

# GLOBALIZATION, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, AND COSMOPOLITANISM: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION OF EUROPEAN PRACTICE

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## **Abstract**

*The current state of international relations is littered with notions of 'globalization', 'global governance' and 'cosmopolitanism', all of which speak to the changing world. One regional governance establishment that has caught the attention of many for its success is the European Union (EU), despite its inherent challenges. The article undertakes a conceptual analysis of global governance and cosmopolitanism, after which it places the EU into perspective to assess the feasibility of its cosmopolitan vision. The article admits and appreciates all the efforts that have been put into making the Union a formidable regional body. However, the overarching argument is that it remains idealistic to envisage a Europe that is fully cosmopolitan, one that reveals the solidarity and hybridity of the various nationhoods and cultures that currently prevail in the region.*

**Keywords:** cosmopolitanism, global governance, globalization, EU, idealism.

## **1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

The end of the Cold War dealt a great blow to those (particularly the realists) who had fetishized the nation-state, both in analytical and geographical/physical terms.<sup>2</sup> Although the U.S. came out of the Cold War as a global hegemon, it was met with a multiplicity of actors that do not necessarily require the consent of states to act.<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt globalization has brought changes to the world, ranging from "Hollywoodization" or "McDonaldization" to transnational social and political-economic arrangements or actors who would have played only a negligible role in the Westphalian sense.<sup>4</sup> It is worth noting that this almost unavoidable

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1 I would like to thank Dr. Andy Knight for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper as well as the anonymous reviewers and editors of this journal for their insightful feedback.

2 For Joseph Nye, this has made the notion of 'soft power' more relevant in our current times as it has become prudent to seek non-coercive ways of achieving ends that were pursued coercively in the past. For an in-depth evaluation of soft power in the context of America's role, see Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

3 Susan Strange was one of the scholars who posed a critical question about the role or rather retreat of the state in the post-Cold War era. See Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

4 See several chapters in Miles Kahler and David A. Lake eds., *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

interconnectedness comes with both merits and downfalls, and there is no consensus on which of these aspects weighs more.<sup>5</sup> In the context of the changing post-Cold War era, it has become relatively prudent to approach both theory and practice from a multi-perspective standpoint, although some still celebrate the inert rigidity of traditional theories; hence the proliferation of many theories that claim to describe existing phenomena, or sometimes, claim to prophesize the future ideal.<sup>6</sup> In the camp of international relations theory, however, there seem to be a group of theories that have gained hegemonic positions although they hardly depict anything other than abstract orthodoxies. The paper mainly contends that although the concepts of “global governance” and “cosmopolitanism” have gained currency in international relations theory, much still needs to be done to find the connection between the theory and the “facts” on the ground – particularly regarding the notion of “cosmopolitanism”. These concepts, for the most part, remain too abstract to serve practically-oriented theoretical functions.

This article adopts a critical theoretical perspective which considers “the ‘fact of globalization’ in relation to the goal of realizing the norms of human emancipation and democracy”.<sup>7</sup> This perspective is methodologically placed in discourse analysis, which aims to tear apart these popular concepts to ascertain their practical significance. By revealing what has been referred to by this author elsewhere as the ‘practicality deficit’ in theory, we can attempt to establish how the theory can be useful to its specific purpose, based on the *a priori* assumption that *every* theory is for someone and for some purpose as Robert Cox argues.<sup>8</sup> It is this praxeologically-oriented thinking that is absent in the extremely abstract variants of both theories of global governance and cosmopolitanism. The focus is on cosmopolitanism as IR theory, but it will be futile to discuss this concept without reference to global governance or globalization since both are connected to cosmopolitanism in many ways. While these concepts mean different things to their proponents, all three will be used interchangeably in some portions of this paper. For the specificity of the vision of cosmopolitanism, the point of reference shall be the European Union (EU) – a post-national political construction which has become a model that reveals the

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5 See Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Arte Scholte and Marc Williams, *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges.” *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 5 (2000), 795-814.

6 See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama’s unpopular declaration of *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, 1992).

7 James Bohman, “Toward a Critical Theory of Globalization: Democratic Practice and Multiperspectival Inquiry” in Max Pensky ed. *Critical Globalization Theory* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005), 48-71.

8 See Nathan Andrews, “Telling Tales of Conformity and Mutual Interests: The Limits of a (Neo)liberal International Order,” *International Journal* 66, no.1 (2011), 209-223.

possibility of a regional or even global cosmopolitan order, yet fraught with many challenges. With regard to the EU example, it is clear that a great deal of effort is going toward building a much united Europe, one similar to the United States of America. However, this agenda faces so many daunting challenges that are not only toppling the agenda itself, but also revealing an existential crisis within the Union that can potentially affect its future potency. This article commends some of the efforts that the European Commission and other established EU institutions are making towards building a stronger Europe but also argues that these efforts are yet to fully reach the stage of a demonstrable possibility. In sum, the paper will show that cosmopolitanism, particularly as it stands in Europe, is only an ideal-type which has lost touch with the realities of enduring differences that pertain at all levels—ideologically, politically, culturally, and historically.

