

SOCIETAL CLEAVAGES AND THE FORMATION OF THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM SINCE 1950

Cuneyt Dinç
Suleyman Sah University

Abstract

This article seeks to identify and describe the relationship between the divisions of party system and social structure in Turkey from a historical–institutional perspective by applying the operational logic of cleavage theory to the Turkish case. The results of this article reveal that Turkey has a distinct historical legacy, resulting in the emergence of some significant cleavages. In addition the paper displays the reflection of these societal cleavages and revealed that not all cleavages are directly reflected in the Turkish party system. Thus the article demonstrates that a Turkish party system is the institutionalizing of a complex arrangement of alliances between significant societal cleavages, which can also change. Generally speaking we can state that socio historical approaches like the cleavage theory are appropriate to explain party system developments in non-European regions.

Keywords: Turkey, party systems, societal cleavage, socio - historical analyses.

1. Introduction¹

The 2000s were a decade of important political and social change for Turkey. The victory of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP, Justice and Development Party) in 2002 changed the Turkish party system by finishing the existence of older parties which dominated Turkish politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the AKP's democratization and Europeanization policy unleashed various societal conflicts between various social groups (religious vs. secular, Turks vs. Kurds, Sunnis vs. Alevis, etc.). While these conflicts existed before the 2000s, the democratization process made it possible that political parties could politicize these conflicts, i.e. they transferred them into the political arena. In addition, social change in Turkey resulted in the emergence of a new religiously devout middle class, challenging the economic and political position of former Kemalist elites. While at the first glance these developments occurred at two separate levels (political arena vs. social structure) one can ask if there is a linkage between these two levels and how it can be explained from an analytic systematic perspective.

From this perspective, the purpose of this article is the identification and description of the relationship between the party system and social structure in Turkey from a historical–institutional perspective by applying the operational logic of cleavage theory. Generally speaking, cleavage theory states, that the formation

1 Special thanks go to Habibe Ilhan and Robert Logan Sparks for 'fine tuning' this article.

of political party systems is the result of prior existing societal and cultural conflict constellations, which, in return, are the results of historical legacies. In this sense, social changes result in a new configuration of conflicts, issues and power relations and thus constitute party systems.² In doing so, this article brings a contribution to cleavage research in non-western regions, with Turkey as a less analyzed case in comparative research. Moreover, Turkey differs in its socio-historical developments from other regions, due to the fact that Turkish history never experienced historical developments like the Reformation, Enlightenment or Industrial Revolution or Colonialism. In this sense, the Turkish case is also a good laboratory for testing cleavage theory on a non-western institutional historical environment. Thus, one additional hope is also that the article's results will provide a contribution to the generalization and de-historicizing attempts of contemporary cleavage research, i.e. to dismantle cleavage theory from its western European 'origins.'

At the same time, the classic and contemporary research on the Turkish party system is dominated by quantitative institutional approaches, describing its characteristics from the aspects of volatility, fragmentation and polarization.³ The few structural-historical works are trying to explain the complexity of Turkish politics by detecting one general, all explaining cleavage like center vs. periphery,⁴ tradition vs. modernity,⁵ Islam vs. Secularism⁶, etc., which is not able to display the complexity of the contemporary Turkish party system and its historical development.⁷ For that

2 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, *European Politics – An Introduction* (London: Sage, 1996), 16; Lane and Ersson *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 16.

3 For example, Ilter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 66 – 80; Michael Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1970), 1 – 16; Yılmaz Esmer "At The Ballot Box – Determinants of Voting Behavior", in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, eds. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), 91 - 114.

4 Ali Çarkoğlu and Gamze Avcı, "An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective," in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, eds. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), 115 - 135. Şerif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relation: a Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Daedalus 102:1*, (Winter 1972), 169 -190; Emre Kongar, *21.Yüzyılda Türkiye* (Turkey in the 21th Century), (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi,1999).

5 Ilter Turan, "Unstable Stability: Turkish Politics at the Crossroads?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2007), 322.

6 Ali Çarkoğlu and Toprak Binnaz, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in Changing Turkey)*, (İstanbul: TESEV, 2006); Nilüfer Narlı, State, "Religion and the Opposition in Turkey", *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1991), 27 – 44; Zeyno Baran, "Turkey Divided", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, No 1 (2008), 55-69.

7 Michael F. Wuthrich *Paradigms and dynamic change in the Turkish Party system*. (PhD. diss., Bilkent University, 2011), 9-19. Ali Carkoglu 'Voting Behavior' in *The Routledge*

reason, the final aim of this article is also that it results will enhance Turkish political research by presenting an institutional historical perspective which is able to detect and explain the complexity of the Turkish party system and its relationship with social structure.

This article consists of three sections. The following section includes the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, discussing cleavage theory in the context of party system analysis and the conventional framework of the Turkish case. Next I focus on the significant societal cleavages within a distinct socio-historical frame. The fourth section analyzes the manifestation of these societal cleavages on the political level. Starting from the literature on Turkish party history and voting behavior I describe the major ideological party families and the distribution of aggregated voting preferences of distinct social groups.⁸

2. Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

The question about the effects of the formation of party systems has a long tradition in political science and resulted in the emergence of different approaches. However, the central question is which of these approaches best suits to explain the relationship of party structure with non-political phenomena (historical conflicts, social positions, etc.) A brief review of the international comparative research about the formation of party systems presents three major approaches.⁹ First, the so called institutional approach, which states that the variation of party systems is the result of institutional factors, like electoral laws and constitutions. Duverger's seminal work stated that the structures of voting systems (plurality voting vs. proportional voting) and party systems (two-party vs. majority party system) are related with each other, because the high/ low thresholds of the party systems affects the exclusion/inclusion of small parties into the party system.¹⁰ However, authors like Riker, Rae or Sartori questioned Duverger's results and assumed that the effect of majoritarian vote has only a constitutional effect at the beginning of party system formation.¹¹ Lane and Ersson made the criticism that the institutional approach can

Handbook of Modern Turkey. eds. Metin Hepar; Sabri Sayari (London: Routledge, 2012), 160–169.

8 For example, Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002); Barry Rubin and Metin Hepar, ed. *Political Parties in Turkey* (London: Frank Cass 2002), Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekin, eds. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* 9 Vol (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009).

9 Daniele Caramani, 'Party Systems' in: *Comparative Politics*, Daniele Caramani (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 318–348.

10 Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, (New York: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 2. Edition, 1964).

11 Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); William H. Riker, *Liberalism against Populism* (San Francisco:

'run into the problem of social indeterminism' where the social historical context of political phenomena are overlooked.¹² For instance, the focus only on the institutional structure of a party system would not explain the emergence of new parties and political issues, like the emergence of Green parties or post-materialist values in industrialized societies.

The second approach is the rational choice approach, applying the economic principle of profit maximizing on politics. Downs states that political parties and citizens behave rationally and that their political activities can only be explained as an attempt to maximize their personal benefits.¹³ Nonetheless, the major flaw of this approach is its assumption that all voters are following their own economic benefits, are all well informed and therefore choose rationally. This assumption neglects the fact that the interests of social groups are not homogenous. Rossteutscher for example stated that politics does not function like the free market, because voters have limited access to political decision processes and to the resources to implement their values and interests.¹⁴

Finally, the structural historical approach claims that the formation of political party systems is the result of pre-existing societal and cultural conflict constellations, which, in return, are the results of historical legacies. In this context, Seymour M. Lipset's and Stein Rokkan's can be seen as the "founding fathers" of the structural - historical approach. Their seminal work of cleavage theory had a very important impact on the discussions of origins and structures of party systems, from a structural historical perspective. According to Lipset and Rokkan the national and industrial revolutions in Western Europe resulted in the emergence of four central conflicts: (1) the conflict between ruling elites in the center and dependent ethnical or religious minority groups in the periphery, (2) a conflict between the secularization tendencies of the state and the church and its privileges, (3) the conflict between rural and commercial/ industrial urban interests and (4) the conflict between the working class and property owners¹⁵. Moreover, the authors said that only when political elites transfer these societal conflicts to the political

Freeman, 1982); Giovanni Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?" in *Electoral Laws and their Electoral Consequences*, eds. Bernard Groffman, Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 43-86.

12 Lane and Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*. 12.

13 Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

14 Sigried Roßteutscher Kein Ende in Sicht: Sozialstruktur als Instrument im Kampf der Deutung [No End at all: Social Structure as an Instrument of Interpretation]. eds. Frank Brettschneider, et al. *Das Ende der politisierten Sozialstruktur?* [The End of politicized Social structure?] (Olpen: Opladen, 2002), 349-380.

15 Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives*, (New York: The Free Press, 1967) 23.

arena will they become institutionalized cleavages. Political parties organize themselves along the identification of cleavage lines. Hence, a cleavage is a continuing political conflict, anchored in the social structure and expressed in a party system, i.e. cleavage structures influence the party structure.¹⁶ On the other hand, not all societal conflicts are cleavages and not all cleavages are reflected by the political party system; thus, the party structure is not a function of societal structure.¹⁷

As a result, Rokkan's and Lipset's cleave theory provides a good description how societal structure as product of historical legacies and party systems are related with each other. In the logic of the cleavage theory, social change results in a new configuration of conflicts, issues and power relations and thus constitutes party systems.¹⁸ Moreover, these conflicts at the societal level are manifested at the level of party politics and party systems. Therefore, the structural historical approach is most suitable by its display of the relationships of party structure with non-political phenomena.

