Book Reviews

Rebecca Pates and Maximilian Schochow, ed., *Der "Ossi:" Mikropolitische Studien über einen symbolischen Ausländer* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013)

Reviewed by **René Wolfsteller, Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow**

Until German reunification in 1990, western social sciences had never been particularly interested in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as an object of research. The fact that western scholars refrained, for various political reasons, from researching GDR society, as well as its successful seclusion from external analysis, contributed to the marginalization of social research within West German academia on its eastern neighbor.[1] With the collapse of the socialist German state in 1989, however, the situation changed completely. All of a sudden, there was an enormous demand for expert knowledge as the remains of an entire political system and the subjects that it left behind needed to be mapped, measured, and categorized.

Yet the dynamics of the following exploration developing between a now-ambitious social research agenda, on the one hand, legitimacy-seeking politics, on the other, and–in between–the media machine thirsty for stories from the "neuen Bundesländer" (new federal states), yielded some peculiar effects. Indeed, the discourse soon changed into an investigation of the genuine "nature" of the "East German," an inquiry into its psyche and (ir) rationality. Accordingly, scholars diagnosed an East German "gap of civilization" or predicted "a de-pacification of the society of the Federal Repub-

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lic coming from East Germany."[2] These speculative attempts to grasp the "true essence of the East Germans," with their demonization as a byproduct, culminated in the criminologist Christian Pfeiffer's "Töpfchen-These"[3] whereby the anti-individualist upbringing in the public kindergartens of the GDR was responsible for serious personality disorders among entire generations of children. From Pfeiffer's point of view, the socialist education system had produced not only submissive subjects of a totalitarian regime, but also unsettled individuals who would continue to resort to violence toward immigrants and the socially deprived for the rest of their lives.[4]

Today, at a temporal and emotional distance of almost twenty-five years after the decay and collapse of the autocratic socialist states in East Central Europe, those anxious discourses about the "East Germans" have themselves become the object of critical inquiry. In their recent and insightful book *Der "Ossi." Mikropolitische Studien über einen symbolischen Ausländer*, a group of political scientists from the University of Leipzig conceive of such "identity talk" as practices in need of an explanation themselves. Within ten analytical chapters, different authors cover a wide range of discursive strands from the fields of psychotherapy, demography, and pedagogy, as well as from the (often entangled) spheres of politics, the economy, and the media in an easily accessible and largely entertaining way. A perceptive introduction by Rebecca Pates provides the contextual framework for this collection. Following Ian Hacking's research into processes of "making up people," Pates identifies the scope of the volume in the critical exploration of how "East Germans" are being constructed, which functions these practices of classification fulfill, and how the classifications interact with the classified people. In an anticipatory summary, Pates suggests that the general talkativeness and confusion about the "*Ossi*" (Easterner) point to a struggle over different hierarchical positions within the social order. Classifying the abnormal *Ossi* in a largely negative manner as contrasted with the "West German" as the normalized viewpoint helps to naturalize and ethnicize social differences. Such an asymmetrical mode of social classification is very similar to the dynamics of identity talk about "die Ausländer" (the foreigners) compared with "die Deutschen" (the Germans). In both cases, as Pates points out by drawing on Rogers Brubaker's terminology, the result is an oversimplifying "cognitive economy" creating the critical impression that social problems are locatable in certain regions and attributable to particular groups of people.

It initially appears therefore as a contrast that the first three analytical chapters of this book focus on the ostensibly favorable narrative of "East Germans" as a pioneering "avant-garde," who set the trend for future eco-

nomic and social transformations of the whole German society.[5] In their discourse analyses of politics, legislation, and the media, the authors of these three contributions reveal, however, the dubious aims and origins of this compliment. For the reframing of well-established stereotypes of the "East Germans" in positive terms as particularly experienced in transformations and hence, supposedly flexible and modest in their standard of living, coincided precisely with the deregulation of the German job market. "East Germans" were defined as "perfect neoliberal subjects" whose socialization under totalitarian rule and in an economy of scarcity would, in fact, call for greater flexibility in employment and for economic conditions encouraging people to become entrepreneurs in their own workforce. This narrative gained prominence in 2003, at a time when the federal government comprised of Social Democrats and Greens introduced extensive deregulatory reforms of the labor market, as well as more restrictive changes to the social benefits system. Correspondingly, East Germany was regarded as an underdeveloped "special economic zone" in need of "special treatment." The function of the discourse of East Germany as the laboratory of the nation and of its inhabitants as pioneers of economic modesty was, thus, not so much to boost their self-confidence, but rather to legitimize neoliberal reforms and to encourage the rest of the society to abandon privileges (e.g., wage agreements and employment protections) for the sake of competition, under the slogan: "If even an Easterner can adapt to this, then why can't you?"

In the following chapter by Daniel Schmidt (Chapter 5), which is among the most interesting in the book, the title "Ostdeutsche Frauenbewegung" ("East German Women's Movement") is to be taken literally. Schmidt describes how both demography and politics problematize the migration of young women from the eastern to western states of Germany after reunification. According to the narrative demographers and politicians have been trying to establish, the well-educated, highly motivated, and flexible women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine who emigrated from "the East" left behind largely poorly trained, frustrated young men of the "underclass" who became violent right-wing sympathizers, and who produced disproportionally high numbers of children with the remaining "underclass" women. In order to save the demographically, intellectually, and economically desiccated homeland, the story continues, it would be required to attract back highly skilled female expatriates, who would also be encouraged to start families. Consequently, the state of Saxony-Anhalt launched a return program, consisting of a so-called *Heimatschachtel* (homeland box) with local sweets sent to the migrants and an agency helping

them to organize their desired return. The chapter finishes by presenting the latest effort of this grotesque politico-demographic intervention: an action plan for "sustainable demographic policy," aiming to increase the birthrate within Saxony-Anhalt with unconventional measures. Otherwise, so the experts feared, no company would be willing to invest in this part of the country ever again.

The sixth and equally insightful contribution deals with the image of the "East German" within discourses of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. On the basis of conference proceedings from 1995 to 2003 of the German Psychoanalytical Association, Robert Feustel critically examines how psychotherapeutical terms and diagnoses have been translated into quasi-sociological diagnoses for a whole population. In their conference papers, psychoanalysts seem to have been unduly influenced by the general societal discourse about the differences between "the East" and "the West" to such an extent that they postulated, along the lines of dominant stereotypes, that the socialization under a totalitarian regime must have had negative effects on the eastern Germans' underlying mental structure. When several psychoanalytical study groups found no common pattern among their eastern German patients–which would have allowed for a more general comparison with the treated western Germans–the authors of the conference proceedings concluded, however, that this lack of evidence must have been their own fault. That way, the investigation of psychic differences between eastern and western Germans became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Feustel concludes, revealing much more about the rationality of psychoanalysis than about its patients.

The subsequent chapter by Ulrike Wagner (Chapter 7) suggests a similar interpretation. On the one hand, she demonstrates how the predominant politics of commemorating the upheaval of 1989/1990 in Leipzig tries to constitute the "East Germans" retrospectively as a genuinely democratic collective actor while building on established stereotypes of the *Ossi* as whiny, humble, and not individually autonomous enough. On the other hand, the rhetorical construction of a whole population of idealistic heroes appears so exaggerated that it points to both the narrative's precariousness and its true purpose as a lesson in popular pedagogy under the paradigm of a national politics of memory.

