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1. Introduction The European Union (EU) has played a major role in Western Balkan societies in the past twenty years. Not only was the EU one of the main international actors in bringing to an end the armed conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s, it was also the most important foreign actor in the reconstruction and reconciliation processes after the wars and has been one of the biggest aid donors in the region. Relations between the Western Balkans and the EU are complex and they influence all aspects of the integration process. The Western Balkan countries embarked on the European integration process at the beginning of this century, they are adopting EU rules and conditions more or less successfully, the EU is carefully monitoring the accession process and is using different mechanisms and tools to implement its basic principles. The functioning of these EU tools has been in the centre of research of EU studies. With the EU integration of the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) in the 1990s the theoretical frameworks of the EU conditionality were based on the social action of this region. However, in past years authors have also researched EU conditionality in the Western Balkans, hence this article contributes to the analysis of the EU integration in the Western Balkans. The case of Croatian general Ante Gotovina is closely connected to the start of Croatia’s official negotiations with the EU back in 2005. In this article we will look at how the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY influenced the political discourses and public opinion of Croatia by challenging national identity, which was partially built on the patriotic war and national heroes from the 1990s, as well asAna Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 178 why domestic political elites still complied with this condition. Is the attraction of EU membership so powerful to outweigh a national hero? The case study of Croatia was selected on the basis of two important facts: first, Croatia was the first of the Western Balkan countries to start with EU negotiations and has been considerably ahead in the EU integration process; second, the start of EU negotiations with Croatia was postponed due to allegedly poor cooperation with ICTY and this represented a precedens: for the first time the EU made the ICTY officially a precondition sine qua non for EU accession process. According to EU policies, this precondition is crucial for the reconciliation process in the region, however it aroused different reactions amongst the public, especially when the indicted were brought to court. The analysis of political discourses in Croatia is based on newspaper articles, analysing the biggest left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers in a period beginning December 2004, when Croatia got positive signals at the EU Council for the start of negotiations, until the end of March 2005 when the EU negotiations were definitely postponed. A qualitative approach was used when analysing the newspaper articles, more specifically the statements of the high-ranking Croatian politicians were gathered and analysed. The article is composed of two sections: the theoretical overview of EU conditionality and the case-study analysis. Firstly, we will look at what has been written about EU conditionality so far, especially in the area of the Western Balkans, and what EU conditionality is. Secondly, we will examine a specific EU condition for the Western Balkans, the so-called ‘ICTY condition’ that the EU applied for the Western Balkan countries that were at war during the 1990s. Thirdly, we will analyse political discourses in Croatia and finally, Croatian public opinion, when we will also try to answer the questions set above. The main argument here is that although the so-called ‘ICTY condition’ undermined national identity and was unpopular with the public, domestic political elites still complied with it because they were already too deeply involved in the accession process and turning away from it would be too costly. However, the EU had to apply serious sanctions in order to press the elites to fulfil the condition. 2. The EU Conditionality EU conditionality has been an important foreign-policy tool of the EU and is occupying the minds of many academics. There has been a lot of research and theorising about this tool in the past fifteen years. In this article we shall expose the authors that have, in our opinion, significantly contributed to the development of this area because they have developed new theoretical frameworks or introducedCEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 179 new concepts in the area of EU conditionality: Frank Schimmelfennig1 , who developed the rationalist theoretical framework (rhetorical action) and explained how supporters of EU enlargement won out over the rationalistic superior negotiating power of their opponents (later Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier2 analysed EU conditionality with governance approach); Milada Vachudova3 (2005), who elaborated the concepts of EU passive (the prospect of EU membership) and active leverage (EU conditionality) in the case of Central and Eastern Europe; Heather Grabbe4 , who has focused on the costs and benefit analysis; and James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon5 , who have critically examined the study of EU conditionality that, in their opinion, is characterised by ‘a concentration on the analysis of its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization, rather than empirically tracking clear causal relationships in policies and institution-building’6 . All these authors based their studies on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and have inspired our thinking about the functioning of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans. Often it appears that the Western Balkan societies react differently to this EU tool then CEE societies, which has been observed and researched by several authors in the past years, however a thorough all-inclusive research such as that Milada Vachudova7 produced on the CEE has not yet been written in the case of the Western Balkans. Instead, authors have dealt with specific problems or phenomena in the Western Balkans that were encouraged or influenced by EU conditionality. Othon Anastasakis8 made an overview of normative and functional conditionality in the Western Balkans and emphasised the problem of criteria inconsistency on the 1 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric. (Cambridge: University Press, 2003). 2 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” in The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 1-28. 3 Milada Vachudova, Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism. (Oxford: University Press, 2005) 4 Heather Grabbe, Profiting from EU enlargement. (London: Center for European Reform, 2001) and Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 5 James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire E. Gordon. Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The Myth of Conditionality. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 6 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, Europeanization, 10. 7 Vachudova, Europe Undivided. 8 Othon Anastasakis, “The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8 (2008): 365-377.Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 180 part of EU. Florian Trauner9 , on the other hand, saw EU conditionality as a continuing successful foreign policy tool in the Western Balkans even if criteria for EU membership were higher. However, the biggest leverage for rule adoption in the Western Balkans has been policy conditionality and not membership conditionality, which Trauner10 demonstrates with two case studies, Macedonia and Croatia, and with the incentive of visa-liberalisation regime. Freyburg and Richter11 critically examine the functioning of EU conditionality and question whether the success story of CEE can be repeated in the case of the Western Balkans. They argue in the case of Croatia that “national identity significantly influences the effectiveness of external democratization by political conditionality”12, “specifically, the EU’s conditionality regarding the prosecution of war crimes clashes with a national identity forged in a context of ethnic conflict”13 . George Vasilev14 compares ethnically diverse Western Balkan states Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia and explores how EU conditionality influenced the relationship between the ethnic groups. Vasilev argues that the “EU’s main focus in previous eastward enlargements was on the production of normative policy outcomes, its primary focus in Bosnia and Macedonia has been to generate normative procedures”15 . Dzihic and Wieser16 examine the influence of EU conditionality on democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They state that the effectiveness of EU conditionality is weakened by the increasing domestic political costs of compliance. Andrew Konitzer17 looks at the influence of EU conditionality on party rhetoric and the transformation of leading political parties from nationalistic to pro-European parties in Croatia and Serbia. 9 Florian Trauner, “From membership conditionality to policy conditionality: EU external governance in South Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (2009): 774-790. 10 Trauner, “From membership conditionality to policy conditionality,” 2009. 11 Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, “National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans,” Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2010): 263-281. 12 Ibid., 275. 13 Ibid., 264. 14 George Vasilev, “EU Conditionality and Ethnic Coexistence in the Balkans: Macedonia and Bosnia in a Comparative Perspective,” Ethnopolitics, 10 (2011): 51-76. 15 Ibid., 51. 16 Vedran Dzihic and Angela Wieser, “Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia & Herzegovina,” Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (2011): 1803-1825. 17 Andrew Konitzer, “Speaking European: Conditionality, Public Attitudes and Pro- European Party Rhetoric in the Western Balkans,” Europe-Asia Studies, 63 (2011): 1853-1888.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 181 This article deals with a specific issue – the influence of EU conditionality on political discourse and public opinion in Croatia in 2005 when negotiations were postponed by challenging national identity. Observing the accession process very carefully, it is noticeable that the EU has been using the leverage of potential EU membership and conditionality throughout the accession process in order to give encouragement to the candidate countries in adopting European values and norms, the so-called Copenhagen criteria. EU conditionality actually started as conditionality in the aid programmes designed for Eastern Europe after 1989 (e.g. the PHARE programme) and was similar to the aid programme conditionality of other international actors (IMF, World Bank). It subsequently developed into a political conditionality of democracy promotion, rule of law and respect for human rights. Hughes, Sasse and Gordon18 distinguish between two main categories of conditionality: formal conditionality, on the one hand, which embodies “the publicly stated conditions as set out in the broad principles of the Copenhagen criteria and the legal framework of the acquis”, and informal conditionality, on the other hand, which includes “the operational pressures and recommendations applied by actors within the Commission to achieve particular outcomes during their interactions with candidate counterparts in the course of enlargement”. Informal conditionality increases the likelihood of inconsistency in themessage communicated by Commission officials over time19 . In theory, governments accept and implement EU rules for different reasons. There is a rationalist and constructivist argument as to why the EU would want to enlarge and why states would apply for EU membership. The rationalist argument is about the costs and benefits of enlargement, hence the egoistic reasons of each state, when the political elites would behave rationally and calculate what brings them more benefits; the constructivist argument is about establishing a community of peace and stability in Europe; moreover it is about the overarching European identity that each nation on the European continent belongs to. According to the first argument, a government would adopt EU rules only when benefits are greater than costs whereas, according to the second argument, governments would adopt EU rules based on a discursive concept – it believes that the state belongs to Europe and the new EU rules are good for the state – rules are imported voluntarily as the result of perceived domestic utility rather than the careful balancing of EU rewards versus adjustment costs. As with the CEE, the Western Balkan “desire […] to join the EU, […] allow the EU an unprecedented influence in restructuring domestic institutions and the entire range 18 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, Europeanization, 26. 19 Ibid., 26.Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 182 of public policies […]”20. or even challenging national identity as in the case of Croatia. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel21 argue that the probability of rule adoption varies mainly with the size of adoption costs. The promise of EU membership and the threat of exclusion mean that the credibility of EU conditionality is quite high, hence the extent of domestic political costs determines the readiness of the government to meet EU demands. Generally, these costs increase the more the EU conditions negatively affect the security and integrity of the state, the government’s domestic power base, and its core political practices of power preservations.22 Nevertheless, it is also important how much progress a country has made at a particular point in time: the further it has progressed, the more costly it would be to turn away from the process. There are different opinions on whether EU conditionality has had a positive or negative effect on candidate countries. Schimmelfennig and Vachudova both argue that due to the strong leverage of the prospect of EU membership the CEE countries strengthened liberal democracy. Vachudova23 argues that the deliberate conditionality exercised in the EU’s pre-accession process has been so powerful because it “builds on the benefits of the membership”. Once the EU developed its active leverage, it had so much attraction over domestic politics because the potential benefits24 of membership were so appealing. Rulers that disqualified their states from EU membership by maintaining illiberal politics and instituting only partial economic reforms such as, for example, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, could not turn their back on the EU because the EU was too popular with the electorate. Their participation in the EU’s pre-accession process opened the door to criticism of their domestic policies, strengthening the hand of their domestic opponents25. Vachudova agrees with Kempe and Meurs who argue that active leverage, namely EU conditionality in bilateral relations with individual countries, is at present the most important instrument for implementing certain EU objectives in the Western Balkans.26 20 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Introduction,” 1. 21 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, “The Impact of EU Political Conditionality,” in The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2005). 29. 