Subsequently, later work on Western Europe has tested and confirmed the findings of Rokkan and Lipset, especially their thesis that the West European party systems reflect the cleavage and party structure of the 1920s.¹⁹ In addition, academic research on cleavages identified new societal and political configurations, which Lipset and Rokkan did not anticipated.²⁰ However, the application of Lipset and

16 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments*: 26; Franz Urban Pappi, *Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte in der Bundesrepublik. Individual- und Kontextanalysen der Wahlentscheidung (Social structure and political conflicts in Germany - Individual and Context analyses of Voting behavior)*, (PhD.diss Universität zu Köln, 1977), 195.

17 Lipset and Rokkan, *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments*:49; Lane, Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*: 13.

18 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, *European Politics – An Introduction* (London: Sage, 1996), 16; Lane, Ersson *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 16.

19 Michael Shamir 'Are Western Party Systems "Frozen"? A Comparative Dynamic Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1984), 35-79; Richard Rose, and Derek W. Urwin 'Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems since 1945', *Political Studies* 18 (1970), 287-319; Stefano Bartolini, and Peter Mair *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stability of European Electorates 1885-1985*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Peter Flora *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa – Die Theorie Stein Rokkans aus seinem gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, (State, Nation and Democracy in Europe – Stein Rokann's Theory reconstructed and introduced from his collected works by Peter Flora) (Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp, 2000).

20 For an overview about the discussion see, Oskar Niedermayer, „Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien“ (Societal and party political conflict lines). *Wähler in Deutschland - Sozialer und politischer Wandel, Gender und Wahlverhalten* (Noters in

Rokkan's results in other non-western societies, especially in the new developed democracies in Latin America and post-communist Eastern Europe, demonstrated some diverging results and raised the question to what extent cleavage theory can be applied to a non-Western context. Authors like Caramani or van Biezen stated that the new democratic nations in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by the absence of strong cleavages because of the socialist rule. For them the concept of cleavage was a product of exclusive West-European transformation processes. Consequently, a historical structural analysis is pointless to describe party formation in non-Western regions, especially in new democracies.²¹

Nonetheless, this statement was challenged by other authors, who demonstrated that the non-Western regions developed different cleavages, because of their diverging socio- historical developments. For instance, academic work about party systems in post-Communist Europe demonstrated that the variation of party system formation in this region can be explained by other factors like ethnic and religious diversity, differences in marketization or variation in the socialist rule.²² For instance, Kitschelt et al. illustrated that as a result of the specific historical developments class cleavages have not develop in some of Central and Eastern European societies.²³ On the other side Kitschelt proved that the major cleavages in Post-Communist Central- and Eastern Europe evolved around economic (Economic

Germany – Social and Political Change, Gender and Voting Behavior) ed, *Oskar Niedermayer* (Wiesbaden: VS.Verlag, 2009), 31–37.

21 Ingrid van Biezen, *Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*. (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Ingrid van Biezen, and Daniele Caramani, 'Cleavage Structuring in Western vs Central and Eastern Europe: State Formation, Nation-Building and Economic Modernization', (Paper presented at the *ECPR Joint Sessions*, Helsinki, 2007), Maria Spirova *Political parties in post-communist systems: Formation, persistence, and change*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2007)

22 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe' *British Journal of Political Science*, 23 (1993), 521-548. Geoffrey Evans, and Stephen Whitefield 'Explaining the Formation of Electoral Cleavages in Post-communist Democracies' in *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: The First Wave* eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Ernst Mochmann and Kevin Newton (Berlin: Sigma, 2000). 36-70; John Elster., Claus Offe, Ulrich K. Preuß *Institutional Design in Post- Communist Societies. Rebuilding the Ship at Sea*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998), Stephan Whitefield. Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5 (2002), 181-200, Enyedi Zsolt 'Party politics in post-communist transition'. in *Handbook of Party Politics* eds. Richard Katz. S. and William Crotty, (London: Sage, 2006). 228-238; Simon Bornschier, 'Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies', In: *Living Reviews in Democracy* 2009; Kevin Deegan-Krause 'New Dimensions of Political Cleavage'. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour* eds. Russel. J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 538–555.

23 Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999)

Liberals vs. Market Liberals), cultural (secular liberals vs. religious rationalists) and ethnic (ethnic Minorities vs. ethnic Majorities) dimensions.²⁴ In the same vein, other authors revealed a division over the importance of democracy and a divide between parties of authoritarian and democratic tradition in this region.²⁵ Finally, Moreno showed the lack of post-materialist and materialist conflicts in Eastern Europe, which was replaced by a clash between fundamentalism and cultural liberalism about the role of church and abortion.²⁶

Furthermore, Latin America is another important non-Western region of cleavage research. One important feature of this region is the amount of intraregional variation, both in party system institutionalization and the degree of party structure reflection.²⁷ Distinct historical factors which explain the variation of party system formation are the historical events after national independence, the form of extension of the franchise, and a common antagonism between secularist liberals and conservatives.²⁸ Many authors have shown that religious homogeneity, early state consolidation and the coincidence of industrial and landed interest did not result in any religious or sectorial cleavages.²⁹ In addition, authors like Roberts or Mainwaring and Torcal mentioned the absence of clear attitudinal and structural bases of party support, in countries like Uruguay and Columbia. Only in Brazil, Argentina and Peru one could find forms of class based voting.³⁰ On the other hand,

24 Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies : Theoretical Propositions *Party Politics* 1 (1995), 447 – 472; Kitschelt et al *Post- Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter- Party Cooperation*.

25 Deegan-Krause 'New Dimensions of Political Cleavage', 548; Bojan Todosijevic 'Serbia", in *The Handbook Political Change in Eastern Europe*, eds. Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, Frank H. Aarebot 2nd Edition (Cheltenham: Edward Studies, 2003), 512

26 Alejandro Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 22

27 Bornschier, *Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies*: 8

28 Ibid.; Michael Coppedge,. The Evolution of Latin American Party Systems, In *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Latin America* eds. Scott Mainwaring and Alfredo Valenzuela (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 171-206, Robert. H. Dix, Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, 22(1), (1989), 23-37.

29 Dix Cleavage "Structures and Party Systems in Latin America", Coppedge "The Evolution of Latin American Party Systems", Bornschier "Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies"

30 Kevin Roberts *Party-Society Linkages and Democratic Representation in Latin America*. Paper presented at the Conference on Threats to Democracy in Latin America, University of British Columbia; Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal "Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization" Working Paper No. 319, Kellogg Institute for International Studies. 2005(Cited 05.09.2012) URL: <http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/319.pdf>, Scott Mainwaring *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks* (Cambridge University Press, 2005) Simon Bornschier . *Demokratie, Sozialstruktur und Parteiensysteme in*

Moreno showed that like in Eastern Europe there was a lack of materialist post – materialist conflict, while Mainwaring and Torcal exposed that there was a similar division between authoritarian and democratic party traditions in this region.³¹

From this perspective, Turkey shares with other non-Western regions the fact that it differs in its socio-historical developments from Western world. Turkey never experienced any historical developments like the Reformation, Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution. Moreover, Turkey's modernization process in the 19th and 20th century was influenced by political, economic and cultural developments in Western Europe. On the other hand, and together with Israel, Turkey is the only country in the Middle East with a long standing parliamentary system. Thus, we can conclude that the Turkish party system has been institutionalized and has developed some distinct voting patterns which are connected with Turkish social structure. Consequently, Turkey's case is also a good laboratory for testing cleavage theory on a non-western institutional historical environment. So how does the general logic of cleavage theory – historical legacies resulting in societal cleavages, which in return are manifested in the party system – express itself in a non-Western socio historical context?

However, to answer the above-mentioned question we must take three important peculiarities of Turkey under consideration for operational conceptualization if we want to decide which societal cleavages and their manifestation on the political level we want to analyze. First, while historical developments result in societal conflicts about resources between social groups, we must bear in mind that a cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by a conflict.³² For instance, some economic groups can try to implement their economic interests within the frame of lobbying in modern democracies, without being recognized by the public. On the other hand there were a lot of uprisings between the Turkish state and the Kurdish minority since 1924, but only in the 1960s and 1970s did Kurdish intellectuals discuss the Kurdish issue and only in early 1990s was the first legal Kurdish party was founded.³³ Thus societal cleavages must be politicized by some political groups, like interest groups or political parties. For

Lateinamerika. Brasilien in vergleichender Perspektive (Democracy, Social Structure and Party systems in Latin America – Brasil in Comparative Perspectives). (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2008), Bornschier, *Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies*

31 Moreno, *Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy*, Mainwaring *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, Mainwaring and Torcal.

