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1. Introduction In the aftermath of the 2012 Russian presidential election, which caused unprecedented public apathy, Putin’s authoritarian political model has lost a lot of its luster. Pervasive corruption and a significant spike in ethnic tension in the North Caucasus have also fueled a sense of alienation among a broad slice of the population. Nationalism in Russia has undergone a dramatic shift, one that Putin, seemingly, has been unprepared to respond to. Economic uncertainty has also boosted the popularity of ethnic nationalism. This trend is emphasized by the growing popularity of the slogan “Russia for the Russians” among ethnic Russians. President Putin has been reluctant to acknowledge this trend in public. Instead, he seems to ignore the rise of ethnic nationalists, casting them as trouble-makers whose personal agendas ignite the disintegration of the Russian Federation. However, as long as genuine federalism in Russia remains vague, the state will be, in its essence, an imperial entity. As such, it can be ruled only undemocratically, with Putin’s repeated warnings that any attempts to set up ethnicity-based political institutions will not be permitted. Such statements indicate unequivocally that force will be necessary to enforce his vision of Russia. But how far can Putin go if a large number of nationalists in the North Caucasus are not behind him? One ethnic group, the Circassians, share the distinction of being the oldest continually identifiable ethnic group in the North Caucasus. Despite the fact thatCEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 235 only around one million Circassians live in the region, the Circassians make an interesting case study because they form what is known as the “Circassian world,” and they have showed a strong sense of common purpose in response to the many challenges in the most volatile region of Russia – the North Caucasus. To explain the path Circassian nationalism is taking after the 2012 presidential election, I will first turn to the classic theoretical literature on this subject, Gellner’s work on nations and modernity1 and Anthony Smith’s famous theory of ethnosymbolism, which both translate well to the Russian context. Smith’s definition of the ethnic as a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a specific “homeland” and a measure of solidarity can accurately apply to the Circassian ethnic minority.2 Gellner’s concept of nationalism as a principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent is also evocative of the Circassian nationalist desire to forge a political entity in which the rights of theCircassians have primacy.3 The rise of Circassian nationalism is not just part of the worldwide resurgence of the politics of ethnic identity. This resurgence has deep causes and will gain strength in both the Caucasus and the diaspora. The Circassians are one of the autochthonous peoples of the North West Caucasus. Their call themselves Adyge and they are “titular” nations in the republics of Adyghea, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino- Balkaria.4 Smaller numbers of Circassians also live in adjacent Russian regions. Circassians, as much dispersed in their homeland as in diaspora worldwide, live in several constituent units of the Russian Federation that are cut off from each other both geographically and administratively.5 Henze describes the Circassians as a people with a common language, common pride in their history and fierce adherence to traditions, but without a written language or recorded laws, and with an absence of administrative structure and of organisation to provide for their own defence6 . Like the ancient Greek cities, Circassian tribes were never united politically, raided each other and took prisoners and hostages and then met in councils on neutral 1 Ernest Gellner,Nations and Nationalism(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 2 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (Routledge, 2009). 3 Gellner,Nations and Nationalism, 6-7. 4 Zeynel Abidin Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet,” Open Democracy, 21 May 2010, accessed December 21, 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/zeynel-abidin-besleney/circassian-nationalism- and-internet. 5 Ibid. 6 Paul Henze, “Circassian Resistance to Russia,” in: The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup (Hurst & Co, London, 1992). 62-111.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 236 ground to regulate relations between tribes and clans, debate political issues, and hold games and festivals; feelings of common nationality were not institutionalised beyond this level.7 In both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the terminology used in Russian academia and the administrative structures to define the Circassians was somewhat inconsistent. The official Soviet bureaucracy defined them as Adyghean, Cherkess, Kabardian and Shapsough depending on their place of residence and the dialect of the Circassian language spoken. The first Russians to come into regular contact with Circassians were paramilitary Cossacks, who established their settlements in the plains north of the Kuban River in the 16th century to patrol the Russian Empire’s southern frontiers. Cossacks, who included men of very diverse origins, struck up alliances with these leaders and married and intermingled with both Circassian and Nogay Tatars, adopting to a large extent their customs and style of life which was in many respects of a higher quality than the Russians had attained at the time.8 The Karachay-Cherkessia Autonomous Region was formed on April 12, 1922. By a law of the Russian Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of July 3, 1991, it was transformed into the Karachay-Cherkessia Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the RSFSR. The administrative Center of the republic is Cherkessk. In Kabardino-Balkaria, ethnic Kabardins (or Circassians) account for a majority of the republic’s population – 57, 2 %, or 492 000 people. Ethnic Circassians comprise 12 % in Karachay-Cherkessia, or a little more than 51 000 people. Finally, ethnic Adygeans, who are also Circassians, comprise barely a quarter of the total population of Adygea, numbering just over 110 000 people.9 Most social scientists do not attribute a significant role to an ethnic factor in contemporary social transformations; they assume that the transformative power of globalization and of bureaucratic rationality will ultimately obliterate it. Yet the contemporary phenomenon of ethnic groups politically mobilizing against the state has demonstrated that it is necessary to include the ethnic factor in the analysis of social transformations. Ethnic mobilization is thus far more than political campaigning on the basis of ethnicity. It occurs not only at the time of elections but also at the time of particular events that can form a basis for mass action. In order to situate the phenomenon of Circassian ethnic mobilization adequately in a wider socio-political context we need a broad conceptualization of the term “political mobilization”, one that goes beyond merely the field of electoral politics. This article would only have a narrow understanding of the process of Circassian mobilization if it was to exclude from its scope those forms of political action that take place outside the official electoral politics, ranging from peaceful protests to 7 Ibid. 8 Paul Henze, “Circassians in History,” (remarks delivered at the conference The Circassians: Past, Present and Future, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, 21 May 2007). 9 Federal State Statistic Service, Itogi Vsesoyznoy perepisi 2010 (2010 Russian Federal Census). Moscow: GoskomstatRossii, 2011,www.gks.ru/, last accessed July 5, 2011.