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1. Introduction: The Greek policies toward the Turkish-Muslim minority evolved significantly from the climate of tolerance of the 1930s to the EU-led hegemonic transformation in the late 1990s. The course of bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece, the interventions of foreign powers, internal socio-political and economic factors, and the national and international conjuncture had an impact on the evolution of these policies. The Europeanization however, exerted significant pressure on the Greek ruling elite for a structural change in their stance and policies towards the minorities in line with the requirements of EU membership, especially from the mid- 1990s onwards. Historically, the transformation of the Greek-Turkish minority relationship from that of a "fifth column (enemy in our midst) vs. authority seeking to suppress it," as understood in populist discourse up to the 1990s, to one of politically constructed consent between "hegemon and subordinate.” was set in motion with the precariousness of the political sphere during the Greek Civil War of the early 1940s, followed by a re-structuring of Greek politics and economy after the Second World War. A Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the early 1950s was cut short by the attacks on ethnic Greeks in İstanbul in 1955. These developments, together with the Cyprus issue moving to the front of the Greek political agenda in the 1970s, were integralCEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 203 to the nationalist posturing1 and anti-Turkish populism of both the PASOK and the New Democracy parties in governments which they led or shared from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. The Simitis-led Europeanization, which took place in Greece between 1996 and 2004 is considered the second wave of Europeanization following the initialization of Euro-guided foreign and domestic policies by the Konstatin Mitsotakis government between 1990 and 19932 . Within this context, the status of minority rights in Greece and the Greek ruling elite’s minority policies have been an important component of the Europeanization process. Among all other minorities, the Turkish speaking Muslim minority has been distinguished from others due to its kinship ties with the “Big Neighbor” and its potential to be a “fifth column” in Greece. Therefore, compared to other minorities, the Greek hegemony-building process, which would require the consent of the Turkish-Muslim minority in Greece to fall under the intellectual and moral leadership of the Greek ruling elite (and Greek dominant socioeconomic forces) pursued a more complicated and multifaceted trajectory within the context of Europeanization. This study is an attempt to apply the Gramscian notion of hegemony to the multi- cyclical relations between the European Union (EU), the Greek ruling elite and the Turkish Muslim minority during the Simitis period within the context of Europeanization. The main argument of the article can be summarized on in three dimensions. First, the nature of relationship between the European Union and its member and candidate states is hegemonic. This hegemony, which is defined as political leadership based on the consent of the led, necessitates diffusion and popularization of the EU’s worldview among both political and civil societies of the member and candidate countries. In this respect, the EU can be labeled a “normative regional hegemon”3 which transforms domestic structures and worldviews of the peripheral regional actors on many issues (such as minority affairs) in line with the dominant value-system of the core ones (leading socio-economic forces4 or the historic bloc5 ) in the EU. Therefore, a Gramscian perspective can be very helpful in evaluating and comprehending the changes in the policies and 1 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “Constitutional Reform and the Rule of Law in Greece,” West European Politics, 28 (March 2005): 317. 2 Ioannis N. Grigioriadis, “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey”, Mediterranean Politics 13 (March 2008): 28. 3 Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies 60 (2008): 1601-1622. 4 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton eds, Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy, (London: Palgrave, 2001) : 25–43 5 Andreas Bieler, “The Struggle over EU Enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration”, Journal of European Public Policy 9 (2002): 575- 597.Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 204 actions of the peripheral member states (such as Greece of the 1990s) in different fields of socio-economic relations (such as state-minority relations). Second, from a Gramscian perspective, Europeanization can be defined as the process of diffusing and popularizing the European norms, values and worldview in the region. Looking at the changing nature of relationship between the EU and Greece in the mid-1990s, it is possible to label the initiatives of Greece’s ruling elites towards Europeanization as the beginning of such a hegemony-in-building process. However, this process does not necessarily result in a static and absolute form of hegemony. It may well face crises unless hegemony-in-building is accepted and internalized by the member countries. In other words, the consent of “the led to be led” should be reproduced and kept alive continuously for a successful hegemony. Third, the relationship between the Europeanization of Greece and its implications for the minority policies of the Greek ruling classes is worth analyzing in order to shed light on the nature and operation of two interconnected cycles of hegemony- in-building processes: the first cycle takes place between the EU as core regional historic bloc6 and the peripheral national historic blocs as subordinates while a second cycle is experienced between the national historic blocs of the peripheral countries and the minorities as their subordinates. This article is structured in six sections. The first discusses the Gramscian theoretical framework to explore the relationship between the Greeks and Turkish minority in the course of Europeanization. This section also includes a review of the literature on Europeanization, Greek-EU relations and the non-Gramscian literature on both the relations between the EU and Greece and the status of minority affairs in Greece. The second section describes the changes and continuities in the Greek 6 The historic bloc is defined in the Gramscian conceptual framework as “The conception of historic bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.” See, Anne, S. Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minesorra Press , 1987), 120. In this respect, an historical bloc refers to the way in which leading social forces within a specific national context establish a relationship over contending social forces. It is more than simply a political alliance between social forces represented by classes or fractions of classes. It indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests that are propagated throughout society ‘bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity...on a “universal” plane’” (Bieler and Morton 2004) For a more detailed conceptual assessment of historic bloc in the case of European Union, see, Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton, “A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations”, Capital & Class, 28 (2004): 85-113.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 205 minority policies under Simitis leadership in the course of Europeanization. The following section elaborates on the legal and political aspects of the hegemony-in- building processesby referring to various developments in this era between the Greek state and the minorities. Next, I scrutinize the dilemmas of the Simitis Government in the course of Europeanization as well as the crises of hegemony-in- building which were experienced both the EU and Greek historic blocs. The article concludes by illustrating the theoretical and practical implications of Gramscian approach in assessing the relations of hegemony between the EU-like supra- national regional frameworks; the peripheral national historic blocs and the subordinate minorities. 2. Theoretical Background and Methodology Regarding the theoretical and methodological paths, this article is based on qualitative analysis of secondary and primary texts from a Gramscian perspective. There has been increasing use of Gramscian notions and conceptualizations in defining the nature relationship between the EU and some of its member states. The literature is composed of a variety of studies ranging from the theoretical foundations of EU integration7 to neo-Gramscian analysis of EU’s environmental policies (particularly emissions trading)8 . Topics in the neo-Gramscian literature include the political economy of EU integration9 , European capitalist structuring and the class struggle in EU10, socio-economic dimensions and the role of social forces in the restructuring of Europe.11 Some research has also been carried out to investigate civil society12 and the operation of democratic procedures, norms, 7 Stephen Gill. “Theoretical Foundations of a Neo-Gramscian Analysis of European Integration” in Dimensions of a Critical Theory of European Integration, eds. Hans Jurgen Bieling and Jochen Steinhilber, (Marburg, FEG am Institut für Politikwissenschaft des Fachbereichs Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Philosophie der Phillips-Universität Marburg, 2000): 15-33. 