32 Lane and Erson *Politics and Society in Western Europe*: 41.

33 Hakan Yavuz, "Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), 9. Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

that reason, the article will focus only on those societal conflicts which were transformed to societal cleavages.

Second, Turkish politics lacks the emergence of significant post-materialist political issues, like the environment or abortion.³⁴ Thus, political identification of social groups in Turkey is focused on classic social categories, anchored in the social structure which is not replaced by new values and conflict categories like in Western Europe.³⁵ For that reason, a clear concept and definition of cleavages in the Turkish case must be limited to those cleavages which are linked only to socio structural categories and may not include dimension of values, like post-materialism, etc. Using Bartolini and Mair's definition that a cleavage has a) social structural element, b) is an element of identification, i.e. the members of this social groups must identify themselves with this category and c) that it must be organizational manifested by a political party or interest group³⁶, we state that this social groups on the social structure have some shared memory which constitutes their group identity and which is in the operational logic of Lipset and Rokkan a product of historical legacies.

Along these lines, this article focuses on the Turkish party system as an analytical level in which cleavages are manifested. A party system consists of a set of political parties operating in an organized pattern, which can be described by some properties.³⁷ Generally speaking, the article assumes that party-systems consist of distinct political conflict lines that are that they are stable, connected with significant social structural positions and thus linked with material interests and values.³⁸ International comparative research on conflict lines between political parties in a party system focuses on the dimensionality of the conflict structure, i.e. the number and structure of conflict lines in a given structure. The majority of quantitative empirical research focuses on a distinct one dimensional left right

34 Ronald Inglehart et al. *Human Beliefs and Values. – A cross cultural sourcebook based on the 1999 -2002 values survey*. 4th Edition (México, DF: Siglo, 2004), 12; Yılmaz Esmer "Islam, Gender, and Values: The case of Turkey 1990 – 2001" in *Changing Values, Persisting Cultures – Case Studies in Value Change*. Eds. Thorleif Petterson, Yılmaz Esmer (Leiden, Netherlands, Boston : Brill, 2008.), 299

35 For a discussion about the value dimension in cleavage research, see, Niedermayer *Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien*: 32 - 33

36 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 213 -220.

37 Lane and Ersson *Politics and Society in Western Europe*: 134, Caramani "Party Systems" 319

38 Niedermayer, *Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien*: 37.

dimension.³⁹ Nonetheless, Niedermeyer states that the focus on a one dimensional 'super structure' on the left-right dimension is valid as long as the traditional left right orientation is not added to by a new conflict dimension, especially if new regional, ethnic or confessional conflicts emerge.⁴⁰ In the Turkish case we assume that the distinct political conflict lines of the Turkish party system are represented by significant ideological party families, which are discussed in Turkish research about political parties and systems.⁴¹ These party families of the Turkish party system consist of one or two political parties, which share a similar ideology and compete for a similar electoral base. In the majority of cases, the fragmentation of these party families is the outcome of inter party rivalries, resulting in the withdrawal of one party faction from the party and founding their own one.⁴² Moreover, academic research in the party system on Turkey mentioned that its distinct feature is that the volatility - 'the net electoral change between two consecutive elections' - between voting blocs has been minimal, and it has been high within blocs rather than across them.⁴³ Consequently, we can assume that

39 For some examples see, Giovanni Sartori *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Franz U. Pappi 'Die Links-Rechts-Dimension des deutschen Parteiensystems und die Parteipräferenz- Profile der Wählerschaft'(The Left-Right Dimension of the German Party System and Party Preference profile of Voters). in *Wahlen und politisches System. Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1980*(Elections and the political System - Analyses of the Elections in 1980). eds. Max Kaase, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983) : 422-441.; Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability. The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990); Ian Budge, et al. (eds.) *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ian Budge, et al. (eds.) *Mapping Policy Preferences, 1984-2004: Eastern Europe and the OECD*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Francis G. Castles, Peter Mair, (1984), "Left-Right Political Scales: Some „Expert“ Judgments", *European Journal of Political Research*, 12, (1984), 73-88. John Thomas, Clayton "Ideological Trends in Western Political Parties". in *Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects*.ed. Peter H Merkl, (New York: The Free Press, 1980), 348-366; Giacomo Sani, and Giovanni Sartori, Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies. In: *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* .eds. Hans Daalder, and Peter Mair, (London: Sage, 1983), 29-66

40 Niedermeyer, *Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien*, 38 - 39

41 For example, Barry Rubin, ed. *Political Parties in Turkey*, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), Ergun Özbudun, "Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System," *Representation*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi I - Kavramlar, Kuramlar, Kurumlar* (Structural Analysis of Turkish Politics - Terms, Ideas and Institutions) (Istanbul: Agora, 2008).

42 For example see Tanju Tosun *Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solda Parçalanması* (Fragmentation in the centre right and the centre left in the Turkish Party System) (Istanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1999).

43 Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985*:19, Ali Carkoglu, "The Turkish Party System

voters stay in their voting blocks, and that the structure of these party families are and stay stable for very long, having an electoral support by distinct social categories located in the social structure.

3. Historical legacies and resulting cleavages in Turkey

A brief overview of Turkish political history reveals some important observations. First of all, unlike its Muslim neighbors, the Ottoman Empire never experienced any sort of colonialism. Until its collapse the Ottoman Empire was an independent power in Europe. The short period of occupation by the allied forces after the First World War (1918 – 1923) was finished by Turkish forces during the Independence War (1919 – 1922). Thus, Turkey never developed any anti-colonial movements and it had a stronger orientation towards the West.⁴⁴

Second, the historical development in Turkey neither experienced an industrial revolution nor was it – as an Islamic civilization – influenced by any Reformation. Çağlar Keyder for instance showed that the Ottoman Empire had only established a modest form of industrialization, which was destroyed after the end of the First World War. Only in the 1930s were there attempts at establishing a new heavy industry under the tutelage of the Kemalist state. On the other side, the Turkish state protected the rural small land owning agrarian producers with specific traffic policies, state subsidies and price guaranties for their products. As a result, the majority of the Turkish workforce was employed in the agrarian sector until the 1990s.⁴⁵ In addition, scholars of Turkish political history have demonstrated that Turkish socio-political history was characterized by the existence of an omnipotent and authoritarian Turkish state, where the articulation of particular interests was not legitimized.⁴⁶

Although, Turkish political history is characterized by the lack of distinct historical developments which were significant for the political development in Western Europe, a review of the literature of modern Turkish history demonstrates three important historical legacies which had a significant influence on contemporary

in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change," *Political Studies* 46 (1998), 544-571., Özbudun, "Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System," 130.

44 Menderes Cinar, Burhanettin Duran "The specific Evolution of Contemporary Political Islam and its difference" *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey – The Making of the Justice and Development Party*. Ümit Cizre (London: Routledge 2008), 17–39.

45 Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development*. (London: Verso, 1987).

46 For example, Metin Heper: *The State Tradition in Turkey*. (Huntington: Eothen Press, 1988).

Turkish political history.⁴⁷ First, the political and societal modernization process of the Ottoman Empire beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries and the Turkish Republic in the 20th. Turkish modernization can be characterized first by its defensive nature, with its goal to end a perceived backwardness by implementing specific institutions from the West. Moreover, modernization was state centered because it was carried by bureaucratic elites as the only legitimate actors of Turkish modernization, while other social groups or actors were excluded from this project.⁴⁸ A more radical break from this state-focused modernization emerged during the authoritarian Kemalist period of the Republic (1923 – 1950). The Kemalist state elites believed that it was not enough to reform the state and its institutions, but that Turkish society with its symbols and traditions must also be transformed. The culmination of these radical reform attempts was the implementation of very rigid secularization, which was rejected by most parts of the population.⁴⁹

Second, the nation building process of the Turkish Republic since 1923 is the next significant historical event of Turkish political history. Contrary to the multi-ethnic and multi-denominational Ottoman Empire, the founders of the Turkish Republic wanted to create a 'cultural' homogenous nation, with Turkish as the only spoken language. This resulted not only in the expelling of the Armenians in 1915 and the Greeks in 1923 and 1960s, but also in the endeavor to assimilate the non-Turkish speaking Kurds, whose existence as a separate ethnic group was neglected until the late 1990s.⁵⁰

47 Bernard Lewis *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), İlber Ortaylı, *Imparatorluğun en uzun Yüzyılı* (The Longest Century of the Empire) (Istanbul: İletişim, 1993) .Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey. *A Modern History. New Revised Edition* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), Şerif Mardin *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4* (Modernization of Turkey) , 8thEdition (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000), Feroz Ahmat : *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu* (The Emergence of Modern Turkey) 2th Edition (Istanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2002).

48 Etyen Mahcupyan, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Parçalı Kamusal Alan ve Siyaset* In: *Doğu Batı*; Vol. 2, No 5 (1999), 53-54 , Etyen Mahcupyan, " Osmanlı Dünyasının Zihni Temeller Üzerine" (About the mental foundations of the ottoman world) *Doğu Batı*; Vol. 2, No. 8; (2001), 41 – 58, Mümtazer Türköne " Batılaştıramadıklarımız" (Those who could we not Westernized) *Doğu Batı*; Vol. 1, No 2 (1998), 107, İnalcık: *The Ottoman Empire*: 66, Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), Heper: *The State Tradition in Turkey*.

