Migration and Cultural Interaction across the Centuries

German History in a European Perspective

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Once upon a time, German studies seemed to be an easy field to define. Like fairytales, the resulting stories were addressed to a faithful audience–but here, an audience of adults, true believers in the nation and nation state. Today, by contrast, we understand that defining area studies is, in fact, a highly complex task involving overlapping regions and social spaces, and analyses of borderlands, interpenetrations, and métissage, as well as of processual structures and structured processes. Even geographies have become "processual."[1] The origins of area studies are often traced to the U.S., the hegemon in the Atlantic world's academe, and the emergence of American studies in the 1930s. Nevertheless, something like area studies also emerged in Europe in the late nineteenth century, juxtaposing 1) a country and its colonies; and 2) a country and its neighbors. The former were inferior societies, the latter competitors in world markets and, repeatedly, enemies in war. Area studies–after a preceding period of knowledge acquisition as reflected in early mapmaking–became colonial studies, competitor state studies, enemy state studies–in each case transnational, transterritorial, and transcultural. Unable to deal with the concept of "trans," i.e., with fuzzy borders and shifting categories and geographies, scholars in each bordered country set their own society, their Self, as the "yardstick." The Other, the delimited opposite, was meant as a background foil before which their respective own nation was to appear as the most advanced and to which–knowledge and interest are inextricably linked–the profits from worldwide trade and the spoils from colonial acquisitions were naturally due (*Folien-* or *Spiegeltheorie*). Since then,

motivations for country studies have become more complex but they basically are framed still by bordered territories, "national culture," national consciousness or identity, nation-state policies, and international relations. Once the ideology of "nation" is abandoned, the blindfold removed so to say, it appears that German-language people may be studied in America or Russia–or Africans, Poles, and Turks in the German-language societies (plural!).[2]

Studies of men and women, old and young, high and low, who move through multiple cultural spaces or who remain located in one particular space for all of their lives, demand multiple perspectives. For migrants this involves at the least the culture of origin and the receiving culture. For residents, questions as simple as how a South American native people's tuber under the name of "potato" became the staple of German cuisine, as well as Irish, but a mere vegetable in France need to be asked. Any study of a culture and cultural spaces requires discussion of transcultural linkages and of the impact–if any–of borderlines. It demands a sensitive tracing of cultural interactions on the level of individuals, communities, social groups, regional spaces, and statewide institutions and structures. Such issues have long been hidden behind an assumed primacy of stationary settledness (*Seßhaftigkeit*), of durable state organization, and of national identity.

Mobilities and Cultural Exchanges: The European Context in Longue-durée Perspective

In a first step, cultural areas need to be contextualized to understand overlapping spaces, permeable borderlands, and transcultural outreach as well as input. Given the historicity of everyday cultures as much as of institutions and values, a *longue-durée* perspective is required. "German" history after Charlemagne often begins with the west central European Hohenstaufen Empire constructed as "Holy," as continuing the "Roman Empire," and (much later) as "of the German Nation." The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (HREGN) extended to Sicily and accommodated many peoples. Within it, the Ashkenazim and Sephardic Jewish diasporas spread. Crusaders of many ethnic origins, lumped together as "Franks,"

moved outbound and destroyed parts of the highly developed inter-faith cultures of the eastern Mediterranean. If they returned, they brought Byzantine relics, Arab building styles, and Palestinian food-ways. Flemish and Saxon men and women, as well as a transeuro-pean itinerant military order originally founded in Palestine, labeled "Teutonic Knights" settled lands of Slavic and Baltic peoples that came to be called "German." Merchants criss-crossed Europe and so did multitudes of pilgrims. Free and enserfed peasant families moved, few could be traced in the same location for more than three generations. All consorted, conceived children, gave birth, and raised new generations in hybrid cultures. Late medieval peoples, imagined as sedentary, were characterized by high mobility and multiple faiths, were ruled by a transeuropean aristocracy and by migrating clerics of many backgrounds. Central Europe, including its German-language section, was characterized by lived co-exis-tence, often armed and conflictual, but always interactive.[3]

The emperors of the HREGN's regional Saxon, Frankish, and Salian dynasties married in a transeuropean manner: princesses from Burgundy and Italy, Theophanu of Byzantium, Agnes of Poitou, to name only a few. In Sicily–then part of the Italian section of the Holy Roman Empire–the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen (1212-50), like that of his Norman predecessor, was a center of intel-lectual exchange between Byzantine, Arab-Islamic, and Scandina-vian thought, political practice, and lifeways. The chancery was bilingual Arabic and Latin and, on occasion, used Greek. Muslims and Christians intermingled, notwithstanding the Christian version of *djihad*, the ongoing destructive crusades. Palermo's population of several hundred thousand included Arabs and Berbers, Greeks and Lombards, Jews, Persians, Turks, and sub-Saharan Africans. Sailors and merchants from afar resided in the city's "Slav Quarter." Freder-ick, born of a Norman mother and a German father, married Con-stance of Aragon, whose retinue of Aragonese knights, court ladies, and troubadours provided additional cultural input. He founded the University of Naples and the medical school of Salerno.[4]

Scholars and students of medieval Europe's universities were organized by regional origin (in Latin *natio*). Such "nations" com-bined individuals from nearby regions in one group and others by the direction from which they came. At the University of Paris, for

example, one *natio* consisted of scholars from the *Isle de France* only, and another combined all English and German scholars. In general, the Italian *natio* was a Mediterranean group which included Iberian scholars and clerics, while the German *natio*, often a catch-all category, could include Bohemians, Scandinavians, and Netherlanders. Any *natio* encompassed diverse peoples who were assumed to have more in common among themselves than with other *nationes* but who, internally, had to use Latin to have a common language.[5]

