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The quarter saw a plethora of provocations by North Korea, ranging from ballistic missiles tests to the country’s second (and more successful) nuclear test. The United Nations Security Council responded with Resolution 1874 that called for financial sanctions and the institutionalization of a counterproliferation regime that would have made John Bolton proud. The U.S. and ROK presidents held their first summit amidst all this noise and sent clear signals of alliance solidarity. Washington exhibited the closeness of the alliance, being the only country to send a presidential delegation to the funeral of former President Roh Moo-hyun. These rhetorical demonstrations of the alliance’s strength, however, cannot drown out the potential substantive setback to the alliance as the KORUS Free Trade Agreement continues to languish. All North Korea, all the time “All North Korea, all the time,” is how one Obama administration official described the events in Asia over the first four months in office. North Korea ended the last quarter threatening to conduct a missile test and opened the second quarter making good on its promise. On April 5, Pyongyang launched what many believe was a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, but which the North justified as a satellite launch. Regardless of what it was, the booster technology for a rocket is essentially that of a ballistic missile, which this time traveled about 1,900 miles and demonstrated an improved capability over the failed launches in July 2006 and in 1998. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) responded to calls from the international community to seek a new UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution to the ballistic missile test by telegraphing its next moves: it threatened more tests and warned that it would restart all nuclear facilities if the UNSC even discussed its rocket launch. True to form, once the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted on April 13 a nonbinding President’s Statement (not a UN resolution) condemning the action as a violation of UNSC Resolution 1718 and called for the UN sanctions committee to list additional goods and entities for designation, Pyongyang ordered the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and a separate U.S. nuclear monitoring team out of the country. On April 29, a Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that the North would conduct another nuclear test unless the United Nations “apologized” for condemning its recent rocket launch. On May 25, Memorial Day in the U.S., the North made good on that threat, conducting its second underground nuclear test. Initial reports of the seismic activity associated with the event appear to indicate a higher yield than the October 2006 test. The DPRK claimed it to be a U.S.-Korea Relations 39 July 2009 successful test that “was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control.” Why the anger? Even for the DPRK, this was a fairly unprecedented string of angry provocations. The few remaining DPRK apologists attempted to justify this activity, employing arguments about DPRK insecurity and desire for U.S. “attention” as causal variables. They look for small signals of moderation even amidst the DPRK anger, for example, claiming that the DPRK notified the U.S., China, and Russia in advance of its plan to launch the long-range rocket and declared a no-navigation zone for ships. Moreover, it is within Pyongyang’s sovereign right, these analysts claim, to put satellites into orbit, just as South Korea and Japan do. These arguments, however, have lost much currency. The Obama administration’s outreach through Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth during his two trips to the region for high-level bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang have undercut attempts to pin the blame for DPRK bad behavior on Washington’s refusal to negotiate. Whether intentional or not, these initial entreaties by Obama did away in one fell swoop with the Bush administration’s perennial problem of being blamed for DPRK shenanigans. Regarding compliance with international procedures, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the DPRK did not follow the necessary international procedures for launching a satellite, which require a state to give prior notice of a satellite’s operating frequency, its intended orbital location, and other information to the International Telecommunication Union two to seven years before a satellite goes into use. And with regard to the moral equivalence of DPRK satellites, the answer quite simply is that neither Japan nor the ROK are under three UNSC resolutions – 1695, 1718, and 1874 (discussed below) – condemning their missile activities; hence the sovereign right to launch rockets is a little less circumscribed than those of Pyongyang. What is it, then, that the North wants with these actions? If Pyongyang rebuffs offers by the U.S. to negotiate and give Pyongyang all the attention it wants, then how does one explain the anger? The simplest explanation is that they are seeking to develop their missile and nuclear capabilities. Both the rocket launch and nuclear test appear to represent advancements in their capabilities. The April 2009 rocket, unlike the July 2006 test, did not fail in its initial ascent. Moreover, the second stage of the rocket overflew the Japanese archipelago, landing in the Pacific Ocean. As noted above, the May 25 underground nuclear test registered seismic activity beyond the so-called “fizzle” of the October 2006 test, which registered less than a kiloton weapon. Even in their failure, scientists can gain valuable data that can be used to advance the programs. Deadlocked in the Six-Party Talks negotiations at the end of 2008 and aware that the new and young U.S. president will be focused on other crises, the North Korean leadership might have found the current situation as good as any to advance their programs. A second potential cause relates to North Korean negotiating strategies. Pyongyang’s lack of interest in the Six-Party Talks at this moment may stem from a desire to shift the talks to a U.S.