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The question of corruption has been on the agenda of such organizations as the UNDP since the early 1990s. Corruption can distort the operation of public services and can also reduce the efficiency of companies, when they become specialized in bribe-giving.1 Fighting corruption is also on the agenda of such organizations as the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the OECD and many others. Indeed, around the world countries have been fighting corruption yet only a small proportion of anti-corruption programs succeed. Singapore and Taiwan are among the famous examples. As Transparency International notes, corruption is especially dangerous when it is a feature of the police, who are supposed to be guardians of the society. One country which achieved significant progress in fighting corruption in the police force is Georgia.2 The World Bank writes: “Georgia’s experience shows that the vicious cycle of endemic corruption can be broken and, with appropriate and decisive reforms, can be turned into a virtuous cycle”.3 On the other hand, anti- corruption efforts have also been made in Armenia since the beginning of the 1 Svensson J., “Eight Questions About Corruption,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 3 (2005): 19. 2 Transparency International, “Research: Corruption Perception Index,” 2011, available at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview, last accessed August 30, 2013. 3 OCCRP, “World Bank: Georgia Is Anti-Corruption Success Story,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, February 2, 2012, available at https://reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/1324-world- bank-georgia-is-anti-corruption-success-story, last accessed August 30, 2013.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 324 2000s, and part of this effort included police reform. Nevertheless, the reforms did not deliver significant results. Transparency International’s index demonstrates that in public opinion the police are among the institutions perceived as the most affected by corruption.4 This study analyzes why the police reform in Armenia has been less successful than in Georgia. It does not claim that the reforms completely eradicated corruption in either country. It is unarguable that the success can be called only relative, and there are more steps to be taken to increase the level of public service; nevertheless, the pace and progress of the improvement deserves the attention given to its defining factors in this study. The study touches only upon police reform and considers only changes and progress made in this sector in Armenia and Georgia, therefore, the conclusions can be inferred only to other cases of police reforms in similar countries. Lower corruption is used in this paper as an indicator of the successful outcome as it was one of the major objectives of the implementation of the reforms. The concept of corruption used in this study is taken from Svensson: “the misuse of public office for private gain”5 . There could be used different indicators for assessing the police reform in Armenia and Georgia; for example, Sun suggest the number of registered crimes or a number of cleared cases. Though such statistics exist, various reports state that the data in Georgia before the reform did not reflect reality as the population did not have enough trust in the police to call for help6 . Therefore, due to this and to the fact that the reforms were clearly directed at eliminating corruption, the Transparency International Index was used in this study. The literature on the difference in anti-corruption reforms and their results in the post-Soviet region is quite extensive. For example, Peter Nasuti focuses on the factors which determine success of the reforms in Georgia.7 He makes a suggestion that state capacity can be such a determinant. However, in opposite, this study suggests that higher state capacity is an achievement of the reforms, not the factor which defines their successful implementation. Also, Kakachia and O’Shea argue that the difference between the outcomes of the police reforms in Russia and Georgia is connected to measures (such as salary increase) taken by the reformers in eliminating predatory state behavior, the nature of relations with criminals and 4 Transparency International, “Research: Corruption Perception Index.” 5 Svensson, “Eight Questions About Corruption,” 20. 6 Shinn Sun, “Measuring the Relative Efficiency of Police Precincts Using Data Envelopment Analysis,” Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 36, no. 1 (2002): 51–71. 7 Peter Nasuti, “The Determinants of Anti-Corruption Reform in the Republic of Georgia,” 2012, available at http://ec2-107-22-211-253.compute-1.amazonaws.com/sites/ default/files/NASUTI%20Research%20Summary.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 325 procedures for the recruitment and promotion of police officers.8 They also argue that in Georgia success was due to the unity of the elite; nevertheless, the authors ignore that even though the government can be renewed there can still be bureaucrats who restrict the reformers. This article does consider this dimension and explains why relations between the government and the losers of the reform are so important. Di Puppo also argues that one of the major reasons of the success of the reforms in Georgia was support from the West.9 The factor of involvement of foreign actors is discussed in the section 4.3.1 but it is argued that this did not play a major role. Shahnazarian’s study takes into consideration Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Georgia and Armenia.10 Her conclusion is that police reform in Armenia did not have the same success as it did in Georgia due to the structure of political and economic elites. She argues that in Georgia the political and economic elites were separated, while in Armenia they were consolidated and did not allow the opposition to form and to stand against the old regime. This article’s main argument also focuses on the elites, but from a different point of view, considering their interests and relations with the losers from the reform. In general, the literature on the anti-corruption reforms does point out the importance of the Rose Revolution and focuses on the age and Western education of the new government. Nevertheless, it ignores the fact that despite the personal characteristics of the reformers, they can be restricted by the losers of the reform, who can constrain the government from implementation. Therefore, this study aims at filling this gap and applies theories to the losers from the reforms and partial reforms to this problem. The next two sections include the theoretical underpinnings and methodological issues. A fourth section presents the empirical influence of independent variables on the reform outcomes. The conclusions summarize the key findings, explore the limitations of this approach and discuss the implications of this study. 