8 Benjamin Stephan, “The Power in Carbon. A Neo-Gramscian explanation for the EU‘s Adoption of Emissions Trading” in Global Transformations towards a Low Carbon Society, ed. Engels, Anita 4 (Working Paper Series), (Hamburg: University of Hamburg/KlimaCampus , 2011) 9 Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton. “Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration” in Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe, eds. Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton (New York, Palgrave, 2001): 3-25. 10 Andreas Bieler, “Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism: Neo‐Gramscian Perspectives and the Analysis of European Integration”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (2005): 513-526. 11 Bieler, and Morton, Social Forces, 25–43. 12 Natalie Tocci ed., The European Union, Civil Society and Conflict (London, Routledge, 2011).Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 206 values and the democratic deficit in Europe and the European Union from a Gramscian perspective13 . There has also been a wide-ranging non-Gramscian literature on both the relations between the EU and Greece and the status of minority affairs in Greece. The first set of studies reflects various aspects of hegemonic relations between the EU and Greece. They support the use of a Gramscian approach with the evidence they offer on receptiveness of Greek administrative system of the European vision14 and European policy formation processes15; dilemmas of Greece with regard to integration and centralism of the EU16; differentiations between the policy design and implementation due to domestic challenges and the nature of Greek structures17; challenges and disproportion in the consolidation of Europeanization in the Greek regions (particularly in the Western Thrace where the Turkish/Muslim minority is found)18. The second set of studies offer detailed analyses on the status of the minorities in Greece by referring to the legal status of minorities19 and Islam20 in Greece; their freedom of movement,21 citizenship issues,22 and education 13 Esteve Morera, “Gramsci and Democracy”. Canadian Journal of Political Science 23 (1990): 23–37. 14 George A. Georgiou, “The Responsiveness of the Greek Administration System to European Prospects” International Review of Administrative Sciences, 60 (1) (Mar 1994): 131-144. 15 Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris, Papadimitriou The limits of Europeanization: Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 16 Kevin Featherstone and George N. Yannopoulos ‘The EC and Greece: Integration and the Challenge to Centralism’, in The European Union and the Regions, eds. Barry Jones and Micheal Keating (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995): 249-268 17 Panagiotis Ioakimidis, “Contradictions between policy and performance” in Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). 33-52 18 Nicholas Rees and Christos J. Paraskevopoulos, “Europeanization of Policy-Making and Domestic Governance Structures in Regional Policy: Cohesion and CEE Countries” in Adapting to EU Multi-Level Governance: Regional and Environmental Policies in Cohesion and CEE Countries, eds. Christos J. Paraskevopoulos, Panayotis Getimis and Nicholas Rees, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006): 179-206. 19 Stephanos Stavros, “The Legal Status of Minorities in Greece Today: The Adequacy of their Protection in the Light of Current Human Rights Perceptions”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 13 (1995): 1-32. 20 Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, Die Welt des Islams 44 (2004): 402-433. 21 Nicholas Sitaropoulos, “Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality v. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of ex Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code”, European Journal of Migration and Law205 (2004): 205-223. 22 Stephanos Stavros, “Citizenship and the protection of minorities” in Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1996). 117-128.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 207 policies.23 These two sets of studies provide researchers with insightful hints about the nature of the relations among the dominant and subordinate actors at regional and domestic levels of analysis. However, few studies are found where a Gramscian perspective on the two intermingled cycles of hegemony building processes is applied the hegemonic cycle between the EU and Greek dominant socio-political and economic forces and the cycle between the Greek dominant social forces and minorities in Greece. This article aims to provide an empirical analysis and Gramscian overview of these two cycles of hegemony-in-building processes through putting particular emphasis on the changes and continuities in Greece’s minority policies during the Simitis period under the impact of Euro-guided (or EU-dominant) re-structuring. In Gramscian terms, hegemony can be defined as: the state of ‘total social authority’ which, at certain specific conjunctures, a specific class alliance wins, by a combination of ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’, over the whole social formation, and its dominated classes: not only at the economic level, but also at the level of political and ideological leadership, in civil, intellectual and moral life as well as the material level: and over the terrain of civil society as well as in and through the condensed relations of the State.24 In this respect, hegemony is not a static mode of dominance simply based on coercion. It is rather a dynamic process which is persistently renovated, reconstructed, protected, and customized 25 in line with the changing conditions of the relationship between the dominant and subordinate actors. The consent of the subordinate classes to the intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant ones is not always taken for granted. In other words, hegemony is not always accepted and internalized by the subordinate actors without a resistance. Therefore it is not immune from certain opposition, limitation, changes, challenges26 or crises. According to Gramsci, an endurable and crisis-free hegemony requires ethico- political leadership and intellectual-moral superiority of a historic bloc (an organic system of socioeconomic, ideological and cultural alliances)27 and the persistent 23 Thalia Dragonas and Anna Frangoudaki, “Educating the Muslim minority in Western Thrace”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 17 (2006): 21-41. 24 Stuart Hall, “Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance, in The Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, ed. Malcolm Cross Volume I, (Cheltenham UK and Northampton USA,:Edward Elgar Publishing , 2000) : 66-67. (331-332 in original text) 25 Raymond,Williams, Marxism and Literature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 26 Ibid. 27 Luiciano Pellicani, Gramsci, An Alternative Communism?, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981)Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 208 reproduction of the consent of the other groups28 in the civil society29 through persuading them to accept and internalize the views, values and norms30 of the historic bloc. According to Strinati, hegemony is activated and consolidated culturally and ideologically through the institutions of civil society (i.e. education, the family, the church, the mass media, popular culture) in mature liberal- democratic capitalist societies”31 Drawing on this assessment, both Europeanization and the attempts to restructuring of the Greek ruling elite and polity under the Simitis government can be considered as two parallel hegemonic processes. In fact, until the mid-1990s, the Greek ruling elites did not systematically attempt or did not manage to form a historic bloc which would embrace the minorities by seeking to obtain their consent on the elite’s intellectual and moral leadership. They rather tried to maintain the ropes of “the system of control” tight over the unreliable fifth column of the kin neighbor (Turkey) through the utilization of relatively more coercive means and policies. As Greece took concrete steps toward a stronger “Europeanization” with the Simitis governments. P. Ioakimidis has described Europeanization as a process