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 237 radical calls for a boycott of the Sochi Winter Olympics. The Circassian mobilization is multi-dimensional; it is not just ethnic, but also, cultural, indigenous and minority rights-oriented. The first section of the article discusses the so-called “Circassian question” through the lenses of political history of the Circassian diaspora both in the Caucasus and worldwide. Problems of Circassian ethnic identity and participation of the Circassians in the political process have been assessed from different perspectives in the second section. The third section deals with the issue of Circassian genocide and its projection as an issue over the 2014 Winter Olympic Games. Then, the strategic goals and the main components of the Circassian ethnic mobilization after the 2012 presidential election in Russia are discussed and analysed in the fourth section. The conclusion summarizes the key findings and highlights the intricate interrelationship between Circassian ethnic politics and the Kremlin’s policies of encouraging hostilities between ethnic groups in the North Caucasus. 2. The “Circassian Question” Since the collapse of the Soviet Union one of the most serious internal policy challenges facing the Russian Federation has unquestionably been Moscow’s relations with the North Caucasus diasporas. The Circassian diaspora came about as a result of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the Northwest Caucasus in the 1860s, when approximately a million people were forcibly removed from their land and deported to the Ottoman Empire. Up to a third died from hunger and diseases in the Russian controlled coastal areas before their departure, on overcrowded ships or in refugee camps on their arrival in Anatolia and the Balkans.10 The descendants of those who survived the deportation, which Circassians and an increasing number of scholars and journalists call the “Circassians Genocide,” currently number around 3 million in Turkey and 400,000 elsewhere in Syria, Jordan, Israel, the USA and the Western Europe. 11 It is important to note that to the extent that disputes have arisen they are not inherently ethnic, but rather are social and economic with an ethnic component. In the early Soviet period ethnic disputes were subdued and practically nonexistent due to a well-functioning system of the social and economic incentives. Since the early 1960s, a process of ethnic or demographic homogenization has taken place in the North Caucasus, though at a slower speed in the west than in the eastern parts.12 Ethnic Russians have been steadily leaving the region in a process 10 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.” 11 Ibid. 12 Lars Funch Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization in the North Caucasus 20- years after the Fall of the Soviet Union,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe,Vol 11, No 2 (2012): 121.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 238 that began when the Balkars and the Karachai returned from exile in Central Asia in the late 1950s. This could also be seen as a counter reaction to the demographic Russification of the Soviet era–enhanced by the North Caucasian re-ethnification processes since 1991. These tendencies increase the legitimacy of the type of self- determination found among the titular-nationalities of the North Caucasian peoples and, in some way, counteracts the Russification processes mentioned earlier. Internally in the republics, the ethnic homogenization processes are to some extent countered by the on-going process of urbanization, by which many villages have lost half of their population since the fall of the Soviet Union13. The relationship that exists between the big Russian state that shares its name with a dominant ethnic group, the Russians or so-called “Staatsvolk” 14 and the Circassians, as ethnic minorities located in the southern periphery, can only be labelled an asymmetric power-relationship.15 This relationship is further challenged by the fact that for an extended period both groups have been troubled by questions of identity and identification as part of the transitional uncertainties that also occurred in many other areas of the post-Soviet space. 16 This is a type of structural problem in the so-called asymmetrical ethno- federalism of Russia that dates back to the state-formation process that began in 1991–a federal model with a solid built-in conflict potential.17 The widespread anti- Caucasian xenophobia and the tendency of the Russian media to constantly link the North Caucasus to issues such as terror and violence to many Circassians end up stressing the point made by Andreas Wimmer on ethno-national dominance as performed by various elite actors in Russia, and how this can function as a mobilizing factor among ethno-cultural minorities.18 Andreas Wimmer distinguishes between inclusivist and exclusivist types of dominant ethnicity, by which he states that the more exclusivist variant delineates a field of political tension and can represent a more contested and conflictive mode of ethno-national dominance.19 Wimmer use the term ethno-national dominance 13 Ibid., 122. 14 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the NewEurope (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 15 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121. 16 Anatoly Khazanov, “Nations and Nationalism in Central Asia,” in The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, eds. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: Sage, 2006). 45. 17 Richard Sakwa. “Nation and Nationalism in Russia‟. In The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, eds. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: Sage, 2006). 418. 18 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121. 19 Andreas Wimmer, ‘Dominant Ethnicity and Nationhood’ In Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities, ed. Eric P. Kaufmann (London and New York: Routledge 2004). 47.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 239 to cover both dominant ethnicity and dominant nationhood, which can be useful in relation to the Russian context where the two forms often are mixed and often not defined. Within contemporary Russia there seems to be a tendency to switch between being inclusivist and exclusivist in a manner that has similarities with the earlier periods of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, when, for instance, periods of “Russification” could shift with periods of “nativization.”20 Hansen points out that elements of this can also be found in the Circassian regions today, where local languages and history are being taught in schools and published in books, but due to enormous developments in the electronic media, especially in television and on the internet, the Russian language has a strengthened position vis-à-visthe local languages.21 The system of dominating ethnic groups is also found on the secondary level of the republics, which Wimmer has termed as “dominant minorities.”22 In Kabardino-Balkaria, Balkars regularly complain about the domination of the Kabardians, as do the Cherkess about the Karachai in Karachai-Cherkessia. In the republic of Adygea, Adygs and Russians are mutually complaining about each other. The closely related Turkish-speaking peoples of Balkars and Karachai are also undergoing a process of mobilization and increased cooperation as found among the Circassians. These two parallel mobilization processes partly enhance each other, which is a by-product of the double-titular republic structure.23 The course of events in Karachay-Cherkessia demonstrate that, even in a multinational society where there are many prerequisites for ethnic tensions, responsible government attempting to provide for successful economic development may be able to prevent conflict because people who have some prospects of economic prosperity are not willing to sacrifice that perspective to the selfish interest of nationalist politicians. Ethnic divisions are also suppressed as a result of cross-cutting cleavages within ethnic groups in Karachay-Cherkessia.24 Even though ethnic tensions in Karachay-Cherkessia have calmed down after an intense conflict erupted in 1999 over disputed elections, the risks of their conflagration still come from three sources: traditional Karachay-Cherkessian tensions; animosity between these ethnic groups and the Cossacks, who are widely perceived to be a part of Moscow’s control system; and growing Islamic supranational groups drawing on local Muslims that who have been marginalized by their respective ethnicities and often implicated in a series of attacks on local police 20 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121. 