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CIAO DATE: 5/99
Critical Assessment of the Achievements of FR Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy *
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Belgrade
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Abstract
The paper deals with the effects of the foreign policy and diplomatic practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the period from 1992 until today. All the analyzed characteristics of contemporary Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy indicate that FR Yugoslavia basically still has not drawn the proper conclusions from its failures owing to the fact that in the process of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia its political elite started from practically unfeasible goals (having in mind international norms and the attitudes of the major actors in the international community). These goals were intended to be achieved in a manner and with means that the contemporary international community does not accept. The political elite of FR Yugoslavia seem to be permanent captives of many illusions that have turned the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy into unsuccessful instruments of a strategy that is not based upon reality, law and ethics. The strategic and tactical directions of Yugoslav diplomacy’s actions are mainly of a palliative, temporary and short-term character because they are based on many unrealistic evaluations of both contemporary relations in general, and of some concrete questions. These range from counting on the maturing of a new “ Cold War” in relations between the USA and Russia, to expecting to benefit from Russia’s destabilization and overestimating differences in the nuances that emerge between the United States and Western Europe and within the European Union with regard to certain aspects of the crisis in the Balkans. However, maybe the most serious reason for the failure of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomacy lies in the lack of readiness of its actors — on the mental and political level — to accept democratic norms both in international and internal conduct.
1. Aims and approach
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate and critically comment on the effects of the foreign policy and diplomatic practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the period from 1992 till today. The aim is much more to stimulate the opening of a thorough discussion and to initiate further research of this problem, and much less to offer final conclusions. Although these evaluations are believed correct, the presented theses should be understood as preliminary since they are based upon the results of still ongoing research; also, the phenomenon in focus is one that is still going on. Therefore, this analysis should be understood as an initial step towards a more precise valorization of the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia. Its conclusions should be taken primarily as working hypotheses which will be either challenged or confirmed to a greater or lesser extent by the results of the research project being conducted by a team from the independent Center for Strategic Studies from Belgrade.
Measuring the effects of any foreign policy and/or diplomacy is an unrewarding and rather difficult task. This is even more so when we are dealing with newly created states which are not only in the process of establishing and promoting their international position, but are, in a way, still in the process of defining their national interests. Therefore, identifying the foreign policy priorities and the organization of diplomacy in these and such countries is objectively a far more difficult and demanding task than for states which have already defined the elementary aspects of their national interests, which have a democratically supported foreign policy strategy and have an established diplomatic service.
The assessment of any foreign policy and/or diplomacy depends upon many parameters. In this paper, the evaluation of the effects of FR Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomacy is based on the following points:
First, how much do foreign policy and diplomacy (which is a tool for achieving foreign policy results) contribute to the fulfillment of national interests, goals and values ? Here one could avoid a strict definition of these notions and make use of the already established definitions given by Valery Manilov 1 of the elements that constitute a substantial parameter of success of any foreign policy and diplomacy. The absence of at least a minimal articulation of these interests, goals and values is a serious handicap for any state and, consequently, any diplomacy. It is beyond doubt that even the most able diplomacy cannot be successful if the goals that it should achieve are unclear or unrealistic, or contrary to leading tendencies in international relations. The opposite is also true: in countries which have a clear perception of their basic national interests, and if these interests enjoy a democratically established internal consensus, such diplomacies have a much simpler task — to achieve goals that are relatively known and are more or less feasible.
Second, when it comes to the realization of interests, goals and values, does the national diplomacy have at its disposal an articulated, not contradictory, and adequate foreign policy strategy and defined tasks that have to be fulfilled within the context of this strategy? Apart from the above-mentioned clear perception of basic national interests, goals and values, a crucial prerequisite to a successful and feasible strategy is an objective understanding of the main parameters of the current international situation . This includes relations among the main actors in the world and the distribution of power among them and, in particular, the real and potential perspectives of making alliances among those states in regard to which the established goals are in conflict. If they want to be successful, foreign policy and diplomacy must be able to adapt to changes in the international surroundings, to new and emerging features of the international environment; they must be able to use these features for the optimal valorization of their country’s advantages or to relativize its shortcomings. To make this possible, there must be an operational and feasible foreign policy strategy that will be compatible with the strategy of other states. This last element is of special significance.
The third parameter of diplomacy’s diplomatic success that will be taken into account in this analysis pertains to the means that a state has at its disposal for the implementation and realization of its foreign policy strategy. Here we have in mind, first of all, an adequate diplomatic service (apparatus), a network of diplomatic missions, adequate financial resources and the necessary expert support. This last point implies the need for the diplomatic service to have at its disposal competent, well-educated and skillful people who will be able to combine broad-mindedness and an inclination for compromise wherever possible with a firm and convincing attitude in promoting their country’s interests in the best way. The ability to negotiate and make rational compromises is a crucial indicator of a diplomacy’s quality, because this is the way to avoid unnecessary conflicts and strengthen the reputation and credibility of the country. 2
Using these parameters as a broader framework, we shall try to evaluate the successfulness of the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia primarily through:
Like the other newly created states-successors of the former Yugoslavia, FR Yugoslavia has found itself in the position where it must formulate its foreign policy strategy and establish its diplomatic service that should respond to very complex needs (needs that every country that is looking for international affirmation is facing); this must be accomplished as part of ongoing practice, and in a new international and regional setting brimming with new processes. Like the other successor countries, FR Yugoslavia has in a way “inherited” — whether it likes it or not — the effects and practices of the diplomacy of the disintegrated SFR Yugoslavia. It is generally accepted that during most of its existence SFR Yugoslavia — although not a democratic country — successfully valorized its geopolitical advantage in conditions of bloc confrontation; the result was that the country had diplomatic “weight” that far exceeded its size, economic and military strength, and its population.
