

THE WRITER'S RESPONSIBILITY IN FRANCE

From Flaubert to Sartre¹

Gisèle Sapiro

Centre national de la recherche scientifique

As Michel Foucault observed in his famous essay, "Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?" before discourse was a product, it was an act that could be punished.² The author's appropriation of discourse as his personal property is secondary to its ascription to his name through penal responsibility. In France, authorial responsibility was introduced in 1551 through royal legislation directed at controlling the book market. The Chateaubriant edict made it compulsory to print both the author's and the printer's names on any publication. The notion of responsibility is thus a fundamental aspect of the emergence of the figure of the modern writer. The state first imposed this conception of responsibility in order to control the circulation of discourses. But after writers internalized the notion, they deployed it against the state in their struggle to establish their moral right on their work and to have literary property recognized as individual property, a struggle that culminated in 1777 with a royal decree recognizing literary compositions as products of labor from which authors were entitled to derive an income.³ This professional development reinforced the writer's social prestige and status, in Max Weber's sense.⁴

The withdrawal of the state from the control of the book market and the abjuration of censorship entailed the need for new legislation restricting the principle of freedom of speech, which had been proclaimed in Article XI of the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du citoyen. In fact, apart from the revolutionary period, the abolition of censorship was not to be achieved before the Restoration. The Charte constitutionnelle of 1814 and the lois de Serre of 1819 opened a new liberal era for the book market. (In contrast to the press, censorship was not restored for books except during wartime.⁵) But this newfound freedom of expression was restricted on both moral and political levels. At a moment when publishing was becoming an industry, the printed

word appeared in the law as one of the means of incitement to crime or, in some cases that the law specified, as a crime in itself. Article I of the law of 17 May 1819 condemns as “moral complicity” incitement to crime by several means, including writing.

Even though, according to the liberal view, writing crimes were defined as common law and not as a specific kind of crime,⁶ a collective belief in the power of the written word and in the social influence of men of letters underlay the debates around those crimes. Moreover, the liberalization of the press provoked a violent reaction from Catholic and ultraconservative milieus, which culminated in book-burnings during Catholic missions.⁷ Among the preferred targets of these auto-da-fés were the new editions of Voltaire and Rousseau’s *œuvres*. This hostility to texts rested on a belief in the role of intellectuals in bringing about the French Revolution, which derived in turn from a belief in the power of words that was shared by revolutionary and counter-revolutionary thinkers alike. Before being immortalized by Tocqueville, this conviction about the importance of intellectuals was expressed by such counter-revolutionary thinkers as Joseph de Maistre and François Guizot.⁸ The belief contributed to the juridical reinforcement of the author’s penal responsibility during the Restoration: special laws passed after the assassination of the Bourbon heir, the Duc de Berry, in 1820 delineated the “moral complicity” of authors who encouraged crime by means of their writings, despite the fact that the murderer, Louis-Pierre Louvel, denied having been influenced by antilegitimist writings.⁹ Although the liberal monarchy of 1830 abolished these special laws, belief in the writer’s symbolic power continued to underlie representations of his social responsibility and moral duty. It informed the penal responsibility of the writer as an author not only of political writings but also of fiction, as demonstrated by the prosecution of obscenity and blasphemy. Article VIII of the law of 17 May 1819 stipulates a prison term of one month to a year for any offense to morality and religion committed through one of the means detailed in Article I, among which is writing. Fiction had no special status in this regard.

Many studies have been devoted to the history of censorship and of prohibited literature.¹⁰ There are also a number of historical and sociological works on the nature of the writer’s political commitment.¹¹ But the link between both issues has not yet been articulated. The notion of responsibility provides such a link: the penal responsibility of the writer as defined in the law and before the bench is an expression of the representations and expectations regarding the writer’s role in a given society—in this case, France. While the penal responsibility of the author in France is imbued with a belief in the power of words—a belief linked to the social status of the man of letters—I will argue that writers defined their own ethics of responsibility against the values of conventional morality and political conformism through which their work was liable to condemnation. At the very moment when the state relinquished its attempts to control the book market, writers appropriated the

notion of responsibility, relieving it of its juridical meaning, in order to define their own ethical principles, their duties, and their rights towards society. Articulating these ethical principles affirmed the writer's independence from political and religious authorities and contributed to the emergence of an autonomous literary field, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu.¹² While Bourdieu insisted on autonomy from economic constraints, I will focus here on autonomy from moral and political constraints, through the redefinition and politicization of the notion of responsibility during literary trials.

This evolution was closely related to the process of differentiation of activities described by Max Weber, and especially to what Andrew Abbott called the "division of expert labor." On one hand, the claims for autonomy and responsibility based on specific ethical principles—even though no code of ethics or deontology of the writer has ever existed—can be compared to those of other professions at that time.¹³ On the other hand, the literary field also gained autonomy in a negative way. If we apply to the case of writers Abbott's view that the professional development of different intellectual activities should be considered as a competition over the division of expert labor, we can argue that the development of academic training and the definition of specific disciplines dispossessed the men of letters of part of their domain in moral and social philosophy, history, and politics. The terms "writer" and "man of letters," which referred in the eighteenth century to authors of philosophical, scientific, or political books as well as of belles-lettres, began, from the Restoration on, to designate more specifically literary authors. Whereas the separation with the scientific field took place at that time, the differentiation within the political field was to be achieved only during the Second Empire, with the higher civil servants becoming specialized,¹⁴ and during the Third Republic, when a group of political professionals emerged—a general process described by Max Weber in his essay "Politik als Beruf."

Struggles for freedom of expression and for the right to criticize political and religious authorities dominated the period of the Restoration and the July Monarchy. During the Second Empire, the new political and moral constraints imposed on literature and the differentiation process, namely with the political field, entailed the withdrawal of writers into the ideology of "art for art's sake," which best incarnated the autonomy principle. The trials for offense to morality played a major role in the elaboration of these principles at this stage, which will be described in the first part of the paper: writers like Gustave Flaubert and Charles Baudelaire defended works accused of offending standards of morality by invoking such values as artistic license, disinterestedness, objectivity, and truthfulness in the representation of reality, the latter being borrowed from other intellectual professions, particularly science but also the law. Thus the literary field restructured itself around the opposition between autonomy and heteronomy; against extraliterary judgment based on moral, ideological, or economic criteria, the defenders of autonomy affirmed the supremacy of aesthetic judgment on the work of art. However, the ideology of

art for art's sake caused the literary world to encapsulate itself. After the Third Republic relaxed the control on publishing, as new publics developed, new forms of universalization came to be sought. As I suggested elsewhere, politicization was one way to compensate for the lack of professional development.¹⁵ At the autonomous pole of the literary field, writers from Émile Zola to Jean-Paul Sartre gave a universal scope to these professional values in order to ground their political commitment as “intellectuals.” Political trials were instrumental in the definition of this new responsibility, as will be argued in the second part of this article. Since the laws restricting freedom of the press do not make any distinction between fiction and nonfiction, and since, in the trials, the very status of these texts as fiction or nonfiction was at stake, the analysis will not be limited to fictional works on trial. As we will see, the frontier between morals and politics was not always clear-cut.

The Ethics of Fiction

The application of the law condemning moral offense could be more or less severe according to the regime; periods of “moral order” such as the Second Empire and the Vichy regime represented zeniths. At the heart of the trials over immorality was the question of authorial responsibility. The arguments put forward by the litigants hinged on assumptions regarding the social impact of literature and of reading. In 1853, the subject given by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques for its annual competition was: “Exposer et apprécier l’influence qu’a pu avoir en France sur les mœurs la littérature contemporaine, considérée surtout au théâtre et dans le roman.” The winner, Eugène Poitou, a judge, accused Honoré de Balzac, Eugène Sue, George Sand and many others of being responsible for the “moral diseases” of his time by popularizing materialism and skepticism.¹⁶ The rapid growth of the periodical press during the Second Empire and the expansion of education reinforced fears over the allegedly harmful effects of literature. While educated, bourgeois, white men were thought to be capable of resisting the baleful effects of fiction, the same expectations were not extended to the new reading publics—youth, women, and the “people” (including the poor and people of color), upon whom novels, especially those characterized by crude realism and eroticism, were believed to have a harmful influence.¹⁷

The “*mauvaises lectures*” included especially popular novels, which were published serially in widely circulated periodicals.¹⁸ But the label could also be attached to the work of respected men of letters like Flaubert and Baudelaire, a fact demonstrated when each was tried for immorality in 1857. Although these writers and their lawyers argued that the high price and stylistic difficulty of the incriminated works restricted circulation to an elite public, their prosecutors countered that because of their format, reprobate books and newspapers could be deposited in libraries and thus easily fall into the hands

of the innocent. According to Ernest Pinard, Flaubert's prosecutor, women were particularly at risk:

Qui est-ce qui lit le roman de M. Flaubert? Sont-ce des hommes qui s'occupent d'économie politique ou sociale? Non! Les pages légères de *Madame Bovary* tombent en des mains plus légères, dans des mains de jeunes filles, quelquefois de femmes mariées. Eh bien! lorsque l'imagination aura été séduite, lorsque cette séduction sera descendue jusqu'au cœur, lorsque le cœur aura parlé aux sens, est-ce que vous croyez qu'un raisonnement bien froid sera bien fort contre cette séduction des sens et du sentiment?¹⁹

Flaubert's lawyer, Maître Senard, defended his client by drawing attention to Flaubert's morality and his virtuous assumption of his responsibility as a writer. Flaubert depicted evil not to incite crime but to dissuade it. Furthermore, Senard explained, the novel showed the baleful influence of literature (Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's *Paul et Virginie*, Walter Scott's novels, and other romances) on a woman of modest social origin: these books nourished her imagination and gave her ambitions that she could not afford, leading to the destruction of her family and to suicide. The argument succeeded in convincing the court, but at the price of an interpretation of *Madame Bovary* as a "roman à thèse," a novel with an ideological thesis,²⁰ an interpretation that certainly exceeded Flaubert's intention.