Economic regions also transcended realms of rule. The "South German" Fugger and Welser families' commercial region extended across many parts of Europe: the Iberian courts and ports, in particular, and from there to Venezuela. It attracted traders from as far as Africa. Albrecht Dürer even painted one of them–even though this picture of an African-German is little known. Silver mining regions were local, but also interlinked through the miners' migrations and trade in silver. The Baltic Sea region was many-cultured, as was the North Sea region. Regions of dynastic political rule were, more often than not, contiguous while economic regions might be characterized by territorial non-propinquity and network connectivity. In East Central Europe, the 18th-century descendants of immigrant German or Jewish artisans, merchants, and intellectuals, formed an "inserted class" (*Klasseneinschiebsel*). They interacted with native peasants speaking a local language (vernacular) and with the (often foreign) nobility speaking the hegemonic (Austrian) German language. Such interactions implied acculturation and ethnogenesis. Thus, in the Danubian Budapest region, Magyar peasants, an immigrant or local gentry and nobility of different language, and the German and Jewish urban populations became Hungarians only in the 1870s and 1880s.[6]

Seventeenth-century urban societies composed and recomposed themselves. In 1600, Frankfurt on the Main drew much of its business and craft production from several thousand migrating journeymen artisans, 3,000 middle-class Dutch Protestant refugees, and 2,500 Jews–out of a total population of about 20,000. Jointly these groups accounted for more than forty percent of the population. In addition, in-migrating women from the neighboring countryside did much of the service work. In Kraków, Poland, Italian scholars taught at the university, Italian architects built the main church, Scottish

merchants and peddlers traded, German was the language of arti-
sanal production. In northern German Hamburg, cloth-makers, mer-
chants, and stockbrokers spoke Flemish; Portuguese Jews from
Amsterdam established the port's commercial connections to Latin
America; manumitted Danish-Caribbean slaves arrived, were bap-
tized, and intermarried with local women. When Hamburg's "Lon-
don merchants" imported brightly colored cloth from India, peasant
dress codes—*Trachten* considered quintessential expressions of
regional German folk culture—became more colorful in the neigh-
boring Vierlande area: a South Asian-inspired, English-mediated
aspect of German culture. Across Germany after 1685, in-migrating
Protestant Huguenots from France settled, acculturated and, over
time, spoke German only. Some of the allegedly deeply rooted Ger-
man folktales, were collected by the brothers Grimm in the early
nineteenth-century from a woman who still had been socialized into
French fairy-tales: a French input into German folk culture.[7] Small
court towns, like Aurich in Oldenburg, were home to Africans
brought in by dynasties to indicate their cosmopolitan outreach.
"German" has long been European and global—so too do German
studies need to be.[8]

Developments in the cultures of German-language Central Europe
with its many regions, several empires and states, changing borders,
and multiple migrations did not necessarily begin or end there—an
empirical finding that master narratives of nation states have obfus-
cated. At the time of the awaking of "national consciousnesses" in
the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, "national" no
longer referred, as the medieval *natio* did, to a multiplicity of origins
in a macro-region of shifting extent, but rather to people in what can
best be characterized as a meso-region. National chauvinism or
national hegemony was not, as yet, part of such consciousness in
dynastic states, whether tiny principalities or of imperial extent. The
German-speaking Johann Gottfried (after 1802, von) Herder, often
constructed as "German," reflects these many-cultured develop-
ments. He came from an East Prussian German family, experienced
the hierarchical multicultural urban life of Riga and was thus social-
ized during a critical period of his intellectual development in the
context of the Baltic segment of the Tsarist Empire, was subject to
the Russian administrative and hegemonic culture, and came into

contact with French Enlightenment thought. He migrated to the multiply dynastically segmented cultures of the Lippe region in present-day North Rhine Westpahlia and then moved to Weimar, the political capital of Saxony-Weimar and a center of German high culture. Referring in particular to the many Baltic and Slavic cultures ruled by distant imperial dynasties, he postulated in his *Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity* (*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*) the equal value of different cultures which—under God's benevolence—develop from the spirit of common people (*Volksgeist*). In modern terms, Herder was transnational in spirit and practice.[9] It has long been clear—but has deliberately been relegated to obscurity—that no story, no state's, people's, or nation's narrative, should ever be told as if there was only one input and only one outcome.

German-Language Central Europe: The Many Forms of Belonging

I have replaced "German" by "German-language" cultures, regions, or migrants, and "Germany" by "German-language Central Europe" or, at least, by the plural "Germanies." While language has always been a criterion for self-description and ascription, the definition of people by ethnicity or ethno-culture is a relatively new phenomenon. To conceptualize the many ways in which belonging was characterized historically, I now discuss religions and crafts, as well as legal provisions for subject and citizenship status. I argue that transregional and transcultural approaches rather than an undefined "German origin" category permit empirically sound analyses in the fields of Central European studies and migration studies regarding German-language people in the Americas, for example "German-Americans," or of those in the Tsarist Empire who named themselves "Germans in Russia" rather than "German-Russians."

Into the seventeenth century and beyond, people located themselves, first, by religion. In the Mediterranean world this involved Jewish, Christian, and Muslim beliefs. Within the Christian realm—from 1517 or already earlier—it involved specific variants like Mennonite or Albigensian, and larger denominations such as Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Armenian, or other autocephalous churches. "Emigrants"

from one particular religion to a different practice or dogma–though not to a different religion–were called "heretics" since fuzzy borders were inconceivable to church hierarchies and dogmatists. Migrants from the Germanies in the South Russian plains or later, in North America, settled in distinct Protestant and Catholic (and other smaller) communities. Like "the Irish," they formed two distinct ethnoreligious groups. In the Germanies, Protestant French Huguenots were granted asylum as Protestants rather than as French and contemporaneous tolerance of diversity permitted them to continue using the French language. An interesting or rather, revealing lapse in consistency of definition occurs as regards the Jewish faith. The comprehensive category "German," that I suggest needs to be deconstructed, has almost never been applied to Ashkenazi Jews whose Yiddish language is a variant of German. Definitions are imposed, regardless of systematic-scholarly logic, by those with the power to define. Scholars do not necessarily need to make themselves servants of such domineering or hegemonic terminologies and their connotations.