8 Kornely Kakachia and Liam O’Shea, “Why Does Police Reform Appear to Have Been More Successful in Georgia Than in Kyrgyzstan or Russia?”, The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. Pipss. Org no. 13 (2012), available at http://pipss.revues.org/3964, last accessed August 30, 2013. 9 Lilli di Puppo, “Police Reform in Georgia. Cracks in an Anti-corruption Success Story,” U4 Practice Insight 2010, no. 2 (2010), available at http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?3748=police-reform-in-georgia, last accessed August 30, 2013. 10 Shahnazarian, Nona, “Police Reform and Corruption in Georgia, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh,” Policy Memo #232, September 2012, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_232_Shahnazarian_Sept2012.pdf , last accessed August 30, 2013.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 326 2. Theoretical explanations To provide theoretical background for the main argument of the article, it is necessary to turn to the question of the insulation and influence of the interest groups. Successful reforms can be caused by institutional vacuum and political insulation, while partial reforms in other cases can be due to existing losers or winners of the partial reforms. Independence of the reformers is especially important when dealing with politicians and other public servants who held positions before the reforms. As Hellman argued in his research on the reforms in post-Communist countries, most of the opposition to the continued reforms in economic sphere comes from insiders.11 Fernandez and Rodrik also argue that “the gains from the status quo may be concentrated on a small number of individuals while the losses are diffuse”12, therefore, the presence of the losers from the reform can keep the reforms from being undertaken. This turns to be a question of insulation in the reforms from the influences of different kinds of interest groups. Even though his study is on transitional economic reforms, this approach can be applied in this article. In the context of Georgia and Armenia, this aspect could play a role, in terms of implementing the reforms after the period of transition. As will be indicated later, among the main losers from the reform are the bureaucrats and police officers who are involved in bribery. Therefore, according to this theory, their interest would be to not allow the reform to be implemented. In this way the reformers should have been either insulated from the losers or should have eliminated them. Returning to the alternative explanations, there are three which cannot be considered as major factors, but that still contribute to the outcome of the police reform,. The first alternative explanation is the content of the reform. Though on paper the reforms were the same, in reality in Armenia many of the planned activities were not implemented, which makes it possible to describe it as a partial reform. The above-mentioned theory by Hellman points out to the interest groups that can resist the reform’s implementation process, and that can lead to partial reforms, as full police reform implementation can be of little benefit to them.13 While the explanation can be valid for defining why the reform in Armenia were not as successful as in Georgia, it is closely related to the main argument, as without the change of the elite the reformers in Georgia would not be able to implement full reforms, avoiding the influence of the losers from the reform. 11 Joel Hellman, “Winners Take All,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 203–234; Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture and Influence in Transition Economies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 4 (2003): 751–773. 12 Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-specific Uncertainty,” The American Economic Review(1991): 1146. 13 Hellman, “Winners Take All.”CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 327 Another alternative explanation is the involvement of foreign actors. The theoretical background of this argument goes back to Jacoby’s argument on coalition approaches. He argues: “We should see outside actors as striving to influence the choices of existing domestic actors with whom they can be seen to form a kind of informal coalition”.14 The involvement of the foreign actors (NGOs, foreign governments) can be considered as such an informal coalition due to cooperation in the policy-formation, financing from abroad and accountability of the reforming governments to the consulting bodies. Nevertheless, this argument is also closely related to the main one: the greater interest and funding of Georgian reforms can be explained by the change in the elites, which provided popular support to the reformers and more credibility in the eyes of the foreign actors. The last alternative explanation is the severity of corruption before the reform. The theory (mentioned, for example by Alesina15) says that the reforms tend to be implemented when the crisis reaches a certain threshold. As the Georgian level of corruption was higher before the reforms, it may be a relevant explanation of why the reforms took place.16 Nevertheless, the full reform implementation is also related to the major argument, as lack of internal constraints helped the Georgian government to implement the police reforms to a greater extent, compared to Armenia. Therefore, the magnitude of corruption has put additional pressures over the reformers, as well as more legitimacy for the reform. However, when it comes to the reform implementation, the reformers would anyway face the internal constraints from the bureaucracy and police officers previous government, and in this way the lack or presence of the losers of the reform became primary and decisive factor for the outcome of the reform. 3. Data and methodology The hypothesis of the article is that the major reason for the success of the reforms in Georgia and lack of success in Armenia is a change in the elites and their relationship with the losers of the reform. Among the control variables are the involvement of foreign actors, the content of the reforms and severity of corruption before the reforms; these will be analyzed using governmental documents, official documents of the involved NGOs, reports, and academic studies. This is a comparative study of two most-similar cases: Armenia and Georgia. Both countries 14 Wade Jacoby, “Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations,”World Politics 58, no. 4 (2006): 625. 