of ‘internalization of environmental inputs’ by the political and societal systems of EU member states, and, as such, it entails a steady redefinition of functions, relationships, boundaries, values and cultural traits, regulatory patterns that shape the internal dynamics of the political system. It involves the redefinition of boundaries between the state and society as well as of the relationships within state structures and within society 32 According to this framework, a Europeanizing Greek state can be assumed to consent a priori to restructure its institutions and policies in line with European values on minority rights and security. Changes along this line in the discourse and practices of the Greek state would also, however, increase its capacity to build a new form of hegemony over the Turkish /Muslim minority by presenting itself as a more Europeanized state exhibiting greater respect for minority rights. Thus, the Europeanization of Greece and the formation of grounds for higher levels of consent of the subordinate minorities in the ruling elite (as well as dominant socio- 28 Ibid. 29 Sue Golding, Gramsci’s Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-Liberal Democracy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 30 Rita, Abrahamsen, “The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo- Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35 (1997): 129-152 31 Dominic Strinati, An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture, (London; Routledge, 1995), 32 Panagiotis C. Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment,” South European Society and Politics 5 (2000): 73.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 209 economic forces) can be considered as interconnected hegemony-building processes. In this respect, the Simitis period is an important turning point in the relations between the Greek dominant state structures and the Turkish/Muslim minority. With the impact of the EU’s “normative-hegemony-in-building” under the strong wave of Europeanization, Greek decision-makers seemed to shift their minority policies from the anti-minority populism to a policy of “hegemony-in- building” by seeking legitimacy and consent in the eyes of minorities. As a result, during this period, the European Union appeared as a historic bloc with its values and institutional framework. In this respect, Europeanization for Greece has become a process of hegemony-in-building of EU over Greek socioeconomic and political forces rather than coercive imposition of those institutions and values to Greek civil and political societies. A parallel hegemony building process was initiated by the Greek-dominated socioeconomic and political forces over the minorities. Although this process was surely influenced by the upper hegemonic cycle of Europeanization, it was not simply a parerga of EU’s hegemony. It was rather an attempt towards the restructuring of Greek political and civil societies initiated by Euro-guided ruling elite and socioeconomic forces. It is then possible to observe that the 1990s has witnessed two intermingled cycles of hegemony building processes in the case of Greece: hegemony of the European Union over Greek ruling elite (which was mainly materialized in the context of Europeanization) and the hegemony of the Greek ruling elite over the Muslim/Turkish minorities and other segments of Greek society, which was highly influenced by the Euro-guided changes in the Greek polity in line with either pragmatic or value-laden policy preferences of the Greek leadership. 3. The Simitis Period: Europeanization and Hegemony-in-building The Simitis-Papandreou government came to the power in 1996 and wasted no time in adopting objectives of modernization and alignment with EU norms33. It also introduced a political style which was less formalistic and more pragmatic, less symbolic and more issue oriented. Melakopides defines the main tenets of Greek foreign policy during the Simitis period by referring to “Simitis Doctrine” as follows: [...] as compared to Andreas Papandreou's vociferous radicalism and his generally "inflexible" stance towards Turkey, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis' policies and operational code have crystallized some distinct features. This is shown by their twofold foundation: first, the principles and practice of International Law, International Ethics, mutual support with like-minded international actors, and the utilization of the relevant International Institutions. Second, there is a coherent 33 Alexander Kazamias, “The Modernisation of Greek Foreign Policy and its Limitations,” Mediterranean Politics 2 (1997): 71-94.Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 210 commitment to the manifold (but primarily economic and diplomatic) strengthening of Greece and to a rational (i.e. never excessive) strategy of deterrence. In any event, and as demonstrated by the low-key "verbal acts" which voice his operational code, Simitis' rhetoric is mild, moderate, and authentically constructive. [...] his doctrine is founded solidly on such "cosmopolitan" values, as moderation, communication, mediation, peaceful resolution of disputes, caring, generosity, and ecological sensitivity. [...]". 34 In fact, the main characteristics of the political stance of the Simitis government were “moderate pragmatism”, “rhetoric of modernization”35, “adoption of neo- liberal agenda”36, “pro-European profile”37, “political re-structuralization toward the European center-left”38, and “a constructive realist foreign policy based on cooperation, pragmatism and taking leading role in the troubled Balkans”39 , in place of the isolationist anti-Westernism, veto diplomacy, and the vendetta politics of Andreas Papandreou. 40 These shifts were part of the new trend of Europeanization of Greece's political system, economy, and society as a whole41 as the EU's political and economic dynamics came to dominate the organizational logic of national politics and policy making. Chryssochoou, Stavridis, and Moschonas argue that the institutional modernization of PASOK along European lines brought about “democratization of its internal structure”, changes that were later adopted by the other parties as well42. This modernization and rising consent to the dominance of European norms and regulations began to dislodge the primacy of ‘populism’ as a strategy for mass 34 Costas Melakopides, “Turkish Political Culture and the Future of the Greco-Turkish Rapprochement”, Occasional Paper 0P02.06, ELIAMEP, Athens, (2002) (Online at ELIAMEP’s webpage, www.eliamep.gr) 35 Christos Lyrintzis, “The Changing Party System,” 24. 36 Takis S. Pappas, “In the Search of Center: Conservative Parties, Electoral Competition, and Political Legitimacy in South Europe’s New Democracies,” in Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe, eds. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 248. 37 Ibid. 38 M. Fatih Tayfur, Semi-peripheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Spain and Greece, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 126. 39 Fotios Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 48. 40 George Kassimeris, “The 2004 Greek Election: PASOK’s Monopoly Ends”, West European Politics 27 (November 2004): 944. 41 Panagiotis Ioakimidis, “The Europeanisation of Greece’s Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems,” in, Contemporary Greece and Europe, eds. Archilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 359-372. 42 Dimitris Chryssochoou, Stelios Stavridis, and Andreas Moschonas, “Greece and the European Union after Amsterdam”, in Contemporary Greece and Europe, eds. Archilleas Mitsos, and Elias Mossialos (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 183-204.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 211 mobilization, replacing it with rational and realistic problem solving within a framework of functioning political pluralism. A clear departure from PASOK's clientalism of the 1980s, this process opened the door to changes in attitude by political organizations on a variety of issues, including that of the minorities. The nation’s minority policy-making was soon to feel the impacts of the Europeanization process, in parallel with such factors as a general decline in nationalist passions, the government’s clear expression of an intent to shift toward pragmatism in foreign policy43 and improve relations with Turkey, the emergence of a more pragmatic leadership from within the Turkish/Muslim minority which appeared to act relatively independently of Turkey, and the Simitis government’s abandonment of PASOK’s populist anti-Turkish rhetoric. Intensified political interaction between Greece and the EU naturally meant the ascendency of the EU mechanisms and regulations over Greek policy-making, which in turn meant closer EU monitoring of minority policies. Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou comment on this relationship: While prompted by Greece’s membership in the EU, regional reforms, as much as the liberalization of the rights of Thrace’s Muslims were actually facilitated by the Europeanization of domestic political and government elites in the 1990s. Greek governments became particularly sensitive about the country’s relations with and overall performance in the EU. Greece began to thoroughly depend on structural funds that comprised a considerable influx of resources for her ailing economy, and was eager to dispel her hitherto reputation as an uncommitted member of the Union. The view that respect for human rights and minorities was indispensable in promoting Greece’s national interests in Europe began to gain ground among domestic political elites and across political parties.44 Even with EU institutional pressure on Greece in the form of “monitoring procedures”, a fundamental re-conceptualization of Greek national identity in a more multicultural mode45 was slow to emerge. Yet compliance with European norms did motivate the political elite to re-contextualize minority issues to some degree. The economic relationship between Greece and the EU was also a factor in persuading Greece to reconsider its stance toward its Turkish/Muslim minority, which was mostly located in one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country. New directions for change thus began to take shape in the intersection 43 AIM Athens, “Greece's Hate Media Breed Popular Hate Culture”, 21 February 1998 44 Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Regions, minorities and European Integration: A Case Study on the Muslims in Western Thrace, Greece”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, (March 2007): 110. 45 Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: ‘Modernization’ and the Structural Constraints of the Greek Politics”,West European Politics 28 (March 2005): 236-7.Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 212 between the decentralization process and the allocation of structural and regional development funds in the Western Thrace. In other words, Greece faced the need for political and legal changes at the local level in the process of creating of new arrangements for distribution of regional development funds. The economic facet of the "Europeanization" of Greece's minority policies mainly consisted in Greece’s efforts in adopting its regional development programs to the EU’s cohesion requirements, within the “Europe of the Regions” framework. The objectives of this framework, including re-organization of territorial structures, revitalization of sub-national politics and creating channels for open communication between local and minority groups and the authorities, seemed to be compatible with Turkish/Muslim minority demands as well. The cohesion processes were able to foster cooperation between the state and the regional minority as it encouraged sub-national authorities and minorities to engage in civic and political efforts focusing on social issues, development, and local governance rather than on cultural homogeneity and ethno-national solidarity46. Yet the absence of widespread public demand for sub-national structures capable of exercising effective autonomy within the public sphere was a persistent problem47 . According to Paraskevopoulos, existence or building of a strong civil society is a must for the success of the regional development programs financed by the EU structural funds which aim at supporting the local productive system through mobilization of regional and local actors of civil society (such as minorities living in the Western Thrace)48 . Thus, “norms and networks of civic engagement that sustain ‘civicness’ and a strong civil society constitute a necessary prerequisite for effective partnerships between state, society and market organizations”49. For Gramsci, civil society is a sphere where political power of the dominant groups –that is partly embodied in the state- is consolidated in parallel with materialization and amalgamation of national-popular collective50. Therefore, civil society is conceptualized by Gramsci as a public domain, where the values, ideologies, and norms of the dominant groups (in this case Greek historic bloc) are disseminated 46 Dia Anagnostou, "Breaking the Cycle of Nationalism: The EU, Regional Policy and the Minority of Western Thrace", South European Society and Politics 6 (Summer 2001): 100- 101. 47 Ibid. 48 Christos J. Paraskevopoulos, “Social capital and the public-private divide in Greek regions”,West European Politics 21 (1998): 154-177. 49 Ibid. 50 Craig N. Murphy, “Understanding IR: understanding Gramsci”, Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 422CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 213 through various institutions and voluntary associations of society51. Thus and so, the constituents of civil society, namely; private and voluntary organisms such as schools, religious institutions, media, political parties, non-governmental organizations enhance in “molecular” construction of socio-political consciousness52 . In this respect, hegemonic co-optation of groups (such as minorities) in civil society would result in manufacturing consent among the subordinate groups to the hegemony of the dominant classes53 . However, in the case of Thrace, such an active engagement by the Turkish/Muslim minority in Greek local productions was curtailed by the ramifications of enduring hierarchical clientalistic relations as well as difficulties in the elimination of the impact of centralized state structure and encouragement of a strong civil society in the region54. The situation was further exacerbated by the structural dilemmas and problems of the Greek political administration system. The system was squeezed between the ambitions of modernization/Europeanization and the legacy of a political system characterized by patronage, a low degree of legitimacy and institutionalization. Under these conditions, it would not be easy either for the Simitis leadership or the EU to operate their control and sanction mechanisms competently over the efficient use of the structural funds55 . This is largely why regional economic and institutional changes made under the hegemonic guidance of the European Union still failed to significantly impact economic development, political participation, educational achievement, and public employment among the Turkish/Muslim minority. They did facilitate some forms of cooperation56 and supported confidence building measures between Christian and Muslim members of the regional councils as part of joint decision- making processes over distribution and implementation of the EU structural funds57 . 51 Umut Koldas, A Tale of Two Villages: A Gramscian Analysis of Hamula and the Relations between the Israeli State and Palestinian Arab Citizens of Israel, (Saarbrucken: Lambert, 2012), 305. 52 Thomas Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony”, Journal of History of Ideas 36 (1975): 353. 53 Hagai Katz, “Gramsci, Hegemony and Global Civil Society Networks”, Voluntas 17 (2006): 335. 54 Paraskevopoulos, “Social capital and the public-private divide in Greek regions”, 154-177. 55 Calliope Spanou, “European integration in administrative terms: a framework for analysis and the Greek case”, Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1998): 467-84. 56 Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “European Integration, Regional Change and Ethnic Minority Mobilisation”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, (Spring 2007): 20. 57 Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “ Regions, minorities and European policies: A state of the art report on the Turkish Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece)” Project report (D1 and D2) prepared for the EUROREG project funded by the European CommissionUmut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 214 However, it did not seem that they generated tangible solutions to economic underdevelopment of the region, which had resulted in internal migration of some 15,000 members of the Muslim minority from Western Thrace to Athens since the 1970s58 . As in the economic and political spheres, Greece’s foreign policy was also not immune to the Europeanization process under Simitis’ leadership. The most significant change in this area was Greece’s doubled efforts to rectify its negative perceptions in the eyes of its EU partners who tended to perceive Greece as an awkward and recreant partner clinging to long-held national positions at the expense of community solidarity. Image rectification efforts in the context of foreign policy Europeanization were made at four different levels: European policy, foreign policy objectives, policy instruments and style, and foreign policy making insofar as institutions, procedures and processes59. Reflected at these different levels, the European orientation ushered in gradual transformation of the identity and style of Greek foreign relations as well as in positions on sensitive issues such as minorities and relations with Turkey60 . In sum, “the transformed position of Greek foreign policy toward Turkey and Turkey-EU relations”61 during the Simitis-Papandreou era did make headway in overcoming mutual distrust between the state and the Turkish minority as well as in overcoming the “fifth column” and “Big Brother” syndromes62. A sample of actions from the Simitis period showing confidence-building inclinations 63 include the Greek-Turkish Madrid Agreement that was signed on 9 July 1997 for stability in the Research DG, Key Action Improving the Socio- Economic Knowledge Base (contract no. CIT2- CT-2003-506019), 2003: 28. 