Tocqueville, Comparative History, and Immigration in Two Democracies[1]

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Tocqueville says nothing about immigrants in America. Neither "*immigré(s),*" "*immigration*" or the word "*immigrant(s)*" appear in *De la démocratie en Amérique*.[2] This is hardly surprising, for two reasons: the word and the reality, that is, the French language and the American context. In Tocqueville's native tongue, the term is absent in the 1835 (6th) edition of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*. The term *émigration* was for years the French word of choice to describe those who had changed countries. (*Émigrés* of course retained its more restrictive meaning, referring to those who fled the Revolution.)

But it is also logical that Tocqueville did not describe that which did not yet exist. There were few immigrants to behold in the United States in 1830-31. Immigration was not yet a mass phenomenon, and the initial groups that had come to America two centuries before were conceived of as pilgrims, colonists, or settlers, but not as immigrants per se.[3] They had, in any case, by Tocqueville's time become "Anglo-Americans" or "Americans" in his terminology. As Tocqueville put it, these emigrants conceived of their encounter with the new land as a *table rase*. Benefiting from relatively homogeneous origins, they spoke the same language, had no sense of superiority over one another, and constituted the *point de départ* for the democracy that Tocqueville hailed.[4] Mass immigration did not occur until the mid-nineteenth century, well after Tocqueville had gone home, when the Germans and Irish came to American shores, bringing untold (and unwanted) diversity to the Anglo-French-Dutch amalgamation of the founding citizens.[5]

If Tocqueville came too early to see the mass immigration of the nineteenth century, can we still use him to discuss immigration to the United States and *a fortiori* to France, where mass immigration would be somewhat later still? There are two ways in which Tocqueville's classic text provides

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insight into an issue that would only grow in importance in the century after his visit. First of all, we can return to Tocqueville's comparativist gaze, both in and of itself and the way in which it has been repeatedly invoked during the Tocquevillian renaissance of the last thirty years. Secondly, if Tocqueville did not discuss immigrants per se, he spoke of something that struck him as fundamental to American society and that, I will argue, is intimately tied to immigration history on both sides of the Atlantic: voluntary associations.

The Comparative Gaze

Tocqueville's inquiry into American democracy, as we know, was not a unilateral fact-finding venture.[6] It was structured by questions about French politics, and the results were informed by this comparative perspective. Tocqueville's *Démocratie* tells us as much about France as it does about *l'Amérique*. ("J'avoue que dans l'Amérique j'ai vu plus que l'Amérique."[7]) Furthermore, Tocqueville has been used as a comparative sounding board on both sides of the Atlantic to discuss issues ranging from democracy to religion to the state.

Within the text, Tocqueville's comparative vision was both implicit and explicit. It was implicit insofar as he referred to findings that corrected previous ideas about democracy, religion, etc. It was explicit in that he compared not just France to the United States and aristocracy to democracy, but he also juxtaposed the United States and England, the United States and Europe, and, within the United States, North and South (slavery), East and West (the former more democratic, the latter more wild and less tempered by religious mores: "[L'Américain] brave sans crainte la flèche de l'Indien et les maladies du désert"[8]).

Indeed, in addition to his famous passages on the tyranny of the majority, the North-South, East-West comparisons also show how democracy in America was not a monolithic concept for Tocqueville. If his principal frame of reference was New England, his information and observations allowed for some variety, even when he minimized it in contrast to that which he knew best: "Il existe cependant moins de différence entre la civilisation du Maine et celle de la Géorgie qu'entre la civilisation de la Normandie et celle de la Bretagne."[9] But the comparative gaze depends on one's point of view, and, presumably a nineteenth-century inhabitant of the state of Georgia would have, on the contrary, found greater differences between Georgia and Maine than between Normandy and Brittany.