This article has five sections. Beginning with the premise that globalization is mainly “a process whereby economic, political, social and cultural differences are lessened by greater interaction across national boundaries,” the first section examines the concept of global governance.<sup>9</sup> Following this is a discussion of hybridity, subsidiarity, solidarism and multi-level governance – concepts that are regarded as subsets of cosmopolitanism in this particular paper, with no intention to oversimplify their complex meanings. The third part details what cosmopolitanism means. The fourth section places the discussion in the context of the EU to ascertain what the Union has been doing so far to advance its cosmopolitan agenda, and the final section examines how what has been espoused in theory reflects the actual practices within the Union. As already alluded to, the EU will be used as the case study because it represents an archetype of an organization that has achieved some success in the face of debilitating challenges. Particularly with regard to our topic of discussion, it is the EU that seems to be making attempts towards consolidating the abstract notions of global governance and cosmopolitanism into something relatively ‘real’.

## 2. The idea of global governance

Today it is common knowledge that one can no longer regard international relations “as the analysis of the relations between clearly and securely bounded sovereign states responding to the challenges of an immutable anarchy”<sup>10</sup> as these relations are pervaded with complex political, economic and social linkages at a global level. It is within this era that ‘global governance’ surged both as a robust concept and a feasible organizational arrangement. Robert Keohane and Joseph

9 Noël Merino, “Introduction” in Merino ed. *Globalization*. (Detroit, New York, London etc: Greenhaven Press, 2010), 7.

10 Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan, “Introduction: Boundaries in Question” in John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater eds. *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations* (London: Cassell Publishers Ltd., 1995), 4.

Nye, for instance, in their 1977 work *Power and Interdependence* posited an ideal-type opposite to realism which they called 'complex interdependence' – a configuration that reveals the continuous blurring of the lines between what is local/domestic and what is international/global. This arrangement is characterised by multiple channels of politics, including interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational; multiple issues besides military security, the result of the absence of hierarchy among issues; and limited resort to military force due to the costs attached to its usage. This notion of 'soft power' derives from the claim that the limited role of force leads one to expect states to rely on alternative instruments and ways of wielding power.

Later on, in 1984, Keohane, from this same perspective, posited the possibility of non-hegemonic cooperation which derives from 'complementary interests'. He has in recent years differentiated between 'interdependence' and 'globalization'. To him, the former refers to a "state of the world" while globalization denotes "a trend of increasing transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of interdependence."<sup>11</sup> The logic of global governance, which is "governance without government"<sup>12</sup> thrives more under mutual interests which derive from shared norms and beliefs. Those who consider it to be a "summative phenomenon" see global governance as a "purposive activity" that aims to "steer and modify the behavior of actors who operate on the global stage in such a manner as to avoid deadly conflicts and control intense socio-economic and political competition."<sup>13</sup> This is conceptualized to be multi-level and non-hierarchical governance ranging from multilateralism to 'plurilateralism' to transnational civil society. Basically, summative global governance is targeted to dealing with the proliferating, and sometimes conflicting, centers of authority.

Global governance is made possible by norms that are often seen as intervening variables between states, "mediating between interests and political outcomes with no independent explanatory power."<sup>14</sup> They generally set the rules of behaviour, jurisdictions, and the varying dimensions of responsibility. Ted Hopf's argument about the logic of habit clearly shows how international norms may become so

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11 Robert O. Keohane, "Introduction: From Interdependence and Institutions to Globalization and Governance" In Keohane ed. *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London and New York: Routledge., 2002), 15.

12 See James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

13 W. Andy Knight, "Global Governance as a Summative Phenomenon," in Jim Whitman ed. *Palgrave Advances in Global Governance* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), 178.

14 Annika Björkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2002), 9-23.

routinized to the point that they are “unintentional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless, that is, they do consume limited cognitive processing capacity.”<sup>15</sup> Antje speaks to the duality embedded in norms. To this author, the three logics when dealing with how norms work include 1) Norms as Facts: The Logic of Appropriateness, 2) Norms as Disputed Facts: the Logic of Arguing, and 3) the Logic of Contestedness: between facts and norms.<sup>16</sup> The proposition is that social norms acquire a degree of appropriateness over time through habitual practices while legal norms – like that of the EU – require social and political institutions to solidify their meanings. This can be achieved through continuous normative practice.

Even for some key global governance theorists, three questions remain despite the success of some global governance regimes.<sup>17</sup> These include 1) governance of, by and for whom?; 2) is global governance or just all over the map?; and 3) can global governance keep pace? None of these questions can be answered with great certainty. Thus, Whitman’s modest conclusion is that “perhaps we need to begin a consideration of the global governance prospect with a humility appropriate to the circumstances we have already created for ourselves and others.”<sup>18</sup> He believes that the success of global governance will be incumbent on legal enforcement but one can argue that this normative change is not possible in the current state of things, that is, the apparent absence of a specific, identifiable and legitimate enforcer.

While all this can be elusive, Andrew Moravcsik is convinced that with reference to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, for example, governments turn to international enforcement when “the benefits of reducing future political uncertainty outweigh the ‘sovereignty costs’ of membership.”<sup>19</sup> To the realists, anarchy still prevails in the absence of a global government although some global-governance-believing constructivists insist that the overarching normative lexicon has been transformed from one of “anarchy in a system of states to governance within a global society,” thereby giving new

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15 Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 4 (2010), 539-561.

16 See Antje Wiener, “The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological and Normative Approaches to ‘Interaction.’” *Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy* 10, no.1 (March 2007), 47-69.

17 See Jim Whitman, “Conclusion: The Global Governance Prospect” in Jim Whitman ed., *Palgrave Advances in Global Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189-203.

18 *Ibid.*, 201.