22 Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, “The Impact,” 29. 23 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 17. 24 For example, access to the structural funds and more foreign direct investments. 25 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 99. 26 Iris Kempe and Wim van Meurs, “Europe beyond EU Enlargement,” in Prospects and Risks Beyond the EU Enlargement. Southeastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Supports, ed. Wim van Meurs (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2003). 19.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 183 Moreover, EU conditionality can also encourage euroscepticism in the candidate countries. Implementing unpopular policies lowers the support of the public on the one hand, on the other hand the political elites continue to comply with EU conditions. EU conditionality has the potential to frustrate a candidate country as it moves towards greater European integration in the medium term because conditionality involves costs to the candidate countries in the implementation of what is essentially a moving target within an “evolving process that is highly politicized, especially on the EU side”27. Grabbe argues that the conditionality rules are too loose and result in difficulties when the candidates themselves try to analyse the EU accession conditionality and what they are required to do.28 This is certainly one way of looking at it, however one must take into account that EU accession is a political project and that power asymmetry plays a big role in the whole process, thus the EU can change or at least modify the conditions for each particular situation. The EU conditionality is saturated with inconsistency in its implementation.29 There have been numerous cases demonstrating the inconsistency with which the EC, Western governments and multilateral organizations applied conditionality and their backsliding from sanctions when their own selfish economic and security interests were considered to be paramount to normative political conditionality.30 These inconsistencies diminish the transformative power of EU conditionality to a certain degree and also frustrate a candidate country that has difficulties with following the rules which are constantly changing. There is a consensus among these studies that for the adoption of the acquis EU conditionality has a strong causal effect in the steering policy and institutional change in the post-socialist countries. In general, EU conditionality has been viewed as an important lever for democracy promotion and has been seen as having made a significant contribution to “foreign-made democracy” in the CEE. Whether the same “positive” effect is emerging in the Western Balkans is debatable. Specifically, one can argue that the “ICTY condition” encouraged Western Balkan governments to arrest generals and politicians that were suspected of committing war crimes and contributed to reconciliation in the region. However, some of these cases are still highly disputed amongst the public, because they challenged national identity. Freyburg and Richter argue that EU conditionality “only trigger[s] democratic 27 Grabbe, Profiting from EU enlargement, 252. 28 Ibid., 31. 29 Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, Europeanization. 30 Ibid., 18-19.Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 184 change if certain conditions are met”31 and say that national identity determines whether EU conditionality is effective. We argue that EU conditionality influences national identity with ICTY condition, because it prosecutes national war-heroes, but does not trigger identity change as Freyburg and Richter argue. As we will show further in this article, political elites were reluctant in bringing General Gotovina to court due to different reasons (public support, political power, national identity, national sovereignty etc.), however, in the end they complied with the EU’s condition, because of the attraction of EU membership and benefits that it brings. 3. “Special” EU conditions for the Western Balkans Before even beginning negotiations with the EU and besides fulfilling for the first time the Copenhagen criteria, Croatia had to meet one specific condition that also set a standard for the majority of the Western Balkan countries that have been aspiring to EU membership: full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a legacy of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. This is a condition sine qua non for the countries that were involved in these wars: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Cooperation with the ICTY is not a condition that has to be fulfilled in order to join the EU, but it is a precondition to even begin the EU accession process. The cooperation has to be continued all the way through the accession process; otherwise the process can be stopped and postponed. In this chapter we will look closely at what was happening at the beginning of 2005 when the negotiations with Croatia were postponed. In 2004 Croatia was moving quickly ahead in its EU integration process. In April its application for EU membership received a positive Opinion (Avis) from the European Commission, in June the EU Council granted Croatia a Candidate Country status, and in December the decision was taken to open accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005 provided there was a full cooperation with the ICTY. Croatia was also satisfied that it would go through the whole integration process by itself and would not have to be packaged together with any other country from the Western Balkans or with Turkey, which could also mean further waiting for Croatia. However, the situation became more complicated and the EU started putting further pressure on the Croatian government to resolve the Gotovina case. In January 2005 Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader assured Javier Solana, the EU High Representative, that Croatia had been doing everything it could to solve its last case.32 At the end of January 2005, when the Commission presented the negotiation framework, the Commission’s evaluation of the cooperation with the 31 Freyburg and Richter, “National identity matters,” 263. 32 HINA. “Juncker i Del Ponte o suradnji Hrvatske s ICTY-em.” (Juncker and Del Ponet on the Croatian cooperation with ICTY)HINA, 11 February 2005.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 185 ICTY was negative, saying that Croatia had not done everything in its power to bring Gotovina to The Hague. Also, Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor, presented the ICTY's opinion on Croatia to Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean Claude Juncker, who presided over the EU Council at that time, and to the wider public, emphasising that full cooperation by Croatia with the ICTY means capturing and sending General Gotovina to the Court in The Hague.33 The meaning of ‘full cooperation’ with ICTY changed from ‘fully cooperating’ to actually ‘finding General Gotovina’. In the eyes of the Croatian public, the EU was acting inconsistently and losing credibility. Not only did the EU postpone the start of the negotiations, it also wanted to imprison General Gotovina who was a war hero and a patriot for a substantial part of the Croatian population. The headlines of articles in the Croatian daily newspaper Jutarnji list from the second half of 2004 provide evidence of the anticipation of the start of negotiations and also the uncertainty as to when would this happen: Negotiations at the beginning of 2005 (Pregovori pocetkom 2005) 34, Conditions for negotiations (Uvjeti za pregovore) 35 , Negotiations after all? (Ipak pregovori?) 