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CIAO DATE: 5/00
Neo-Techno-Nationalism: How and Why It Grows
International Studies Association Convention
Los Angeles, California
March 14-18, 2000
The aim of this paper is to discuss the following points:
(1) The changing nature of nationalism in major nations’ technology policies today can be better understood as the rise of neo-techno-nationalism, rather than as the conflict between (old) techno-nationalism and techno-globalism.
(2) Neo-techno-nationalism has risen because of the glocalization — the co-evolution of globalization and localization ˆ of technology.
Section One involves the discussion of why the conventional dichotomy of techno-nationalism and techno-globalism is inadequate for a better understanding of the ongoing changes in technology policies, and what neo-techno-nationalism means and how it has risen. Examples in the United States, Japan and other major nations are provided to illustrate these points. Section Two involves the discussion of what the glocalization of technology means, and how and why it has developed. Section Three offers a set of hypotheses on how the glocalization of technology can lead to the rise of neo-techno-nationalism. In short, Sections One and Two define the dependent variable (the rise of neo-techno-nationalism) and the independent variable (the development of glocalization) respectively, and Section Three explains the causal link between the two variables. Finally in Section Four, some implications for IR theories will be discussed.
The Rise of Neo-Techno-Nationalism
Nationalism in technology promotion has been labeled as techno-nationalism, usually contrasted with techno-globalism.
Although no standard definition exists, in common usage, techno-nationalism refers to such public policies that “target” the strategic (usually high-tech) industries and give them various governmental support: government procurements, import restrictions, export subsidies, research and development (R&D) subsidies, R&D tax credits, controls on inward foreign direct investments, protection of intellectual properties, government-funded R&D projects, and others. All support is given only to domestic firms (i.e. firms owned by its own citizens), for their aim is to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic industries against foreign rivals in a growing world market.
By contrast, techno-globalism refers to the ideas that, in today’s increasingly integrated world, the globalization of technology is both unavoidable and desirable for all nations, firms and citizens: technology development is not a zero-sum game, but a plus-sum game in which all nations can and should cooperate to develop technologies crucial to the sustainable economic growth. As high-tech firms become more and more global, the nationality of firms and technologies means less and less, and the technology policies that aim to support only “domestic” firms are, according to this view, outdated. Innovation is supposed to be driven by global market forces, without being disturbed by politics and national borders.
Both isms are ideal types, and the actual technology policy of any major nations is a mixture of the two: some measures are techno-nationalistic, while others are in accordance with techno-globalism. Various explanations have been advanced to account for this dualism. Some argue that, while the economic rationale urges nations to adopt techno-globalism, techno-nationalism remains because of the politics ˆ e.g., demands from less competitive domestic industries, needs to countervail the “unfair” targeting policies of foreign nations, and the policy-makers’ unwillingness to change the existing policies. Others see a pendulum swinging between the two: techno-nationalism grows when a nation faces severe competition with foreign rivals, while techno-globalism flourishes during an economic boom. Still others claim that some nations (esp. Japan and some other East Asian nations) are inherently techno-nationalistic, while others (esp. the U.S.) are more market-oriented and thus more inclined towards techno-globalism.
My argument is that the conventional dichotomy of techno-nationalism and techno-globalism, which all the existing arguments are based on, is inadequate for a better understanding of the changing nature of all major nations’ technology policy today. The existing arguments see the actual technology policy of nations as if it were a salad bowl into which the contradicting elements of nationalism and globalism were joined together randomly. True, the actual policy is a mixture, but it should be seen not as a mere mixture of contradicting elements, but as a hybrid that consists of the elements complementing each other. The hybrid as a whole is a response by nations to the essential changes in today’s international political economy. I call the hybrid neo-techno-nationalism, and argue that it has grown as a response to the ongoing glocalization of technology. Nations take neo-techno-nationalistic policies in order to meet the challenges posed by glocalization and advance their own national interests in a “glocalized” economy.
What I call here neo-techno-nationalism has four main characteristics: expanded state commitments to promote technical innovation domestically; further reliance on the private initiative and the public-private partnerships; further openness toward foreign R&D entities; and expanded commitments for international rule-making and policy coordination.