Second, self-characterization as well as classification from the outside by craft or profession preceded ethnocultural belonging. Regional origin designation overlapped with it: artisans in their transeuropean migrations made the German language the *lingua franca* in this economic sector, but still differentiated themselves by craft. The transeuropean migrant artisans' culture was replaced from mid nineteenth century by English mechanics who transformed the technical aspects of crafts. The artisans' circuits differed, for example, from those of German-language administrators or soldiers entering the employ of some ruler outside of the territory in which they had been born and lived– one of the best known is Prince Eugene of Savoy, but migration across state borders into military service was widely practiced. Such migrants might continue to use the German language (in the person's particular local or regional variant), but could become subjects of the ruler they served. Vice versa, people of languages and cultures other than German could become lawful members of the (segment of) German peoples whose sovereign they served. Craft hierarchies and ethnocultural belonging interacted in power hierarchies. German-background men would not enter lowly crafts nor would they admit men of other cultures, considered inferior, to the more prestigious crafts.

As regards membership in polities, subjects of "German" rulers and citizens of the Second Reich after 1870/1871 were not necessarily of German cultural background. People designated as "Germans" in other cultures and countries, may have defined themselves over generations as Bavarians, Hessians, Mecklenburgers, or other, i.e., as a specific and special part of German-language culture. Belonging was not national or "racial." The *Untertanengesetze* and the *Bürgerrecht* (subject and citizenship laws) of medieval and early modern dynastic states and cities, determined belonging by allegiance to a ruler or by property ownership. Legal regulation followed a *raison d'état* rather than a lineage concept. In Prussia, Danish, Norwegian, and Holstein men, for example, could become civil servants (edict of 1776), and the annexed Polish population of several million in the eastern territories (1795) received the same legal status as persons of German cultural background (as opposed to "foreign" Polish-culture men and women migrating from the Russian or Austrian areas annexed after the partitions). The Prussian Subject Law of 1842 followed a mixture of *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, as was common in Europe at the time. The only ethnoreligious group listed as separate was "foreign Jews," whose naturalization had to be approved by the secretary of the interior. In France, by comparison, the 1789 Revolution established a concept of *citoyenneté* for all.[10]

Membership status in dynastic or urban polities was differentiated by placement in a particular estate. With the rise of the Third Estate (after nobility and clergy) in the eighteenth century to the position of the new middle classes, status came to include political rights and participation, *Bürgerrechte.* This aspect of citizenship, again not necessarily ethnocultural, evolved out of the mercantilist concept of productive persons and taxpayers contributing to the state or the general welfare. *Wirtschaftsbürger* (the economic bourgeoisie) and those who could afford an education and involvement in the affairs of state, *Bildungsbürger* (the educated bourgeoisie), came to be enfranchised citizens. By 1871, property requirements provided these groups with access to political resources. Other groups in the polity were not granted this level of membership. Poor laws provided a further distinct tradition of (dependent) belonging. It bound *local* people to support each other in case of need under concepts of moral economy and social security. When poor relief evolved from

Christian charity to a function of municipal authorities, laws tied a person's right to support to the place of birth, *Heimatrecht*, in a kind of localized *ius soli*. The indigents' entitlement was not transferable to a larger regional or national community.[11]

When the revolutionary Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 proposed that any person residing in German territory was to be considered a German citizen, not by descent or language, but as a member of the state, a *Staatsangehöriger*, it argued for historic continuity (*Untertanenstatus*), as well as Enlightenment innovations, since all citizens were to have basic human rights, were to be *Grundrechtsträger*. The major change from negotiated belonging to an ideology of descent did not come with the establishment of the Second Reich, 1870/1871, but only at the eve of World War I.[12] The Law of 1913 and the climate of opinion in which the debates took place, marked the decisive break with residential and other bases for citizenship status. Although voices were raised for the *ius soli* principle, and although Social Democratic parliamentary deputies insisted on naturalization provisions for immigrants, the majority decided for *ius sanguinis*, the community of descent.[13] Thus, only after the turn of the twentieth century, was *ius soli* deemed "incompatible with the purity of our race and the unique character of our people" (*mit der Reinerhaltung der Rasse und der Eigenart unseres Volkes unverträglich*).[14]

Still, legal traditions and nationalist reasoning prevented a rigorous construction of the lineage principles in practice. Most of the 1913 law's exceptions, similar to those in other states of Europe, placed *raison d'état* over the ideology of racial purity.[45] In a contradiction of terms for any descent reasoning, gender-specific provisions regulated loss of citizenship and, thus, of lineage (§ 17). Women lost or acquired citizenship by marriage—their citizenship was derived from their husbands. Contemporary views that descent came through bloodline would have had to take into account birthing and the attachment by navel-string to the mother's blood and body and thus construct descent through the female line. Citizenship and military service were tied to each other: men lost citizenship when refusing military service in the German army or by serving in a foreign army. Under the same reasoning, the law provided for naturalization of foreigners in German military or civil service. Once religion ceased to define belonging, political

persuasion became a parameter of exclusion in the case of men, *vaterlandslose Gesellen* (fellows without a fatherland), women became "un-German" when they married a non-German man. The *Volks-körper* (body of people) in the view of male legislators, was defined by blood and willingness to accept death in war but not by residence at birth.

In 1913, citizenship, contrary to the *Staatsrechts* concept of territoriality, was also extended beyond state borders. Emigrants could keep German citizenship permanently, pass it on to their children born abroad, and even reacquire it if it had been lost under previous law. In cases of acceptance of a different citizenship, a previous application to German authorities for permission could prevent the automatic loss of German citizenship. These provisions extended the territorially bordered community of descent into a diaspora defined by lineage and, by implied intention, extended the imperial reach of the Reich to German communities in other states. The parliamentary debates of 1913, with a view toward the German enclaves in Russia, Hungary, and the Balkan states, the residents of which under the new nationhood politics faced loss of–once dynastically approved–privileges, were concerned more with power politics than with lineage. *Auslandsdeutsche*, (descendants of Germans abroad), came to be considered as factors in economic relations and penetration, as bridgeheads in other states.[16] Thus, the generic "Germans" of everyday language–and of some scholars' terminology–need to be conceptualized alternatively as differentiated by religion, craft or profession, regional origin including dialect variant, gender, and class or status. Exclusion of a dialect, like the Yiddish, from the language family demands explication.