The following three, rather short chapters include a summary by Maximilian Schochow of the public debate on the best education model initiated by Christian Pfeiffer's "Töpfchen-These" (Chapter 8), Ewa Bojenko-Izdebska's differentiated analysis of political cartoons on the "East Germans" (Chapter 9), and a philosophico-aesthetic discussion of the revolutionary

and democratic character of the 1989 upheaval by André Debüser and Wolfgang Fach (Chapter 10).

In the final chapter, Kathrin Franke et al. argue that the specific formation of subjectivity termed the "East German" emerged after reunification as a result of the former "GDR subjects" clashing with the structures of the "old Federal Republic." According to them, the inertia of both the subjects and the West German system encountering each other caused significant irritations on both sides. For the "GDR subjects" it was difficult to realize that their political and economic system had just disappeared, and with it, conventions of interaction between the people and the state. The system of the "old Federal Republic," on the other side, was suddenly facing the danger of losing its discursive hegemony, and hence, of its contingency being revealed. In order to render these conflicts manageable, the *dispositif* of the "East German" was introduced as a deviant but discursively integrate-able subject. Thus, by constructing a new subjectivity that was compatible with the system in place, the window of contingency was closed.

It is this questionable thesis that stands out in an otherwise largely coherent collection of essays. Franke and her co-authors imply that there are indeed group-specific differences between what they call "GDR subjects," on the one hand, and the "system of the old Federal Republic," on the other. Such a view, however, is in conflict with Pate's sociological perspective as presented in the volume's introduction. Her approach is not interested in ontological identities, but highlights the functions of social classifications and the cognitive effects of identity politics. Compared with this, Franke et al. involve themselves with those classifications on the level of identity politics by contrasting different forms of subjectivity.

Yet, the conflict between these two opposing poles within the book proves to be a fortunate development for the reader because it points to the more general dilemma of identity and difference, which underlies its very topic. As a consequence of this dilemma, most of the chapters oscillate between a dissociated investigation of identity discourses about the "East Germans" and related classifications, trying to avoid a reproduction of East-West differences in their arguments, and the necessity of having to refer to actual people, historical events, and experiences which are indeed shared by certain social groups. But, in so doing, they only illustrate the power of the underlying, well-established cognitive economy, which, by classifying people as members of ethnic or other identity groups, simplifies the complexity of social differences, and, hence, orders the world and people's cognitive perception of it in a particular way. Even attempts to overcome stereotypes of the *Ossi* are compelled to constantly reproduce the very foun-

dations of this cognitive economy, as the example of the initiative "Dritte Generation Ost" (third generation east) shows.[6] Therefore, in her introduction Pates rightly points out the impossibility of simply abolishing such classifications–precisely because they are more than a label as they represent an established way of understanding the world. Although the various chapters of the book cannot escape completely from this dilemma, each makes an effort to reveal this far-reaching mechanism of identity politics by demonstrating how much discourses concerning "East Germans" in fact tell us about the motives, intentions, and fears of their participants.

The overall quality of the eleven chapters may vary a little, and for a potential second edition, a further specification of the methodology as well as a more thorough proofreading would be advisable. Moreover, a broader range of discursive examples could also contribute to make this study even more illuminating and conclusive. There is certainly no lack of such examples, as the media debate of the "ungodly East" in 2012 illustrated. Nevertheless, every single chapter of this book offers the reader new insights, not least due to the diversity of approaches, ranging from media analyses to the sociology of social sciences, from philosophical to historically informed perspectives. Altogether, this volume edited by Rebecca Pates and Maximilian Schochow is thus to be considered, alongside Thomas Ahbe's works,[7] a new standard reference for scholars investigating images of the "East German" in the media, politics, and social sciences, or for those who are researching social stereotypes and identity politics within the German context.

Notes

1. Hans Joas and Martin Kohli, "Der Zusammenbruch der DDR: Fragen und Thesen" in *Der Zusammenbruch der DDR. Soziologische Analysen*, ed. Hans Joas and Martin Kohli (Frankfurt/Main, 1993), 11.
2. See Wolfgang Engler, *Die zivilisatorische Lücke. Versuche über den Staatssozialismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 1992), pp. 26-61. This is, as with all the following quotes in English, the author's translation; Heinz Bude, "Das Ende einer tragischen Gesellschaft" in Joas and Kohli (see note 1), 267-281, 279.
3. The literal translation of this would be "potty hypothesis."
4. Christian Pfeiffer, "DDR: Erziehung zum Haß. Der Kriminologe Christian Pfeiffer über die Erziehung in der DDR und die Folgen," *Der Spiegel* 12 (1999), 60-66.
5. Elena Buck and Jana Hönke "Pioniere der Prekarität–Ostdeutsche als Avantgarde des neuen Arbeitsmarktregimes" (Chapter 2); Anne Dölemeyer "Not Handicapped, but with Special Needs–Sonderwirtschaftszone Ostdeutschland" (Chapter 3); Inga Hoff and Stefan Kausch, "Die neue innerdeutsche Grenze. Deutschland als Zwei-(Normalitäts-)Klassen-Gesellschaft" (Chapter 4).

6. Michael Hacker et al., ed., *Dritte Generation Ost: Wer wir sind, was wir wollen,* 3rd ed. (Berlin, 2012).
7. Thomas Ahbe, "Die Konstruktion der Ostdeutschen. Diskursive Spannungen, Stereotype und Identitäten seit 1989," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 41-42 (2004): 12-22.

Lisa Pine, *Education in Nazi Germany* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2010)

Reviewed by **Gregory Baldi, Political Science, Western Illinois University**

The use of educational institutions for the ideological indoctrination, political mobilization, and military preparation of young people represented a core strategy of the National Socialist regime. At the same time, education offers a distinct policy window through which one can observe the functioning of the Nazi regime itself. Indeed, few policy areas demonstrate more fully the conflict in the Third Reich between practical considerations and ideological aims, or offer opportunities to assess streams of continuity and change between the Nazi period and the eras that preceded and succeeded it.

As a topic of study, however, education has been relatively (and somewhat surprisingly) underrepresented in the recent historiography of the Nazi period. Lisa Pine's slender but significant volume *Education in Nazi Germany* thus marks a welcome contribution. As Pine accurately notes early in the work, "Education is fundamental to our entire macro-view of the Third Reich" (1). Education is broadly defined here to include not only schools and universities, but the range of institutions related to the socialization of young people more generally. Such was the view of Nazi educational theorists themselves, as Pine points out, who viewed party organizations as extensions of formal schooling. Thus, while the work examines structural and curricular issues related to traditional primary and secondary schools and universities, it also considers the elite party schools, the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend), and the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel).[1]

The book is organized into six core chapters. The first provides the historical background to education in the Third Reich and examines the extent to which Nazi policy marked a continuation of the *völkisch* and nationalist tendencies in German education that prior to 1933 had coexisted and conflicted with both the Humboldtian humanist tradition–reflected most strongly in the Gymnasium–and the progressive tendencies of Weimar reformers. The second chapter considers the role played by Hitler in shaping Nazi education policy, the organizational framework of educational policymaking, and the changes to the structure of schools and universities.

