts of deputy foreign ministers; there were four generals among the Albanians, one of the deputies of the SFRY defense minister was also an Albanian, etc.

In April 1989, when the end of Yugoslavia was in sight Belgrade annulled Kosovo's status of the federation subject. By that time the Albanians comprised 82 percent of the total population of Kosovo as against 13 percent of Serbians. The Albanian nationalists exploited this far from wise decision of Belgrade to fan centrifugal and anti-Serbian sentiments.

On 7 September 1990, the deputies of the disbanded Skupsina of Kosovo adopted a Constitution and declared a republic. This started a campaign of mass disobedience to Belgrade, the self-proclaimed republic sat down to the business of creating its own power structures. Three thousand Albanians demonstratively resigned from the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia to set up the Kosovo police. In September 1991, the Kosovo Albanians carried a referendum on independence and declared the area an independent state. The movement toward unification with Albania was gaining momentum. The Kosovo problem acquired an international dimension in Dayton when the sanctions against Yugoslavia were lifted in exchange of its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and the Kosovo settlement. In 1997, it became obvious that the United States and NATO had sided with the Kosovo Albanians; this fact encouraged the latter: Serbian officials, policemen and Serbian civilians as well as loyal Albanians perished in terrorist acts.

Meanwhile Russia consistently supported the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. As the situation was steadily going from bad to worse Russia remained convinced that Belgrade should demonstrate political flexibility and reason in its relations with the Kosovo Albanians' national movement. The joint statement issued during President of SFRY Milosevic working visits to Moscow on 15-16 June 1998 spoke of Belgrade's obligation to resume without delays the talks with the Kosovo Albanians on the form of autonomy; the document stressed that all repressions against Albanian civilians should be discontinued while diplomats and international organization should acquire unhampered access to the area. In September 1998, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that obliged the Serbs to stop the hostilities, pull their security forces out of Kosovo and create conditions for international observers. By early October, tension reached new heights: NATO threatened Serbia with air strikes while the UN Security Council demonstrated its usual "tact" by not recommending a military operation in Yugoslavia.

In February 1999, the Kosovo Albanian and Serbian delegation arrived to Rambouillet outside Paris in search of a peace settlement. The progress toward a political agreement stumbled across the sides' disagreement over the "substantial autonomy for Kosovo" term. The Albanian delegation interpreted the autonomy offered to the area for the next three years as the first step toward complete independence, while the Serbs believed that it was the first step toward wider autonomy and nothing more.

At the second round of the Rambouillet talks, on 15-18 March 1995 the sides were invited to sign the draft agreement without further discussions. The Kosovo delegation signed the draft and the military appendix. The Yugoslavian delegation was prepared to sign the main text but not the military appendix that envisaged introduction of peacekeeping forces under political and operational command of the NATO Council which meant, in fact, the state-by-stage separation of the area from Yugoslavia. Russia sided with Belgrade.

In fact the Rambouillet talks can be hardly described as such. Yugoslavia was presented with an ultimatum: either it accepted the de facto NATO occupation (under the military appendix "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY") and the loss of Kosovo or be prepared to NATO air strikes. The Rambouillet ultimatum and its repercussions fully revealed the true nature of the North Atlantic Alliance as an aggressive institution ready to use force to impose its values in any corner of the globe.

On 24 March 1999, bombing of Yugoslavia began, the Kosovo Albanian fighters synchronized their land operations against the YPA units, the Serbian police and the remnants of Serbian civilians with the NATO air operation. On the whole NATO made about 23 thousand sorties, 14 thousand of them strikes; it used over 1 thousand winged missiles and 20 thousand aerial bombs and guided missiles. This was a barbarian action that remained unpunished. I saw the results with my own eyes. It looked as if the NATO pilots enjoyed their perfect machines, their might and precision. The bridges were hit at the central line; the Defense Ministry received a missile at the part that housed the strategic service and computer center.

On 9 June 1999, NATO and Belgrade signed an agreement on pulling out the security forces of Serbia from Kosovo; on the next day, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that confirmed the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The same resolution demanded that Albanians should demilitarize themselves. This never happened. During the first twelve months of the presence of NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo hundreds of Serbs were killed; 960 disappeared; 85 more mediaeval religious objects and monuments were ruined; 350 thousand Serbs left the area; 250 thousand Albanians moved in. Practically nothing was left of the formerly 40 thousand-strong Serbian population of Priština.

According to international observers the so-called demilitarization left behind over 500 thousand units of firearms of varied calibers. Out of the 226 thousand Serbian refugees slightly over 100 trusted the safety guarantees and returned to their homes. Organized crime reached unheard of dimensions. According to the Interpol over 90 percent of the drugs that reach Europe pass across Kosovo.

By summing up one can say that the international community has not done much in former Yugoslavia - no conditions for continued peaceful coexistence of the nations that always lived there were created; enmity and confrontation can still be felt while no stability, security, confidence and tolerance have been achieved. One regrets to say that at the present stage of peacekeeping activities are limited to rude administering, intimidation and pressure applied to those of the national groups that fail to meet the Western criteria.