In an attempt to comprehend the effects and most important features of FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy, at least two preliminary remarks should be made:
First, the syntagma “foreign policy of FR Yugoslavia”, or “the diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia” hardly makes any sense in view of the fact that the two federal units that constitute FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have diametrically opposing evaluations of the new international environment and strategic directions upon which the foreign policy of the country should be based and upon which its diplomacy should act. After the October 1997 elections, the conflict between Serbia (which is in complete control of the federal government through individuals from Montenegro who are faithful to her), and Montenegro, headed by President Djukanovic, has evolved to the point where it is impossible to talk about FR Yugoslavia (the federation of Montenegro and Serbia) conducting one, unique foreign policy. However, the federal government continues to formally respect the adopted parity with regard to the representation of both federal units in federal bodies, hence, also in diplomacy. In these bodies Montenegro is represented by supporters of Mr. Momir Bulatovic who lost the elections, but in the meantime was inaugurated by Mr. Milosevic to the position of federal Prime Minister.
Second, in the analyzed period of 1992-1998 the informal center of the political decision-making process in FR Yugoslavia, including foreign policy issues, was shifting to the function held by the most influential political personality in the country, the current president of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic. Up to 1997 the real decision-making center with regard to foreign policy issues was Mr. Milosevic in his capacity as the president of Serbia, one of the federal units (in that capacity he was also one of the signatories to the Dayton Agreements on ending the war in Bosnia). Until 1997, when Mr. Milosevic was elected president of FR Yugoslavia, federal bodies were completely marginalized in foreign policy decision making; after he was elected president of Yugoslavia, they gained importance, but not in the manner envisaged by the Constitution of the country. According to the Constitution, the federal government has the main authority in foreign policy matters; instead the decision-making center and essential leadership in this regard has now shifted to the level of the president of Yugoslavia. In the entire period being examined, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been under the substantial control of Mr. Milosevic, and all foreign ministers of FR Yugoslavia from 1992 until today have been high officials in the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and individuals enjoying Mr. Milosevic’s highest confidence. 3
Hence, when we use the syntagmas “Yugoslav foreign policy” or “Yugoslav diplomacy”, we have in mind the foreign policy/diplomacy personified by the president of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of the federal government that is not recognized by Montenegro.
2. The foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia and new processes in the international community
Changes in the international community that occurred in the 1990s have been interpreted by Yugoslav diplomacy in a way that, already at first glance, reflects a deep misunderstanding of the essence and character of these changes. The system of values established in the Cold War period has remained strongly rooted in the standpoints and behavior of Yugoslav diplomacy, and certain shifts in the perception of the world during 1992-1998 have been mainly of a negative nature. The distance from the foreign outside world and deep mistrust (especially with regard to the USA and the West in general) have been constantly growing, and so have isolationist and xenophobic attitudes, whilst tolerance with regard to the international community and openness towards the world have been weakening. Among Yugoslav foreign policy decision-makers and diplomats, values based on the realities of the world before 1989, i.e. a world divided into blocs, were unexpectedly widespread. Now these have been supplemented by statements from officials on the categorical significance of secret combinations being made by “world power holders” against small peoples and states, on the malicious intentions of most international actors when it comes to the interests of FR Yugoslavia and, generally speaking, on increased mistrust with regard to anything coming from the world. In other words, there is a big gap between what has really been going on in the international community with regard to basic social and political processes and the rules of conduct of the international actors, on the one hand, and what Yugoslav diplomacy has been trying to convince itself and the domestic public is true, on the other. This is a gap, one would say, that should cause worries.
The above statement would be hard to prove if we were to rely solely upon the statements of officials and programmatic declarations of the respective organs and parties with decisive influence on the formulation of FR Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomatic methods. Namely, we find a completely different picture on the level of programmatic statements. In contrast to the concrete moves of diplomacy and practice developed in communication with other countries, unfulfilled aims are set forth as strategic priorities. Thus, for instance, Foreign Minister Mr. Jovanovic will emphasize the need for a “European orientation for FRY” and “rapid inclusion into European integration...”. 4 The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia claims in its program that “FRY is interested in cooperation with the European Union, the Council of Europe and other European organizations and institutions...”, and the former foreign minister and current president of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic, in his presidential campaign put forward the slogan “Both Serbia and the world”, underlining openness to the world as the basis of the country’s future strategy. He said: “We want to achieve a substantial breakthrough and economic development as soon as possible, to preserve peace and political stability and not to be isolated from the world. We must be a part of the European and world market, because this is where the future lies...”. 5
Such public statements could create the illusion that the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia have good and sound intentions and ideas, but cannot fulfill them because of others. It is obvious that these statements were meant for internal purposes, as an excuse for the clearly bad effects of the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy, and for a series of diplomatic failures that FR Yugoslavia has experienced since the disintegration of the country. “The foreign policy and diplomacy of Serbia and FRY are guided almost exclusively by internal aims: they are primarily subordinated to the need of the regime and the ruling establishment to remain in power at any cost.” 6
Not only the features of the country’s international position as portrayed in the country, but also a number of concrete steps and actions taken by leading diplomats and politicians, illustrate that Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy understand the contemporary world in a manner that is profoundly anachronic and wrong. If we try to systematize and generalize the standpoints and convictions held by the regime in Yugoslavia and its diplomacy, we shall come to the following conclusions:
Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy persistently express the anachronic attitude that, basically speaking, the international community does not have the right to participate in solving the internal problems of third countries, and hence in Yugoslavia, not even when these problems result from failing to respect obligations that the state in question has undertaken by international treaties. Yugoslav diplomacy claims that the international community can at best suggest solutions. The referendum that was organized in mid-1998 posed a question and suggested the (negative) answer with regard to the involvement of the international community in solving the problem of Kosovo. It illustrated the extent to which the ruling diplomacy treats the nowadays rather relative principle of “non-interference in internal affairs of states” in the same way that it was treated by members of the Warsaw Treaty in the Cold War period. However, diplomatic practice shows that FR Yugoslavia itself does not abide by this standpoint when the pressure of the international community forces it to accept active mediation and the “interference” of foreign actors: the USA in the case of signing the Dayton-Paris Agreements on ending the war in Bosnia, and the USA, the European Union and OSCE in the case of the Kosovo crisis, and the Contact Group whose members are the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany in all these cases. This interference has been present in all conflicts that emerged as a result of the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. Along these same lines is the frequently repeated standpoint of Yugoslav diplomacy that the undeniable right of the international community to punish states and introduce sanctions for the non-fulfillment of obligations undertaken by relevant documents (based on the UN Charter — particularly Chapter VII in the case when a state’s activities represent a threat to peace) represents a violation of international law, particularly of the human and civil rights of that country’s population.