36, Waiting for negotiations (Cekajuci pregovore) 37. At the beginning of 2005, Croatian politicians interpreted the situation as good and non-alarming since the signals had been different from different sides. However, although not united in agreeing on how to treat Croatia, the EU was persistent in pursuing fulfilment of its condition and it halted the start of the negotiations, even though it was losing support among the Croatian public. Nevertheless, active cooperation with the ICTY became a major issue for Croatia and consequently also for other Western Balkan countries that were involved in the wars of the 1990s. In view of the fact that the EU has put Croatia under significant pressure to help the ICTY with its investigation and confirmed cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition for even starting the accession negotiations, EU conditionality entered a new phase. If we take a look back at past enlargements, we can see that each enlargement wave had additional requirements for the candidate countries according to their past political regimes, economic needs, level of development and other socio-economic and political circumstances. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia, we can see that the wars of the 1990s 33 HINA. “Juncker i Del Ponte o suradnji Hrvatske s ICTY-em.” (Juncker and Del Ponet on the Croatian cooperation with ICTY) HINA, 11 February 2005. 34 Butkovic, Davor. “Pregovori pocetkom 2005.” (Negotiations at the beginning of 2005) Jutarnji list, 5 June 2004. 35 Butkovic, Davor. “Uvjeti za pregovore.” (Conditions for negotiations) Jutarnji list, 23 October 2004. 36 Butkovic, Davor. “Ipak pregovori?” (Negotiations after all?) Jutarnji list, 27 November 2004. 37 Butkovic, Davor. “Cekajuci pregovore.” (Waiting for negotiations) Jutarnji list, 11 December 2004.Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 186 had strongly influenced the EU politics of inclusion for these countries and the ICTY condition has been one of them. The reasons for introducing this new condition can be fourfold. Firstly, capturing war criminals on all sides and putting them on trail in an international court was possibly a means of bringing about reconciliation in the Balkan region and therefore preventing any possible future conflicts, leading to greater political stability and security in the region. Secondly, it might have been a good excuse for delaying the enlargement process because Turkey was close to accession and not all existing member states were supportive of its integration for different reasons. Moreover, some politicians and bureaucrats of the European Commission advocated that the EU was suffering from enlargement fatigue since it had yet to absorb the biggest enlargement wave of 2004 and certain doubts were also occupying the minds of European leaders regarding the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania, which were due in 2007. Thirdly, the EU was trying to change the internal institutional framework because it was no longer able to function effectively due to its growth, hence the debate on the European Constitution was heating up the European public sphere. Finally, the case of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY and the delay of negotiations were depicted as an example to the rest of the Western Balkan countries in order to emphasise that the fulfilment of demands of the ICTY was a binding condition that could not be bypassed. The EU implemented the ICTY condition very strictly and the first time that this condition delayed the EU integration process was in 2005 when the start of the accession negotiations with Croatia was postponed due to the unsatisfactory cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY. On 16 March 2005 the EU's foreign ministers decided to postpone the launch of accession talks, arguing that Zagreb had not met the related conditions. 4. Croatian political discourses In this section we will analyse the discourses of the leading Croatian politicians that emerged during the implementation of EU conditionality by using a qualitative approach and examining the Croatian media. In particular we analysed two newspapers: Jutarnji list, the biggest left-leaning newspaper and also the biggest newspaper in the country, and Vjesnik, its right-leaning counterpart, which was a HDZ38 government tool and ceased to exist in 2012. For the purpose of this analysis the on-line archives of the newspapers were reviewed and articles with content relating to EU, negotiations and Gotovina were selected. The on-line archives are 38 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union), a Christian- democratic party of late president Franjo Tuđman and a governing party for almost two decades since 1990.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 187 incomplete, hence only 104 articles and opinion editorials were analysed. The timeline of analysis that interests us is a three months period from December 2004, when Croatia received the nod from Brussels and promises that negotiations would start in March, till the postponement of EU negotiations in March 2005. Already at the end of 2004, when signals from The Hague were not at all positive, the leading Croatian politicians started to give statements in public that it was internal affairs that were blocking the EU integration and not the Gotovina case so as to redirect attention from the non-cooperation of the Croatian government with the Hague Tribunal. Some Croatian journalists opposed this, saying that it was untrue and immoral to claim that purely internal questions were connected to the start of the negotiations with the EU.39 At the beginning of 2005, the Croatian government assured Carla del Ponte, the EU and the Croatian constituency that they were doing everything they could to catch Gotovina. At the same time, the Croatian government tried to get assurances from the EU that catching Gotovina was not necessary to start the negotiations. However, when EU politicians reaffirmed that catching Gotovina was a precondition to start EU negotiations, the Croatian government began to claim that Gotovina was no longer in Croatia, therefore he was not under Croatian jurisdiction so it was not in their power to catch him40 whilst Carla del Ponte was claiming the opposite41. The leading Croatian politicians turned to a self-victimising discourse, which reached the very top when Prime Minister Sanader and President Mesic called on the general to surrender to the ICTY for the sake of their country42. A journalist from Jutarnji list quoted President Mesic from a pre-election appearance on a television show when he said that he would invite Gotovina to his place for a coffee and try to convince him to surrender, which, “to put it mildly, is ridiculous and irresponsible,” commented the journalist.43 On 1 March 2005, Vjesnik commented on Prime 39 Butkovic, Davor. “Cekajuci pregovore.” (Waiting for negotiations) Jutarnji list, 11 December 2004. 40 Vjesnik. “Ako Gotovina nije u Hrvatskoj, ne mozemo ga uhititi.” (If Gotovina is not in Croatia, we cannot catch him)Vjesnik, 24 February 2005. 41 Vjesnik. “Del Ponte: Gotovina je u Hrvatskoj.” (Del Ponte: Gotovina is in Croatia) Vjesnik, 24 February 2005. It turned out eleven months later that Gotovina had escaped from Croatia as he was captured in Spain on the Canary Islands but when he left Croatia is not known. 42 Rozankovic, Miroslava. “Sanader pozvao Gotovinu da domoljublje dokaze u Haagu.” (Sanader called upon Gotovina to prove his patriotism in the Hague) Vjesnik, 1 March 2005. 43 Butkovic, Davor. “Sanader, Mesic i Gotovina.” (Sanader, Mesic and Gotovina) Jutarnji list, 22 January 2005. English translation: “During one pre-election television appearance, Mesic even said that he would invite Gotovina for a coffee and try to persuade him to surrender which is ridiculous and an irresponsible thing for a politician to say, to put it mildly.”Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 188 Minister Sanader’s statement that it would be best for Gotovina and Croatia for the General to surrender to the Court and prove his patriotism in front of the Hague Tribunal44. The next day Vjesnik also reported on the statement by President Mesic that Croatia was ready to give up General Gotovina to The Hague, adding that they admitted that there were powers within the Administration that were protecting ‘Hague fugitives’ but that such powers no longer existed45 . It was only at the beginning of March 2005 that the government started to take serious action, intensifying police monitoring and searches. The President, the Prime Minister and the President of the Parliament sent a letter (145 pages of a report) to the Court in The Hague and to all EU member states, trying to show that they had searched all across the country and to prove that Gotovina was no longer in Croatia by showing the evidence of the routes the General took to escape from the country (Headline: We are ready to catch Gotovina. 46). In doing so, in the eyes of the Croatian public the government transferred all the responsibility for the start of negotiations onto prosecutor Carla del Ponte (Headline: Decision on Carla del Ponte 47 . The government was confident of Croatia’s geopolitical importance for the region’s stabilisation which would be further strengthened after the start of Croatia’s negotiations and that the EU would finally concede and start negotiations on time. Croatian politicians emphasised the disastrous consequences that could arise if negotiations were postponed. The Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, pointed out that Croatia was being put in an impossible situation 44 Rozankovic, Miroslava. “Sanader pozvao Gotovinu da domoljublje dokaze u Haagu.” (Sanader called upon Gotovina to prove his patriotism in the Hague) Vjesnik, 1 March 2005. English translation: Sanader mentioned that the best thing for Croatia and the General would be for him to appear in The Hague because he can only refute the charges in a court of law and that Croatia would offer him plenty of legal assistance there. Referring to the cases of Generals Cermak, Markac, Praljak and Petkovic who are also in The Hague along with General Gotovina, Sanader stated that “Had General Gotovina gone to The Hague, today he would be preparing his defence whilst still a free man. I call on him now to prove his love for the homeland in front of the Hague tribunal.” 45 Lopandic, Bruno. “Spremni smo uhititi Gotovinu.” (We are ready to catch Gotovina) Vjesnik, 2 March 2005. English translation: After meeting with Scheffer, President Mesic again repeated that Croatia was willing to arrest and hand over Ante Gotovina to The Hague if he was in Croatia. “We recognise that there were powers within the Administration in Croatia which were protecting fugitives from The Hague. Those powers no longer exist as of today. If we receive information that Gotovina is in Croatia, we will arrest him and send him to The Hague” announced Mesic. 46 Lopandic, Bruno. “Spremni smo uhititi Gotovinu.” (We are ready to catch Gotovina) Vjesnik, 2 March 2005. 47 Vodopija, Zoran. “Odluka na Carli del Ponte.” (Decision on Carla del Ponte) Vjesnik, 4 March 2005.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 189 because the EU’s conditions were made “in such terms that it does not make possible for Croatia to resolve the situation”48 . Vjesnik commented on the Mesic statement, reporting that out of 626 Hague conditions, Croatia had fulfilled 625 and that it was surely unfair to punish Croatia just because of one condition.49 Directly before the EU ministers meeting, Sanader gave an interview to Vjesnik, stating that the negotiations had to begin because Croatia deserved it and he was expecting to start.50 Also, the opposition leader Ivica Racan of the SDP (Social Democratic Party) stated that making the start of negotiations only conditional on the Gotovina case was unfair and a simplified evaluation of Croatia’s case; the dilemma of the EU versus Gotovina was wrong for Croatia and for the EU as well.51 Sanader, Mesic and Racan emphasised that after all the work Croatia had done in such a short time, it deserved to start negotiations on time and it would be a great injustice and humiliation for the Croatian people if that did not happen.52 , As shown by the statements made by leading Croatian politicians, self-victimising discourses do not serve only to re-interpret past events, but are also used in articulating current political issues and at the same time they serve to prepare the ground for future debates and contestations of power. Moreover, such discourses encourage the gradual formation of a certain self-image which we can call collective victim identity. Not only has EU conditionality challenged national identity that was build on the Homeland war and national heroes, but has also changed it into a victim-identity. Gotovina did not represent only “the generals of Croatia’s victorious army, but the Homeland War, Croatian sovereignty, the Croatian state, and ultimately all Croats”53. Freyburg and Richter54 argue that Croatia experienced a ‘profound national identity change’ towards European identity after 2005 due to the blockade of the EU negotiations. However, Croatia 48 Vjesnik. “Del Ponte: Gotovina je u Hrvatskoj.” (Del Ponte: Gotovina is in Croatia) Vjesnik, 24 February 2005. 49 Rozankovic, Miroslava. “Mesic manje optimistican.” (Mesic is less optimistic) Vjesnik, 4 March 2005. English translation: Of 626 Hague conditions, Croatia has met 625. The Head of State is therefore openly asking whether it is fair to punish Croatia for this? 50 Latinovic, Andrea and Körbler, Jurica. “Hrvatska ne odustaje od 17. ozujka.” (Hrvatska is not giving up the 17th March) Vjesnik, 5 March 2005. English translation: Negotiations should start because Croatia has deserved this. And I expect [to start] them. 51 Kapetanic, Sanja. “Datum pocetka pregovora nije najvazniji.” (Date of beginning of negotiations is not the most important) Vjesnik, 10 March 2005. 52 Vjesnik. “Sanader: Ocekujem odluku o pocetku pregovora.” (Sanader: I am expecting a decision on the start of negotiations) Vjesnik, 10 March 2005. English translation: “Afterwards, full of confidence, we are expecting a positive response from the Council of Ministers because Croatia deserves that negotiations begin” said Sanader. 53 Vjeran Pavlakovic, “Croatia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and General Gotovina as a Political Symbol,” Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (2010): 1717. 54 Freyburg and Richter, “National identity matters.”Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 190 (and Slovenia) perceived itself as a more European then other Yugoslav republics already before 1990s, which was also one of the narratives of the independence. After the war in 1990s Croatian identity is compound of European and nationalistic component, which does not seem to be conflicting at all. As shown below, war veterans stated that they were fighting for a European Croatia. Therefore, the EU conditionality did not contribute to the shift from nationalistic to European identity. They go together hand in hand. Depending on the circumstances one or the other component prevails in the public discourse. In preparing the ground for future debates, the Croatian government was faced with the threat of radicalism and euroscepticism that might grow if negotiations did not start according to the schedule and the consequences would be felt across the whole region. Hence, the politicians who used the self-victimising discourse were actually fuelling the euroscepticism in the public with this exact discourse. Vjesnik commented that radicalism would ‘grow wings’ if the pressure on Croatia continued and that this trend would spread across the region55. The newspaper also reported on the President Mesic statement that postponement of negotiations would negatively influence the whole of South-Eastern Europe56. On the other hand, a majority of the Croatian political elite were at the same time saying to the Croatian public that it would not be a catastrophe if negotiations were delayed, thereby trying to minimise the importance of its political ‘failure’ and again preparing the ground for the future contesting of power. The case of General Gotovina was becoming an increasingly important political issue, hence the support for Gotovina grew among Croats and so did euroscepticism.57 In several Dalmatian towns posters with a photo of General Gotovina were displayed, saying that he was not a war criminal but a hero. The Croatian war veterans issued a public statement, saying that they had been fighting for a European Croatia and that the people should not forget this.58 Gotovina was transformed from a military to political figure without him taking a part in this transformation yet Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration depended on his arrest, which was fuelling euroscepticism. 