15 Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi, Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12049, last accessed August 30, 2013. 16 Transparency International, “Research: Corruption Perception Index.”Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 328 shared similar problems with police corruption and, due to a shared history, the type and nature of corruption appears similar. This study is based on expert evaluations by various institutions, both domestic and international, in both Armenia and Georgia, and public opinion indices (such as the Corruption Perception Index by TI). The research consists of analysis of legal documents on the reform process by the governments, their special committees on police and corruption, the parliament, etc. The analysis also includes reports by the non-governmental organizations, and special attention is given to the international organizations, such as the Council of Europe. In addition, various academic papers are used to analyze activities during the police reform process. To evaluate corruption public indices are used, including Transparency International and World Bank indicators. 4. Factors defining successful police reform This section starts with discussion of the similarities between Georgia and Armenia in the 1990s, because it is both a period when the countries had obtained independence and were able to enjoy autonomy in their policy-making process, and it is also a period where neither of the countries had yet started developing anti- corruption polices, including police reform. Also, choosing this period allows the analysis to hold some factors constant. The section continues with the impact brought by the reform and ends with a comparison of the reform content in both countries, as well as other possible explanations, such as elite change, foreign involvement and corruption severity. 4.1. Content of the reform Before the reforms both countries had similar issues related to organized crime, corruption and a low state capacity, that was present in the police as well and which did not allow the government to manage the situation and avoid the involvement of other groups. Avagyan and Hiscock argue that in Armenia since independence in 1991 the police sector of the government has been very vulnerable and experienced various changes in leadership at the Ministry of the Internal Affairs due to corruption.17 Corruption in the police and connections with organized crime, according to Avagyan and Hiscock, was claimed to be one of the biggest problems and was even called to be a focus of the policies by Sargsyan, newly appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in 1996.18 17 Gagik Avagyan and Duncan Hiscock, Security Sector Reform in Armenia (Saferworld, 2005), http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/19431/ipublication document_singledocument/b2ef71cd-8180-4999-adcf-55539bfb0e6e/en/SW_Armenia.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013. 18 Avagyan and Hiscock, “Security Sector Reform in Armenia“.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 329 Similar problems were experienced in Georgia. Kakachia and O’Shea describe the situation in several countries, including Georgia: Thus, regardless of involvement in predatory policing or organized crime, the political elite in each country operates on the basis of organizational cultures where recruitment and, especially promotion, are determined by adherence to principles such as personal loyalty and discipline rather than the performance of ones’ duties according to the principles of some sort of democratic governance.19 Similarity in terms of corruption in the police forces and more generally in public administration in Armenia and Georgia in the 1990s makes it puzzling as to how the reform of the police brought different results in each case. The reforms in Armenia and Georgia started at the very beginning of the 2000s. The reforms in both countries are still ongoing and evolve with time. Yet even though the reforms have not yet reached their end, it is already clear that reforms in Georgia are bringing positive results in fighting corruption. Two figures below demonstrate the general decrease in the level of corruption and improvement in state capacity in Georgia, while staying nearly the same in Armenia. Figure 1 shows the increase in the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International over recent years in Georgia. The data for the figure was collected over 12 years and includes level of perceived corruption by Georgians and Armenians in the 1990s before the reforms, in the second time point chosen in this study, as well as in the period after reform. What is remarkable is the sudden improvement in Georgia after 2004, which was the year when Saakashvili was elected and a new government was formed after the Rose Revolution. It is also important to draw attention to corruption before 2004, where it drastically dropped. To demonstrate the fact that the corruption had generally decreased, another corruption indicator has been chosen: the World Bank CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating, which ranges from "1" which is low to "6" which is high.20 According to this index in 2005 Armenia had a score of 2.5, compared to 3.5 for Georgia. It is clear that for Georgians police become one of the most trusted institutions in the country, and, as was cited before, the explanation can lie in the fact that the new elite which has come to power during the revolution needed to obtain the popular support sufficient to be able to stand against the losers of the reform and to be able to continue their political 19 Kakachia and O’Shea, “Why Does Police Reform Appear to Have Been More Successful in Georgia Than in Kyrgyzstan or Russia?”. 20 World Bank, “CPIA Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector Rating.”Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 330 course. Therefore, the police sector was strategically important as one of the most visible state institutions for the public. Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index in Armenia and Georgia in 1999-2011 Note: 0 = a country is perceived as highly corrupt; 10 = a country is perceived as very clean. Source: Transparency International.21 To consider the level of corruption particularly in the police there is a Global Corruption Barometer Survey, conducted by Transparency International. It is a public opinion survey that demonstrates the sectors which are perceived to be the most corrupt.22 Analyzing the results of the survey from 2001 to 2011, it is possible to conclude that Georgia’s police have got twice lower scores in the level of perceived corruption, while in Armenia the police remained one of the most corrupt sectors in the state (1, 2 for education and 3 for judiciary).23 Another evidence of decrease of corruption in Georgian police is a report by the World Bank. They state: “Corruption in the police force has fallen sharply, as several surveys reveal. A 2010 survey indicates that only 1 percent of Georgia’s population reported having paid a bribe to the road police”.24 There have been several attempts to adopt single legal acts in both countries, as for 21 Transparency International, “Research: Corruption Perception Index.” 