CIAO DATE: 08/2008
Volume: 7, Issue: 1
Spring 2008
Why Did Poland Choose The F-16? (PDF)
Barre R. Seguin
This essay provides a comprehensive synthesis of the Polish military’s fighter aircraft selection process, assesses the dominant issues, and answers the question, “Why did Poland choose the F-16?” It begins with a brief examination of Poland’s military aircraft status and military aircraft industrial production capability from approximately 1990 to 2002, its requirements for an advanced fighter aircraft, and Poland’s military hardware procurement and acquisition processes. Analysis then turns to acquisition reforms associated with the F- 16 decision, the institutional structure for purchasing military aircraft, the mechanics of the F-16 decision, and who ultimately made the decision. Given the centrality to the decision process, a capabilities comparison of the three competitors—the Lockheed Martin F-16, Saab/BAE Systems JAS-39 Gripen, and the Dassault Mirage 2000-5 Mk II—is offered and interoperability considerations addressed. This study then outlines the financial construction of the three bids, to include economic issues and pressures from the U.S., French, and Swedish governments and industry, and an in-depth analysis of industrial offsets. Lastly, it will examine political issues associated with the F-16 purchase.
Montenegro and the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PDF)
Mehmedin Tahirovic
In contrast to the former republics of Yugoslavia that fought wars to reach their sovereignty, Montenegro achieved its independence democratically. This was a longer process, but it demonstrated that, even in the traditionally unstable Balkans, the most sensitive issues can be resolved peacefully, based on the concepts and principles of Western democracy. It is this specific feature of Montenegro that requires a special approach to finding adequate modalities to participate in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), taking into account the theory and practice of international relations.
It is particularly important to use thorough analysis to draw attention to Montenegro’s specific circumstances, problems, needs, opportunities, and priorities as it prepares to enter the PfP. By following key mechanisms, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Council for Partnership and Individual Partner Relations may choose appropriate and adequate forms of cooperation and common activities with both Allies and Partners as well.
Based on research and the status of the police, economic, and security parameters described herein, efficient solutions related to common activities and Allies and Partners’ direct assistance can be found so that Montenegro is able to actively participate and act within the Partnership for Peace Program.
Montenegro’s geographic, demographic, economic, and other resources afford it the opportunity to contribute to the Partnership for Peace. Based on the facts at hand, viable forms of cooperation and engagement can be determined in order to engage the potential of Allies and Partners in common activities. Also worthy of note are the priorities required for the Partnership process to function smoothly, particularly those related to the resolution of common security problems, which presumes quality cooperation and meaningful contributions from all parties. The Partners’ “Lessons Learned” constitute an especially good foundation, and can serve as guidelines that Montenegro can use to make appropriate decisions.
The Principle of Distinction and Weapon Systems on the Contemporary Battlefield (PDF)
Michael N. Schmitt
This article examines, primarily from the perspective of U.S. forces, the challenges faced by technologically advantaged forces on the asymmetrical battlefield vis-à-vis the legal principle of distinction. Distinction, the linchpin of international humanitarian law, requires that parties to a conflict conduct their operations in a manner that distinguishes between combatants and civilians, as well as between civilian objects and military objectives. Paradoxically, the technological edge that advanced militaries enjoy over their enemies may present problems in terms of ensuring compliance with the distinction principle, particularly at the tactical level of warfare. The conflict in Iraq has demonstrated that on an asymmetrical battlefield, the weaker party may adopt tactics that violate the norm in order to offset its technological disadvantage. When this occurs, compliance by the advantaged party is also complicated. Safeguarding the principle of distinction, therefore, requires altering the cost-benefit calculations of the side facing defeat at the hands of its stronger opponent.
Solving Transnistria: Any Optimists Left? (PDF)
Cristian Urse
Since 1992, there has been an ongoing debate regarding the situation in Transnistria, the breakaway republic on the border between Moldova and Ukraine. After the conclusion of the agreement that ended the armed conflict, the Moldovan government in Chişinău and the Transnistrian authorities in Tiraspol made efforts to find a political solution, under the supervision of a negotiation mechanism that included, until the end of 2005, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE. Russia’s 2003 plan to that end was rejected by the Moldovan leadership. This triggered a set of political and economic punishments from Moscow. The political changes of 2005 have given a new impetus to the negotiations on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. The changes in Georgia and Ukraine and the resuscitation of GUAM have significantly influenced the premises for a settlement, while the United States and the European Union have become observers in the negotiations format.