It is hard to avoid the impression that Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy are captives of major illusions or willful mistakes not only with regard to understanding the scope and nature of changes in the international community, but also with regard to modern concepts which are nowadays the basis of relations in the international system. Here we are dealing with illusions and mistakes which pertain to both value-oriented standpoints (differences in evaluating the meaning of new processes in the international community after the end of the Cold War, of course, are legitimate and natural) and to illusions and mistakes resulting from an insufficient understanding of the basic changes that are deeply affecting the contemporary world. Let us indicate just a few of the deeply rooted evaluations upon which Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy insist:
The first and maybe deepest illusion, one that is the basis of most of the others, is connected to the prevailing standpoint in Yugoslav diplomacy that changes in the international system after 1989, what is called “the new international order”, are basically bad and unfavorable , and in themselves negative. They are seen as particularly dangerous for smaller countries and peoples and, thus, for the fate of individuals. The objective problems faced by countries in transition are presented as difficult and without solution, and the democratic changes in them as the result of foreign influence which the domestic population generally opposes. Actually, Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy seem to have lost sight of the fact that the end of the bipolar structure caused the Soviet Union, one of the most repressive machineries in contemporary history, to withdraw from the world scene. It was replaced by Russia — an actor with a respectable military power oriented towards democratic changes and market values, basically oriented towards a cooperative relationship with the West. Also, insufficient consideration is given to the fact that, maybe more than ever in this century, the contemporary world and especially the actors in Europe have convergent attitudes with regard to basic values and the future of the continent, values that will put the strengthening of democracy, market economies and scrupulous respect for human rights in the forefront.
The above-mentioned central illusion is the basis for all the others, those that pertain to more concrete questions with regard to the international community and the obligations of its actors. One of the most noticeable has already been mentioned — not wanting to see changes concerning the scope of states’ sovereignty. The impression is that FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy is not sufficiently acquainted with the substantial evolution that this concept has undergone in international law and international politics. Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy act as if it were not true that almost all the states in the world gathered in the United Nations have voluntarily given up part of their sovereignty in many fields, especially in the field of human rights, arms control and environmental protection. This is particularly true of the members of the OSCE, an international organization that brings together practically all the most important countries in the Northern Hemisphere (apart from Japan and China). There is complete neglect of the fact that the classical concept of sovereignty, which in conditions of bipolar confrontation meant the right of states not to be questioned for actions against their own population, has fundamentally changed. There is no indication of a readiness to accept the fact that today states have an obligation — not only as a political principle, but also as a concrete international legal obligation — to respect adopted standards (for instance in the field of peace preservation and human rights), to undertake steps in this regard that will be transparent and to expect that inappropriate steps will be internationally controlled and, in case of violation, punished. Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy most often link this tendency to US hegemony, and do not see that this is a level of democratic development reached by the international community today, especially by Europe, which has advanced the furthest in the codification of these principles (Helsinki, Paris, etc.).
Approaching the contemporary world in such a way, Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy is first of all characterized by suspicion and rejection with regard to ongoing democratization processes in the former totalitarian countries of Eastern Europe. This consequently leads to different irrational concepts about “conspiracies” against this or that people and the strategic intentions of the strongest powers to inflict harm upon them. There is no understanding, or it is hidden from the population or misinterpreted, that in the process of change the international community has behaved — at least in the case of the Yugoslav crisis — mainly rationally, although not without blame. Yugoslav diplomacy is far from the assessment shared by many objective analysts that some of the international community’s mistakes and disorientation in handling the Yugoslav crisis have been greatly caused by the unexpected scope of irrationality in the behavior of domestic political forces and their readiness to disparage current mega-trends and violate the elementary norms of international conduct, regardless of the costs. In short, FR Yugoslavia blames international actors for all its misfortunes, completely excluding and overlooking the guilt of domestic actors.
3. Achievements of Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy
The international position of FR Yugoslavia
Owing greatly to FR Yugoslavia’s above-described understanding of changes in the contemporary world, and its behavior and communication with other countries based upon this understanding, FR Yugoslavia currently finds itself among a small group of countries with an extremely unfavorable international position. The image of FR Yugoslavia in the world is extremely low and has reached close to the level of negative perception that is similar to or even worse than that shared by only few countries in the world, such as Iraq, Libya, Cuba or North Korea. FR Yugoslavia is exposed to widespread odium in the international community, and its relations with major international organizations and certain countries are very bad.
Unlike other states-successors of the former Yugoslavia, FR Yugoslavia has been expelled from all the major international organizations. Its status in the United Nations is controversial and awkward. Whilst all the newly created states-successors of the former Yugoslavia have become members of the United Nations according to the usual procedure, at this moment the member is formally the former and non-existent Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, instead of FR Yugoslavia; the FRY delegation in New York has a sui generis status, one that does not allow FR Yugoslavia to participate normally in the work of the world organization, except — but only in a limited way — concerning problems that arise from international obligations taken over by FRY. Hence, FRY is not in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and without their participation the country cannot count on any significant international economic support.
In addition, unlike other states-successors of the former Yugoslavia, FR Yugoslavia is still in the position of an incompletely recognized or not recognized country. Its diplomatic relations with a great number of countries in the world (mainly the most influential) have not yet been completely defined and cleared, and these very states are denying FR Yugoslavia normal bilateral relations and an equal position in major international fora because of the country’s foreign policy and internal political steps. FR Yugoslavia maintains a liberal visa regime with a very small number of countries, which makes travelling abroad very complicated for Yugoslav citizens.
Finally, the problems of minority status in Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Sandjak) have factually, politically and legally been internationalized and brought to very delicate levels, with the gradual maturing of factors that could create a critical mass for the further escalation of violence that would endanger world peace.
FR Yugoslavia and the “outer wall of sanctions”
Although the sanctions that the UN Security Council introduced against FR Yugoslavia in May 1992 were formally lifted four years later in 1996, the so-called “outer wall of sanctions” has remained in force as a consequence of non-compliance with international obligations that have been taken over. They represent an informal list that the USA and the European Union have put forward as the precondition for their support to normalization of the international position of FR Yugoslavia and their bilateral relations with the country.