59 Two public figures with radical 55 Latinovic, Andrea and Jurica Körbler. “Ocekujem pregovore!” (I expect negotiations!) Vjesnik, 14 March 2005. English translation: Radicalism will grow wings if this trend of putting pressure on Croatia continues. Furthermore, opponents of a European Croatia will continue with their euroscepticism and fear-mongering. It is also realistic to expect that these trends will spread to other countries in the region and then give rise to problems in those countries which are already EU member states. 56 Vjesnik. “Mesic: Odgoda pregovora pogodila bi cijeli jugoistok Europe.” (Mesic: Postponing negotiations would affect all of South-Eastern Europe)Vjesnik, 5 March 2005. 57 Pavlakovic, “Croatia.” 58 Franicevic, Mile. “Politicari zaboravljaju da su se branitelji borili za europsku Hrvatsku.” (Politicians keep forgeting that defenders faught for European Croatia) Vjesnik, 11 March 2005. 59 Pavlakovic, “Croatia,” 1716.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 191 views openly defended General Gotovina. The first was Branimir Glavas, a member of HDZ, who by doing so opposed the official stance of his governing party. He stated that Ante Gotovina is “our grand hero” and that the EU would surely find another reason to deny Croatia the start of negotiations if it wasn’t for Gotovina.60 The second was a very popular Croatian priest, Zlatko Sudac, who supported Gotovina and incited euroscepticism. The priest said to the media that the EU accession would bring the legalisation of abortion, apparently not realising that abortion had been legal in Croatia for more than 30 years.61 The media also blamed the EU Council decision to postpone the negotiations for the growing nationalism in Croatia and for the fall in support for the EU. In order to reduce the growing euroscepticism and to reverse the fall in public support for EU membership, leading Croatian politicians used two discourses to support European integration: first, “Return to Europe”, which was used also by Central and Eastern European countries when the communist regime was overthrown in the 1990s, and emphasises that Croatia has always been a European nation and has to return to its European family and second, “Defence of Europe”, which is emphasising the fight against the Other and preventing the Other from entering Europe, usually a non-Christian Other but also a non-Catholic Other (Croatia represents Antemurale Christianitatis) and has been used many times before in the Balkans.62 Prominent political figures tried to show their devotion to the fulfilment of the ICTY condition because they interpreted the start of negotiations as a success, which would bring far greater benefits compared to the costs of handing over a war hero and losing part of their domestic support. As Vachudova63 argues with the CEE countries, the benefits and attraction of the European integration process were far greater than the costs, meaning painful economic reforms in most of the countries; in the case of Croatia, EU membership outweighed not just the economic reforms but also a hero from a patriotic war which has been a feature of public discourse in Croatia since 1991. At the last moment, on 14 March 2005, they even froze Gotovina’s assets but the only solution was the actual capture of the General. The EU took into account Del Ponte’s evaluation but nevertheless some member states supported Croatia immediately starting accession negotiations, mostly 60 Butkovic, Davor. “Glavas i sudac.” (Glavas and the judge) Jutarnji list, 19 March 2005. 61 Butkovic, Davor. “Glavas i sudac.” (Glavas and the judge) Jutarnji list, 19 March 2005. 62 For authors addressing orientalism and balkanism, see also Edward Said, Milica Bakic-Hayden, Maria Todorova, Slobodan Drakulic and Bojan Baskar. For an example of similar discourses in Slovenia, see Mandelc, 2011. 63 Vachudova, Europe Undivided.Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 192 because of Croatia’s perceived strategic importance. These countries were its neighbours (Slovenia, Hungary) and mostly the countries from the region of Central Europe (Austria, Slovakia and Italy). Those strongly opposed were led by the United Kingdom, followed by Sweden, Finland and Denmark. German passiveness and French silence were the source of much disappointment in Croatia because Germany was considered a traditional ally.64 In the end, both countries agreed with the UK position by remaining silent. In March 2005 the EU council of ministers decided to put the start of negotiations with Croatia on indefinite hold. In October 2005 prosecutor del Ponte stated that Croatia had been fully cooperating with the ICTY but Gotovina had yet to be found. Since Gotovina was captured in December 2005, the ICTY probably had reliable information on Gotovina in October 2005, therefore Croatia fulfilled the ‘ICTY condition’ and the negotiations were started. Nevertheless, not all of the EU member states were convinced by Carla del Ponte’s recommendation and the ICTY’s positive opinion on Croatia was not enough to start the negotiations. Ironically, it could be said that Croatia was ‘saved’ by Turkey. Austria, as a traditional ally of the Balkans, pressed hard on those member states that were in favour of the start of negotiations with Turkey, especially the UK, by threatening to use its veto if they did not support Croatia. Therefore, the EU agreed to formally open membership talks with Croatia and Turkey on 3 October 2005 and the screening process in Croatia started on 20 October 2005.65 5. Croatian public opinion The attitude of the Croatian public towards the EU was ambivalent overall; it was very positive at the beginning of the EU integration process but became quite negative during the “Gotovina crisis”. This public attitude was mostly defined by national circumstances. The implementation of ICTY condition and Croatian political discourses influenced Croatian public opinion, because they challenged national identity. For the purposes of this analysis of public opinion we took the opinion polls conducted by the Ministry of European Affairs, later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Between 2000 and 2005 the Ministry conducted the opinion polls on Croatia’s membership and, only after the start of negotiations, the 64 Butkovic, Davor. “Ipak pregovori?” (Negotiations after all?) Jutarnji list, 27 November 2004. English translation: “... the extent to which Croatian officials must rely on the logic of higher political interests, even if from that logic comes the promise of concrete German supportwhich probably also means concrete support from the French in view of the fact that German and French government policy is expressly aligned, in particular after the US intervention in Iraq.” 65 General Ante Gotovina was found not guilty on all charges and released from the prison in November 2012.On 1st July 2013 Croatia joined European Union.