At the end of 2007, however, the prospects of solving the Transnistria issue are no longer that promising. The present negotiating mechanism continues to lose relevance. Meanwhile, developments in Kosovo, relevant for the case of Transnistria, are taking international affairs down a path where the frozen conflicts of the former USSR are losing importance as time goes by.
This article argues that the decisions of the actors involved have negatively affected the negotiating mechanism. During 2005–06, the parties took unilateral steps that they perceived as likely to improve their position in the future. Meanwhile, the heated debate on Kosovo and the tangled political evolution of Ukraine in the last two years have seemed to lead the conflict in Transnistria to a dead-end, at least in the short and medium term.
The European Union's Energy Security Challenges (PDF)
Paul Belkin
Recent increases in energy prices and a steady escalation in global energy demand-expected to rise by nearly 60 percent over the next twenty years-have led U.S. policymakers to engage in a wide-ranging debate over how best to address the country's future energy requirements. Similarly, energy security has become a policy priority for the European Union (EU) and its twenty-seven member states. Together, the United States and Europe represent the world's largest energy market. Although they produce approximately 23 percent of the world's energy, they consume almost 40 percent of the world's supply.
The EU imports about 50 percent of the energy that it consumes. Barring significant changes, the European Commission expects this figure to rise to 65 percent by 2030. Approximately half of the EU’s imported energy comes from Russia, in the form of oil and natural gas. Europe’s growing dependence on Russian energy has fueled speculation that Moscow is using the “energy weapon” to try to influence European foreign and economic policy.
The EU has traditionally exerted little if any influence over the energy policies of its individual member states. However, in March 2007, in the face of increasing concern regarding Europe’s reliance on Russian energy resources, and growing public pressure to address global climate change, the EU member states agreed on a series of policy measures intended to form the foundation of an “Energy Policy for Europe.” The March agreement aims to increase the EU’s ability to secure and diversify European energy supplies, while seeking to reduce EU-wide carbon emissions by promoting alternative and renewable energy sources.
The United States and Europe have steadily broadened the transatlantic energy dialogue to include joint promotion of collective energy security, energy efficiency, and alternative energy sources. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have agreed to pursue U.S.–EU cooperation to develop alternative and renewable energy technologies and to forge coordinated policies with regard to Russia and politically unstable regions with substantial energy resources. U.S. officials have expressed some concern at some European member states’ unwillingness to exert more pressure on Russia to comply with EU market principles. On the other hand, European leaders appear increasingly frustrated with U.S. resistance to binding multilateral regulatory frameworks to reduce carbon emissions and promote energy efficiency.
This article examines some of Europe’s critical energy security challenges and EU efforts to coordinate a common European energy strategy. It also includes an overview of broader transatlantic energy security cooperation.
Managing Defense Transformation in Small and Medium-Sized NATO Countries (PDF)
Dorinel-Ioan Moldovan
Defense transformation in small and medium-sized countries has a dialectical aspect. On one hand, it is a general process that has arisen as a result of the effect of the forces of globalization on domestic security and defense issues. As such, it is identical for all countries, having the same features. On the other hand, as a critical organizational process, defense transformation represents a unique response by each nation’s defense institutions, a response that is crafted in order to cope with challenges coming from both internal and external sources. This paper will analyze the challenging dimensions of defense transformation from the perspective of the binomial relationship of willingness and affordability, and will compare the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches. It is obvious that the complexity of the defense transformation process comes from the many questions it raises and requirements it poses, which each country must solve for its own specific context.