Understanding the fundamentally comparativist aspect of Tocqueville's vision helps shed light on the ways in which contemporary French observers invoke the United States today. The opposite is much rarer. Comparative visions are rarely symmetrical, and while the French gaze towards America seems a fairly constant trope, American comparisons with France are fewer and farther between. While American sociologists may invoke Tocqueville, as we

will see, rare are those who study the United States and explicitly compare it to France.[10] As for American historians of the US, comparisons to matters French are practically non-existent; only recently have calls been made to "internationalize" American history, among other ways, through comparison.[11]

Immigration History in Comparative Perspective

The field of migration history has been no exception, with most American historians of US immigration little interested in other histories of immigration.[12] Contemporary French researchers have, however, often done that which Tocqueville could not do: compare the immigration history of France with that of the United States. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, this rhetorical device has practically been constitutive of the field of migration history in France, talking about American immigration history in order to legitimate French immigration history.[13] If the French reference to American immigration history in order to talk about immigration to France has been based at times on faulty premises (about American immigration history), this is often part of the way in which cross-national comparisons are constructed and used as cautionary tales for local consumption.[14] Immigration to the United States has thus served as a reflecting board for evaluating immigration to France.

As John Stuart Mill pointed out, the (rhetorical) comparative options are basically two, and both exist in the French analysis of French and American immigration history: similarity and difference.[15] In the first instance, similarity has been stressed. Historians of French immigration have noted how France, like the United States, has had a long history of immigration linked to nineteenth-century economic development. This comparison of similarity is furthermore constructed in contrast to most of the other countries of Europe, marked by emigration rather than immigration during the long nineteenth century. The American "melting pot" has been used as a benchmark by which to resuscitate France's own immigration history.

In a second phase, however, difference has been emphasized over similarity, or, as Reiji Matsumoto has described it, the model has become a menace.[16] In a comparison of difference, the French experience has been not only differentiated from that of the United States, but its *modèle républicain* has come to be considered the true melting pot, more successful than the original. Critical of and fearful of a divisive American multiculturalism, this vision of American immigration history stresses the negative results of American immigration history, in contrast to a more sanguine view of *intégration à la française*.

That these negative or positive references have often come at the expense of a flattening of American immigration history—ignoring the oscillation of immigration waves to the United States and the repeated periods of xenophobic exclusion or only emphasizing immigrant activities as separatist—is less pertinent here. What is important is understanding the ways in which the

American model has thus served as both a positive and then a negative example for French migration history. Both descriptions (regardless of their *justesse*) have served, like Tocqueville's *Démocratie,* not just as analyses of American history but, fundamentally, as comments on France itself.

Voluntary Associations and the Immigrant Impulse

One of the most resounding comparative criticisms of American immigration history *vue de la France* has to do with the ways in which immigrants organize their communities. The contemporary French vision often sees immigrant associations (in the United States and *a fortiori* in France) with trepidation, if not fear, as dangerous lobbies ready to rent the democratic fabric. If we can use Tocqueville better to understand how the comparative critique at the heart of the French observation of America is structured, we can also use his *Démocratie* to ponder the ways in which immigrants partake in civic society.

While Tocqueville saw no immigrants, he was well aware and very impressed by the numerous voluntary associations that had been created by the former emigrants-cum-Anglo-Americans. This *associationite,* epitomized by the creation of a variety of clubs and political parties was, for him, a salutary sign of democracy in action. And Tocqueville's emphasis upon the liberty of association was a key and novel component of his analysis.[17]

> Une association politique, industrielle, commerciale ou même scientifique et littéraire, est un citoyen éclairé et puissant qu'on ne saurait plier à volonté ni opprimer dans l'ombre, et qui, en défendant ses droits particuliers contre les exigences du pouvoir, sauve les libertés communes.[18]

As bulwarks against the tyranny of the majority and as safeguards against the pitfalls of individualism, *associations libres* were hailed by Tocqueville as a way to "lutter contre la tyrannie sans détruire l'ordre."[19]