(1) Expanded state commitments
Despite the widely shared view that economic globalization is creating a “border-less” world and nullifying the geography-based nation-states, all major states are now expanding their commitments to promote technical innovation within their own boundaries.
Just after the inauguration in 1993, the Clinton administration announced its Technology Policy Initiative. It pronounced that “Investing in technology is investing in America’s future” and that America should move in a “new direction.” The new direction was to place more emphasis on the industrial technologies that would become more and more crucial for the economic growth and prosperity of nations in the coming decades, than on the military technologies that the U.S. had concentrated on during the Cold War. While reducing the military R&D expenditures, the administration has established and expanded some programs for industrial technology development. It also started the Information Super-Highway project to construct the world-best infrastructures for the fast growing information and communication technology.
By the mid-1990s, Japan had defined its new goal for the 21st century in science and technology (S&T) policies by making itself a kagaku gijutsu sozo rikkoku (S&T Creative Nation). In July 1996 the Cabinet approved the S&T Basic Plan which included an attempt to double the government S&T spending during 1996-2000.
In Europe, while each nation is pursuing its own technology policies, some large-scale pan-European projects are underway. Famous among them is EUREKA, a Europe-wide network for industrial R&D. Currently with 26 European countries, EUREKA aims to increase European competitiveness in high-tech markets against the U.S. and Japan. One of its largest programs is JESSI (Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative), which was succeeded in June 1996 by the MEDEA (Micro-Electronics Development for European Applications) program.
In 1996 Malaysia began the Multimedia Super Corridor project, an ambitious plan to make itself the technology hub in Asia. The project is at the heart of a more encompassing plan, Vision 2020, to make Malaysia one of the most advanced industrialized nations by the year 2020. Similarly in Singapore, the IT (Information and Technology) 2000 project is underway. It includes Singapore One, a plan to establish a nation-wide network that connects everyone in the country ˆ central and local governments, offices, and houses - via high-speed cables. In 1995 Taiwan started the Asia-Pacific Operation Center project, which aims to make Taiwan a “high-tech island” in the region. China also began in 1996 the 9th Five-year Plan that emphasizes the promotion of information and communication technology.
(2) Public-private partnerships
In traditional techno-nationalistic policies, governments were supposed to “select winners” and lead the direction of innovation. Proponents of techno-globalism, on the other hand, assert that only the private sector can efficiently promote innovation through competition in a global market. Today in all major nations, it is the private sector that takes the initiative. However the governments have not just withdrawn. Rather, they have defined their new roles, recognizing the growing importance of “partnerships” between the public and private sectors.
Partnerships have been an integral part in the Japanese government-sponsored industrial R&D programs. The Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit (VSLI) project between 1975 and 1981, co-funded by MITI and participating firms, helped the Japanese semiconductor manufacturers catch up and later overtake U.S. giants such as IBM, Texas Instruments and Motorola.
By the early 1980s, the success of Japanese collaborative R&D led to a paradigm shift in the U.S. where the government had been reluctant to support the non-military technology R&D. In 1987, the U.S. government and industry established SEMATECH (SEmiconductor MAnufacturing TECHnology), which was the first public-private cost-sharing project in U.S. history for the commercial technology R&D.
“Partnerships” became one of the catchwords in the Clinton administration’s Technology Policy Initiative. The administration has boasted the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) as a showcase of the successful public-private partnerships in the U.S. The ATP was created in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and has been expanded dramatically under the Clinton administration to support the creation and commercialization of highly innovative “generic” technologies that are expected to benefit the entire national economy. It is private firms that propose R&D plans, carry out the research, and commercialize the results. However, because the costs and risks in developing generic technologies are too large for private firms to bear, the government supports about half of all R&D expenditure. Since its inception through 1997, the ATP has received over 3,000 applications and funded 352 projects. Slightly over $2.3 billion has been committed, shared by the industry and the government.