Among the most important demands that the proponents of the so-called outer wall of sanctions have in regard to FR Yugoslavia are the following:
In regard to all the mentioned demands, Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy have up to now acted basically in a non-cooperative manner (except in the case of stabilization of the situation in Bosnia), assessing the so-called outer wall of sanctions as a “dictate of the major powers” and “interference in internal affairs”, although all of these demands, in fact, are based upon obligations that FR Yugoslavia is obliged to fulfill pursuant to its acceptance of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, the Dayton Agreements, and OSCE documents. A critical assessment of FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy in regard to these demands would require considerable more elaboration, and therefore here will be stressed only the following:
When it comes to the demand to extradite individuals accused of war crimes to the Hague Tribunal, Yugoslav diplomacy insists upon the erroneous assertion of the primacy of internal over international law. If it is to be understood that by acting in this way Yugoslav diplomacy is fulfilling orders given by higher political authorities, it is hard to understand the argumentation used by Yugoslav diplomats when discussing this matter. The impression is given that government “experts” do not seem to be aware that such an approach is a wrong and nonlegal one. The evolution of international law and the practice of states and international judicial arbitration bodies have indisputably affirmed the standpoint that international law and obligations deriving from it are clearly of greater legal strength than the internal norms and internal legal order of any country. Therefore, noncompliance in regard to international obligations implies the international accountability of states.
When it comes to the succession of former Yugoslavia, it remains hard to understand why Yugoslav diplomacy insists upon continuity and thus sacrifices the normalization of relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Readiness is even expressed to assume the huge foreign debt of the entire former Yugoslavia when it is completely clear that, in the economic and financial sense, this would be a worse solution than to accept the approach that the international mediators are offering on the basis of the conclusions of the Arbitration (Badinter) commission. If insisting upon continuity is meant to justify war politics and represent it as “defense of the integrity of the common state from the secessionist tendencies of other republics”, then it must be said that (apart from the fact that this in no way justifies a war option) FR Yugoslavia is thereby, inter alia, exposing itself to the risk of being declared formally responsible for all the nonlegal acts and damage that the former Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) made during 1991 and 1992. Let us leave aside the incontestable fact that there are clearly no prospects of the international community accepting this argumentation of FR Yugoslavia, and that persistently insisting upon continuity is only prolonging the international isolation of the country. 7
The approach of Yugoslav diplomacy to the problem of Kosovo is perhaps the most impressive example of how the lack of good diplomacy and the proper approach to the international factors involved can transform a problem in which the international legal, political and historical arguments are basically in favor of FR Yugoslavia into a situation in which these very same arguments lose their credibility and the arguments of the opposing side in the conflict gain in importance. The international community, particularly the USA and the European Union, have expressed the clear resolve not to allow further border changes in the Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and to contribute to the solution of this overheated conflict by offering different mediation services. The steps undertaken by Yugoslav diplomacy, however, did not lead to developments which would correspond to FR Yugoslavia’s interests but have instead led to multiple unwanted effects: because of the country’s attitude to solving this problem — excessive but ineffective use of power and absence of real readiness to negotiate on the autonomy of Kosovo — at the end of November 1998 FR Yugoslavia was exposed to the realistic threat of NATO air strikes. In spite of all the previous refusals of the Yugoslav side and the already mentioned referendum by which the Yugoslav population rejected international involvement, the Kosovo problem became internationalized to the maximum level with the arrival of the OSCE verification mission. The opposing side, the Albanian independence movement, whose military wing (the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army) would in any similar case be proclaimed a terrorist organization, has gradually acquired legitimacy and is being treated as an internationally recognized actor. The most recent events concerning Kosovo that were taking place exactly as this paper was completed only confirm this evaluation: they culminated with the even greater probability that NATO will use force following the hasty declaration that the head of the OSCE verifiers’ mission in Kosovo was a persona non grata.
In acting with regard to fulfilling perhaps the most significant among the conditions for the removal of the outer wall of sanctions, i.e. accepting the need to democratize the country, Yugoslav diplomacy has behaved as an instrument of and performer in a political course that is pushing the entire country into growing international isolation. Not only did FR Yugoslavia refuse the OSCE mission (the so-called Gonzales mission) which would have dealt with the state of democratic freedom in FR Yugoslavia, but the entire situation in regard to this question has been deteriorating, which makes the removal of the mentioned “outer wall of sanctions” even more remote, bringing with it very serious consequences for the further social, political and economic development of the country. Instead of meeting the demands of the international community, and particularly those of the OSCE with regard to admitting electoral fraud at the end 1996 which led to massive protests all over Serbia, the Yugoslav regime has continued with measures aimed at strengthening internal repression and state control over all segments of civil society. During 1998 legal acts were passed through which the voice of the independent media was greatly suppressed and the traditional autonomy of the University was removed. In addition, propagandistic and police pressure continued against opposition parties and non-governmental organizations. The restrictive visa policy prevented the arrival of academic and political personalities from the world who are engaged in promoting democracy, and the recent attacks against the USA for supporting the independent media and non-governmental organizations showed that the regime does not have the slightest intention of helping remove this precondition to lifting the sanctions. In such a situation, FR Yugoslavia’s submission of a formal request for membership in the Council of Europe (almost simultaneously with the refusal to grant visas to prominent representatives of this very Council so they could enter the country and participate at a meeting of experts devoted to development of the independent media) looked like playing cynical games with the international and domestic public.
Yugoslavia was suspended from the OSCE after refusing OSCE monitoring missions whose task was to monitor the protection of minority groups in the country (Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina). Thus, Yugoslavia became the only European country without full participation in the OSCE; due to this institution’s significance, Yugoslavia has, in fact, been removed from equal cooperation in Europe. The lack of readiness to meet the requests of the OSCE and to enable transparency in how the authorities treat minorities in FRY isolates Yugoslav diplomacy from the possibility of participating in different OSCE activities whose significance the government itself could not deny. This was proven by the fact that FRY has twice relied upon the OSCE in crisis situations: first, by inviting an OSCE delegation to come after the mass protests provoked by fraud at local elections in 1996, and again at the end of 1998 (the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement) by accepting a 2000-man mission of verifiers that should monitor compliance with the reduction of military and police forces in Kosovo.