Baudelaire was less lucky. Though his lawyer, Maître Chaix d'Est-Ange, also contended that his client was fundamentally moral, the argument was not sufficient in his case. Baudelaire was sentenced not for his intentions, which were recognized as pure, but for the "error" he committed in carrying out his purpose by painting scenes that offended public decency. The judgment mandated the suppression of six poems from future editions of *Les Fleurs du mal*. Although unexpurgated editions continued to circulate after 1868, the sentence was still in force. In 1924, a copy of the first edition was seized at a sale at the Hotel Drouot. In response, writers campaigned to overturn the judgment against Baudelaire. Louis Barthou, a senator and also a man of letters, presented a legislative bill in order to allow for appeals against sentences for outrage to public morality by literary means. It was not until 1946 that Barthou's proposal was enacted into law, allowing for the rehabilitation of *Les Fleurs du mal* on 31 May 1949.

There are two opposite interpretations of Flaubert's trial: whereas Dominick LaCapra demonstrated that the novel was subverting the social and moral norms on behalf of which its author was tried, Christine Haynes has argued that Flaubert's acceptance of the moralistic interpretation of *Madame Bovary* means that, like other writers, he partly shared the same conception of the writer's responsibility as the court.²¹ But, as Haynes recognizes, although it convinced the court, Senard's interpretation of *Madame Bovary* as an ideological novel with a highly moral intention was at odds with the ideology of "art for art's sake" advocated by Flaubert and his peers.²² This motto, upon which

the autonomy of the literary field would be grounded, condensed a series of claims developed in response to the literary trials of the first half of the nineteenth century: that literature is a game, that it is its own purpose, that it should not be judged on extraliterary criteria such as ethics or politics, that it should not be held responsible for social troubles. Most of these aesthetic arguments were simply reversals of juridical indictments.

The conception of the writer's responsibility implied the widespread idea that literature can generate social effects, that it can be a cause. This idea was grounded in pseudoscientific conceptions of aesthetic emotion as a form of nervous contagion,²³ and of the power of images to sustain or weaken moral energies.²⁴ In contrast, the theory of "art for art's sake" considered literature not as a cause but an effect, as nothing but the mirror of society, its reflection and expression. "Les livres suivent les mœurs et les mœurs ne suivent pas les livres," wrote Théophile Gautier.²⁵ Hence, writers could not be held responsible for social problems. To the penal notion of morality, the champions of "art for art's sake" opposed the principles of artistic freedom and the autonomous rights of literature. In this sense, these principles can be considered to be less political than those used by the writers during the Restoration, for instance, but it was this conception of the autonomy of literature regarding moral constraints that was subversive.

Moreover, the advocates of "art for art's sake" developed ethical principles, with an alternative conception of responsibility based on such professional values as beauty, disinterestedness, and sincerity. Central among these values was the notion of objective truth, borrowed from the scientific paradigm on which the emerging professions based their claims to expert authority. They contrasted the quest for truth to the moralistic conception of literature, which they dismissed as social hypocrisy. Truth, they claimed, could not be immoral. Immorality, Flaubert argued, stemmed from the lack of truth.²⁶ While Pinard reproached the fact that Madame Bovary's behavior was not explicitly condemned either by the narrator or any other sympathetic character, he asserted that the writer, like the scientist, had to describe reality objectively without judging it. Probity and sincerity in the exercise of art were the guarantee of morality. This vision of the relationship between the morality of an artist and that of his work undermined the juridical question of intentionality with regard to offending public decency.

Although he rued the absence of explicit moralizing, it was literature itself that Pinard criticized when he denounced the realism, the expressive style, and the exuberant sexuality of *Madame Bovary*. The author's talent exacerbated the suggestive and thus harmful character of the novel:

Je signale ici deux choses, messieurs, une peinture admirable sous le rapport du talent, mais une peinture exécration au point de vue de la morale. Oui, M. Flaubert sait embellir ses peintures avec toutes les ressources de l'art, mais sans les ménagements de l'art. Chez lui point de gaze, point de voiles, c'est la nature dans toute sa nudité, dans toute sa crudité!²⁷

Continuing, he explained that even if the novel were ultimately a cautionary tale, "une conclusion morale ne pourrait pas amnistier les détails lascifs qui peuvent s'y trouver." If this were the case then an author could describe "toutes les orgies imaginables, décrire toutes les turpitudes d'une femme publique."²⁸

Faced with such complaints, the champions of "art for art's sake" went one step further in their repudiation of juridical arguments. Utility, they asserted, was contrary to beauty; only disinterestedness could ensure beauty. Théophile Gautier had developed this idea in 1834: "Il n'y a de vraiment beau que ce qui ne peut servir à rien; tout ce qui est utile est laid, car c'est l'expression de quelque besoin, et ceux de l'homme sont ignobles."²⁹ According to Baudelaire, bourgeois and socialist morals reduced art to a "question of propaganda."³⁰ He argued that "si le poète a poursuivi un but moral, il a diminué sa force poétique, et il n'est pas imprudent de parier que son œuvre sera mauvaise."³¹ In the essay he published on *Madame Bovary* after the trial, Baudelaire wrote: "Une véritable œuvre d'art n'a pas besoin de réquisitoire. La logique de l'œuvre suffit à toutes les postulations de la morale, et c'est au lecteur de tirer les conclusions."³² This idea was to become a major creed in the literary field; after World War I André Gide expressed it in a famous formula: "Les bons sentiments ne sont pas matière à littérature."

The only persons qualified to judge beauty, they argued, were the writer's peers, not the court. During trials for immorality, defense attorneys typically quoted the estimation of other authors as evidence of the writer's honor and respectability. Now writers considered the judgment of their colleagues as the only ground for literary value, rejecting such extraliterary appraisals as the approval of official guardians of public decency and the taste of the wider public.

The theory of "art for art's sake" aimed at ensuring the autonomy of literature with regard to religious and political authorities as well as to the book market. But too much autonomy carried the risk of irrelevance. If literature had no social impact, if its circulation were limited to the small elite that comprised the world of letters, if it were not even worth being condemned, the writer's discourse would be devaluated. In contrast, the notion of the writer's social responsibility implied the momentousness and universal scope of literary endeavor, but it also fostered a heteronomous conception of literature by admitting extraliterary judgments of it. The modern writer's professional ethics oscillated between this sense of social responsibility and the idea of "art for art's sake." But while the latter was developed as a response to the limits that political and religious authorities tried to impose upon literary creation, the notion of the writer's responsibility was theorized by conservative and Catholic men of letters in order to place boundaries on the range of speech and expression.

The question raised by Ernest Pinard at Flaubert's trial was that of the limits of art. Victor Hugo claimed he did not know "en quoi étaient faites les limites de l'art."³³ The debate on the harmful effects of literature arose again after

1881, when the Third Republic instituted freedom of the press and began to democratize access to education through laws abolishing censorship and establishing free and obligatory primary schools. In 1864, the Roman Catholic Church had condemned freedom of speech in the *Syllabus*, which mentioned among the eighty modern errors the idea that expressing “any opinion whatsoever” does not cause moral corruption. But while the republican state relinquished its attempt to control the minds through censorship and developed a secular morality to educate the citizenry, it also sought to reduce the Church’s social influence and power. The law condemning outrage to public morality was maintained, but the phrase regarding offense to religion was suppressed. Facing this struggle between the state and the Church, and concerned over what they considered to be a void in moral leadership, certain conservative men of letters took it upon themselves to become guardians of the social and moral order by speaking for the Church within the intellectual field. Continuing the counterrevolutionary tradition, such right-wing Catholic thinkers as Ferdinand Brunetière and Paul Bourget tried to limit the exercise of artistic freedom and critical thought, charging these to be ferments of social and political turmoil.

In the literary domain, they especially rejected naturalism, which insisted on the analogy between literature and science. As Zola, one of naturalism’s foremost theorists, explained in *Le Roman expérimental* (1880), literature was a form of social inquiry, based on scientific methods. He repeated this claim in his preface to the second edition of *Thérèse Raquin*, in which he affirmed that his aim was “scientific” and his method grounded in observation and analysis. Though Zola argued that the realistic description of human nature was of social utility since it provided a better comprehension of society and could consequently help to cure its troubles, Brunetière, in *Le Roman naturaliste* (1883), condemned naturalism for its materialistic positivism and lack of moral sense.

It was the psychological novelist Paul Bourget who first discussed the notion of intellectual responsibility, in his novel *Le Disciple* (1889), which was a commercial success, selling 22,000 copies in the first month of publication. Bourget’s protagonist is a scientist (modeled on his own mentor, Hippolyte Taine) who has lived his whole life in an ivory tower, unconcerned with the social consequences of his doctrines. In the spirit of experiment, one of his “disciples,” a tutor in a noble family, applies the scientist’s psychological theories to the daughter who falls in love with him. As a result, she commits suicide, the disciple is arrested and tried, and the scientist is compelled to grapple with the question of moral responsibility. Although the novel leaves matters unresolved, Bourget used the preface to call upon the young generation of writers to assume their responsibility to society, condemning both materialistic positivism (i.e., naturalism) and aesthetic detachment (i.e., art for art’s sake).