Pan-European R&D programs, including EUREKA, also take the form of cost-sharing between the public and private sectors. EUREKA was created in 1985 and by 1995 a total of 14.5 billion ECU had been invested in more than 650 projects involving 2400 firms and 1100 other participants. Firms from all EUREKA member countries can propose collaborative projects on a bottom-up basis. Each project must involve at least two partners from two different member countries. Decisions on funding are then made by their respective governments.
(3) More openness toward foreigners
In the traditional techno-nationalistic policies, all governmental support is given only to “domestic” firms and institutions. Today, many government-funded R&D programs are internationalized, i.e., allowing the participation of foreign entities. However, unlike pure techno-globalism, those programs are open to foreigners only under some conditions.
The Advanced Technology Program welcomes applications from not only U.S.-owned companies but also U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies (i.e., U.S.-based companies that are majority owned or controlled by non-U.S. citizens). Furthermore, many such companies have been actually awarded U.S. government subsidies for their R&D efforts: in 1997, 29 active or completed ATP projects involved 33 participants who are U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies, representing 12 different countries. Foreign-owned subsidiaries are also eligible for U.S. government-funded programs such as Co-operative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and some R&D programs administered by the Department of Energy.
Japan has long been notorious for its “closeness” in its technology policies. Recently, however, in an attempt to make Japan an S&T Creative Nation, the government announced its intention to make the Japanese R&D system open to international society. Several government-funded R&D programs have already involved foreign participants. New Sunshine Program, one of the largest industrial R&D programs administered by MITI, has four projects in which American, Canadian and other foreign firms and research institutions participate. The Industrial Science and Technology Frontier Program also administered by MITI has 13 projects that involve foreign entities, out of 21 ongoing projects in 1997. Japan Key Technology Center program, a Japanese counterpart of the ATP, also accepts the participation of foreign-owned companies.
ESPRIT (the European Strategic Program for Research and Development in Information Technology), one of the largest EU-wide R&D programs, has accepted the participation of two world giant IT firms, IBM and Fujitsu. Some EUREKA projects have also allowed the participation of foreign-owned companies since the late 1980s.
Malaysia has been eager to invite foreign-owned companies since the beginning of the Multimedia Super Corridor project. In fact, Malaysia regards foreign high-tech firms’ participation as a key to the success of its ambitious plan. Executives of world giant firms such as IBM and Hewlett Packard have been invited to the advisory panel of the government, and 228 companies have signed up to invest in the MSC. Malaysia’s rivals, especially Singapore and Hong Kong, are now competing to attract foreign high-tech firms into their territories.
Although participation by foreign-owned firms in government-funded R&D programs is increasing in many countries, often the participation is accepted only under some conditions. According to a recent OECD report, participation is most often limited to domiciled foreign-owned firms (those with substantial R&D or production facilities in the country). In the ATP, for example, only “U.S-based” foreign-owned companies are eligible.
Other major requirements include reciprocity and domestic exploitation. The ATP admits a foreign-owned firm only if the company’s home country grants
U.S firms equal access to its government-funded technology programs. The ATP also requires participating foreign-owned firms to exploit the technology developed in the ATP project within the U.S. (e.g. to use the technology at U.S. manufacturing sites). ____⁄_
The OECD report suggests that these restrictions exist widely in OECD countries.
(4) International rule-making and policy coordination
Techno-nationalism tends to worsen international conflict, while techno-globalism is expected to nurture international cooperation. Neo-techno-nationalism expands the opportunities for both conflict and cooperation, as the globalization of technology demands more and more international rule-making and policy coordination among nations.
As the cross-border transaction among companies, scientists, engineers, and research institutions increases, the demand for international rule-making and policy coordination also increases to ensure those entities a freer and fairer global business environment. Governments have expanded their commitments to arrange international regimes that would promote the innovation of their own companies on a global scale, through both bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Trade negotiations have always been both cooperative and conflictual. A series of GATT negotiations have dramatically reduced protectionist tariffs of all nations. Some international codes were made during the Tokyo Round for the non-tariff barriers as well, including government procurements, anti-dumping, government subsidies, and standards. Nevertheless, trade frictions have never ceased, as we have witnessed. Explicit techno-nationalistic trade measures have mostly disappeared, but more implicit ones (e.g. Japanese business practices) and some unilateral measures (e.g. the U.S. anti-dumping law and the Super 301 section) have led to conflicts among nations.