49 For a description, see Nilüfer Göle "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey" in: *Civil Society in the Middle East* , ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 35. Nuray Mert, *Early Republican Secularism in Turkey: A Theoretical Approach*. (Phd. diss. Bogazici Üniversitesi, 1992), Esra, Özyürek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2006).

50 Martin Van Bruinessen, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

Finally, the Europeanization process which can be regarded as an effort to adapt Turkish law and economy to EU standards and which can be traced to 1963, with Customs Union in 1995 and the starting of the negotiations with the European Union (EU) in 2003.⁵¹ This *Europeanization* process has two dimensions. First, the implementing of a more liberal economic system in Turkey, including the renunciation of the former state subsidy economic system and the privatization of state enterprises. The second dimension was political liberalization, which started in the 2000s, when Turkish governments, and particularly the AKP government since 2002, tried to implement the regulations of the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership. The judiciary system was liberalized, the human rights situation was improved, and the power of the military in civil matters was limited.⁵²

As a result, we can assume that the distinct historical developments of Turkish society has resulted in the emergence of a combination of societal conflicts about economic, political and cultural resources, which became politicized by political actors and thus became significant societal cleavages. How have the aforementioned historical development in Turkey influenced the emergence of significant cleavages? First of all, the literature about class structure in Turkey demonstrated that the lack of industrialization in combination with the aforementioned rigid Turkish state tradition has never allowed the formation of a significant working or commercial class which could challenge the Turkish state.⁵³ Neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in the Turkish Republic until economic liberalization in the 1990s, had independent societal actors from the state ever developed. Hence, Turkey never experienced a real social democratic or communist movement, a liberal bourgeoisie party or an agrarian movement and therefore any significant class based voting.⁵⁴

51 Turkey has been an associate member of the European Union (EU) and its predecessors since 1963, with the sign of the Ankara Agreement.

52 For an overview about the Europeanization politics in Turkey, see Meltem Müftüler Baç: "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union", *South European Society and Politics*, 10:1 (2005), 17 -31; Ali Resul Usul *Democracy in Turkey – The Impact of EU Political Conditionality* (London, Routledge: 2011).

53 Ahmet Makal *Osmanlı İmparatorluğ'unda Çalışma İlişkileri: 1850-1920* (Labour relations in the Ottoman Empire: 1850 – 1920) (İstanbul: İmge, 1997); Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*; Ayşe Buğra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

54 Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*; Heper, *State, Democracy, and Bureaucracy in Turkey*. 25; Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire – The Classical Age 1300 – 1600*, 3. Edition. (London: Weidenfall and Nicolson 2003), 66.

Table 1: Historical Legacies and resulting societal conflicts since 1923

Historical Legacies	Societal Cleavages	Positions
Modernization process (1923 -)	(1) Kemalist vs. liberal state elites	Turkish Republic should be centralist, nationalist and secular vs. Turkish Republic should be more federal, moderate secular and should respect cultural rights (a) orthodox Sunni organization who want to run their religious schools and lodges vs. secular state who closes them in the name of Turkish secularism (<i>laiklik</i>) (b) Religious (Sunni-) Muslims who want to express their religiosity in public vs. secular Muslims who see these attempts as an assault on the principles of Turkish secularism (<i>laiklik</i>). (c) (heterodox) Alevis who want to run their houses of worship (<i>cemevi</i>) and practice their religion in public vs. Secular State who regards these <i>cemevi</i> as lodges, which must be closed in the name of Turkish secularism (<i>laiklik</i>)
	(2) Secular state vs. (Islamic) religion	
Nation-building process (1923 -)	(3) Turkish nation state vs. Kurdish minority	Kurdish Minority who wants to speak their language and express their culture. vs. Turkish national state who wants to implement a homogenous (Turkish) culture
Europeanization process (1995 -)	(4) Pro-European vs. Anti-European state elites	State Elites who want to implement the economic and political regulations of the EU vs. state elites who oppose it. (Religious) Anatolian entrepreneurs who favor the integration of Turkish economy into global economy, vs. (Secular) Istanbul entrepreneurs who favor state support and a less integration of Turkish economy into global economy.
	(5) Anatolian vs. Istanbul capital	

Second, a majority of authors observed a major cleavage within this bureaucratic nation building elite about the 'nature' of Turkish Modernization. As presented in Table 1, we can see on the one side a more centralist, nationalist and more secular stance, which was represented by the so called *Young Turks* and later the *Kemalists*, who ruled the country between 1909-1918 (Young Turks) and 1923-1950 (Kemalist). On the other side, we observe a group with a more liberal stance, who supported a more federal national state, more cultural rights for minorities and a moderate secularization.⁵⁵ This cleavage was renewed and deepened again later by the Europeanization process, between the state elites in the bureaucracy, military and high judiciary. They were divided between those who opposed the political liberalization process and those who supported it, which was called by Ziya Önis as the conflict between "conservative globalist" vs. "defensive nationals".⁵⁶

In addition, many authors of Turkish politics have discovered a distinct second cleavage between the secular (*laiklik*) and westernized Turkish State and various orthodox Sunni organizations, as a result of Kemalist secularization politics.⁵⁷ This conflict has two dimensions. First, a conflict between the Kemalist state and Islamic organizations, who wanted to run their religious schools and practice their rituals in their convents and lodges.⁵⁸ Second, a conflict between two different lifestyles and their public expression, which became more public in the late 1990s.⁵⁹ On the one side, we can observe a more secular and Western way of life, dominating the public

55 Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi I - Kavramlar, Kuramlar, Kurumlar* (Structural Analysis of Turkish Politics - Terms, Ideas and Institutions) (Istanbul: Agora, 2008). Şerif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relation: a Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Daedalus* 102:1, (1972), 169 -190, Idris Küçükömer, '*Batılılaşma*' – *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, 5th Edition (Istanbul: Bağlam, 2007).

56 Nathalie Tocci, Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?, *South European Society and Politics*, 10:1, (2005), 80; Ziya Öniş 'Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey'. In: *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*. Volume 9, Issue 3,(2007), 247-261.

57 Çarkoğlu and Binnaz. *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset*.

58 İslam does not have an institutionalized church like Christianity. Next to an orthodox and script based interpretation of a 'state Islam' other more heterodox or more spiritual orders and convents has been established. During the Ottoman Empire most of them where tolerated by the state, sometimes there were interactions between members of the state elite and this religious virtuosi and movements. The Kemalist state abolished all convents and orders in 1924 and suppressed the members of these movements. However, these movements never vanished. Most of these convents survived the suppression by the Kemalist and became again public after the end of the authoritarian era. In Addition new movements emerged, like the Süleymancı, whose vocation was the teaching of the Koran or the more state indifferent. For an interpretation see, Gökhan Bacık, Ümit Kurt, New Islamic movements and a modern networks. *Culture and Religion*, Vol.12, No. 1(201) 21 - 37

59 For a description see Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state: secularism and public life in Turkey*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press:, 2002).

picture of cities like Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. On the other side, a more self-confident religious way of life, became more and more visible in the public from the late 1990s. The apex of this conflict climaxed in the headscarf controversy and the claim of religious women to study at universities while wearing their veils, constrained by the Kemalist elites.⁶⁰

A third cleavage is the violent clash between the Kemalist State who wanted the implementation of a homogenous national identity during the nation building process and the Kurds, who defend their cultural rights. This conflict resulted in the emergence of a bloody war between the Turkish Army and the Kurdish groups in East and Southeast Anatolia. Civil and non-violent attempts to articulate Kurdish claims in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were suppressed by the Turkish state. Only in the 2000s was there a possibility for Kurdish politicians to be politically active without the threat of political persecution.⁶¹

The fourth cleavage is the conflict between the old Istanbul economic elites and the new emerging Anatolian economic elites, which emerged in the last decade as a product of economic Europeanization process.⁶² The "Istanbul Capital" was a product of the state centered economic policy and produced for the home market. The economic actors were protected by tariffs and received state subsidies due to their good relations with the state bureaucracy. However, the emergence of the global post-Fordist labor division and the beginning of the European Customs Union in 1995 changed the position of these elites. Small and middle scale family business enterprises in provincial cities of Anatolia, who never receive financial support from the state, began to adapt to the new global economic situation. Therefore, these Anatolian economic elites were more integrated into the global economy and hence were keen supporters of the economic Europeanization process.⁶³ Hence,

60 For a description of the headscarf controversy see, Nilüfer Göle. *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996). Elizabeth Özdalga *The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism, and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey*. (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1998) Dilek Cindioğlu, and Gizem Zencirci. "The Headscarf in Turkey in the Public and State Spheres." *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, 5 (2008), 791–806.

61 Martin Van Bruinessen, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006). Yavuz, *Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey*: 9.

