

Social Cleavages, Conflict and Accommodation in Bosnian Political History from the Late 19th Century until the 1990s

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Abstract: This paper studies social cleavages, conflict and accommodation in Bosnian political history since the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the 1990s taking into consideration the plural nature of Bosnian society. Throughout history Bosnia has been characterized by peoples of different ethnic, religious and cultural background who were of relatively equal size and with cross-cutting cleavages. These peoples were well known for their peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and tolerance. However, the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the rise of ethno-nationalism brought this phenomenon to an end and disclosed the territorial aspirations of the neighboring entities and their political establishment.

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Political History, Conflict, Accommodation, Social Cleavages, Political Parties.

Introduction

Few political systems have completely complementary political and cultural units. The problem of political stability and national integration need not arise from the mere fact of cultural diversity. The real question is not whether social cleavages will manifest themselves but, rather, along which lines of cleavages will salient political division appear.

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Throughout Bosnia's history, which has been characterized by a plural society, multiple social cleavages, sometimes overlapping, have influenced social relations. Prominent social divisions until the late 19th century were class and urban-rural differences. Ethnic differences, which were rooted in religious tradition and practice, were not constructed and politicized until the late 19th century.²

The notion of the plural society was introduced by J.S. Furnivall who defined a plural society as "comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling in one political unit."³ In addition to this, Smith M. G. sharpens this definition by attributing to the separate communities different institutional structures as well as the absence of consensus on social, economic and political values. Therefore, the existence of separate cultural groups with generally incompatible sets of values, which result in cultural diversity, constitutes a necessary condition for a plural society.

According to Rabushka and Shepsle, nearly every modern society is culturally diverse and although the existence of well-defined ethnic groups with generally incompatible values constitutes a necessary condition of the plural society, it is not sufficient.⁴ According to them, the hallmark of the plural society and the feature that distinguishes it from its pluralistic counterpart is the practice of politics almost exclusively along ethnic lines.⁵ Hence, in the plural society – but *not* in the pluralistic societies- the great preponderance of political conflicts is perceived in ethnic terms. Therefore, it can be concluded that a society is plural if it is ethnically and culturally diverse and if its cultural and ethnic sections are organized into cohesive political sections.

The purpose of this paper is to explain conflict and accommodation in Bosnian political history since the Austro-Hungarian empire until the 1990s

² Donia Robert and Fine John, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A tradition betrayed*, New York: University Columbia Press, 1994, 84.

³ Furnivall, J.S., *Netherlands India: A study of plural economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 446.

⁴ Rabushka Alvin and Shepsle Kenneth A., *Politics in plural societies: A theory of democratic instability* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), 20.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

taking into consideration the plural nature of Bosnian society and identifying milestones in its formation.

Geography, Population and Language

Bosnia is located in Southeastern Europe, bordering the Adriatic Sea and Croatia on the west and north and Serbia and Montenegro east and south and has an area of 51, 129 km². Formerly, Bosnia was one of the six constituent republics of communist Yugoslavia and in March 1992 Bosnia declared its independence. In 1991, in the last census taken in Yugoslavia, Bosnia had a population of 4,364,574. According to this census Muslims represented 44 percent of the population, Serbs 31 percent, Croats 17 percent, Yugoslavs (people of mixed Muslim, Serb, and Croat ancestry) 6 percent, and others 2 percent.

However, after the war which left hundreds of thousands dead and forced many thousands of others to flee, the demographic picture of the country has changed and according to the last estimation (no census was held after the war) 4,025,476 people reside in Bosnia. Bosniaks represent 48 percent, Serbs represent 37 percent, Croats make 14 percent and others make 1 percent of total population.⁶ Thus Bosnia's major ethnic groups are Bosniaks⁷, Croats and Serbs. The primary difference among the largest ethnic groups is religious, the Serbs being traditionally Orthodox Christians and the Croats Roman Catholics. The Bosnian Muslims, descendants of Slavs who converted to Islam in the 15th and 16th centuries, are generally Sunni Muslims. Bosnia also has a small number of Jews.

The people of Bosnia speak the Bosnian dialect of the Serbo-Croatian language. However, according to the Bosnian government, the country officially has three languages: Serbian, "Bosnian" (the language associated with the

⁶ Muhamed Filipovic, *Bosna i Hercegovina: Najvažnije geografske, demografske, historijske, kulturne i političke činjenice* [Bosnia and Herzegovina: Most important geographical, demographic, historical, cultural and political facts] (Sarajevo: Compact E, 1997). See also <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html>.

⁷ The Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals in 1993 voted to use 'Bosniak' for the Bosnian Muslim nation to reinforce national, rather than merely religious, distinctiveness. 'Bosnian' is a regional term that includes all citizens of Bosnia.

Bosniaks) and Croatian. In writing, the Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet, while the Muslims and Croats use the Latin alphabet. Thus, there exists relative equilibrium among the Bosnian segments. This is one of the favorable conditions for cooperative elite behavior as discussed in the first chapter.

Conflict and Accommodation in Bosnian Political History

The Bosnian political history has gone through different socio-political contexts. It began with the framework of Ottoman Empire that lasted from 1463 to 1878. In the post-Ottoman period four different regimes succeeded one another in Bosnia until 1990. Austria-Hungary ruled Bosnia between 1878 to 1918; royal Yugoslavia ruled it between 1918 to 1941; during the four years of World War II, Bosnia was incorporated into the fascist “Independent State of Croatia”; and finally it was governed as part of the Socialist Yugoslav Federation from 1945 to 1991.