The publication of *Le Disciple* marked a turning point in Bourget’s career; after having been, under Taine’s influence, one of the first to import psychological methods to literature and criticism, he now condemned social scientific

pretensions to truth. His evolution was representative of the politicization of the debate; Bourget was soon to join the conservative Catholic camp and become one of its most famous speakers. His concern with the question of the writer's responsibility had appeared already in the 1883 and the 1885 prefaces to his collection of critical reviews, *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*. As the influence of traditional and local authorities diminished, he argued, the place of the book in the education of hearts and minds grew, raising concerns about the effects of literature as "intellectual and sentimental propaganda." The role of the critic, according to Bourget, was to diagnose the etiology of the "diseases of moral life"; democracy, science, Parisian life, and cosmopolitan trends were the sources of the moral turmoil evident in the new generation.³⁴

Le Disciple provoked a quarrel within the intellectual field. The writer Anatole France defended the "imprescriptible rights" of free thought, while the critic Brunetière called for limits on philosophical speculation.³⁵ A Catholic writer, Georges Fonsegrive, would put the matter clearly a few years later: "La responsabilité de l'écrivain limite ses droits."³⁶ This moralistic conception of literature underlay the condemnation of romanticism and of modern art on the part of defenders of classicism.³⁷

These opposite values were to be invested and universalized in the political struggles in which the "intellectuals" engaged at the end of the nineteenth century. At the heteronomous pole of the intellectual field, writers related the defense of morals to the strength of the nation state—a concern that lies at the heart of the political dimension of an author's penal responsibility, to which we will now turn. At the autonomous pole, "intellectuals" conceived a set of professional values to affirm their symbolic power and reconceptualize their responsibility along political lines.

The Writer's Political Responsibility

The liberal democracy of the Third Republic completed the liberalization of the press. The law of 29 July 1881 abolished the censorship of printed works. But it remained in force in the domain of theater until 1905. Though offense to religion was no longer considered as a crime, writers were still prosecuted and condemned for moral or political reasons.³⁸ The indictment against outrage to public morality in the press was even reinforced by the law of 2 August 1882, which transferred it from the *cour d'assises* to the *tribunal correctionnel*. The condemnation of inducements to crime by means of writings was further stiffened with the three "*lois scélérates*" passed in December 1893 and July 1894 after anarchist attacks. These laws condemned apologias for crime, dictating that those who approved of the actions of malefactors even on the pure level of ideas might be prosecuted as one of their number. After the assassination of President Sadi Carnot, any anarchist propaganda could be condemned.³⁹ The repression of literature produced by political opponents of the

regime proved to be a lasting pattern; targeted groups included antimilitarists and anarchists at the end of the nineteenth century, pacifists during World War I, Communists in the interwar period, but also extreme-Right leagues, particularly under the Popular Front.

In the middle of the 1880s, a series of literary works (novels and plays) were prosecuted or forbidden for political reasons.⁴⁰ Plays about social struggles (such as the dramatic adaptation of Zola's *Germinal*) or about governmental administrators (*Une journée parlementaire* by Maurice Barrès) were censored. Novelists were tried for their dissenting views, particularly anti-militarism; though Abel Hermant (*Le Cavalier Miserey*) and Lucien Descaves (*Sous-Offs*) were prosecuted for insulting the army, political and nationalist concerns were prominent in their trials. At that time, the humiliation of the military defeat that put an end to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 was still alive in collective memory. But the transformation of the professional army to a national one in 1872 opened the experience of life in barracks to all citizens, including writers for whom it provided a new fictional framework. And fiction could be used to criticize the military system, which could not be denounced openly.

Descaves' trial for *Sous-Offs* in March 1890 is exemplary in illustrating the links between the moral and political repression of literature. The Ministry of the Army pressed charges against Descaves and his publisher after *La Presse* published, on 12 December 1889, a letter from General Boulanger congratulating Laisant, a lawyer who attacked *Sous-Offs* in the same journal a few days earlier. As one of the defense lawyers explained, "Le gouvernement n'a évidemment pas voulu laisser à un parti hostile le monopole de se préoccuper du sort de nos sous-officiers."⁴¹ Stock, the publisher of the novel, was charged with insulting the army and offending morality, and the author, Descaves, was accused of moral complicity with these crimes. According to the lawyers for the defense, the charge of moral offense was brought in order to give substance to the government's case and to raise the stakes: whereas the term of incarceration for insulting the army did not exceed three months, it could reach two years for moral offense. Since fiction could easily escape the accusation of insult, the prosecutor tried to identify the novel as a lampoon—he characterized it as an "infâme libelle"—because it claimed to tell the "truth"; in a parallel way, he defined the author and the publisher as "malfaiteurs de la plume" ("malefactors of the pen"), who were pursuing only publicity and mercantile interests.⁴² In response, Descaves and Stock's lawyers both stressed the differences between a novel and a lampoon, between a book and a newspaper, between serious literature and popular fiction. The form of *Sous-Offs*, written in a difficult, dense style, as well as its format—its length, its high price (three and a half francs) as compared to cheap popular novels (ten to fifty cents), its publication directly as a book and not first as a magazine serial—all served to indicate that this work did not address the public at large but a small elite. Neither the author nor the publisher, they argued, sought a *succès de scandale* or

commercial profit. Their intentions were pure. The author wanted only to reveal the truth, to denounce bad conditions and identify abuses that could be redressed; his lawyer, Maurice Tézenas, provided evidence from the press and war councils that confirmed that the facts described in the novel were true. Tézenas compared *Sous-Offs* to a scientific treatise, the function of which was to inform the public.

The reference to science was not a casual one. As noted, the naturalist school, to which Descaves belonged, took science as a model for its methods and purpose. Stock's lawyer, Alexandre Millerand, suggested that this was precisely what Descaves was reproached for. There were two different conceptions of art, he explained: the one considered that "l'art ne peut être que l'image idéalisée de la nature et de la vie," as Lucie Herpin put it; the other, with which Descaves' novel concurred, defined it in Émile Zola's terms: "L'art, c'est la nature vue à travers un tempérament."⁴³ This was a literary quarrel, the lawyer concluded, in which the court should not get involved. Millerand thus argued for the relative autonomy of the literary field and the professionalization of aesthetic judgment.

The same arguments were invoked in the petition signed by fifty-four writers in favor of Descaves in *Le Figaro* on 24 December 1889: "Dans les questions de littérature, le jugement de l'auteur par ses pairs est le seul raisonnable, le seul admissible, à une époque qui a tout discuté, tout analysé, tout nié."⁴⁴ On the eve of a legislative debate on the question of freedom of the press, the petition defended Descaves in the name of free speech and artistic independence. Among the signatories were such famous authors as Émile Zola (the instigator of the petition), Alphonse Daudet, and Edmond de Goncourt. Though they claimed to represent all literary and political trends, most belonged to the realist or naturalist schools; members of the Académie Française and other, more classical, men of letters were absent. But the psychological novelists Paul Bourget and Maurice Barrès, who had not yet joined the conservative camp, also signed it. As Tézenas pointed out, it was the first time such an honorable company of men of letters had joined together in a spontaneous protest. This petition, which used the lobbying tactics characteristic of parliamentary regimes, drew on the symbolic power that emanated from the renown of the signers in order to assert the writer's autonomy.⁴⁵ Although the statement was formulated in the name of a corporate and apolitical conception of the literary profession and did not take a stand on the question of the novel's antimilitarist dimension, the claim for freedom of speech implicitly included the right to criticize the state through a critique of its army. During the trial, both defense lawyers argued that Descaves did his duty as a writer in telling the truth. Once truth has been established, should it not be revealed? In this matter, Tézenas explained, there are two schools of thought. One considers that patriotism consists in not telling the truth about the army. The other says: "Il ne convient pas de la soustraire à l'esprit de contrôle et de critique, seuls garantie des nations libres comme la nôtre."⁴⁶ Thus,

social criticism is an essential function in a democracy, and the duty of the writer, as an observer, is to exercise this function by telling the truth about what he observes. In many ways—the defense of truth as a professional duty, the assertion of one's right to criticize the state, the use of petition as an expression of collective symbolic power—this trial prefigures the new mode of mobilization of “intellectuals” in the Dreyfus Affair.

It was in the name of truth that the *dreyfusards*, led by Émile Zola and Anatole France, demanded the juridical inquiry to be completed and the sentence against Captain Dreyfus to be revised. Opposing the *dreyfusards*, the *antidreyfusards*, under the leadership of Ferdinand Brunetière, Maurice Barrès, and Paul Bourget, sought to restrict further investigations in the name of “*raison d'État*,” that is, for the preservation of the army's prestige and the social order, which appeared to be more important to them than finding out the truth. This debate was homologous to that which divided the intellectual field around Bourget's novel *Le Disciple*, but the terms of the quarrel were now politicized: whereas the “intellectuals” who championed Dreyfus institutionalized their critical function as a social group, giving a universal scope to such professional values as “inquiry,” “truth,” “free speech,” and “justice,” their opponents imposed limits on these values in the name of extraintellectual considerations, namely national interest, and condemned what they considered an abuse of this critical function by those whom they stigmatized as “intellectuals.” The two camps embodied different conceptions of the social and political responsibility of the intellectual, one “autonomous,” the other “heteronomous”; they would remain in combat until World War II.

Because of his paradigmatic “sublime engagement,” as defined by Susan Suleiman, it is worthwhile to recall the main traits of Zola's commitment: disinterestedness, courage, and the choice of writing as a weapon.⁴⁷ Zola proclaimed that his commitment in the Dreyfus affair was the continuation of his œuvre as a writer, since truth had always been his only passion.⁴⁸ Reversing the positions of defendant and judge, he accused the generals involved in the affair, the experts who examined the bordereau, and the martial court. In fact, Zola was eager to be prosecuted, to demonstrate the risk he took in his combat for truth. Though some members of the government were unwilling to do so, the War Ministry lodged a complaint against him. The trial took place between 15 and 23 February 1898. Instead of defending himself before the jury, he used the tribunal as a political arena to reaffirm his belief in Dreyfus's innocence; reversing his adversaries' argument, he argued that the fate of the nation depended on truth and that it was the duty of a citizen to defend it.⁴⁹ But the jury found no extenuating circumstances, and he was condemned to one year of prison and a penalty of 3,000 francs. Though the Supreme Court of Appeal annulled the condemnation, he was charged again and fled to England where he stayed eleven months. The new government headed by Waldeck-Rousseau “pardoned” Captain Dreyfus and granted amnesty on the whole affair, including Zola's trial.

