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Pragmatism on both sides of the negotiating table suggests a willingness to end the armed conflict. BY ALDO CIVICO Will the negotiations between the government and the FARC bring lasting peace to Colombia? Yes After 50 years of armed conflict, the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) have an unprecedented opportunity to break with the patterns of violence and underdevelopment that have plagued the country for decades. The Colombian government had promoted similar peace talks between 1999 and 2002, yet two things distinguish today’s talks: long-term planning that has bolstered the negotiating position of President Juan Manuel Santos’ administration, and the willingness of both sides to be flexible on previously contentious issues like land reform. The Colombian state’s negotiation strategy dates from the days when Santos was former President Álvaro Uribe’s minister of defense. Even though, ironically, Uribe has become one of the most vocal opponents of the current round of peace talks, the military intelligence mined during his administration (2002–2010) has played a strategic role in designing ongoing talks with the FARC. Now the FARC is pursuing politics as war by other means. The agreement announced last May by the Colombian government and the FARC on agrarian reform is evidence that the strategy is working. The agreement is not only historic—it’s the first political accord achieved by the two parties in 30 years—but also reflects a substantial shift in the political calculus of both sides. In a break from their modus operandi, the FARC agreed to pursue agrarian reforms without using revolutionary or violent means. Instead, the document states the need to guarantee land access “with equity and democracy”—in other words, no private property acquired legally will be confiscated. Unlike previous negotiations, this time the FARC is taking a deliberate—and politically wise—step toward pragmatism. The Colombian government has also taken a more conciliatory tone in the negotiations. In the same land reform agreement, the Santos administration signaled its willingness to address Colombia’s historical underdevelopment and to implement the changes needed to address the social and economic inequalities that have plagued the country, especially in rural areas. The list of pledges contained in the statement announcing the agreement and jointly issued by both parties is long. It includes providing access to land for those people who live in rural areas but have insufficient or no land, technical assistance, education, training, social protection, and the eradication of hunger. Many of these issues were tenets of the FARC’s 1964 agrarian program. Important concessions were made on both sides of the agrarian reform debate. While the FARC showed flexibility in agreeing not to use revolutionary means, the Santos administration signaled its willingness to integrate the guerrillas—and some of their core ideals—into the nation that emerges from these talks to create the conditions for lasting peace and prevent the resurgence of violence. And yet, the vocal and public opposition to the peace process with the FARC also suggests the limits and perils of the ongoing conversations. Several opponents, such as former presidents Uribe and Andrés Pastrana, appear worried that Santos will use these negotiations to increase the influence of the Partido Liberal Colombiano. The larger framework of the debate is important to remember. The FARC has been embroiled in a five-decade-long conflict with the government in hopes of overthrowing the state and obtaining power. Agreeing to negotiate a political solution to the conflict means that the FARC finally realized its armed revolution is not attainable. However, this does not mean that the FARC has given up its political aspirations. In fact, lately it has shown a keen interest in doing politics, something that ought to be welcomed. But with whom will the FARC ally politically? If the ultimate objective is to have access to power, then the leftist Marcha Patriótica (MP) is not the FARC’s most suitable political vehicle. In fact, MP is not a political party—though as a movement it effectively mobilizes the masses to highlight issues that are important to the FARC. Less useful yet to the FARC is Polo Democrático Alternativo, given their reciprocal mistrust. Instead, the FARC has been flirting with the Partido Liberal, especially with the faction that includes former Senator Piedad Córdoba and former President Ernesto Samper. In addition, the founders of the FARC were originally Liberal guerrillas during La Violencia, and in 1986, Unión Patriotica in several regions of Colombia was an ally of the Partido Liberal, where it won local elections. Santos has also worked to give prominence and unity back to the Partido Liberal and to further consolidate its influence. In part, that’s why conservatives have accused him of being a traitor. The real question is whether the negotiations will achieve the ultimate goal: a strong peace agreement that doesn’t just end the conflict with the FARC, but also means a peace in Colombia that overcomes political resentments. Both sides have said that “there is no agreement until everything has been agreed upon.” But if the talks in Havana can establish the conditions under which Colombians come together to build a modern, successful and prosperous democracy, they are worth supporting. Back to top The FARC’s escalating demands; ongoing attacks and intransigence demonstrate that it doesn’t really want peace. BY ALFREDO RANGEL Will the negotiations between the government and the FARC bring lasting peace to Colombia? No The current dialogue between the Colombian government and the FARC has no chance of ending in a definitive peace agreement. Various factors threaten its success: the guerrillas’ arrogant and demanding negotiating style, the lack of public support for the talks and sheer time constraints. Since