It has been popular among journalists and politicians from the West to describe Bosnian history as that of “tribalism” and “ancient ethnic hatred”.⁸ However, through its history Bosnia was not a society in which ethnic conflict and confrontation were widespread. Although the three different ethnic groups in Bosnia practice three different religions, they still belong to the same culture, speak the same language and subscribe to the same social norms and values. In fact, since War World II, 30 to 40 percent of urban marriages in Bosnia have been mixed. These urban cultured Europeans do not want partitions or ethnic cantons; their goal, even in the post-Dayton era though it can be unrealistic one, is a restored united Bosnia populated by people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds.⁹ Yet, one cannot completely dismiss the existence of hatred between different ethnic groups, but there has been much more coexistence, mutual understanding and tolerance than suppressed hatred or open confrontations. Ironically, much more ethnic conflicts in the twentieth-century Bosnia can be found than during the

⁸ Kaplan Robert D., *Balkan ghost: A journey through history* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005).

⁹ Fine John V.A., The medieval and Ottoman roots of modern Bosnian society in *The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The historic development from the middle ages to the dissolution of Yugoslavia*, edited by Mark Pinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 2.

medieval period from when it is often alleged all this hatred originated.¹⁰ Hence, two worlds existed: one was a world of hatred towards others, while the other was of love or tolerance at least, towards the rest of society.¹¹ These two conceptualizations, to a large extent, shaped Bosnia's political culture in the past.

Bosnia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire

The first sign of dynamic political life in Bosnia, which was marked by the establishment of ethnically based political parties took place in the beginning of the 20th century, during the period of Austro-Hungarian control of the country. In the first years of Austro-Hungarian rule over Bosnia the Austrian authorities encouraged the revival of religious hierarchies and the growth of religious education in Bosnia. They subsidized the religious organizations of the Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslims in the hope of discouraging political activism. At the same time officials under the leadership of Benjamin von Kallay, Austro-Hungarian Finance Minister, promoted the notion of Bosnianism. The primary aim of this concept was to encourage Croats, Serbs and Muslims to express their patriotic loyalty to Bosnia itself as an alternative to separate Croatian, Serbian and Muslim identities.¹² However, Bosnianism found no fertile soil in the Bosnian population mostly due to the fact that identification with ethno-religious communities was already too advanced for considerable number of Bosnians to give up their ethnic identity in favor of regional patriotism. Thus, instead of serving as a counterbalance to Serbian and Croatian nationalist influences, the traditional religious hierarchies were frequently a catalyst for ethnically based political movements that will soon arise into ethnically based political parties demanding autonomy for their constituents and stronger voice in government. Once the Austrian officials realized that policy of trying to isolate Bosnia from the growing ethnic conflict in the Balkans was unworkable, the authorities gradually liberalized their policies

¹⁰ Andjelic Neven, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The end of a legacy* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹² Donia Robert J. and Fine John V.A., *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A tradition betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 97.

and tolerated political activities.¹³

One of the most important results of the liberalized Austrian stance towards political liberalization was the formation of ethnically based political parties which represented respective ethnic groups in the country, Serb, Croats and Muslims. Thus, in December 1906 the Bosnian Muslims created a formal political party, the Muslim National Organization (MNO). The MNO and its post-1918 successor the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (YMO) dominated Bosnian Muslim politics until 1941. In October 1907, Serbian political activists created the Serbian National Organization (SNO) and few months later, in February 1908, Bosnian Croats formed the Croatian National Union (CNU). In addition to this, Croatian clerics, in January 1910, established another party, Croatian Catholic Association (CCA) whose political program emphasized clerical ideals and religious exclusivity.¹⁴

This period brought the birth of a Bosnian style of political life characterized by coalitions of interest between the political elites of different communities such as Serb-Muslim coalition on the question of cultural and religious autonomy up to 1909 and Croat-Muslim coalition on the agrarian reform issue from 1911.¹⁵ This stage, which was marked by the emergence of mass politics, proved to be crucial for later country's political development.

Bosnia between 1918-1945

After the end of the First World War and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the first serious rifts among the Bosnian people came into being. Political life and the voting pattern of the Bosnian population in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes continued to be communitarian and organized along ethnic lines. In the first parliamentary elections held in 1910, MNO secured all 24 seats allocated for Muslims, SNO

¹³ Ibid., 99; See also Mark Pinson, "The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian rule, 1878-1918," in *The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, edited by Mark Pinson, 84-128.

¹⁴ Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 101-109.

¹⁵ Bougarel Xavier, "Bosnia and Herzegovina- State and communitarianism in *Yugoslavia and after: A study in fragmentation, despair and rebirth*, edited by Dyker D.A. and Vejvoda I. (London: Longman, 1996), 90.

won all 31 seats allocated to the Serbs in the Parliament and CNU and CCA secured 12 and 4 seats, respectively, allocated to the Bosnian Croats in the Parliament. However, different ethnic groups had different stands vis-à-vis the Kingdom and their own ethnic interests. Thus, for the Orthodox Serbs, the Kingdom was simply realization of their dreams to create Greater Serbia at the cost of other parts of the Kingdom most predominantly Bosnia where a good number of Serbs lived. The Croats and Slovenes wanted the Kingdom to be a federal structure that would unite all of the South Slavs on the basis of equality and not to be treated as Serbian subjects.¹⁶ Finally, the Bosnian Muslim political elites supported the idea of the Kingdom as centralized state but under the condition that all its constituent parts, including Bosnia, should be given full territorial autonomy. They realized that the struggle for Bosnian political setting is the main political agenda and the key determinant of then-Bosnian Muslim politics.