Tocqueville's remarking upon the American propensity for creating and joining voluntary associations must be historically situated. It perhaps could only have been formulated some forty years after the French Revolution (even if "la plupart des Européens voient encore dans l'association une arme de guerre"[20]). Tocqueville recognized this particular feature of American society, in contrast to France's, as positive, but he too was haunted by the French fear of intermediary bodies resulting from the more general critique of everything from *compagnonnages* to *communautés* to *corporations* to *associations professionnelles*. From Turgot in 1776 to Pierre d'Allarde and Isaac Le Chapelier in 1791, the abolition of the *corps* of the ancien régime in order to clear the way for the newfound spirit of *laissez-faire*, meant that it took another century for the law of 1884 to re-establish the right to organize unions. Tocqueville, writing mid-century, had enough distance from the Revolution, enough of a sense of continuity and enough of a vision of the future to consider that the benefits of

such *associations* outweighed the fears of any particularistic assault against the general will.

But beyond the "moment" of Tocqueville's analysis, his reflections on American voluntary societies must be seen as fundamentally comparative. And it is this comparative trope that has had a long life in the historiography of difference between France and the United States. The contrast between an America embracing the intermediary bodies that the French state abhors has been a staple feature of the Franco-American comparison, as well as a verity repeated in the separate historiographies of France and the United States up through the very recent debates about the nature of civic society. This has always been a source of puzzlement to me as a historian of nineteenth- and twentieth-century migration. We can first ask how Tocqueville's 1835/1840 comparative observations on *associations* have stood up historically and historiographically in both countries before returning to the comparison itself.

Tocqueville in America

In the United States, Tocqueville has repeatedly been invoked as an expert to attest to American gregariousness, even as the loss of civic enthusiasm has been bemoaned. Robert D. Putnam's recent *Bowling Alone*, preceded by Robert Bellah and others' inquiry into the *Habits of the Heart*, have both called wistfully upon Tocqueville in support of their theses that the rise of late-twentieth-century individualism has led to the decline of the social bonds Tocqueville had so well charted. Mark Hulliung has commented wryly that Tocqueville would be "baffled with the proposition that the study of bowling leagues can yield political results."[21] (Hulliung further comments on the "Americanization of Tocqueville": "Whether he would have liked it or not, Tocqueville has been granted American citizenship and forcibly enrolled in the American Political Science Association, the American Historical Association, and the American Sociological Association."[22]) The discussion about "social capital" or social bonds has become a lament on the world we have lost and a search for a return to what Tocqueville had seen.[23] From gardening clubs to singing groups to bowling leagues at the grass-roots level to political, labor or non-profit organizations at the most institutionalized end, voluntary associations are seen to define the American spirit itself, confirming Tocqueville's insight. And they seem all to have been done in by the rise of the subject, the Me Generation, and the decline of bowling. Although this understanding of American society has been criticized by some as "inaccurate, exceptional, one-sided or irrelevant,"[24] it has become a leitmotiv of the "communitarian" movement, with Tocqueville becoming the "patron saint of American communitarians."[25]

Yet while "Tocqueville's" (American) voluntary associations loom large in such discussions, the debate has curiously ignored a more obvious example, one that, as we have seen, Tocqueville himself could not have known: the

plethora of organizations created by immigrants. Two distinct historiographies have been talking past one another in the United States: political theorists and historians of immigration. If Tocqueville had good reason not to have "seen" immigrant associations—because they were not yet there—more recent political theorists have no such excuse. Even important contemporary journals such as the *International Migration Review* (Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island) or the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (Sussex Centre for Migration Research, United Kingdom) have inexplicably hailed the study of contemporary immigrant associations as a novelty.[26]

However, even the most cursory glance at the more historically-oriented *Journal of American Ethnic History* reveals the tales of immigrant community construction since the mid-nineteenth century. The abundant literature on the history of immigrants to the United States, which has blossomed since the 1970s, is replete with, if not largely based on, descriptions of the institutions, large and small, that the immigrants created and that the post-1965 Hispanic and Asian immigrants continue to create in abundance today. The new social history of immigration was possible for two reasons, first thanks to new questions asked by historians who sought to counter the older, more lachrymose, history of immigrant alienation.[27] It was also due to new sources—the unearthing of extant newspapers and records of the organizations themselves. One could say that immigration historians have been Tocquevillians all along, without knowing it. Tocqueville scholars of voluntary associations would do well to integrate immigration history into their reflections.