Chapter 3 examines the National Socialists' influence on the schools' curriculum across a range of subject areas, including the natural and biological sciences, history, German, and physical education, as well as the development and implementation of Nazi racial theory as a topic of study. The fourth chapter turns to a discussion of the Nazi elite schools, including the National Political Institutes of Education (Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten, or NAPOLAS), the Adolf Hitler Schools, and the Order Castles (Ordensburgen) and their role in promoting a new generation of leaders thoroughly infused with Nazi ideology and principles of leadership. The next two chapters are devoted to the party youth organizations, the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls, as well a brief discussion of underground groups such as the Edelweiss Pirates, and highlight, among other features, the differences in regime socialization strategies towards young men and women and how the experiences of youth organization members changed once the war began.

As a historical survey, the book effectively incorporates archival work and detailed accounts of the history of everyday life (*Alltagsgeschichte*) into a consideration of overall policy direction and development that demonstrates how the regime used education as a forum for the pursuit of a variety of goals. Through a strategy of "total education" that included the institutions of general and higher education, the elite party schools, and the youth organizations, Pine maintains that the Nazis sought to achieve a "root and branch reshaping of values" by promoting the militarism, antiliberalism, anti-intellectualism, and racism and anti-Semitism of party ideology. Frequently, Pine finds, the pursuit of this strategy would conflict with other policy actors, most notably in the churches, and more fundamental pedagogical aims, especially in the face of wartime imperatives.

While Pine's book functions as an introductory overview of education, its central aim is as much theoretical as empirical. The work's "main objective," she writes, is "a re-evaluation of education and the socialization of youth in the Third Reich in light of new knowledge, theories, and debates about the nature of the Nazi state" (1). Specifically, she examines education in the context of three debates in the historiography of the period that have emerged since the last major wave of Nazi education research. First, she asks to what extent education policy under the Nazis was distinct from previous periods or can be seen in terms of a German special path (*Sonderweg*) and thus a continuation of patterns established in the previous century. Second, Pine cites the arguments of the "intentionalist-structuralist" debate most closely associated with studies of the Holocaust to examine whether the sources of National Socialist education policy are to be found at the cen-

ter with Hitler himself or with other power nodes across the policymaking landscape of the Nazi state. Finally, referencing Jeffrey Herf's study of technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and Nazi Germany, Pine asks if education policy under the Nazis achieved a "modernizing" of long-standing traditional arrangements or whether it is better characterized as "reactionary" in its reinforcement of existing or creation of new antimodern elements in German education.[2]

In addressing these theoretical questions, *Education in Nazi Germany* is probably not as effective as in its empirical dimension. This judgment is rooted less in a disagreement with Pine's conclusions, but instead in the specification of the various explanatory frameworks she invokes and their application to the subject components of her study. While, for example, her conclusion that education policy can be best understood as a synthesis of the intentionalist and structuralist perspectives, with Hitler providing overall guidance but competing bureaucracies and officials (generally drawn along party and state lines) also playing a role, is consistent with much historical scholarship on other aspects of the Nazi regime since the 1990s, there is little sense, as structuralists generally argue, that this competition drove policy in a more extreme direction.[3] Instead, the impression one derives from her work is that the proliferation of education organizations–such as the various elite school types–rather than the radicalization of policy was the primary consequence of this contestation.

One may likewise question how Pine utilizes the "modernizing/reactionary" framework. Although she notes the link between the Nazis' embrace of modern technology and the rejection of Enlightenment rationality associated with Herf's conception of "reactionary modernism," Pine appears to conceive of "modernization" in her study either as social progressivism, as in her consideration of the regime's policy and attitudes toward girls and women, or as efficiency, as in the discussion of Nazi efforts to streamline general education after the proliferation of secondary school types under Weimar. In either case, she concludes unsurprisingly that the regime's "reactionary" tendencies were likely to win out in education and that any modernizing was an unintended by-product, usually born of wartime necessity.

It is the examination with regard to the continuity question that is the most successful of the three "re-evaluations." Pine's careful and nuanced tracing highlights both links and breaks in policies and practices before and after 1933, particularly in her analysis of the curriculum and party youth organizations. One is left to wonder, however, if any continuities carried forward beyond 1945, for although Pine occasionally makes reference to

the Nazis' educational legacies in the postwar era, there is effectively no discussion in the book of developments in either the Federal Republic of Germany or the German Democratic Republic.

Whatever questions one might raise about how Pine has applied these explanatory frameworks, her book undoubtedly has helped set the direction for future studies of this topic. From students and researchers seeking a broad introduction to subject experts, there is much to be gained from *Education in Nazi Germany.*

Notes

1. Interestingly, there is no consideration of vocational education, which has been the subject of much research in the postwar period.
2. Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1986).
3. For a discussion, see Richard Bessel, "Functionalists vs. Intentionalists: The Debate Twenty Years on or Whatever Happened to Functionalism and Intentionalism?" *German Studies Review* 26, no. 1 (2003): 15-20.

Stephen J. Silvia, *Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013)

Reviewed by **Volker Berghahn, History, Columbia University**

Following the debate on "globalization" after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the assertive unilateralism of the United States in the 1990s, there emerged a renewed interest in the "varieties of capitalism" debate. This debate and the research that was subsequently undertaken were enlivened by the crisis of the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism in 2007/2008 that, among other topics, directed attention to the German (or "Rhenish") model of capitalism. This, in turn, stimulated comparative studies of labor relations that had developed quite differently in the Federal Republic of Germany from those of United States.

Stephen Silvia has been one of leading American scholars of the peculiarities of (West) German industrial relations traditions, institutions, and practices, and his new book on *Holding the Shop Together* is an important synthesis of the expertise that he has accumulated on this subject. As he puts it in his Preface:

> My big aims in writing this book have been: (1) to integrate into a single volume the economic, historical, legal, political science, and sociological assessments and methods used on both sides of the Atlantic to

> analyze the major aspects of German industrial relations, and (2) to make innovative arguments using new evidence regarding the trajectory of German industrial relations (ix).

Given his interdisciplinary approach, he also hopes to provide "a broader and deeper understanding of German industrial relations than could be obtained through individual studies undertaken by scholars in each discipline acting in isolation" (ix).

Among the author's sources are also "hundreds of interviews" with officials at employers' associations and trade unions, many of whom summed up their efforts by saying that they were doing nothing less than "*den Laden zusammen[zu]halten*" (x). To him, this summary therefore highlights a central aspect of postwar German labor relations. And it also encapsulates the "ongoing effort of both labor and management to hold together their organizations and industrial relations system on the postwar era" (x).

It is against the background of these larger considerations that Silvia moves, in his first chapter, to an examination of the persistence of the codification of German industrial relations and hence of the role of the state in this picture. The disruption of these relations by the Nazi dictatorship and the chaos in the West German economy in the late 1940s merely reinforced the desire on both sides of industry to institutionalize conflicts as a way of stabilizing the social market economy that had emerged from the rubble of World War II.