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 OCCRP, “World Bank: Georgia Is Anti-Corruption Success Story.”CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 331 example in Georgia: “The Law on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in the Public Service was adopted in 1997 and deals with the prevention and suppression of corruption”.25 Nevertheless, the level of corruption in Georgia remained approximately the same until the Rose Revolution, which raises a question of why it happened only after the Revolution and the elections and what measures were taken by the new government to decrease the level of corruption. First of all, it is important to note that most of the activities of the police reform both in Armenia and Georgia were built into larger anti-corruption reforms, and that these were taking place simultaneously. The reforms transformed several sectors and, to take a wider view, it makes sense to present a brief comparison of the activities undertaken by the Georgian and Armenian governments. Table 1:Major Anti-corruption Programs in Georgia Year A Program 2005 National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2005 Anti-Corruption Strategy Action Plan (2005-2006) 2010 National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010 National Action Plan for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy (2010-2013) Source: Transparency International26 and Ministry of Justice of Georgia27 . Overall, the reforms undertaken by Armenia and Georgia resemble each other. Both states implemented reforms with the help of such organizations as Council of Europe, European Union and OSCE. Both countries have had simultaneous reforms (Tables 1 and 3) directed towards the improvement of public service quality through increasing accountability and transparency. 25 Directorate General I – Legal Affairs, First Evaluation Round. Evaluation Report on Georgia, GRECO, June 15, 2001, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1(2001)5_Geor gia_EN.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013; Directorate General I – Legal Affairs, Third Evaluation Round. Evaluation Report on Georgia on Incriminations, GRECO, May 27, 2011, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3 (2010)12_Georgia_One_EN.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013. 26 World Bank, “CPIA Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector Rating,” n.d., available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAN.XQ, last accessed August 30, 2013. 27 Ministry of Justice of Georgia, “About Ministry of Justice of Georgia,” Website of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=1, last accessed August 30, 2013.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 332 Table 2: Police Reform Activities by the Georgian government Date Activity July 2004 Dismissal of the Traffic Police and creation of Patrol Police End of 2004 Dissolution of the Ministry of the State Security and renewal of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs End of 2004- 2005 Renewal of police equipment 2005 Payment of salaries in bank checks instead of cash Source: Devlin28 and Saakashvili29 . Such reforms included measures on privatization, installation of the new equipment and the creation of electronic databases in both Armenia and Georgia. It is possible to make the conclusion that similar legal acts and principles used during the reforms are the result of the involvement of the same international organizations. Among the main directions in both countries’ reforms were modernization of the police equipment, its educational institutions and other police-related services, as well as creating and maintaining electronic databases, ensuring more transparent public procurement and public officer incomes and increasing penalties for crimes related to corruption. Both countries indicated raising public awareness of their rights and improving public image of the police as one of the goals of their activities. However, there were some dissimilarities, as, for example, the fact that Georgia dismissed its Traffic Police personnel entirely before the beginning of the reform (Table 2) and made several other radical steps, such as firing high-ranking police officials, who were accused of corruption. In Armenia, there have been attempts to decrease personnel, but nothing in comparison to the measures taken in Georgia. This raises the question of what could stop the reformers from taking similar steps in Armenia, and what enabled the Georgian government to make such a radical move. Another dissimilarity are evidential partial reforms in Armenia. There are studies which demonstrate that, despite the call for modernization on paper, in reality the Armenian police remains a Soviet-type force with the same equipment, uniform and attitudes, and accordingly the same level of corruption as in the Soviet Union. For example, Ivkovich and Khechumyan argue that even though new legal documents bring stricter rules which should reduce corruption, such as increased punishments 28 Devlin Mathiew, “Seizing the Reform Moment: Rebuilding Georgia’s Police, 2004- 2006” (Innovations for Successful Societies, 2010), available at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/focusareas/PL/policynotes/view.xml? id=126, last accessed August 30, 2013. 29 Saakashvili, Mikhail, Georgia’s National Police Corruption Project, interview by Robert Siegel, NPR, September 15, 2005, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4849472, last accessed August 30, 2013.