21 Ibid. 22 Wimmer, “Dominant Ethnicity and Nationhood”, 47. 23 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121. 24 Among the Karachays, the pre-revolution social classes included Bii(barons), Uzden (yeomen) andKul(serfs). The Soviet regime led to the extermination or exile of the Biis,the dispossession of the Uzden, and the usurpation of power byKuls.Despite representing 40% of Karachays today, Kuls continue to hold most important social and political positions.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 240 and civilians. The potential source of conflict with the Cossacks has been overshadowed by the rift between the Karachay and the Cherkess since the election of Semenov as president (a retired general and a paternal descendant of one of the Karachay’s clans) in 1999. Unlike in Chechnya, Moscow always demonstrated a willingness to mediate this dispute, demonstrating a proactive attitude rather than the reactive response. Under pressure from Moscow Semenov did not dispute the results of the 2001 parliamentary elections suggesting that no one in the region is willing to replicate the fate of the Chechens. However, the growing power of radical Islamic groups associated mainly with ethnic Karachay and the response to this by federal authorities are becoming now of greater concern.25 Notwithstanding the fact that the Cherkess and Kabardins are closely related Circassian peoples living in the north of these republics, and the Karachay and Balkars are Turkic people living in the south, two ethnically divided republics, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, were created as part of the “divide and rule” policy of the Soviet regime. Thus, instead of two ethnically homogenous republics, Stalin created two mutually contemptuous (if not hostile) units laying the foundations for ethnic strife that began to reassert itself with the first presidential elections in Karachay-Cherkessia in 1999. In 1999, Vladimir Semenov, an ethnic Karachay, won a run-off against Stanislav Derev, a Cherkess. Perceived electoral frauds led to demonstrations and acts of violence, as the Cherkess and the Abazins started to vow for secession from Karachay-Cherkessia. Only Moscow’s intervention with unprecedented resources deployed to the region prevented violence. Semenov retained power until the 2003 presidential elections when, in contrast to 1999, only ethnic Karachay candidates ran for office and Semenov was narrowly defeated by Mustafa Batdyev. From time to time Karachay-Cherkessia experiences waves of terrorist attacks associated with ethnic Karachay involvement in Islamic extremist organizations, such as Hizbu at-Tauhid, aiming to establish an Islamic state in the Caucasus. These type of attacks involves small car-bombs killing police and some ambushes targeting pro-governmental civilians on trains and in towns and lead to a series of reprisal arrests. These attacks remain a disturbing trend especially with the continuation of series of attacks committed against Circassians leaders in Karachay-Cherkessia, Adyghea and Kabardino-Balkaria. At present, the Kremlin is unwilling to resolve any of the three main components of the Circassian question: recognition of the genocide, the unification of the multiple Circassian regions into a single republic within the Russian Federation, and the repatriation of the Diaspora. After the wave of demonstrations against Caucasian ethnic minorities, it was obvious that any decision in favour of Circassians could beef up Russian 25 The Karachays are a Sunni Muslim Turkic people who closely related to the Balkars and Abkhaz, and less closely to the Nogai and Kumyk of Dagestan. The Karachays group identity and cohesion, although relatively low compared to other ethnic groups due to strong tribal (rather than communal) identification, is in the process of solidifying due to the inferior socio-economic status coupled with enticing slogans of pan-Turkic and Islamic solidarity.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 241 nationalism, which is by far more dangerous than Circassian nationalism, so the Russian authorities apparently adopted the “tactics of silence” on the Circassian question. 3. Ethnic Nationalism as Mobilizing Ideology Problems of Circassian ethnic identity and participation of the Circassians in the political process have been assessed from different perspectives – Circassians after the fall of the Soviet Union,26 Circassians and gender,27 Circassians and the Internet,28 Circassians in Turkey,29 and the strategic goals of Circassian nationalism.30 As Zhemukhov points out, while composing a common ethnic community, the Circassians did not represent a unified mass national movement either at the time of Russian conquest or during the Soviet ethno- territorial delimitation. Instead, they share a common ideology based on a common memories of what they regarded as genocide committed during the conquest of the North Caucasus in the 19th century. The Circassian organizations maintain three goals: recognition of the genocide, unification of Circassian territories in one homeland, and repatriation of the expelled population.31 Zhemukhov provides a new typology of Circassian movements: nationalists, sovereigntists (unification of the Circassians as a single autonomous region within Russia), culturalist (development of culture and language inside the regions where they live), accommodationists (local political elites incorporated into the Russian state policy), and centrists. In Zhemukhov’s view, the centrist position was stronger during the first Circassian movement in 1989–2000 when the positions of nationalists and accommodationists were less different than during the second movement. The active involvement of Russia and Georgia resulted in the polarization of the movement and prevented establishment of an active centrist strand in the 26 Georgi Derluguian, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005). 27 Seteney Shami, “Prehistories of Globalization: Circassian Identity in Motion,” in Caucasus Paradigms: Anthropologies, Histories, and the Making of a World Area. Ed. Bruce Grantand LaleYaltildeın-Heckmann (Berlin: Lit, 2007). 191–218; Nil S. Dogan, “From National Humiliation to Difference: The Image of the Circassian Beauty in the Discourses of Circassian Diaspora Nationalists,”New Perspectives on Turkey 42 (2007): 77–101. 28 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet;” Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization.” 29 Ayhan Kaya, “Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey,”Mediterranean Politics 9.2 (2004): 221–239. 30 Sufian Zhemukhov, “The Circassian Question in Russian-Georgian Relations,“ Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo 118 (2010); Sufian Zhemukhov, “The Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism,“Nationalities Papers 40(4) (2012): 503-524. 31 Zhemukhov, “The Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism.”Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 242 contemporary Circassian movement.32 Zhemukhov also notes that the main differences between opposing Circassian position are based on different views of the Russian role in the movement. Accommodationists and culturalists regard the Circassian issue as an internal Russian problem, while centrists, sovereigntists, and nationalists claim that it is an international one, causing further polarization of the contemporary Circassian movement.33 Since 2005, the Circassian nationalist movement has been moving in a new direction as Circassians around the world have begun to mobilize demanding international recognition of the 19 century atrocities committed by the Russian Empire in its conquest of the Northwest Caucasus. While sharing with sovereigntists the concept of recognition of the genocide by the international community, nationalists have different approach to other issues, for example the unconditional cancelation of the 2014 Sochi Olympics and creation of an independent Circassian state. On 4 October 2007 the nationalists appealed to the Russian president Vladimir Putin to cancel the Sochi Olympics and recognize the Circassian genocide.34 Likewise, numerous appeals for recognition of their brutal deportation as genocide have been rejected twice by the Russian Duma in 200635 and in 2011.36 Unlike the Chechens, who at least received an apology from the Soviet regime, the Circassians remain the only ethnic group in the North Caucasus omitted from any sort of apology from Soviet or Russian authorities for the historical injustices they experienced in the 19th century. In the international arena, however, the Circassian diaspora has been much more successful in approaching this goal. Thus, on 6 April 2008, the Parliament of Israel fulfilled the request of the Circassian community and established the 21st of May as an official Day of Memory and Sorrow of the Circassian People. In March 2010, Circassian representatives from six different countries participated in an international conference organized in Tbilisi, Georgia: “Hidden Nations, Enduring Crimes: The Circassians and the Peoples of the Caucasus Between Past and Future.” The conference offered an unprecedented opportunity to examine the problem as the Georgian parliament had begun to examine evidence from historians and scholars as to whether the above-mentioned deportation of the Circassians constitute genocide. After some deliberations, on 20 May 2011 Georgia’s parliament recognized the Circassian Genocide which took place towards 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 The State Duma of the Russian Federation, The Duma Committee on Nationalities’ Official letter 3.18-30/10. January 27, 2006. 36 Jamestown Foundation, “Russian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Meets with Circassian Activists,” 18 May 2011, North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 12 Issue: 10, accessed July 4, 2011, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4dda2d022.html.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 243 the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, culminating in 1864. Georgia became the first country to recognize 19th century forced deportations of Circassians by Tsarist Russia in the northwest Caucasus as “genocide”.37 Such conferences attended by US, Turkish, and European scholars (out of curiosity rather than professional interest) are held in the countries where Adig communities influence local politics and able to provide favorable media coverage. The Adig nationalist ideology is also diffused particularly among the younger Adig generation through a number ethnic organizations (the Circassian Congress in Adyghea; the Kabardin Congress, The Independent Public Research Center, and the Public Human Rights Center in Kabardino-Balkaria). Karachay and Balkar activists are also actively engaging into interpretations of myths about the history of their kin, being convinced that the Karachay and Balkar peoples who are actually of the Turkic origin are Alans and thus are somehow entitled to the territories formerly owned by the latter. Many experts believe, however, that Georgia took an obviously political decision.38 Apart from the fact that it is clearly a result of Georgia’s current post-war rhetoric with Russia, if Georgia really aspires to the moral leadership of the Caucasus, it must also recognise the Armenian genocide, something Armenian groups have requested on several occasions. Moreover, as Thomas de Waal points out, it is striking that Georgia has only recognised as genocide the Tsarist murder of Circassians and not the very similar murder of the Abkhaz in 1867 and 1877.39 If it would also recognise deported Abkhaz as refugees, it would be hard to disagree with Abkhazian efforts to bring about the return of its diaspora. It would also undermine Georgia’s claim that Abkhazia’s independence project is rejected by a majority of the people who have a right to live there. It seems unilateral for the parliament of Georgia to be contemplating a resolution declaring the 1864 deportations of the Circassians to be genocide. Circassians and Abkhaz are ethnically and linguistically related and the 1867 deportations were a continuation of what the Russian imperial government had done in Circassia just to the north only three years before.40 37 The Georgian Parliament passed it with 90 votes to 0 a resolution saying that “pre- planned” mass killings of the Circassians by the Tsarist Russia in second half of 19 century, accompanied by "deliberate famine and epidemics", should be recognized as "genocide" and those deported during those events from their homeland, should be recognized as "refugees." 38 Thomas De Waal, “1867 and all that: Abkhaz, Circassians and Georgians and historical justice,” Abkhaz World, May 18, 2011, available at: www.abkhazworld.com/headlines/648-1867-and-all-that-abkhaz-circassians-and-georgians- and-historical-justice.html; Jameson Foundation, “Russian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee;” Zhemukhov, “The Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism.” 39 de Waal, “Abkhaz, Circassians, Georgians, and Historical Justice.” 40 Ibid.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 244 Clashes between the two ethnic groups would likely force Russia to militarily intervene on behalf of peace and stability creating ethnic repercussions in Kabardino-Balkaria and Adyghea. The assassination of Fral Shebzukhov is only one in a series of attacks committed against Circassians (Adige) leaders in Karachay- Cherkessia.41 In the two other Circassian republics of Adyghea and Kabardino- Balkaria, political leaders have been assaulted and hospitalized, but rarely has a murder taken place so openly and demonstratively. With the 2014 Sochi Olympics on the horizon, the Kremlin could be gambling that a low-intensity conflict in Karachay-Cherkessia would dampen the activity of the Circassian nationalist movement (both in the Caucasus and among its 7 million strong overseas diaspora) by diverting the attention of Circassian nationalists away from their plans of opposing the 2014 Sochi Olympics. The first wave of Circassian nationalist activism crystalized in the early 1990s during Boris Yeltsin’s period in power. Within a few years it gained popular support and became a key element in the struggle for power in the North Caucasus. Even though most of the demands of the nationalists were heard and acted upon by the federal authorities,42 in Karachay-Cherkessia they found themselves locked in a secondary position under the Karachay majority. After Putin became President, the International Circassian Association was gradually taken over by the pro-Moscow functionaries of the ruling Kabardin elites. By 2000 some of the leading members who refused to be co-opted, including Ibragim Yaganov and Valery Khatazhukov, had been excluded from the political scene, leaving no functioning independent nationalist organizations. Thus, post-Soviet local bureaucratic elites, who had already adapted to post-Soviet political realities, firmly restored themselves to positions of influence and integrated these nationalist movements into the pro- Kremlin organizations.43 In spite of the fact that the Circassian nationalist movement are still run by veterans of the early 1990s the situation has been changing. A younger generation of activists, unlike the veterans, has no experiences of the war in Abkhazia and is not bounded by the traditionally unquestioned authority of the elders inCircassian society. The International Circassian Association (ICA) founded in 1991 is actually an umbrella organization comprising the main Circassian organizations of the time in the Caucasus and in the diaspora in Turkey, Europe, the USA, Syria and Jordan. It was very influential during the war in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 and then in Karachay- 41 Fral Shebzukhov, an adviser to Karachay-Cherkessia’s President Boris Ebzeyev who was in line to become Prime Minister, was murdered on May 12, 2010 in Cherkessk. 