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The last four months of U.S.-ROK relations under the Bush administration saw the completion of a mission that helped to define the broadening global scope of the alliance as well as the final resolution of the troublesome “beef issue.” Tough negotiations were completed on a new defense cost-sharing agreement and the ruling party in the ROK began the process of passing the implementing legislation for the free trade agreement. All of this amounts to President Obama’s inheritance of an alliance relationship that is in fairly strong shape, but a North Korean nuclear negotiation that remains unfinished. Despite the best efforts of the U.S., Pyongyang remained unwilling to accept standard verification procedures as part of the six-party denuclearization agreement. This was despite the fact that on Oct. 11, the U.S. removed the country from the terrorism blacklist. Obama’s team will need to adhere to seven key principles as it continues to navigate the labyrinth of these difficult negotiations and bolster the strength of the alliance. The alliance: packaged for the transition The last quarter of 2008 saw the completion of several issues that will allow for a well-packaged transition of the alliance to the next administration. In December, the Republic of Korea (ROK) completed successfully its four-year deployment to Iraq in a welcome home ceremony with music and military honors. This mission, perhaps more than anything else, truly defined the broadening scope of the alliance relationship. The ROK had at its peak some 3,600 troops in Iraq (Irbil), constituting the third largest ground contingent behind that of the U.S. and the British. The ROK also had a supporting air force unit in Kuwait. While their mission was primarily humanitarian, in later stages ROK forces played an important role providing protection to high-value assets including U.S. Agency for International Development and United Nations officials. They also engaged in training and equipping Iraqi forces and other coalition partners. Critics might argue that Seoul’s motives for participating in Iraq were hardly global and entirely parochial (Roh Moo-hyun only agreed to the deployment despite protests at home because he perceived it as a quid pro quo for U.S. flexibility on North Korea); nevertheless, the troops were dispatched, they performed well, and thereby set a new standard for ROK participation alongside the U.S. in areas around the world where interests converge based on common values. This is a critical component of the alliance’s future resiliency. On trade issues, the quarter saw an announcement by major Korean food retailers about the reintroduction of American beef on their shelves for sale to consumers. While the decision to reopen the ROK market to U.S. beef imports took place last spring, many of the major U.S.-Korea Relations 41 January 2009 supermarket chains did not stock the cheaper and higher quality commodity largely for fear of violent protests by activist groups. Predictably, the beef began selling immediately once it hit the shelves and this appears to put an end to an ugly ordeal that became politicized beyond reason – at least until the next shipment of beef with bone chips is found. On the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) free trade agreement (FTA), the ruling Grand National Party sought to begin the process of passing the implementing legislation for the agreement, which was met with violent opposition from Democratic Party legislators. Seoul’s moving forward with the FTA might look like an attempt to pressure the incoming U.S. administration or an attempt to pre-empt any future renegotiation of its terms, but ruling party legislators have assured U.S. interlocutors that this is not their intention. Indeed, numerous interactions among alliance watchers on both sides of the Pacific and several blue-ribbon commissions appear to have reached a conventional policy wisdom that the FTA will not see the light of day in 2009 (i.e., at least for the first year of the Obama administration). Whether this is correct or not, the key point is that the Lee Myung-bak government understands that even as it moves forward with the FTA at home, patience is necessary with regard to the U.S. and that a full court press on Obama in his first months in the Oval Office will not set the alliance off on a good start. The most painful and difficult negotiations in the alliance are over defense cost-sharing. Each time these talks take place both sides get angry, walk away from the table, threaten that the alliance’s fate hangs in the balance, and appeal to their higher-ups to use political intervention to force the other side’s hand. Negotiators will tell you that the negotiations are this way precisely because they are about “real things” – i.e., money. Yet invariably, after several nail-biting rounds these talks always reach a hard-fought conclusion that works well for the alliance – again, because the negotiations are about real things – money and the strength of the alliance (unlike the Six-Party Talks, some might quip). In late December, the U.S. and ROK concluded a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) effective January 2009. The agreement covers five years beginning with Seoul providing $585.4 million to cover the cost of keeping U.S. forces in Korea next year, with future contributions in both cash and goods tied to the consumer price index. In November, another longer term accomplishment in the alliance came to fruition with the first visa-free travel to the U.S. as South Korea qualified for the U.S. visa waiver program. In all, these developments offer a fitting end to the Bush administration’s shepherding of the alliance over eight years: an unprecedented expansion of the alliance’s global scope, the conclusion of the largest bilateral free trade agreement, the implementation of visa waiver, and the conclusion of a new SMA and major base relocation agreement. These accomplishments package up the alliance nicely and leave Obama with a strong foundation upon which to begin. “You’d have to be an idiot to trust the North Koreans” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s above comment at the Sons and Daughters event at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in December pretty well summed up the reasoning behind the inconclusive ending to the last round of Six-Party Talks in 2008. The U.S. held a series of consultations with the allies, Japan and South Korea, and then with the North in preparation for the December round of talks to nail down a verification protocol for the North’s nuclear declaration. The troublesome issue appeared to be the North’s unwillingness to agree in writing to all of the elements of a standard verification agreement – site visits, interviews with U.S.