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 193 opinion on EU membership was measured by a Eurobarometer but with a different methodology. For the purposes of this analysis the source of the Ministry was used, because it coincides with the timeline of the analysis. Figure 1:Croatian Public Opinion on the EU Accession of Croatia (2000-2005) Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia Support for EU membership was high and stable until 2004, with 72-79% of the participants in favour of Croatia’s membership and only around 8-14% against (See Graph 1). However, the percentage of those against was steadily rising and in December 2003 had already reached 21%. In 2004, support for membership fell from three quarters of the population to around 51% later in the year. The percentage of those against the EU membership rose to 39%. Support dropped even further when the problems with the search of General Gotovina began in the beginning of 2005, and continued when EU negotiations were postponed in March 2005. For the first time the number of those against the EU membership was higher (47%) than those in favour (41%). A similar trend continued throughout 2005 and even the start of the EU negotiations with Croatia in October 2005 did not persuade Croatians to change their mind about the EU. In December 2005 those against the accession were stillmore numerous than those in favour. One way of interpreting this data is that support in the CEE states also fell the closer they came to actual membership. For example, at the beginning of 2004, twoAna Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 194 months before joining the EU, support for EU membership in Slovenia was at its lowest point at just 40% as shown by the Eurobarometer 2004. Apparently, the closer the country gets to the EU membership, the lower the enthusiasm about EU amongst the population. However, Croatia in this period was only getting closer to the negotiations and was not at the doorstep of EU membership. On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous chapter, some Croatian politicians were also interpreting this as growing euroscepticism, which could be attributed to different causes. Some eurosceptics presented arguments which were mostly not connected with the Gotovina case but rather with solving of Croatia’s serious economic problems. The arguments were that, first, Croatia was not economically developed enough to compete in the EU market and had been lacking successful reforms since 1905, therefore joining the EU would not help Croatia economically; and second, EU membership would mean ceding a part of its sovereignty, which would be a major mistake because the EU is burdened with a fundamental ‘democratic deficit’66. Not all eurosceptics were against the accession per se but were pleading for accession to take place later due to the passive reform policy of Croatia’s government. The Gotovina crisis was drawing attention away from the domestic economic crisis which was useful for the local politicians that were gaining political power by nationalistic discourse. One reason for growing euroscepticism was also decreasing trust in the EU on the part of Croatian citizens, who at the beginning of the process believed that EU membership would bring them economic benefits. However, the integration process had not brought any real change for the better; on the contrary, the economic crisis was persisting and EU membership seemed too far away from the present and too abstract. Some politicians embarked on a negative campaign and frightened citizens with stricter EU rules that would apply and endanger Croatian agriculture. One of the famous billboards from 2005 said: “The EU is not cool, but cheese and cream are. Think about it!” (EU nije cool ali sir i vrhnje jesu. Razmisli!). The author of this billboard was the former chief editor of the newspaper Vjesnik, Nenad Ivankovic, under the umbrella of political organisation, close to the Franjo Tuđman circle, SIN (Samostalnost i napredak, eng.: Independency and progress).67 The Croatian media attacked the exaggerated euroscepticism which might take Croatia back to Tuđman’s times: economically underdeveloped, corrupt, undemocratic and isolated. Some journalists together with certain politicians drew 66 Also other smaller European nations have been dissatisfied with growing democratic deficits, not only member states (Ireland and Denmark) but also countries that have temporarily rejected membership (Norway, Switzerland). Habermas, Jürgen. “Why Europe needs a constitution”, New Left Review11 (2001): 14. Tihomir Ponos, “Europska unija ne rjesava nijedan ozbiljan problem Hrvatske.” (European union does not solve any of the serious problems of Croatia)Vjesnik, 26 February 2005. 67 Butkovic, Davor. “Zasto moramo u EU?” (Why do we have to enter EU?) Jutarnji list, 21 August 2004.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 195 attention to the consequences of a stalling European integration: a rise in nationalism, weakening of pro-European elites, threat to regional stability and re- establishing of tensions between the countries of the former Yugoslavia.68 Their concerns were reasonable, not only because of manifestations of ethnic nationalism in its worst form at the start of the 1990s, but even in the years 1999-2000 an all- encompassing European survey showed that Croats were the fourth most xenophobic nation out of 32 European nations, coming only after Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.69 Ramet explains that xenophobia, which was encouraged by the war, diminishes with peace and prosperity, although this process is slower in isolated rural areas, among conservatives and less educated people who are insecure and turn towards institutionalised religion.70 An important factor in the relationship of Croatian citizens towards the EU (but also in other small countries, such as Slovenia) was nationalism, which was connected to the perception of national and European identity. Two dimensions, protectionism and xenophobia, represent an obstacle in forming support for EU membership, while the third dimension inclusive nationalism, when people perceive themselves as Europeans, can diminish the effects of the first two or even have a positive impact on support for EU membership. Fearful of how to preserve their national identity, many Croatian citizens had a negative attitude towards the EU and a threat to the national heroes from the Hague tribunal even increased this fear since national heroism substantially contributed to the formation of independent Croatia and the new Croatian identity during the 1990s. However, leading conservative Croatian politicians, creators and protectors of the new Croatian state and identity, supported the EU membership as “national identity would upgrade and round up with Euro-Atlantic membership”71 . While Eurosceptics and Europhiles were discussing protection of the national interest within or outside the EU, Vidmar Horvat argues that the Europeanness of Slovene identity was never in question and the same is true for Croatian identity in public discourses, which was always 68 Butkovic, Davor. “Ipak pregovori?” (Negotiations after all?) Jutarnji list, 27 November 2004. Vjesnik. “Ako Gotovina nije u Hrvatskoj, ne mozemo ga uhititi.” (If Gotovina is not in Croatia, we cannot catch him) Vjesnik, 24 February 2005. Pulic, Marija. “Racan ce kontrolirati pregovore s EU-om.” (Racan will control the negotiations with EU) Vjesnik, 3 March 2005. Latinovic, Andrea and Körbler, Jurica. “Hrvatska ne odustaje od 17. ozujka.” (Hrvatska is not giving up the 17th March) Vjesnik, 5 March 2005. 