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CIAO DATE: 6/99
Unveiling Human Rights: A Postcolonial Feminist Analysis of Women, Veiling, Human Rights and Western Geopolitical Discourse *
Department of Political Science
Northern Arizona University
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
This is a work in progress. Please do not quote without permission from the author.
Abstract
The contributions of feminist scholarship to International Relations have exposed gender bias in the field and have provided inroads toward the internationalization of women’s human rights. Nevertheless, non-Western women’s bodies continue as an important site for the construction of Western geopolitical discourse. Western discourse on Islam represents Muslim societies as inherently violent and backwards with Muslim men as irrational victimizers of passive Muslim women. The veil epitomizes this oppression. Subsequently, this discourse justifies Western intervention into Muslim countries.
Through discursive and content analysis, I examine how the discourses of masculinity and femininity, which parallel Western discourse on Islam and the veil, have been utilized in the construction of Western geo-political discourse. The first group of data includes popular print media sources such as The New York Times, Economist, Newsweek and Time from 1994 to 1998. The second group includes the films Conversations Across the Bosphorus and Women in Islam.
Introduction
Saideh Fisher, also known as Saideh Hassib-Tehrani, was ordered to return to Iran by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and later, by the Board of Appeals. 1 Fisher, with her son, left Iran and was admitted to the US as the fiancé of a US citizen in 1984. However, because she found her then fiancé to be living with another woman whom he had also impregnated, she did not marry him and instead married Charles Fisher. She and Charles divorced in 1987 and despite the fact that Charles initially filed a petition in support of Fisher’s citizenship, this petition was repealed under allegations that Charles had been paid to marry her. In 1987 the Immigration and Naturalization Service refused Fisher’s application for citizenship, at which time the applicant filed for asylum and the withholding of deportation. Two hearings followed (May 1987 and September 1987) during which time Fisher explained the circumstances surrounding her marriage and subsequent divorce from Charles.
During the September hearing, Saideh Fisher argued that she was forced to leave Iran as the result of three related events which led her to the conclusion that she was being persecuted by the government based upon her political and religious beliefs. First, Fisher testified that she was detained and questioned by Khomeini government officials for having attended a party at a male friend’s house, during which time she observed this friend in a swimsuit. This, according to government officials, was “incorrect” for her to have done. One month prior to her departure from Iran, four government officials stopped Fisher on the street and ordered her into their car at gunpoint. Allegedly she was stopped and detained because she “had a few pieces of hair hanging out [of her chador or veil] by mistake” (Villanova Center for Information & Policy, 1996: 5). Following the “veil incident”, Fisher alleges that government officials came to her house to look for political dissidents, an allegedly routine occurrence. These events were characterized by the applicant as persecution and were said to have traumatized her to such a degree that she became ill, missed a great deal of work and ultimately left Iran. Fisher stated that she did not believe in “the way [the Khomeini government] treat(s) people, the covering of the face and the way of life” mandated by the government, and testified that she feared greater persecution should she be forced to return to Iran (Villanova...1996:6).
Despite the fact that the judge found her application for asylum credible (although he did not find her testimony regarding her marriage credible) he denied her asylum because she failed to prove a well-founded fear of persecution and a clear probability of future persecution. This decision was appealed although the Immigration Board affirmed the initial opinion. The Board argued that the enforcement of Iran’s rules regarding the interaction between men and women and the clothing restrictions “...do not rise to the level of persecution” and that Saideh failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that the government’s actions related specifically to her and her beliefs (Villanova..., 1996:6). However, a three-person panel of the court vacated this decision and remanded holding that, according to the 9 th Circuit Court 1995, the Board failed to properly define persecution and failed to take into account the applicant’s fear of future persecution. Thus, the case was reheard. Nevertheless, Saideh Fisher was again denied her application for asylum because of her failure to prove that the Iranian government took action against her because of her religious or political beliefs and concluded that instead, Fisher received punishment for having broken generally applicable laws (Villanova..., 1996:12). Saideh Fisher was granted voluntary departure in 1996, despite her previous experiences of persecution and despite her fears of future persecution.
Why International Relations? Problematizing the Field
Veiling constitutes a rather contentious subject within human rights discourse, international law and International Relations (IR). The Fisher case sparked further debate regarding the role of international law and human rights standards, not to mention the role of various feminist theories, in addressing gender-specific forms of violence and repression. In fact, scholars and activists disagree on whether or not forced veiling even constitutes a form of gender-specific repression at all, much less that it deserves attention in the field of International Relations. At first glance, one may feel inclined to relegate the Fisher case to the realm of anthropology or simply to the realm of “Women’s Studies”. However, it and forced veiling more broadly deserve placement in the field of International Relations given their status as human rights issues and given the use of forced veiling in the construction of Western geopolitical discourse. 2 For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be used, as many have, in opposition to forced veiling as it is often perceived as forced segregation from the public sphere. One can also argue that forced veiling constitutes a violation of one’s right to liberty (Article 3) that it constitutes degrading treatment (Article 5) that it violates one’s right to equality before the law (Article 7) and one’s freedom of movement (Article 13). However, forced veiling stands on contested grounds vis a vis the human rights movement.
Issues surrounding forced veiling, along with the Fisher case, deserve attention in the field of International Relations not only given their status as human rights issues, but because issues such as veiling are instructive in illuminating the construction of Western geopolitical discourse, and more importantly, the manner in which issues such as veiling are used in the construction of “others”. The creation of “others” in turn legitimizes and justifies Western neo-colonial efforts against “other” countries, such as so-called “Islamic countries”. In other words, “whether it is the struggle for nationhood or cultural identity, how a woman generates life, how she lives, what she reads, what she does with her body - become the most crucial issues of debate” (Lakshmi, 1997:2953).
I argue that gender and race are crucial to the political mobilization of identity and the necessary creation of enemies characteristic of mainstream IR. However, much of the literature on geopolitical discourse does not adequately address gender. Similarly, while authors such as Said (1997) have brilliantly demonstrated the connection between the Western media, “experts” on Islam, US corporations and the interests of the US government in the construction of the “Muslim other”, gender does not hold a central position in his analysis either. I suggest that the Western representation of veiling and those who allegedly engage in its practice are crucial to the definition of “others” in International Relations; thus, non-Western women’s bodies become an important site for the construction of Western geopolitical discourse. 3 Although women and women’s rights are not the focal points of Western geo-political discourse, non-Western women’s bodies nevertheless become the handmaidens of identity construction in IR; hence the denial of Fisher’s claim for asylum despite Western opposition to forced veiling and “commitment” to human rights.
In illuminating my central argument, I examine the academic debates on veiling as well as Western discourse on veiling through the analytical framework of postcolonial feminism. Often, the Western media conflates forced veiling with all forms of veiling, thus depicting veiling in general as characteristically oppressive. However, many of the diverse interpretations of veiling, as offered by scholars from Ahmed (1992) to Macleod (1991), are presented in this project. Through the use of content and discursive analysis, 4 I examine Western print media sources, particularly those of the United States, such as The New York Times, Time, Economist and Newsweek from January 1994 to January 1998 and the films Women and Islam and Conversations Across the Bosphorous. I use several overarching (though not mutually exclusive) categories to examine my data sets. The discursive representation of veiling as a cultural issue, religious issue and/or “rights” issue is explored as well as the representation of countries in which veiling is thought to occur. The stated motivations for veiling, along with the representation of men and women vis a vis veiling in Western media discourse is also examined. First however, I discuss many of the primary tenets of mainstream International Relations theory as well as several feminist critiques of IR theory. This will be followed by a brief discussion of Western human rights discourse, particularly as it relates to gender-specific forms of violence. Finally, I discuss many of the primary assumptions within postcolonial feminist analysis, which serves as the central theoretical framework of this project.