Tensions between the centralizers (Serbs) and de-centralizers (Croats and Slovenes) grew until they peaked with the assassination of Stjepan Radic, leader of the HSS, who was shot together with four other party colleagues in Parliament on June 20, 1928. After this incident Croats asked the King for a newly federalized Kingdom. As a result of this the King suspended the Parliament, annulled the Constitution and proclaimed himself the sole source of all authority in the kingdom. Coalition politics ended as political parties were banned. Eventually only non-nationalistic parties were allowed to contest elections in 1931, essentially leaving only the one party, the Yugoslav National Party (JNP) to contest in elections. The name of the country, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia or simply Yugoslavia (the land of the South Slavs). This name reflected the attempt to impose on the rival ethnic groups the concept of *jugoslovenstvo* (Yugoslavism), one South Slav nation, by destroying the traditional national-historical provinces. The common heritage of the various groups, not their differences, would be stressed.¹⁷ However, political relations further deteriorated during the 1930s. As politics

¹⁶ Francine Friedman, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A polity on the brink* (London: Routledge, 2004), 13-14.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

was often based on ethnic belongings, inter-ethnic relations also deteriorated. The 1930s were characterized by the King's dictatorship, which left small room for political activity. It was during this period that Bosnia lost its historical, provincial character and was divided, like the rest of Yugoslavia, into *banovinas*, districts or larger regions named after rivers that flowed through them, in order to eradicate the ethnic character of the territory. Yugoslavia was divided into nine such territories, four of which incorporated some Bosnian land. Most of the local administrators were Serbs who were favored by the King. Thus in many Bosnian towns, elected Muslim mayors were replaced by Serb appointees. This gave even more grounds for dissent among Muslims.¹⁸ On the other side, Muslims supported most of their actions or at least their political representatives did. Even when Bosnia was divided between the Serbs and the Croats towards the end of this organization of polities in 1939, by creation of Croatian *Banovina*, the leaders of YMO supported the new order "in the belief that it would strengthen the Yugoslav state".¹⁹ This division into Serb and Croat spheres of influence was to be repeated in attempts to divide the country during the 1990s. By this time, however, Muslim national identity was much more developed. One may see some perpetual patterns in Bosnian political life.

There are forces in both Serbian and Croatian political teams that argue and fight for an inclusion of Bosnia in their nation states and regard Muslims as a part of their own ethnicity, although of a different religion. The Muslims' major concern is the preservation of Bosnia, since only within it can their own character be preserved and the political nation further developed. This is true despite the support for Bosnian division in 1939. At the time of the division, inter-ethnic relations deteriorated to such an extent that a collapse of the state was a clear possibility. The question was what would happen to Bosnia if Yugoslavia was dissolved? Muslims represented the only party interested in the preservation of Bosnia, but it was never strong enough to lead the struggle by either political or violent means. Therefore, they had to opt for a political alternative that would preserve any kind of the Yugoslav

¹⁸ Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 129.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

state. The price was the political division of Bosnia along ethnic lines.²⁰

In the Second World War, Yugoslavia was divided among the Axis conquerors: Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Germany. During this time Bosnia was absorbed into the so-called Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska*, NDH) and under the German military dominance. The country was divided into six districts.²¹ Some districts exceeded the borders of Bosnia while some parts of Bosnia were included into districts whose headquarters were outside the country. The primary objective of this was to emphasize the Croatian territorial rights in Bosnia, which had never existed before. At the same time, incorporation of certain parts of the country into districts whose headquarters were outside the country served as a proof to annul historical, territorial and political unity of Bosnia.

In such circumstances Muslims were the only south-Slav people who had neither national army nor fascist movement and ideology. Moreover, this was the period when they were left without united political leadership and joint military forces and, therefore, without clear and constructive objectives. As a result, Muslims fell prey to both Croatian and Serbian intentions to create Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia, respectively. For them Muslims did not exist as a nation, only as Serbs or Croats of Islamic religion. Thus, while other nations were fighting for higher objectives such as having a state and being independent, Muslims were protecting their lives and fighting for mere physical survival.

This was the period when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) started to receive prominence in the Yugoslav political life. The Communist Party with Tito as its leader tried to promote the nationality policy embodied in the slogan *Bratstvo i Jedinstvo* (Brotherhood and Unity) among all ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. This was of utmost importance for Bosnia and Muslims as majority group.

During the meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) held in November 1943, a decision was made to build Yugoslavia on the federal principles whereby Bosnia will be one of its

²⁰ Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 16.

²¹ Vrhbosna (Sarajevo), Usora and Soli (Tuzla), Glaz, Plivaj and Rama (Travnik), Sana and Luka (Banja Luka), Krbava and Psat (Bihac) and Hum (Mostar).

six constituent parts.²² Therefore, six republics were created, five of which reflected by their names the titular majority population within their borders.²³ The exception to this federal creation was Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unlike the other five republics, Bosnia had no titular nation to dominate its decision-making bodies. With a large number of Serbs, Croats and Muslims scattered all over the country, that republic has been truly multinational.

This mixture of people made status of Bosnia a matter of some concern during the wartime discussion about the postwar composition of Yugoslavia. Some in the leadership of the CPY such as Milovan Dilas, Sreten Zujovic and Mosa Pijade favored giving Bosnia autonomy within the Yugoslav federation while the representatives of the Bosnian delegation, Rodoljub Colakovic and Avdo Humo asked for an equal status of Bosnia within the Yugoslav federation. In the end, Tito, on the recommendation of Edvard Kardelj, decided that Bosnia should be an equal republic within Yugoslavia. The Council proclaimed Bosnia as a distinct territory in which ‘full equality of all Serbs, Muslims and Croats would be guaranteed’. It was around this time that Muslims started to join the Partisan movement in large numbers.²⁴

By this policy, the CPY succeeded in mobilizing the Muslims for its own Yugoslav project. They were aware of the fact that Bosnia is a multiethnic republic and denial of the basic rights to any of its constituent ethnic groups would inevitably lead to the collapse of the system.²⁵ Therefore, the CPY had to be very careful in executing the sensitive policies pertaining to the issue of ethnicity.

Bosnia in Communist Yugoslavia 1945-1992

After the end of the Second World War Bosnia was incorporated as a federal unit in (Communist) Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ).

²² Yugoslavia will consist of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Monte Negro and Macedonia and two autonomous parts, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

²³ Slovenia mostly populated by Slovenes, Croatia populated by Croats, Serbia populated by Serbs, Montenegro populated by Montenegrins, Macedonia populated by Macedonians.