Tocqueville at Home

In France, until very recently, most historiography has also taken for granted the opposite: Tocqueville's implicit analysis of the absence of *corps intermédiaires* in France. However, here too, immigration historians or those who have worked on other minorities in France have another story to tell. The history of Jews in France, for example, is replete with post-Revolutionary contradictions to Clermont-Tonnerre's famous injunction: "Il faut refuser tout aux Juifs comme Nation et accorder tout aux Juifs comme individus."[28] His 1789 statement, a variation on the Revolutionary notion that nothing (and particularly pre-Revolutionary *nations* and *corps*) should stand between the state and the individual, was disproved as soon as Napoleon set up the Consistoire. More importantly, in the succeeding century the French Jews themselves created a variety of oratories and organizations of their own, including major institutions such as the Alliance israélite universelle, founded in 1860.[29] The subsequent arrival of immigrant Jews from Eastern Europe led to the setting up of everything from non-consistorial prayer groups (like others before them) to newspapers to mutual aid societies to Yiddish-speaking sections of the Confédération générale du travail by the early twentieth century.[30]

Indeed, all immigrant groups in France (like in the United States) have founded clubs, groups and various societies over the last century and a half. The history of mutual aid societies in France awaits its emancipation from the history of *mutualisme* (which jumps from Proudhon to health insurance). Immigrant mutual aid societies in particular have been social as well as self-help organizations that most often serve as way-stations to settlement. Through balls and meetings, reading rooms, and obligatory attendance at funerals, immigrants have learned from one another about life and death in the new country.

Similarly, the history of *associations*, resuscitated thanks to the centennial of the Law of 1901, also needs to take up the challenge of Maurice Agulhon three decades ago to study nineteenth-century local sociability through singing clubs and fanfares, the *sociétés savantes*, *cercles bourgeois*, *loges maçonniques*, and other sports or business clubs that are all part of a necessary post-Tocquevillian history of France. Two recent histories of the Law of 1901 even go back to ancient times in order to chart the history of *associations* in the widest sense of the term, from monasteries and medieval corporations through their prohibition during the Revolutionary period to their return in the nineteenth century.[31] Like Pierre Rosanvallon's most recent observation, these new histories of *associationisme* in France show that *les choses* existed before *le mot* and *a fortiori* before the law of 1901 gave the word "association" a specific, official, meaning in French (which Tocqueville probably would have abhorred[32]). In his *Le Modèle politique français: La Société civile contre le jacobinisme de 1789 à nos jours*, Rosanvallon has argued for a necessary revision of the "vulgate Tocquevillienne" in order to question the "dénonciation récurrente de la société bloquée et de l'héritage jacobin." He traces the presence of workers' societies before unions were made legal and the development of forms of *associations* before the 1901 law while emphasizing the importance of a renewed history of the *corps intermédiaires politiques*. In stressing the sociological reality of intermediary organizations that contradict the (only apparent) legal Jacobinism, Rosanvallon rediscovers the "indéniable pluralisation de la société."[33]

Immigration historians of France have been doing so for over two decades now. The idea that individuals in general and immigrants in particular joined together as part of what could be called a sociability of insertion is clear from the archives, newspapers, and memoirs. Self-help organizations, for survival and for leisure, have been common to all immigrant groups, from the early Belgians, Italians, Poles, Jews and Armenians, who came to work and live in France from the second half of the nineteenth century to the more recent immigrants from North Africa or Southeast Asia.[34] In France, too, most immigration historians have been fundamentally Tocquevillian in writing the history of immigrant groups, even if à la Monsieur Jourdain.