During World War I, censorship was restored, and pacifists were fiercely oppressed. Henri Barbusse's pacifist novel *Le Feu*, which was first published in 1916 as a series in the newspaper *L'Oeuvre*, was censored in part. The experience of the war favored the triumph of what I call "national moralism," meaning the use of national interest as an argument to condemn a social or intellectual trend or a form of behavior, here creative freedom. In such a climate, the royalist extreme-Right league Action Française, led by Charles Maurras, gained credit even in the eyes of a skeptical writer like André Gide. After the war, when the intellectual field reorganized, the two conceptions of the writer's responsibility once again clashed. Nationalist thinkers continued to promote national moralism in order to fight the international trends represented by Barbusse, who was close to the Communist movement, and by another famous pacifist writer, Romain Rolland, whose "Déclaration pour l'indépendance de l'esprit" demanded that intellectuals free themselves from nationalist constraints.⁵⁰ The staff of *La Nouvelle Revue française*, the prestigious literary review founded by André Gide and published by Gallimard, was itself divided between the nationalist camp and the defenders of literary autonomy.⁵¹ But when the journal was relaunched in 1919, the lead article by editor Jacques Rivière announced that the *NRF* would aim to "faire cesser cette contrainte que la guerre exerce encore sur les intelligences."⁵² To the nationalists close to Action Française who wanted to impose moralistic constraints on literature, Rivière responded that disinterestedness in thought and creation was a patriotic duty, necessary for the preservation of France's prestige.

But the revolutionary ambitions of the surrealist avant-garde, who wanted to turn poetry into a subversive arm against society, disturbed the classical division between art for art's sake and moral responsibility. The alliance between literary and political avant-gardes was not new: at the end of the nineteenth century, the symbolists were connected to the anarchist movement, but they did not assign poetry a political role as such. The model of the Russian avant-garde in the Bolshevik revolution inspired the surrealist conception of the revolutionary role of poetry.

The debate over the prosecution of the surrealist Louis Aragon for his poem "Front rouge" in 1932 illustrates the contradictions faced by literary field regarding the question of the writer's responsibility. Aragon, whose affiliation with the Communist Party waxed as those of his colleagues, most notably André Breton, waned, was prosecuted for incitement to murder in his verses: "Feu sur Léon Blum / Feu sur Boncour Frossard Déat." In spite of their political differences, Breton took a stand against Aragon's prosecution in the name of the rights of poetry. Poetry, he explained, emanated from the author's unconsciousness so he could not be held responsible for it. Breton circulated a petition in favor of Aragon that was signed by more than 300 intellectuals. The petition asserted the autonomy of poetry: "Nous nous élevons contre toute tentative d'interprétation d'un texte poétique à des fins judiciaires."⁵³

But the arguments Breton invoked revealed the contradiction between surrealist literary theory and its revolutionary ambitions. Among the writers who refused to sign the petitions were real revolutionary militants, but also defenders of the autonomy of art such as André Gide, Romain Rolland, and Jean Paulhan. As Paulhan, Rivière's successor as editor of *La Nouvelle Revue française*, explained to Roger Martin du Gard: "Si la poésie, comme les surréalistes l'ont toujours prétendu, est un danger redoutable pour la société, l'on est mal venu, le jour où la société esquisse un geste (timide) de défense, à se retrancher derrière l'art pour l'art, et à prétendre que 'c'est de la poésie, ce n'est pas sérieux.'"⁵⁴ According to Paulhan, an author has to take responsibility for his words and accept the consequences; otherwise, the writer's speech will be discredited and will never be taken seriously.

If this were true of poetry and fiction, it was all the more so for nonfiction. This is why Paulhan opposed the demand to pardon Charles Maurras when the leader of Action Française was imprisoned in 1936 for calling for the murder of members of the Popular Front government. The same applied to Jean Giono, who was imprisoned in 1939 because of his pacifist commitments. Paulhan first thought of publishing a note in the *NRF* saying that it was better to leave Giono in prison "pour sécurité" if he was serious in "les engagements précis pour le cas de guerre qu'il prenait," and if he was not, "pour son honneur."⁵⁵ But he decided not to make his opinion public: whereas, as Baudelaire noted, the state has to do its job like the writer does his own, the writer is not to judge if the state is "sage quand il met Baudelaire à l'ombre."⁵⁶

The defeat of the French army at the hands of German troops in June 1940, an event that catapulted Marshal Pétain to the head of the French government and resulted in the establishment of the Vichy regime, favored the imposition of national moralism on the literary field. In order to legitimate the Vichy regime and its program, the National Revolution, its defenders claimed that military loss was the inexorable expiation for the sins of the Republic. In a famous pronouncement, Philippe Pétain blamed the French people, whose quest for pleasure had prevailed over the spirit of sacrifice ("l'esprit de jouissance l'a emporté sur l'esprit de sacrifice"). What were the sins of the Republic? Paid holidays, reduction of work time from forty-eight to forty hours per week, and all the other social rights recognized by the Popular Front government.⁵⁷ And literature. The summer of 1940 saw the outbreak of "the bad masters quarrel" (*la querelle des mauvais maîtres*) over the extent to which intellectuals were culpable for the present crisis. Nationalist and Catholic writers who supported the Vichy regime denounced the most well-known and prestigious writers of the interwar period as being responsible for the military defeat of France. The individualism, subjectivism, pessimism, immorality, and gratuitousness to be found in their writing allegedly drained the energy and moral strength of the nation's youth and weakened the bonds of the social fabric. As was the case during the Second Empire, the new regime, which regarded literature as morally and politically corrosive, was repressive, and the first reaction

of the champions of autonomy was to retire behind the following arguments: art for art's sake, literature is not a cause but an effect, the writer is not responsible for social troubles, and so on.⁵⁸

But the nationalistic and moralistic discourse of writers who supported a regime that had given the country over to the enemy and made itself an auxiliary force to the occupying authorities against patriotic Resistants sounded less and less convincing. The discordance between their rhetoric and their objective position made it easy for opponents of the Vichy regime to appropriate the mantle of political and ethical righteousness. The notion of the writer's responsibility was appropriated and redefined in this transfer of national moralism from the Vichy ideologues to the intellectuals of the Resistance. Now it was Resistance writers who accused collaborators and pro-Vichy thinkers of national treason—and of intellectual treason as well, because they betrayed the rules of literary autonomy by fostering repressive politics in the cultural domain. Following the intellectual tradition beginning with Zola and continuing with Rivière, they identified patriotism with the defense of such universal values as freedom of thought and speech.

It was in the context of this reversal that Sartre elaborated his theory of literary commitment. In "La littérature, cette liberté!" a clandestine article published in April 1944 in the Resistance literary journal *Les Lettres françaises*, Sartre wrote:

On n'écrit pas en l'air et pour soi seul: la littérature est un acte de communication. ... Ainsi la littérature n'est pas un chant innocent et facile, qui s'accommoderait de tous les régimes; mais elle pose elle-même la question politique: écrire, c'est réclamer la liberté pour tous les hommes; si l'œuvre ne doit pas être l'acte d'une liberté qui veut se faire reconnaître par d'autres libertés, elle n'est qu'un infâme bavardage. Ainsi, en dehors même de ses sentiments de patriote, tout écrivain conscient de son métier trouve dans son activité littéraire elle-même, un devoir politique: il faut qu'il lutte pour délivrer son pays et ses compatriotes, pour leur rendre cette liberté qui, seule, rendra leur valeur à ses écrits; il est un moment où la littérature elle-même exige le silence et le combat.⁵⁹

It is notable that Sartre's definition of literary commitment here is already detached from national moralism and linked to freedom ("apart from his patriotic feelings, every writer who is conscious of his profession finds in his literary activity itself a political duty"). This is, as we will see, Sartre's main contribution to the redefinition of the writer's responsibility in 1945.

The purge trials at Liberation shed a dramatic light on the penal responsibility of the author. In autumn 1944, after the liberation of Paris and the restoration of Republican law, the Provisional Government of the French Republic brought proceedings against writers and journalists. They were charged with one of two crimes: either "intelligence with the enemy," an infraction already established in the penal code (Article LXXV et seq.), or "national indignity," a crime defined by the edict of 26 August 1944 punishing people who had disseminated enemy propaganda or who had belonged to

collaborationist organizations.⁶⁰ From October 1944 to February 1945, Georges Suarez, Paul Chack, Henri Béraud, and Robert Brasillach were sentenced to death for “intelligence with the enemy.” Only Béraud was pardoned.