There follows a very illuminating Chapter 2 on the peculiar system of codetermination that became enshrined in the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Law) of 1952, after the earlier *paritätische Mitbestimmung* (parity co-determination) that the British occupation authorities had promoted in 1947/1948. This earlier effort had placed a "worker-director" on the management boards of the big steel and coal companies, but had not been extended to other branches, as the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (Confederation of German Trade Unions) had been hoping. In the next two core chapters the author then offers a rigorous statistical analysis of trade union membership and density trends between 1950 and 2009. The text and the accompanying tables demonstrate that what the author calls the "milieu" became "the single biggest factor affecting union density in postwar Germany" and that the decline of this milieu has figured "prominently in the drop" in this density (102).

For a long time, it was the positive contribution to union density coming from the successful exporting industries of the second industrial revolution (i.e., mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and chemicals) that allowed the unions to remain relatively strong. In the 1990s, German unifi-

cation also contributed to maintaining this density. Chapter 4 deals with the two postwar phases of unionization and their "performance," with the first phase covering the rise and fall in memberships during the years 1945-1989. The second phase began in 1990 and was marked by what the author calls "the metamorphosis to a multisectoral trade union movement" up to 2001 (123). While the ups and downs in memberships and the shifts away from the traditional associations in the private sector to the power of public sector unions is generally known, the chapter provides a wealth of material on the origins and evolution of these shifts all the way up to 2010.

Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on employers associations. Going back to the beginning of the twentieth century, Silvia provides a broad outline of the historical development of the "other side" of industry. There are informative sub-sections on the resurgence of these organizations after 1945, their growing contributions to fostering industrial peace and "social partnership" in the 1950s, but also their hard-line response to the rise in trade union militancy in the 1960s and attempts to manage it in the 1970s. After 1989/1990 there were efforts at preserving continuity and cohesion beyond the upheavals brought on by unification, but also failures and setbacks. Silvia touches upon these more recent challenges, but acknowledges that further investigation is warranted. Accordingly, the author encourages future researchers to "test the robustness" (219) of his findings.

While both unions and employers associations faced many challenges all the way up to the most recent period, Silvia concludes that "the commitment to holding the shop together is still very much alive among the social partners and state officials" and that they will therefore "continue to play an important role in the German economy and society for some time to come" (230). This is why this book will not only be of great value to scholars across the social and historical sciences, but also to trade union leaders and managers in the English-speaking world.

Egbert Klautke, *The Mind of the Nation: Völkerpsychologie in Germany, 1851-1955* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013)

Reviewed by **David Freis, History and Civilization, European University Institute**

Today, *Völkerpsychologie* appears as an outdated aberration from scientific objectivity, and an example of bad science from a time when scholars used immature methods to chase an ominous *Volksgeist* ("folk spirit"), and eventu-

ally came up with nothing but political propaganda thinly veiled in the vocabulary of social science. In particular, it is the legacy of National Socialism that weighs heavily on our reception of *Völkerpsychologie*, having discredited the underlying concept of *Volk* and most of the compound words containing it, as well as the essentialist idea of national or ethnic characteristics or the "mind of the nation." The notion *Volk* may also be one of the reasons why the reception of *Völkerpsychologie*, then and now, was difficult in the non-German-speaking world–the translation "folk psychology" is awkward at least, and this problem extends from the designation of the discipline itself to many of its key concepts.

The intellectual historian Egbert Klautke (University College London, School of Slavonic & East European Studies) has now published a thin book of less than two hundred pages that promises to be the first comprehensive study on the entire history of *Völkerpsychologie*, spanning from its "invention" in 1851 to its final demise in 1955. Moreover, Klautke does not content himself with unearthing the fascinating history of a semi-forgotten discipline, but calls for a fundamental reevaluation of its current reception, claiming that historians have largely misunderstood the original aims and objectives of its proponents. Although it has since been ignored or written off as pseudo-science, he argues, the modern social sciences owe a lot more to *Völkerpsychologie* than has usually been acknowledged.

Without doubt, Klautke presents some strong arguments for why one should take a closer look at *Völkerpsychologie*. Not only did its "invention" in the mid nineteenth century occur at the intersection of two of the most relevant intellectual, cultural, and political currents of this period–the rise of the modern sciences, and the increasing importance of a German national movement. At the same time, Klautke repeatedly stresses, *Völkerpsychologie* was also one of the academic roots of the modern social sciences. Indeed, many ideas and approaches that later became incorporated by sociology and anthropology were first introduced by representatives of *Völkerpsychologie*, and were then taken up by eminent scholars such as Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Franz Boas (1858-1942), Martin Buber (1878-1965), Georg Simmel (1858-1918), and Werner Sombart (1863-1941). To make the history of *Völkerpsychologie* even more relevant, Klautke claims a direct connection between *Völkerpsychologie* and present-day sociology, cultural anthropology, cultural studies, and such widely used concepts as "national identity" and "national mentality."

To write the comprehensive history of a scientific discipline and to keep it concise, readable, and focused is certainly always a challenge–even more so when this history spans more than a century and is presented on little

more than 150 pages of text. Klautke has found a solution to this problem that is both elegant and convincing. In three chapters, he examines the protagonists of three ensuing generations of *Völkerpsychologie*, situating them in their historical context and discussing the national and international reception of their ideas.

Klautke's point of departure is Moritz Lazarus's (1824-1903) and Heymann Steinthal's (1823-1899) idea of *Völkerpsychologie* as a discipline in the second half of the 1850s. Unlike their intellectual predecessors, Lazarus and Steinthal attempted to establish a new scientific discipline devoted entirely to the study of an assumed "folk spirit" (*Volksgeist*) as a driving force of history. As such a discipline would touch on all areas of individual and collective life, its scope, Klautke stresses, was–in theory at least–"universal, all-encompassing and without limits" (18). Throughout the first chapter, Klautke argues against the reproach that *Völkerpsychologie* was racism in the guise of a social science. The exact opposite was the case, he claims. As liberal scholars, Lazarus and Steinthal had advocated an understanding of the *Volk* based not on biological essence, but instead on the subjective view of its members. At the same time, however, Lazarus's and Steinthal's *Völkerpsychologie* was not only intended to empirically study the *Volksgeist*, but was also to serve a practical, national-pedagogical function, strengthening and reassuring the Germans' national consciousness. While these ideas can be understood in the context of aspirations for German unification in the 1850s and 1860s, *Völkerpsychologie* changed its direction against the background of the rise of antisemitism at the end of the 1870s. As a liberal reformist Jew, Lazarus stood up against Heinrich von Treitschke and like-minded scholars, using *Völkerpsychologie* to expound the Jewish *Volksgeist* and to defend it against antisemitic charges.