42 For instance,Adygheya’s status was upgraded to a republic. 43 Fatima Tlisova, “The War on Circassian Nationalism” JRL Research & Analytical Supplement. Issue No. 42, May (2008); MathewLight, “Territorial Restructuring In the Russian Federation And The Future of The Circassian Republics” JRL Research & Analytical Supplement. Issue No. 42, May (2008).CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 245 Cherkessia during the political power struggle in 1998-99 between the Karachay and Circassians. However, after falling under the full control of the pro-Moscow Kabardin elites in the early 2000s, ICA leaders have repeatedly stated that they no longer intend to engage in ethnic politics and are merely concerned with the cultural and linguistic needs of the Circassian community. Nevertheless, the Adige Khases in Adighea and Karachay-Cherkessia, under the respective leaderships of Arambi Khapai and Mukhammed Cherkesov, have begun actively engaging in ethnic politics. Their position on political issues such as the unification of Circassian peoples or the Circassian genocide thus differs significantly from the official position of the ICA, of which both organizations are members.44 Besleney points out that non-aligned groups of Circassian activists that have a different support base pursue different recruitment strategies and are very keen to engage with international political actors for their cause, all of which distinguishes them from the ICA. “The Cherkessian Congress”, “Youth Khase” and “Khase” in Adyghea, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria come into this category as all of them have come into being in the late 2000s. 4. The issue of “Circassian Genocide”and the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi45 There is an almost universal agreement across the whole spectrum of Circassian society on the concept of the genocide against the Circassian nation by the Russian Empire. Furthermore, the parliaments of both Kabardino-Balkaria and Adyghea passed laws, in 1992 and 1996 respectively, officially recognizing what they named “the Circassian Genocide” and also appealed to the Russian Duma for such recognition.46 This issue becomes divisive, as Besleney points out, when organizations want to elevate the problem to international dimension by co-opting the Circassian diaspora.47 A good example of this would be the protest actions of some diaspora Circassians activists against the Sochi Olympics during the last Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. More recently in March 2010, following a conference on the issue in Tbilisi, an official appeal was made by Circassians delegates to the Georgian Parliament to recognize the “Circassian Genocide.”48 These efforts resulted in Georgia’s parliament formally recognized the Circassian 44 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.” 45 An additional factor behind the tension between the Russian authorities and the Circassians in the run-up to the Olympics is the creation in 2010 of the Northern Caucasus Federal District (NCFO), which officially divided Adygea (and Shapsugia) from the other administrative subdivisions containing a Circassian ethnic element and created a bureaucratic obstacle to the inclusion of Circassians of the NCFO in activities connected to the Olympics. 46 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.” 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 246 genocide which took place towards the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, culminating in 1864. As previously mentioned, Georgia became the first country to recognize the 19th century forced deportations of Circassians by the Tsarist Russia in the northwest Caucasus as “genocide”. While new activists want to further push the issue wherever possible, the established or state sponsored organizations are prone to a more conciliatory position with regard to the Russian authorities.49 On the one hand, it is a factor in the collective historical memory of the Circassian peoples and in their allegiance to a common historical narrative. On the other hand, the narratives of the numerous sacrifices attributed to the Circassians during the war with the Russian Empire from 1820s to the 1860s, and during their subsequent resettlement in the Ottoman Empire, are often used by the local elites of the Circassian republics to exert pressure on the federal authorities for further subsidies and subventions. At the same time, some specialists cast doubt upon the validity of applying the term “genocide” to the policy of the Russian Empire. 50 This critique stems not only from the fact that this term came into use in international law only after the Nuremberg trials, but also with the fact that the Russian empire did not seek to murder the Circassians as an entire ethnic group. Rather, it is more appropriate to describe the policy of enforced resettlement in the Ottoman Empire as ethnic cleansings. However, the outright denial of the Circassian sufferings as genocide does nothing to facilitate interethnic dialogue in the North Caucasus but rather solidifies more radical position of the Circassian diaspora. 51 Even though after the Georgian- Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, in which volunteers from the Circassian republics also played an active role by virtue of their ethnic kinship with the Abkhazians, the consolidation of the Circassian peoples had reached a new level sufficient to transform the Circassian national movement into a new political player in the Caucasus, it did not happen. 52 Experts indicate that the reasons behind the failure of the Circassian national movement to come up with consolidated position are multiple. For example, Turkey-based Circassian organizations split in their attitude towards the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 as well as in their intention to raise the question of Russian responsibility for the Circassian genocide carried out by the Russian Empire at the international level before the 2014 Olympic Games. 53 Political analysts suggest that, contrary to the fact that Circassians have expected 49 Ibid. 50 Aleksei Skakov and Nikolai Silaev, “The ‘Cherkessian Factor’,” in The Contemporary Political Situation in The Caucasus, Carnegie Moscow Center Black Sea Peace building Network Russian Expert Group ReportNo. 2010/1. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 247 Turkey to back their efforts to restore justice in their homeland, Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations and domestic situation, together with Russia’s ability to play on both, severely limited Ankara’s ability to play that role. There are a few main reasons for which Turkey, despite the presence of a large Circassian diaspora and the role its members play in the Turkish armed forces, will never be the ally Circassians had hoped for. First, Turkey is extremely reluctant to press for Russian recognition of the genocide of the Circassians because that it will immediately change Russia’s stance the 1915 mass murder of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, something the Turks are desperately trying to avoid. Second, Turkey is unwilling to play an ethnic card against Russia because it recognizes that Russia could play an ethnic card back with greater success, targeting the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in particular. Third, Turkey is vigorously trying to assert itself as a key player in the larger geopolitics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, a possibility that requires some level of cooperation with Moscow. It would be undercut if the Turks became more heavily involved in Circassian issues that temper with Moscow’s internal affairs. The republican status of Adyghea is another cause of continual friction between Circassians activists and the federal center, as Moscow seems to have made plans to merge it with Krasnodar Krai, in which Adyghea is a geographical enclave.54 The 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi constitutes a key issue in the ongoing transnational Circassian mobilization, but a number of what could be called structural issues also contribute as mobilizing factors. These include anti-Caucasian xenophobia, the role of ethnic Russians as the dominant ethnic group in the Russian Federation, the double-titular composition of some of the republics in the North Caucasus, and the general process of ethnic homogenization.55 Skakov and Silaev argue that one factor behind the intensification of interest in the historical grievances of the Circassians is the 2014 Winter Olympics in Krasnaya Polyana, a settlement that was created on the site of the Circassian mountain village of Kbaade.56 There is a broadly accepted perception amongst the Circassian peoples that Sochi was the last bulwark in their resistance to the Russian Empire’s conquest of Circassian lands. As such it holds a significant place in the collective Circassian consciousness. For this reason there was indignation at President Putin’s speech to the International Olympics Committee in July 2007 when he listed the ancient Greeks, Kolkhi and Cossacks amongst the former inhabitants of Sochi, but did not make any 54 Paul Goble, “Window on Eurasia: Turkey’s Geopolitical Aspirations and Domestic Problems Limit Its Role as Ally of the Circassians, Analyst Says”, 2010, available at http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.ro/2010/12/window-on-eurasia-turkeys-geopolitical.html, last accessed July 5, 2011. 55 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 2012. 56 Skakov and Silaev, “The ‘Cherkessian Factor’,” 3.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 248 mention at all of the autochthonous peoples, the Circassians. To make thing worse, the Russian Olympic Committee invited a Cossack dance troupe to the Vancouver Olympics to represent the culture of the region.57As Skakov and Silaev point out, severalCircassian activists, speak of an allegedly joint Russian-Abkhazian position in favor of holding the games in Sochi. The reason for these differences can be found not only in the traditional arguments between the Circassian and the Abkhazian national movements but also in consideration of the very materialistic nature of the local population. The Olympic Games in Sochi brings significant profit for quasi- sovereign Abkhazia from tourism, supplying construction materials and goods for smuggling, while theCircassian elites remain marginalized. In his assessment of the Circassian position on the issue of holding the Winter Olympics in Sochi, declared by President Medvedev to be another “Russian National Project”, Besleney points out three distinct attitudes. First, few organizations, such as the Cherkess Congress, want the Games to be cancelled. They insist that the Olympics cannot be held on land where thousands of Circassians were murdered in the Russo-Circassian War and that 2014 is the 150th anniversary of what they call “the Circassian Genocide”. Second, other groups, including the Adige Khase of Adyghea and many intellectuals and academics in the Circassian world, want increased and visible Circassian participation, similar to the role of North American and Australian indigenous peoples in past Olympics. The third attitude was that of the ICA and reflected the official Russian position that there should be no special Circassian dimension at all.58 However, a vigorous campaign of increased public attention mounted by the other groups in recent months has somehow forced the ICA and its member organizations towards a gradual acceptance of the second approach. 5.Circassian Ethnic Mobilization after the 2012 Presidential Elections On January 23 2012 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta about ethnic relations in the Russian Federation as he geared up for presidential elections in March 2012. To a large extent the article was implicitly devoted to Moscow’s policy toward the North Caucasus. Putin proclaimed ethnic Russians “state constituting people”, something Russian nationalists had always advocated previously. At the same time, Putin compared those demonstrating under the banner “Stop Feeding the Caucasus” to the people who broke up the Soviet Union and proclaimed that the self-determination of the ethnic Russian people was as part of a “poly-ethnic civilization, united by a Russian cultural 57 Historically, the paramilitary Cossacks units were primary combat forces who played a pivotal role in the demise of historical Circassia, so this was just adding insult to injury. 58 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.”CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 249 core.”59 Despite the fact that Putin is often characterized as a nationalist, it would be more accurate to call him an opportunist who exploits other people’s prejudices when politically expedient. In fact, he believes that Russian identity doesn’t depend on somebody’s ethnicity but on whether they have adopted the “cultural code” of Russian civilization. However, even if Putin believes so firmly that the country’s existence depends on interethnic harmony, little been done to implement it over the past decade. The importance of the “Circassian question” (see table 1) is systematically muted by the Russian authorities insofar as it affects, firstly, policy towards Abkhazia, and, secondly, the situation in the Northern Caucasus. Due to the presence of an extensive and influential Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, that country was and will remain a most important external partner for Abkhazia on an equal footing with Russia. 60 Indeed this was so even before Russia recognized Abkhazia and will, to all appearances, continue to remain so in the future. In the current context, Abkhazia’s “horizontal ties” with the diaspora may be more important than Ankara’s official position with respect to the political status of Abkhazia. The “Circassian question” is also reflected in the attempts made by the Abkhazian government to find ways of surmounting the demographic problem posed by the dwindling Abkhazian population of the republic, immediately addressed by the repatriation of Abazins from countries in the Near East and Russia. 