Out of thirty-two cases of writers and journalists tried in the period of the *épuration* by the Cour de Justice de la Seine, a department whose jurisdiction over Paris encompassed a high concentration of intellectuals, twelve were sentenced to death, thirteen to penal servitude, and six to prison. Only one was acquitted.⁶¹ Of the dozen writers condemned to death, seven were shot. The rate of execution for intellectuals was much higher than the national average of 11 percent (767 executions out of 6,763 death sentences during the *épuration*).⁶²

The gravity of the punishment to which writers were exposed—death—provoked an acute surge of emotion in the literary world. Justice seemed to be more severe for authors than for economic or political traitors who provided the material means for collaboration. To many it seemed that intellectuals served as scapegoats for a whole society. In his sociological analysis of the concept of responsibility, the Durkheimian Paul Fauconnet relates indirect or mediate responsibility to religious rituals of sacrifice and the designation of a scapegoat; the death sentence, he argues, was originally “un sacrifice expiatoire par lequel la société écarte les dangers que le crime attirerait sur elle.”⁶³ Several structural reasons account for the harshness of the sentence.⁶⁴ Evidence against published writers was easy to gather and unequivocal when their work had overtly served enemy propaganda, so they were the first to be judged. The sentences were much more severe during the war—that is, until May 1945—and became more indulgent as time passed. The trials were more severe in Paris than in the provinces, and intellectuals were mainly sentenced in the capital because of the centralization of intellectual life. In general, individuals were more harshly punished than institutions, since the country had to be reconstructed. Although penal responsibility increased in direct proportion to social position, members of the upper classes could afford a better defense than those of the middle and lower classes. Intellectuals, being dominated within the dominant class, as Pierre Bourdieu puts it, were more vulnerable.⁶⁵ Because of their individual renown, it was possible to make their trials exemplary, as de Gaulle wished. But the designation of intellectuals as scapegoats would not have been possible without a collective belief in the writer’s social power, a belief that intellectuals shared with judges, prosecutors, and juries.

The intellectuals’ trials had a specific character. Their writings were “the best witnesses” for the court, as the prosecutor André Boissarie explained during the trial of Jean Hérold-Paquis, a pro-German broadcaster on Radio-Paris.⁶⁶ Boissarie’s point was that published texts constituted the record of an evil deed: the crime of their own production. In a memoir he wrote for his defense, the journalist and writer Henri Béraud argued, on the contrary, that since he was prosecuted for his writings, he was tried not for deeds but for ideas, for his “opinions.”⁶⁷

The purge trials were clearly a case of political justice. But does it mean that the accused were condemned for their opinions? The answer is no, at least not in principle. Writers were prosecuted not for their ideas but for what were defined as acts of treason. Helping to formulate and disseminate the enemy's arguments was an act of treason, and so was denouncing French citizens. The prosecutors tried to prove that words entailed deeds, that they were "performative," in John Austin's sense,⁶⁸ and thus constituted a concrete act. All of the usual signs of a writer's success were taken as evidence for the potential power of his words, including the writer's audience (especially when he wrote for presses with large circulation) and the breadth of his talent, which increased his persuasive power and the efficacy of his propaganda, particularly among the young. As the prosecutors argued, even his literary style, colorful or violent, could have served the enemy's interest.

At the heart of these trials was the question of the writer's responsibility. After Béraud's trial on 29 December 1944, Mauriac protested against the death sentence. Claiming that Béraud was innocent of the crime for which he was condemned, "intelligence with the enemy," Mauriac invoked the sense of solidarity among writers and the fact that "un écrivain français appartient à notre patrimoine. Ce n'est pas à nous d'en faire bon marché." But he added, "Si Béraud avait commis le crime pour lequel il a été condamné, son talent ne serait pas à mes yeux une excuse."⁶⁹

The ambivalence of Mauriac's position crystallized the issues posed by the trials. On one hand, condemning a writer to death seemed to be a mutilation of the national patrimony and prestige. In this perspective, the symbolic capital of the writer should function as an extenuating circumstance and protect him from the specter of capital punishment. Jacques Isorni, Robert Brasillach's lawyer, used this argument in his defense; he quoted the opinion of some famous writers (Mauriac, Marcel Aymé, Paul Valéry) regarding his client's talent. In most trials, the defense dissociated the polemicist from the writer in order to save the latter. On the other hand, according to Mauriac, talent was no excuse if the accused really were guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In fact, talent could even be construed as reinforcing the guilty verdict; the responsibility of the writer varied in proportion to his talent and his renown. During Béraud's trial, the judge told him: "L'accusation va vous reprocher d'avoir, en agissant ainsi, mis à la disposition et au service de nos ennemis votre talent d'écrivain et de journaliste. C'est ce qu'il y a de plus grave."⁷⁰ In *Le Figaro*, the reviewer of the trial noted, "Séance pénible et même douloureuse entre toutes, où l'accusation tirait ses arguments les plus forts du talent même de l'accusé, du retentissement de ses campagnes et de l'influence que ce privilège lui permettrait d'exercer. Procès où le principe même de la responsabilité de l'écrivain prenait une valeur tragique. C'est ce que souligna dès l'abord l'accusation."⁷¹

Similarly, in Brasillach's trial on 19 January 1945 the general prosecutor Marcel Reboul closed his case by drawing attention to the "powerful prestige"

that this young writer enjoyed, being “paré de toutes les séductions de l'éloquence persuasive,” in a country that has “toujours placé au premier rang les mérites de la plume.” It was this privileged position, Reboul noted, that made so reprehensible the crime of having “abusé de ses dons, de ses succès, de cette autorité, pour tenter d'entraîner la jeunesse, d'abord vers une politique stérile, ensuite vers l'ennemi.”⁷² The penal responsibility of the writer was here measured according to his social status, that is, the prestige he enjoyed in French society. As had been the case in the trials of the nineteenth century, the penal responsibility of the author was once more imbued with the collective belief in the writer's symbolic power.

During the trials, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers regularly used literary arguments and invoked the professional code of ethics among writers as if this abstract, unwritten, and much disputed set of principles had a secure legal or professional foundation. Even though Béraud, Brasillach, and the others were indicted not for their literary writings but their journalism, police reports and court proceedings stressed the status of the accused as renowned men of letters. In most trials, the prosecutor argued that the defendant had misused his talent and his influence for political or propaganda purposes. In Brasillach's trial, the general prosecutor Reboul succeeded in convincing the court and the jury that Brasillach's talent and influence had served the enemy. Reboul specified that Brasillach's treason was a “clerk's treason,” an expression referring to Julien Benda's 1924 essay, *La Trahison des clercs*, which denounced the political commitment of intellectuals as a betrayal of their universal vocation and mission. He argued that Brasillach betrayed the ethics of every aspect of his profession: he was the writer who abandoned pure literature out of his ambition to enlarge his audience and gain political influence; he was the intellectual who misused his authority and his power of persuasion among young people to incite them to denunciation and crime; he was the critic who abandoned dispassionate analysis for treasonous propaganda and collective denunciations of Communists, Jews, and civil servants; and last, but not least, he was the academic scholar who insulted his alma mater by calling for the suppression of free thought in the universities.⁷³

Conversely, most of the accused writers adopted the defense strategy of discussing their writings from a literary or philosophical standpoint, and not as political polemic. During the interrogations, Abel Hermant, an octogenarian member of the Académie Française, contested the interpretation of his articles, noting his use of literary genres and devices. An intellectual's legitimate claim to his own system of thought might serve as the basis for justifying his actions. Defendants insisted upon their professional probity and sincerity, an argument that was calculated to recast a trial from an indictment for treason into a prosecution for one's opinion. The accusation of treason was unjust, they argued, since they believed they were promulgating their ideas only for the national interest. Many of them denied responsibility. Béraud, who was a renowned writer, winner of the 1922 Prix Goncourt, and a famous lampoonist

who published in the extreme-Right weekly *Gringoire*, which had a circulation of 600,000 in the 1930s, passed the blame on to Marshal Pétain: "Comment un simple citoyen, tel que moi, qu'il avait jadis commandé à Verdun puis aidé dans sa carrière littéraire, et qu'il venait de recevoir paternellement, eût-il pu mettre en doute l'autorité du Maréchal? Je l'ai suivi."⁷⁴ The young critic Lucien Combelle deflected his responsibility onto Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, denouncing his elder's influence. Abel Hermant claimed he had been deceived by journalistic sources. With the benefit of hindsight, they recognized that they were wrong, but could an error be punished by death?

In contrast to Béraud and Combelle before him, Brasillach was the only writer who assumed his responsibility entirely. He set forth his defense on the very grounds of the indictment: he affirmed that everything he wrote during the Occupation was in the sole interest of France and not in the service of the enemy. His fascist and anti-Semitic opinions, he declared, were not due to German influence but rather were grounded in a venerable French tradition. But these arguments did not suffice to avoid the death sentence. In spite of the large mobilization within the literary milieu to support his demand for pardon in a petition that was presented to Charles de Gaulle by François Mauriac, Brasillach was not pardoned. In refusing to grant clemency, de Gaulle indicated he shared the same conception of the writer's responsibility; as he wrote in his *Mémoires de guerre*, "S'ils n'avaient pas servi directement et passionnément l'ennemi, je commuais leur peine par principe. Dans un cas contraire—le seul [that is, in Brasillach's case]—je ne me sentis pas le droit de gracier. Car dans les lettres comme en tout, le talent est un titre de responsabilité."⁷⁵ At the age of thirty-five, Brasillach was shot on 6 February 1945. A few weeks later, fascist writer Drieu La Rochelle committed suicide. In an exordium he left, Drieu, like Brasillach, claimed full responsibility for his actions as an intellectual: "Je me suis conduit en pleine conscience, au milieu de ma vie, selon l'idée que je me fais des devoirs de l'intellectuel. L'intellectuel, le clerc, l'artiste, n'est pas un citoyen comme les autres. Il a des devoirs et des droits supérieurs à ceux des autres."⁷⁶

Drieu La Rochelle expressed the same intransigent conception of responsibility shared by a new generation of intellectuals. The question of the purges divided the literary field into two camps: the "indulgents" (a term that referred to the French Revolution) and the "intransigents." Apart from the political opposition between Left and Right, Communist and Gaullist, this division was the expression of a struggle between the old generation and the new one for the imposition of the legitimate definition of literature. At stake was the conservation or the transformation of the balance of power that characterized the literary field before the war.