Relations of FR Yugoslavia and selected international actors
Broadening the number of allies and strengthening established alliances is a postulate not only of classical, but also of any modern foreign policy and diplomacy. Judging by this criterion, the effects of Yugoslav diplomacy are quite disastrous. Namely, today it is difficult to say that FRY has any ally or country that basically understands and supports the international behavior of the country and respects its interests. In an attempt to explain such a situation, Yugoslav diplomacy has regularly tried to blame the international community for this situation, at the same time trying to create an image of Yugoslavia as a fortress besieged by an environment which has bad or dishonest intentions. 8 The strongest accusations are directed against the USA and Germany, and criticism made by small and medium-sized countries against Yugoslav foreign policy is frequently explained as the result of pressure allegedly made by the USA.
There is most probably no risk in saying that unless a country, especially if it is in the process of transition, uses readiness to cooperate and collaborate as the basis for its relationship with the most significant world actors after the end of the Cold War — the USA as the only remaining superpower and the European Union as an economic giant in its immediate neighborhood — it has no great prospects for the improvement of its international position. During the entire 1992-1998 period, the relations between FRY and Western countries have been characterized by conflicts and misunderstandings and this has been naturally reflected not only on their bilateral relations, but also upon the activity of these countries in the UN and its specialized agencies.
Relations between FR Yugoslavia and the USA have been characterized in the entire analyzed period by an ambivalence that could be called paradoxical. On the one hand, due to their critical standpoint with regard to FRY’s foreign policy 9 the USA have been presented in official propaganda as the main cause of FRY’s international isolation, and Yugoslav diplomacy joined the official media which were systematically satanizing the USA (together with NATO), inflaming anti-American sentiments among the population. On the other hand, at key moments in concrete diplomatic activities, such as the termination of the war in Bosnia and solving the Kosovo problem, FR Yugoslavia has under pressure, as a rule, accepted the USA as a key partner and under their patronage some of the phases in the mentioned crisis situations were brought to an end (the Dayton Agreements 1995, the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement on Kosovo 1998). This aspect of diplomatic relations between FRY and the USA, however, is not sufficient proof or a sign that Yugoslav diplomacy has accepted the standpoint that normalizing and promoting relations with the USA should be at the very top of the country’s strategic foreign policy priorities. 10
Yugoslav diplomacy has insisted upon traditional, previously rooted perceptions with regard to relations with individual countries or international organizations and their motives vis-à-vis FR Yugoslavia that have not corresponded with the new reality. Yugoslav diplomacy has systematically offered standpoints on close or distant relations, friendship or hostilities, sympathies or antipathies in regard to certain countries and international organizations. It seems that this has been influenced not only by the attitude of individual countries towards Serbia, Montenegro and the main actors in the Yugoslav crisis, but also by the images on alliances that have been offered to the citizens through propaganda from the official media during all these crisis years. When it comes to the desirability of partners for political cooperation with FR Yugoslavia, diplomacy has nurtured isolationist standpoints and even animosity with regard to developing political cooperation with a great number of countries that were considered, according to not always clear criteria, to have an “unfriendly attitude towards FR Yugoslavia”. The impression is that those leading Yugoslavia’s foreign policy understand partnership in political cooperation as a necessity imposed by pressure from the outside and the “dictates” of the international community, rather than a normal and desirable form of interaction among states. This also indicates the notable presence of isolationist views, as well as general “disappointment” with the political behavior of most countries in the world towards Yugoslavia. 11
In an attempt to prove that there are, nonetheless, countries that side with FR Yugoslavia, Yugoslav politicians and diplomats, and particularly the pro-government media, have persistently tried to convince the Yugoslav public that FR Yugoslavia has good allies in Greece, Russia and China, and occasionally there have been evaluations that European countries such as France (recalling the Serb-French friendship established in the First World War), as well as Italy and Spain, have favorable attitudes towards Yugoslavia. If we exclude the internal political motives of the regime aimed at preserving tensions with the international community in order to justify its unsuccessful foreign policy, it is hard to explain the arguments upon which Yugoslav diplomacy has based such views. There is, for instance, no explanation as to what was the basis for asserting that Greece has a particularly friendly attitude towards FR Yugoslavia, when this country behaves no differently from others, not to mention the fact that Greece maintains a visa regime with FRY although it has been removed for some of the states-successors of former Yugoslavia. How, if not by wrong convictions and propaganda needs, to explain the “anti-Americanism” of Yugoslav diplomacy in comparison to the perception of, for instance, France and Italy, when it is widely known that the policies of the USA, on the one hand, and Italy and France, on the other, mostly converge in all crucial aspects, including events in Yugoslavia. Finally, neither Russia nor China ever used their veto right in the UN Security Council when all the resolutions that were unfavorable for Yugoslavia were adopted during 1992-1998.
The approach of Yugoslav diplomacy to relations with Russia deserves special attention, since the official treatment and evaluation of Russia and its international role after the end of the Cold War reflects perhaps most precisely the characteristics of contemporary Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy. The attitude of Yugoslav official authorities with regard to changes in Russia, as well as expectations of support for Yugoslavia’s current foreign policy, have rested upon the assumption that a deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, and even a new “Cold War”, would be in the interests of FR Yugoslavia. The call for restoration of the former Soviet foreign policy was accompanied in Belgrade by support for anti-Yeltsin and pro-Communist forces in Russia. Official evaluations of Yugoslav diplomacy (disseminated much more through the regime’s media than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) rested upon the hope that democratic forces in Russia would lose power and be replaced by those which would allegedly restore the power of the former Soviet Union. Support developed along these lines to remove the reformers in Russia from power — the coup d’etat against Gorbachev, Hazbulatov’s mutiny and others against Yeltsin and Ziuganov’s electoral campaign.