58 Dimitris Antoniou, “Muslim Immigrants in Greece: Religious Organization and Local Responses”, Immigrants and Minorities 22 (2003): 155-74. 59 Ioakimidis, ‘The Europeanisation of Greece’s Foreign Policy,” 359-372. 60 Dimitrios Kavakas, “Greece,” in The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States, eds. Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 149. 61 Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2004), 181. 62 Big Neighbour Syndrome is defined by A. M. Navaratna-Bandara as the abnormal state of fear from a "neighboring state which is relatively larger (by any meaningful measure) and which has the capability to intervene in the affairs of the secession-affected country by economic, political, or military means" in A. M. Navaratna-Bandara Management of Ethnic Secessionist Conflict: Big Neighbour Syndrome, Aldershot: Darmouth Publishing Company (1995). 63 Ziya Önis, “Greek Turkish Relations and European Union: A Critical Perspective”, Mediterranean Politics 6 (2001): 31-45.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 215 Aegean64, earthquake diplomacy and disaster-related collaboration following the devastating earthquakes in 1999 in both countries65, the resignation of hardliner Theo Pangalos as Foreign Secretary following the Ocalan crisis in 199966, and a new “policy of constructive engagement in the fields of low politics” designed and to some extent implemented by both nation’s Foreign Affairs Ministers67. Interestingly, these shifts took place following three major crises between the two states. The first crisis was the S-300 missiles crisis, which erupted after release of Greek Cypriot plans to station S-300 missiles and control the air corridor between Greece and Cyprus in 1998. The second crisis, the Imia/Kardak confrontation, took place between 1997 and 1998 over the sovereignty status of these Aegean islets68. The last crisis occured during the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the PKK (the Kurdish Worker’s Party), in January 1999. The Turkish government harshly criticized the Greek government for sponsoring terrorism because it assisted in Ocalan’s escape and hosted him in one of its embassies during the Turkish state’s pursuit of him69 . Ironically, these crises resulted in pragmatic (or idealist) reassessment of national interests and/or ideals in both Greece and Turkey. This new policy line, which was pursued by the Greek ruling elite, helped in the gradual decline of bilateral conflicts and the initiation of a constructive dialogue among the various actors of two countries, which gave way to a boost in the practice of "civic diplomacy" or "second-track diplomacy" in addition to inter-state policies of rapprochement70. This historic rapprochement, however, did not necessarily emerge from the emotions of mutual sympathy or even from purely pragmatic considerations or national interests. The European Union played an important role in the evolution of this détente, especially in pressuring Greece to solve its problems with its neighbors. In parallel to this process, Europeanization became a main tenet of PASOK’s rhetoric of modernization, social transformation, economic liberalization, and political re-structuring; its impacts are easily observed in Greece’s politics, economics, and foreign policy. Yet as the EU-Greece relationship 64 Haralambos Athanasopulos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law(North Carolina: McFarland.2001). 65 N. Emel Ganapati, Ilan Kelman and Theodore Koukis “Analysing Greek-Turkish disaster-related cooperation: A disaster diplomacy perspective”, Cooperation and Conflict 45 (2010): 162-85. 66 Önis, “Greek Turkish Relations and European Union”, 31-45. 67 Othon Anastasakis, “Greece and Turkey in the Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?,” Turkish Studies 5 (2004): 45-60. 68 Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tourmikiotis, “Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The `Expectations-Reality Gap',” Security Dialogue 34 (2003): 301-14. 69 James Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, (London: I.B.Taurus, 2007). 34-56. 70 Ayten Gündoğdu, “Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?” MERIA 5 (2001), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a8.htmlUmut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 216 was anything but symmetrical, increased “Greek dependence on EU regulations and policy initiatives”71 amounted to a deepening of the EU’s hegemony over the Greek socioeconomic and political structures from the mid-1990s onwards. 4. The Legal and Political Dimensions of Minority Policies According to a statement by the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry from 1999, Greece had committed itself to the strict application of the principles of "equality in the face of the law" (“isonomia”) and "equality of civil rights" (“isopoliteia”) for all Greek citizens of Thrace72. In such official statements Greece was described as acting in accordance with current international agreements, and with standards set by international law on the treatment of minorities73. The Foreign Ministry website stated that Greece respects all existing regulations regarding the special status of the Muslim minority in Thrace, to ensure the observance of the relevant international contractual obligations stemming from the Peace Treaty and the Conventions and Protocols of Lausanne signed in 1923 as well as from other International Conventions on Human Rights. 74 The new government’s changing attitudes were also visible in several steps taken in the legal and political arenas in the late 1990s and early 2000s in response to demands made by the international community. Some of the measures signaling attitudinal change are lifting limitations on the freedom of movement of minority members in the mountainous zones of Western Thrace in 199575, removing the discriminatory Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law in 1998, signing the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and including the minority in affirmative action programs in education76 . In the legal sphere, abolishment of Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law 3370/1955 in 1998 was a major sign of changing attitudes amongst lawmakers and political circles during the Simitis period. While in force, Article 19 had been an salient instrument in the isolation, denationalization, and even expulsion of 71 George Andreou, and Nikos Koutsiaras, “Greece and Economic and Monetary Union: Whither Europeanization?” in Greece in the European Union, eds. Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas (London: Routledge, 2004). 86-110. 72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Official statement, (June 1999), http://www.hri.org/ MFA /foreign/musminen.htm, and http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/musminen2.htm. 73 Official statements of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, http://www.greekembassy.org/wgreece/ greece/321.html. 74 Ibid. 75 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey,” Mediterranean Politics 13 (2008): 23-41. 76 Ibid.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 217 Turkish/Muslim minority members. In addition to stating that persons of non-Greek origin may be deprived of their Greek citizenship if they leave the country without proven intent to return, Article 19 also authorized the Interior Ministry, according to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, to “take the decision to terminate their citizenship without either giving the individual in question the opportunity to explain his/her intentions or notifying them about the decision"77. In the next clause, the Greek authorities were permitted to strip those individuals of citizenship who had placed themselves "in the service of foreign powers" [especially Turkey]78 . Nicholas Sitaropoulos argues that application of these clauses to Macedonians and Turks between 1955 and 1998 strongly suggests the state’s intention to rid itself of a host of members of ethnic or ‘politico-ideological’ groups viewed by the state as dangerous to the country’s wished-for homogeneity, or even its territorial integrity. 