²⁴ Atif Purivatra, *Nacionalni i politicki razvitak Muslimana* [National and political development of Muslims], (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1969).

²⁵ Bougarel Xavier, “Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav idea,” in *Yugoslavism: Histories of a failed idea 1918-1992*, edited by Djokic Dejan, (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), 100-114.

Constitutionally and following the formal-legal principles, Bosnia was a republic equal to other republics of the Federal Yugoslavia. However, the main difference between Bosnia and the rest of republics was that its statehood was based upon historical and territorial-political and not on the national principles exclusively. Other republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were national-political units of one dominant people- Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians- while Bosnia was a political unit of three dominant peoples, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). Thus having no national-political unit to dominate its decision-making apparatus, Bosnia was an exception to the federal creation of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, with a large number of Serbs, Croats and Muslims scattered throughout Bosnia, the republic was truly multinational. However, the grant of republic status formally made the boundaries of Bosnia constitutionally inviolable. For example, the Bosnian constitution of 1946, provided that the boundaries of the republic could not be changed without its consent. The primary aim of this was to prevent Serb and Croat mutually exclusive and contradictory claims on Bosnia and remove one potential source of conflict within the Yugoslav federation.²⁶

The Bosnian Serbs and Croats dominated Bosnia's political relations in the early years of the Yugoslav federation. The Muslims as the Bosnian largest community were considered to be only a religious, not a national, unit and thus had none of the prerequisites that other national groups possessed within Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the Bosnian Muslims were an object of rivalry between the Serbs and Croats.²⁷ Bosnia's decisions making apparatus reflected this multiplicity and coalition games were often played within Bosnia, with the Bosnian Muslims being the targets of Serb-Croat discussions.

Nationality Policies: The Rise of the Bosnian Muslims

The communist regime in Yugoslavia was at first highly decentralized but over the years evolved into a loose federation, although one based on an authoritarian one-party system. As stated earlier, Bosnia was incorporated in-

²⁶ Friedman, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 22-23.

²⁷ Sacir Filandra, *Bosnjačka politika XX stoljecu* [Bosniak politics in the 20th century] (Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998), 199-225.

to the federal system created during World War II as a republic, equal in all aspects to the other republics of Yugoslavia. Initially, the Muslims were looked upon with distrust and the Serbs dominated leadership in Bosnia. However, with the passage of time it became evident that the question of what it meant to be a Muslim in Bosnia- of whether it was a religious, an ethnic or a national identity- did not go away. In the 1940s the official position was that this problem would gradually solve itself as Muslims would come to identify themselves with Serbs and Croats. At the first Party Congress after the end of the war it was stated that

Bosnia cannot be divided between Serbia and Croatia, not only because Serbs and Croats live mixed together on the whole territory, but also because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet decided on their national identity.²⁸

What “decided on their national identity” meant here was “decided whether to call themselves Serbs or Croats”. In the 1948 census the Muslims had three options: they could call themselves Muslim Serbs, Muslim Croats or “Muslims nationally undeclared” (or “undetermined”). This gave the Bosnian Muslims a chance to demonstrate just how reluctant they were to be either Serbified or Croaticized: 72,000 declared themselves as Serbs and 25,000 as Croats, but 778, 403 registered as ‘undeclared’. The next census, in 1953, produced a similar result. This time the official policy was to promote a spirit of “Yugoslavism”: the category “Muslim” was removed from the census altogether, but people were allowed to register as “Yugoslav, nationally undeclared”. In Bosnia, 891,800 did so.²⁹

For the first fifteen to twenty years after the war, the senior official posts in Bosnia were dominated by Serbs: in the 1940s the Bosnian Communist Party membership was 20 percent Muslim and 60 percent Serb. The policy of the Bosnian republican government was very submissive to Belgrade, with a tendency to treat the republic as little more than an external province of Serbia. However, since the dismissal from the Yugoslav Central Committee of Aleksandar Rankovic, Tito’s brutal Serb security chief, in 1966, there was a

²⁸ Malcom Noel, *Bosnia: A short history* (New York: New York Press, 1994), 197.

²⁹ Imamovic Mustafa, *Historija Bosnjaka* [History of Bosniaks] (Sarajevo: Bosnjačka zajednica kulture Preporod, 1998), 563.

general relaxation of policy towards the non-Serb people of the whole country in general and Muslims in particular. In addition to this, two other factors can be considered as causes of recognizing Bosnian Muslim nationhood: the decision to drop the policy of “integral Yugoslavism” and strengthen republican identities instead in early 1960, and the rise of elite of Muslim Communist officials within the Party in Bosnia.³⁰ These active Muslim intellectual elite were supportive of and loyal to the existing political order.³¹

In spite of the fact that Serb and Croat members of the Communist party expressed very strong resistance to recognize Muslims as a nation, however, under the intellectual leadership of Muhamed Filipovic and with the assistance of Communist functionaries such as Atif Purivatra, success finally came at a meeting of the Bosnian Central Committee in May 1968, where a communiqué was issued containing the following statement:

Practice has shown the harm of different forms of pressure ... from the earlier period when Muslims were designated as Serbs or Croats from the national viewpoint. It has been shown and present socialist practice confirms that the Muslims are a distinct nation.³²

Despite fierce objections in Belgrade from Serbian nationalist Communists such as Dobrica Cosic, this policy was accepted by the central government. Muslims were recognized as a fully equal nation in the 1971 census and each succeeding Yugoslav census.

The concept of Muslim nationhood developed by these intellectuals was at the same time carefully restricted. Thus, it included only Serbo-Croatian speaking, Slavic Muslims, primarily those in Bosnia and the neighboring former Turkish *Sandzak* of Novi Pazar that had been part of the Bosnian *Sandzak* before 1878 and is now divided between Serbia and Montenegro.