19 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” *International Organization* 54, no. 2 (2000), 217-252.

meanings to words like sovereignty, territory, authority and security.<sup>20</sup> As will be shown below, these 'new' meanings remain ambiguous in the context of the EU and even in the international regime broadly defined. For instance, while states have surrendered a portion of their sovereignty to the European Commission, there exists a fair amount of authority to deny a referendum from passing.<sup>21</sup>

In the final analysis, one can safely say that the global governance ideal greatly informs notions of cosmopolitanism or vice versa, although some theorists belonging to this perspective will not readily accept this. The argument here is that while the nexus can be blurred, one reinforces the other. In this regard, the success of global governance reveals the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

### 3. What is cosmopolitanism?

Cosmopolitanism simply "means 'world citizenship' and implies belonging on the part of all individuals in a universal community of human beings as moral persons."<sup>22</sup> This same understanding of universality informs the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations, and other regional/global governance arrangements (although not all regional arrangements can be included in this category). The term also represents the triumph of local affiliation as opposed to state affiliation, and challenges the idea of a fixed order embodied in the state. It is a framework of ideas and principles that guide the governance of the challenges that come with the changing times. Some scholars (such as Giulio Gallarotti) maintain that underlying cosmopolitanism is the idea of 'smart power' that denotes a fair synthesis of 'hard power' as posited by the realists and 'soft power' as conceptualized by neoliberals and constructivists – often representing the position of critical realism. David Held argues that although there appears to be the absence of a supranational authority – a 'higher coordinating body' – states have always been concerned with cooperation and consensus-building at different levels.

On the level of principles, Held posits that cosmopolitanism works through a set of universally shared principles that "can form the basis for the protection and

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20 Michael Barnett and Kathryn Sikkink, "From International Relations to Global Society," in Reus-Smit and Snidal eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 62-83.

21 The Dutch saying 'no' to the European constitution in 2005 is a case in point. See BBC, "Varied reasons behind the Dutch No," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4601731.stm> (accessed October 5, 2012).

22 Patrick Hayden, "Cosmopolitanism Past and Present" in Patrick Hayden ed. *The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations* (Surrey, England and Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2009), 59.

nurturing of each person's equal significance in 'the moral realm' of humanity."<sup>23</sup> In this regard, cosmopolitanism comes with a strong 'moralistic' orientation. Cosmopolitanism is about deliberation and consensual decision-making linked to law, and thus can be more important than just (state) power and economic strength. The two main strands of cosmopolitanism are moral cosmopolitanism and legal (institutional) cosmopolitanism. The former fits more into the definition provided above while the latter emphasizes the creation of "transforming institutional schemes" that aim at providing "concrete procedural and organizational mechanisms" for dealing with issues that affect all people.<sup>24</sup> While these two strands exist, cosmopolitanism has three fundamental characteristics, namely; individualism (that is, human beings or human welfare being the center of concern); universality; and the generality of human dignity or status.

With universalism come concepts such as transnationalism and communitarianism, both of which have the similar premise of a highly connected world order, although they are unique in other conceptual contexts. However, it is worth pointing out that there has been an age-old debate over cosmopolitanism and communitarianism and how these two ethical positions address the value assumptions (regarding 'the good') that underpin the daily choices individuals face.<sup>25</sup> Even in the ethical sense, a concise definition of 'the (general) good' remains problematic. The point is that what can be considered 'good' cannot be thought of as an external reality 'out there'; it is embedded in normative subjectivities either manifest or latent.

Religion plays a role in the discussion of 'universalism' within the EU. There are speculations that the entrance of Turkey into the EU can potentially cause problems for a Union that is already in the midst of an existential crisis. This conjecture is premised on the country's 'Muslim identity'. However, we cannot assume that the Christian faith is monolithic in beliefs, norms, customs and rituals, and that Europe without Turkey (or other world religions) will necessarily be more united. In essence, any concept of cosmopolitanism must be based on the 'unity of humans' rather than on religious belief. Reference to cosmopolitanism in the EU will be to legal-institutional cosmopolitanism as the Union represents a somewhat 'concrete' organizational mechanism that seeks to advance the welfare/progress of all European member states alike.

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23 David Held, 2010. *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (Cambridge, UK and Malden, USA: Polity Press, 2010), 69.

24 Hayden, "Cosmopolitanism Past and Present," 43.

25 See Molly Cochran, "Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism in a Post-Cold War World" in John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater eds. *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations* (London: Cassell Publishers Ltd., 1995).

*Hybridity, Subsidiarity, Solidarism and Multi-Level Governance*

Hybridity simply denotes a mixture, and in the context of cosmopolitanism, it is reflected through a high sense of interconnectedness that human beings generally share; one that can result in a stronger sense of global integration. Those who posit this “high-level synthesis” argue that its full establishment will “eradicate violent and non-violent harm from relations between social groups.”<sup>26</sup> With hybridity comes the notion of ‘globalism’ which eventually leads to ‘globality’ a case where boundaries (be it geographical, political, ideological, and cultural) give way to complete homogeneity – a condition where everyone competes with everyone for everything.<sup>27</sup> This process will result in the fruition of the ‘global village’ idea, a kind of ‘global common’ that erodes all differences between and among societies through the process of time/space compression.<sup>28</sup>