61 In those republics of the Russian Federation that contain a Circassian ethnic component more complex and multilevel processes are taking place over the past two decades: the privatization of budgetary allocations by local elites, the freedom from supervision and pervasive corruption at all levels of governance, and the transformation of the law- enforcement and the judiciary into an instrument serving the rent-seeking ethnic clans. The slogan of ethnic consolidation has been also actively manipulated by local elites as they deemed necessary, both to garner additional subsidies from the federal center, as well as to block those political initiatives that might undermine their privileged status.62 On February 28, 2011 President Medvedev appointed two heads of the North Caucasian republics Karachay-Cherkessia and Chechnya. Karachay-Cherkessia received a new leader, 35-year-old Rashid Temrezov, while the previous president of the republic, Boris Ebzeyev was dismissed from his post before completing his 59 Vladimir Putin, “Владимир Путин. Россия: национальный вопрос“ (Russia: National Question). Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2012), available at www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01- 23/1_national.html, last accessed March 15, 2013. 60 Skakov and Silaev, “The ‘Cherkessian Factor’.” 61 Ibid. 62 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet;” de Waal, “Abkhaz, Circassians, Georgians, and Historical Justice;” Jameson Foundation, “Russian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.”Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 250 first term which should have lasted until 2013.63 Although Medvedev’s decree cited “his own request” as the reason for Ebzeyev’s dismissal, the slow socio-economic development of Karachay-Cherkessia was widely viewed as the primary reason.64 However, an activist from Karachay-Cherkessia, Murat Gukemukhov, told Voice of America that Boris Ebzeyev failed to control the republic. Table 1:Key Goals and Components of the “Circassian question” in Russia Goals 1 Recognition of the genocide 2 Unification of the multiple Circassian regions into a single republic within the Russian Federation 3 Repatriation of the diaspora Components 1. Civil society mobilization 2. Youth mobilization 3. Internet and mass media campaigns 4. Connecting with international NGOs and human rights groups As late as February 24 2011, when he tried to rally the local parliament to support him to block his dismissal from the office, only 30 of 73 deputies of the republican parliament turned up to vote. Gukemukhov asserted that Ebzeyev lacked influence among high-ranking officials in Moscow, respect among local elites, and the necessary management skills to be in charge of this complex republic.65 Boris Ebzeyev’s sudden dismissal was evidence of one of the most spectacular failures of the new model for appointing regional governors in the North Caucasus, given that he was the first among Medvedev’s regional appointees and was unable to survive even for one full term. Having an extensive professional background as a professor of law, Ebzeyev was one of the contributors of the Russian constitution and served as a judge on Russia’s Constitutional Court from 1991 to 2008. The newly appointed head of Karachay-Cherkessia, Rashid Temrezov, stated on March 1, 2011 that his main goal would be improving the socio-economic situation in the republic and reducing its dependency on Moscow’s financial aid.66 63 RIA Novosti, February 28, 2011. 64 RIA Novosti, February 26. 2011. 65 Website Voice of America,www.voanews.com, last accessed February 26, 2011. 66 Website Caucasian Knot,www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, March 1, 2011.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 251 On June 21, 2011, the Russian Public Chamber’s working group on the North Caucasus held a public hearing on the problems of divided peoples who involuntarily found themselves separated by state boundaries.67 TheCircassian issue was one of the most discussed themes, as a majority of ethnic Circassians live outside their homeland in Russia’s North Caucasus since the expulsions by the Russian empire in the nineteenth century. Besides the Circassians, the working group also recognized the Lezgins, Avars, Tsakhurs and Rutuls as divided peoples. The participants in the hearing produced a list of recommendations for the Russian government that particularly addressed Circassians. They advised the authorities in Moscow to make adjustments to Russian law in order to grant members of the Circassian diaspora the status of compatriots with a simplified path to Russian citizenship. The government was also asked to examine the possibility of organizing resettlement programs for members of the Circassian diaspora willing to return to their historic homeland in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adighea, the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions and the Mozdok district of North Ossetia. However, all these proposals were muted after the 2012 presidential elections. Before the 2012 presidential election in Russia, Georgia was by far the biggest accomplishment of all the Circassian campaigns. No other country, besides Georgia, recognized the genocide and was weighing the possibility to boycott the Sochi Winter Olympic Games. Nonetheless, the parliamentary elections of 1 October 2012 in Georgia overlapped with the time in which newly re-elected President Putin was reshaping his image as a powerful player in the Caucasus. After the parliamentary elections of October 2012, the balance of power has shifted in Georgia and with it the positioning of Georgia regarding the Circassian question.68As soon as Ivanishvili assumed the legislative power in Georgia, the “new government says it is seeking to turn down the temperature with Moscow and engage Russia on issues of common interest, such as trade”69 without abandoning its intention to join NATO and the European Union. Georgia also continues to question Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but, in order to revive negotiations, Ivanishvili has to offer something to Russia and the Circassian political agenda seems to be ideal. If the Circassian question was one of the key policy issues 67 This is a non-governmental public organization that is supposed to represent all major interest groups in the Russian society. In fact, its creation was initialized and approved by the incumbent political regime to legitimize its monopoly on decision-making processes in Russia. 68 BidzinaIvanishvili (the Georgian Dream) won almost 55% of the votes, a result that ensured 85 seats from the 150 seats that compose the Georgian National Parliament. Pro- presidential The United National Movement decreased from almost 60% (119 seats) in the parliamentary election of 2008 to 40% (65 seats) in 2012. 69 Brian Whitmore, “Georgia’s Changing Russia Policy,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, last modified on April 29, 2013, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia- russia-foreign-policy-ivanishvili-saakashvili/24971738.html.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 252 for Saakashvili, Ivanishvili has opted for a totally different approach; the very existence of the project "the Circassian Genocide" has been called into question”70 and there is a significant decrease of political support to the ongoing activities at the Circassian Cultural Center in Georgia. While President Boris Yeltsin permitted varying degrees of autonomy for the Caucasian republics, the ascendency of President Vladimir Putin brought a recentralization of government authority in the mid-2000s. However, as soon as Putin began his third term as president in May 2012, the Kremlin moved swiftly to modify its method of governance. It has now made it easier to register political parties and is bringing back direct elections of governors, although both come with notable restrictions. It has stopped ignoring protests mobilized its own supporters to publicly counter the opposition and reached out to various groups of less radical or hard-line opponents, offering them buy-ins into the system through, for example, consultative mechanisms. At the same time, it has sought to strengthen its own instruments of power: control of the key electronic media, the law enforcement system, appealing to