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 333 and better communication with the population, it does not work in reality.30 “Although rules for detection, investigation, and discipline of police misconduct are in place, critics – primarily various NGO reports – indicate that the enforcement of these rules is weak”.31 This calls into question why the Armenian government was not able to implement its planned activities and bring real “modernization” to the Armenian police. Table 3: Major Anti-corruption Programs in Armenia Year Program 2003 Republic of Armenia Anti-Corruption Strategy (2003-2007) 2003 Implementation Action Plan of the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Republic of Armenia 2009 Republic of Armenia Anti-Corruption Strategy (2009-2012) 2009 Implementation Action Plan of the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Republic of Armenia Source: Government of the Republic of Armenia.32 Both dissimilarities stem from the main hypothesis of this study. The renewed Georgian government after the Rose Revolution consisted of bureaucrats who did not serve as ministers before, and had little to do with the old Shevardnadze system. It allowed them to be unconstrained by the losers of the reform– corrupt politicians and public servants - as well as eliminating the losers themselves through massive firings. In contrast, in Armenia the government went through elections and its revolutionary movement with its old team who were uninterested in resisting corruption from which they are benefiting. Therefore, reductions in personnel in a similar manner to Georgia were not possible in Armenia, as well as partial reforms were endorsed by the losers of the reforms. Without the change to the elites the Georgian government would not be able to consider firing personnel across the whole department or completing vast reforms, due to resistance from the losers in the reforms. The next section will go deeper into discussion of the revolutionary movement and will provide evidence for the main argument of this study. 4.2. Elite Change The main argument of this article is that the change in the elites and their relations with the losers in the reform could be the main factor which brought a difference to 30 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich and Aleksandr Khechumyan, “The State of Police Integrity in Armenia: Findings from the Police Integrity Survey,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 36, no. 1 (2013): 70–90. 31 Ibid, 75. 32 The National Assembly of the Repubic of Armenia, The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Police, 2001, available at http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show &ID=1271&lang=eng, last accessed August 30, 2013.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 334 the police reform outcomes between Armenia and Georgia. In Georgia, after the Rose Revolution, a new group of young educated politicians came to power and were able to avoid the old traps of the system. Before, as several researchers point out and which will be discussed in detail below, the whole public administration system was corrupt and in order for nomenclature to survive they could use compromat (“incriminating evidence”) against each other, sharing a piece of governmental cake. There were two types of changes brought by the Revolution in Georgia: elimination of the losers’ channels for manipulating the reformers, and some of the losers in the reforms were removed from public service. The change from the old government administration brought by the revolution did not allow losers to act the same way as they had, and the new administration eliminated a vast part of the losers of the reform. The events of the Rose Revolution could be considered to have started from the creation of the reformers group within parliament with such politicians as Saakashvili and Noghaideli, who were later appointed as ministers for Justice and Finance accordingly. As Wheatley points out, the members of the reformer group in the parliament did not have anything in common with the Soviet politicians who still remained in power.33 In the aftermath of the revolution Saakashvili continued surrounding himself with the like-minded. Mitchell also points out the fact that some of the government members returned to Georgia after training in the West in order to serve in the government after Saakashvili’s call to the diaspora:34 When Saakashvili entered office in early 2004, he had just turned 36, making him one of the youngest presidents in the world at the time. Many of his cabinet and advisers were even younger. Like the president, several had attended universities in Western Europe or the United States before returning to Georgia to work in civil society organizations.35 According to Wheatley, during the elections in Georgia various international observers were invited, such as the “Global Strategy Group”, who recorded electoral fraud.36 The authorities reported that a significant number of votes had gone to the pro-government bloc, which put it ahead of the opposition. As Wheatley reports, Saakashvili organized a movement on the streets and led the people to the parliament, and in a few days had brought a cortege of several kilometers of opposition supporters to Tbilisi, forcing Shevardnadze to resign. Saakashvili, says 33 Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 34 Lincoln A. Mitchell, “Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution,” Orbis 50, no. 4 (2006): 669–676. 35 Mathiew, “Seizing the Reform Moment: Rebuilding Georgia’s Police, 2004-2006.” 36 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awaking to Rose Revolution.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 335 Wheatley, gained 96.24 percent of support during the elections in the following year, appointing new ministers who did not serve under Shevardnadze (with a few exceptions) (Table 4). Table 4: Heads of the key Georgian ministries after the Rose Revolution (appointed February 2004) Ministry Name Served as a minister in (the previous) Shevardnadze’s governments Was part of reformers’ group Ministry of Defense Gela Bezhuashvili Ministry of Finance Zurab Noghaideli X (before 2002, resigned) X Ministry of Justice Giorgi Papuashvili Ministry of Internal Affairs Giorgi Baramidze Source: www.civil.ge; Ministry of Justice.37 As Saakashvili’s political campaign was built on opposition to the Shevardnadze regime, all his steps were directed to demonstrate his distinctiveness from Shevardnadze: “Fighting corruption, however, was not an isolated undertaking; it was part and parcel of a wider attempt to overhaul the old system”. 38 Regarding the change in the methods of how losers from the reform influenced the government, it is important to underline that, according to Wheatley, the internal politics within the public institutions were made through having “compromat” against each other, blackmailing and inclusion in corruption schemes as a way of solving problems.39 This was a common feature in post-Soviet states: “Corruption and organized crime are rooted in Soviet rule and in cultural, traditional and psychological factors. From that point of view Georgia is not unique”.40As the newly appointed government did not have the experience of working in the old system, 37 Ministry of Justice of Georgia, “About Ministry of Justice of Georgia”; Ministry of Justice of Georgia, “Giorgi Papuashvili: About,” Website of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov.ge/?sec_id=184&lang_id=ENG, last accessed August 30, 2013. 