Problematizing International Relations: Where Are Women’s Human Rights In Mainstream IR?
Many theoretical avenues may be employed in discussing the placement of veiling and the associated Fisher case within the field of International Relations. As I will discuss, mainstream IR theory, as influenced predominately by realism and to a lesser extent neo-realism and interdependence theory, offers little means by which to recognize gender-specific forms of violence. In addition, mainstream IR theory depends on the construction of “others” to further the global interests of the West. 5 Feminist IR theorists 6 have made important contributions to the dismantling of the mainstream IR framework and to the recognition of women’s rights as human rights within IR, human rights discourse and international law. However, postcolonial feminist theory offers the best means by which to interrogate the construction of Western geopolitical discourse and women’s human rights in the context of forced veiling. Therefore, I also highlight many of the primary assumptions of postcolonial feminism.
International Relations and the Quest for Power
Women are effectively homeless in IR given that “the soldier, the citizen, the political subject and the state are all gendered male” (Pettman, 1996:1). The underlying assumptions of mainstream IR, its androcentric bias and its engendering of the state with masculine characteristics, exclude women from the field and until recently, have impeded the recognition of women’s rights as human rights. Although written scholarship on foreign policy and the state dates back to 4 BCE with Kautilya’s Arthasastra, 7 the field of International Relations came into being as numerous scholars sought practical solutions to the problem of war, particularly as the First World War came into full force. IR theory was to analyze war and the causes of war in a “scientific manner” and thus improve the lot of humankind through the application of science to social problems (Groom, 1994:2). The classical realist school 8 (and to a lesser extent neo-realist 9 and interdependence schools 10 ) came to dominate the field as it was assumed that this framework of analysis, one characterized by “...hard and ruthless analysis...” (Carr, 1939:9), would provide the answers so desperately sought. Realism is a rationally based theory built upon the assumption that the world can be objectively known and controlled. Following the works of Kant, realist scholars contend that there exists a universal set of self-evident “Truths” accessible through human reason (Hoffman, 1994:28). Moreover, realism rests upon four key assumptions. States are for one, the principal actors and serve as the primary unit of analysis. The state is viewed as a unitary and rational actor and finally, national security is the most important consideration in realist theory.
The key assumptions of realist theory reflect a particular conception of human behavior which, although not absent in Arthasastra, 11 is generally associated with the Hobbesian construction of human nature. Realist scholars contend that all free persons share the capacity for rationality in that they seek to maximize benefits, minimize costs and risks and operate on the principles of prudence and amoral behavior. Moreover, the drive to dominate is considered a universal characteristic of humans who are perceived by realist theorists as innately selfish, untrustworthy and conflictual.
The realist model is essentially a conflict driven model. The realist conception of human nature is aggregated to states, who are regarded as untrustworthy and motivated by self-interest. Actors (states) engage in zero sum games in an anarchic international system. National interest is defined as power and self preservation, with power (primarily military, but also economic power) seen as the means by which states resolve as well as deter conflict. Violence occurs “out there” in the world of anarchy, between states through militaristic means; this violence is legitimated by national interest. Peace, on the other hand, is seen as elusive by realist scholars such as Morgenthau, who argue that there can never be peace, only truces based upon the overwhelming power of dominant states, which makes the constant threats and manipulations posed by these dominant powers a central feature of the dialogue characterizing the state system (Morgenthau, 1948).
The level of analysis for neo-realist (or structural realist) scholars shifts to the state system. Structural realists emphasize relations within the state system and include within their model the recognition of international regimes as legitimate actors in the state system. Structural realism allows for the contextualization of action between states. Waltz, perhaps the best known structural realist, demonstrates how the international system is shaped by, and shapes, state behavior, thus Waltz “reformulates and systematizes” realist theory (Keohane, 1993:200).
The fundamental assumptions of classical realism however, remain largely in tact within structural realism. States, who are still perceived as rational actors, remain the primary unit of analysis despite the recognition of non-state actors. One distinction that may be made between classical realism and structural realism is the rejection by structural realists that states seek power over all other interests, particularly given the recognition that different systemic conditions force states to define their self-interest in different ways (Keohane, 215:1993). Similarly, the classical realist emphasis on power as an end in itself can be contrasted with the structural realist recognition of security as the highest end (Schweller & Priess, 1997). Security, however, still refers to security between states, which is predicated upon power and military might. In both the classical realist and structural realist schools, power is defined as having the ability to force, intimidate and/or coerce other actors into doing what they do not want to do. Moreover, neither classical realism nor structural realism recognizes gender nor culture as important categories of analysis in IR.
Interdependence theory also relies upon four key assumptions, although these assumptions differ from those of realism. Non-state actors including multinational corporations (MNCs) and regional organizations, hold an important position within this model and accordingly, states are not viewed as unitary actors. The rationality of the state is also challenged by interdependence theorists and finally, international politics includes not only national security issues, but a host of other concerns ranging from economic to environmental issues. Interdependence theorists (also referred to as pluralists in IR) expand notions of “power” by including non-state actors within their model of “complex interdependence” and by recognizing the links between politics and economics. Moreover, human nature is viewed as cooperative as opposed to innately selfish. Military security does not hold the dominant position rather, the multiple channels which connect society and international regimes are emphasized in this model. Moreover, interdependence is thought to lessen the potential for international conflict (McMillan, 1997:40).
Although the interdependence model allows scholars to look at the world in a different way given its inclusion of non-state actors and its expanded definition of power, attention to gender remains inadequate. The focus here is upon gender-as-difference (as opposed to gender-as power) and feminist contributions in the context of interdependence theory are often perceived as additive as opposed to transformative (D’Amico & Beckman, 1994:62). In addition, interdependence maintains the public/private boundary in their conception of power. Humans and relations between people are also absent in this model or rather, only formal political relations and identities are conferred legitimacy in this model (D’Amico and Beckman, 1994:71). In addition, while the primary architects of the interdependence school, Keohane and Nye, begin to talk of the role of domestic politics, they nevertheless fall back upon agenda setting and therefore, state policy (Suhr, 1997). Ultimately, the interdependence euphoria of cooperation was short lived. In fact, Keohane and Nye’s 1987 article “Power and Interdependence Revisited” suggests some degree of backtracking with respect to the definition of power and in addition, presents a narrow and ethnocentric definition of conflict. 12
Challenging “Power”
The reliance of mainstream IR theorists upon particular notions of power serves to justify the exclusion of women, the conquering of women and creation and maintenance of the public/private dichotomy (Sylvester, 1994). Similarly, the focus upon “power politics and interstate conflict has left IR theorists with a world view based upon ever-present danger” (Tickner, 1994:29). A wide variety of feminist scholars problematize this anarchic world view, particularly on the basis that while the “outside” is perceived as chaotic, dangerous and uncertain, the “inside” (the domestic) in contrast, is perceived as controlled and orderly. This ignores the violence often experienced by women in the “private realm”.