79 Within this context, 60,004 ‘Greeks of different descent’ were stripped of Greek citizenship in those 44 years80 . Abolition of this article was a clear sign of the state's changing perceptions of its “alloyens” or citizens of non-Greek descent. Following its annulment, the Ministry of Public Order further tasked other Ministries with providing identity and travel documents to those who had become stateless as a result of these clauses81 . While the nationalistic discourse of the early 1990s had fundamentally contradicted EU and other European institutional legal criteria, the above politico-legal moves appeared to signal the objective of re-establishing mutual confidence with the state’s non-Greek citizens by adopting European human rights and minority protection standards. Nevertheless, as may be seen in the Constitutional reform of 2001 that worked to strengthen political majorities82 , as well as the identity card conflict of 2000/2001 regarding whether or not to include religious affiliation on 77 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, (Annual Report 1997), http://www.ihf-hr.org/ar97gre.htm. 78 Ibid. 79 Nicholas Sitaropoulos, “Freedom of Movement and Right to Nationalist v. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of ex Article of the Greek Nationality Code”, European Journal of Migration and Law6 (2004): 205. 80 Ibid. 81 AIM Athens, “Greek Muslims-Finally Citizens, Ghosts finally come alive!,” 19 December 1997. 82 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “Constitutional Reform and the Rule of Law in Greece,” West European Politics 28 (March 2005): 317.Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 218 national identity (ID) cards,83 the government’s legislative efforts were not free of quandaries and controversy, including persistent suspicions regarding the minorities. These moves, part of what I call a ‘hegemony building-in-process’ on the part of the European Union vis-à-visGreece, also produced new sources of friction, new tensions between “national interests and European norms and legal authority,” or simply between “national and European sovereignty”84 . At the same time, tensions resulting from a similar hegemony building-in-process on the part of the Greek state vis-à-vis the minority may be detected in the higher number of legal cases taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) by Turkish/Muslim minority members between 1996 and 2004. Intensification of “minority mobilization for claiming their rights”85 together with minority members’ choosing to apply to European legal institutions with their cases rather than to those available in Greece indicates the state’s failure to persuade minority members to increase their integration and loyalty to the Greek legal structures. This crisis in the hegemony building process was exacerbated by regional dynamics such as Turkey’s favorable view of the Turkish/Muslim minority’s bringing their cases to the ECHR rather than to the Greek legal institutions86 . In the political sphere, significant changes in Turkish/Muslim minority status were observed in the characteristics of and roles undertaken by the minority leadership within an increasingly democratized and Europeanized political sphere during the Simitis period. This included changes in the nature of political relationships at the prefecture level riding on two waves of reform in the local administrative organization during the 1990s resulting in the creation of sub-national structures87 . With its pro-European stance, the PASOK of Simitis promoted local government institutions as independent partners within the Community Support Frameworks, as part of his integrationist stance vis-à-vis the minority. Prior to these initiatives the government had not appeared to seek the consent of the minority in decisions regarding them. Now, prefecture politics provided a ground for state authorities and minority members to undertake political communication toward (re)building 83 Lina Molokotos – Liederman, “Looking at Religion and Greek Identity from the Outside: The Identity Cards Conflict through the Eyes of Greek Minorities,” Religion, State & Society 35 (June 2007):139. 84 Lina Molokotos – Liederman “Identity Crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy, and the European Union,” Journal of Contemporary Religion 18 (2003): 301. 85 Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “Minority Mobilization in Greece and Litigation in Strasbourg”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 15 (2008): 27. 86 Ibid. 27-48. 87 Dia Anagnostou, “Breaking the Cycle of Nationalism,” 109.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 219 trust, notwithstanding severe difficulties in their implementation on the ground as well as in their economic impact in the region88 . To contextualize those issues within the Gramscian theoretical framework about the cycles of hegemony one can use the following table. Table 1 indicates the relationship between the empirical data and theoretical framework through highlighting the interconnection between the some developments and the policies pursued during the Simitis period in the process of hegemony-in-building between the Greek state and the Turkish/Muslim minority by referring to the main tenets of the hegemonic relations between the EU and the Greek ruling classes (or historic bloc). 88 George E. Halkos, and Nickolaos G. Tzeremes, “Measuring Regional Economic Efficiency: The Case of Greek Prefectures”, The Annals of Regional Science 45 (2007): 603-32.220 Table 1: The dynamics and theoretical implications of intermingled cycles of hegemony among the EU, Greek Historic Bloc and Turkish/Muslim minority Issue-Fields Policies and instruments of the EU's hegemony-in- building over Greece Policies and instruments ofthe Greek state's hegemony-in- building over minority Implications of those policies for the relations between Greek state and the Turkish Muslim minority Theoretical implications moments and reasons of crisis of hegemony-in-building Economic issues Structural funds, regional development funds, EU’s cohesion requirements 1. adopting its regional development programs to EU's cohesion requirements 2. decentralization process; allocation of developmental funds in the regions (such as Western Thrace) cohesion policies foster cooperation between the state and regional minority and acquire the consent of the minorities to engage in civic and political efforts in Greek public sphere passive revolutionary acts in order to acquire the consent of the minorities to engage in civic and political efforts in Greek public sphere and passive acceptance of dominantGreek political community ramifications of enduring hierarchical clientalistic relations as well as difficulties in the elimination of the impact of centralized state structure Institutionalizati on and political arena Institutional pressure on Greece: monitoring procedures and the implementati on of the Community Support Frameworks (the CSF) 1. institutional modernization and internal democratization of the governing party (PASOK) 2. departure from clientalism 3. promotion of local governments as partners to the CSF. 1. increasing political communication between the state and the minority to integrate minority to national political framework and structure 2. promoting active civic participation of minority members to prefecture politics and Greek political processes hegemonic cooptation of groups (such as minorities) in civil society would result in manufacturing consent among the subordinate groups to the hegemony of the dominant classes absence of widespread public demand for sub-national structures that are capable of exercising effective autonomyCEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 221 Socio-cultural issues Identity formation Europeanness and/or/v.s. Greekness recontextualization of Greek national identity in a more multicultural mode. attempts towards subordination of the Turkish/Muslim ethno- religious belonging to civic identity under the intellectual-moral values of Greek / European historic blocs and dominant classes power of the dominant group does not derive from its coercive capacity. its power and ethico-political superiority is rooted in its ability to attain recognition of the other segments of society about itsintellectual and moral leadership double talk of the Simitis leadership and stereotypical rear-guard nationalistic, xenophobic & isolationist rhetoric of some political figures in the PASOK and Greek government Legal framework The EU's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1. Removal of discriminatory Article 19 of Greek Citizenship Law in 1998 2. Including the minority in affirmative action programs Elimination of a tool of isolation, denationalization and expulsion of Turkish/Muslim minority is an important step towards confidence-building between the state and Turkish/Muslim citizens hegemony of dominant group is also consolidated through creation and implementation of certain conception of