62 For a description of the rise of this this devout bourgeoisie see, Emir B. Adaş, The making of entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic spirit of capitalism. *Journal for Cultural Research* 10: 113–37 (2006), Kamil Yılmaz, The Emergence and Rise of Conservative Elite in Turkey. *Insight Turkey* 11, 2 (2009), 113-136, Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. (Stanford: Stanford University, 2009), Emin Hoşgör, "Islamic Capital/ Anatolian Tigers: Past and Present." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47, 2 (2011), 343 -360.

63 Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Sağı ve AKP* (The Right Wing in Turkey and the AKP) (Istanbul: Agora 2007), 119-120.

these so called 'Green Capital' or 'Anatolian Tigers' grew in the 1990s and tried to challenge the position of the former economic elites. On the other side, the difference between these two economic actors was not only economic in nature but also cultural and religious. The old Istanbul economic elites supported and lived a more secular Western lifestyle, while the emerging class of Anatolian entrepreneurs had a more traditional and Islamic lifestyle.⁶⁴

Finally, there is confessional cleavage between heterodox Alevi Muslims and orthodox Sunni Muslims and especially the (Sunni) Turkish state.⁶⁵ During the Ottoman Empire, the Alevis were prosecuted by the Sunni state authorities and practiced their rituals in secret.⁶⁶ After the fall of the Empire the Alevis supported Atatürk and his plan to establish a new secular Turkish Republic which meant for them more security against Sunnite prosecution. However, despite the support of the Alevis, the Kemalist State closed their traditional ritual houses in the name of Kemalist secularism in 1924.⁶⁷ The Kemalist understanding of secularism (*laiklik*) was not to separate state and religion from each other, but like the Ottoman Empire to allow only one interpretation of Sunni Islam which was controlled by the Turkish State. For that reason, the Turkish state could not allow any alternative religious social groups, next to its unofficial Sunni state religion. For that reason Alevis have enormous problems in practicing their religion, despite the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion in Turkey. Their places of worship (*cemevi*) are not accepted as religious entities but as cultural buildings and their children are forced to visit the obligatory religious education classes in schools, which explains Islam only from a Sunni perspective.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, for a long period the Alevis have

64 Gülalp, Haldun. *Kimlikler Siyaseti – Türkiye’de siyasal İslamin Temeli*. [Identity Politics – The basics of political Islam in Turkey] (Istanbul: Metis, 2002), 51. Ayşe Buğra, Class, culture and the state: an analysis of interest representation by two Turkish business associations. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 30 (1998), 521 – 539.

65 Koçan and Öncü demonstrated that it is difficult to explain what Alevism is, which is estimated to be between 10% - 30% of Turkish population, because there are different interpenetrations about the idea of Alevism. Some sets of traditions, rules and symbols shape the collective space of Alevi communities, but on the other side the social relations, feelings, thoughts and behavior practiced are multiple and complex. Moreover there are different competing descriptions of Alevism, considering Alevism as a heterodox sect within Islam, as Turkish Anatolian Islam, as a philosophy, as Sufi or Shiite in nature or as a syncretic mixture of elements of Islam, Christianity and Shamanism. See, Gürcan Koçan and Ahmet Öncü "Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial". *Journal of Historical Sociology*. Volume 17, Issue 4, (2004), 473–474.

66 For a history of Sunni Alevi relations in Ottoman Empire and Turkey see, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Türk Süfiliğine Bakışlar* (Opinions about Turkish Sufism) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

67 David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*. (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1999), 152–154.

68 Mert, *Early Republican Secularism in Turkey*.

accepted their situation in Turkey and many young Alevis became associated with socialist or social democratic political movements, forgetting their religious past.⁶⁹ However, the rise of Islamism and violent incidents against Alevis in the 1990s has renewed the interest among Alevis in their identity.⁷⁰ Thus, since then, many Alevis have been in favor of the equalization of their sanctuaries and the abolishment of the obligatory religious Sunnite instruction in schools.⁷¹

4. The Reflection of Societal Cleavages in the Turkish party system

Scholars of Turkish politics have shown that the existence of some ideological party families is a significant element of the Turkish party system and that these ideological party families have some distinct characteristics.⁷² First, they consist of one or more political parties sharing a similar political ideology, stable system of ideas, values and beliefs, shared by societal groups, making concrete desirable social and political statements and claims to other social groups.⁷³ Second, the fragmentation of an ideology party family is the result of inter party rivalries about

69 For a description of Alevi revival in the 1990s, see, Martin van Bruinessen Kurds, "Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey" Middle East Report No. 200 (1996), 7-10; Karin Vorhoff 1998 "Let's Reclaim Our History and Culture!" Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey." *Die Welt des Islams New Series*, Vol. 38, Issue 2 (1998), 220-252, Reha Camuroglu, 'Alevi Revivalism in Turkey', in *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, eds. Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Ozdalga and Carl Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998).

70 Koçan and Öncü, *Citizen Alevi in Turkey*. 476. Lütfi Kaleli. *Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri*. (Alevi Identity and Alevi Organizations). (Istanbul: Can Yayınları, 2000), Murat Küçük, Türkiye'de Sol Düşünce ve Aleviler (Left Ideology in Turkey and the Alevis) in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce – Vol. 8: Sol* (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 8: The Left) 2nd Edition ed. Murat Gültekinçil (Istanbul: İletişim 2008), 896–933.

71 Karin Vorhoff, *Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft. Alevitische Identität in der Türkei der Gegenwart* (Between Believe, Nation and new Community - Alevi Identity in Contemporary Turkey) (Berlin: Schwarz, 1995).

72 For example, Feroz Ahmad. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi* İ; Turan, *Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey*; Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections, Sayarı and Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*. Feroz Ahmad: "Politics and political Parties in Turkey". In: *The Cambridge History of Modern Turkey – Volume 4: Turkey in the modern World*, ed. Kasaba, Resad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 226 – 265. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Political Parties in Turkey) (3 vols.) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998) Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," *Turkish Studies*, 11 (2000), 128-148.

73 Kai Arzheimer, 'Ideologien' (Ideologies), *Politische Soziologie – Ein Studienbuch* (Political Sociology – A Studybook), eds. Victoria Kaina, Andrea Römmele (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009), 83- 109; 86.

political and ideological issues, resulting in the break of one party fraction and the founding of a - short lived - new political party, which then declares itself as the guardian of the pure ideology, like the *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*, (CGP, Republican Trust Party), as guardian of Kemalism or the *Millet Partisi*, (MP, Nations Party) as guardian of liberal conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, these parties still declare themselves to be part of the same ideological family and represent different interpretations of a political ideology which constitutes these ideological party families. Third, Turkish political history is full of examples of competing parties emerging after a military *coup d'état*, not differing in their ideological stance. For example, the parallel emergence of the *Yeni Türkiye Partisi*, (*YTP* New Turkey Party) and the *Adalet Partisi* (*AP*, Justice Party) after the coup 1960, which claimed to be the true successor of the former *Demokrat Partisi* (*DP*, Democracy Party) which ruled Turkey between 1950 and 1960 and was closed after the coup d'état in 1960.⁷⁵ From this perspective, the ideology of a party family exists not only for differentiating itself from other party families. In a political environment, which is characterized by party bans and military coups d'état (1960, 1980) the ideology of a party family is an important tool for these parties to represent themselves as legitimate successors of former banned parties to their voters. Finally, one characteristic of Turkish party systems is that many Islamic and Kurdish parties were banned by the constitutional court. Many of these parties then established new parties under a new name but with a similar political platform. Thus, Turkish ideological party families also consist of successive established identical political parties under different names.

74 For example, see Tarhan Erdem 'CHP'de Parti içi Mücadele 'Kemalizim ve 'Devrimler' Tartışmaları Üzerine (About the intra- party struggles between 'Kemalism' and 'Revolutions' in the CHP) in, *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce – Vol. 2: Kemalizm (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 2: Kemalism)* ed, Ahmet Insel (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009), 449 – 462, Tanıl Bora, Yüksel Taşkın 'Sağ Kemalizm' in *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce – Vol. 2: Kemalizm (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 2: Kemalism)* ed, Ahmet Insel (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009), 529 – 553.

75 See, Nuray Mert *Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi* (A small history of the Merkez Sağ) (Istanbul: Selis, 2007).

Table 2: Political Parties within the Party Families, represented in Turkish Parliament since 1950

Elections	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011
Kurdish (Left-) Nationalism	[Redacted]										HEP	HADEP	DTP	BDP		
Merkez Sol	[Redacted]					CHP (1)	CP/CGP	HP	SODEP/SHP	CHP (2)		DSP	DSP			
Merkez Sag	DP (1)	[Redacted]			MP	AP	[Redacted]		ANAP	ANAP	DYP	ANAP	DYP	ANAP	DYP	DP (2)
Political Islam/Milli Görüş	[Redacted]						YTP	MNP/ MSP	[Redacted]		RP	FP	SP			
Turkish Nationalist	[Redacted]	CKMP				MHP (1)	MDP	[Redacted]	MCP/MHP (2)		BBP					

Source: TBMM: TBMM’de siyasi partiler [database online:] available at http://tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_partiler.html (12.9.2012)

Considering these points, the review and re-evaluation of the literature of the Turkish party history illustrates the existence of five successively evolving major ideological part families.⁷⁶ First, the liberal conservative center-right *Merkez Sağ*, second the Kemalist secular left-centrist *Merkez Sol*, third Turkish nationalism (*Türk Milliyetçiliği*), fourth political İslam (*Siyasi İslam*) and finally, leftist Kurdish nationalism (*Kürtçülük*). Wuthrich showed that these labeling were developed by political scientist and journalists and were then used by the political parties to position themselves in the political competition with other parties.⁷⁷ Table 2 illustrates the development of the five party families and the various political parties which existed parallel or successively within them.