Globalization does not necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism but it is certainly “the raw material for its possibility.”<sup>29</sup> As a disposition of ‘openness’, cosmopolitanism “is expressed by an emotional and ethical commitment towards universalism, selflessness, worldliness and communitarianism, and thus such values should be identifiable in the practices, attitudes and identifications of individuals.”<sup>30</sup> Also embedded in this idea are the concepts of subsidiarity and solidarism. Subsidiarity is an international norm that requires decisions to be made at the lowest level as possible before resorting to other levels, if needed. This norm usually seeks to structure the distribution of competences between a supranational organization and its member states or polities.<sup>31</sup> Subsidiarity allows for multi-level governance which permits issues to be dealt with at different levels (local, domestic, regional, intraregional, or international) depending on what the condition demands/requires. A multilateral subsidiarity governance arrangement has at its heart the idea of ‘burden sharing’, a case where the competencies of different levels of governance are utilized. This model “allows the more immediate levels (those most affected by a decision-making fall-out) to be responsible for carrying out tasks for which they

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26 Andrew Linklater, “Human Interconnectedness” in Ken Booth ed. *Realism and World Politics*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 318.

27 See Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

28 See David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

29 Zlatko Skrbis and Ian Woodward, “The ambivalence of ordinary cosmopolitanism: Investigating the limits of cosmopolitan openness,” *The Sociological Review* 55, no. 4 (2007), 730-747.

30 *Ibid.*, 730.

31 See Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, “The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 2 (2007), 217-238.

have certain competence.”<sup>32</sup> This is also based on the notion that no single level can deal with the entire governance burden, particularly when placed in the context of the changing times where hitherto local or domestic issues have reached global proportions. This ‘post-national constellation’, according to Nancy Fraser, challenges the six main national presumptions which include nation-state sovereignty, national economy, national citizenry, national language, national literature, and national infrastructure of communication. She argues that today, every one of these presumptions “is problematic if not simply patently counterfactual.”<sup>33</sup>

Solidarism, though a contested term, denotes the “normative convergence by states on issues like self-determination and human rights.”<sup>34</sup> This is separate from pluralism in the sense that the former “approximates a ‘constitution’ for international society” which may permit intervention against non-conforming members while a pluralist international society is “one which permits normative diversity and in which there is little propensity to make binding, enforceable rules.”<sup>35</sup> Barry Buzan’s reinterpretation of the English School theory shows that solidarism actually refers to “the convergence in domestic institutions and values across states, and the propensity of states to cooperate on the basis of shared normative projects, whatever those institutions, values, and projects happen to be.”<sup>36</sup> The keywords here are convergence, cooperation, institutions and values: it is these notions that cement the broader conception of cosmopolitanism. In this context, solidarism can occur not just in political or human rights terms, but it can be conceptualized in economic and socio-cultural terms. In the case of the EU, it is uncertain if a clear distinction can be drawn between these two concepts of convergence. Since the EU has a constitution which is binding on member states, it can fit into the solidarism perspective of the English School but it certainly also allows for some ‘domestic autonomy’ especially for powerful, usually founding, states. It is within this autonomy that Great Britain, for instance, although not a founding state maintains its currency autonomy, and it also explains why no single *lingua franca* has been agreed upon. For instance, the entrance portal to the EU website has twenty-three language options, a choice close to the number of member states of the Union. What follows is an analysis of EU cosmopolitanism in a more in-depth manner.

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32 W. Andy Knight, *A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2000), 171.

33 Nancy Fraser, 2005. “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere” in Max Pensky ed. *Critical Globalization Theory* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005), 37-47.

34 Neil Englehart, “Representing Civilization: Solidarism, Ornamentalism, and Siam’s entry into International Society,” *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 3 (2010), 417-439.

35 *Ibid.*, 41.

36 Cited in *ibid.*, 420.

#### 4. The EU Cosmopolitan Agenda

Evolving from the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community of 1957, the EU came into existence upon the signing of the Treaty of Rome by its 'inner' six founders, namely; Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and the Netherlands.<sup>37</sup> The Union currently has twenty-seven member states with several others hoping to become members eventually, including Turkey and Macedonia, while Croatia will become a Member State in 2013. Many reasons, including geopolitical and strategic, account for this trend towards enlargement but the fact that the institution has moved from six to twenty-seven member states in about five decades speaks to some success. Global governance, though it denotes governance without government as already indicated, does require a relatively well established institutional arrangement.

The EU has done more than this. While the proposed constitution was rejected in a referendum in 2005, institutions like the European Commission, European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, European Ombudsman, European Central Bank, and the European Council exist with the aim of facilitating democratic decision-making and presenting Europe as a stronger force to the rest of the world. It is out of these arrangements that one can identify the quest to build a 'United States of Europe'. In line with engendering a sense of 'Europeanness' and following the recommendations of the 1985 Adonnino Committee, measures have been taken to give the Union a 'human face'. With budgetary support from the European Parliament, the 'People's Europe Campaign' has been launched to invent new European symbols and culture-building initiatives such a standardized European passport, European logo and flag, anthem, among others.

For proper multi-level governance, the Union adopted the subsidiarity principle at the 1990 Maastricht summit which required that decisions should be made at the lowest level as possible, but since then there has been a continuous battle over the norm's actual definition. It was after the summit that the name 'European Union' actually came to stay. The skirmishes or ambiguities are often between the various actors of the Union, notably the European Commission, the member states, the regions, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and when each of these levels of competencies should be utilized. Although subsidiarity was expected to reinforce the position of domestic actors in European decision-making, due to the vagueness and elusive formulation of this norm "member states were likely to invoke subsidiarity as an instrument to protect national interests" and "[t]he Commission was equally likely to mobilize subsidiarity for further integrative policies at the European level."<sup>38</sup> This tends to create an institutional deadlock.