Outside the European Economic and Monetary Union: Consequences for the United Kingdom (PDF)
Anna Konarzewska
The consequences of staying outside the European Economic and Monetary Union can be divided into three categories: political, economic, and social. For the United Kingdom, most attention has been concentrated on the issue of economic gains and losses. The potential gains include a possibility for the British government to conduct its own national economic and monetary policy, the elimination of so-called social dumping, preserving the British mortgage and housing markets, and promoting London as a worldwide financial center. Moreover, approving the Euro could enlarge British foreign trade and enhance inflows of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the negative economic consequences focus on lack of transparency of prices, no elimination of transaction costs, and the risk of disrupting the exchange rate of the pound sterling. The political and social consequences of staying outside the Euro zone must also be taken into account when analyzing the British case. Without participating in the common currency, the United Kingdom could preserve her national sovereignty and independence, although this remains questionable in the current world, which is characterized by high levels of interdependence. Likewise, the British stand to lose their influence in the European Union and in the world by not participating in the third stage of the EMU.
Public Diplomacy's Next Challenge (PDF)
Christopher C. Harmon
Despite seven years of experiments, U.S. public diplomacy against international terrorism has largely failed. What is most needed is a strong infusion of fresh ideas. The rhetorical branch of the offensive against terror has been utterly neglected. U.S. spokesmen should re-open the argument about terrorism’s rank immorality; amplify the voices of Muslim critics of terrorism; publicly deconstruct the ideas of outspoken terrorists; and point to such weaknesses as their lack of credentials in theology. Secondly, there is much room for vigorous and thoughtful defense of evident political alternatives to terror, especially moderation and the rule of law.
John J. Le Beau
Insurgency and counterinsurgency as types of warfare are currently subject to considerable attention due to the nature of the high-profile struggles underway in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is prudent to note that neither insurgency nor the strategy and tactics required to combat it represent new phenomena. A large body of experience and literature from the twentieth century and earlier exists that addresses both sides of the insurgent struggle. Some characteristics of insurgencies are largely immutable, since insurgency is ultimately a form of warfare that is adopted when a combatant has limited resources and limited choices for how to fight against a more powerful adversary. Today as in the past, these characteristics include employment of small-unit attacks, ambushes, assassinations, propaganda activity, and the development of covert infrastructure. Nevertheless, the primary insurgencies active in the twenty-first century are marked by important differences from earlier struggles, particularly in the areas of motivation and inspiration. Rather than being quintessentially political and interested in local or national grievances, many contemporary insurgencies are at their core linked to a particular interpretation of Islam. Thus, these insurgencies represent a war of religion, not of politics, economics, or ethnicity. Islamist insurgencies are likely to be uncompromising and averse to negotiation, absolutist and pan-national in their goals, and willing to justify the mass slaughter of non-combatants who do not share their religious vision.
Counterinsurgent strategies that take into account the religious world-view of their opponents are better equipped for success than counterinsurgent efforts that ignore or minimize the radical Islamist dimensions of the struggle. Saudi Arabia offers an example of a counterinsurgency campaign that has been tailored to deal with an Islamist challenge. Modern communications and technology may link disparate Islamist insurgencies to some degree, and might eventually provide a means of coordination and information sharing. In fact, this may already be occurring. Contests with Islamist insurgencies around the globe are likely to continue for a protracted period.
The Expanding Security Agenda: Challenges for Transition States (PDF)
Elena Kovalova
Since the end of the Cold War, transnational organized crime and corruption have persistently plagued the post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Facilitation of travel and trade regimes in Europe has provided criminal organizations with a broader scope to expand their businesses and to invest and profit through such practices. The fall of living standards and growth of unemployment in the post-communist economies—along with the promotion of free movement of goods, services, and people in the enlarging European Union (EU)—produced new forms of organized crime in the region, particularly a modern-day equivalent of slavery that is known as trafficking in persons (TIP). The novelty of the crime, combined with the corruption of unreformed law enforcement agencies in transition states and the transnational nature of TIP have increased the need for international cooperation to fight it effectively. Based on an analysis of TIP in South Eastern European (SEE) and Eastern European states, this article attempts to assess the patterns of human trafficking in the region, determine links between corruption and trafficking, and identify possible networks for counter-trafficking activities in the region.