New Approaches: Transnational or Transcultural?

Transnationalism, since the 1990s a widely used concept, is problematic if the nation and the nation state are so difficult to define. Nation states incorporated, first, the dynastic-territorial concept of "sovereignty" introduced in the Peace of Westphalia's Europe after 1648-1649. Second, in the Age of Revolution natural law added the concept of a sovereign people. Both meanings were never recon-

ciled in political theory. Furthermore, the concept of "nation state" is a contradiction in terms because the parliamentary-republican version of "state" grants equality before the law to each and every citizen, while the ideology of "nation" elevates one ethnocultural group over all others. Belongings emerged regionally and thus, transregionalism–or even translocality–is a more empirically tenable concept. Migrants–like sedentary residents–had and may still have intensely local identifications or loyalties.

Translocal, transregional, or transnational continuities, as well as divisions, may be analyzed comprehensively as "transcultural" lives and practices. The respective geographic-societal-legal scope needs to be determined case by case. The "transcultural" notion provides room for empirical delimitation of the cultural space or spaces of residents as well as migrants, of interaction and overlapping of economic, religious, social, and other spheres. Based on a *Wissenschaftsgeschichte* of the study of Canada and its many spaces, overlapping and shifting, with multiple meanings, with administrative and cultural aspects, regional and local and extent, I have developed an integrative and interdisciplinary approach, which I deem transcultural societal studies. Traditional area studies with, first in the 1970s, the turn to social history and, soon after, the linguistic turn, had split into social history and cultural studies. It is time to combine the achievements of both.

The broad transdisciplinary agenda of transcultural societal studies, comprehensive as to class, race/ethnicity, gender, and generations, would combine the discursive sciences, i.e., the humanities, and the social sciences, i.e., the study of state institutions, societal structures, and (family) economics, the life and environmental sciences, and the normative sciences, i.e., the study of law, religion, and ethics. Transcultural societal studies capture the diversity of human lives and the diversity in each and every human being's life in the frame of institutions and power hierarchies. Transcultural societal studies reach out globally to the diversity of origins of residents and migrants. They also analyze relations, interactions, and networks, approaching individuals' lives and their roles in creating ever new societies or "scapes."[17]

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Narratives from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Centuries: States, Migrations, Shifting Borders

In a way, transcultural and transnational approaches were inherent in the study of the Germanies since the early nineteenth century. Scholars in Austria, successor to the Habsburg *Vielvölkerstaat* (state of many peoples), and scholars in four-cultural Switzerland's German segment have always been aware of this, at least to some degree. Scholars in the nineteenth-century Germanies and, subsequently Hohenzollern Germany, in contrast, chose to concentrate on one national narrative, placing what they considered non-German (or un-German) in the shadows or even obliterating it from collective public memory altogether. A German-language cultural macro-region needs to be conceptualized as a tri-state "ethnicity," following the analysis of Canada as binational or of migrants from "China" as coming from the three Chinas, the cultural region of the People's Republic, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—with many mutually incomprehensible languages. Any theory of ethnic or national culture, any data-based research on culture will have to incorporate such many-layered empirical complexity.

The Germanies, distinct from Habsburg Austria and the Swiss-German region, at the beginning of the nineteenth century separated into more than 300 dwarf principalities or larger dynastic units, thereby had divided themselves off of the political map of Europe. Like other polities, they were reorganized by an outside imperial ruler, Napoléon, whose earlier attempt to reorganize Egypt (1798-1802) and whose later attempt to reorganize Russia (1812) failed. From 1806 to 1870/1871 numerous attempts at further political and economic unification into one, at first cultural and partially economic, German nation had resulted in federations. With Hohenzollern Prussia's increasing strength and chauvinism, the multiplicity of polities and cultures was dualized (partly through bribery) by Otto von Bismarck into the Hohenzollern and Habsburg states, the former retaining citizenship of the many federal states, the latter remaining a "state of many peoples." The two increasingly nationalist Austrian-German and Prussian-German cores incorporated many areas of mixed settlement: the Czech-Austrian region, part of the Habsburg monarchy for centuries, and the Prussian-ruled bicultural

Polish-German eastern territories, with a segment of Poland annexed in 1795. Through internal migration of some 500,000 Polish-background citizens of the Reich to the Ruhr District, a second region of biculturally mixed settlement emerged. Similarly, internal migrations of Czech men and women with their children made Vienna bicultural—if not multicultural given the mixed composition of Vienna's population. Other groups incorporated into Hohenzollern Germany included the Frisians and the Slavic Sorbs. By religion and, in terms of the times, by "race" German-language Jews remained distinct in both states. While nationalist historians began to construct *the* master narrative and, in the process, discarded empirical data on the historic many-culturedness subsumed under "German," transcultural societal studies—the former area studies or country studies—combine the many stories revealed in the data.[18]

The Habsburg Empire included eleven nationalities—in alphabetical order Croats, Czechs, Germans, Italians, Magyars, Poles, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Ukrainians—as well as more than a dozen smaller ethnocultural groups. The state compiled official statistics on sixteen recognized religious confessions. Vienna, a lively many-cultured city, counted among its inhabitants in 1880 only 38.5 percent as born in the city (in 1910 48.8 percent) and 18.7 percent born in other German-Austrian Provinces (in 1910 14.8 percent). The other 48.8 percent (in 1910 36.4 percent) had been born elsewhere, of these less than three percent in Hohenzollern Germany. The famous Austrian, especially Viennese, cuisine was created largely by in-migrating Czech women who fused Czech and Austrian-German foodways. Generalizations, like "Viennese cuisine," may involve incorporation of plural cultures beyond our recognition. Officially, at the time of *Nationalstaaten* (national states), the Habsburg state considered itself a *Nationalitätenstaat* (state of nationalities) and incorporated diversity or pluralism into public data collection—Germanization politics and policies notwithstanding. Habsburg or Austro-Hungarian scholars and, subsequently Austrian ones, did not construct a single narrative. Similarly, in bicultural Canada, in contrast to the United States, attempts to impose one British-Canadian master narrative failed. "The Double Monarchy thus constituted as a multinational state characterized the spatial-cultural specificity of Central Europe. Plurality was the main characteristic of a distinct