Another telling story involves the negotiations on intellectual property rights (IPRs). As the internationalization of patents, copyrights and other intellectual properties proceeds, demands for the harmonization of IPR policy increases and a series of negotiations has continued at the WTO, the WIPO and other international forums. Agreements have been made regarding the procedures, such as the internationally unified patent application procedure and the international patent database. For more essential principles, however, confrontations remain. One is between the first-to-invent principle of the U.S. patent law and the first-to-apply principle that Japan, Europe and other major nations hold. Another confrontation exists between the pro-patent attitude of industrialized nations and the anti-patent attitude of developing nations.
Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) have become an international political issue at the Uruguay Round and the OECD forums. In traditional techno-nationalism, governments were mostly concerned about whether the acquisition of domestic high-tech firms by foreigners would damage the technology base of the nation. Today, they are more eager to invite foreigners who have technology and money, into their own soil. However controversies remain on the harmonization of TRIMs that currently vary among nations, including the controls over share holding and the local contents. The negotiation at the OECD on the Multinational Agreement of Investment (MAI) has come to a deadlock.
The incentive for international cooperation is stronger today than the traditional techno-nationalists imagined, for all nations’ R&D activities will suffer if no stable international regime exists. However, contrary to the expectation of techno-globalists, the harmonization of interests cannot be achieved automatically and easily.
Table 1 summarizes the differences between techno-nationalism, techno-globalism, and neo-techno-nationalism as discussed above.
Table 1. Differences between the three isms
| Techno-nationalism | Techno-globalism | Neo-techno-nationalism | |
| Policy goal: promote whose interests and how? | National interests, by preventing globalization | Global interests, by leveraging globalization | National interests, by leveraging globalization |
| Who leads innovation? | Government targeting | Global market forces | Private initiative and public-private partnerships |
| Open/closed toward foreigners | Closed | Open | Open under certain conditions |
| Prospects for conflict/cooperation | Conflict | Cooperation | Cooperation AND conflict |
II. The Development of Glocalization
To understand why neo-techno-nationalism is growing today, one needs to understand how the glocalization ˆ the co-evolution of globalization and localization ˆ of technology affects national policies and corporate strategies.
As for globalization, a large body of literature already exists and it is still growing.
A number of indexes have been used to show the unprecedented speed, scale and depth of today’s globalization of technology: the rapid growth of technology trade; the internationalization of R&D, represented by the growth of R&D foreign direct investments; the increasing share of patent applications made from and to foreign nations; and the rapid expansion of strategic alliances between companies of different nationalities.
True, their impacts should not be underestimated, but globalization is only one side of a coin. The other side, localization, also increases in importance in today’s international political economy.
While the globalization of technology is the diffusion of technology across borders, the localization of technology is the accumulation of technology within a certain geographic area. Silicon Valley is an area where the localization of microelectronics technology has developed. It has attracted more and more world leading firms and engineers, as its reputation grows as the Mecca for semiconductor and computer technologies. Other localization sites in the U.S. include Silicon Alley in Manhattan (Internet-related technologies), Medical Alley in Minneapolis (medical equipment technologies), and the Route 128 area in Boston (information technologies).
Localization can be seen at the international level as well. Germany has traditionally been competitive in chemical technology, and is even more so today as many foreign chemical firms set their R&D facilities in Germany. The same is true for biotechnology in the U.K., aerospace and information teechnologies in the U.S., consumer electronics and manufacturing technologies in Japan, and computer software development in India.
But here lies a paradox. In a global economy – in which_rapid transportation and high-speed, around-the-clock communication____ enable all companies to do their business wherever they want — the importance of location and geography is supposed to diminish.
Then, why the localization?