38 Engvall, Johan, “Corruption and What It Means,” Silk Road Studies (2012), 22.v available at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/1209Engvall.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013. 39 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awaking to Rose Revolution. 40 Alexandre Kukhianidze, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Georgia before and after the ‘Rose Revolution’,”Central Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (2009): 215.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 336 they were not rooted into the existing schemes of corruption and were able to start police reforms during the window of opportunity and avoid the influence of the losers. The whole system of police and bureaucrats related to the police were interconnected and they were involved in the same corruption schemes. Newly appointed ministers and reformers who did not serve in the government before did not have an interest in maintaining the system as they were not involved and, therefore, did not benefit from it. Therefore, it was possible to proceed with the mass firings, and further reforms which were described in the legal acts in the previous section. An example of arrests and firings of high officials is the head of Georgian Railways: “He has been joined in detention by other high-profile violators, the former energy minister and the chairman of the Georgian Football Association”.41 The distinctiveness of the new elite and unlikeliness of inclusion in the old system can be also be argued for by the common view in academia that Saakashvili was using the anti-corruption drive as a political tool to eliminate his political enemies and clean up the old system: Saakashvili knew the political and public support-building benefits of anticorruption drives. He knew that exposure of the corruption in Shevardnadze’s government would serve as a pretext to clean up the system.42 Another element is the elimination of a large number of losers themselves. The entire Traffic Police squad was fired, as were the low and middle rank heads of police regional offices. Therefore, a large number of the losers of the reforms who were involved in the corruption and in the links to organized crime were eliminated from the public service. In Armenia, in contrast, the reform could not be implemented and achieve its goals as the old corruption schemes remained the same and no power shift had occured. As Wheatley points out, a similar movement in Armenia which aimed at displacing president Kocharian in early 2004 turned out to be unsuccessful. As well as in Georgia, the presidential and parliamentary elections in the first half of 2003 were also reported as fraudulent.43 The incumbent president Kocharian, who had been in power since 1998, received more than 60% of the votes. As Beachain and Polese put it, the events of the Rose Revolution in Georgia unified Armenian opposition and the conflict began in 2004 with a “parliamentary boycott in response to the pro- 41 David L. Phillips, “Corruption Next in Georgian Cleanup,” Christian Science Monitor, February 5, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0205/p11s02- cogn.html, last accessed August 30, 2013. 42 Alexander Kupatadze, “Explaining Georgia’s Anti-corruption Drive,” European Security 21, no. 1 (2012): 23. 43 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awaking to Rose Revolution.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 337 Kocharian majority cutting off a debate to initiate a confidence plebiscite in the President”.44 The opposition brought more than 20,000 protesters to the streets and, as Beachain and Polese report, took measures used by Georgia: people marching from Freedom Square to the parliament where they chanted calling for Kocharian to resign and stayed on the streets overnight. Nevertheless, as researchers put it, the protesters were met by the armed forces and were defeated which resulted in a hundred arrests and several injuries. The main reason for the lack of success of the protests, as Wheatley puts them, is that the movement lacked good leadership: The most prominent opposition leader, Stepan Demirchian, who stood against Kacharian in the 2003 presidential elections, had neither experience in government, nor widespread public support. His reputation was based merely on the fact that he was the son of the former First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, Karen Demirchian.45 After the attempted revolution Kocharian’s government continued their anti- corruption reforms. Even having similar reforms on paper, the reformers in Armenia did not manage to achieve the same results as the elites did not change (Table 5) and even though the government made some reductions in the police personnel, it did not hit the corrupt officers and did not distort the corruption schemes, so the corruption remained on the same level and even grows, according to Transparency International. Therefore, of the absence of any change in the elites did not allow for the implementation of the reforms in the similar conditions as in Georgia. Since the losers from the reform – corrupt politicians and, particularly, police officers - still held their positions after the implementation of the police reforms, and as the officials who were implementing the reform were the same as before, they were able to maintain their corruption schemes. The losers would not have any interests in increasing the transparency of the police and this reality is demonstrated in the worsening TI indices for Armenia. The Armenian government remained the same on several levels: Kocharian stayed in power through the attempt at revolution as well as after the elections, and the ministerial position holders remained the same, too. It is especially important to note that the Minister of Internal Affairs (who became the Head of the Police Department afterwards) continued to hold office throughout the considered period. The ruling Republican Party also did not have major changes in its structure, having the Prime Minister Margaryan as its head until his death in 2007.46 Without a change in officials, and as a consequence of 2003 elections and 44 Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese, ed. The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures(Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010), 21. 45 Wheatley, Georgia from National Awaking to Rose Revolution, 193. 46 Republican Party of Armenia, “History of the Party,” Website of the Republican Party of Armenia, 2012, available at http://www.hhk.am/en/history/, last accessed August 30, 2013.