Viennese modernity that influenced the emergence of modernity all over Central Europe," as has been argued.[19]

Practices, discourses, and narratives developed differently in the Hohenzollern German Reich. Men and women of German culture living outside of the arbitrary political borders but in proximity to them were called *Grenzdeutsche* (border Germans) The descendants in distant enclaves of earlier emigrant generations were homogenized and utilized as *Auslandsdeutsche* from the 1880s on. Vice versa, migrants from the Reich with German citizenship but of Polish background were counted as Germans in emigration and immigration statistics (in a kind of resurrection of the medieval *natio* concept). If the concept of lineage grew from the 1830s, and especially from the 1870s on, some seven million "Germans" of many regional variations did not care for such ascribed or imposed belonging, identity, and related duties: they emigrated mainly to North America where their chances of economic security and of pursuing their life-projects were better. In the East, on the latifundia, their departure created a labor shortage and, from the 1880s, "foreign" Poles, a term necessary to distinguish them from the "citizen Poles," immigrated in ever larger numbers from the Romanov- and Habsburg-annexed parts of historical Poland. They were needed by segments of "the German" economy, as were Italians in the south. Traditional labor migrations from Denmark and Sweden, from Belgium, Luxemburg, and France also continued. When Germany declared war in 1914, some 1.2 million "foreign workers" (*Fremdarbeiter*) were present in Germany.[20]

When work had to be done, lineage was no longer paramount but concepts of race determined the way in which the foreign workers were treated. Germany admitted rotational laborers that, if in agriculture, had to leave Germany in winter. This provision saved on wages and prevented acculturation. Industrialists stopped parliament from extending this provision to their Polish or Ruthenian workers–they wanted a reliable, well-trained labor force. If the Reich's treatment of foreigners was particularly harsh, it was no *Sonderweg*. France and Britain also pursued exclusionist stances. In the latter nineteenth century, the dynastic states' capability to negotiate belonging had been replaced by the (more) democratic states' absolute demand for the surrender of culture. But only those considered racially acceptable were permitted to assimilate into a nation now said to be homoge-

nous. Yet, the German nation had received and continued to receive ever-new cultural additions: the noble and clerical refugees from the French Revolution, the Ashkenazi Jews who fled pogroms in 1880s Russia, the refugees from the Russian Revolution, and the many other people who migrated into, out of, or through the Germanies and Germany.[21]

In addition to the internally diverse Austrian-German and German-German cultures, the Swiss-German ones would need attention. Emigrants from the latter were certain that they were not generic Germans even though they shared the language. They did not consider themselves generic Swiss either because they came from particular cantons, the more resilient basis of belonging. Moreover, they came from particular crafts and professions and identified with such.[22]

Diasporas: "Germans" from Many Cultural Backgrounds in Multiple Immigration Contexts[23]

The concept of diaspora experienced a brief blooming in the 1990s.[24] "Diasporic" does not merely signify a spreading across (segments) of the globe, but a connectedness of the migrants with the (constructed) homeland and between sections of the diaspora. For outbound migrations from the Germanies, some of them circular, I have argued elsewhere:

> Late medieval migrations from German-language areas and other parts of Europe involved rural settlers, craftsmen, and urban elites of Latin Christian religion without regard to ethnicity. Early modern artisans' migrations established a Europe-wide community of guild-based craftsmen with the German language as *lingua franca*. 19th-century mass emigration of agriculturalists and urban workers strengthened existing communities afar and created new ones, in particular in North America. Thus, the regionally heterogeneous migrants from the German-language region of Europe built *a bifurcated– partially imagined–diaspora*, East European and North American; as well as *island-like small clusters of communities* in South America, Australia, the Pacific Islands and Africa. Their "common historic territory" of origin expanded and contracted. It was a mosaic of many regions, the "shared historical memories" and allegiances were being constructed by intellectual and religious elites, and the "common culture" was reduced to the smallest denominator. In the case of German-language migrants, the interpretative approach of

diaspora necessitates a construction of commonality of origins first. Only for migrants in some regions, and for these for particular time periods only, may a diasporic relatedness to a culture of origin and with emigrants in other locations be empirically demonstrated.[25]

Linkages were constructed in particular historical periods either by migrants or in the interests of the German Reich.

As regards, "Germans in America," usually referring to the United States, one glance into the "classified section" of German-American newspapers indicates that until 1917 the immigrant associations announcing their meetings and activities operated on the basis of local or regional affinities—Hungarian Germans or people from Osterholz-Scharmbeck (a small town close to Bremen), for example. The problems of defining "German" ethnicity are illustrated by the case of an Austrian socialist. Arriving in New York in 1910, he was denied a job as editor of the German-language newspaper, the *New York Volkszeitung* the board of which rhetorically took an internationalist stand, but whose hiring policy preferred Reich-Germans to Austrian-Germans. Later, as editor of the German-language socialist *Cleveland Echo*, he ran into difficulties with the long established German working-class and middle-class communities because his sentiments, in their opinion, were not "national." When, in an editorial, he supported Cleveland's Italian socialists, he was called "Spagettifritzi." The settled Germans in New York and Cleveland refused to accept him on national grounds (Austrian), on ideological grounds (socialist), and for reason of class.