law. Law provides the dominant group with necessary tools and ethico-political grounds for pursuing its legitimized suppressive actions to sustain its moral leadership over the others. criticism of the state for failing to address minority concerns on religious freedoms, elections of mufti, the administration of waqfs, discrimination in education and the job market; the Constitutional reform of 2001 that worked to strengthen political majority; the identity card conflict of 2000/2001; Foreign policy good neighborhood policy (zero problem with the neighbors approach) 1. improvement of relations with Turkey 2. abandonement of anti-Turkish rhetoric the emergence of a more pragmatic minority leadership acting relatively independent from Turkey and engaging in socio- economic and political activities in Greek civil and political societies elimination of possible counter-hegemonicmoves which could be organized by the minority leadership and supported by Turkey against the Greek historic bloc. the inter-state disputes between Turkey & Greece in the late 1990s such as Imia/Kardak confrontation; the S-300 missiles crisis; the capture of the head of the PKK (the Kurdish Worker’s Party)222 In Gramscian terms, hegemony-building is about “changing values, controlling behavior and motivating consent, both in economic production and in maintaining allegiance to or at least passive acceptance of the state”89 through manufacturing consent on the side of the subordinate segments of society. This has not been a major concern of the Greek elites in their relations with the Turkish/Muslim minority until the Simitis period. The latter has witnessed two interconnected processes of hegemony-building. On the one hand, Greek historic bloc faced with the necessity of changing the values of Greek society, controlling its behavior and motivating consent among different segments of the society to the values of Europe and processes of Europeanization. On the other hand, having influenced (particularly but not exclusively) by the first cycle of hegemony building, the Simitis- led ruling classes initiated a hegemony building process between the Greek state and the Turkish Muslim minority. Within the context of Europeanization, minority policies pursued by the Simitis governments aimed at manufacturing consent among the minority members to subordination, “allegiance to or passive acceptance” of the Greek state. In this respect, Simitis period can be characterized as initial phase of hegemony-in-building process between the Greek state and Turkish/Muslim minority, which was not immune from the moments of crisis. 5. Dilemmas of the Simitis Government, Crises of Hegemony-in-building By 2000, it began to appear that the Simitis government had been less than successful in mobilizing new channels of communication toward increasing Turkish/Muslim minority’s confidence in the state’s regional policies. Gaps begin to appear between the state’s discourse and its practice. The minority felt that ethnocentrism continued to influence implementation of the EU-funded aid programs, notwithstanding changes in the state’s discourse regarding the minorities. Some members expressed dissatisfaction and distrust, criticizing the state for failing to address their concerns about such matters as religious freedoms, elections of mufti, the administration of waqfs, and discrimination in education and the job market90 . In the course of minority policy implementation it became clear that the Simitis government was caught in a dilemma between internalizing European values regarding minorities and maintaining an ethno/religio-centric “system of control.” 89 Anne Showstack Sassoon, “Family, Civil Society, State: Is Gramsci’s Concept of Societa Civile stil Relevant?”, The Philosophical Forum23 (1998) : 210. 90 Natalia Ribas-Mateos, “Old communities, excluded women and change in Western Thrace’ (Thracian Greece, the Provinces of Xanthi, Rhodopi and Evros),” 119-50, in Papers 60, (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Portugal, Servei de Publications, Bellatera, 2000), http://ddd.uab.es/pub/papers/02102862n60p119.pdf.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 223 The 2000s were also marked by a debate in which the government was criticized by some political circles, especially the far right wing, for not doing enough to encourage Greek couples to have large families, thus leaving the Greek population open to the threat of becoming a minority in its own country in the face of a rapidly growing Muslim population91 . In such an atmosphere, launching reforms to improve the status and situation of the Turkish/Muslim minority was not going to be easy. Such fears as losing ground demographically were kept alive by an enduring heritage of antipathy promoted by previous governments as part of the more general anti-Turkish populist rhetoric. To cope with such accusations as leading the Greek population toward minority status, the government chose a "double talk" strategy which included different discourses on minority issues for different circles and contexts. This naturally created difficulties in understanding the true position and intentions of the government in this area. Two discursive tacks dominated the rhetoric. The first was mainly in response to pressures exerted by the U.S., international human rights organizations, and the EU. Appearing often in Papandreou’s speeches, this mode emphasized acknowledgment of the right to minority self-definition92 and implementation of international human rights standards in Greece. Greek intellectuals were invited to initiate some self- critical and introspective approaches such as admitting to stereotyping, hate speech, and disguised discrimination and ethnocentrism in education, selective criticism of human rights violations, non-democratic regimes, nationalism, and racism with references not only to the past but also the present93 . Absorption of these new forms of expression by a Greek public opinion heavily conditioned by deep-seated nationalistic views was by no means simple and straightforward. The second discursive track drew on the traditional approaches that had nourished anti-Turkish populism since time immemorial in Greece. This defensive rhetoric featured denial of self-definition by the minorities94 and their problems in Greece95 . Panayote Elias Dimitras, for instance, argues that despite the new government's minority policy, the prevailing attitude among Greeks is that there was no minority in the country; in addition to that, among those few who thought otherwise most also believed that whatever minorities might exist face no major problems, at least of a magnitude that could explain bona fide international interest in them96 . 91 AIM Athens, “Greece's Census: Down for the Count,” 3 April 2001. 92 AIM Athens, “Greek Turkish Amazing Rapprochement,” 30 January 2000. 93 AIM Athens, “'Zero Hour' of Greek Turkish Friendship,” 19 August 2000. 94 AIM Athens, “Human Rights Problems in the Balkans as Reported to the OSCE,” 26 October 2000. 95 AIM Athens, “Greece's Anti-Minority Attitude,” 31 May 2000. 96 Panayote Elias Dimitras, "The Greeks' Persistent Uneasiness With Minorities and Migrants", AIM Athens, 1 January 2000.Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 224 With the stereotypical rear-guard nationalistic, xenophobic, and the isolationist rhetoric of, for example, Pangalos97, accusing the new voices of selling out the interests of the Greek people, it was a major task for Greek modernizers to create and begin operating in a more tolerant mode in regard to minority issues, especially in the domestic political sphere. In order to see this shift materialize, Simitis and Papandreou knew that they first had to prepare the public opinion, until then molded by suspicion. Yet efforts of the Simitis government to manage the incompatibility between these two modes of expression did not succeed in overcoming the image of double talk with regard to the Muslim minority in Greece both domestically and internationally. Regarding the annulment of the infamous Article 19 of the Citizenship Law, for instance, the Foreign Minister and two Deputy Ministers of the Simitis government were reported to have constantly assured the international society, that this “notorious”, “unconstitutional”, and “contrary to every human rights agreement” legislation would be abolished, as it was a violation of human rights. 