69 Ramet, Sabrina P. “Građanske vrijednosti u demokratskoj tranziciji” (Citizenship values in democratic transition), in Demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj - transformacija vrijednosti, obrazovanje, mediji, (Democratic transition in Croatia – transformation of values, education and media) ed. Sabrina P. Ramet andDavorkaMatic (Zagreb: Alinea, 2006). 26. 70 Ramet, “Građanske vrijednosti u demokratskoj tranziciji”, 26-27. 71 Damjan Mandelc, Na mejah nacije. Teorije in prakse nacionalizma. (On the borders of a nation. Theories and practices of nationalism.) (Ljubljana: Znanstvena zalozba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, 2011), 144.Ana Jese Perkovic: National Heroes vs. EU Benefits 196 perceived as European.72 On the contrary, Europeanness became an instrument of historic differentiation and solidification of cultural distinction in the region,73 as presented in the previous chapter with the examples of the two discourses: “Return to Europe” and “Defence of Europe”. The population’s orientation in any candidate country towards the EU is fluid and under the influence of everyday political and socio-economic life, discourses of political parties and decision-making in the parliament; therefore the role of media and politicians is crucial in shaping public opinion and national identity in the framework of European identity. The EU influenced Croatian public opinion with its unpopular demands of EU conditionality, trying to set a standard for other Western Balkan countries as did the self-victimising discourse of Croatian politicians. Croatian political elites accepted the demands although the public support was falling, however the HDZ government did not lose a lot of support and won again at the next elections. In the case of Croatia, EU conditionality played a role in shaping public opinion and in this particular case the public opinion was formed in a conflicted context of a clash between the national (sovereignty, pride, war heroes) and the European imperative (conditionality, ‘humiliation’ with conditioning, imposed interpretations of war and war crimes). The domestic political elites were trying at the same time to be transmitters of the conflict between the European Union and domestic public and an ally of the domestic public in order to lower the costs and preserve the benefits of the EU integration process. 6. Conclusion With the powerful attraction of EU membership and EU conditionality, the EU has been promoting democratic reforms in the Western Balkans, sometimes more and sometimes less successfully. Many academics argue that EU conditionality has been the most successful foreign policy tool of the EU in the past three decades. This article shows that EU conditionality has a different impact on the Western Balkan societies than it has had on CEE. EU conditionality proved efficient in the case of Croatia in fulfilling the legal standards, which are the basis for democratising the legal-political systems of candidate countries. However, the implementation of conditionality and its impact on the domestic social and political processes was different than in CEE. This article does not explain why the impact is different and leaves it for future research. 72 Ksenija Vidmar Horvat, Zemljevidi vmesnosti. Eseji o evropski kulturi in indentiteti po koncu hladne vojne. (The maps of inbetweenness. Essays on European culture and identity after the end of Cold War.) (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2009), 26-27. 73 Vidmar Horvat, Zemljevidi vmesnosti, 27.CEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 197 The implementation of the ICTY condition in Croatia set a standard for other Western Balkan countries: without sufficient cooperation with the ICTY there can be no EU integration. However, the ICTY condition challenged national identity by influencing political discourses and public opinion. The insistence on bringing General Ante Gotovina, a national war hero, to court and the postponement of negotiations caused public frustration, the support for EU integration dropped whilst euroscepticism and nationalism were on the rise. EU conditionality clashed with national identity, which was based on the Homeland War and national war heroes from 1990s. The party in power in 2005, a centre-right HDZ, which was established by Tuđman, had to choose between the European Union on one hand and General Gotovina with public support on the other. Hence, the leading Croatian politicians complied with the EU conditions and at the same time used the discourse of self-victimisation in the domestic public sphere in order to prepare the ground for future contestations of power. Furthermore, by using self-victimising discourse in trying to secure their position in power, they actually encouraged euroscepticism in Croatia and fuelled nationalism. 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Available at www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/05/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1. Accessed on 5 March 2005. Lopandic, Bruno. “Bruxelles se zbog Hrvatske nece sukobiti s Carlom del Ponte.” (Bruxelles will not fight with Carla del Ponte over Croatia) Vjesnik, 4 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/04/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2. Accessed on 4 March 2005. Lopandic, Bruno. “Spremni smo uhititi Gotovinu.” (We are ready to catch Gotovina) Vjesnik, 2 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/02/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=1. Accessed on 4 March 2005. Ponos, Tihomir. “Europska unija ne rjesava nijedan ozbiljan problem Hrvatske.” (European union does not solve any of the serious problems of Croatia) Vjesnik, 26 February 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/26/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=9. Accessed on 26 February 2005. Pulic, Marija. “Racan ce kontrolirati pregovore s EU-om.” (Racan will control the negotiations with EU)Vjesnik, 3 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/03/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1. Accessed on 3 March 2005. Rozankovic, Miroslava. “Mesicmanje optimistican.” (Mesic is less optimistic)Vjesnik, 4 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/04/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1. Accessed 4 March 2005. _________. “Sanader pozvao Gotovinu da domoljublje dokaze u Haagu.” (Sanader called upon Gotovina to prove his patriotism in the Hague) Vjesnik, 1 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/01/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1. Accessed on 4 March 2005. Vjesnik. “Ako Gotovina nije u Hrvatskoj, ne mozemo ga uhititi.” (If Gotovina is not in Croatia, we cannot catch him) Vjesnik, 24 February 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/24/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=1. Accessed 24 February 2005. _________. “Del Ponte: Gotovina je u Hrvatskoj.” (Del Ponte: Gotovina is in Croatia) Vjesnik, 24 February 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/24/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=2. Accessed on 24 February 2005. _________. “Mesic: Odgoda pregovora pogodila bi cijeli jugoistok Europe.” (Mesic: Postponing negotiations would affect all of South-Eastern Europe) Vjesnik, 5 March 2005. Available atCEU Political Science Journal. Vol. 8, No. 2 201 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/05/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2. Accessed on 5 March 2005. _________. “Sanader: Ocekujem odluku o pocetku pregovora.” (Sanader: I am expecting a decision on the start of negotiations) Vjesnik, 10 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/10/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1. Accessed on 10 March 2005. Vodopija, Zoran. “Odluka na Carli del Ponte.” (Decision on Carla del Ponte) Vjesnik, 4 March 2005. Available at http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/04/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1. Accessed 4 March 2005.