The transition from authoritarian Kemalist one party rule (1923 – 1950) to a democratic multi-party system in 1950 resulted in the emergence of two diverging party families of *Merkez Sağ* and *Merkez Sol*, which dominated Turkish politics for the next two decades.⁷⁸ From 1950 onwards, the *Merkez Sağ* ruled the country and controlled between 40 and 50 per cent of all votes, with some exceptions in the 1970s and 1990s.⁷⁹ It was represented in the 1950s by the aforementioned Demokrat Partisi and the Adalet Partisi, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Anavatan Partisi, (ANAP, *Motherlands Party*) and Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP, *Party of the Right Way*) in the 1980s and 1990s.⁸⁰

76 For examples see Feroz Ahmad. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*; Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi İ*; Turan, *Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey*; Feroz Ahmad: "Politics and political Parties in Turkey". Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler* (Political Parties in Turkey) (3 vols.) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998) Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," *Turkish Studies*, 11 (2000). 128-148, Nuray Mert *Merkez Sağ'ın Kısa Tarihi*.

77 Wuthrich, *Paradigms and dynamic change in the Turkish Party system*. 385.

78 For some historical descriptions, see Idris Küçükömer, 'Batılılaşma' – Düzenin Yabancılaşması, (Westernization – The Alienation of the Order) 5th Edition (Istanbul: Bağlam 2007), Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi İ*; Tanel Demirel '1946 – 1980 Döneminde Sağ Sol Mezelesi.' (The Right - Left Issue between 1946 – 1980) Tekin *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce – Vol.9: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 9: Periods and Mentalities)* eds. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gül (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009), 413 – 450. Tosun *Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solda Parçalanması*.

79 Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu: Milletvekilleri Seçimleri Sonuçları. [database online:] available at http://tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=199 and http://tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=200 (10.9.2012).

80 For a history of these parties see, Tanel Demirel 'Demokrat Parti' (The Demokrat Party), in: *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce – Vol.7: Liberalizm (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 7: Liberalizm)* eds. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekin (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 480 – 444). Tanel Demirel 'Adalet Partisi' (The Adalet Party), in: *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce – Vol.7: Liberalizm (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 7: Liberalizm)* eds. Tanıl Bora,

In this context, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, *Justice and Development Party*), ruling Turkey since 2002, can be described as the newest political representation of the *Merkez Sağ*, after the former center right parties have politically vanished. At the first glance, the AKP developed after an intra-party conflict within political Islam between traditional conservative islamist and moderate post-islamists, whereupon the post-Islamic fraction left the party and established their own party. In this case, the AKP can be seen as exception, where one (part of a) party moves from one ideological party family to another one. Nonetheless, while the founders of the AKP had their political socialization at the Islamist Welfare Party, many parliamentarians and party members have their roots in former *Merkez Sağ* parties. However, the party has announced that it is not an Islamist party, and adapted the liberal-conservative creed of *Merkez Sağ* parties.⁸¹ The central ideological creed of these parties was the representation of the will of the excluded people against the elitism of the Kemalists. In this aspect, the politics of *Merkez Sağ* parties have two elements: First, by a more liberal understanding of secularism and a support of cultural conservative values these parties tried to bind the religious voters.⁸² Second, by redistributing the economic resources of the center to the periphery, the economic politics of the *Merkez Sağ* allowed the peripheral economic elites access to economic resources, which also resulted in the founding of new economic groups.⁸³

In addition, the *Merkez Sol* party family can be seen as the natural adversary of the *Merkez Sağ*. The political ideology of *Merkez Sol* was always the defense of the principles of Kemalism as founding ideology of the modern Kemalist state in 1923 and especially secularism against the conservative religious attempts of the *Merkez*

Murat Gültekin (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 548–582. Kahraman, *Türk Sağı ve AKP*, Nuray Mert *Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi*.

81 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in an interview 'With our conservative democrat identity, the Ak Party desires to rebuild the fragmented center-right in Turkey along with eliminating the old understandings of politics, and place our political foundations in the center. . . The Ak Party, in a very short period, has reached its objective and sits at the very center of Turkish politics' *Radikal*, 17 October 2002, quoted from, Wuthrich, 'Paradigms and dynamic change in the Turkish Party system', 353, see for the Muslim democratic creed of the AKP, Yalçın Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Political Identity," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey* ed. Hakan Yavuz, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2006), 49-65; Kenan Çayır 'The Emergence of Turkey's Contemporary 'Muslim Democrats' in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey – The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Ed. Ümit Cizre (London, Routledge: 2008), 62-79.

82 Nuray Mert *Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi*, 76-78.

83 Kahraman, *Türk Sağı ve AKP*, 224; Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi I*, 216.

Sag and later political Islam.⁸⁴ The *Merkez Sol* collected between 25 and 35 per cent of all votes, mostly controlled by the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP, Republican Peoples Party).⁸⁵ In 1965 the CHP declared itself as a centrist leftist party and integrated social issues like welfare and workers' rights to its political platform which, in return, gave the CHP the support of leftist intellectuals and blue collar workers in the public enterprises. As a result, the more conservative Kemalists left the CHP and founded 1969, a new but largely unsuccessful party, the *Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi* (CGP, Republican Trust Party).⁸⁶ In the early 1990s the *Merkez Sol* was also keen to find solutions for the Kurdish issue and joined a strategic alliance with the Kurdish left national movement. Economically, the *Merkez Sol* parties were vivid defenders of state enterprises and rejected throughout privatization by the *Merkez Sag* parties in the 1990s. In the 2000s the centre left lost its former social democratic creed and became more and more the defender of radical Kemalist secularization and of a secular nationalism (*Ulusalçılık*). This differed from traditional Turkish nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*), by avoiding Islam as a vital element of national identity and focusing more on historical secular memories of the 'War of Independence' (1919 – 1922) and the founding of the (Kemalist) Republic in 1923.⁸⁷

The Turkish nationalist party camp is the third political group of the Turkish party system. It emerged early together with two aforementioned centrist party families, but in the 1950s and 1960s it played only a marginal role in Turkish politics. Only with the founding of the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP, Nationalist Action Party) in 1965, Turkish nationalism became an important political actor, when the MHP became part of the two National Front (Milli Cephe) governments in the late 1970s. Turkish nationalism had a consistent ideology, the so called *Dokuz Işık* (Nine Lights),

84 For the political position between centre right and centre left for example see, Özkan Ağataş 'Ortanın Solu: İsmet İnönü'den Bülent Ecevit'e' (The Left of The Centre: From İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit) in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce – Vol. 8: Sol*. (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 8: The Left) 2nd Edition ed. Murat Gültekinil (Istanbul: İletişim 2008), 194–260; Tosun *Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solda Parçalanması*.

85 Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu: Milletvekilleri Seçimleri Sonuçları. [database online:] available at http://tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=199 and http://tuik.gov.tr/PrelstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=200 (10.9.2012).

86 Erdem 'CHP'de Parti içi Mücadele 'Kemalizim ve 'Devrimler' Tartışmaları Üzerine (About the intra- party struggles between 'Kemalism' and 'Revolutions' in the CHP)

87 For some explanation about the difference between *Ulusalçılık* and *Milliyetçilik*, see Umur Özkırmı, *Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri* (Nationalism and Turkey - EU Relations) (Istanbul: TESEV, 2007), 32 – 35; Emre Uslu, *Ulusalçılık: The Neo Nationalist Resurgent Turkey*. *Turkish Studies*, IX (1) (2008), 73 - 97. Ioannis Grigoriadis and İrmak Özer, "Mutations of Turkish Nationalism: From Neo-Nationalism to the Ergenekon Affair," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2010), 101-13. Wuthrich, *Paradigms and dynamic change in the Turkish Party system*, 392-395.

focusing on anti-communism and pan Turkism during the Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War, the Pan-Turkist element became stronger, together with a support of a specific nationalistic understanding of İslam, as an inevitable source of Turkish morality, culture and identity.⁸⁸ In the 2000s the MHP became a more centrist party, where the interests of the State were more important than party ideology, especially when the MHP alongside the CHP became the sole protector of the red lines of the Turkish state against the democratization process of the AKP. Whereas the CHP was the protector of secularism against a possible threat of Islamization by the AKP, the MHP became the protector of the centralist Turkish state against any cultural concessions for the Kurds.⁸⁹

Political Islam is the fourth ideological political party family. It shares with the *Merkez Sag* and with Kurdish parties the repetitive experience of political party bans and the reopening under new names. The reason for the emerging of conservative islamistic party in 1970 was the result of conflict between the İstanbulian economic elites which were supported by the *Merkez Sag* and an emerging class of Anatolian entrepreneurs of small and middle size companies in Anatolia, which became alienated and disappointed by the *Merkez Sag*, which they had supported in the 1950s and 1960s. The *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP, Party of National Order) and its successor the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP, Party of National Salvation) saw themselves as true protector of the interests of these peripheral entrepreneurs.⁹⁰

This ideological principle of political Islam, the so called *Milli Görüş* (National View), was a combination of conservative moralism and a specific economic program for different conservative voters but without supporting the introduction of the Sharia.⁹¹ In the 1970s, the MNP supported the idea of the development of a

88 Alev Çınar and Bülent Arıkan (2002) 'The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?' in: *Political Parties in Turkey*, ed, Barry Rubin (London: Frank Cass 2002), 27; Tanıl Bora 'Alpararışlan Türkeş' (Alpararışlan Turkes) , in: *Modern Türkiye' deki Siyasî Düşünce: 4.Cilt: Milliyetçilik*, (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 4: Nationalism) ed. Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 688.