98 Yet concurrently with the speeches of these three ministers, the Interior Minister of the same cabinet was assuring concerned nationalist constituencies in Thrace that no such plans existed and that the law would continue to be enforced99. Another example of double-talk took place during a foreign policy debate in the cabinet in June 2000, when Foreign Minister George Papandreou, known for acknowledging the right to minority self-definition and for promoting the process of internalizing coexistence with the Turks100, yet in this debate appeared to reference the nationalist approach to minorities as formulated in the Treaty of Lausanne and defended aggressive and nationalistic positions toward Turkey101 . This double-talk blurred the Simitis government’s minority policy vision throughout the late 1990s and into the early 2000s. It also went hand in hand with three parallel and interconnected hegemonic crises: the crisis in Greece-EU relations, in state and nationalist circles relations, and in relations between the state and the Turkish/Muslim minority. The first crisis involved, as mentioned above, the 97 AIM Athens, “People's Diplomacy' Spearhead of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement,” 13 October 1999. 98 AIM Athens, “Persecuted Ethnonational Minorities in the Cradle of Democracy,” 17 November 1997. 99 Ibid. 100 Alexis Alexandris, “Religion or Ethnicity: The Identity Issue of Minorities in Greece and Turkey,” in Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, ed. Renée Hirschon (Berghnan Books, 2004). 129. 101 AIM Athens, “Papandreou's New (Nationalist?) Greek Foreign Policy Doctrine,” 8 July 2000.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 225 deepening of hegemony of the EU over Greece as part of the Europeanization process restarted by the Simitis government in the late 1990s. Notwithstanding government moves toward internalization of some EU norms and regulations, it was really too early to speak of consensus on a deep transformation in the political and socio-economic spheres across the broad segments of Greek political and civil society. As a structural reform was blocked by various group interests102 and a good part of Greek society showed itself to be less than enthusiastic about the Europeanization project, the EU’s hegemony building-in-process suffered a crisis even in its initial stages. The second crisis appeared when the Simitis government's attempted to construct a hegemony over the political sphere, one that seemed to consist of convincing political actors across the political spectrum of the sacrifices to be made in order to fulfill requirements for rising to a hegemonic position within the EU. A third crisis may be detected in the Simitis government’s hegemony building project vis-à-vis the Turkish/Muslim minority. In this process the Simitis government soon appeared to be a mediator between the EU and Greek socio-economic and political forces, seeking to garner consensus on both sides for smooth progress in the maturation of the hegemonic relationship. On the one hand it tried to persuade local interests and opinion to embrace and meet the demands of the hegemon in fashioning their positions on minority issues; on the other hand, it tried to convince EU policy making centers to adopt appeasement policies in order to satisfy public opinion and economic and political interests in attempts to build consensus on the Europeanization of minority relations. The link between economic prosperity hoped-for successes in the cohesion process and in the regional development programs of the EU, and speaking out on sacrifices to be borne in the course of decentralization and shifts from traditional minority policies can be considered the main connections established between the Europeanization demands of the EU and consensus seeking within Greece's traditional political and socio-economic spheres. Regarding the third crisis, the first impulse of the Simitis and Papandreou leadership was to attempt to suppress populist voices persistently critical of post-1995 minority politics103 . This response was related to the first two crises. The hegemony-building aspirations of the state with respect to the minority were actually materializing with the emergence of more pragmatic cadres of minority leadership on the minority side and with increased efforts toward a guided integration of the minority into the broader society on the state side. This process was undergirded by contributions 102 Panos Kazakos, “Europeanization, Public Goals and Group Interests: Convergence Policy in Greece, 1990-2003”,Western European Politics 27 (2004): 901-18. 103 Victor Roudometof, “Orthodoxy as Public Religion in Post-1989 Greece,” in Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century, eds. Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian and Jerry Pankhurst (Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2005). 86- 87.Umut Koldas: Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building 226 from the international community such as guidance from the EU and recommendations of the US, which included the need to formulate new policies for the post-Communist Balkans and to improve relations with Turkey. 6.Conclusion It is argued here that EU hegemony over Greek institutional structures and domestic policies was constituted in a series of inter-connected features such as external penetration of the state administration by the EU, dependence on EU aid, “fragmentation”, and “core executive’ empowerment”104. Resulting internalization of the supremacy of EU norms over existing domestic ones by the political community was reflected in the opposition New Democracy party’s belief that “the EU decided on everything and that the country is on automatic pilot”105 during the Simitis government. The period is strongly marked by a renewed Europeanization of Greece's minority policies and the emergence of the potential for a hegemony building process on the part of the Greek state with regards to the Turkish/Muslim minority which parallels the deepening of a hegemonic relationship between the EU and Greece during this period. Prior to the Simitis period the Greek state had never so energetically sought to bring onto the agenda the situation and status of the Turkish/Muslim minority within the nation’s political, economic, and social structures with the goal of establishing a hegemony backed by the consent of the minority. What differentiated the Simitis period from its predecessors is that only in this period did the potential for such a relationship actually see the light of day. As noted above, this potential was closely interconnected with a parallel process between a leading EU and a subordinate Greece, which consented to the leadership/dominance (hegemony) of this supranational structure over its practical and discursive acts regarding minorities and related issues. Looking at the prospects for future relationships, the scope of discussions may be broadened around the possibility of transformation of the Greek-Turkish minority relations from one between "suppressor and fifth column" as had survived (or thrived) in populist discursive frameworks until the 1990s, to a hegemonic type of relationship between the "hegemon and the subordinate" developing under the influence of a parallel hegemonic process (Euro-guided democratization and Europeanization) between the EU and Greece. 104 Kevin Featherstone, “'Europeanization' and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s,” South European Society and Politics 3 (1998): 23-39. 105 George Kassimeris, “The 2004 Greek Election: PASOK’s Monopoly Ends,” 944.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 227 However, in the course of a deeper analysis of the future of the hegemony-in- building processes, the possible ramifications of the recent economic crisis in Greece should also be taken into consideration. The global economic crisis, which has been experienced by Greece from 2008 onwards, has had significant repercussions on the two abovementioned intermingled processes of hegemony in building that were initiated during the Simitis period; the one between the EU and Greek state/society and the other one between the Greek state and the minorities in Greece (particularly Turkish-Muslim minority). As the deepening of economic crisis would shake the very basis of the ‘consent of the led’ to the leadership of the dominant actor(s), hegemony building processes may face with more serious crises in the future. In this respect future research may explore the endurance of those hegemony-in- building processes under the light of deeper assessment of implications of recent economic crisis on the hegemonic relationships among the EU, Greek state/ruling classes and the minorities. Future research may also include the Gramscian analysis of the hegemonic triangles among the EU, the other EU member and/or candidate states which were hit by the economic crises and the minorities living in those countries. Bibliography: Abrahamsen, Rita, “The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo- Gramscian Perspective on Democratisation” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35 (1997): 129-152 AIM Athens, “Greek Muslims-Finally Citizens, Ghosts finally come alive!,” 19 December 1997. AIM Athens, “Persecuted Ethnonational Minorities in the Cradle of Democracy,” 17 November 1997. AIM Athens, “Greece's Hate Media Breed Popular Hate Culture,” 21 February 1998. 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