Feminist scholars also challenge the androcentric bias of IR theory and its emphasis on “modern man” and “political man” as well as its engendering of the state with masculine characteristics. Characteristics often ascribed to states within mainstream IR theory such as rationality, self-interest and a lack of moral restraint, are in fact socially constructed masculine characteristics (Tickner, 1994:30). On the other hand, characteristics such as emotion, interdependence and idealism, characteristics often associated with femininity, are perceived as inferior and as a “liabilities in the conduct of international relations” (Tickner, 1994:31). IR has been constructed in such a way as to position the state, men and war as the foundation of theory, thus privileging the goals of domination, mastery and “power-over”. Neither women nor the experiences of women in the international realm hold positions in this model. It is in revealing the normative assumptions within dominant IR discourse and in laying bare the power relations which underpin and perpetuate this discourse, that scholars and activists may illuminate sites of resistance to the IR worldview.
The manner in which security and violence are defined and represented in mainstream IR render women’s understandings of, and experiences with, violence and security invisible. This has had tremendous implications for the recognition of women’s human rights in Western human rights discourse and in international law. More often than not, IR theorists perpetuate the definition of security and power elucidated by realist theorists, e.g. security as the ability to have power over others through militaristic (and to a lesser extent economic) means. Such a definition begs the question of whose security is being addressed in International Relations theory and further, whose experiences of danger and violence are being addressed in the field (Pettman, 1996:97). Feminist revisions of these concepts provide new definitions of security and danger and expose the “sham dichotomy” presumed in IR between the international space, where violence is legitimated, versus the domestic/private sphere, within which individual morality is supposedly opposed to violence (Pettman, 1996:106). In this respect, many feminist scholars also challenge the notion that domestic violence for example, is merely a private problem and not the problem of International Relations theory nor international law. Masculinist discourse in society, IR included, perpetuates violence against women, including acts of rape, torture and structural violence, as well as the economic and social repression of women. With regard veiling, “cultural forms of violence” carry their own gender politics in that the masculinist power structure defines abuses against women as cultural, natural or private but not political and certainly not international (Pettman, 1996:209). 13 Thus, such acts of violence often remain invisible or are simply appropriated to further a political or economic agenda; in other words, women’s experiences with violence are often not the central issue of concern.
The definitions of violence and security privileged in IR have their origin in a particular conception of “power” which is rooted in the Enlightenment model of knowledge production. This “mode of knowing” is characterized by the creation of binary relationships used to objectify and categorize “reality”. Often these mutually exclusive categories privilege socially constructed masculine characteristics over feminine (thus inferiorizing that which is perceived as feminine). Binary relationships including man/woman, rational/instinctual, culture/nature and modern/traditional characterize Western Enlightenment thinking, and continue to serve as the basis for our understanding of political, economic and social realities. Such categorization allows for the promotion of efficiency and control and in so doing, provides justification for the conquering of women, nature and anything that does not fit the Enlightenment model of rationality, as well as that which does not coincide with Western culture, as the history of Western culture is perceived as the history of all cultures and thus, the standard against which all cultures are judged. This mode of thought, for example, provided justification for the Witch Trials, slavery and the destruction of indigenous peoples; “the same charges leveled against Witches - charges of savagery and devil worship - were used to justify the enslavement of Africans...the destruction of cultures and the wholesale genocide of Native Americans (Starhawk, 1989:21). In addition, the methodological determinism of the Enlightenment model of knowledge production promotes a view of nature and society broken down into their constituent parts, thereby allowing the exploitation of each component without appearing to impinge upon the whole (Kabeer, 1994:73).
“Power-over”, the conception of power prevalent in realism (and thus common to mainstream IR theory) is created and maintained by the belief that some are more valuable than others; war is the execution of power-over and requires the creation of the “other” who is different and inhuman, while conquest is justified by the denigration of the conquered (Starhawk, 1987:14). Power-over as well as the ideology of warfare is one result of patriarchal 14 structures. In fact, the ideology of warfare is founded upon contempt for women and socially constructed feminine characteristics such as weakness and passivity. This definition of power has come to shape nearly all of our institutions and structures and violence emanating from this notion of power takes on many forms, from the power wielded over “other nations” in the form of cultural imperialism to the power wielded over women in situations of domestic violence and rape. The language of power-over is our system of rules and “abstract, generalized formulations enforced on the concrete realities of particular circumstances” (Starhawk, 1987:14). Mechanistic science also sustains power-over because, for one, it provides us with the technology to sustain power-over, but for another, it allows us to separate and ultimately devalue the world as well; “if we say that only quantifiable experiences are true, we have not eliminated what cannot be measured, but we have devalued it” (Starhawk, 1987:20).
Power-over motivates through fear, intimidation and the threat of punishment and violence. What results is a culture of domination in which our worth must be earned and determined by our roles and status, not by our intrinsic worth for “in the world-view of power-over, human brings have no inherent worth” (Starhawk, 1987:14). Systems of domination however, are ill-equipped to cope with fearlessness thus, resistance begins when we cease to act from fear (Starhawk, 1987:14). “Power-from-within” or empowerment for example, entails a different consciousness, one which sees the world as a living being in which all elements are inherently valuable (Starhawk, 1987:15). “Power-with” also entails a different type of consciousness, one which sees the world as a pattern of relationships. Power-with is social power, the “influence we wield among equals” and the relationships which allow us to resist the culture of domination collectively (Starhawk, 1987:15).
The contributions of a variety of feminist scholarship to the field of International Relations have challenged traditional notions of masculinity and femininity and in so doing, have exposed gender bias in the field. As the feminist critiques noted above demonstrate, there is little room within the framework of mainstream IR theory for women and the experiences of women, thus mainstream IR theory offers little in the way of understanding and addressing the Fisher case or veiling more broadly. Gender relations never exist apart from other power relations. Therefore, theories of international relations must be predicated upon the illumination of the intersections of gender, race, nationality, sexuality and class in the international realm (Pettman, 1996:1) and the redefinition of qualities considered masculine and feminine.
International Human Rights: Which Humans?
Feminist scholarship and activism have more recently addressed Western human rights discourse and have provided inroads toward the internationalization of women’s human rights. Western discourse on human rights and the assumptions therein have important implications for the recognition of women’s rights as human rights. This discourse, in part, illuminates the reasons behind the denial of asylum for Fisher. Moreover, Western human rights discourse influences, and is influenced by, Western geopolitical discourse. This section focuses upon the Western discourse of human rights, its assumptions as well as many of the challenges posed to this discourse by a variety of feminist scholarship(s). Finally, I discuss the challenge posed by “relativists” to the very foundation of human rights discourse, its universality, as well as the implications of this challenge to the internationalization of women’s human rights.
Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Ain’t I a Human? 15
International law emerged from International Relations theory (from those of the idealist persuasion in particular) in order to confront, and perhaps control, the nature of the world system and its actors. From this emerged international human rights law which seeks to provide and mandate “acceptable” standards of human rights around the world. As feminist critiques of mainstream IR have demonstrated however, the framework of mainstream IR theory tells us nothing about gender-specific human rights violations, and certainly nothing about the Fisher case. In fact, this framework does not allow for the recognition of gender-specific violence and repression because such acts are often relegated to the cultural and private realms which are not the concerns of mainstream IR theory. In addition, the Western, liberal human rights framework employed within international law has failed until recently, to recognize gender-specific forms of violence (many of these recent developments however, have been met with critiques and even outright opposition). This historic failure is partly the result of the three generations or perspectives on human rights which have come to constitute the contemporary human rights framework (James, 1994) and discourse. 16
The movement toward the internationalization of women’s human rights was first given voice in the 1945 United Nations Charter which called for the reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of each person and equality between men and women (U.N. Charter, 1945:1). While the concept of “human rights” is, as mentioned, included in the U.N. Charter, the actual meaning of the concept is not clearly defined. The 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) clearly defines the notion of “human rights” left ambiguous by the UN Charter. Human rights, according to the UDHR range from the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3), the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5) freedom of movement (Article 13) freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19) to the right to work, to a standard to living adequate for health and well-being (Article 25) and the right to education (Article 26). Throughout the UDHR, equality acts as the foundation of human rights (James, 1994:556). For instance, Article One of the UDHR mandates that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in the spirit of brotherhood.