89 Çınar; Arıkan, *The Nationalist Action Party*, 32; Kahraman, *Türk Sağı ve AKP*: 75.

90 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay *Türkiye' de Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP örnek Olayı* (Religion and Party Politics in Turkey: the MSP case) (İstanbul: Alan, 1985), 98 – 100; Güllalp, *Kimlikler Siyaseti*: 70. Ruşen Çakır, 'Milli Görüş Hareketi' (The National View Movement), in: *Modern Türkiye' de Siyasî Düşünce, Cilt 6: İslamcılık* (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 6: Islamism) 2. Edition, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinçil (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 545.

91 Ruşen Çakır. *Ne Şeriat ne Demokrasi' – Refah Parti Gerçeğini Anlamak*. (No Sharia no Democracy – Understanding the Welfare Party Reality) (İstanbul: Metis, 1992), Ruşen Çakır 'Milli Görüş Hareketi' (The National View Movement) in: *Modern Türkiye' de Siyasî*

national heavy industry and public sector and public support for small and middle sized companies. In the 1990s *Refah Partisi* (RP, Welfare Party) as successor of the banned MNP and MSP supported private ownership and the integration of the industry to the global economy.⁹² In addition, the *Refah* defended a specific Islamic moral code, the so called Adil Düzen (*Just Order*), was a critic on capitalism and individualism, and a claim for social justice, freedom of religion, anti-corruption and respect for the working class.⁹³

Lastly, the Kurdish left nationalists are the newest political camp in Turkey, appearing on the political landscape in the 1990s, claiming administrative and cultural autonomy for the Kurdish people within a democratic Turkey. This party family has its roots in the leftist environment of the 1960s and 1970s, when Kurdish intellectuals articulated the problems of the Kurdish minority from a more Marxist perspective.⁹⁴ The various Kurdish parties, who were founded, banned by the constitutional court and then reopened under a new name since 1991 have always declared themselves to be secular leftist mass parties. From their ideological standpoint they did not only fight against the Turkish state, but also against traditional loci of Kurdish power, the tribal chiefs and the religious orders.⁹⁵ Therefore, they had little success attracting religious and traditional Kurds for whom religion is more important than ethnicity.

Düşünce, Cilt 6: İslamcılık (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 6: Islamism), 2. Edition. Ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (Istanbul: İletişim 2005), 544 – 602.

92 Ömer Demir, 'Anadolu Sermayesi' ya da 'İslamcı Sermaye' (Anatolian or Islamist Capital), in: *Modern Türkiye' de Siyasal Düşünce, Cilt 6: İslamcılık* (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 6: Islamism), 2. Edition. (ed) Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinil (Istanbul: İletişim 2005), 872.

93 Çakır. *Ne Şeriat ne Demokrasi' – Refah Partii Gerçeğini Anlamak*. (No Sharia no Democracy – Understanding the Welfare Party Reality), 115 -116.

94 Mesut Yeğen 'Türkiye Solu ve Kürt Sorunu' in *Modern Türkiye' de Siyasal Düşünce – Vol. 8: Sol* (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 8: The Left) 2nd Edition ed. Murat Gültekinil (Istanbul: İletişim 2008), 1280–1235.

95 Ayla Kılıç, "Democratization, Human Rights and Ethnic Policies in Turkey," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1998), 99.

Cuneyt Dinç: Societal Cleavages and the Formation of the Turkish Party System since 1950

Table 3: Aggregate Voting Support of the Societal Categories for Party Families during National Elections

Elections	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	
Kurdish (Left-) Nationalism	[Blue shaded area]										Secular (Sunni) Kurds + Alevi Kurds						
Merkez Sol	Strict secular state elites + Turkish and Kurdish Alevis + Secular (sunni) Kurds										Strict secular state elites+ Turkish Alevis			Strict secular state elites+ Turkish Alevis + Istanbulian Capital			
Merkez Sag	Moderate secular state elites+ Orthodox Sunni religious organizations + Istanbulian Capital+ Anatolian Capital+ Sunni Turks + Sunni Kurds										Moderate secular state elites+ orthodox Sunni religious organizations + Anatolian Capital+ Sunni Turks + Sunni Kurds						
Political Islam/ Milli Görüş	[Blue shaded area]										Orthodox Sunni religious organizations + Anatolian Capital			Orthodox Sunni religious organizations			
Turkish Nationalist	[Blue shaded area]										Sunni Turks			Sunni Turks + Strict secular state elites			

While these five political party families dominated Turkish politics at different times, the question is still how societal cleavages presented in the first section are reflected by the ideological segmentation of the Turkish party system. How do the various social categories identify themselves with the ideological creed of the party families? Table 3 illustrates the voting support of various societal categories (Kurds, Alevis, etc.) for one of these five party families. While Table 2 has demonstrated the fragmented composition of the party families, Table 3 focuses only on the aggregated voting support for the single party families and not for each political party, because of the aforementioned low volatility between these families. These aggregated voting supports are compiled from the literature of Turkish party research and voting behavior.⁹⁶ Each of these social categories are the result of societal cleavages, which in return have identified themselves as such social categories, have distinct interests and have formulated them on the political arena. Thus, Table 3 tries to illustrate the reflection of societal cleavages on the level of the Turkish party system.

A brief look to Table 3 reveals some important observations: First of all, the various political families are alliances of different societal groups, or cleavages. For instance, the *Merkez Sag* camp can be defined as a coalition or alliance between religious congregations and orders, the Sunni Kurdish and Turkish rural masses and the mentioned liberal secular elite of the centre, who reject the radical nationalist and centrist politics of the Kemalist elites. On the other hand, we can observe that the emergence of new societal actors due to social change, resulting in the change of these alliances. For instance, the emergence of the export oriented Anatolian entrepreneurs in the 2000s resulted in the end of the former Istanbulian economic elites support for the *Merkez Sag* in the 2000s. In the same vein, the conflict between the Kemalist state and Sunni Islamic interests did not result in the emergence of a separate political party which represented the interests of Islam. The religious votes, which were never homogenous and were shared between the various parties of Merkez Sag and Political Islam, because some religious groups rejected political Islam or the use of Islam as a political ideology and therefore voted for more centre right parties. On the other side, we assume that the Alevis

96 For example, Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, Kahraman, *Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi I*; Turan, *Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey*; Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections, Sayarı and Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*. Ahmad, *Politics and political Parties in Turkey*; Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*; Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy."

also never established their own political parties and supported traditional leftist parties.⁹⁷

Second, we can observe a clear ideological division between secularism and religion within the political party families, which fits with the observations of other authors on Turkish party systems.⁹⁸ This ideological division on the party level is the reflection of the secular (state) – (islamic) religion cleavage. For instance, political parties with a strict secular stance, like the *Merkez Sol* and left Kurdish nationalist parties collected the votes of the non-religious secular electoral, like Kemalist state elites and secular leftist Turkish /Kurdish voters. In addition, many or most Alevis also voted also for one of these two party families, due to the fact that the *Merkez Sag*, Political Islam and Turkish Nationalist blocks used Sunni orthodox Islam for mobilizing the conservative, religious voters.⁹⁹ One exception of these voting patterns are moderate secular state elites, who are not only the founders of traditional *Merkez Sag* parties but also supported these parties.

Third, despite the reflection of the aforementioned secular - religious cleavage on the left/ right dimensions of the Turkish party system, we can observe that with social change this left right dimension weakened. While the right *Merkez Sag* and the left *Merkez Sol* gathered the religious/ secular votes, the emergence of new social groups who developed their own identity and formulated their own interests resulted not only in the emergence of new cleavages, but also in an overlapping of ethnic, confessional and economic interests and a breakdown of the right/left differentiation of the Turkish party system. For example, while many Alevis have long voted for the CHP, since the 1990s we can observe a break between Kurdish and Turkish Alevis. The formers vote for Kurdish Left nationalist parties, while the latter ones still vote for the CHP. This can be explained by the more traumatic historical experience of the Kurdish Alevis, whose uprisings in 1925 were brutally suppressed by the Turkish army. In addition, Kurdish Sunnis vote more for conservative parties, while Alevi Kurds have always voted for more leftist parties.