Their experience of the war and their commitment to the Resistance contributed to the crystallization of a new literary generation born between 1900 and 1915 (between thirty- and forty-five-years-old at Liberation) and best represented by Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Vercors (Jean Bruller).⁷⁷ This

experience established their vision of the world and their authority to speak in its name. It was through one particular notion that these writers assimilated their collective experience to their intellectual vision of the world and that they valued the “moral capital” they accumulated with their underground activity in order to compel recognition on the literary scene: the notion of the writer’s responsibility. This notion of responsibility is at the core of the controversy between “indulgents” and “intransigents” around which the literary field restructured. It also forms the basis of the concept of “committed literature,” which Sartre articulated in the Autumn 1945 issue of his new review, *Les Temps Modernes*, as an alternative to the “art for art’s sake” paradigm that still prevailed in the interwar period at the aesthetic pole represented by Gallimard and the *Nouvelle Revue Française*.

The first public debate on the issue opposed the young journalist and writer Albert Camus to the venerable Catholic author François Mauriac. Both were journalists (the former at *Combat*, the latter at *Figaro*), novelists, and members of the Resistance. Camus demanded a severe purge; Mauriac called for national reconciliation. The quarrel, which lasted from October 1944 to January 1945, would be styled “Justice ou charité,” a title given by Camus, who succeeded in identifying Mauriac’s position as a Catholic one, although Mauriac’s arguments were more complicated, involving the idea of national reconciliation.⁷⁸ The intransigent young writer won in the public arena; in private he acknowledged the force of his elder’s case.

Brasillach’s condemnation and execution reinforced the generational divisions and elicited debate about the notion of responsibility. About sixty prominent individuals signed the petition supporting Brasillach’s pardon, including thirteen members of the Académie Française and famous authors Marcel Aymé, Colette, Jean Cocteau, Jean Paulhan, and, of course, Mauriac. Giving voice to the camp of the “indulgents,” this document was representative of the literary establishment. All signers belonged to the elder generation (the average age was fifty-eight),⁷⁹ except Camus, who overcame his intransigence after a long night’s hesitation because, he said, he was morally opposed to the death sentence. (He may also have been motivated out of a sense of solidarity with this young man he hated but who was his very age and whose father, like his, had been killed during the First World War—this was one of the extenuating circumstances Brasillach cited in his demand for pardon).

In the public debate that arose in the wake of Brasillach’s execution, younger intellectuals defended an intransigent conception of the writer’s responsibility against the protestations of their elders. The weekly journal *Carréfour* published an inquiry on “la responsabilité de l’écrivain” from 10 February to 17 March 1945. While the older generation, represented by such distinguished men as Georges Duhamel of the Académie Française, the Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel, and Jean Paulhan, the editor of the *Nouvelle Revue française*, tried to limit the writer’s responsibility, to propose a sliding scale of accountability, or even to plead the right to error, most of the

younger disputants replied that if writers did not accept full responsibility for their work their discourse would be discredited. Two young veterans of the literary Resistance, Vercors, the author of *Le Silence de la mer* (1942), the first novel to be printed clandestinely during the Occupation, and Pierre Seghers, a poet and publisher, argued that the writer's responsibility was even greater than that of the industrialist. Jacques Isorni, Brasillach's lawyer, had contrasted intellectual and economic collaboration during the trial; if we require the death sentence for a poet like Brasillach, he asked, what sentence would arms magnates deserve? The rumor that intellectuals were being punished more severely than the industrialists who provided the material means for the Nazi war machine began to spread in the intellectual milieu, inspiring Jean Paulhan's parable of the Atlantic Wall:

L'épuration mène la vie dure aux écrivains. Les ingénieurs, entrepreneurs et maçons qui ont bâti le mur de l'Atlantique se promènent parmi nous bien tranquillement. Ils s'emploient à bâtir de nouveaux murs. Ils bâtissent les murs des nouvelles prisons, où l'on enferme les journalistes qui ont eu le tort d'écrire que le mur de l'Atlantique était bien bâti. C'est ainsi que nous autres gens de lettres avons fait fortune, il y a trois ans. Je parle d'une fortune morale. [...N]ous allions recevoir enfin notre pleine responsabilité.⁸⁰

For Paulhan, whose conception of the writer's responsibility had changed since the interwar period, the crime resides in deeds and not in words. The responsibility devolved upon those who realized the ideas concretely and not those who elaborated on them intellectually. Sartre, who did not participate directly in the debate, replied to Paulhan in *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* that he was undisturbed by the fact that the literary profession could be a dangerous occupation; in fact, he was happy to accept the risk.⁸¹ And Simone de Beauvoir would later say that she never regretted not having signed the petition in favor of Brasillach. It was a pity, she noted, that economic collaborators were not punished, but she approved of the severe judgment against Hitler's propagandists: "Par métier, par vocation, j'accorde une énorme importance aux paroles. [...] Il y a des mots aussi meurtriers qu'une chambre à gaz."⁸²

But Sartre's real response to Paulhan was to affirm that writing constituted a form of action in the world. He could rely on the trials where writings were judged as acts of treason and not as expression of ideas. Indeed, as Anna Boschetti puts it, Sartre achieved "un renversement magistral: il peut soutenir que la pensée, la littérature, non seulement sont action en soi, mais qu'elles sont la forme suprême de l'action."⁸³ While compensating for the inferiority complex of the intellectual Resistance vis-à-vis the armed Resistance, Sartre's position also collapsed the traditional opposition between thought and action. But this is not all. His definition of "committed literature" also superseded another old dichotomy: that between responsibility and liberty, which had been opposed since the time of Bourget and Brunetière. Sartre's reformulation of the writer's responsibility contributed to his success in postwar France.

The issue of authorial responsibility had long been defined with respect to the interests of the state. During the German Occupation writers of the Resistance were able to redefine responsibility by appropriating national moralism. In the purge trials, collaborationist writers were sentenced as traitors to the nation. But the patriotic moralism that Resistance writers, especially Communists, claimed was quickly devalued as a criterion for literary judgment. From Mexico, the surrealist writer Benjamin Peret denounced the patriotic poetry of Aragon and Paul Eluard, stating that it did not surpass "le niveau lyrique de la publicité pharmaceutique."⁸⁴ Sartre would also decry the risk of "nationalizing" literature; alluding ironically to the nationalization of gas and electricity that occurred at that time, Sartre observed that since France had lost its political and economic stature on the international scene, but still kept its literary prestige, the government increasingly considered writers as a national patrimony and as civil servants.⁸⁵ Yet Sartre also rejected Peret's defense of "art for art's sake." He did not renounce the notion of responsibility, which was central to his existentialist philosophy. Sartre's innovation was to separate responsibility from national moralism and to connect it to his philosophical conception of freedom.

In itself, the link between responsibility and freedom was not new. It grounded the most common juridical theory of penal responsibility, which punishes the free adult person who is able to exercise choice and denies responsibility to animals, children, or madmen. Responsibility and free will are here inseparable.⁸⁶ But Sartre extended this idea to artistic freedom, reversing the traditional arguments that tried to restrict it in the name of a moral notion of responsibility. According to Sartre's theory, responsibility does not impose any limits to artistic freedom. On the contrary, responsibility is the finest expression of liberty. Sartre developed this idea in 1947 in an essay on Baudelaire, in which he criticized the poet for conceiving freedom only as gratuitousness. Although Baudelaire understood that freedom leads to total responsibility, he wanted to avoid the attendant anxiety and thus adopted for himself a "limited responsibility."⁸⁷

Sartre composed his study of the poet just after the law allowing appeals against sentences for moral offense by literary means was adopted, on 26 September 1946, and Baudelaire was in the midst of rehabilitation. Baudelaire's exoneration by judicial authorities did not please those in literary circles, who feared it would diminish the prestige of the poet while enhancing the credit of government administrators. Baudelaire's official restoration threatened to erase from collective memory the scandal his work provoked when it was first published and, consequently, to leach its subversive force. It denied the writer's symbolic power and his responsibility. "Après tout, ce n'est pas aux écrivains de tirer d'embarras les magistrats et les policiers," argued the critic André Billy, observing: "Il est beau, d'autre part, que Baudelaire reste condamné. Cela fait partie de son rayonnement, de son prestige."⁸⁸

In his introduction to *Les Temps Modernes*, Sartre stated that he held "Flaubert et Goncourt pour responsables de la répression qui suivit la Commune

parce qu'ils n'[avaient] pas écrit une ligne pour l'empêcher."⁸⁹ On 1 November 1946, at the first UNESCO conference, Sartre delivered a lecture on the writer's responsibility. For Sartre, as for Dostoyevsky, "Tout homme est responsable de tout devant tous." The responsibility of the shoemaker or the physician is only a limited one; he is responsible as a human being, not as a professional with particular skills. But this is not so for the writer, because to name or to designate is to give meaning to acts, to make them exist in the general consciousness. The writer is responsible in spite of himself, because he names things, and consequently, he is also responsible when he chooses to remain silent, since "[s]e taire, c'est encore parler."⁹⁰ If responsibility is the result of creative freedom, then the writer has, in return, the responsibility to guarantee freedom. For Sartre, the writer is responsible for human freedom in general.