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37 Information for this section, unless otherwise noted, is readily available on the EU website, see [http://europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/index_en.htm).

38 van Kersbergen and Verbeek, "The Politics of International Norms," 226.

Many steps have been and are still being taken to ensure the Union reaches its cosmopolitan goal. Beyond the official institutional arrangement, there is a good amount of scholarly support behind this objective. These scholars range from those who envisage a "United States of Europe" or a "cosmopolitan Europe"<sup>39</sup> both of which are underpinned by Habermas' idea of 'post-national citizenship' – a kind of citizenship that transcends the rigid boundaries of the various European nation-states. Habermas and Derrida both threw their weight behind this cause by pleading for a common European foreign policy, insisting that the core EU countries should find ways of endowing the Union "with certain qualities of a state."<sup>40</sup> According to them, the absence of a common foreign policy regarding the invasion of Iraq, for instance, was made explicit on 15 February 2003 when mass demonstrations were held in London, Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin and Paris to react against European involvement in the war on terror. With a common policy that binds Europe together, Habermas and Derrida argue that the region will be able to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralist tendencies of the United States. More than a decade ago, Habermas argued that in order to entrench the goal of European unification, it is necessary to move beyond a 'mere market' and adopt a constitution. The justification is that the intergovernmental arrangement adopted at Maastricht "lacks that power of symbolic crystallization which only a political act of foundation can give."<sup>41</sup> His call for a constitution is based on the belief that a:

European constitution would enhance the capacity of the member states of the Union to act jointly, without prejudicing the particular course and content of what policies it might adopt. It would constitute a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the kind of policies some of us are inclined to advocate.<sup>42</sup>

In order to undermine the EU's meta-power game and give way to cosmopolitanism and sufficiently in line with Habermas' argument, Beck and Grande (2007) argue for four main strategies that can be undertaken at the state level, namely; 1) (neo)nationalist egoism which limits the exclusive pursuance of one's 'national interests'; 2) intergovernmental minimalism which encourages states to cooperate and cede their sovereign rights to European institutions; 3) cosmopolitan realism which permits states to pursue their interests 'realistically' while considering the other members' interests and 4) cosmopolitan idealism which emphasize the

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39 Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe* (Cambridge, UK and Malden, USA: Polity Press, 2007).

40 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, 'February 15; or, What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe' in Max Pensky ed. *Critical Globalization Theory*, 27-34.

41 Jürgen Habermas, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution," *New Left Review* 11 (2001), 5-26.

42 Ibid., 12.

absolute subordination of individual national interests as it denotes acting 'idealistically' instead of 'realistically'.<sup>43</sup> They also outline capital and technocratic strategies Europe can undertake to overcome the power game and arrive at 'genuine' cosmopolitanism. While some of these strategies are feasible, particularly intergovernmental minimalism, they seem overly idealistic when placed in the context of the contemporary Europe. Even the idea of adopting cosmopolitan realism and idealism simultaneously is ambiguous.

## 5. Idealism vs. Reality: The EU Cosmopolitanism Challenge

Many people have questioned the extent to which the EU can maintain a cosmopolitan identity amidst the differences that prevail among members. There is nothing wrong with having some form of 'intersubjective consensus'<sup>44</sup> among a people of a particular region, but to assume that this consensus will result in the total relinquishing of their particular national/ethnic identities is quite far-fetched. In other instances, what is considered a 'norm' which derives from practices that are widely accepted are not necessarily shared by all.<sup>45</sup> In any case, referring to the EU as an indication of European cosmopolitanism can be misleading in many respects. Although research shows that it is mainly an elitist project,<sup>46</sup> the Union still prides itself on building some sense of 'Europeanness' through superficial symbolic arrangements such as EU flag, anthem, logo, licence plates, passports as though these will remove Europeans' specific nationalities and give them all one identity.

A telling example of why the sense of 'Europeanness' has not yet been established is captured by the deadlock that occurred in the spring of 2005 when the French and

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43 Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 142-145.

44 In the context of religion and world order, Knight (2010) finds that the 'intersubjective consensus' needed to establish a unified world order is missing among the world's religions. The point here is that if this kind of unifying consensus is absent or almost impossible among religions which share similar faith-driven premises, then it remains problematic in the case of Europe with diverse identities and nationalistic belief systems. In principle, the solidification of any norm requires a 'generalized sharedness' in that norm. For instance, Björkdahl (2002) defines norms as the "intersubjective understandings that constitute actors' interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behaviour ought to be" (21). Until this understanding is maintained, EU cosmopolitanism will remain only a utopian ideal!

45 Note that over a decade ago, authors pointed to the 'implementation deficit' in the Union. See Risto Lampinen and Petri Uusikylä, "Implementation Deficit — Why Member States do not Comply with EU directives?" *Scandinavian Political Studies* 21, no. 3 (1998), 231–251. See also, Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib, "Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New Member States," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 no. 2 (2008), 293–313.