-DPRK bilateral negotiation between two established nuclear weapons states. The latter qualifier is a key consideration. As I noted in the Washington Post (June 14, 2009), the North constantly complained that the Six-Party Talks were about one-sided denuclearization of the DPRK, which U.S.-Korea Relations 40 July 2009 amounted to asking Pyongyang to “strip naked” while all others remained “garbed” (their parlance). Their preference was for “nuclear arms reduction” talks between two established nuclear weapons states. The ostensible purpose of these talks would be to get to zero, but neither would truly reach this point. In the interim, the North would enjoy both the economic/energy quid pro quos for partial denuclearization and the status of being the newest nuclear power. In this regard, the tests represent an attempt to demonstrate their capabilities in a way that positions them and the world into de facto acceptance of their nuclear status. A third potential explanation for North Korean behavior relates to its internal political situation. The ailing Kim Jong-il’s apparent attempt to transfer power to his youngest son, Kim Jung-un is only the second power transition in the nation’s history. The youngest son, only in his 20s, possesses none of the experience or revolutionary credentials of his predecessors. This has resulted in two dynamics: the rise of so-called hardliners within the North to protect the younger Kim and act as regents to him as he learns the ropes of the regime; and second, the tendency for unstable dictatorships to demonstrate as much external belligerence as possible to ensure that no one messes with the regime in its vulnerable state. The confluence of these factors may have created the “perfect storm” for the North’s nuclear belligerence. Little daylight: policy response Whatever the reason for the actions, there was little daylight among the international community in terms of responses. After the nuclear test, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg spent a week in Asia reaffirming the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Seoul and Tokyo while coordinating measures with the allies along with China and Russia. The South Korean government announced that it would fully participate in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which the previous ROK government had strongly resisted. These and other consultations led by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice in New York paved the way for the unanimous adoption on June 12 of UNSC Resolution 1874, which was co-sponsored by the U.S., France, Britain, Japan, and the ROK – an enhanced package of sanctions against the DPRK. The Chapter 7 resolution condemned in the strongest terms the May 25 nuclear test. It called on member states to inspect, seize, and dispose of banned imported/exported weapons including combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and missile parts, and to deny fuel or supplies to vessels carrying such items. The resolution also called on member states and international financial and credit institutions to prohibit services that could contribute to DPRK missile and nuclear programs. In the aftermath of UNSC Resolution 1874, some argued that the resolution lacked the “teeth” that Ambassador Rice promised. Some pointed to the fact that the resolution did not authorize the use of force and that aside from a mandatory ban on arms exports, the steps enumerated in Resolution 1874 constitute recommendations rather than requirements, so the potential impact ultimately depends on the determination of member states. While it is certainly true that the resolution does not mandate the use of force (few resolutions do), it goes a long way to building an effective counterproliferation regime against the North’s weapons capabilities. The arms embargo, financial sanctions, and inspection regime all U.S.-Korea Relations 41 July 2009 represent advances in efforts undertaken by the Bush administration to curtail DPRK proliferation financing and weapons development. Most important, these measures, once considered “unilateral” efforts by the Bush administration to undercut the regime in North Korea, are now institutionalized in a multilateral context, thereby making them potentially more effective. What was once, for example, a request on the part of the Bush administration to a financial regulator in Europe to investigate suspect North Korean bank accounts has now become an obligation among UN member states as a result of UNSC Resolution 1874. Moreover, the inspection regime created by this resolution represents a UN-backed institutionalization of the PSI created by John Bolton and Bob Joseph. UN member states are now obligated to inspect suspect cargo, deny “bunkering” (food and fuel) to suspect vessels, and share information, all of which should dramatically hamper the North’s ability to operate. Moreover, the resolution provides for the creation of a monitoring body among UNSC members to report on member state compliance with the resolution’s provisions. These arguments did not persuade many until a North Korea ship, the Kang Nam, en route to Burma/Myanmar, offered the first immediate test of the resolution in June. Many saw Rangoon as a weak link that could provide bunkering for DPRK vessels and thereby enable trade to the Middle East. However, contrary to most pundits’ expectations, the government in Rangoon announced that it would be obligated to inspect and if necessary seize and dispose of banned cargo in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1874. The result: the North Korea ship reversed course, apparently navigating back to its home port. The resolution is far from air tight, but it makes commendable progress in building a real counterproliferation regime. Other areas