For whom was he then writing in the *Cleveland Echo*? According to his own words, he addressed recently immigrated German proletarians, few of whom came from the German Reich. They were:

> Germans from Austria, from Hungary, from the Baltic areas and God knew from which other places. Even German workers from Syria ... To express their feelings and views these workers from the many different countries recurred to different usages of the German language ... A simple and clear German consisting of about 850 words and similar to "basic English" had to be developed to reach all of them.

The microcosm of the Cleveland "Germans" consisted of a cultural pluralism as does the ethnic element of ethnocultural group of "Germans" in Canada, the United States, and Mexico.[26]

The people in the "German" census category do constitute a mosaic in themselves. But segments of this group "have religiously expended an enormous amount of energy for what they say is 'the preservation of *the German culture.*' In reality—H. Schmidt commented as regards the Canadian situation—those were the people who had most problems in freeing themselves from the umbilical cord of the mother country."[27] The *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* differentiates between Germans, Austrians, Swiss, as well as Alsatians, Frisians, Amish, Hutterites, Germans from Russia, and Pennsylvania Germans.[28] From the Germanies proper, southwest Germans began the transatlantic migrations, Palatines and Hessians joined, then different North Germans and Northeast Germans—Mecklenburgers for example—followed. They spoke dialects, not necessarily mutually comprehensible, that ranged from southwestern dialects via High German to northwestern and northeastern Low Germans. In secondary migrations, German-Russian, Transylvania Saxons, and Danubian Swabians—all constructed groups—came. They were Catholic, Protestant, or Mennonite; among them were Hutterite and Amish believers as well as the Moravians (Herrnhuter) in both primary and secondary migrations.[29] Before the 1820s, more than half of the migrants to North America and the Caribbean came as indentured servants—but have hardly ever been compared to other indentured servants or to bound Africans.[30] All were divided by rural or urban socialization, class, and gender. This differentiation was introduced in the Federal Republic of Germany's emigration research through the 1980s research projects of Hartmut Keil on German immigrant workers in Chicago, of Christiane Harzig on German immigrant women in comparative perspective, and of Wolfgang Helbich on letters of immigrants, mainly from rural backgrounds.[31]

To what degree did the migrants, some of whom returned while other were permanent emigrants, remain "German?" Since the construction of ethnicity has been debated intensively in the last two decades, this will not be repeated here.[32] Just as the Puritans did not copy England into New England, so German-language Catholics or Protestants did not copy Germany into Little Germanies. I will use as an example one of the descendants of migrants to Russia who returned to Germany when nationalist ideology was ready to annex *Auslandsdeutsche* worldwide to the Reich. Eduard Duesterhoeft, considered him-

self a German from Russia, became painfully aware of his being different and of his multiple adaptations during a trajectory leading from culture of origin to a "colony" in the East (for his ancestors), then back to Germany, and on to North America. In 1913, he traveled from Volhynia to Hannover to study for the ministry. There, he first had to divest himself of Russian-German and re-learn the German-German language: "they would correct every word you would utter, saying it was wrong." When war was declared in August 1914, Duesterhoeft, as a "foreign student" and "Russian citizen," had to report

> to the police. They took us and we had to do some labour. Our education was more or less disrupted ...There were German boys from Australia ... from Africa, from Poland, all intending to go back as pastors on completion of their studies. But, we were all forced to labour there for a few years in the institution.

In the 1920s, Duesterhoeft moved on to Canada and became port of a network of Protestant ministers of German language in an English-language environment.[33]

German studies in the U.S. need to become many-cultured. Similar to what Angelika Sauer noted for Canada, German-origin migrants are not a homogeneous group, but rather provide a "chorus of many voices."[34] She and her co-authors countered the then still current nation-centered self-aggrandizing views of scholars who asserted that *the* German group is one of the "co-founders of Canada," a "charter group in Canadian history," or, more plaintively, noted that the group has "received scant attention," goes "virtually unnoticed," and even became a "silenced as well as the silent" group.[35] Problematic terminologies bring about problematic research results. The critique of scholarship based on the implicitly monocultural "nation-to-ethnic-enclave" paradigm has developed for three decades. For all ethnic groups the concept of a "home" society, in German the more emotion-laden *Heimat*, is one of the many problematic terms that, after the linguistic turn, should have been debunked. The "home" society is the place in which birth located people. The vast majority of those who left did so because this "home" did not provide options of satisfactory or even sustainable life-courses and projects. Home was the place of socialization but it is not necessarily one of emotional attachment. "Home" may be uninteresting, unfair, unjust, and unsupportable.

The achievements of social history and those of a data-based cultural studies have resulted in transcultural approaches that differentiate and remain empirically grounded. Placing "Germans" in a Central European perspective and the migrations in worldwide perspective indicate the diversity and richness of contexts. German studies and German-American transcultural societal studies are, at the same time, multicultural and pluralism studies both internally and in regard to the context of the receiving society.

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Notes

1. Allen F. Roberts, "La 'Géographie Processuelle:' Un nouveau paradigme pour les aires culturelles," *Lendemains* 31, no. 122/123 (2006): 41-61; Dirk Hoerder, "Transcultural States, Nations, and People," in *The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World*, eds., Dirk Hoerder, Christiane Harzig, and Adrian Shubert (New York, 2003), 13-32.
2. Dirk Hoerder, "The Long History of Area/Country Studies: Canadian Studies as Model or Special Case of Societal Studies," in "Au-delà des Area Studies: Perspectives comparatistes et interculturelles," éd. Laurence McFalls et Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, *Lendemains* 122/123 (2006): 62-76; Dirk Hoerder, „Bedingungsfaktoren der Auslandsstudien im Deutschen Reich: Imperialismus, Auslandsdeutsche, Wirtschaft," *Gulliver. Deutsch-englische Jahrbücher* 11 (1982): 118-139.
3. Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, 2002), ch. 2, 3.

4. Aziz Ahmad, *A History of Islamic Sicily* (Edinburgh, 1975), 37-41, 52-75, 82-96; David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (London, 1988), 25-53, 144-171; Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and Mediaeval Europe*, 2nd ed. (London, 1979), 142-68.

5. Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, " Mobility," in *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 1, ed., Hilde de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge, 1992), 280-285; Hilde de Ridder-Symoens, "La migration académique des hommes et des idées en Europe, XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles," *Université et cité: à la recherche du passé* (Geneva, 1983), 69-78.

6. Juliette Roding and Lex Heerma van Voss, eds., *The North Sea and Culture (1550-1800)* (Hilversum, 1996); Michael Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness, 1637-1718* (London, 1973).

7. The brothers Jakob Ludwig Karl Grimm (1785-1863) and Wilhelm Karl Grimm (1786-1859), imbued by the romantic concept of national consciousness, collected the *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* in the belief that they expressed a particular German spirit (*vaterländisch*, *Volksgeist*). The debilitating flaw of this reading was that the "old peasant woman" who provided many of the tales was of French Huguenot background, spoke French, and was familiar with the tales written (not collected) by the seventeenth-century French writer Charles Perrault. See Heinz Röllecke, *Die Märchen der Brüder Grimm* (Munich, 1985); and Heinz Röllecke *"Als das Wünschen noch geholfen hat"—Gesammelte Aufsätze zu den "Kinder- und Hausmärchen" der Brüder Grimm* (Bonn, 1985), 39-54.

8. Paul Bairoch, Jean Batou, and Pierre Chèvre, *La population des villes européennes de 800 à 1850* (Geneva, 1988); Etienne François, ed., *Immigration et société urbaine en Europe occidentale, XVIe-XXe siècle* (Paris, 1985); Friedrich Bothe, *Geschichte der Stadt Frankfurt am Main* (Frankfurt/Main, 1966), 359-384; F.W. Carter, *Trade and Urban Development in Poland: An Economic Geography of Cracow, from its Origins to 1795* (Cambridge, 1994); Dirk Hoerder, "Historical Dimensions of Many-Cultured Societies in Europe: The Case of Hamburg, Germany," in *Socio-Cultural Problems in the Metropolis: Comparative Analyses,* eds.,Dirk Hoerder and Rainer-Olaf Schultze (Hagen, 2000), 121-39; Peter Martin, *Schwarze Teufel, edle Mohren. Afrikaner in Bewusstsein und Geschichte der Deutschen* (Hamburg, 1993); Gerhard Höpp, ed., *Fremde Erfahrungen. Asiaten und Afrikaner in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz bis 1945* (Berlin, 1996).

9. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (incomplete manuscript, published 1784-91), see especially Book 16, ch. 4; Holm Sundhaussen, *Der Einfluß der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchie* (Munich, 1973), critically evaluated the hegemonic Germano-centric scholarship on Herder. See Dirk Hoerder with Inge Blank, "Ethnic and National Consciousness from the Enlightenment to the 1880s," in *Roots of the Transplanted —-East European Monographs*, eds., Dirk Hoerder, Inge Blank and Horst Rössler , 2 vols. (New York, 1994), vol. 1,37-110.

10. Gesetz über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Eigenschaft als preußischer Untertan sowie über den Eintritt in fremde Staatsdienste, 31 December 1812, reprinted in Matthias Lichter, *Die Staatsangehörigkeit nach deutschem und ausländischem Recht*, 2nd edition (Berlin, 1955), 519-24, 528-30. Rolf Grawert, *Staat und Staatsangehörigkeit. Verfassungsrechtliche Untersuchung zur Entstehung der Staatsangehörigkeit* (Berlin, 1973). Lichter's study reflects the dependence of legal theory on political context: the first edition was published in 1943, a second, "totally revised" edition followed in 1955.

11. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992), 62-72, emphasizes the aspect of construction of external boundaries, of migration, and of membership. The debate has been refined by Andreas K. Fahrmeir, "Nineteenth-Century German Citizenship: A Reconsideration," *Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 721-52, especially 727-43; and Dieter Gosewinkel, "Die Staatsangehörigkeit als Institution des Nationalstaats. Zur Entstehung des Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes von 1913," 359-78 in *Offene Staatlichkeit. Festschrift für Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde zum 65. Geburtstag,* eds., Rolf Grawert et al. (Berlin, 1995).

12. Grawert (see note 10), 164-212. The citizenship law of 1870, modeled on the Prussian law, provided for dual citizenship, first of the respective state in the Reich and, second, of the German nation state.

13. Law of 1913; reprinted in Lichter (see note 10), 50-167. Gosewinkel (see note 11), 367, noted that Social Democrats argued for retention of German citizenship by emigrants in face of return migration.

14. Lineage concepts and an emphasis on purity of blood had been advocated by nationalists since the 1830s, by *Turnvater* Friedrich Jahn, for example.

15. In addition to descent (§ 3, no.1) and incorporation (§ 2), citizenship could be acquired by legitimation, marriage, readmission (for Germans) and the naturalization of foreigners (§ 3, nos. 2-4).

16. Klaus J. Bade, "Transnationale Migration, ethnonationale Diskussion und staatliche Migrationspolitik im Deutschland des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts," in *Migration−Ethnizität−Konflikt: Systemfragen und Fallstudien*, Klaus J. Bade (Osnabrück, 1996),403-30, especially 409-17; Brubaker (see note 11), 114-19; and Klaus J. Bade, "From Emigration to Immigration: The German Experience in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Migration Past, Migration Future. Germany and the United States*, eds., Klaus J. Bade and Myron Weiner (Providence, 1997), 1-38.

17. Adapted from Dirk Hoerder, "From Interest-Driven National Discourse to Transcultural Societal Studies," in *"To Know Our Many Selves Changing Across Time and Space": From the Study of Canada to Canadian Studies* (Augsburg, 2005), 316-26. Arjun Appadurai, "Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational Anthropology," in *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present*, ed., Richard Fox (Santa Fe, 1991), 191-210; Roberts (see note 1), 41-44.