Location matters, first at the inter-personal level, because of the nature of technology as knowledge. Knowledge, including technology, can be divided into two types: codified knowledge and tacit knowledge. Codified knowledge is the kind of knowledge that is expressed in the form of books and articles, charts, pictures, and so forth. It is explicit and relatively easy to transfer. On the other hand, tacit knowledge is the kind of knowledge that remains only in an implicit form, often as a complex and vague idea shared only by a small number of colleagues working together daily. Its transfer is slow and costly. Only the members of the technology “community” can have access to it. As technology becomes more specific and sophisticated, the role of tacit knowledge in the complex innovation process increases, and so does the importance of being an insider of the community. Firms and engineers are attracted to the location in order to get the knowledge that otherwise they cannot have.
Second, at the inter-firm and inter-industry level, location matters because it can enhance the synergy effects between firms and between industries. Michael Porter explains how it works, using the concept of “clusters.” Clusters are geographic concentration of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field. They include both upstream and downstream companies, customers, universities, government agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, and trade associations. The competitiveness of companies is strongly influenced by the quality of the local business environment. Being part of a cluster allows them to operate more productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology, and required institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement. Once a cluster begins to form, a self-reinforcing cycle promotes its growth. Porter asserts that, somewhat paradoxically, the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly in local things that distant rivals cannot match.
Third, at the international level, location matters because technology is for the most part embedded in the “national systems of innovation.” A national system of innovation is “the network of institution in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.”
It includes such various institutions as: the government-industry-university relationships; the relationship among firms; patents, copyrights and other intellectual property laws; bank systems and other financial institutions; and science and technology educational systems. These institutions are shaped by history and culture, and each nation has its own system of innovation. According to the theory of national systems of innovation, a nation which has a leading edge in, say, biotechnology, has a somewhat better national system of innovation for biotechnology than other nations — e.g., historically close relationships between the nation’s world-class universities and industry. Such a better system of innovation attracts foreign firms into its soil. A national system of innovation tends to persist over a long period of time, and by successfully adjusting itself to the technological and other changes in the business environments, it can reinforce itself.
These are the driving forces for the localization of technology today. Most of the globalization literature does not pay enough attention to localization, which makes their argument one-sided. Both globalization and localization simultaneously affect the technology policies of major nations. The next section discusses how it functions.
III. Glocalization and Neo-Techno-Nationalism: Hypotheses
Below I construct a set of hypotheses to explain how the development of the glocalization of technology has led to the rise of neo-techno-nationalism in today’s international political economy.
First, for theoretical purposes, I distinguish domestic technology policies from foreign technology policies. Domestic technology policies are policies that the government makes and implements in order to promote technical innovation within the country. Those policies are aimed at domestic R&D entities, i.e., companies owned by its own citizens, universities, and public research institutions. Foreign technology policies are policies that the government makes and implements in order to promote technical innovation of the nation outside the country, i.e., globally. Those policies are aimed at foreign entities, i.e., foreign governments, foreign-owned companies, foreign universities, and foreign research institutions.
Second, it is assumed that, under the glocalization of technology, globalization and localization respectively and simultaneously affect the technology policies of nations. Globalization affects both domestic and foreign technology policies in its own ways. Localization affects both types of policies in its own way, too. Thus we can construct a table concerning the effects of glocalization on the technology policies of nations, as shown below.
Table 2. Effects of glocalization on technology policies
| Globalization of technology | Localization of technology | |
| Domestic technology policies | (A) Further reliance on private initiative and public-private partnerships | (C) Expanded commitments to promote innovation domestically |
| Foreign technology policies | (B) Expanded commitments for international rule-making and policy coordination | (D) Further openness toward foreign R&D entities |
Cell A is the hypothesis regarding the effects of globalization of technology on domestic technology policies. In a world where firms of many nationalities are ready to make R&D investment wherever necessary, it is increasingly difficult to create a new technology that will remain within national borders for very long.
What governments can do in promoting innovation has certainly changed. Innovation in a global era is driven mainly by competition in a global market. One task for governments is, instead of selecting winners through various regulations and controls, to let the private sector take the initiative, and let them act freely and globally to exploit the opportunities open to them. In this sense, the traditional techno-nationalistic policies became outdated, as proponents of techno-globalism have argued.