the peace talks began in Havana, the FARC has sabotaged any hope of progress. Many of its demands regarding key issues—like agrarian reform, control of national territory and the insistence on keeping its arms—simply cannot and will not be met by the Colombian government, primarily because the talks—and the FARC itself, with a 2 percent approval rating among Colombians—lack political legitimacy. The barriers to agreement were obvious soon after the process began. The FARC failed to fulfill its initial commitment to limit the dialogue to only six key topics, which was a condition of sitting down at the table. Instead, it has been endlessly expanding the agenda and bringing myriad proposals and demands to the table, slowing negotiations to a crawl. In effect, the peace talks have been used by the farc to gain the kind of political leverage that it failed to win on the battlefield. Despite political unpopularity and shrinking military influence (guerrilla forces were reduced by half as a result of former President Álvaro Uribe’s security policy), the FARC believes the government needs the talks more than the guerillas do. As the country gears up for elections in 2014, President Juan Manuel Santos needs to show progress in what was a cornerstone of his campaign platform: bringing to an end Colombia’s long internal conflict. The FARC’s perceived upper hand has guided the group to pursue an aggressive negotiation strategy. For example, FARC negotiators presented some 110 proposals regarding comprehensive agrarian reform—many of them, such as the demand for demilitarization of the countryside to lay the groundwork for such reform, are simply unrealistic. The demand would have meant reducing the military budget and the size of the Colombian armed forces, and revising the state’s military doctrine. If the Santos government conceded that point, it would have effectively removed the army as a presence in rural areas—an obvious deal-breaker. Just as far-fetched are FARC demands for major revisions to existing mining, energy and foreign investment policies, as well as reform of the 11 bilateral free trade treaties that Colombia has signed. But the demands don’t stop there. Perhaps the guerrillas’ most audacious demand is one that gives the FARC control of 40 percent of the national territory through the creation of rural reserve zones and other territorial divisions. According to the proposal, these zones would have full economic, fiscal, judicial, and cultural autonomy and be completely demilitarized. Under such a plan, Colombian national territory would be fractured—something the Colombian government clearly will never accept. Moreover, the FARC maintains that it should be granted total impunity, allowing it to escape prosecution for human rights abuses. This idea has been rejected by the vast majority of the public, human rights NGOs and the attorney general. Although the Santos government pushed through constitutional reform guaranteeing impunity to bring the guerrillas to the negotiating table, the International Criminal Court (ICC) made clear it would refuse to recognize any such guarantees. Citing Colombia’s position as a signatory of the 2002 Rome Statute, which empowered the ICC to investigate crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and crimes of aggression, the court has warned that it would intervene. For the time being, the two positions seem irreconcilable. But no peace agreement is possible unless this is addressed. Another obstacle is the arms issue. The FARC made it clear it will not disarm until the Colombian state has complied with all of the provisions agreed upon in the eventual peace accord. Government spokespeople say that even if this condition were accepted, disarmament would take at least 10 years. Effectively, that means the guerrilla group would maintain its weapons, leaving Colombia in a state of armed peace and effectively holding the government hostage to the FARC’s judgment about whether it has upheld its side of the bargain. If the government agreed to this, it would be defying public opinion. According to polls, the vast majority of Colombian citizens insist on the FARC’s total disarmament as a condition of the peace treaty and reject any agreement that would allow the guerrillas to maintain both their weapons and their political leverage. The FARC is aware that even in the unlikely situation that the country’s political leadership concedes to demands for impunity, control of territories, radical Castro- or Chávez-style economic reforms, and unfettered possession of arms, the Colombian people will not. For this reason, it wants the agreed-upon points to be voted on by a constituent assembly, and—if passed—incorporated in the Constitution. Their hope is that in a constituent assembly charged with amending the Constitution, they would enjoy more support than in a popular referendum, which the Santos government prefers. The FARC has warned that if the government does not agree to a constituent assembly, the armed conflict will continue. To apply pressure to negotiations, the FARC has resorted to a campaign of sabotage, hostage-taking, extortion, and terrorism. Despite the surge in violence, the government has not walked away from the negotiating table. Santos’ political future largely depends on the success of the peace talks, since his approval rating has dropped to 21 percent. The government has ignored the FARC’s more onerous demands, while spreading the illusion that a deal could be reached in just a few months. Most Colombians don’t believe it. The campaigns for parliamentary and presidential elections will begin in a few months. With guerrilla violence and public skepticism (and fatigue) rising, it’s unlikely that the government will risk any unpopular concessions at the negotiating table during the electoral season. If the declining popular support for the Santos administration doesn’t torpedo the peace talks, the FARC’s overly-ambitious demands certainly will.