From the Declaration emerged two international covenants, one focusing upon civil and political rights and the other focusing upon economic, social and cultural rights. Together they came to be known as the International Bill of Rights which seeks to encompass all imaginable elements of human rights. Unlike the Declaration, both are legally binding and establish implementation procedures for State Parties. It is within this International Bill of Rights that James (1994) elucidates three different, albeit related, generations in the development of human rights.
The first generation, as reflected in the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasizes notions of individual freedom against abuses perpetrated by the government. Thus, rights to liberty, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, assembly, expression and so forth take the pride of place in this generation. The desire to conceptualize citizenship rights is also evident within this Covenant, which contributed to the formalization of the public/private dichotomy, as citizenship became circumscribed within the realm of the public (James, 1994:565). This is particularly apparent in the related debates surrounding suffrage. This generation is influenced by the rationale underpinning the French and American revolutions, as well as the rise of capitalism (James, 1994:565). This is evident, particularly in terms of the manner in which notions of the individual are conceptualized as well as the rights of the citizen against the excesses of its government. These constructions impede the recognition of women as citizens and thus, the recognition of their inalienable human rights.
The second generation was influenced by the Marxist socialist critique of capitalist development and is reflected in the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (James, 1994:565). Within this generation, notions of social justice are highlighted and state intervention is mandated in areas of production and allocation of resources and the determination of social values (James, 1994:565). In other words, rather than “freedoms from” (negative rights) as emphasized in the first generation, this generation emphasizes “rights to” (positive rights) and seeks to ensure state intervention on their behalf (James, 1994:565). While little mention is made of women in the first generation, the second generation seeks to shift the boundaries between public and private by incorporating women in the public sphere and thus expanding the boundaries of the public to be more inclusive of women. However, the second generation assumed that by shifting public/private boundaries, gender equality would be achieved, thereby ignoring the role of patriarchy in gender oppression; all oppressions, including gender and racial oppression, became subsumed under the rubric of class and class oppression (James 1994:565).
The third generation of human rights, often referred to as solidarity or collective rights, remains the least developed and perhaps the most controversial generation of human rights (James, 1994:565). The third generation emerged in response to the aftermath of colonialism and in the midst of often devastating neocolonialist practices. Many Third World scholars and activists recognized that critical issues, such as the right to development and peace, had to be addressed as a basis for dialogue concerning the equitable distribution of the world’s resources (James, 1994:566). Despite the fact that the third generation of human rights rose out of anti-colonial nationalist struggles, the boundaries of gender relations remained firmly in place in this generation (James, 1994:567). In fact, it was not uncommon for women’s rights arguments to be viewed as detrimental to nationalist movements as exemplified in Partha Chatterjee’s “The Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question” (1990) within which Chatterjee illuminates the manner in which nationalism and “the woman question” were treated in early and middle 19th century Bengal.
Of the over sixty United Nations human rights conventions, many do in fact deal with “the woman question” specifically, such as the 1952 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, The 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration for Marriage (1962) as well as the 1951 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. In addition, the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Practices Related to Slavery includes a condemnation of practices such as bride price as a practice similar to slavery. Finally, the 1979 Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) seeks to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and challenge the normative foundations of gender-based oppression including patriarchy (James, 1994:568-69). However, it includes only minimal provisions for enforcement (James, 1994:568-69).
Despite these Conventions, women around the world continue to experience gender-based forms of violence and are in fact, becoming the majority of the world’s poor and displaced (e.g. the feminization of poverty). The current framework and discourse on human rights serves as an obstacle to women’s human rights given its failure to adequately recognize these realities. This is so given the inability of the three generations of human rights to adequately critique the construction of fundamental norms and boundaries which perpetuate gender inequality in both the public and private realm (James, 1994:376). CEDAW makes strides in challenging these boundaries, however more work is necessary in redefining human rights to adequately reflect the lives, experiences and needs of women. Scholars such as James however, go so far as to argue that the condition of women’s human rights remain dismal around the world because of the disaggregation of women’s human rights (by CEDAW, for example) from the general conceptualization of human rights (James, 1994:563).
One reason for the failure of Western human rights discourse to adequately address the diverse experiences of women is its liberal bias. Definitions of human rights are often associated with Western, liberal and individualistic theoretical approaches. In this context, it is assumed that such rights are possessed by individuals as autonomous moral agents rather than as members of any particular group. Such rights exist independently of any particular culture, ideology or value system and are instead, part of an individual’s status as a person; therefore, claims to human rights are made against all other individuals and not just a select few (Hoffman, 1994:30). This assumption mirrors the Western, liberal recognition of humans as unique in their capacity for rationality, with particular emphasis placed upon the moral and prudent characteristics of that rationality. The liberal notion of the right of humans to exercise autonomy and fulfill themselves, provided that such behavior does not deprive others of their rights to fulfill themselves, has become one of the primary tenets of contemporary human rights discourse. In other words, it is assumed in both liberal thought and human rights discourse that a “just society will be created out of an aggregate of freely choosing adults” (Elshtain, 1982:442). Moreover, with respect to Western human rights discourse, the prevailing assumption among liberal feminists reflects the notion that women must be recognized as equals to men, as mandated in the United Nations Charter of 1945, and that discussions of human rights must include the rights of women to equality, justice and the pursuit of happiness. Women must be recognized as autonomous individuals with the right, as autonomous, rational individuals, to self-fulfillment. This is an inadequate approach for it seeks to simply add women to existing structure without problematizing the nature of this structure.
On an even more basic level, a wide variety of feminist scholars hold that the Western construction of “human” effectively excludes women from its definition. Subsequently, the recognition of women’s rights as human rights (or women as humans) is obfuscated. Peterson draws our attention to the androcentric construction of “human” in Western philosophical and sociological discourse, particularly in terms of the Western articulations of human nature, the moral agent, the rational being and the political animal as evidenced within the works of Aristotle, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Hegal and others (Peterson, 1990:314). The same holds true for Kant’s model of the moral agent. Women are thought devoid of the rational characteristics which allow for one to be human; rather than thinking, women emote and given their propensity do things simply for pleasure, women are not regarded by Kant as capable of having principles (Peterson, 1990:314).
Moreover, human rights have historically been defined by the criterion of what “men fear will happen to them” (Pettman, 1996:209). In other words, men and the experiences of men are taken as the standards against which all others are judged. This “male as norm” standpoint ensures that issues surrounding gender-specific violence will remain on the fringes of the field of IR as well as international human rights law. For instance, although many scholars and activists applaud the steps taken by the creators of the CEDAW in addressing gender-specific forms of violence, others continue to express dissatisfaction with the notion of equality highlighted in CEDAW. “Equality” implies sameness with men which reinforces the “male as norm” standpoint and obfuscates the value, if not the existence, of women’s unique experiences (Wright, 1993:114). In fact, with the exception of the CEDAW “...the language of human rights is resolutely and utterly male” (Wright, 1993:114). It should also be noted that as of this moment, not only has the United States failed to ratify this Convention, but enforcement mechanisms do not exist within this Convention and finally, the implementation process of the Convention is also weak (Wright, 1993:115). Therefore, although women’s equality relative to men’s is ensured in the United Nation’s Charter of 1945, issues regarding violence against women, or gender-specific forms of violence, have not adequately been addressed. As long as social constructions of gender are reproduced, women and their experiences with war, state terrorism and structural violence will be ignored, as will women’s human rights. Moreover, “liberal mystifications” of free and equal individuals continue to mask the perpetuation of patriarchy as it has taken different forms, from father to husband patriarchy and to public patriarchy (Peterson, 1990:319).