97 Murat Küçük, 'Türkiye'de Sol Düşünce ve Aleviler' (Left Ideology in Turkey and the Alevis).

98 For example, Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Nature of Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement in the Turkish Context," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), 253-71; Esmer, "At the Ballot Box," İlter Turan, "Unstable Stability: Turkish Politics at the Crossroads?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2007), 319-338.

99 İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1983), 428; Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment with Democracy, 1950-1975*: 17.

Like other works before explained religion or confessional membership plays a crucial role in Kurdish party support.¹⁰⁰ Generally speaking, the socio structural cross sectionality and the resulting overlapping of cleavages has developed new party conflict lines, which goes beyond the classical left – right scheme. For instance, while on the left the Kurdish parties defend cultural autonomy for the Kurds, the CHP has refused these political claims. On the whole, the contemporary Turkish party system has become more complicated and is influenced by the historic-structural dynamics of social structure in Turkey.

5. Conclusion

The major aim of this article was to identify and describe the relationship between party systems and social structure and/or social change in Turkey from a structural-historical perspective by applying the operational logic of cleavage theory to the Turkish case. Briefly speaking, the results of this article revealed that Turkey had a distinct historical legacy - lack of industrialization, enlightenment and reformation, the importance of the state centred-defensive modernization, nation-state formation and Europeanization processes - and that that these resulted in the lack and emergence of significant relationships between societal groups, mostly as a conflict on access to power and to cultural and economic resources. The fact that the representatives of the societal groups politicized these conflicts, that is they formulated claims on the holders of political power, transformed these conflicts into societal cleavages. These politicization processes were formulated within the frame of distinct political ideologies, which again were used for the purpose of identification of the social groups and their mobilization. Finally, the article described the reflection of these societal cleavages and revealed that not all cleavages are directly reflected in the Turkish party system. For instance, the (Turkish) Alevi decided not to establish an independent political party and established an alliance with the left-centrist Kemalist *Merkez Sol* or with *Kurdish left Nationalism*. Moreover, the article also discovered the emergence of some cross-sectionality resulting in an overlapping of different cleavages. For instance,

100 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Political Participation of Turkey's Kurds and Alevis: A Challenge for Turkey's Democratic Consolidation" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* Vol. 6, No. 4, (2006), 444–446. For a good explanation of the diversification Kurdish votes see, Ahmet Yıldız, 'Kürt Ulusal Hareketin Üç tarsi siyaseti: Kemalizm, İslamcılık ve Sol (The three ways of politics of the Kurdish national movement: Kemalism, Islamism and Leftism) In: *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce, Vol.9 Dönemler ve Zihniyetler* (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 9: Periods and Mentalities), eds. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekin (İstanbul İletişim, 2009), 545–615.

the Turkish State vs. Kurds cleavage overlapped with the Sunni vs. Alevi Muslims cleavage, which resulted in the support of the *Merkez Sol* by Turkish Alevis, while the Kurdish speaking Alevis showed generally supported for Kurdish Nationalism. This means that the traditional left right dimension between Merkez Sag – Merkez Sol was as long valid and could explain Turkish party system, as not new ethnical, confessional and economic conflict dimension were added. In this sense, the fragmentation of the Turkish party system is a reflection of the dynamics of the social structure that is social change which in return are the results of distinct historical developments.

Overall, the results of this article refute the aforementioned thesis of authors like Caramani and van Biezen that cleavages are the result of the distinct socio-historical development in Western Europe and therefore socio-historical approaches are not appropriate to explain party system developments in non-European regions. First of all, like the work of cleavages in Latin America or Post-Communist Eastern societies, the findings of this article demonstrated that every region had its own historical legacies, resulting in a the development of distinct significant societal cleavages and which have their own logic of transition to the level of party -systems. Second, the article proved how social change in Turkey resulted in the emergence of new societal actors, which in return had a significant effect on formation of the Turkish party system. Hence, socio–historical approaches and especially cleavage theory are well suited well in explanations party system formation in non-Western societies. Therefore the aim of comparative cleavage theory research should be to detect such dynamics and development in other regions by using the general operational logic of cleavage theory. This is so that future research can provide a contribution to the de-historicizing and generalization of cleavage theory.

Finally, the results in this article demonstrated that the complexity of contemporary Turkish party politics can not only be explained by institutional approaches While one cannot neglect that institutional approaches have provided valuable explanations about party systems, they ignore the fact that party systems are embedded in more complex socio - structural and historical environment. For instance, traditional approaches would not understand why Kurdish and Turkish Alevis have developed different party preferences, especially since the 1990s. The answer would be that Kurdish Alevis have a more negative historical experience than the Turkish Alevis. In addition, classical approaches to Turkish political science, which explain Turkish politics through the existence off one all explaining national cleavage, like left vs. right, tradition vs. modernity, secularism vs. religion, etc. also have problems to understand the complex dynamics of the party system. For

example, the diverging voting pattern of Kurdish and Turkish Alevis cannot be explained only by a center periphery cleavage, because both belong to the periphery.

Nonetheless, the goals of this article were modest and its method had some limitations. First of all, the article wanted only to describe the reflection of societal cleavages by the party system. It did not seek for the historical institutional factors which can explain this reflection. Future research should focus more on how distinct historical institutional characteristics of Turkish politics, like the aforementioned state tradition of Turkey and the transition to democracy in 1950 have an effect on the constitutionalizing of cleavages and their transition to the political level. Moreover, this article used secondary analyses of existing research literature about Turkish politics. A different methodological approach would be to analyze party manifestos, and quantitative data of voting behavior for analyzing the reflection of societal cleavages on the party system. Finally, this article focused only on political parties' respectively party system as an analytical unit. Future research can also analyse how the societal cleavages are reflected in other levels of the political arena. For instance, the cleavage between Turkish and Kurdish Alevis results also in a division between the interest groups of Alevis. While Turkish Alevis are more or less represented by the Kemalist CEM Vakfi, the leftist Kurdish Alevis are represented more by the Pir Sultan Abdal foundation. These examples illustrate that the use of cleavage theory can be a valuable source for the study of Turkish politics. Therefore Scholars of Turkish Politics should be more open to use this less noticed approach of party system research. This will not only open new perspectives for Turkish political research but will also connect it with international research.

Appendix 1: Political Parties within the ideological party families, represented in Turkish Parliament since 1950

1. Merkez Sol

- CHP (1): Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party). 1923 – 1980 (banned after coup d'état in 1980)
- CP: Cumhuriyetçi Partisi (Republican Party) 1967 (Split of from CHP) – 1972 → Renamed CGP
- CGP: Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Trust Party: 1972– 1980 (banned after coup d'état in 1980)
- HP: Halkçı Parti (Populistic Party): 1983 – 1985 -> Emerged with SODEP to SHP
- SODEP: Sosyal Demokratik Parti (Social Democratic Party) 1983 – 1985: Emerged with HP to SHP
- SHP: Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti (Socialdemocratic Populist Party): 1985 – 1995 fused with CHP (2)
- CHP (2): Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party): 1995 (Split of from SHP, fused in the same year with SHP) –
- DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party): 1987 -

2. Merkez Sağ

- DP (1): Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) 1950 – 1960 (banned after coup d'état in 1960)
- AP: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party): 1961 -1980 (banned after coup d'état in 1980)
- MP: Millet Partisi (Nations Party): 1962 – 1977 (self dissolved)
- YTP: Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party): 1961 – 1973 (self dissolved)
- ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (Motherlands Party): 1983 – 2007 -> fused with DYP to DP(2)
- DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party): 1987 – 2007 -> fused with ANAP to DP(2)
- DP (2): Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) 2007 –
- AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party): 2001 –

3. Turkish Nationalism

- CKMP: Cumhuriyetçi Köylü ve Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant and Nation Party): - 1958 – 1969: rename in MHP

- MHP (1): Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party): 1969 - 1980 (banned after coup d'état in 1980)
- MDP: Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party): 1983 - 1986 (self dissolved)
- MÇP: Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Work Party): 1987 - 1993 (renamed again in MHP(2))
- MHP (2): Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party): 1993 -
- BBP: Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party): 1993 (splitted of from MHP) -

4. Political Islam/ Milli Görüş

- MNP: Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) 1969 - 1971 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- MSP: Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party): 1971 - 1980 (banned after coup d'état in 1980)
- RP: Refah Partisi (Welfare Party): 1987 - 1998 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- FP: Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) : 1997 - 2001 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- SP: Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party): 2001 -

5. Kurdish (Left-) Nationalism

- HEP: Halkın Emek Partisi (Work of the People Party) 1990 - 1993 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- DEP: Demokrasi Partisi (Democratic Party): 1991 - 1994 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- HADEP: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democratic Party): 1994 - 2003 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party): 2005 - 2009 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) 2009 -

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