Thus Sartre moved beyond the opposition between responsibility and freedom inherited from such Catholic and conservative writers as Paul Bourget. He redefined responsibility within a philosophical framework and gave it a universal scope. He did so at the very moment when the world was discovering the horror of the Holocaust and when the juridical notion of a "crime against humanity" was being formulated. Although this notion would not be applied in France until Adolf Eichmann's trial in the 1960s, the definition of the penal responsibility of intellectuals evolved throughout 1945. For example, in Hérold-Paquis' trial, the prosecutor felt it necessary to identify a charge more universal than "intelligence with the enemy"; he therefore accused the broadcaster of "complicity with war crimes."⁹¹ In her article "Œil pour œil," published at the beginning of 1946, Simone de Beauvoir accused Brasillach not of national treason but of committing a "péché contre l'homme" by helping "dégrader l'homme en chose."⁹²

By declaring that writing engaged the author, Sartre placed himself in the camp of the intransigents, who held the writer responsible for his work and who rejected the disavowal inherent in Paulhan's assertion of the writer's "right to make an error" or his "right to aberration." But Sartre's conception of "committed literature" also allowed him to reaffirm the writer's autonomy in contrast to the model of militancy represented by Aragon and Eluard, who put literature at the service of the Communist Party. He established a genealogy from Voltaire's commitment in the Calas Affair and from Zola's *dreyfusard* broadside, *J'accuse*, to the literary Resistance (and to himself), thus establishing the figure of "the intellectual" as one who intervenes in public affairs in the name of his specific symbolic capital, that is to say his renown in his domain of creation—a figure best represented in France by the writer.

The debates spawned by the *épuration* lasted until the declaration of legal amnesty in 1953. But this conception of responsibility, which is the most important legacy of the intellectual Resistance, would survive this period, as the commitment of French writers against the Algerian War would prove. As Diane Rubinstein puts it, Brasillach had to die in order "to ensure the status of the French intellectual" and his symbolic capital.⁹³

As demonstrated in this article, the notion of responsibility provides a link between the social conditions of production of literature and the ethical principles that founded the commitment of writers as intellectuals in France. The trials were the place where writers were confronted with the social and moral definition of their responsibility. The trials were often the occasion for them to become aware of the social expectations and significance attributed to the written word. As Paul Fauconnet puts it, the "haute valeur morale de la répression fait la valeur de la responsabilité qui en est la condition."⁹⁴ But they also had to defend their autonomy against the conception of their responsibility imposed upon them in the trials. It was, as argued here, partly in this confrontation that writers defending the autonomy of literature against extraliterary judgments (moral and political, as well as economic) came to define collectively their ethical principles. Against the claims of social morality and public decency, which they considered as official hypocrisy, French authors opposed the values of "truth," "probity," "sincerity," "free speech," and "artistic freedom." These values founded the theory of art for art's sake and the claims for literary autonomy. Whereas Catholic and conservative writers and critics developed a restrictive conception of responsibility close to the social and penal definitions, some writers, from Zola to Sartre, invoked these professional values not only to claim literary autonomy but also to ground an autonomous conception of their political responsibility based on their symbolic power. They gave such intellectual values as truth, freedom of speech, and sincerity a universal scope so as to legitimate their political engagement as intellectuals. Thus, the penal definition of the writer's responsibility contributed to the building of his or her symbolic power, even as the conception of the political responsibility of the writer and the figure of the committed intellectual can be considered in turn as an autonomous response to this heterogeneous definition.

GISÈLE SAPIRO is research director at the CNRS (Centre de sociologie européenne-Paris). She published a book on the French literary field during World War II, *La Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953* (1999) and articles on literature and politics, public intellectuals, and translation. She coedited two books: *Pour une histoire des sciences sociales* (2004) and *Pierre Bourdieu, sociologue* (2004). She has also coedited: Issues 144 and 145 of *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* (2002) on international cultural exchange and the circulation of ideas, Issue 15 of *Sociétés et représentations* (2002) on socialist realism in France, and Issue 214 of *Le Mouvement Social* (2006) on the organization of professions.

Notes

1. Different versions of this paper have been presented at Cornell University's Department of French Studies (2 October 2000), Harvard University's Center of European Studies (21 October 2002), Duke University's Center for French and Francophone Studies (12 September 2003), NYU's Institute for French Studies (16 September 2003), and Williams College's Oakley Center (26 April 2005). I would like to thank all the scholars who invited me for the opportunities they gave me to present this research to colleagues in different disciplines and for facilitating such rich discussions. Special thanks to Brad Verter who kindly revised the English version.
2. Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?" [1969], *Dits et écrits*, vol. 1, 1954-1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 789-820.
3. Roger Chartier, "Figures de l'auteur," *L'Ordre des livres: Lecteurs, auteurs, bibliothèques en Europe entre XIV^e et XVIII^e siècle* (Aix-en-Provence: Alinéa, 1992), 57-58.
4. Max Weber, "Ständische Lage," *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1957), chap. 4, §3.
5. Bernard Vouillot, "La Révolution et l'Empire: une nouvelle réglementation," and Isabelle de Conihout, "La Restauration: contrôle et liberté," in *Histoire de l'édition française*, vol. 2, *Le Livre triomphant*, ed. Roger Chartier and Henri-Jean Martin (Paris: Fayard/Promodis, 1990 [1984]), 694-718.
6. Practically, this meant that they were to be judged by the *cour d'assises*. This principle was challenged several times during the nineteenth century; conservative governments decided to submit writing crimes to the court of summary jurisdiction instead of the *cour d'assises*.
7. Martyn Lyons, "Fires of Expiation: Book-Burnings and Catholic Missions in Restoration France," *French History* 10, 2 (June 1996), 241-66.
8. Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 234-38; Roger Chartier, *Les Origines culturelles de la Révolution française* (Paris: Seuil, 2000 [1990]); Paul Bénichou, *Le Sacre de l'écrivain 1750-1830: Essai sur l'avènement d'un pouvoir spirituel laïque dans la France moderne*, rev. ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1996 [1973]), 117-19.
9. Annie Prassoloff, *Littérature en procès: La propriété littéraire en France sous la Monarchie de Juillet*, (thèse de doctorat, EHESS, 1989), 128.
10. Apart from the classical works on the book market during the ancien régime by Robert Darnton and Roger Chartier, see, for example, for the modern period: Annie Stora-Lamarre, *L'Enfer de la III^e République: Censeurs et pornographes 1881-1914* (Paris: Imago, 1990); Yvan Leclerc, *Crimes écrits: La littérature en procès au XIX^e siècle* (Paris: Plon, 1991); James Smith Allen, *In the Public Eye: A History of Reading in Modern France, 1800-1940* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 3; Robin Myer and Michael Harris, eds., *Censorship and the Control of Print in England and France 1600-1910* (Winchester: St Paul's Bibliographies, 1992).
11. For the French case, see for example: Susan Suleiman, *Authoritarian Fictions: The Ideological Novel as a Literary Genre* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Susan Suleiman, *Subversive Intent: Gender, Politics, and the Avant-Garde* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Anna Boschetti, *Sartre et "Les Temps Modernes": Une entreprise intellectuelle* (Paris: Minuit, 1985); Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, *Literary France: The Making of a Culture* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Christophe Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels" 1880-1900* (Paris: Minuit, 1990); Jeffrey Mehlman, *Genealogies of the Text: Literature, Psychoanalysis, and Politics in Modern France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). I wrote a book on the political choices of writers during World War II: *La Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

12. Pierre Bourdieu, *Les Règles de l'art: Genèse et structure du champ littéraire* (Paris: Seuil, 1992).
13. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See also "Les professions intellectuelles entre l'État, l'entrepreneuriat et l'industrie," my introduction to the special issue of *Le Mouvement Social* 214 (January-March 2006): 3-18 and, in this same issue, Robert Nye, "Les médecins, la déontologie et l'Etat (1789-1947)," 19-26, which is an analysis of the development of medical ethics in the nineteenth century, long before the adoption and legal enforcement of a written code of professional ethics by statute in 1947. Other professions, such as architecture and social engineering, are studied in this issue.
14. In 1820, 24 percent of literary authors served as diplomats, in government, or had honorary responsibilities; the rate falls to 17 percent in 1827, then to 10 percent in 1834 and to 13 percent in 1841. Roger Chartier, "La génération romantique" [annex], in Chartier et Martin, *Le Livre triomphant*, 784. See also in the same volume, Robert Bied, "La condition d'auteur," 773-99.
15. Gisèle Sapiro, "Forms of politicization in the French literary field," *Theory and Society* 32 (2003), 633-52. For a sociohistorical approach of the professional organization of writers in France, see my articles: "Entre individualisme et corporatisme: les écrivains dans la première moitié du XX^e siècle," in *La France malade du corporatisme?* ed. Steven Kaplan and Philippe Minard (Paris: Belin, 2004), 279-314 and, with Boris Gobille, "Propriétaires ou travailleurs intellectuels? Les écrivains français en quête de statut," *Le Mouvement Social* 214 (January-March 2006): 113-40.
16. Eugène Poitou, *Du roman et du théâtre contemporain et de leur influence sur les mœurs* (Paris: Durand, 1857), iii-iv.
17. Anne-Marie Chartier and Jean Hébrard, *Discours sur la lecture (1880-2000)* (Paris: Fayard, 2000). The same arguments will be used during the Third Republic; see Stora-Lamarre, *Censeurs et pornographes*, chap. 2.
18. Anne-Marie Thiesse, *Le Roman du quotidien: Lecteurs et lectures populaires à la Belle époque* (Paris: Le Chemin Vert, 1984).
19. Ernest Pinard, speech for the prosecution, trial of Gustave Flaubert, Tribunal correctionnel de Paris (sixth chamber), 31 January and 7 February 1857, in Gustave Flaubert, *Œuvres*, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 1951), 631-32.
20. Suleiman, *Authoritarian Fictions*.
21. Dominick LaCapra, "Madame Bovary" on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Christine Haynes, "The Politics of Publishing during the Second Empire: The Trial of *Madame Bovary* Revisited," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 23, 2 (Summer 2005): 1-21.
22. Albert Cassagne, *La Théorie de l'art pour l'art en France chez les derniers romantiques et les premiers réalistes* (1906).
23. See, for example, Jean-Marie Guyau, *L'Art au point de vue sociologique* (Paris: Alcan, 1887), 380. On the appropriation of the notion of moral contagion by medical discourse from the eighteenth century onward, see Jan Goldstein, "'Moral Contagion': A Professional Ideology of Medicine and Psychiatry in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France," in *Professions and the French State 1700-1900*, ed. Gerald L. Geison (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 181-222.
24. This idea was widespread at least until World War II. For example, in 1941 the Catholic writer Henry Bordeaux explained why he considered literature to have causal effects, asserting that it "projette dans les cerveaux d'une élite ou d'une foule, selon son crédit, des images qui soutiennent les énergies ou les affaiblissent" (Henry Bordeaux, "La responsabilité de l'écrivain," *Voici la France* 13 [March 1941]: 1-4).