Muslim scholars did not, of course, all agree on a single definition of the

³⁰ Ramet S.P., *Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia, 1961-1991* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2nd ed., 1992), 178-9.

³¹ Ceric Salim, *Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1968); Ceric Salim, *Prilog pitanju: Jugoslovenska nacionalnost ili jugoslovenski socijalistički patriotizam* (Sarajevo: Oslobođenje, 1971); Purivatra Atif, *Nacionalni i politički razvitak Muslimana* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2nd ed., 1970).

³² Irwin Z.T., “The Islamic revival and the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *East European Quarterly*, vol.17 (1984): 444.

Muslim nation or its origins. However, Hadzijahic summarized national feeling of the Muslims as one that “is of a different quality from the feeling of solidarity with other Muslims in the world or even with other Yugoslav Muslims for whom Serbo-Croatian language is not their mother tongue...”³³ He continues, “it has shown stronger cohesive force than identification with either the Serb or Croat nation and has been manifest in institutionalized forms ... analogous to the situation among Serbs and Croats.”³⁴ One of these forms is Islam and the Islamic religious hierarchy, which plays a role analogous to Catholicism and the Catholic Church among the Croats and Orthodoxy and Orthodox Church among the Serbs. Thus according to Hadzijahic, while “it is necessary to distinguish the feeling of membership in the community of Bosnian Muslims from the feeling of Islamic membership it is also necessary to keep in mind that in practice one and the other feeling are often intertwined.”³⁵

The drive for recognition of the Muslims as a nation was not an Islamic religious movement. On the contrary, it was led by the Communists and other secularized Muslims who wanted the Muslim identity in Bosnia to develop into something more definitely non-religious. Therefore, two quite distinct trends can be seen in Bosnia during this period: this movement of secular “Muslim nationalism” and a separate revival of Islamic religious belief.³⁶ The later became well-known by a short treatise written in the late 1960s by Alija Izetbegovic, the *Islamic Declaration*.³⁷ His argument was distinct from that of Bosnian secularized Muslims such as Purivatra and Filipovic. Izetbegovic was not concerned with the problems of Bosnia per se, but with the situation of Islam in the whole world. For him, nationalism was a divisive force and Communism is an inadequate system.³⁸

However, this was far from what secularized Bosnian Muslims were striving for. Their concerns were that the Muslims of Bosnia were under-

³³ Hadzijahic, *Od tradicije do identiteta*, 65.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 177.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁶ Irwin, “The Islamic revival...,” 445-46.

³⁷ The Treatise was not published until 1990. See Alija Izetbegovic, *Islamska deklaracija* [Islamic Declaration], (Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 17-23.

represented in the administrative set-up and that the republic as a whole was regarded as somehow lower in status than the other republics of Yugoslavia. This inferior treatment came about because Bosnia was seen as containing not a distinctive nation but merely fragments of two other nations (Serbia and Croatia) and a non-nation.³⁹ It was an analysis which contained a great deal of truth. Bosnia's economic development lagged far behind the republics of the Yugoslav federal system.

Relative to the rest of Yugoslavia, Bosnia stagnated and declined during the 1950s and 1960s, with its GDP per capita falling from 79 percent of the Yugoslav average in 1953 to 75 percent in 1957, and 69 percent in 1965. In 1961 much of Bosnia was officially declared as under-developed region. Out of all the Yugoslav republics, Bosnia had the lowest rate of economic growth over the entire period 1952-68.⁴⁰

From the late 1960s on, Bosnia witnessed remarkable social and cultural changes. Social and ethnic barriers began to break down in the urban areas as the number of mixed marriages and the number of those who chose to identify as Yugoslavs increased.⁴¹

Public manifestations of national intolerance were ruthlessly suppressed by the communist regime. In spite of the fact that the three national groups had no equal access to education, jobs and positions of responsibility in the government and the party, no effort was made to correct this. However, any attempt of political activism, in communist Yugoslavia, that would try to rectify this mistake was considered anti-state directed with primary aims to destabilize the country and undermine the national unity among various ethnic groups.⁴²

³⁹ Purivatra, *Nacionalni i politicki...*

⁴⁰ Irwin, "The Islamic revival...", 99-100.

⁴¹ By the 1981 census, those who for census purposes called themselves Yugoslav constituted 7.9 percent of the population, three quarters of whom were to be found in the largest cities such as Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla and Zenica. Mixed marriages accounted for 15.3 percent of the total number of marriages in the republic in 1981. However, 95.3 percent of Muslim women and 92.9 percent of Muslim men entered into homogenous marriages. Inter-marriage rates were higher among Serbs and still higher among Croats. Thus, most of the inter-marriage in the republic was taking place among non-Muslims; See *Demografska statistika 1981* (Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1986), 228-29.

⁴² Trhulj Sead, *Mladi Muslimani* (Zagreb: Globus, 1991), 68.

Despite the fact that in the late 1960s Bosnia saw some economic development still the republic remained less developed in comparison to other republics. GNP per capita was 35 percent below the Yugoslav average in 1981. The lower level of development of the republic contributed to a substantial net out-migration from the republic. Out-migration consisted very largely of Serbs migrating to Serbia and Croats migrating to Croatia. Migration of Muslims into and out of the republic was approximately in balance.⁴³

However, political development did not keep pace with economic development and this proved to be a fatal weakness. As Yugoslavia evolved into a complex and initially successful model of authoritarian consociationalism, the political elite in Bosnia remained highly conformist, with a reputation for repression of political dissent. Politics continued to be cadre-driven and the monopoly of a narrow circle of politicians. Responsibility to solve ethnic disputes rested with this small group of Communists for whom national feelings appeared secondary to consideration of power and control. Bosnia was thus rigidly governed and its broader elites coming from different ethnic groups were without any experience in genuine power-sharing when the collapse of Yugoslavia left them on their own.⁴⁴

At the level of the federation, the loyalty of the Muslim political elite and the secular Communist Muslim scholars to Yugoslavia was unquestioned. Though the support for Yugoslavism was declining in the 1970s and 80s, however, Bosnian political and intellectual circles remained very loyal to that idea. Yet this political loyalty could not be translated and transformed into political influence in the federation, where the determination of federal policies remained concentrated in the hands of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In Bosnia itself, recognition of the Muslims as a nationality and the growing share of the Muslims in the republic population raised the possibility that they will ask for being a constituent nation. This aroused unease among the Serb political elite.⁴⁵

⁴³ Bogosavljevic Srdan, "Bosna i Hercegovina u ogledalu statistike," in *Bosna i Hercegovina između rata i mira*, edited by Janjic Dusan and Shoup Paul (Belgrade: Dom Omladine, 1992), 24-29.