46 See Paul Magnette, "European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?" *Political Studies* 51, no. 1 (2003), 144–160.

the Dutch said no to the proposed constitutional treaty. A lot of interpretation has been given to explain this incident, but one of the main concerns is the absence of coordination and/or communication between the European masses and the elites<sup>47</sup> or what Schmidt calls "lack of communicative discourse"<sup>48</sup> which results from a nonexistent public sphere. The EU, which began as an elitist organization, has not been able to bring the public or the domestic actors to play significant roles in it. There remains a strong disagreement between the EU governments and their publics over several issues. Apart from the fact that the people have realised the Union is an elite project, it has also been realised that domestic leaders use the EU as a scapegoat to relinquish their responsibilities to their nation. It is only assumed that domestic issues will automatically be addressed once the Union is solidified, but the issue goes beyond this. Therefore, the issue here should not be that Europe needs a constitution; rather, it should be focused on *whether* this legally-binding arrangement is possible or not amidst the ongoing internal dynamics.

Having been established as an economic organization, based on what is known as 'negative integration'<sup>49</sup>, democratic legitimacy has become a "hard currency" in the EU. Also, the multi-level or multi-centred nature of European governance has also resulted in what Schmidt calls a 'fragmented democracy'. The EU is arguably one of the most democratic regional organizations in the world today, but Schmidt's argument is based on the fact that it lacks a *demos*<sup>50</sup> or a single people. This is not to essentialize the nation-states democracies as possessing a singularity, or that they necessarily follow Abraham Lincoln's dictum of government by the people, of the people, and for the people. But the point is meant to elucidate the argument that the fragmentation in governance disallows the organization from escaping the democratic deficit. The Union is only a regional body of nation-states which does not possess the traditional attributes of a government but it certainly has

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47 Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, "The European Union's Legitimacy Crisis and the Future of European Integration." A Paper Prepared for the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, February 27- March 3, 2007.

48 Vivien Schmidt, "The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, no. 5 (2004), 975-997.

49 According to Gillingham (2003), 'negative integration' occurs through markets, the case where particular economic institutions are created to ensure the optimal performance of the market. Transforming this market-oriented or monetary approach into a more democracy or governance-driven one has been one of the problems of the EU. A historical institutionalist analysis by Pierson (1996) also shows that evolving from the EEC, there are limits in treating the European Community as an instrument that facilitates collective action or decision-making among sovereign states. He suggests we conceptualize integration as "a path-dependent process producing a fragmented but discernible multi-tiered European polity" (p. 123).

50 It is worth noting here that Cederman (2001) constructs the notion of 'bounded integration' in the EU which, instead of accepting or denying the existence of a European demos from the onset, rather attempts to problematize it as socially constructed and 'sticky'.

arrangements that should make it more and more 'majoritarian' in the sense of a democratic government. To be precise, the fact that there have been direct elections every five years since 1979 shows that the EU enjoys a good amount of democracy, although voter turnout has been below 50 percent since 1999. However, while the establishment of the European Parliament was meant to address the divide Schmidt notes, voting is still hijacked by well-organized lobby groups who have interests that may not be representative of the general public. Cosmopolitanism in the European sense "preserves the idea of a *single human destiny*, a *telos* for all mankind and the conception of a future – and ineluctable – emergence of a *single human culture*."<sup>51</sup> However, Pagden argues that it is a false hope to think that "the truly cosmopolitan vision of the cosmopolis" is achievable. This kind of multi-level governance actually denotes the conglomeration or multiplicity of actors and levels of governance; there is therefore a problem when an organization that purports to be of this character is unable to tap into the nuances of each of the levels.

The question, however, is whether all the people in the various member states be adequately involved in the decision-making processes of the Union without neglecting some minority interests?<sup>52</sup> If possible, to what extent can this happen? The inability to carefully coordinate the multi-leveled competencies is fundamental to the Union's inability to construct a cosmopolitan Europe, one that blurs the divisions and universalizes individual nationalistic sentiments. But it is worth noting that while the member states have rendered parts of their sovereignty to be part of the Union, they still possess a significant amount of power to maintain their pre-existing social identities, even amidst the plethora of forces that prevent them from doing so. For cosmopolitanism to work there is the need to move from an 'I' to a 'we' feeling. Regardless of some commonalities that pertain among EU member states, this strong sense of cohesion is absent. As of now, we cannot decidedly point to *the* "European people." Where this sense of belonging to Europe is nonexistent, it remains elusive to envision cosmopolitanism – something that relies greatly on shared and consensual norms, beliefs, and principles. On another level, the duality of the EU as both an intergovernmental and a supranational organization has resulted in some of the many normative challenges it faces. This conflict is well captured by van Kersbergen and Verbeek in the following statement:

One would expect norm reinforcement to be easier and less conflictual in more supranational contexts, because such systems at least have some form of norm

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51 Anthony Pagden, "Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism," *Constellations* 7, no. 1 (2000), 3-22, my emphasis.

52 Nathan Andrews, "The EU and Global Governance: Is the EU still a Model for other Regional Organizations?" in Sabrina Hoque ed. *Geopolitics vs. Global Governance: Reinterpreting National Security*, (Halifax, Dalhousie University: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 2009), 57-72.

reinforcing mechanisms, such as an advanced system of law. Yet, because the polity of the EU is simultaneously an intergovernmental *and* a supranational polity, a battle over norms remains a distinct possibility here too.<sup>53</sup>

The duality captured in the statement above enables actors to continually 'redefine' pre-existing norms in which case certain actors might have more influence in such re-negotiations than others, making the EU susceptible to an "imperfect competence regime." As argued by Beck and Grande, the cosmopolitan utopia might be able to help Europe overcome its 'debilitating malaise' (which result from its lack of a robust public sphere, the disconnect between the EU level of governance and domestic levels, its economic performance, and its Eastern enlargement) when established. For now, however, this has yet to prove a possibility in the immediate future. This malaise places Europe in a threatening 'existential deficit'.<sup>54</sup> In general, European politics shows a 'highly complex conflict structure' which Beck and Grande identify in three dimensions, namely: 1) institutional conflicts over the distribution of power between the Union and its member states; 2) ideological-cultural conflicts which reveals divergence visions and images of the future of Europe and its cultural identity; and 3) material-distributional conflicts which result from the apparent regional and structural inequities.<sup>55</sup> To summarize this section, these three dimensions of conflict present a formidable setback to European cosmopolitanism.