the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church and reliance on the traditional paramilitary units, the Cossacks. Cossacks have experienced a revival in the Krasnodar region, where they were provided with financial support, uniforms and official status. Seven years ago they drove out a local population of Meskhetian Turks.71 In a speech to police officers on August 2, 2012 governor of the Krasnodar krai and a close ally of President Putin, Alexander Tkachev (whose region will host the 2014 Olympics) announced that as of September, 1000 Cossacks would be paid from the budget to maintain public order. He stressed the importance of controlling the migration of non-Russians from the North Caucasus region and stressed that the Cossacks would take measures beyond what the police were allowed. Governor Tkachev said that his enlistment of Cossacks was intended purely to enforce Russian migration laws but his speech contained incendiary language about relations between ethnic groups in southern Russia. Pointing to the Krasnodar krai, Tkachev noted that this region did not belong to the Russian Empire; it belonged to the Caucasian people, the Circassians. However, as Tkachev put it, due to the fact that the Circassian land was added to the Russian Empire so recently, it was vulnerable to non-Russian influences and demanded that ethnic Russians stand up to curb the increasing migration from North Caucasus regions. Citing the example of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians initially were a minority and then became the majority, Tkachev said he was determined to preserve the predominance of ethnic Russians in the Krasnodar krai. More than $20 70 Georgia Times, “Will Ivanishvili mess about Circassian Genocide?,” last mdified November 29 2012, http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/interview/83654.html. 71 Tom Trier and Aleksander Khanzhin, The Meskhetian Turks at a Crossroads: Integration, Repatriation or Resettlement? (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007).CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 253 million will be allocated to the newly created Cossack police force over the next year. 72 Since the Krasnodar region is hosting the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, such provocative initiatives are clearly in line with the Kremlin’s effort to keep North Caucasians away from the region. Having made clearly discriminatory statements, Tkachev confirmed via Twitter that he is determined to fight “illegal migration”.73 Tkachev’s statements seemingly mark a hardening of the Russian government’s positions in the region and the absence of political will for dialogue and compromise. Furthermore, as the positions of the ethnic Russian regions harden, the North Caucasian republics are likely to react in an asymmetric manner. Since the republican elites cannot afford to make anti-Russian statements, they will pursue anti-Russian policies informally or at least turn a blind eye to nationalist civil activism. In fact, Tkachev once again articulated Putin’s views that internal migrants from the North Caucasus are not welcomed by ethnic Russians, who consider them outsiders to say the least. Responding to the growth of nationalism and the apparent reluctance or inability of the Russian state to do something about it, the Circassians are likely to step up resistance along ethnic lines to defend their rights. For example, when the prime minister of Adygea met with a member of the Jordanian parliament, Munir Sobrok, who came to explore the situation in the republic and make inquiries as to whether the Adygean authorities were prepared to accept Circassian refugees from Syria, mounting pressure by two opposing sides – officials in Moscow and the Circassian activists in the North Caucasus – resulted in a state of denial on the part of Adygean officials to resolve the issue. 74 At a conference in Maikop on June 30 2012, the Adygean leadership was harshly criticized by Circassian activists for inaction in regard to facilitating the Syrian Circassians’ repatriation.75 Since the Russian government shows no signs of readiness to address a plethora of Circassian grievances, ethnic identity will continue to be the main driving force of political mobilization of Circassian peoples in the North Caucasus. 6.Conclusion The core of the Circassian problem for the federal authorities appears to be the existence of large and strong Circassian diaspora outside Russia that is still ignored by Moscow. The conflict in Syria has further galvanized Circassian activists and the more the Kremlin postpones finding a resolution to the Circassian problem, the 72 http://www.yuga.ru/articles/society/6390.html, last accessed March 15, 2013. 73 Twitter, https://twitter.com/antkachev, last accessed March 15, 2013. 74 According to Albert Kazharov, a deputy of the Russian Federation Council from Kabardino-Balkaria, an estimated 2000 Syrian Circassians may relocate to the North Caucasus, but the Russian legislation prevents them from doing so (http://kommersant.ru/doc/1977996). 75 Website Caucasian Knot, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/209724., last accessed March 15, 2013.Marat Grebennikov: Is Leviathan Back? 254 more negative is the international informational background. In spite of Moscow’s persistent attempts to soft-pedal and ignore the Circassian problem, this issue has gained momentum due to the changing map of the Middle East, rising Circassians activism, and Russia’s own actions in the Caucasus, which have convinced Georgian policymakers to adopt a proactive strategy toward the North Caucasus. The ethnic consolidation of the Circassian peoples within the boundaries of distinct administrative and territorial formations, alongside the broad development of the radical Islamist movement, becomes a powerfully destabilizing factor in the event that the current political order in the Northern Caucasus breaks down further. The evolution of Circassian nationalism also highlights the initial failure of post-Soviet nation-building policies, the weakness of civil society and the transparency of patriotic nationalism created only to justify the vital interests of the ruling elites, which by promoting confusion between the public and the private have succeeded in carving up the most profitable political, bureaucratic and economic functions. The Circassian movement has already developed a clear ideology and made significant efforts toward achieving its strategic goals. The Circassian genocide has been recognized by the parliaments of Kabardino-Balkaria (1992), Adygea (1996), Abkhazia (1997), and Georgia (2011). The opportunity to address – both in positive and negative approaches – the hosting of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, the last capital of Circassia, on the 150th anniversary of the Circassian Genocide, created new possibilities for the Circassian movement. After the 2012 presidential elections Moscow has not yet developed a coherent policy to address the Circassian issue which allows regional pro-government elites to come forward with provocative grass-root initiatives. On the one hand, the Kremlin cannot take any effective repressive measures against the Circassian movement because it has already become an international issue and it would further damage Russia’s reputation and undermine the very meaning of hosting the prestigious Olympic Games. On the other hand, the Kremlin cannot positively resolve the Circassian issues because that would put it in direct confrontation with other nationalist movements, which are also gaining strength in the North Caucasus. In the absence of political will for dialogue and compromise, the Russian government will further try either to ignore the Circassian nationalism or to split it by gaining control over a number of Circassian activist groups. 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