⁴⁴ Burg Steven L., and Shoup Paul S., *The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and international intervention* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 43.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

Muslims' struggle for political and social equality was jeopardized by a campaign against so called Islamic fundamentalism, launched by Belgrade, which culminated in the trial of Muslim intellectuals (including Alija Izetbegovic) in 1983.⁴⁶ The crackdown had an intimidation effect on Muslim religious activists in Bosnia and for a while strengthened the position of senior Muslim Communists such as Hamdija Pozderac who could be at ease with the idea of Muslim identity as long as it remained essentially secular. However, the pressure on the new Muslim elites spread to the political field in the 1980s.

The *Agrokomerc* affair of 1987 focused on the financial crisis created by Fikret Abdic. But it also had a political objective of discrediting the old-guard Muslim political elites. The affair was followed by revelations of the high lifestyle and corruption of Bosnian communist leaders that almost paralyzed the political leadership in Bosnia.⁴⁷

Political instability in Bosnia in the late 1980s was one of the major factors that led to the victory of the nationalist parties in the first multiparty elections of 1990.

At the end of the 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic captured the Serbian political structure and assumed the leadership of a growing Serb nationalist movement that cut across republic boundaries, including those of Bosnia.⁴⁸ The period 1987-91 saw a profound change in Yugoslav society, marked by the end of one-party rule, the polarization of public opinion along national lines and growing demands for secession by Slovenia and Croatia.⁴⁹

These developments affected Bosnia in fundamental ways. Although the communist political elites were under attack from within and without, it was united in opposing the Serb nationalist campaign. Serb nationalism

⁴⁶ Danilovic Rajko, *Sarajevski proces 1983* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2006).

⁴⁷ Malcom, *Bosnia...*, 209.

⁴⁸ LeBor Adam, *Milosevic: A biography* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Sell Louis, *Slobodan Milosevic and the destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

⁴⁹ Silber Laura and Little Allan, *Yugoslavia: Death of a nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997); Ramet Sabrina P. and Ademovich Ljubisa (eds.), *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, economics and culture in a shattered community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Ramet Sabrina P., *Balkan Babel: Politics, culture and religion in Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

threatened to loosen the Bosnian social compact, built on loyalty to Titoism and to polarize Bosnian society along ethnic lines.⁵⁰ The Bosnian Communist Party could not simply “change its spots” as the communist party of Serbia did under Milosevic because its membership was multiethnic compared to the communist party in Serbia which was monolithic. Although Serbs constituted the largest single group in the party (42.8 percent in 1982), Muslims and Croats together outnumbered them (35.0 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively). And in a reflection of both demographic and political realities the Muslim share of the party was increasing over time. Those declaring Yugoslav identity also represented, at least in 1982, an important party constituency, comprising 8.4 percent of the membership.⁵¹ None of these non-Serb constituencies would accept Serb nationalist orientation that was born with Milosevic.

The Bosnian Serb members of the communist party behaved quite differently. They left the party and joined the nationalist Serb Democratic Party (SDS) established by Radovan Karadzic in June 1990. Later on Milosevic formed an alliance with the SDS. On the other hand Bosnian Croats established Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which was merely an extension of the same party established by the then Croatian President Franjo Tudman. Therefore, increasing Serb and Croat nationalisms caused Muslims to think again how to resist that.

Ethnic Polarization and Multiparty Elections

From the end of 1988 and especially in the months preceding the elections of 1990, the polarization of the Bosnian society along national lines was increasing. Mass gatherings of Serbs in support of Milosevic and among Croats in support of Croat independence took place during the summer and fall of 1989. Following the fragmentation of the Yugoslav communist party into separate republic organizations pursuing separate and conflicting agendas in January 1990, the Bosnian party leadership, like other republic leaderships, accepted the establishment of opposition parties. As a result of this many po-

⁵⁰ Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.) *Yugoslavia and after*, (especially chapter six).

⁵¹ Steven L. Burg, “Research Note: New Data on the League of Communists,” *Slavic Review*, Vol.46, No.3-4, (1987), pp.553-67.

litical organizations were established in the republic in the course of 1990. However, most of these political parties were small and they had either to form coalitions or were of no consequence in the politics of the republic. Electoral competition was dominated by three explicitly ethnic and de facto nationalist parties created in 1990: SDS, HDZ and SDA.⁵² Finally, only ten parties were able to secure seats in the parliament.⁵³

Table 1.1. Seats in Parliament per Party, 1990.

Party Name	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	43 (33.00)	43 (39.09)	86 (35.85)
Serb Democratic Party (SDS) + Serbian Movement for Renewal (SPO)	34 (26.15)	38 (34.64)	72+1(30.41)
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	21 (16.15)	23 (20.93)	44 (18.35)
League of Communists-Social Democratic Party (SK-SDP) + Democratic Socialist Alliance (DSS)	11 (8.50)	3 (2.72)	20 (8.32)
Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia (SRSJ)	11 (8.50)	1 (0.90)	13 (5.41)
Alliance of Socialist Youth-Democratic Alliance (SSO-DS)	---	---	2 (0.83)
Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO)	---	2 (1.80)	2 (0.83)
Others	10 (7.50)	---	---
Total	130 (100)	110 (100)	240 (100)

Notes: (1) House of Citizens (%). (2) House of Municipalities (%).