Despite claims of the universal appeal of human rights, numerous scholars and activists take issue with the very foundations of the contemporary human rights framework and its discourse; its universalistic claims and its construction of “human”. 17 Proponents of universal standards of human rights argue that human rights transcend culture and are part of an individual’s status as a person. The implicit assumption in this context is of the legal subject as an individual distinct from the community and endowed with inalienable rights; thus, individual and collective rights are seen as diametrically opposed (Obiora, 1997:279).
“Cultural relativists” on the other hand, argue that calls for the recognition of universal standards of human rights challenge the cultural autonomy, sovereignty and domestic jurisdictions of postcolonial regimes. Furthermore, “...the preponderance of human rights bear a Western imprint and evince paradigms, philosophies and ideologies that are more resonant with the West” (Obiora, 1997:277). In other words, cultural relativists challenge the model of human rights in international law as culturally-specific; despite assertions of universality, the foundation of human rights are historically Western and offer a particularly Western philosophy which is not always applicable in non-Western value-systems (Bunting, 1993:8). This argument has several implications. For one, the universal human rights model tends to presuppose a universal human nature and human experience, which reflects a bias for the Western construct of human nature (i.e. rational, atomistic man) as well as a Western experience (the Western modernization model is one important example). The Western construction of “human” as well as the Western experience have come to be taken as the norm against which all others are compared.
There are three specific (yet related) ways in which human rights discourse suffers from a Western bias (Peterson, 1990:313-14). In generalizing what is a specifically Western historical experience, non-Western experiences are distorted. Secondly, the Western theoretical preference for abstract universality in its definition of “human” masks the interests served by such a definition. Finally, the prevailing model of human rights privileges both the Western experience as well as a specifically male experience. The tendency to adopt a transhistorical or universal model of human rights (despite the fact that this model is very much historically constituted) renders inferior and/or invisible all non-Western experiences, while its androcentric bias renders invisible the lived experiences of many of the world’s women. Moreover, claims of universality mask the power relations inherent in the particular ways in which concepts such as “human” and “individual” get defined.
Much of Western feminist scholarship on human rights rejects culturally relative positions for fear that the consideration of such arguments will render projects for women’s empowerment impossible (Bunting, 1993:6 & 9). Mies and Shiva suggest that the total acceptance of relativism leaves many feminists in a position of having to accept any form of violence against women, while the exclusive focus on difference could make communication among women impossible (Mies and Shiva, 1993:11-12). Representative Pat Schroeder, who introduced legislation in 1993 to ban female circumcision/genital mutilation in the US (HR 3075), spoke out against impediments to the recognition of women’s human rights in her statement “if it happens to you for racial reasons, it’s a human rights violation. If it happens to you for political reasons, it’s a human rights violation. If it happens to a women, it’s cultural” (Brownlee, 1994:57). Finally, cultural relativists are often accused of romanticizing “traditional societies” and moreover, Western feminists often regard “culture” as something which simply perpetuates the subordination of women and impedes the application of universal law (Bunting, 1993:9).
The exclusion of race, culture, class, sexuality and nation renders feminist scholarship on human rights however, “theoretically impoverished and strategically weak” (Bunting, 1993:6). With respect to issues of “difference” within international human rights laws, difference as the basis for equality (as is reflected in CEDAW) is inadequate for addressing the experiences of women or men. Wright illuminates the complicated intersection of race, class and culture vis a vis human rights and explains that “this is particularly acute in an international law context where cultural differences and the existence of a diversity of traditional and other practices fragments the search for a simple equality” (Wright, 1993:115). Universal laws based upon individualistic and particular moral philosophies serve to exclude the perspectives of others and leads to strategies relevant only to a minority of women in the world (Bunting, 1993:10). Furthermore, cultural relativism does not imply the condoning of violence against women. Ultimately, the simple dichotomous positions associated with the universalist and relativist approaches are not adequate for addressing gender-specific violations against women. The failure of feminists to include analyses of cultural contexts perpetuates stereotypical, racist and neo-colonial perspectives of “others” which effectively silences women in non-Western communities (Bunting, 1993:15).
The discourse on human rights tends to cluster “around either a universalist, homogenizing interpretation of human rights or an easy kind of relativism” (Chowdhry & Urban, 1998:17). Neither side of this dyad offers an adequate means by which to address veiling. Therefore, Chowdhry and Urban, for example, refuse “either of these two moves [and instead] would like to explore how we come to do feminist work across cultural divides” (Grewal & Kaplan, 1994:2). In other words, rather than relying upon either side of the dyad in addressing veiling, postcolonial feminism allows one to “write against the grain to explore the fault-lines of these discourses and to position cultural/identity productions” in the field of International Relations (Chowdhry & Urban, 1998:18).
Postcolonial feminism provides a means through which one may do feminist work across cultural divides and thus, serves as the primary analytical framework for this project. Therefore, I discuss the primary themes associated with postcolonial feminism and their relevance to the examination of veiling as well as the Fisher case. Because postcolonial theory is essential to understanding postcolonial feminism however, I begin with a brief discussion of several tenets of postcolonial theory.
Postcolonial TheoryWhile the era of direct territorial occupation under colonization is no longer with us, many scholars and activists argue that current international hierarchies, relations of power and geographical boundaries are presently determined by relations characteristic of colonialism (Pettman, 1996:26). Further, imperialism was not only influential in the construction of colonial “others” but in the construction of the West as well. In this light, many authors and activists have begun unraveling and challenging the metanarratives of Western civilization and the constructions, definitions and representations of the “West and its others” through postcolonial theory. Within this framework, the link between the historical periods of colonialism and imperialism, as well as the Western pursuit of “Truth” and “...racist power and cultural supremacism” have been exposed (Prakash, 1995:202). The writings of Edward Said served as one impetus for what is referred to as postcolonial theory. Said’s Orientalism discusses the manner in which the West has represented the Orient, 18 or the “other”, and exposes the relations of power and domination inherent in this construction. His examination serves to delegitimize the authoritative position of Orientalism and the representation of the Orient in Western discourse. Further, by interrogating the system of knowledge upon which Orientalism is based, the authority of Western discourse and Western modes of knowing in general are also challenged.
The discourse of the “Orientalists” defined the Orient in opposition to the West thereby creating a dichotomous relationship between the West and this “other”. There existed a complex array of representations of the Orient in Western discourse ranging from Oriental despotism and cruelty to Oriental splendor and sensuality (Said, 1978:4). The West has defined the Orient in such as way as to declare and maintain positional superiority over this “other” based upon notions of difference or rather, Oriental inferiority and Western superiority. This discourse has been maintained politically, economically and culturally, thus rendering other cultures and their histories invisible. Hence, the ability of the West to “discover” and colonize new lands. In sum, the writings of Said and those inspired by Said (Ashcroft et. al., 1989; Bhabha, 1985 and Prakash, 1994, for example) have challenged the construction and reproduction of knowledge and Western modes of knowing, as well as the tendency of Western discourse to espouse non-political, value-free stances, particularly in its quest to define “Truth”. Ultimately, postcolonial scholars seek to expose the nexus between power and knowledge as well as the manner in which definitions and representations of “the other” are value-laden and often politically motivated.