In the second chapter, Klautke turns to Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), an eminent scholar in late nineteenth-century Germany and the "founding father" of experimental psychology. From the 1860s onwards, Wundt held an interest in topics such as language, myths, religion, and customs–an occupation that culminated in a monumental ten-tome study on *Völkerpsychologie* published between 1900 and 1920. Different from Lazarus and Steinthal, Wundt did not envisage his brand of *Völkerpsychologie* as a supreme discipline situated above other academic disciplines. In an increasingly crowded field of newly emerging and institutionalizing social sciences, he positioned *Völkerpsychologie* as the study of the history of human civilization, perceived as a teleological development from primitive stages to the modern *Kulturnationen* (cultural nations). Unlike Lazarus and Steinthal, Wundt was one of the "mandarins" of the German universities; his theories

were widely received and controversially discussed by many prominent scholars. The beginning of World War I then became a caesura for *Völkerpsychologie*, when Wundt–like many of his fellow intellectuals–tried to put his ideas into service for the German war effort. Whereas *Völkerpsychologie*'s view on different nations had–at least inside of Europe–been relatively universalistic, Wundt shifted the focus on the alleged differences between the "national characters" of Germany and those of its enemies. Klautke shows, however, that Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* could not capitalize on the nationalistic postwar atmosphere of the Weimar Republic–and racial theories filled the gap instead.

Nonetheless, *Völkerpsychologie* experienced a noteworthy comeback during the Nazi period in the works of Willy Hellpach (1877-1955). Klautke's protagonist in the third chapter is certainly a most interesting figure. Trained as a psychologist and physician, Hellpach was a prolific and eclectic science writer. At the same time, he made a political career in the liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) during the Weimar years, serving as Minister of Education and State President of Baden, member of the Reichstag, and–unsuccessfully–ran for the Reich presidency in 1925. Hellpach's engagement with *Völkerpsychologie* only began after the Nazis' rise to power had brought an end to his political career. As Klautke accurately shows, Hellpach could then use *Völkerpsychologie* to reconcile himself with the Third Reich and to establish a safe niche for himself in academia.

Nevertheless, while Klautke's decision to rely almost entirely on the biographies of four scholars representing three generations of *Völkerpsychologie* allows the book to be well-focused and succinct, it is arguably here that its main problem lies. By sticking to scholars who described their own, eclectic and diverse approaches as *Völkerpsychologie*, the study seems to imply that it was something like a relatively well-defined discipline and that the different approaches bearing the name followed on each other in a rather linear way. As Klautke repeatedly stresses himself, this was clearly not the case. If the object of study were to be defined less by its designation, and more by its questions, topics, and intellectual approaches, the border of the overall narrative would probably get fuzzier, but it would allow to get a clearer picture of *Völkerpsychologie* in its context.

Another weakness is certainly that Klautke tends to oversell the relevance and timeliness of *Völkerpsychologie*, arguing that it was an important precursor of the modern social sciences, and that many present-day questions and concepts were first introduced by its representatives. This stressing of the groundbreaking qualities of *Völkerpsychologie* comes at a price. Not only does it imply that it was something like a relatively homoge-

neous, marked-out discipline; at the same time, this narrative leaves out much of the specificities of the different brands of *Völkerpsychologie* and, above all, makes it difficult to explain why three consecutive generations of scholars tried to introduce *Völkerpsychologie* as a label for their research—and all of them eventually failed. In any case, the topic would not need such puffery. Regardless of its eventual failure, *Völkerpsychologie* is a most rewarding and under-researched object of study. And the account in Klautke's book is, notwithstanding its shortness, far more nuanced and rich than some overemphasized assertions reflect.

That said, *The Mind of the Nation* is a well-written and compellingly constructed study on a topic that, until now, has been unjustly ignored. There are still many open questions, but any study that tries to answer them will have Klautke's book as an essential reference. In addition, it is a valuable and original contribution to the history of the human sciences from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, ranging from sociology and anthropology to the psy-disciplines.

Damani J. Partridge, *Hypersexuality and Headscarves: Race, Sex and Citizenship in the New Germany* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012)

Reviewed by **Myra Marx Ferree, Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison**

This is an unusual book, not only because it is one of a relatively small number of anthropological studies of contemporary Germany nor because it engages Black people's embodied experiences in the Berlin Republic. Partridge offers what I would call, for lack of a better term, a postmodernist ethnography of racial tensions in the "new" Länder. He draws heavily on his own experiences as a twenty-something African American living in East Berlin in 1995-1996, his teenage homestay with a Turkish-German family in a Western small town before the fall of the wall, a researcher studying Vietnamese contract workers in 1999-2000, his work for MSNBC in producing a documentary on neo-Nazis in 2001, and observation and interviews with antifascist activists in 2009-2010. These idiosyncratic samples of daily life in Germany form the backbone of his various accounts of what he calls "exclusionary incorporation" involved in making "non-citizenship" a formative experience for residents who are racialized as "others" of various sorts, whether as Black or Asian asylum seekers, Muslim Germans of Turkish heritage, or Afro-Germans with formal citizenship.

Partridge tells his story in a nonlinear and apparently intentionally disjointed style, beginning with an extensive "prologue" which includes some substantial portions of the script of the film he produced, and accounts of conversations embedded in descriptions of his own movements, encounters, and intentions. It is followed by an introduction that engages with the literature on citizenship and defines key terms. In this chapter he suggests that his focus will be on the "technologies of exclusion." These range from the social organization of governance, under which he includes legal limitations on citizenship, the organization of schools serving minority populations, and the street violence and attacks on residences for asylum-seekers which underline the non-belonging, to the more cultural forms of representation, including media portrayals along with self-representation through both racist and antiracist NGOs. He also places the processes of exclusion observed in Berlin and Brandenburg in a context in which the eastern parts of Germany are themselves being governed and represented in marginalizing and minoritizing terms.

The organization of the remaining chapters, however, seems to be more organized around the issue of observing bodies and embodied forms of otherness across a range of loosely grouped thematics. The first chapter "Ethno-patriarchal Returns: The Fall of the Wall, Closed Factories and Left-over Bodies" particularly examines the contract workers that the German Democratic Republic had brought in and who were left behind when the government dissolved, posing challenges both the new governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the individual states. But this chapter also addresses the malaise of East Germans through the lens of resurgent nationalism, unification as a reassertion of masculine privilege, and immigrant-blaming for economic problems on both sides of the wall. I would have found the analysis easier to follow if the chapter had been divided conceptually as the colon of the title suggested, but it appears that Partridge's intent is to demonstrate the connections of these processes through the mere combination of both sorts of observations, each glancing off the other. In my view, the result is less systematic and more superficial than either topic deserves.

The next chapter "Travel as an Analytic of Exclusion: The Politics of Mobility after the Wall" is even more eclectic in its organization even though the title suggests more coherence. The basic idea of "seeing citizenship through travel" (53) is appealing and his argument that the sole focus on immigration is unnecessarily limiting and blinds one to the other forms of travel is persuasive. But, how he deals with tourism, intranational moves, and safety in walking the streets is less convincing. On the one hand, he

becomes narrow as own body becomes a primary focus. Where he goes, how he feels, and with whom he talks tends to dominate the story. On the other hand, his story becomes so big that he loses focus, considering East German "imaginaries of travel," experiences of asylum camp inhabitants as they arrived in Europe and as Germany unified, and Afro-German resistances to being portrayed as alien and exotic.