(3) Total Number of Seats (%)

Source: Arnautovic Suad, *Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini 1990: Analiza Izbornog Procesu*, Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996, p.108.

⁵² See Burg & Shoup, *The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p.46.

⁵³ They are: Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Serbian Movement for Renewal (SPO), League of Communists-Social Democratic Party (SK-SDP), Democratic Socialist Alliance (DSS), Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia (SRSJ), Alliance of Socialist Youth-Democratic Alliance (SSO-DS), Liberal Democrats (LDS) and Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO)

Table 1.1 shows that in the first parliamentary elections held in Bosnia in November 1990 the three ethnically based political parties emerged victorious in both chambers of Parliament. They won 86 percent of the 240 seats in the Bosnian Assembly. Thus, the HDZ led by Stjepan Kljucic won 44 seats, the SDS led by Radovan Karadzic won 72 seats and the SDA led by Alija Izetbegovic won 86 seats. Seven small parties shared the remaining seats. The reformed League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SKBiH), Social Democratic Party (SDP) together with Democratic Socialist Alliance (DSS) came fourth with 20 representatives in the Parliament. The League of Reformists (SRSJ) won 13 seats, while the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO) and Liberal Democrats (LDS) had two representatives each. Finally, the Serb Renewal Movement (SPO) had one representative but he acted as a member of the SDS.

All the nationalist candidates were elected into the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Alija Izetbegovic was designated president of the Presidency for a one-year term and only one possible chance to stand for re-election.⁵⁴ The results of the Presidential election in 1990 demonstrate remarkable historical consistency with previous Bosnian multiparty elections, whether in 1910 (the Austrian period) or in the 1920s (the royal Yugoslav era). In 1990, Bosnians again voted overwhelmingly for ethnically based political parties, and a single party achieved overwhelming majority among the voters of each nationality. The three nationalist parties agreed on a partnership in governing the republic. Thus a Muslim was appointed as the President of the Collective Presidency, a Croat became the Prime Minister and a Serb was given the role of the speaker of Parliament. However, problems soon appeared when the governing bodies were supposed to start working.⁵⁵

The three parties, despite sometimes-harsh nationalist campaign rhetoric agreed to rule as a coalition. However, the first disagreement among representatives of the three ethnic groups appeared once the parties began to discuss a possible compromise regarding the future of Bosnia in the Yugoslav

⁵⁴ See Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, pp.210-11; Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, pp.188-92.

⁵⁵ See Izetbegovic, *Sjecanja*, pp.85-6.

context. Muslim and Croatian politicians supported the notion of independent and sovereign Bosnia, while Serbian leaders strongly opposed it. Proposal for a sovereign Bosnia submitted by the representatives of predominantly Muslim based SDA was quickly endorsed by the HDZ and rejected by representatives of the SDS who, under influence from neighboring Serbia, wanted to remain in the Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation and feared that Bosnian sovereignty would institutionalize the minority status of Serbs in Bosnia.

Table 1.2. Presidential Vote 1990, (top three candidates only)

Name	Number of Votes	Percent of Votes
Muslim Candidates		
Fikret Abdic-SDA		
Alija Izetbegovic-SDA	1,045,539	44,68
Nijaz Durakovic-SK-SDP	879,266	37,57
	558,263	23,85
Serb Candidates		
Biljana Plavsic-SDS		
Nikola Koljevic-SDS	573,812	24,52
Nenad Kecmenovic-SRSJ	556,218	23,77
	500,783	21,40
Croat Candidates		
Stjepan Kljucic-HDZ		
Franjo Boras-HDZ	473,002	20,21
Ivo Komsic-SK-SDP	416,629	17,80
	353,707	15,11
Other Nations and Nationalities		
Ejup Ganic - SDA		
Ivan Ceresnjes - SDS	709,891	30,33
Josip Peakovic - SRSJ	362,681	15,50
	317,978	13,58

Source: Suad Arnautovic, *Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini 1990: Analiza IZbornog Procesu, Sarajevo: Promocult, 1996*, p.108.

Shortly after the elections of November 1990, the SDA declared itself in favor of a confederal solution⁵⁶ and submitted to the Bosnian Parliament a “Declaration on the sovereignty and indivisibility of Bosnia.”⁵⁷ However, Radovan Karadzic’s SDS strongly opposed the idea of Bosnia leaving federal Yugoslavia, mounting tensions between Croatia and Serbia and the first talks between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudman about the partition of Bosnia.⁵⁸ This led the SDA to withdraw its proposition to declare Bosnia a sovereign republic and to fall back onto the proposition of an “asymmetrical [Yugoslav] confederation” presented by Alija Izetbegovic and Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia in May 1991.⁵⁹

After the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, the essential question was no longer how to recognize the dying Yugoslav federation, but whether Bosnia should remain in a rump Yugoslavia, reduced to Serbia and Montenegro, or should it declare independence too.

In August 1991, the SDS and the Muslim Bosniak Organization led by Adil Zulfikarpasic, made public a Serb-Muslim “historical agreement”, which implicitly exchanged the maintenance of Bosnia in rump Yugoslavia for the preservation of its territorial integrity.⁶⁰ After a few days SDA leaders rejected the proposal on the basis that Yugoslavia without Croatia and Slovenia is not acceptable for them.⁶¹ Izetbegovic argued that Bosnia would be forced to declare its independence should Croatia and Slovenia (but especially the former) leave the federation. On the other hand he sought to facilitate an agreement among the quarreling republics that would allow Yugoslavia to survive.⁶² With the support of Macedonia, Izetbegovic argued for a “Yugoslav state community” that would acknowledge the sovereignty

⁵⁶ See Ibrahim Bakic, “Gradani BiH o Medunacionalnim Odnosima” *Sveske Instituta za Proucavanje Medunacionalnih Odnosa*, Vol.8, No. 28-29, (1990) p.299.