However, absent the history of immigration, the separate historiographies on both sides of the Atlantic have, for the most part, largely echoed Tocqueville's comparative vision of Franco-American difference with regard to

voluntary associations: American historiography is replete with an understanding of American civil society as built upon voluntary associations, while French historiography, regardless of plenty of examples to the contrary, constantly repeats the old Tocquevillian chestnut that intermediary bodies are non-existent in France.

The two historiographies only reinforce the comparative analysis of difference between the two countries. Furthermore, when the comparison is applied by French observers to American immigration history in particular, the contrast turns from model to menace. No longer are voluntary associations seen as beneficial accessories to democracy. French historical and sociological analyses of American immigration organizations more often see such voluntary associations as particularly worrisome, and the fear of "importing" a mode of such intermediary bodies seems even greater today than in Tocqueville's time. Immigrant voluntary associations are seen as mettlesome at best, demanding and disruptive at worst. In the late twentieth century, they once again represent the *arme de la guerre* of particularism versus universality that Tocqueville recognized but ultimately minimized. So Tocqueville is used selectively, which is hardly new in the history of ideas. But it seems that the Tocqueville of voluntary associations has been eclipsed by the Tocqueville of French-American difference.

Ultimately, I would argue that a return to Tocqueville's voluntary associations can do several things: re-evaluate the role of intermediary bodies in France from the nineteenth century on; better integrate, in this context, immigration history into that story; and, ultimately, re-question the great Franco-American divergence over the role of "intermediary bodies" in society. With a new understanding of the role of such organizations in France and the United States, the Tocquevillian distinction itself collapses. (We can thus use Tocqueville to revise him.) A new history of intermediary bodies and their role in social and civic life in France and the United States may indeed close the gap of difference and pave the way to a greater comparison of similarities between the two countries.

While Tocqueville saw voluntary associations as positive adjuncts to democracy, he too worried about the possibility of their excesses. The paradox of recent years has been the notion that while voluntary associations may be good for America, they are dangerous for France. The tension between particularism and universality has continued unabated throughout nineteenth and twentieth-century French, as well as American, history. Yet, as Tocqueville concluded "[La liberté d'association] est donc un danger qu'on oppose à un danger plus à craindre."[35]

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and Immigrants in Paris and New York (1997); *Repenser les migrations* (2002); and a co-edited volume *Citizenship and Those Who Leave* (with François Weil, 2007). She is currently working on a book manuscript on elite migration and the American colony in Paris, 1880-1940.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Reiji Matsumoto and the other organizers and participants of the Tocqueville conference entitled "La France et les États-Unis, deux modèles de démocratie?" organized by the Maison Franco-Japonaise in Tokyo, 10-12 June 2005, for which this paper was first written. (The University of Tokyo Press is publishing the conference proceedings in Japanese.)
2. See http://www.frantext.fr/noncateg.htm. However, in a footnote, Tocqueville describes "une multitude d'Européens que le malheur et l'inconduite poussent chaque jour sur les rivages du nouveau monde; ces hommes apportent aux États-Unis nos plus grands vices, et ils n'ont aucun des intérêts qui pourraient en combattre l'influence." Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, I.2.9 (Paris: GF-Flammarion, 1981), 381. My thanks to Ary Zolberg for this reference.
3. "Les émigrants, ou, comme ils s'appelaient si bien eux-mêmes, les pèlerins (pilgrims), appartenaient à cette secte d'Angleterre à laquelle l'austérité de ses principes avait fait donner le nom de puritaine." Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, I.1.2, 91.
4. Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, I.1.2.
5. See, e.g., Aristide Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Significantly, however, the early history of colonial America is currently being rewritten as a history of immigration. But this is more a comment on our historiographic times than on the perception of the colonial period, as it was understood up until recently. See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, *The Peopling of British North America* (New York: Random House, 1986); Alison Games, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). Nonetheless, in a passage prescient of the Gold Rush to come, Tocqueville speaks of a double movement of emigration: Europeans arriving on the Eastern seaboard, while their children, Americans, continue the movement westward. Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, I.2.9, 384.
6. François Furet insists on the explanatory "system" that Tocqueville had brought with him to the United States. François Furet, "Préface: Le système conceptuel de la 'Démocratie en Amérique,'" in Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, vol. 1, 7-43. See also Françoise Mélonio, *Tocqueville et les Français* (Paris: Aubier, 1993).
7. Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, I.1.1, 69.
8. Ibid., I.2.9, 386.
9. Ibid., I.1.8, 247.
10. Notable exceptions are Michèle Lamont and Jean-Philippe Mathy, both French scholars long settled in the United States. There are, of course, those American scholars who study France per se, but it is the use of comparison that interests me here.