This example clearly shows just how anachronous and wrong are the judgements upon which Yugoslav diplomacy bases its strategic orientation: counting on a deepening of the conflict between Russia and the West (primarily the USA) and on the Russian nationalist-communist opposition’s support of Serbia’s interests in the Balkans. Namely, even if by some chance Yugoslav diplomacy’s hopes were realized, there still would not be sufficient reason to believe that Yugoslavia would gain from a revived conflict between Russia and the West. Yugoslavia would find itself on the side that would be inferior by all standards, particularly in economic and technological respects. 12
The most recent, unsuccessful and by many parameters trivial initiative from Belgrade for a closer alliance and institutional ties between FR Yugoslavia and Russia and Belarus is along these lines. This initiative was met coolly even by the “allies” of FR Yugoslavia in Russia and Belarus, so it is clear that it was primarily intended for internal political purposes; it was aimed at further indoctrinating the population along the lines of an anti-Western and anti-American attitude, within the context of USA and NATO pressures connected to the Kosovo problem.
All this clearly illustrates that Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomacy are still far from a balanced assessment of the role and possibilities of today’s Russia. It seems that they are still not capable of understanding that a true and realistic comprehension of the interests of both Russia and Yugoslavia would not be protected by the creation of a new “bloc” that would be an adversary to the West, but, on the contrary, would create the greatest problems for Russia and Yugoslavia themselves. The fact is also neglected that Russia has an irreversible strategic orientation to continue partnership relations with the West (which does not mean the automatic convergence of all their interests, judgements and foreign policy moves) and internal stabilization, because without the support of the West Russia cannot overcome its economic and social crisis and consolidate its international position in the new circumstances. It seems that Yugoslav diplomacy is still far from the assessment shared by many critics that it is hard to expect any special quality in Russian-Yugoslav relations as long as FR Yugoslavia is internationally isolated, and that Yugoslav-Russian relations will develop best only after normalization of Yugoslavia’s international position and its participation in European political and economic integration.
In solving numerous open problems in relations with the newly created neighboring countries, Yugoslav diplomacy has achieved partial results. The most important question, the succession of former Yugoslavia, has not yet been solved. Judging by the nonelastic attitude of FR Yugoslavia, which unrealistically expects to get recognition of continuity with the former SFR Yugoslavia similar to the manner in which the Russian Federation was recognized after the disintegration of the USSR, in the end this problem will probably have to be taken to international arbitration.
Relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina have not yet been fully normalized because the two countries have not establish regular diplomatic relations, although they have mutually recognized each other on the basis of the provisions of the Dayton-Paris Agreements. For the full normalization of diplomatic relations between FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgrade demands withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s charges of genocide against FR Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice in the Hague; if proved at this court, these charges would formally establish the international legal responsibility of FR Yugoslavia for violence during the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Based on endeavors by both sides, certain progress in relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia has been achieved in the field of reviving economic cooperation and traffic.
FR Yugoslavia has not established diplomatic relations with Slovenia, either, although both countries have separately announced declarations of recognition, under unusual circumstances. Namely, although FR Yugoslavia unilaterally recognized Slovenia in 1992 — when Mr. Milan Panic was Prime Minister — Slovenia ignored or rather “rejected” this. Yugoslav diplomacy acted in the same manner when Slovenia recognized FR Yugoslavia in 1995. Recently there have been signs that Slovenia is strengthening its efforts to solve the problem of establishing diplomatic relations, but these efforts are not being met with positive reactions in Yugoslavia. The reasons for this are not completely clear; there are indications that the present harsh attitude of FR Yugoslavia, which is not very logical if one bears in mind the numerous mutual interests and the realistic need to normalize diplomatic relations, results from former animosities and “settling old accounts” among the highest representatives of the two countries that stem from the process of former Yugoslavia’s disintegration.
Yugoslav diplomacy deserves the least critical remarks with regard to the way it handled the normalization of diplomatic relations with two neighboring countries: Macedonia and Croatia. It could even be said that the pragmatism exercised by Yugoslav diplomacy during the process of normalizing relations with these two countries is some sort of exception from its general practice in solving many questions and in this regard Yugoslav diplomacy deserves a relatively positive mark.
Diplomatic relations between FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia were established in April 1996; Belgrade recognized Macedonia under its official name, the Republic of Macedonia, contrary to the expectations of Greece which, as already mentioned, Yugoslav diplomacy presents as a “faithful ally”. The Agreement on Establishing Diplomatic Relations also contained a mutually acceptable formula pertaining to the problem of the continuity of SFRY. However, relations between Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia have not yet been normalized to the fullest extent. Demarcation of the common border has not yet been completed and Belgrade also accuses Macedonia of allowing NATO and the USA to use its territory for possible operations against FR Yugoslavia
Yugoslav diplomacy exercised a similar pragmatism in the process of normalizing relations with Croatia. The Agreement on the Normalization of Relations was signed in August 1996 in Belgrade; it solved some problems and established the principles to solve the remaining open questions, opening the way for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. Since then these relations have shown a slowly improving tendency, and numerous unsolved issues are being treated slowly but surely; this illustrates Yugoslav diplomacy’s intention to normalize relations with Croatia, which seems to meet with considerable understanding on the Croatian side. Apart from different approaches to the problems of succession and continuity with regard to SFRY, the most serious problem that has not yet been solved in Yugoslav-Croatian relations is the problem of Cape Prevlaka in the Bay of Kotor. Contrary to the demands of Montenegro which is most directly concerned in this issue, FR Yugoslavia is holding back on the resolution of this problem in spite of the UN Security Council’s clear position with regard to guiding principles. The reasons for this delay most probably lie in certain internal political matters; namely, the president of FR Yugoslavia, Mr. Milosevic, would like to make the position of the president of Montenegro, Mr. Djukanovic, as difficult as possible since Mr. Djukanovic insists on reaching an agreement about Prevlaka with Croatia, whose standpoints he basically accepts.
4. Concluding remarks
On the basis of the above, one can make the rather credible conclusion that, generally speaking, the foundations of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and the achievements of Yugoslav diplomacy that stem from them are very unfavorable. The above mentioned could be systematized also in the following way.
Absence of clearly defined foreign policy goals — Yugoslav diplomacy did not have, and does not have clearly defined foreign policy goals, the main strategic directions that it should follow in its activity. It is the general impression that FR Yugoslavia actually does not have a foreign policy in the full meaning of the word. There is no articulated foreign policy concept, strategic priorities are not known, there is no doctrinal basis of this foreign policy. “There are only moves and extorted actions. There are activities, and there is no policy”. 13 This statement places the burden upon the major creators of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, but it also in a way decreases the responsibility of Yugoslav diplomacy for the bad results; namely, without a clearly defined foreign policy program even the best of diplomacies cannot help being reduced to an actor in day-to-day reactions, incapable of understanding the contemporary world, anticipating events and the strategic moves of others.