18. Hoerder (see note 1), 15-19.

19. Michael John, "National Movements and Imperial Ethnic Hegemonies in Austria, 1867-1918," in Hoerder et al. (see note 1), 87-105; See also Gerald Stourzh, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848 -1918," in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848 - 1918,* vol. III (Die Völker des Reiches), 2. Teilband (Vienna, 1980), 975-1206; Robert Kann, *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*, 2 vols. (New York, 1964); Gerald Stourzh, "The Multinational Empire Revisited: Reflections on Late Imperial Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 23 (1992): 1-22; Jenö Szücs, *Die drei historischen Regionen Europas* (Frankfurt/Main, 1994); István Bibó, *Die Misere der osteuropäischen Kleinstaaterei* (Frankfurt/Main, 1992); Moritz Csaky, "Die Wiener Moderne," in *nach kakanien. Annäherung an die Moderne*, ed., Rudolf Haller, (Vienna, 1996), 59-102.

20. Peter Marschalck, *Deutsche Überseewanderung im 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur soziologischen Theorie der Bevölkerung* (Stuttgart, 1973); Lothar Elsner and Joachim

Lehmann, *Ausländische Arbeiter unter dem deutschen Imperialismus 1900 bis 1985* (Berlin-Ost, 1988); Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter* (Berlin-West, 1986), English translation under the title *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany 1880-1980. Seasonal Workers–Forced Laborers–Guest Workers*, translated by William Templer (Ann Arbor, 1991).

21. Dirk Hoerder and Jörg Nagler, *People in Transit. German Migrations in Comparative Perspective, 1820-1930* (Cambridge, 1995).

22. See research on the multiple migrations of German-language Swiss. Carsten Goehrke, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Rußlandschweizer*, Bd. 1 (Zürich, 1985); Markus Glatz, *Schweizerische Einwanderer in Misiones. [sic] Ein Beispiel ausländischer Siedlungskolonisation in Argentinien im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt/Main, 1997); Karl Lüönd, *Schweizer in Amerika. Karrieren und Misserfolge in der Neuen Welt* (Oltern, 1979), and the numerous publications of Leo Schelbert.

23. This section is based on Dirk Hoerder, "The German-Language Diasporas. A Survey, Critique, and Interpretation," *Diaspora: a journal of transnational studies* 11, no.1 (2002): 7-44, and Dirk Hoerder, "German-Speaking Immigrants [in Canada]: Co-Founders or Mosaic? A Research Note on Politics and Statistics in Scholarship," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Kanadastudien* 14, no.2 (1994): 51-65; revised version "German-Speaking Immigrants of Many Backgrounds and the 1990s Canadian Identity," in *Austrian Immigration to Canada. Selected Essays*, ed., Franz A.J. Szabo (Ottawa, 1996), 11-31.

24. Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London, 1997); Khachig Tölölyan, "Rethinking *Diaspora(s)*: Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment," *Diaspora* 5, no. 1 (1996): 9-36.

25. Adapted from Hoerder (see note 23), 31-32.

26. Dirk Hoerder, ed., *Josef N. Jodlbauer, Dreizehn Jahre in Amerika, 1910-1923. Die Autobiographie eines österreichischen Sozialisten* (Vienna, 1996), 51, 88, 90-91, translation by the author.

27. Herminio Schmidt, "The German-Canadians and Their Umbilical Cord," pp. 71-77 in *German Canadian Studies: Critical Approaches*, ed., Peter G. Liddell (Vancouver, 1983), 71-77, 74 (emphasis added).

28. Stephan Thernstrom, ed., *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, 1980).

29. Historiography has sometimes treated the creeds (often labeled "sects") other than Protestant or Catholic separately. This is, in some way, justified because these groups separated themselves from the German regional society of origin, among other means through their pacifist ideas.

30. David W. Galenson, *White Servitude in Colonial America. An Economic Analysis* (Cambridge, 1981); Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, *Vor der großen Flut: die europäische Migration in die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1783-1820* (Stuttgart, 2001).

31. Hartmut Keil and John B. Jentz, eds., *German Workers in Industrial Chicago, 1850-1910: A Comparative Perspective* (DeKalb, 1983), and other publications; Christiane Harzig, *Familie, Arbeit und weibliche Öffentlichkeit in einer Einwanderungsstadt: Deutschamerikanerinnen in Chicago um die Jahrhundertwende* (St. Katherinen, 1991), and Christiane Harzig, ed., *Peasant Maids, City Women. From the European Countryside to Urban America* (Ithaca, 1997); Wolfgang Helbich, Walter D. Kamphoefner, and Ulrike Sommer, eds., *Briefe aus Amerika. Deutsche Auswanderer schreiben aus der Neuen Welt, 1830-1930* (Munich, 1988); English-language edition, Walter D.

Kamphoefner, Wolfgang Helbich and Ulrike Sommer, eds., *News from the Land of Freedom. German Immigrants Write Home,* translated from the German by Susan Carter Vogel (Ithaca, 1991).

32. Werner Sollors, ed., *The Invention of Ethnicity* (New York, 1989); Kathleen N. Conzen, David Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozetta, Rudolph J. Vecoli, "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.," *Journal. of American Ethnic History* 12 (1992): 3-41.

33. Joanna Matejko and Tova Yedlin, eds., *Alberta's Pioneers from Eastern Europe: Reminiscences [and Biographies]*, 2nd ed. (Edmonton, 1978), 77.

34. Angelika E. Sauer and Matthias Zimmer, eds., *A Chorus of Different Voices. German-Canadian Identities* (New York, 1998).

35. Gerhard P. Bassler, "Silent or Silenced Co-Founders of Canada? Reflections on the History of German Canadians," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 22 (1990): 38-46, especially, 38, 43; Rudolf A. Helling, *A Socio-Economic History of German-Canadians. They, too, Founded Canada.* A Research Report by Rudolf A. Helling, Jack Thiessen, Fritz Wieden, Elizabeth and Kurt Wangenheim, Karl Heeb, edited by Bernd Hamm (Wiesbaden, 1984), 14. Helling cautiously added that his study does not claim "special status" for this group but describes its participation "... in the building of this country," 15.