His third chapter ("We Were Dancing in the Club, Not on the Berlin Wall: Black Bodies, Street Bureaucrats and Hypersexual Returns") focuses on sexualities, but again–as the chapter title suggests–attempts to cram a great variety of concerns about bodies as sexual into a single chapter. By contrast, the much shorter fourth chapter "The Progeny of Guest Workers as Leftover Bodies: Post-Wall West German Schools and the Administration of Failure" has a tight focus on the way that schools operate, but is thin (one set of interviews with tenth graders reported in a bit over a page becomes "student perspectives" and there does not seem to be any systematic selection of schools to observe or teachers to interview). The impressionistic nature of this chapter is even more pronounced in the following chapter, which is the only one dealing with the headscarf issue (despite the key role it is given in the title). Here, existing research is recycled in summary form, and his own research seems to consist of three interviews: with an imam, a Turkish heritage Green politician, and Fereshta Ludin–a prominent Muslim teacher in Berlin–herself. The conclusion and epilogue actually do little to sum up and interpret what has come before, but instead introduce new observations about how school-based teaching of the Holocaust now brings in the Armenian genocide and casts the Turks as "unrepentant" in contrast with German atonement politics. These are interesting, but have no obvious connection to "hypersexuality" or headscarves.

Partridge's odd volume convinces me that laboring bodies, traveling bodies, sexual bodies, young bodies, female bodies, and most particularly racialized bodies are sites of politics and worthy of a serious anthropological examination. However, he does not convince me that a postmodern mélange of personal stories, extensive citations from other works, and unsystematic interviews and observations provide a valuable addition to the anthropologists' repertoire of methods. Moreover, his linguistic presentation (sometimes presenting translations alongside lengthy German originals, sometimes offering only English, rarely only German) seems to have little coherent logic and is, thus, very distracting. I would not recommend this as a teaching tool, but scholars with particular interests in these areas can mine some fascinating insights and compelling stories from this book.

Moshe Zimmermann, *Deutsche gegen Deutsche: Das Schicksal der Juden, 1938-1945* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2008; Hebrew trans., Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2013)

Reviewed by **Noga Wolff**

Historiographers tend to end the chronicles of the history of German Jewry in 1938 and focus their attention after that milestone year on Jews outside the old Reich. Historian Moshe Zimmerman puts the spotlight back on German Jewry and finds that 1938 was, in fact, a significant turning point down a slippery slope which began on 30 January 1933–the day Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany–and that 1938 certainly did not herald the end of this process of persecution.

It is this process that the book deals with, as well as with the intolerable ease of the implementation of a gradually worsening series of measures against the Jews. In the beginning, these steps were not necessarily aimed at achieving the "Final Solution"–not intentionally, in any event. However, they did provide all the reasons and conditions for the ultimate execution of this objective. In his other writings, Zimmermann emphasizes this trend of cumulative radicalization, beginning with "small" steps, such as civil exclusion, prejudice, abuse, and expulsion. In the end, these turned into an expulsion from life. The history of the German Jews in Nazi Germany illustrates how the ignorance of human needs and imperviousness to suffering can gather momentum through a sequence of restrictions on civil rights, and ultimately form a "springboard" (77) for the intensified oppression of and perpetration of acute social injustices against fellow citizens, which reached its climax during the Holocaust.

Thus, this book does not describe a static situation or a "long-term" *(longue durée)* inborn hatred of the Jews that was unaffected by the subject's own decision-making, but rather shows how there was "a sum total of small steps, sometimes imperceptible, which added up to total dehumanization" (190). Accordingly, and in contrast to the intentionalists' interpretation of German history, Zimmermann's book demonstrates, with an abundance of evidence, that until war broke out on 1 September 1939, the goal of the Nazi regime was not the destruction of the Jews, but rather their exile. This was carried out by means of a cynical looting of Jewish property in accordance with Nazi law, as well as the humiliation of the Jews meant to "take away their desire to remain in the Reich" (28, 32).

Although the Nazis had a common desire to get rid of the Jews, and individual murder attempts already took place at the very beginning of the Nazi regime, a joint decision had not yet been made and no systematic murder

plan had been set forward in the early stages. This only developed gradually and ultimately received Hitler's full authorization in October 1941 when German Jews were forbidden to leave Germany. In December 1941, about a half-year after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and not long after the United States joined the war, the Führer announced in front of fifty party leaders in Berlin that the time for the destruction of the Jews had arrived, as he had forewarned in his famous speech in 1939. This announcement came just one month before the notorious Wannsee Conference (January 1942), in which the implementation of the "Final Solution" to the Jewish question was coordinated among the various state departments.

Zimmermann indicates three main events in 1938 that resulted in a radicalization of the process, leading to a subsequent deterioration in the situation of German Jewry. The first was the Evian Conference in which sixty-two countries proclaimed, according to the same Hitlerian rationale, that the Jews were not welcome inside their borders as well. The second event was the *Kristallnacht* pogrom on 9 November, which the German leadership explained away as a seemingly spontaneous outburst. Given the lack of international reaction, this incident also provided evidence that such actions would have no significant effect on the Germans, or other powers, for that matter. The third turning point was the meeting in the office of the decorated pilot and air force chief, Hermann Göring, on 12 November 1938. On this occasion, a comprehensive solution for German Jewry was transformed into an official platform and a plan of exile and looting was clearly outlined and ready to be applied. In the evolving political context, this anti-Jewish policy adopted the same rationale that was used for earlier measures and would later be used to justify the "Final Solution."

In his writings over the last two decades, Zimmermann has attributed importance to a history-from-below explanation. This perspective puts an emphasis on the history of the everyday life of ordinary people and not necessarily on those individuals who shaped ideology and contributed to its formulation. Despite the fact that *Germans against Germans* ascribes a central role to the influence of bureaucracy–those who engineered the policy course to the end–Zimmermann shows that ideology was used as a manipulative tool and that Hitler played a major part while the party management tried its best to appease him. "Words," writes Zimmermann, "gave legitimacy to the actions even before they were put into practice" (146). When the war began, especially with the launch of the uncompromising invasion of the Soviet Union, tough words against the Jews took on practical significance.

An examination of the components of this anti-Jewish ideology is important not only in order to understand both the Nazi phenomenon *sui generis* and the effects of the Holocaust, but also because the reasons that justified the outcome–and the course of events that led to them–could very well happen at a different time or location to other groups in the world. "Looking back," says Zimmermann at the end of the book, "it seems that the foundations from which the Holocaust evolved–in our case the Holocaust of German Jews–were not necessarily unique" (190). The Nazi chapter of history is instructive on a more general level because it describes not only how non-Jews hunt Jews but how people develop into human hunters and how citizens become hunters of their fellow citizens: "We saw how on the one hand, neighbors became hunters and how, on the other hand, these same people became the hunted only because through ideology, words and laws allowed people to turn into both monsters and the lowliest of insects" (190).