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 338 the failure of the attempt of the Revolution, Armenia could not repeat the Georgian success and break out from the existing corruption schemes and sweep away the losers, who might resist the police reforms. Table 5: Heads of the key Armenian ministries under prime-minister Margaryan Ministry Name Served under Kocharian’s government before the reforms Ministry of Defense Serge Sargsian X Ministry of Finance and Economy Vardan Hachatrian X Ministry of Justice Davit Harutunian X Ministry of Internal Affairs Haik Harutunian X 47 Source: Adalian48 . 4.3. Other possible explanations 4.3.1. Involvement of foreign actors One of possible alternative explanations is the presence of foreign actors in the reform process. Davison, in discussing the “soft power” concept, argues that various international organizations have created regimes which made it possible to shape the policies of the targeted states through various norms, rules and sanctions.49 Involvement of foreign actors could be considered as one of the reasons why the police reform did not achieve the planned results in Armenia but did in Georgia. Saakashvili, being a pro-Western politician, got words of support from abroad and especially from the US.50 Nevertheless, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), as well as other organizations, has been closely working with both countries and included similar recommendations to the countries. Both countries 47 Since 2002 –Head of the Police of the Government of the Republic of Armenia. 48 Rouben Paul Adalian, Historical Dictionary of Armenia (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2010). 49 Remy Davison, “‘Soft Law’ Regimes and European Organisations’ Fight Against Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering,” in Terrorism, Organised Crime and Corruption: Networks and Linkages, ed. Leslie T. Holmes (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007). 50 Cory Welt, “How Strategic Is the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership?,” Harriman Institute: Columbia University, 2010, available at http://home.gwu.edu/~cwelt/USGeorgiaStrategicPartnership.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 339 received recommendations on further activities. Therefore, the foreign actors’ involvement though can be an important part of the scope of causes of different outcomes of the reforms, but was not the primary factor which influenced the outcome of the reforms. Moreover, as Davidson points out, the mechanisms implemented by the international organizations leave room for manoeuvring by the states and, therefore, states’ internal reasons can play a bigger role in the reform process. 51 He makes an example of the case of Macedonia, which also received recommendations from GRECO, but has not enacted any legislation dealing with prevention of corruption. This exemplifies the gap between the ratification of international conventions and the implementation of the necessary legal instruments within domestic jurisdictions.52 Therefore, the foreign actors’ involvement though can be an important part of the scope of causes of different outcomes of the reforms, but was not the primary factor which influenced the outcome of the reforms, due to similarities of programs by international organizations (such as OSCE, for example ) in which Armenia and Georgia participated. There are, however, more reasons to state that foreign involvement could not be a primary driver for an outcome of a police reform. Another dimension of foreign involvement is the amount of funding which the countries have received during the process of the police reform implementation. On the question of financing, there are different sources of aid that were directed to Georgia and Armenia. Among the biggest donors are the United States and European Union.53Analyzing the level of funding which became available to Georgia and Armenia (Figure 2), for example in the case of the funding from the United States agencies, the amounts received by Armenia were bigger than those of Georgia during the 90s, and though the level of aid to Armenia declined after the beginning of the 2000s, the difference was not significant until 2008 and the events in Abkhazia and Ossetia. 51 Remy Davison, “‘Soft Law’ Regimes and European Organisations’ Fight Against Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering.” 52 Ibid., 141. 53 Ibid, 3.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 340 Figure 2: U.S. Assistance to the South Caucasus (in millions of current dollars) Source: Nichol54 . It is true, that the level of funding directed to Georgia is slightly higher, though it is also explained by the change in the elites and the excitement of the West about changes and the future cooperation with Georgia. Referring to the level of corruption recorded in both Armenia and Georgia, if the funding played a major role in defining the outcome of the police reform, then after the beginning of the 2000s Georgia, having higher incomes (Figure 2) from international donors, should have achieved a decrease in corruption (Figure 1) earlier during the attempts of police reform by Shevardnadze’s government. As higher aid did not bring such results, it is possible to conclude that there were more important factors than financial aid from the abroad in the question of the implementation of the reforms. In other words, the funding contributed to the successful reform implementation, but changes in the elite and their relations with the losers were the major factor which enabled the attractiveness of Georgia over Armenia due to the outcome of the Revolution and the possibility for the reformers to be free from the internal constraints set by the corrupt bureaucrats and police officers. 4.3.2. Severity of corruption As Figure 1 showed, the level of corruption in Armenia was lower than in Georgia 54 Jim Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, April 9, 2009, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124976.pdf, last accessed August 30, 2013.