Postcolonial scholars, in challenging definitions of power and representation in IR, expose the tendency of IR theorists to discuss power only as it relates to “...statist affirmations of its centrality to the national interest”, as well as the tendency of IR theorists to view power only in economic and military terms (Darby & Paolini, 1994:381). 19 Within mainstream IR theory, there is little recognition of knowledge and representation as forms of power. Furthermore, issues of culture and identity are given only peripheral status in mainstream IR theory. This stands in direct contrast to the central position given to culture and identity within postcolonial theory as well as many feminist theories (Darby & Paolini, 1994:382).
An important example of the need to engage in International Relations through the lens of postcolonial critique is Persaud’s illumination of the relevance of Fanon’s theories to the study of global politics. Persaud suggests that realist theorizing in International Relations “has served as a form of power/knowledge, thus ‘disciplining’ theoretical practices in the field” (Persaud, 1997:170). Persaud suggests that the privileging of certain definitions/constructions of power, states and national interest in realist ontology has deemed irrelevant the histories and experiences of less powerful states and their peoples (Persaud, 1997:170). This has influenced not only what is considered “reality”, but has influenced the manner in which included versus excluded realities are represented; this has led to a kind of “colonization and dichotomization of the mind” (Persaud, 1997:170).
Colonial domination, as an “epistemological and ontological system as well as a form of structural violence...was much broader than economic exploitation...it was civilizational and...racial in content” and in its “characteristic forms of violence have a peculiar spatial logic” (Persaud, 1997:170). Through the illumination of Fanon’s work, Persaud attempts to challenge many of the notions taken as “givens” in realist theory and the field of International Relations, by suggesting that in focusing upon particular conceptions (e.g. states, national interest and the state system) realist theorists often relegate other entities to an inferior status. Persaud addresses the sub-field of “Strategic Studies” as an example of a field whose theorists “politically manipulated discourses on security and prevented other significant problems in the study or field of International Relations from gaining greater status” (Persaud, 1997:172). It is Persaud’s intent to demonstrate how hegemonic discourse in this field have employed particular definitions of domination, violence and liberation which have relegated the understanding of colonialism to one based upon economic exploitation while obfuscating the racial character of colonialism. Persaud uses Fanon’s notions/conceptions of domination, violence and liberation to challenge the realist framework and further, to better illuminate the subordination of the Third World today and to point to ways in which racial issues appear to overlap with the “contradictions generated by globalization in a postcolonial era so as to shape national security conceptions and policies of the West” (Persaud, 1997:173). In essence, Persaud uses the work of Fanon to challenge the metanarrative of Western colonialism, as well as the discourse which has legitimized and perpetuated the domination of the Third World by the West, by shedding light upon race as a central, if not key, principle in this exploitation, as well as the spatial logic of colonial domination. Thus, Persaud demonstrates the “discursive constitution of identity/difference through racialization” (183), and suggests that the “social structure of accumulation is configured around race” or rather “that the relations of production...cannot be separated from the racial relations of subordination” (Persaud, 1997:175).
This brief discussion of postcolonial theory should not suggest that there is consensus among scholars regarding the boundaries of postcolonial theory, much less agreement on the meaning of “postcolonial” itself. Bhabha contends that “...the term postcolonial is increasingly used to describe that form of social criticism that bears witness to those unequal and uneven processes of representation by which the historical experience of the once-colonized Third World comes to be framed in the West” (Mongia, 1996:1). Prakash regards postcolonial theory as the critique of “the historicism that projected the West as history” (Mongia, 1996:5). Aidoo, Dirlick and Goodison however, problematize the periodization that “postcolonial” infers, while still others argue that with the growing institutionalism of “postcolonialism” as well as the inclusion of marginal constituencies in the “First World”, comes the erosion of the oppositional stance once offered by postcolonial theory (Mongia, 1996:1-6). Mongia however, seeks to leave the “meaning” of postcolonial theory fluid, as a “locus of contradictions”, in order to illuminate the debates in the field which reflect the “difficulties of engaging with such notions as representation, identity, agency, discourse and history” (Mongia, 3:1996). Thus, for the purposes of this project, “postcolonial theory” is at once the recognition of the continuance of colonial structures and relations of power, as well as the quest to de-center modes of knowing and knowledge and the structures which perpetuate the claimed universality of particular discourses and forms of knowledge.
Postcolonial Feminism: Women as the “Other”
Postcolonial feminist scholars expand upon the writings of postcolonial theorists and in so doing, challenge the representation of women within Western discourse, including Western feminist discourse, and expose the diverse ways in which women are impacted by (post)colonial structures and relations of power. Several interrelated themes emerge from the literature emanating from the postcolonial feminist school, many of which demonstrate the interconnectedness of class, race, nation, gender, sexuality and socioeconomic positioning in mediating the lives of women. Moreover, they demonstrate the complex nature of women’s human rights, particularly as they relate to issues of veiling. It is for these reasons that postcolonial feminism enjoys the pride of place in this project.
Gender
Many postcolonial feminists (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Spivak, 1987; Ahmed, 1992; Mani, 1990) seek to interrogate and unsettle the negative ways in which women are represented in colonial/neo-colonial narratives. Women have been represented by and large as submissive victims and/or sexualized objects. As one example, Muslim women are often represented in the Western media in one of two extremes: as voluptuous objects of desire surrounded by servants and slaves or as submissive victims at the mercy of tyrannical men (Walther, 1993:8).
Many Third World and postcolonial feminists have implicated not only Western discourse generally, but Western feminist discourse specifically for perpetuating the representation of Third World women as undifferentiated, backwards and inferior. This is particularly true of the manner in which Third World women are represented within Western liberal feminist discourse. Often, Third World women are represented in this discourse as an already constituted group with identical interests and desires irrespective of class, ethnic, sexual or racial locations, which implies a notion of gender that can be applied universally (Mohanty, 1991:55). Thus, scholars such as Mohanty have made the recognition of colonialist and neo-colonialist relations of power, including the colonizing ventures of Western liberal feminists, central to their work and have sought to illuminate the political, social and economic consequences of related discourses. Integral to such a project is the necessity of formulating autonomous, geographically, historically and culturally grounded feminist struggles (Mohanty, 1991:51). Feminists in the US must realize that they have excluded women whose interests and needs have appeared somehow different, for “...paradoxically, as soon as feminism defines ‘woman’ it excludes all sorts of women” (Oliver, 1993:98-99).
Contrary to discourse of universality within Western liberalism and liberal feminism, as well as assumptions of universality within the Western construction of human rights, Third World Feminisms claim a “location” and often argue for specific forms of resistance to diverse forms of oppression (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:184). Many Third World feminists are keenly aware of white women’s advantageous position within colonialist/neo-colonialist and racist systems; thus Third World feminist claims are often made in the context of anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles and not on the basis of some perceived global sisterhood (Alexander an Mohanty, 1997:184). However, this is done in the midst of having to navigate “... between their excommunication as ‘traitors to the nation’...and the imperial rescue fantasies of...veiled women proffered by Eurocentric feminism” (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:184). Moreover, feminists of color “have from the outset, been engaged in analysis and activism around the intersection of nation/race/gender” (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:184).