## 6. Cosmopolitanism: Depletion of cultures and nations?

Globalization may be expected to erode all boundaries but the recent security threats have rather increased the need to strengthen national security and safeguard one's cultural and overall existential potential. In the midst of the globalizing trend, nations have managed to survive with a good amount of their culture and identity intact. A study of 'ordinary cosmopolitanism'<sup>56</sup> in Australia by

53 van Kersbergen and Verbeek, "The Politics of International Norms," 218.

54 See Andrews, "Telling Tales of Conformity and Mutual Interests," 209-223. Additionally, recent widespread economic and social protests in EU member countries such as Ireland, Greece, the UK and France reveals the fundamental existential crisis the Union is facing in contemporary times. In economic terms, the pejorative acronym PIIGS has come to stay signalling the downward spiral of the economies of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, with the addition of Great Britain – all EU member countries. The now political union has also to deal with these emerging economic (or fiscal) concerns if the institution aims to survive the times.

55 Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 139-41.

56 "Ordinary" in this context refers to a vast group of middle class members. There is a contention in the literature about the distinction between elite and ordinary cosmopolitanism. The question often asked is whether middle class or low-income people are more likely to hold cosmopolitan views than the privileged elites who have better income, higher education and potential for socio-economic mobility. The study by Skrbis and

Skrbis and Woodward, for instance, revealed ambiguities surrounding the concepts of openness and fluidity that come with the cosmopolitan project. The idea of a cosmopolitan culture, as already alluded to, denotes cultural cross-pollination, fluidity and hybridity. In this case, regardless of trends towards general openness, the authors found a mix of sentiments of weakening national culture and culture loss. Also, the idea of openness was filled with nationalistic loyalties, apprehensions and various forms of egocentricities. The three main ambiguous dispositional themes that emerge from their study include: choice and opportunity in economic terms versus commercialization and exploitation; homogeneity, borderlessness versus loss of home – the flattening of all diversity; enhanced communication and mobility versus dangerous and unpleasant security threats.

For every single good thing that people see globalization bringing there is a counter disposition. Based on this result, they admit that it is problematic and somewhat futile to think of cosmopolitanism as “a continuum of openness – a continuum on which more openness, tolerance and acceptance of diversity corresponds with a more intensely cosmopolitan identity.”<sup>57</sup> The data they gathered suggest that while cosmopolitanism is a possibility, it should not be imagined as a soon-to-arrive system of social organization. So, while cosmopolitanism or in this regard globalization may come with many positive connotations/experiences, there are negatives which derive from people’s cultural and existential anxieties. Even a study of European cosmopolitanism that found ample grounding for openness and recognition of difference also found the ‘social reality’ of cosmopolitanism ambiguous as next to openness was the more ‘banal’, non-cosmopolitan sentiments of the people. This study shows that while cosmopolitanism has a foothold in Europe, when placed the context of ‘reality’, “there are different forms of cosmopolitanism coexisting with nationalism, particularism and pluralistic positions.”<sup>58</sup> In any case, none of these concepts or ideological positions is adequate in its own rights.<sup>59</sup> It is based on this that the paper has questioned notions of cosmopolitanism that seem to discount the ‘nation’ as they envisage a post-national arrangement that shares almost no resemblance with arrangements characteristic of nation-states.

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Woodward somewhat settles this debate by showing that one need not belong to an elite group to hold such views.

57 Zlatko and Woodward, “The ambivalence of ordinary cosmopolitanism,” 734.

58 Florian Pichler, “How Real Is Cosmopolitanism in Europe?” *Sociology* 42, no. 6 (2008), 1107-1126.

59 See an attempt to synthesize nationalism and cosmopolitanism in Brett Bowden, “Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Bedfellows?” *National Identities* 5, no. 3 (2003), 235-249.

In his 1996 article Etienne Balibar asked the question, "is European citizenship possible?"<sup>60</sup> For proponents of cosmopolitanism, the answer to this will be probably be a resounding 'yes' but Balibar showed how no simple deductions can be made as 'nations' thrive. This article seems outdated since changes have occurred since the year 2000. However, the argument pursued so far indicates that we need to continually question and problematize (maybe, not yet reject) this cosmopolitan ideal. It has become even clearer in these globalizing times that the kind of national self-consciousness, "the unique spirit of the nation" as Habermas calls it, is not embodied in the EU because "[a] plurality of European public and social spaces exist, often beyond the control of, or unrelated to, the EU or its member states."<sup>61</sup> As a result of this plurality of spaces, it is difficult to think of a harmonious, cohesive, coherent, and unified European society. It would be useful therefore to accept the nations as they are instead of trying to 'unify' them into one singularity – potentially leading to a kind of cosmopolitanism that does not target a universalized public through the depletion of diversity, culture, and individualized identities.