-Korea Relations 42 January 2009 scientists, documentation, and especially sampling of materials. The absence of an agreement on verification made it difficult to declare the conclusion of the “second phase” of the Six-Party Talks, which would have then allowed the Obama administration to begin the third or dismantlement phase of the negotiations with the verification protocol in place. North Korea’s unwillingness to agree to a written document crafted by the Chinese became apparent almost immediately at the recent round of talks in Beijing. North Korean negotiators apparently were interested only in getting commitments from other parties about the continued supply of fuel shipments even as Pyongyang was unwilling to accept a verification protocol. This intransigence was despite a highly controversial decision by the Bush administration in October to remove North Korea from the terrorism blacklist. U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill’s last-ditch attempt to break the logjam reflects a fundamental dilemma of “relative reasonableness” the U.S. continually faces in implementing Six-Party Talks agreements with the North. What this means is that every agreement in the Six-Party Talks process is negotiated with painstaking care as parties hammer out specific quid pro quos and synchronize steps and timelines with concomitant rewards and penalties. Yet, sooner or later, Pyongyang plays brinksmanship and demands more than it was promised or does less than it should. In this instance, a “verifiable nuclear declaration” – emphasis on verifiable – by the North was the clear understanding of all parties to the talks dating back to the September 2005 Joint Statement. Nevertheless, Pyongyang eventually chose not to agree to standard verification schemes. While everyone accepts that the DPRK is being completely unreasonable, they also realize that a failure of the agreement could mean the failure of the Six-Party Talks and the precipitation of another crisis. To avoid this, the parties end up pressing the U.S., knowing full-well that the DPRK is at fault and traversing the bounds of fairness and good faith, but certain that the only chance of progress can be had from U.S. reasonableness rather than DPRK unreasonableness. The result is that any additional U.S. flexibility is widely perceived in the region as evidence of U.S. leadership (except perhaps in Tokyo), but is viewed in Washington as some combination of desperation and weakness. Holding out for a written verification protocol was the right move by the Bush administration even as he leaves the Obama administration with an unfinished second phase negotiation. Nevertheless, Bush will leave the remnants of a workable nuclear disablement process rather than a full-blown crisis. This process is hardly any consolation to those who believe we should end this charade of trying to negotiate away Kim’s weapons and instead resort to financially strangling the regime, especially as its leader is in poor health. But collapsing the regime is costly, and holding out for a Libya-type wholesale disarmament is not possible. Meanwhile, Obama will inherit a situation in which U.S. and international inspectors are on the ground in North Korea learning more about their nuclear secrets, while slowly disabling and degrading Kim’s nuclear capabilities. In this regard, the last round of Six-Party Talks constituted another yard gained in a slow ground game, with the ball soon to be handed over to the next team. Looking forward: seven principles for Korea Korea will be only one of many hot button issues the new administration must contend with. It is not likely to be priority issue even with the fluid situation regarding the negotiations over the U.S.-Korea Relations 43 January 2009 North Korean nuclear program. Some basic principles should guide the new team’s focus amid the dizzying array of international and domestic issues it must address: • Results, not tone: The new team must remember that the process of the U.S.-ROK alliance can at times be ugly, with demonstrations and occasional expressions of anti-Americanism. But historically, the results in terms of cooperation in Asia and around the world have almost always been positive. • Intrinsic, not strategic: The alliance with South Korea should be viewed as more than a defense against North Korea. It should be seen as a vibrant democratic partnership in Asia and a worldwide contributor to the counterterrorism, clean energy, and development agendas. • Run, don’t coast: The new team must continue to push the alliance’s scope to the regional and global, rather than just peninsular. The alliance has both the capabilities and the political will, based on common democratic values, to operate everywhere from Central Asia to the Middle East. • Tend the garden at home: Even as crafters push the alliance, they must also ensure that the redesign of the military elements of the alliance are completed and remain sensitive to runaway populism in Korea. • Finish the KORUS FTA: This may be difficult for President Obama in his first year in office, but the new team must remember that expectations are high that this represents a new phase in the alliance’s history. Its failure may damage the alliance as well as views of U.S. leadership in Asia. • Test North Korea: Obama must pick up the Six-Party Talks process with a negotiation strategy that pushes the North to denuclearization while demonstrating U.S. political commitment to the process. That is the best way to build a multilateral coalition for punishment if the negotiation fails. • Keep an eye on the prize: Remember that the ultimate prize is not denuclearization but managing an eventual “inheritance” process where a united Korea, free and democratic, is an engine of peace and economic growth in Asia and a global partner of the U.S. in world affairs.