At the same time, Zimmermann points out the difficulty of trying to put up some kind of resistance under the totalitarian conditions of the Nazi regime. Noting the variations in German public opinion in different regions of the country, Zimmermann still distinguishes between knowledge of the extermination–which could have been ambiguous–and the indisputable awareness of the events of *Kristallnacht*, the regulations requiring Jews to wear the yellow star, and the overall deterioration of the Jewish situation. There is no doubt that German citizens were indeed aware of these latter developments. Could they have opposed these events? Had it been a matter of a different group, would they have voiced their objection? Would an average citizen in a different situation and location give up goods and services for the sake of "strangers"? If he or she had, in fact, met the persecuted–would he or she endanger his or her family members for their sake? This book encourages the reader to grapple with these important moral questions that indeed require answers–but not on the part of the victim. By describing the trap that the Nazis set for the Jews and their leaders, the author shows that the Jews could not have acted differently and could not be blamed for their own deaths. Yet, the goal of *Germans against Germans* is not to leave the Jews with a victim consciousness. It essentially presents the reader with the task of viewing the history of German Jewry as an example of a course of exclusion down whose slippery slope any group–including, dialectically and absurdly, the Jewish-Israeli collective–can plummet and create a situation whose consequences cannot be foreseen.

Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

Reviewed by **Volker Prott, Department of Contemporary History, University of Tübingen**

The Triumph of the Dark, the second volume of Zara Steiner's history of the interwar period,[1] provides us with a rich and well-balanced synthesis of European international history between 1933 and 1939. Viewing the period from multiple perspectives, it disentangles the intricate diplomatic fabric of the last few years leading up to World War II. Steiner's account does not always fully develop, though in many ways hints at, several innovative and inspiring clues as to how to redress the international history of the 1930s, including issues such as the crucial role of the Spanish Civil War, the connections between Europe and the Far East, and the "perceptual gap" (1050) between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the democratic powers, on the other. Steiner's nuanced synthesis thus provides highly valuable empirical and analytical building blocks upon which to base future research on a fascinating though admittedly somber period of international history.

The primary focus of the book lies on interstate relations and the key political and diplomatic decision-makers of Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy. Steiner places considerable emphasis on economic factors, rearmament, and military planning. This rather conventional approach is invigorated by several intriguing passages in which the author explores mutual perceptions between the states. Steiner expounds, for instance, on how Hitler's rise to power was largely downplayed in its importance by the British and French ambassadors in Berlin (21-29).

In addition to her meticulous account of international relations, the reader encounters sporadic references to domestic particularities, for instance with regard to the role of nongovernmental pressure groups, such as the pro League of Nations associations in Great Britain (106, 168-171). Fewer are the allusions to social or cultural factors–Steiner mentions a few strikes in France and a small number of movies and poems without, however, further discussing their wider significance. More importantly, Steiner does not, contrary to what she states in the prologue (4), examine very closely the role of mass media, propaganda, and ideology.[2] Although she outlines the main ideological features of National Socialism, Steiner does not further investigate how Hitler's ideas shaped people's minds and behavior. Moreover, the author devotes only a few pages to local realities, when she refers to the depressed but resolute mood of most Germans, British, and French citizens once the war had finally broken out (1021-1028).

In part, this bias towards diplomacy is due, as Steiner rightly points out, to the dominance of traditional interstate relations in the 1930s. Yet, it is also, one may argue, the consequence of the fact that this is a work of synthesis based primarily on secondary sources. This is not to say she does not use any primary sources at all. Steiner draws on official records collections, diaries, memoirs, contemporary publications, newspapers, and a few archival records from the British National Archives and the archives of the French Foreign Ministry. The primary emphasis lies on British sources, which are then followed by French and German documents. A smaller but noticeable number of Soviet sources are used and, finally, a few American and Italian documents. Reading the book, however, one cannot avoid the impression that these primary documents only serve to illustrate the general narrative rather than to constitute or drive it. Nonetheless, there are some important exceptions. A good example is Steiner's source-based depiction of the meeting between the British cabinet minister and former Viceroy of India, Lord Halifax, and Hitler in November 1937, which provides vivid insights into the logic of appeasement. During this meeting, the German dictator was frank about Germany's revisionist and antidemocratic agenda, though Halifax later downplayed Hitler's bellicose intentions. British Prime Minister Chamberlain even deemed the meeting "a great success" (339) and believed the chances for a peaceful solution to German expansionism had actually increased.

Throughout the eighteen chapters, Steiner elegantly switches perspectives and skillfully combines descriptive passages with interpretative remarks. The author pursues a clear analytical trajectory and makes well-balanced judgments. To give an example, Steiner writes how in 1937 the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden "could hardly have been more mistaken" in his attempt to bind Italy to Britain, although he "rightly questioned Mussolini's trustworthiness" (223). By constantly discussing and evaluating the actions and plans of the leading decision-makers, Steiner ensures that the reader does not lose his or her orientation in the depths of diplomatic detail. At the same time, the author's judgments, in hindsight, are nuanced enough not to cut short open-ended and complex historical processes.

In fact, the long passages on diplomatic maneuvering may seem somewhat tedious at first, but within the larger context of the book, they effectively convey two key elements of Steiner's narrative. First, they reveal the feeling of pervasive anxiety that characterized the leaders of Great Britain and France, who constantly hesitated between bringing militarily, economically, and morally costly sanctions against Germany for its violations of the Treaty of Versailles, on the one hand, and the more convenient approach of

appeasement, on the other. Second, Steiner uses diplomatic details to depict the high degree of uncertainty and contingency that marked the 1930s. In the opening chapters, which address the demise of internationalism and the rise of national egotism, Steiner introduces Hitler as the principal actor in the dismantlement of the Allied postwar order. Although he is recognized as a skilled politician, the German dictator is also portrayed as a "gambler" (252, 1053), who was driven by an obsession for war and anti-Semitism.

Throughout the book, Steiner emphasizes the unwillingness of Britain and the impotence of France to oppose the German threat. France faced not only a prolonged phase of post depression economic weakness, but it was also marked by the deep-rooted pacifism of its elites and most of the population in the aftermath of the devastation brought about by World War I. In light of the demise of multilateral security and the League of Nations, the French became increasingly dependent on Britain, while this country, under Chamberlain, sought to avoid a costly arms race and the prospect of war by appeasing Germany (Chapters 6, 10, and 12). Based on the work of Adam Tooze,[3] moreover, Steiner highlights that Germany faced major shortages of raw materials that seriously hampered its ambitious rearmament program, something Britain and France were slow to capitalize on (Chapter 15).

Cutting across the chronological structure, Steiner incorporates very valuable chapters on the Spanish Civil War (Chapter 5), the smaller European states (Chapters 7 and 17), and the Far East (Chapter 9). Viewing the Spanish Civil War from an international perspective, Steiner demonstrates that the conflict functioned as a military and diplomatic laboratory that was crucial for the consolidation of the ideological divisions in Europe. With regard to the smaller states, she points out that they attempted to remain disengaged from the coming war by emphasizing their neutrality. Instead of cooperating with each other or seeking Allied protection, Steiner argues, states like Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, or Belgium tried to strike bargains with both the Western and the Axis powers and, thereby, played directly into Hitler's hands. Somewhat contradictorily, the chapter on the Sino-Japanese conflict finds that the rising tensions in Europe and the Far East occurred independently from each other, though there did exist a number of connections and repercussions at the international level. The author alludes to but does not further investigate these connections and transfers between Europe and the Far East, for instance those between Germany and Japan. This is where a transnational perspective would have helped to refine the rather cumbersome, dissatisfying conclusion derived solely from the examination of international relations.