This author agrees with Stefan Auer in that the attempt to move towards a more federalist Europe with the underlying ideal of 'post-national citizenship' is both unrealistic and undesirable, as well as his plea for "a Europe that accepts *nationhoods*, a Europe comfortable with a vast *variety* of political *cultures*."<sup>62</sup> This argument is summed up in two words: "nations matter,"<sup>63</sup> and it is not going to wither away anytime soon. If it is peace and unity that the EU seeks, both desirable outcomes could be attained outside the construction of a federalist Europe because not all federations around the world are necessarily peaceful or united. Rather, the EU needs to 1) re-envision its identity as a 'regional state' with nation-states members in overlapping policy communities; 2) re-envision its democracy with appropriate decision-making procedures; and 3) re-envision the European economy through innovative initiatives that can deal with the economic crisis some member states are facing.<sup>64</sup>

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60 See Etienne Balibar, "Is European citizenship possible?," *Public Culture* 8, no. 2 (1996), 355-376.

61 Chris Rumford, "Social Spaces beyond Civil Society: European Integration, Globalization and the Sociology of European Society," *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 14, no. 3 (2001), 205-218.

62 Stefan Auer, "New Europe: Between Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 5 (2010), 1163-1184, my emphasis.

63 For more on this, see Craig J. Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

64 See an extensive discussion of this in Vivien A. Schmidt, "Re-envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy" *Journal of Common Market Systems* 47 (Annual Review) (2009), 17-42.

## 7. Conclusion

Unlike global governance in general, which seems to have become visible through the processes of the UN and many regional and international organizations, albeit with some challenges, cosmopolitanism as an ideal has yet to become fine-tuned. For now, it indeed remains contentious how it will become a reality, making the concept itself no less utopian. The EU as an organization has been and could potentially remain a strong force for 'good'. But one can certainly doubt if its existence would necessarily result in the realization of the cosmopolitan dreams of Europe. While cosmopolitanism has become a fashionable term for people with a more neoliberal or perhaps global ontology, there are ambiguities (or if you like, continuities and discontinuities) with the notion of global citizenship and the extent to which human beings will begin to reach binding and enforceable agreements of common interest. Linklater admits that

No less important is whether different cultures can find a common ground in a grand narrative that harnesses the more sophisticated self-understandings of the age to a cosmopolitan political project than can combine moral legitimacy with respect on the grounds of practicality.<sup>65</sup>

At the EU level, it appears that both the 'moral legitimacy' and the 'grounds of practicality' needed for a formidable cosmopolitan project are missing. Perhaps, David Held's idea of a *cosmopolitan democratic community*, although equally fraught with challenges, can work better in the European context. According to him, this community does not require any form of political or cultural integration that leads to consensus on a variety of beliefs, values and norms. Rather, it must be

An ensemble of organizations, associations and agencies pursuing their *own* projects, whether these are economic, social or cultural; but these projects must always also be subject to the constraints of democratic processes and a common structure of political action.<sup>66</sup>

In this sense, there may be some uniformity in terms of a common organizational structure but at the same time difference in so many issue areas. For me, this appears a far more feasible community than the 'European community' the EU is trying to construct – a community where difference and diversity are not slaughtered on an altar of solidarity but rather embraced as essential parts of the democratic process. We must realise though that even a neoliberal institutionalist such as Robert Keohane sees cosmopolitan democracy as "a distant ideal, not a feasible option for our time."<sup>67</sup>

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65 Linklater, "Human Interconnectedness," 315.

66 Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, 278, my emphasis.

67 Cited in Hayden "Cosmopolitanism Past and Present," 59.

On the contrary, Held argues that cosmopolitanism is “in the here and now” since it “is already embedded in the rule systems and institutions which have transformed the sovereign states system in a number of important respects.”<sup>68</sup> But Keohane is quite right since cosmopolitanism, as defined at least in this paper, does not exist anywhere as of now although increasing levels of regional and global integration of varying forms point to its future possibility. We do need a law of global citizens, as argued by María Lara, because only such laws can shield individuals from the tendency of states to go astray. However, until such laws are established, widely accepted, and ‘practicalized’, we can only assume that they exist even when there is glaring evidence to the contrary. Particularly in the context of Europe, there is the need for a more robust sense of ‘community’, ‘culture’, and ‘universal acceptance’ at every level of analysis, all of which are currently absent (or rather ambiguous) in the EU regime.

This article has argued that the EU cosmopolitan agenda is far-fetched mainly because the degree of uniformity, consensus and hybridity required for it to be successful are not properly in place. With the quest to enrich the theoretical debate around the EU, and generally global governance regimes, this paper has sought to show that the very idea of ‘cosmopolitanism’ is not necessarily sensitive to cultural and national differences and diversity. And this has been a primary bane to its current utility in praxis-oriented theoretical discussions. This must be addressed before we can begin a discussion of whether cosmopolitanism will really ever occur or not. For those who believe it already exists, it will be useful to explain how the notion resides in the same arena as difference, diversity, and nationhood. Future research in this area can also consider a more empirical assessment of what some non-key EU members<sup>69</sup> think of the Union as it stands in these turbulent times, particularly the potential for a more solidly grounded universalist Europe.

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68 Held, *Cosmopolitanism*, 50.

69 Any of the non-founding member states fits into this category of ‘non-key’ members, at least in this paper.

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