Many scholars and activists make the mistake of assuming that critiques of universal, essentialized categories of womanhood are also rejections of commonalties and common bonds among women (Trend, 1995:121). The use of essentialized categories of womanhood is reflected in liberal feminist attempts to create and call upon notions of a “global sisterhood” of international feminism. Western liberal feminists tend to treat all women as an undifferentiated group, devoid of class and racial inequalities. However, “...it is inadequate to theorize violence [and repression] as an inherently male characteristic with only women as victims” (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997:60). This global sisterhood also often reflects and/or rests upon a center/periphery model within which women of color in the Third World constitute the periphery (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997:xviii).
Underlying the notion of “international” is the concept of universal patriarchy which is thought to operate in a transhistorical way to oppress all women irrespective of geographic location, without an understanding of the unequal relationships among and between peoples, without consideration of the term “international” in relation to the examination of economic, political, and ideological processes which foreground the operations of capitalism and finally, without an understanding of the processes of globalization and the differential impacts of this process based upon one’s location in the international (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997). “The recent diffusion of Eurocentric consumer culture in the wake of further consolidation of multinational capital, for example, foregrounds the need to theorize the ways in which inequality structures values, desires, and needs for different groups and classes of women. Any understanding of women’s experiences based on a narrow conception of gender would simply be incapable of fully addressing the homogenizing and hierarchizing effects of economic and cultural processes which are the result of this consumer culture” (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997: xvi). Similarly, as Nawal El Saadawi points out, “Western women often go to countries such as Sudan and ‘see’ only clitoridectomy [or the veil], but never notice the role of multinational corporations and their exploited labor” (Mohanty, 1991:224). In other words, Western liberal feminists, whether consciously or unconsciously, fail to see how they are economic and political oppressors of women and men in the Third World.
The term “recolonization” is used by Alexander and Mohanty to argue that global realignments and the fluidity of capital have led to a further consolidation and exacerbation of capitalist relations of domination and exploitation. Recolonization is predicated upon hierarchical, racialized identities and representation. Of central importance here is the recognition of contemporary practices of postcolonial and advanced colonial states with capitalist processes of recolonization and recognition of newly emergent forms of colonization. “Decolonization” then, is also central to the project advanced by Alexander and Mohanty. Decolonization refers to the thinking of oneself out of spaces of domination and has both a practical dimension (praxis) and a pedagogical one. We must think through an “anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist lens” which will require the recognition of the “objectifying, dehumanizing effects of colonization and the building of actively anti-colonialist relationships and cultures” (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:xxi-xxii). Western liberal feminists, despite claims otherwise, do not hold the key for the universal liberation of women around the world. Claims to universality, whether that of “universal womanhood” or universal forms of oppression, are being met with increasing resistance. This is not to dismiss however, the opportunities possible through collective strength and action. International movements may be built without resorting to essentialized categories of women and without the dichotomizing discourse which renders many women and their experiences invisible and/or irrelevant.
The representation of women solely as “victims”, be they victims of men, of patriarchy or of religion have several important implications as well. Women have often been constructed as victims who happily accept their subordinate role (Macleod(b), 1992:534). With respect to veiling in the Middle East, women are often portrayed and pitied as victims of a particularly oppressive culture (often equated with Islam) and depicted as bound to the harem, repressed and constrained. The ultimate symbol of their oppression, as well as their acceptance of this oppression, is the veil (Macleod(b), 1992:535). Not only are the unique and varied ways in which women act as agents in their lives rendered invisible by such discourse, but attempts at Western colonial and neo-colonial ventures are legitimized by discourses which represent women, particularly Third World women, as helpless and in need of Western intervention in order to become conscious of, and escape, their oppression. We must move beyond “actor/victim and powerful/passive” dichotomies and toward an understanding of the more complicated ways in which “consciousness is structured and agency is embodied in power relations” (Macleod(b), 1992:557).
RaceRace and imperialism are treated as metatheoretical categories within postcolonial feminism. Recognizing how the multiple sites upon which locations of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, geographic location, politics, economics and social conditions come together in influencing the lives of women, praxis and feminist analysis, are integral aspects of postcolonial feminist theory. Alexander and Mohanty draw attention to the multiple sites of racism, gender and power including the local and global manifestations of race/gender/power relationships in this context.
In illustrating these multiple locations and identities, Alexander and Mohanty speak of their locations as “outsiders” in Western educational institutions within which as “immigrant women of color” they were neither the “right” color, gender, nor nationality with respect to the US academy as well as the Western construction of “citizen” (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:xiv). Related to this is the need for challenging the “hegemony of whiteness” and capitalism often located within academic institutions (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:xiv). This includes Western Women’s Studies programs, which often end up supporting regimes of race. To this end, terms such as “genealogies” and “legacies” are employed within postcolonial feminist theory to encourage an interested, conscious thinking and rethinking of history and historicity, with women’s autonomy and self-determination at its core (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:xvi). Women must be recognized as agents in their own lives as opposed to simply victims; as agents, women not only reproduce the terms of their existence, but take responsibility for their existence. Further, it is upon the reconceptualization of Third World women as agents, as opposed to victims, that emancipatory discourses can be constructed.
This discussion is not to imply that all Western feminism(s) and feminists have excluded from their analyses the recognition of the interconnectedness of racial/gender/class/nation/sexual locations. Great strides have been made by “multicultural feminists” in recognizing the interconnections between these diverse locations in mediating the experiences of women in the US. The inclusion of so-called “marginalized constituencies” within the “First World” into the rubric of postcolonial theory stands on contested grounds, however. Frankenberg and Mani, for example, would prefer to call “minority feminists” in the U.S. “post-civil rights feminists” rather than include such scholarship in postcolonial feminism, for the term postcolonial “sticks in [their] throats” in this context (Frankenberg and Mani, 1996:348). However, Mufti and Shohat problematize the exclusion of “minority feminisms” of the U.S from postcolonial anthologies, and argue that their anthology “insists upon precisely the contrapuntal juxtaposition of these diverse yet related debates” (Mufti & Shohat, 1997:3). Therefore, they refuse “to separate the linked histories of race as well as the contemporary complication of communities within and across the borders of nation-states” because “it is impossible to discuss issues of nation and gender in national isolation” (Mufti & Shohat, 1997:3). It can also be argued that given the centrality of imperialism in defining global international relations, postcolonial feminist theory must also recognize that imperialism has also influenced minority experiences in the United States. For these reasons, I include “minority feminisms” from the United States in my discussion of postcolonial feminism. Moreover, the arguments provided by authors such as Davis, bell and others have influenced my examination of veiling. Particularly useful are those arguments which illuminate the interconnections between race/gender/culture/class, the critiques of Western liberal feminism and the arguments which illuminate the problematic positioning of “other men” within Western discourse.