However, the present global competition puts higher costs and risks upon the private sector than before so that no firm, no matter how large, can bear them alone. To share costs and risks, firms need partners. They need to work with universities and research institutions, with clients and regulatory agencies, and even with competitors.
Alliances have been formed among firms across borders for the development of near-market technologies. For more basic scientific research, which is essential as the foundation of innovation but requires sufficient time and high costs, firms need governments as their partners. All major countries recognize this, and put a greater emphasis on the public-private partnerships in their technology policies. In sum, other things being equal, the globalization of technology will push governments to rely more on private initiative and public-private partnerships in promoting innovation (Cell A).
At the same time, the globalization of technology pushes governments to expand their commitments for international rule-making and policy coordination (Cell B). This is because, as the cross-border transaction of technologies and R&D entities (firms, scientists, engineers, and research institutions) increases, governments receive greater pressures from those entities to secure a fair and stable R&D environment on a global scale. International negotiations have been expanded in all areas of trade, intellectual property rights, and foreign direct investments. This enlarges opportunities for both cooperation and conflict among nations. Governments have greater incentives today for international rule-making and policy coordination than before because, without a stable international regime, the global exploitation of technology by their firms will be disturbed and the innovation of the nation will be hampered. However, what they need most is an international regime that would help promote their own national innovation. Thus, while nations may agree on how to coordinate the procedures, conflict can remain regarding the principles of the regime.
The localization of technology, on the other hand, will press governments to expand their commitments in domestic technology policies to enhance the domestic R&D environment (Cell C). As discussed in the previous section, localization is the concentration and accumulation of technology and R&D entities in certain geographic areas (clusters). All nations want to have clusters within their own boundaries. Governments recognize that, in order to encourage the development of localization in their countries, they must build a world-class research infrastructure. In other words, they need to improve their national systems of innovation in order to attract more R&D activities and enhance their own domestic technology base. Necessary measures may differ among nations, since each nation has its own national system of innovation with its own strengths and weaknesses that have been historically shaped. They would include increasing public investment in R&D infrastructure, universities and public research institutions; establishing a legal system for intellectual properties that encourages both creation and diffusion of new technologies; a competitive financial system that encourages investment in innovation; and an education and training system for an abundant skilled labor force.
In order to promote localization within their own boundaries, attracting R&D investment from abroad is crucial. Governments need to pave the way for the foreign R&D investments to come. Thus the localization of technology will urge governments to lower the old techno-nationalistic barriers against foreign R&D entities (Cell D). But openness alone is not sufficient to promote localization. Governments should attempt to capture greater benefits from those foreign R&D investments, maximizing the spillovers for the domestic economy. Certain conditions are set for that purpose. Often government-funded R&D programs are open only to domiciled foreign-owned companies, and they are required to exploit new technology only domestically for a certain period of time. These requirements are set to make sure that the participating foreign-owned companies are anything more than “listening posts” which do not contribute to the domestic research base. Also common is the reciprocity requirement, which is set to ensure that domestic companies can gain as much access to foreign R&D programs as foreign companies can in the country.
In sum, technology policies of major nations have been changing to put more emphases on A) private initiative and public-private partnerships; B) international rule-making and policy-coordination; C) promotion of domestic innovation; and D) openness toward foreign R&D entities under certain conditions. These four elements complement each other and they as a whole form what I call neo-techno-nationalism, which is the reaction by nations to the challenges and opportunities posed by the glocalization of technology. Unlike the old techno-nationalism, neo-techno-nationalism does not intend to prevent the global flow of technology. Rather, it aims to leverage globalization. But unlike the idealistic techno-nationalism, its goal is to advance national interests, rather than global interests, by encouraging localization and promoting further innovation that will be even more crucial for economic growth and prosperity in the 21st century.