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 341 before the reforms. According to earlier research, reforms can be triggered by serious crisis.55 Though the “crisis hypothesis” is usually applied to the economic reforms, it can be useful in analyzing police reform as well: the police reform in Georgia can follow from a serious corruption crisis which was an obvious problem in the country, visible to everyone. Nevertheless, though the crisis hypothesis explains why the decision for the need of the reforms was in place, only presence or lack of the losers of the reform can explain why the reforms were done partially or not. Level of corruption in Georgia was higher than in Armenia before the reforms and it could contribute to why it was so important for the reforms to be completed, the crisis also enabled the new government to be empowered with more legitimacy in order to stand against the losers during the reform implementation. In Armenia, the corruption was at a lower level and the elites did not change, and though the reforms still took place, the losers of the reform could restrain the reformers, who also lacked external pressure due to levels of corruption, which led to the partial reform implementation. All the previously mentioned alternative explanations contributed to the outcome of the police reform, though were only enabled due to the main argument of the study – lack change of the elite and remaining connections with the losers of the reform did not allow Armenia to make the same progress in anti-corruption measures as Georgia did. Therefore, even though corruption magnitude is a plausible explanation, changes in the elite still remain a superior explanatory factor which defined the outcome of the police reform because a new government has less constraints and more credibility from the population, as well as from the foreign actors involved, and therefore in Georgia the reformers could implement full reforms. 5. Conclusion This article has addressed the problem of implementing the police reform in two Caucasian countries: Armenia and Georgia. The countries share a similar historical and cultural past and have similar levels of corruption in the past. The reforms, started in both countries in the early 2000-s, despite the similarities of the actions taken by both governments, led to different outcomes. While in Georgia the reforms increased the trust of the population in the police and decreased levels of corruption, its level in Armenia stayed approximately the same. The research question of this study is why the reforms in Armenia were less successful than in 55 Ashoka Mody and Abdul Abiad. “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?” International Monetary Fund, 2003; Alberto Alesina, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi. “Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms”. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12049. Accessed August 30, 2013.Olga Sholderer: The Drivers of Police Reform 342 Georgia. The hypothesis is that the major reason for success of the reforms in Georgia and lack of success in Armenia is a change in the elites and, consequently, their relations with the losers of the reform, which found support in this comparative case study. The question of fighting corruption in the post-Soviet region has been widely discussed in the literature, and this study analyzed the question in the framework of the elite continuity and internal constraints related to the reform implementation. The main finding of this study is that the success of the police reform in Armenia and Georgia was defined by the outcomes of the revolutionary movements which emerged in 2003/04 in both states. The main argument is that the change in the elites which took place in Georgia allowed the reformers, who did not hold their positions in the government before, to be free from the internal constraints put by the corrupt bureaucrats of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police officers. In Armenia, in contrast, the failure of the revolutionary movement allowed the government of Kocharian to stay in power and ministers to continue holding their positions. Therefore, even though the actions indicated in the reform action plan and strategies were similar to the ones made by Georgia (due to involvement of the same international consulting bodies), their implementation was restricted by the losers from the reforms: the corrupt bureaucrats. New governments are not bound by the old connections and existing corruption schemes and, therefore, are better able to implement reforms. This is reinforced due to the higher credibility and recent legitimization of their power and their proposed course of action during the revolution. With all the received support the reformers were able to go through the series of measures in Georgia. This study emphasizes the importance of the elite change for the successful police reform in Georgia and Armenia. Nevertheless, it does not claim that other factors are unimportant. Indeed, it states that, all together, they created a critical mass which allowed the police reform in Georgia to bring such a successful result and allowed the situation to remain the same in Armenia. A major limitation of such an argument is the complexity of the issue and difficulty of credible testing of a large number of variables on a set of two cases. This is why only one factor was chosen as of a primary importance while others serve as additional. The cases were also selected on the dependent variable and, therefore, the conclusions have to be considered with the greatest care for further inferences. The finding of this study can only serve as generalizable to the countries which are similar to Georgia and Armenia in various ways: size, political regime, culture, history, economic development and so on. The problem with selecting the dependent variable also can result in unobserved variables which vary slowly over time, which was partly solved by comparing countries at a second point in time (during the 1990s), as well as picking countries which are similar in variousCEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 3 343 dimensions. Azerbaijan can be considered among such countries. The state also had made steps in implementing police reforms and, though having a different political regime, can serve as a case for further studies. Another drawback is a limited availability of information on corruption schemes and internal governmental relations. Discussing the future of the police reforms and the level of the corruption, one can expect that the effect of the changes done by Georgia, and lacking in Armenia, may be not permanent. Following from the main argument of the study, the police reform succeeded due to the change in the elite. It was important for Saakashvili to gain popular support in conditions of political instability after the Rose Revolution, and therefore, the police reforms were chosen as the forefront of the new government’s policies. Nevertheless, as time passes the new government members and public servants can create new corruption schemes as the government is no longer under the political pressure arising from instability. Corruption can also re- emerge due to the elimination of excitement in the international community about Georgia, particularly after the events of August 200856, popular rallies for Saakashvili resignation57 and various reports on abuses58 and, consequently, due decrease of funding. 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