In the final chapters, Steiner traces the failed attempts made by Great Britain and France to establish an alliance with the Soviet Union against a German attack on Poland. This failure was not only caused by mutual suspicions and ideological animosities. As emerges implicitly from the account, it was also the result of irreconcilable concepts of the future international order. While France and Britain still favored independent nation states, Stalin and the Soviet Union thought in terms of regional blocs and spheres of influence (Chapter 16). Stalin's fateful decision to agree to a pact with Nazi Germany, finally, is explained by Steiner as a rational choice of the better option. With regard to the Western powers, Stalin and Hitler, she aptly concludes, "played by different rules" (914).

Steiner's work is characterized by an undercurrent of indecision that results from a tension between the rational analysis she pursues and the partially "irrational" conclusions she draws. Since she cannot fully explain the outbreak of the war by weighing the strategic factors of diplomacy, military planning, and economic considerations alone, Steiner leaves the question unresolved, making reference to ideology, miscalculations, and Hitler's "near lunacy" (in Chamberlain's words, 1051). Yet these latter elements remain beyond the limits of her analytical grasp. That which is irrational thus becomes a black box that haunts Steiner's rational diplomatic, economic, and military analysis and the precise role and importance of which she never fully clarifies.

Using the metaphors of light and darkness, Zara Steiner creates a powerful–though in its simplicity ultimately untenable–narrative of the interwar period, wherein the hopeful "lights" of the 1920s–"reconstruction, internationalism, multilateralism, and disarmament"–ultimately gave way to the forces of the "dark"–"explosive nationalism, authoritarian rule, autarchy, and militarism" (1043). This metaphorical confrontation of liberal and authoritarian forces, one may contend, fails to take into consideration recent research that has identified a certain degree of similarity between the democratic and the autocratic regimes and their various forms of entanglement that took shape over the course of the twentieth century.[4]

Notes

1. Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933* (Oxford, 2005).
2. A notable exception is the British and French media campaigns to induce a "revival of imperial sentiment" (795) in their populations as the war drew near in 1939.
3. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London, 2006).

4. See Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London, 1998); Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005); Kiran Klaus Patel, *Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933-1945* (Cambridge, 2005); and, most recently, Eric D. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (2008): 1313-1343.

Stefan Berger and Norman La Porte, *Friendly Enemies: Britain and the GDR, 1949-1990* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010)

Reviewed by **Meredith Heiser-Duron, Political Science, Foothill College**

If you are interested in the field of people-to-people diplomacy, then this will be one of the best accounts you can find of British and East German relations in the post World War II period. While there has been much written on relations between Britain and West Germany, the relationship between Britain and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) remains relatively unexplored.

The following quote from Martin McCauley sums up the authors' overall view of the relationship:

> Britain developed never any rapport with the GDR. Part of the problem was that the relationship with the Soviet Union came first, followed by concern to support the West German position in Berlin and the east. … Britain never developed much love towards the GDR. It remained an unloved country. There was a remarkable level of ignorance about the GDR among the British public.[1]

The authors do not place GDR-British relations in the Cold War superpower context of the U.S. and USSR, possibly because they thought it would distract from their bilateral focus. While the authors do cover official diplomacy and institutional contexts within each state, most of their discoveries concern the ideas and motivation of East German and British individuals, especially academics and political party members, to get to know one another on a bilateral level. The topic is, therefore, the post World War II history of East German-British relations at an individual and elite level.

The authors are interested in publications, ranging from newsletters to academic research that those individuals produced. They discuss ways in which the GDR tried to manipulate British visitors to write positively about the nature of the socialist political system and pushed East Germans to spread propaganda while residing in Great Britain. The authors, however, clearly have the most respect for those who wanted to see the best in socialism, while remaining critical about its failings.

What makes this account particularly fascinating is the breadth of coverage. The authors deal with events ranging from the Leipzig Trade Fair and Edinburgh Film Festival, to trade union/parliamentary delegations. They explore political and social history through many different lenses. There is even a focus on relations between individuals in Scotland and the GDR. Their research includes interviews with twenty-nine individuals over an eight-year period. Moreover, they conducted primary research at twenty-four different archives in both the United Kingdom and Germany including regional archives.

They approach the topic chronologically, so the opening chapter explains how relations were especially troubled in the 1945-1955 period. Negative sentiments remained from the enemy relationship strongly established in World War II. The topic of West German rearmament, for example, finally brought Britain and East Germany closer, and opened up the first possibilities of rapprochement. It also opened up the Dresden-Coventry link–cities heavily damaged by the opposing air forces of World War II–that would prove crucial in later church relations, reconciliation efforts, and other town-twinning arrangements.

The next three chapters cover the following periods: 1955-1973, 1973-1979, and 1979-1990. In the 1955-1973 period, East Germany was focused on gaining acknowledgement of its sovereignty. In the 1973-1979 period, embassies and parliamentary delegations began to move into the foreground, and there were deeper church contacts, expanding educational exchanges, and a growing peace movement. In the following 1979-1990 period, the authors focus more on the context of a "second Cold War" encouraged by the anticommunism of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan. I think the book would benefit from an overview of Mikhail Gorbachev's relationship to East and West Germany, as well as the larger Soviet/East Central European efforts at transformation in the late 1980s. On the other hand, the authors do develop the theme of Eurocommunism as an existential threat to the GDR.

In their conclusion, the authors focus on seven main findings. First, Britain was able to come to terms with the two Germanies after 1945. Second, the British elite was generally relieved when a new Ostpolitik began in West Germany in the late 1960s. Third, East Germany never really managed to overcome its negative image in Britain, and, fourth, the prominent British attitude toward the GDR remained one of disinterest. Fifth, the British left emphasized anticapitalism over democracy and this increased its sympathy with the GDR. Sixth, and most interesting to this reviewer, the GDR's foreign policy was more reactive to the West German agenda and less

focused on winning the "hearts and minds" of the British population at large. Finally, some of the failures of the GDR to convince the British of its socialist advantages, was due to an East German lack of tolerance for criticism of socialism.

It is unfortunate that the authors do not provide more background on the field of people-to-people diplomacy, as there is a great deal of literature on this topic. The volume would also be helped by other background information. For example, what was the Stalin note of 1952? Who were Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker and how did their leadership styles impact people-to-people diplomacy? In addition to Gorbachev in the 1979-1990 period, one would think that Richard Nixon/Henry Kissinger attempts at détente would at least be mentioned in the context of the 1973-1979 period.

That said, readers will especially enjoy the information on individual British academics and journalists, who helped shape the field of East German studies both in the UK and the U.S. Individuals such as David Childs, who took part in peace rallies, and Neil Ascherson, who was a foreign correspondent in Germany stand out. Knowing details of their personal backgrounds and exposure to the GDR helps to provide context for their later academic work. Perhaps the authors intend for this work to be used primarily at the graduate level. If so, then my criticism of missing background is less relevant. As this is such an excellent and neglected topic, however, it is sad if it does not reach a wider (undergraduate and lay) audience.

Note

1. Martin McCauley. 2002. "British-GDR Relations. A See-Saw Relationship" in *Britain and the GDR. Relations and Perceptions in a Divided World*, ed. Arnd Bauerkaempfer (Berlin, 2002), 60f.