Theoretical Implications
The theoretical model presented above is a primitive one that needs further elaboration. Efforts are especially necessary to consider the interaction between the two variables, for states are not only reacting to glocalization but are also affecting the pace and scale of glocalization. Also required are empirical tests in different nations, different industrial sectors, and different time periods. I believe such efforts will also contribute to the advancement of IR theories in general.
(1) Globalization and nation-states
Students of IR have continuously debated how economic globalization affects the roles and functions of nation-states. Although few would accept such a simplistic view that nation-states will disappear, no clear answer exists to the question of how they will change. This paper has shown that nations have changed themselves to become neo-techno-nationalistic states as they respond to the glocalization of technology. It is important to see both sides of the coin, glocalization, in any attempts to analyze the changes that nation-states are experiencing today. Otherwise one can see only part of the changes.
(2) Globalization and international cooperation
Another controversy remains regarding whether economic globalization will promote international cooperation or not.
Related to this issue is the debate on whether globalization promotes the conversion of national economies and policies among nations.
The implication of this paper is that, by taking into account both globalization and localization, one would expect cooperation and conversion in some areas but not in others. Incentives for cooperation have increased as each nation needs stable international regimes to promote innovation, but conflicts will remain because it is its own innovation, not necessarily global innovation, that a neo-techno-nationalistic nation aims to promote. Policy conversion will increase as all nations adopt more or less neo-techno-nationalistic policies, but diversion may also increase because each nation has its own strengths and weaknesses in its national innovation system and may use different policy tools to improve the system. Efforts are necessary to specify in which areas cooperation and conversion can be more expected and why.
References
Sylvia Ostry and Richard R. Nelson, Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: Conflict and Cooperation, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995.
For a good summary of various arguments see Candice Stevens, “Technoglobalism vs. Technonationalism: the Corporation Dilemma,” Columbia Journal of World Business, 25:3 (Fall 1990), pp.42-9.
The full text of the Technology Policy Initiative can be found in William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Jr., Technology for America’s Economic Growth: A New Direction to Build Economic Strength, Washington, D.C.: White House Press Office, February 22, 1993.
Special Issue on “Public/Private Partnerships in Science and Technology,” STI Review, No.23, 1999.
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, The ATP: A Progress Report on the Impacts of an Industry-Government Technology Partnership, Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, April 26, 1996.
National Institute of Standards and Technology, ATP Eligibility Criteria for U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Owned Companies, NISTIR-6099, Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, January 1998; and Office of Technology Assessment, Foreign Eligibility for U.S. Technology Funding, OTA-BP-ITC-154, Washington, D.C.: GOP, September 1995.
OECD, Foreign Access to Technology Programmes, OECD/GD(97)209, Paris: OECD, 1997.
For a deliberate analysis of the globalization of technology, see Daniel Archibugi and Jonathan Michie, “The Globalization of Technology: a New Taxonomy,” in Archibugi and Michie, eds., Technology, Globalisation and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.172-197.
For these data, see for example OECD, Internationalisation of Industrial R&D: Patterns and Trends, Paris: OECD, 1998.
See for example Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.
See for example Jacqueline Senker, “The Contribution of Tacit Knowledge to Innovation,” AI & Society, 7:3 (1993), pp.208-224.
Michael E. Porter, “Clusters and the New Economics of Competition,” Harvard Business Reviews, November-December 1998, pp.77-90. See also by the same author The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: The Free Press, 1990, esp. chapter 4.
Christopher Freeman, Technology and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, London: Pinter, 1987.
For a discussion of the national systems of innovation, see Freeman (1987); Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed., National Systems of Innovation, London: Pinter, 1992; Richard R. Nelson, ed., National Innovation Systems: a Comparative Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; and OECD, National Innovation Systems, Paris: OECD, 1997.
Richard R. Nelson and Gavin Wright, “The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature, 30:4 (December 1992), pp.1931-1964.
Jean Guinet and Dirk Pilat, “Promoting Innovation ˆ Does It Matter?” OECD Observer, No.217/218, Summer 1999, pp.5-7.
For various arguments regarding globalization and international cooperation, see for example Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
For a discussion of the conversion hypothesis, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
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