Unfeasibility of (supposed) goals. —I f it is established that the failures of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy stem from the unclear foreign policy goals of the country, this does not mean that such aims do not exist at all or that they were not present in the heads of those who formulated them and had the opportunity and the political power to try to implement them. All the characteristics of contemporary Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy indicate that FR Yugoslavia basically still has not drawn the proper conclusions from its failures owing to the fact that in the process of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia its political elite started from practically unfeasible goals (having in mind international norms and the attitudes of the major actors in the international community). These goals were intended to be achieved in a manner and with means that the contemporary international community does not accept. After Yugoslavia disintegrated in blood, with the culmination of the drama in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the political elite of FR Yugoslavia seem to be permanent captives of many illusions that turned the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy into unsuccessful instruments of a strategy that was not based upon reality, law and ethics.
Disrespect for international realities and democratic principles. — One more element could be added to the mentioned basic weaknesses of the Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy: since Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy are in a constant state of confrontation with the main actors in the international community, they are constantly in a defensive position, trying to defend a foreign and internal policy that are hard to defend, and to justify the Yugoslav position by arguments that do not have value in the contemporary world. The strategic and tactical directions of Yugoslav diplomacy’s actions are mainly of a palliative, temporary and short-term nature because they are based on many unrealistic evaluations of both contemporary relations in general, as well as of some concrete questions. These range from counting on the maturing of a new “Cold War” in relations between the USA and Russia, to expecting to benefit from Russia’s destabilization, overestimating differences in the nuances that emerge between the United States and Western Europe and
within the European Union with regard to certain aspects of the crisis in the Balkans because the Common European Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP) has not yet become effective, etc. However, maybe the most serious reason for the failure of Yugoslav foreign policy and diplomacy lies in the lack of the readiness of its actors — on the mental and political level — to accept democratic norms both in international and internal conduct.
Diplomacy without autonomy in action. — Yugoslav diplomacy does not have the so-much-needed room for autonomous activity that enables any diplomacy to be an active actor and participant in the creation of strategic foreign policy orientations and priorities. 14 The reason for this is, on the one hand, the already mentioned nonconstitutional taking over of authority from the federal government by the current president of the Republic in the domain of foreign affairs 15 as well as the complete absence of parliamentary control of diplomatic activities, and on the other, the lack of high-quality diplomatic personnel. Namely, the personnel-planning policy for the diplomatic service has many critics in FR Yugoslavia. It is generally assessed that this policy is guided primarily by criteria of political devotion, and very little, if at all, by expertise and experience. Career diplomats are becoming rather rare in the highest positions of diplomacy. 16 Besides, among the diplomats in FR Yugoslavia — and the case is similar with diplomats from other states in this region — the so-called “culture of optimum solutions” is not particularly developed. It is as if the political elite and diplomats in the Balkans were much more inclined to either maximum fulfillment of aspirations or to total losses. 17 This observation holds for the foreign policy and diplomacy of FR Yugoslavia in the entire analyzed period from 1992-1998.
The sources of all the failures of FR Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and diplomacy are numerous and complex, and their comprehensive evaluation exceeds the framework of this paper. However, if one were to offer a basic hypothesis with regard to the reasons for these failures, it could be the following: a national strategy without foundations during and after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, as well as the political elite that emerged on these grounds, have prevented the development of a political pluralism in FR Yugoslavia’s society, depriving it of the possibility to build democratic institutions and mechanisms for democratic decision making with regard to strategic decisions, including decisions concerning the foreign policy strategy of the country. The effects of FR Yugoslavia’s diplomacy represent only one of the consequences of the lack of democratization of the country. This lack of democratization is caused — among other reasons — by the preservation of political, ideological and personal continuity between the new political elite in FR Yugoslavia and the previous one-party regime, on the one hand, and the fetishization of remaining in power as the ultimate goal for which the broader and long-term interests of the citizens are being sacrificed, on the other.
Belgrade,
January 1999
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Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: Valery Manilov defines (Russia’s) national values as “the fundamental moral and ethical norms that define each person’s position in life, their attitude toward the past, the present, and the future of their country, and their responsibility for its fate and for the preservation and augmentation of their national heritage.” He defines national interests as “the conscious, officially expressed objective interests of the individual, society, and the state”, and he identifies three categories of national interests. “Vital interests” include the strengthening of public unity, the securing of the integrity and inviolability of (Russian) territory, and the repulsion and cessation of aggression against (Russia) and its allies. “Important interests” include the attainment and defense of human rights and freedoms, the preservation of the significant components of Russia’s material and spiritual heritage, and the guaranteeing of international stability and security. Other “Interests” include the securing of favorable conditions for stable social-economic and spiritual progress, the preservation and defense of the environment, the securing of civil peace and harmony, and the attainment of social justice, whilst the national goals are seen as “the fundamental reference points of the activities of the state, society, and the citizen for the attainment and if necessary the defense of the national interests” of their country. — Valery Manilov: The National Security of Russia, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, June 1997, Internet, available on: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/bcsia/Library.nsf/ Back.
Note 2: In his classical work Politics Among Nations Hans Morgentau emphasizes that a nation must be ready to compromise on all issues that are not of vital importance for this nation. In his view, the prerequisites of compromise are the following: a) Give Up the Shadow of Worthless Rights for the Substance of Real Advantage, b) Never Put Yourself in a Position from Which You Cannot Retreat without Losing Face and from Which You Cannot Advance without Grave Risks, c) Never Allow a Weak Ally to Make Decisions for You, d) The Armed Forces Are the Instrument of Foreign Policy, Not Its Master, and, e) The Government Is the Leader of Public Opinion, Not Its Slave. — Hans Morgentau: Politics Among Nations — The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fourth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, pp.545-548 Back.
Note 3: Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic (1992 – 1996), Mr. Milan Milutinovic (current president of Serbia, 1996-), and Mr. Zivadin Jovanovic, (the current minister of foreign affairs, since 1998). The exception is Mr. Ilija Djukic, who was foreign minister for a short time in 1992/93 in the government headed by Mr. Milan Panic. Back.