where cooperation particularly with the Chinese and Russians is needed are controlling airspace and overland routes to prevent potential proliferation. These activities do not represent an end to the Obama administration’s interest in diplomacy (although there is understandably less interest in bilateral talks now). On the contrary, as one official noted, these activities would need to be undertaken regardless of the state of the negotiations as long as the North was in possession of even one nuclear weapon. The latter is an important message to the Chinese that any North Korean return to negotiations should not be equated with relaxed counterproliferation efforts. The plight of Lee and Ling Amid the nuclear provocations, the North Korean high court sentenced the two detained U.S. journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, to 12 years of “reform through labor.” The harsh sentence was seen by some as an attempt to link their release to the ongoing nuclear dispute in some sort of “high stakes” poker game. While this made a good soundbite, it is not clear how such a negotiation might be manipulated by the North. The more likely explanation is that through the harsh sentence, Pyongyang sought to send a message to the world, deterring other journalists or humanitarian workers from operating near the North Korean border. In the midst of an internal power transition, North Korean leadership probably does not want the international media drawing attention to their refugee problem (the two reporters were apparently doing a story on the trafficking of DPRK refugees into China). The U.S. response has been to draw a clear line between this issue and the nuclear dispute, essentially saying to the North that they have made their point with the harsh sentencing and should now release the two women on humanitarian grounds. The administration continues to U.S.-Korea Relations 42 July 2009 work this issue behind the scenes, exploring a variety of channels including the possible dispatch of a high-level envoy to negotiate their return at the appropriate time. Meanwhile, the two journalists have been confined in the North for the past four months. Allied solidarity North Korea lowlights for the quarter were complemented by U.S.-ROK highlights when President Lee Myung-bak traveled to Washington for his first summit with President Barack Obama. According to inside accounts, the atmospherics of the meeting were very good with the two leaders spending triple the allotted time for their one-on-one meeting in the Oval Office. The press conference and statements coming out of the meeting presented two strong messages: 1) that the U.S. would never accept a nuclear North Korea; and 2) the written promise of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Seoul. On other issues, Lee apparently came ready to discuss new forms of assistance for Afghanistan and pledged cooperation on climate change and other issues. As a symbol of the friendship between the two countries, Obama sent a presidential delegation to the funeral of former president Roh Moo-hyun who committed suicide in May. The presidential delegation (which included this writer) was the only one of its kind to pay respects to the former head of state. Japan sent former Prime Minister Fukuda, but the Chinese conspicuously sent no one from its capitol. This message was not lost on the Koreans who appreciated the U.S. response and groused at the Chinese. The candlelight vigils in the streets of Seoul in the aftermath of Roh’s state funeral were notable for their absence of any anti-American agitators (unlike the beef demonstrations or the 2002 candlelight vigils). Despite the positive indications, progress on passage of the all-important KORUS free trade agreement (FTA) still remained absent. The ROK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee approved the deal in April, paving the way for the entire Assembly to vote on the pact. Yet progress on the U.S. side remains stymied by parochial domestic interests. KORUS – the United States’ largest FTA since the North America FTA – dwarfs most recent agreements and could help restore critical U.S. jobs and exports to a Korean economy expected to be among the first to recover from the global crisis. The nonpartisan International Trade Commission estimates that enacting KORUS could boost U.S. GDP by as much as $11.9 billion and merchandise exports as much as $10.9 billion – a free economic stimulus without driving up U.S. debt. Moreover, the importance of KORUS to visions of larger free-trade areas in the Asia-Pacific and beyond should not be underestimated. As World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations stall, one scenario for advancing trade is uniting scattered bilateral FTAs into multilateral arrangements. KORUS is both a strong model and – with provisions that allow other nations to join – a potentially powerful draw for building multilateral efforts in Asia and globally. When the U.S. launched KORUS negotiations, countries like Japan watched politely but dismissively. After it was negotiated, there was quiet but palpable interest by Tokyo in exploring FTA talks – a testament to KORUS’s influence on one of the world’s largest economies. Perhaps even more important than its economics are KORUS’s strategic ramifications. KORUS helps elevate the U.S.-ROK alliance to a higher plane beyond its traditional military focus to the broader exchanges of a mature partnership. Koreans seek to strengthen bilateral ties and “trust” in the relationship – and there could be no more important way of advancing this than KORUS. U.S.-Korea Relations 43 July 2009 Delaying KORUS would be a setback in the alliance’s growth. Granted, it would not end an alliance based on shared values and interests, yet it could drive Seoul to look beyond the U.S. for strategic partners. Korea is moving forward with FTAs with the European Union and across Asia while U.S. trade with Korea has already fallen behind that of China, Japan, and Europe.