25. Théophile Gautier, "Préface," *Mademoiselle de Maupin* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966), 41.
26. Cassagne, *La Théorie de l'art pour l'art*, 234.
27. Pinard, speech for the prosecution, 627.
28. *Ibid.*, 631.
29. Gautier, "Préface," 45.
30. Charles Baudelaire, "Les Drame et les romans honnêtes," *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 1976), 41.
31. Baudelaire, "Théophile Gautier," *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 2, 113.
32. Baudelaire, "Madame Bovary," *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 2, 81-82.
33. Victor Hugo, "Préface à l'édition originale des *Orientales*," *Œuvre poétique* (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 1964), 578.
34. Paul Bourget, "Avant-propos de 1883" and "Avant-propos de 1885," in *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*, vol. 1 (Paris: Plon, 1901), xvi, xx-xxvi.
35. See Thomas Loué, "Les fils de Taine entre science et morale. À propos du *Disciple* de Paul Bourget (1889)," *Cahiers d'histoire* 65 (1996), 55.
36. Georges Fonsegrive, *De Taine à Péguy: L'évolution des idées dans la France contemporaine* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1917), 73. See also Hervé Serry, *Naissance de l'intellectuel catholique* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004) and "Littérature et religion catholique (1880-1914). Contribution à une socio-histoire de la croyance," *Cahiers d'histoire* 87 (2002): 37-60.
37. Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, chap. 2.
38. See Stora-Lamarre, *L'Enfer de la III^e République*.
39. Jean-Yves Mollier, "La survie de la censure d'État (1881-1949)," in *La Censure en France à l'ère démocratique (1848-...)*, ed. Pascal Ory (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1997), 77-87.
40. Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels"*, 111.
41. Alexandre Millerand, "Speech for the Defense," in Lucien Descaves, *Sous-Offs* (Genève: Slatkine, 1980), 505.
42. "Argument of the Avocat Général," in *ibid.*, 443.
43. Quoted by Millerand, in *ibid.*, 502, 503.
44. Reproduced in *ibid.*, 490 n.1.
45. Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels"*, 112.
46. Maurice Tézenas, "Speech for the Defense," in Descaves, *Sous-Offs*, 470.
47. Susan Rubin Suleiman, "L'engagement sublime: Zola comme archétype d'un mythe culturel," *Les Cahiers Naturalistes* 67 (1993), 11-24; see also Alain Pagès, *Emile Zola, un intellectuel dans l'Affaire Dreyfus: Histoire de "J'accuse"* (Paris: Séguier, 1991).
48. Emile Zola, "Lettre à la France [6 janvier 1898]," in Emile Zola, *L'Affaire Dreyfus: La vérité en marche* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1992), 80.
49. Emile Zola, "Déclaration au jury," in Emile Zola, *L'Affaire Dreyfus*, 111-19.
50. "Déclaration d'indépendance de l'esprit," *L'Humanité* (26 June 1919), reproduced in Jean-François Sirinelli, *Intellectuels et passions françaises: Manifestes et pétitions au XX^e siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 42; "Pour un parti de l'intelligence," *Le Figaro* (19 July 1919), reproduced in *ibid.*, 43-46.
51. Notes prepared by Jacques Rivière for a meeting of contributors to the NRF on 3 July 1919, in Henri Ghéon and Jacques Rivière, *Correspondance 1910-1925* (Lyon: Centre d'études gidiennes, Université de Lyon II, 1988), 200.
52. Jacques Rivière, "La Nouvelle Revue française," *La NRF* 69 (June 1919), 4.
53. Quoted in Maurice Nadeau, *Histoire du surréalisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1945), 203.
54. Jean Paulhan to Roger Martin du Gard, 18 February 1932, in Jean Paulhan, *Choix de lettres*, vol. 1, 1917-1936 (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 229-30.
55. Jean Paulhan to Marcel Arland, 20 October [1939], in Paulhan, *Choix de lettres*, vol. 2, 1937-1945 (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 125 (emphasis in original).

56. Jean Paulhan, "Il ne faut pas compter sur nous," *La NRF* (December 1939); *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 5, *Politique* (Paris: Cercle du livre précieux, 1970), 272-73.
57. Francine Muel-Dreyfus, *Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002 [1996]).
58. For a detailed analysis of this quarrel, see Wolfgang Babilas, "La querelle des mauvais maîtres," in *La Littérature française sous l'Occupation* (Reims: Presses Universitaires de Reims, 1989), 197-226 and Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 161-207.
59. [Jean-Paul Sartre], "La littérature, cette liberté!" *Les Lettres françaises* 15 (April 1944), 1.
60. On the purges, see Herbert R. Lottman, *The Purge* (New York: Morrow, 1986); Peter Novick, *L'Épuration française 1944-1949* (Paris: Balland, 1985); Marc Olivier Baruch, ed., *Une poignée de misérables: L'épuration de la société française après la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Paris: Fayard, 2003).
61. Gisèle Sapiro, "L'Épuration du monde des lettres," in *Une poignée de misérables*, 243-85. The provisional results I present here are part of a larger project on the purge trials of intellectuals based on the instruction files in the archives of the Cour de Justice de la Seine (in the Archives Nationales [hereafter, AN], series Z6), shorthand notes on the trials by the Cabinet Bluet, and a consultation of the press. The thirty-two cases I identified are only a sample.
62. Cf. Henry Rouso, "L'Épuration en France. Une histoire inachevée," *Vingtième siècle* 33 (January-March 1992), 91, 94.
63. Paul Fauconnet, *La Responsabilité: Étude de sociologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1920), 170.
64. Novick, *L'Épuration française*, 258-59; Pierre Assouline, *L'Épuration des intellectuels* (Bruxelles: Complexe, 1985); Diane Rubinstein, "Publish and Perish: The Épuration of French Intellectuals," *Journal of European Studies* 23 (1993), 76.
65. Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Minuit, 1979).
66. Minutes of the trial of Hérold-Paquis, 17 September 1945, Archives René Bluet, AN: 334 AP 15.
67. Henri Béraud, memorandum addressed to the Juge d'instruction, 4 November 1944, AN: Z6 7.
68. John Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
69. François Mauriac, "Autour d'un verdict," in *Le Baïllon dénoué: Après quatre ans de silence* (Paris: Grasset, 1945), 221.
70. Interrogation by Judge Pailhé, minutes of the trial of Henri Béraud, Archives René Bluet, AN: 334 AP 10.
71. [Anonymous], "Devant la cour de justice de la Seine Henri Béraud est condamné à mort," *Le Figaro*, 30 December 1944.
72. Marcel Reboul, speech for the prosecution, in Jacques Isnorn, *Le Procès de Robert Brasillach* (Paris: Flammarion, 1946), 125-27.
73. *Ibid.*, 137, 146-47, 159-65.
74. Béraud, memorandum.
75. Quoted in Assouline, *L'Épuration des intellectuels*, 83-84. For an analysis of the circumstances of this refusal, see Alice Yaeger Kaplan, *The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 211-12.
76. Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, "Exorde," in *Journal 1939-1945* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 502-503.
77. On the role of social upheavals in the crystallization of new generations, see Karl Mannheim, *Le Problème des générations* (Paris: Nathan, 1990), 65-67.
78. Albert Camus, "Justice et charité," *Combat*, 11 January 1945.
79. According to Alice Kaplan, who had access to other lists, it is even higher (sixty-two-years-old; see Kaplan, *The Collaborator*, 201).
80. Jean Paulhan, *De la paille et du grain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), 98.

81. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Situation de l'écrivain en 1947," *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975 [1948]), 260.
82. Simone de Beauvoir, *La Force des choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 33.
83. Boschetti, *Sartre et "Les Temps Modernes,"* 143.
84. Benjamin Péret, *Le Déshonneur des poètes* (Paris: Pauvert, 1965 [1945]), 23.
85. Jean-Paul Sartre, "La nationalisation de la littérature," *Situations*, vol. 2, 31-54. On the philosophical grounds of Sartre's position, see my article "Responsibility and Freedom: Foundations of Sartre's Concept of Intellectual Engagement," *Journal of Romance Studies* 6, 1-2 (2006).
86. Fauconnet, *La Responsabilité*, 177-80.
87. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Baudelaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975 [1947]), 65.
88. André Billy, "Faut-il réhabiliter Baudelaire?" *Le Littéraire*, 12 October 1940.
89. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Présentation des Temps Modernes," *Situations*, vol. 2, 13.
90. Jean-Paul Sartre, *La Responsabilité de l'écrivain* (Paris: Verdier, 1998), 21. The line from Dostoyevsky provided the theme for the conference.
91. André Boissarie, "Speech for the Prosecution," trial of Hérolde-Paquis, Sténographie Bluet.
92. Simone de Beauvoir, "Œil pour œil," *Les Temps Modernes* (February 1946), 816-17, 828.
93. Rubinstein, "Publish and Perish," 90.
94. Fauconnet, *La Responsabilité*, 300.