Note 4: Excerpts from the statement of Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic given to the Young Socialists of Belgrade with regard to FR Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities, Belgrade, 13 November 1998. Internet, available on: http://www.smip.sv.gov.yu Back.
Note 5: Statement by M. Milutinovic, Internet, available on: http://www.sps.org.yu/izbori97/271197/slogan.htm Back.
Note 6: Prof. Vojin Dimitrijevic: Introductory remarks, TV, “Open Studio Program” I program RTS, April 25, 1997. Back.
Note 7: For a broader analysis consult: Dusan Lazic: Zvanicne iluzije o medjunarodno-pravnom kontinuitetu SRJ sa SFRJ — kontuinuitet ne moze biti zastita od neophodnih promena, (Official Illusions on the International Legal Continuity of FRY with SFRY — Continuity Cannot Be a Protection Against Necessary Changes), Spoljnopliticke sveske, No.1., April, 1996, Forum za medjunarodne odnose, Belgrade, November, 1996. Back.
Note 8: Thus, for instance, the foreign minister, Mr. Jovanovic, after stating that FRY wants good relations with the European Union, also said the following: “....However, I must say that we have not got practical confirmation that the European Union shows the same openness for cooperation. Instead of a positive, constructive attitude, the European Union has even recently been coming up with persistent demands for concessions from our side, and has not been ready to give a positive answer to our openness for cooperation.” Internet, available on: http://www.smip.sv.gov.yu Back.
Note 9: The USA have not recognized FRY under its new name, given in the Constitution (April 1993), stating that this would prejudice the principle of the Badinter Commission with regard to the continuity of SFRY and did, in this way, support the so-called “outer wall of sanctions”. In Washington’s view, FRY (or, Serbia and Montenegro, as the USA are referring to the country) should — like the other successor-states of SFRY — ask and get their international recognition as a new state. However, the USA have not closed their embassy in Belgrade, but they did decrease diplomatic representation to the level of charge d’affaires until this question is solved. Back.
Note 10: Thus, for instance, the independent non-governmental organization, Forum for International Relations (Forum za medjunarodne odnose), has suggested in its Platform for an Alternative Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia: “...Therefore, our relations with the USA should be given priority in the foreign policy engagement of Yugoslavia, since the degree of trust and the nature of contacts and cooperation with the USA will determine numerous other interests of vital importance for our country. ...In that context Yugoslavia as a small country will, in its relations with the USA and not only the USA, find itself in the position of asymmetric dependence, especially due to the difficult political and economic situation. With this reality, Yugoslavia will have a limited degree of independence, as a result of the modern understanding of sovereignty in international relations, whereby increasing interdependence is implied, on the one hand, and voluntary acceptance of the standards of conduct on the internal and external levels, on the other... Normalization of Yugoslavia’s relations with the USA is a difficult, delicate and an exceptionally important issue, but also indispensable for its future ...”, CSS Survey, No.11, Center for Strategic Studies, Belgrade, November 1996, p.12-15 Back.
Note 11: For a broader analysis consult: Vatroslav Vekaric, “Odnos prema svetu kao element gradjanske svesti” (Attitude towards the world as an element of civic consciousness), CSS Survey, No.11, Center for Strategic Studies, Belgrade, November, 1997, p.9-11; Milivoje Maksic, in this context wrote: “In a changed world and distribution of power centers, our main pillars should remain the international organizations and the main factors within them, in a balanced manner, without giving clear advantage to anyone. This excludes naïve and risky one-way orientation towards “eternal”, “natural” and “true” friends, towards mystic, religious-Slav links, and gets us closer to the centers that are most influential in international relations.” “Spoljna politika Jugoslavije posle Dejtona” (Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia after Dayton), Spoljnopliticke sveske, No.1., April, 1996, Forum za medjunarodne odnose, Belgrade, November, 1996 Back.
Note 12: Vladimir Veres: “Aktuelne dileme ruske spoljne politike”, (Current Dilemmas of Russian Foreign Policy), Medjunarodni odnosi, Vol I, No.5, October 1998, Center for Strategic Studies, Belgrade, 1998. Back.
Note 13: Ilija Djukic, “Spoljna politika Jugoslavije posle Dejtona” (Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia after Dayton), Spoljnopliticke sveske, No.1., April 1996, Forum za medjunarodne odnose, Belgrade, November, 1996. Back.
Note 14: The Forum for International Relations of the European movement in Serbia suggests in this regard: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be the central government body for the implementation of foreign policy and coordination of the international activities of other institutions. To operate successfully, the Foreign Ministry should be independent enough to professionally select the modes of foreign policy actions, and should be protected against any unlawful external influence. In parallel with that, the Foreign Ministry must promote an atmosphere beneficial to the free expression of professional views. This is a major precondition for a creative foreign policy.” — “An Alternative Foreign Policy...”, CSS Survey, No.12. 1997, Center for Strategic Studies, Belgrade, December 1997. Back.
Note 15: The former foreign minister of FR Yugoslavia, Ilija Djukic, said in this regard: “...Principally speaking, diplomacy must have autonomous space, and I have here in mind its capability to influence politics. Since the very moment that diplomacy serves is a mere servant of politics, it is no longer diplomacy. We have symbiosis between politics and diplomacy and are shifting from one crisis situation to another. Dometi i rezultati diplomatije, Elektronsko izdanje i radio emisija, Radio B92, “Doba razuma” broj 46 * novembar 1998. Back.
Note 16: “...We must return to the world from which the irresponsible government has expelled us. Our diplomacy must be brought to order and get professionalized. This service cannot be the livelihood for incompetent cadres. International norms must be respected if we want to have a place and respect in the world. Yugoslavia must be firmly determined to restore its full position in the international community ....” Gradjanski savez Srbije (Civic Alliance of Serbia, an opposition party): Manifest 97, Internet, available on: http://www.beograd.com/gss/manifest.html Back.
Note 17: Aleksandar Fatic: Savremena balkanska diplomatija, (”Contemporary Balkan Diplomacy), Conference paper, Conference: Montenegro and Contemporary Diplomacy, Kotor, 27 June, 1998, Internet, available on: http://www.diplomacy.cg.yu Back.
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