⁵⁷ See Dzemaludin Latic, “Zasto se Izvrshi Odbor SDA Odlucio za Konfederaciju, *Muslimanski Glas*, Vol.2, No.3, 20th February 1991, p.1.

⁵⁸ See Sejo Omeragic, *Dogovoreni Rat*, Sarajevo: Proton, 2001.

⁵⁹ Interview with Alija Izetbegovic, Radio Liberty (Private Archive).

⁶⁰ For the detailed explanation of this “historical agreement” see Muhamed Filipovic, *Bio sam Alijin Diplomata*, Bihac: Delta, 2000, pp.83-124.

⁶¹ See Izetbegovic, *Sjecanja*, p.98.

⁶² See “Documents on the Future Regulation of Relations in Yugoslavia,” *Yugoslav Survey*, Vol.1, 1991, pp.3-24.

of the republics while retaining Yugoslavia's international legal status. At one point in the spring of 1991, he even appeared open to the idea of an "asymmetric federation" in which Bosnia would have closer ties to the federal government than Croatia and Slovenia.⁶³ However, this attempt failed as a result of, according to Izetbegovic "...hesitant international community, agitating nationalism, incapable domestic and international politicians and the objectives and characters of Milosevic and Tudman."⁶⁴

After this the SDA leaders set themselves irreversibly on the road towards independence. The SDA leaders continued for some months to advocate a "Yugoslav community" which would include both Serbia and Croatia but, in the context of a Serb-Croatian war going on in Croatia, this position was just meant to ease Bosnia's exit from Yugoslavia by securing the support of the European Community. As soon as European diplomats started to consider recognition of the secessionist republics, the SDA passed on October 15, 1991 a "Memorandum on sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina" through the Bosnian parliament and on December 20 demanded the international recognition of Bosnia.⁶⁵

By opting for independence, the SDA leaders made a clear stand against the SDS and had, therefore, to rely on the support of the HDZ. It was the turn of the Croat nationalist party to occupy an intermediate position: close to the SDA because it was supportive of the independence of Bosnia, but close to the SDS because it favored division of Bosnia into several ethnic territories.⁶⁶

Finally, a referendum for sovereign and independent Bosnia was held on February 29 and March 1, 1992. Serb leadership urged Serbs to boycott the independence referendum. Consequently, few Serbs voted in the referendum, Muslims and Croats on the other hand voted in large numbers and cast over 99 percent of their ballots for Bosnia's full independence. The

⁶³ See Izetbegovic, *Sjecanja*, p.93; See also *Svjedoci Raspada* (Witnesses of Dissolution) Interview with Alija Izetbegovic, Radio Liberty (Private Archive).

⁶⁴ Izetbegovic, *Sjecanja*, p.94.

⁶⁵ See "Memorandum on sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina", 15th October 1991, *SDA Archive*.

⁶⁶ See Xavier Bougarel, "Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea" in *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992*, Dejan Djokic (ed.) London: Hurst & Company, 2003, pp.100-14.

then-European Community announced its recognition of Bosnia on 6th April and day later the United States announced that it recognized Bosnia as sovereign and independent state. On the other hand, the Bosnian Serbs-fully supported by neighboring Serbia and Montenegro- responded with armed resistance aimed at partitioning the republic along ethnic lines and joining Serb-held areas to form a “Greater Serbia”. Thus the war erupted in April 1992, lasted for three and a half years and was stopped by the Dayton Peace Agreement brokered by the United States signed and ratified at the end of 1995, which forced the Bosnian delegation to accept the war results and practically rewarded war crime inductees for their crimes.

Conclusion

Bosnia has been characterized by its multiethnic nature throughout its long history since the Ottoman conquest of the country in the middle of the 15th century. Various segments of Bosnia were of relatively equal size with cross-cutting cleavages. During the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1878-1918, Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1918-1939, and during Tito’s Socialist Yugoslavia from 1945-1990, Bosnia was a part of a bigger entity and enjoyed various types of autonomy. Throughout its history Bosnia was well known for the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic and religious groups on its territory. The dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the rise of ethno-nationalism brought this phenomenon to an end. In 1992 Bosnia became an independent country and a full member of the United Nations. However, since its independence, Bosnia has gone through the most difficult time in its entire history. The country’s independence caused the genocide and mass killings committed by the Serb and Croat forces against the Bosniaks who represent the majority of the population.

19. Yüzyılın sonlarından 1990’lara Bosna’nın Siyasi Tarihinde Sosyal Bölünmeler, Çatışma ve Uzlaşma

Özet: Bu çalışma, Bosna’nın siyasi tarihinde sosyal bölünmeler, çatışma ve uzlaşmayı bu toplumunun çoğulcu özelliğini dikkate alarak yaklaşık olarak Avusturya-Macaristan işgalinden Yugoslavya’nın çözülmesine kadar olan

dönemi incelemektedir. Bosna toplumunu tarih boyunca genellikle aynı büyüklükte ve kesin çizgilerle birbirinden ayrılmış farklı etnik, dinsel ve kültürel geçmişe sahip halkların varlığı karakterize etmiştir. Bu halkların barışçıl birlikleri, karşılıklı saygı ve toleransları iyi bilinmektedir. Ancak eski Yugoslavya'nın çözülmesi ve etnik milliyetçiliğin yükselişiyle bu olguyu bitmiş ve birbirine komşu olan hakların ve politik kurumlarının birbirlerinin topraklarına karşı gizledikleri emelleri açığa çıkmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bosna ve Hersek, Siyasi Tarih, Çatışma, Uzlaşma, Sosyal Bölünme ve Siyasi Partiler

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