11. Carl J. Guarneri, ed., *America Compared: American History in International Perspective* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); two special issues of *The Journal of American History* 85, 4 (March 1999) and 86, 3 (December 1999); Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). I am speaking specifically of American historians of the United States here. The "use" of "French theory" by literary and critical theorists in the United States is a different issue (and is not, strictly speaking, comparative). Furthermore, admittedly, my own perspective undoubtedly complicates the comparative issue. As an American in France, observing the French observe the United States, my own viewpoint is undoubtedly no more neutral than that of Alexis de Tocqueville himself.
12. One of the few early exceptions being: John Higham, "Immigration," in *The Comparative Approach to American History*, ed. C. Vann Woodward (New York: Basic Books, 1968).
13. Nancy L. Green, "'Le Melting-Pot': Made in America, Produced in France," *The Journal of American History* 86, 3 (December 1999): 1188-1208.
14. Tocqueville himself complained about certain *idées reçues*, going out of his way to rectify false generalities with such phrases as: "Ce n'est donc pas, comme on le répète souvent,…" Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, I.1.5, 156.
15. On different forms of comparison, see Nancy L. Green, "Forms of Comparison," in *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective*, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor (New York: Routledge, 2004): 41-56. In general, the comparison between the United States and France is drawn as one of difference or contrast. However, some authors have interestingly sought to dampen the discourse of national difference. See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Mathy, *French Resistance: The French-American Culture Wars* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Robert C. Lieberman, "A Tale of Two Countries: The Politics of Color Blindness in France and the United States," *French Politics, Culture, and Society* 19, 3 (Fall 2001): 32-59.
16. Reiji Matsumoto, "From Model to Menace: French Intellectuals and American Civilization," *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 15 (2004): 163-85. See also Françoise Melonio and Shigeki Uno's papers at the Tokyo conference on Tocqueville as a way of comparing the United States and Europe and on comparative readings of Tocqueville.
17. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Lamberti, *Tocqueville et les deux démocraties* (Paris: PUF, 1983), 103.
18. Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, II.4.7, 391.
19. Ibid., II.4.4, 366.
20. Ibid., I.2.4, 279.
21. Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steve M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). Mark Hulliung, *Citizens and Citoyens: Republicans and Liberals in America and France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 90. Hulliung's book is, however, marred by his own *parti pris* and the confusion between the terms republican and liberal in French and in English.
22. Hulliung, *Citizens and Citoyens*, 17.
23. The use of the term "social capital"—which Putnam, in *Bowling Alone*, remarks is new language for an old discussion—is one more example of a term that is confusing in comparative context, given the more widespread Bourdieusian meaning of the term in French. On social bonds more generally, see Pierre Bouvier, *Le Lien social* (Paris: Gallimard, 2005).
24. Inaccurate: the numbers are wrong; there is no decline in associationism. Exceptional: the decline in civic ties may be true for the United States, but it does not

work in other Western democracies. One-sided: if older forms of participation are in decline, other forms of participation are on the rise. Irrelevant: the decline of traditional participation is not relevant in today's world. Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe, "Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (January 2004): 149-67.

25. Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 24, 292. The communitarian manifesto was outlined by Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1993). But see other, less strident, formulations, e.g., Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985).
26. E.g., Shin-Kap Han, "Ashore on the Land of Joiners: Intergenerational Social Incorporation of Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 38, 2 (Summer 2004): 732-46, arguing for combining Tocqueville's view on the "land of joiners" with the notion of America as a "land of immigrants." See also Jose Moya, "Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective," in the special issue of *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (Winter 2004). The Chicago School of Sociology well charted the myriad of immigrant organizations, e.g., Robert Park, *The Immigrant Press and its Control* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1922).
27. See, e.g., Oscar Handlin's important, if lachrymose, *The Uprooted* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973); and Rudolph J. Vecoli's classic response: "'Contadini' in Chicago: A Critique of *The Uprooted*," *Journal of American History* 54 (1964), 404-17.
28. *La Révolution française et l'émancipation des Juifs*, vol. 7 (Paris : EDHIS, 1968), 13.
29. Indeed, the mini-debate over Jewish assimilation in France since the nineteenth century has turned around the meaning of the various groups and institutions created by French Jews. Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France: From the French Revolution to the Alliance Israélite Universelle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Michael Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation: A Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1971); Phyllis Albert, "Ethnicity and Jewish Solidarity in Nineteenth-Century France," in *Mystics, Philosophers, and Politicians*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Daniel Swetschinski (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982): 249-74; Pierre Birnbaum, *Les Fous de la République: Histoire politique des Juifs d'État de Gambetta à Vichy* (Paris: Fayard, 1992).
30. Nancy L. Green, *The Pletzl of Paris: Jewish Immigrant Workers in the Belle Epoque* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986; Paris: Fayard, 1985).
31. Maurice Agulhon, *Le Cercle dans la France bourgeoise: 1810-1848, étude d'une mutation de sociabilité* (Paris: A. Colin, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1977); Maurice Agulhon, *La République au village: Les Populations du Var, de la Révolution à la Seconde République* (Paris: Plon, 1970); Henri Desroche, *Solidarités ouvrières: Sociétaires et compagnons dans les associations coopératives, 1831-1900* (Paris: Éditions ouvrières, 1981); Jean-Claude Bardout, *L'Histoire étonnante de la loi 1901* (Lyon: Ed. Juris-service, 1991); Jean Defrasne, *Histoire des associations françaises* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004); Michel Dreyfus, *La Mutualité* (Paris: FNMF/CIEM, 1988). For examples straddling the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see William H. Sewell, Jr., *Gens de métier et révolutions: Le Langage du travail, de l'Ancien régime à 1848* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1983); and Cynthia M. Truant, *The Rites of Labor: Brotherhoods of Compagnonnage in Old and New Regime France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), and for the nineteenth century, Philip Nord, *The Republican Moment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
32. He heartily disapproved of the state defining which associations are useful or not. Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, II.2.7, 149, n. 1.

33. Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Modèle politique français: La Société civile contre le jacobinisme de 1789 à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 2004), 431.
34. Just a sampling of some of the monographs on the history of immigration to France includes: Gérard Noiriel, *Longwy: Immigrés et Prolétaires, 1880-1980* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984); Green, *Pletzl*; Janine Ponty, *Polonais méconnus: Histoire des travailleurs immigrés en France dans l'entre-deux-guerres* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988); Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard, *Les Italiens dans l'Est parisien: Une histoire d'intégration, 1880-1960* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000); Martine Hovanessian, *Lelien communautaire: Trois générations d'Arméniens* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992); Véronique De Rudder and Michèle Guillon, *Autochtones et immigrés en quartier populaire: Du marché d'Aligre à l'ilôt Châlon* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987); Catherine Withol de Wenden and Rémy Leveau, *La Beurgeoisie: Les Trois âges de la vie associative issue de l'immigration* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2001).
35. Tocqueville, *Démocratie*, I.2.4, 278.