Authors such as Spelman (1998) urge contemporary feminists to resist the tendency to gloss over difference and resort to the promulgation of notions of essential “womanhood” and argue that a valid feminist theory must take into account differences among women, as opposed to claims that all women are “just like me” (Tong, 1998:215-16). One of the central claims of African-American feminists is the inseparability of structures of gender, race and culture and that white, liberal feminists must more fully understand the intersection of racism, classism and sexism in the lives of women of color in the US (Tong, 1998:216-17). Oppression is understood here as a “many-headed beast”, thus the whole body of the beast must be eliminated in order for oppression to end. Such claims are reflected in the works of bell hooks, Audre Lorde and Angela Davis. Bell hooks draws attention to the failure of certain Western feminist movements to recognize race as a central category of concern and analysis. Similarly, Angela Davis points out that even the 19 th century women’s rights movement was really a white, educated middle-class women’s movement (Davis, 1981:434). Betty Friedan, one of the founders of NOW (The National Organization of Women) seems oblivious to any other perspective than that of white, middle class, heterosexual, Western women in her book The Feminine Mystique (Tong, 1998:26). hooks notes that many (including some members of NOW) have experienced discomfort with efforts to introduce diversity into the agendas of social movements and organizations. She explains that often attempts at forcing a paradigm shift through the inclusion of diversity and difference in the contemporary US Left has caused a period of confusion and chaos. This is not exclusive to the Left, however, for as hooks explains, anytime there is a revolution in thought which requires a paradigm shift, stability and peace do not necessarily follow. The inability to resolve this tension however, has led many people on the Left to panic. Many have begun to wonder if the introduction of diversity and difference was actually undermining the Left’s capacity for collective struggle. hooks responds to this with the assertion “once you destabilize static and unitary notions of commonality, you require people who have certain kinds of privilege truly to engage in solidarity and to divest their privileges in certain ways” (Trend, 1995:118).
With respect to issues of representation, Patricia Hill Collins (1990) argues that the oppression of black women in the US is systemized and structured along three dimensions. For instance, the economic dimension relegates black women to low-paid service occupations, the political dimension denies black women the rights and privileges normally extended to white men and women, and finally the ideological dimension imposes a “...freedom restricting set of ‘controlling images’ on black women, serving to justify as well as explain white men’s and (to a lesser extent) white women’s treatment of black women” (Tong, 1998:218). For Collins (as well as many other postcolonial feminists) the ideological dimension is the most powerful of the three, for racial, class and sexist oppression cannot continue without powerful ideological justifications for their existence (Tong, 1998:218). Therefore, the stereotypes and representations of the “other” in this context must be challenged in order for the oppression of women of color to be addressed and transcended.
Other Men
Recognition by postcolonial feminists of the manner in which “other men” are represented is another important component in the examination of Western discourse on veiling. Western colonial and neo-colonial discourse often represent Third World men as “hypermasculine”; e.g. men are represented as oppressors of women in all contexts and at all times. “Hyperfeminity”, on the other hand, implies that all women are passive victims of all men in all contexts and at all times. In fact, postcolonial feminists such as Ahmed as well as “minority feminists” in the US such as Davis, suggest that Western liberal feminists are often complicit in the creation of “other men” as well. For example, Ahmed exposes the fusion of the Western narrative of Islam with the colonial narrative in the late 19th century and suggests that the Victorian male establishment captured the language of feminism and redirected it in the service of colonialism, toward “other men” and “other cultures” (Ahmed, 1992:150-151). In other words, issues regarding women, their oppression, and the cultures of “other men” were fused together in the rhetoric of colonialism to “...render morally justifiable its project of undermining or eradicating the cultures of colonized peoples” (Ahmed, 1992:151).
Similarly, Western discourse often represents African-American men as more sexually voracious and violent than white men. Subsequently a tension exists between the desire among many feminists to expose sexism within the black community, and the fear that in so doing, the construction of black men as the “other” would only be strengthened. Angela Davis (1981) is particularly critical of the works of white feminists such as Susan Brownmiller, Jean MacKeller and Diana Russell who have helped resuscitate the image of black men as “ the rapists” who prey upon white women. For instance, Davis draws attention to Brownmiller’s book Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape which includes the argument that many agree with Eldrige Cleaver’s statement that rape is an “insurrectionary act” against “white society” (Tong, 1998:223). This representation reflects the same type of thinking used to justify the lynching of thousands of black men during the 19 th century which was largely based upon the fear of violent “Negro conspiracies” against white men and women (Tong, 1998:223-25). hooks is also particularly vocal about issues of sexism and rape within the black community. Although hooks recognizes the tendency of Western white feminists and others to represent black men as the “other”, hooks nevertheless maintains that the black community must challenge its own sexism in addition to the sexism provided by the white men (hooks, 1990).
In short, I have sought to examine mainstream IR theory’s (in)attention to issues such as forced veiling and the Fisher case more specifically. Mainstream IR theory invisibilizes women and their particular experiences with violence and repression, thus the Fisher case becomes a non-issue vis a vis mainstream IR theory. Similarly, despite the strides made by feminist scholars in making inroads towards the internationalization of women’s human rights, problems remain with both the androcentric bias of Western human rights discourse and its universalizing tendencies. Postcolonial feminism however, through its illumination of the diverse locations held by women and the multiple structures and relations of power which mediate the lives of women and through its focus on the nature and role of discourse, offers the best lens through which to examine veiling and the Fisher case. It is through this analytical framework that the often contradictory and certainly problematic Western discourse on veiling may be illuminated and addressed. Moreover, it is through this framework that the relations of power which mediate the use of women’s (veiled) bodies as the site of Western geo-political discourse may be revealed.
Unveiling Human Rights
“Few issues in Islam and Muslim culture have attracted more interest - and yet proven more susceptible to stereotyping - as issues involving women” (Haddad & Esposito, 1998:xi). Whether as the subjects of romantic Orientalist tales or feminist expositions, the subject of women and Islam is most often characterized by, or symbolized by, the veil (Haddad & Esposito, 1998:xi). Western discourse on Islam represents women as the helpless victims of a particularly barbaric and repressive system. Islam is faulted not only for the repression of women but, Islam is said to coincide with inherent “characteristics in the mental and psychic constitutions of Arab peoples” which has resulted in the retarded development of Arab countries (El Saadawi, 1980:i). As El Saadawi explains however, Western discourse on Islam fails to recognize the economic and political factors associated with underdevelopment, particularly those associated with the foreign exploitation of resources (El Saadawi, 1980:i).
A number of scholars have sought to expose, unravel and problematize Western discourse on Islam and the associated discourse on the veil. In so doing, these scholars have illuminated not only the relations of power inherent in the construction of this discourse but the diverse, nuanced and widely ranging variations of Islam and women’s experiences with Islam, as well (El Saadawi, 1980; Ahmed, 1992; Haddad & Esposito, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1991; Mernissi, 1987). Along with Western discourse on Islam and veiling, I also draw attention to the discussions presented by many of the aforementioned scholars on political/establishment Islam, for Western discourse tends to subsume all “Islams” under the umbrella of this Islam, which is most commonly referred to as Islamic fundamentalism in the Western media. Similarly, “forced veiling” as opposed to “voluntary veiling” is located within Western discourse. In other words, all forms of veiling are subsumed under the rubric of forced veiling, which is represented as one of the primary mandates Islam. In reality however, not all interpretations of Islam nor all forms of veiling follow the “Taliban model” of Islam perpetuated by Western media and Western geopolitical discourse. Veiling has however, been used by women as a political/subversive weapon, as was the case for many women in Turkey who donned the veil despite governmental regulations against veiling. Veiling may also reflect acceptance and agreement with cultural/religious mores as they relate to veiling, as is exemplified by one Refah party member in the film Conversations Across the Bosphorous, who suggests that in fact veiling gives her freedom of movement and allows her to engage in the “public realm” without feeling sexually objectified. Nevertheless, the representation of veiling as “forced veiling” as well as the representation of Islam as “Islamic fundamentalism” has allowed for the representation of Islam as Western enemy number one within which veiled women serve as the “most visible marker of the differentness and inferiority of Islamic societies” (Ahmed, 1992:152).
One of the focal points of Ahmed’s book Woman and Gender in Islam is discourse, particularly Western discourse on Islam and the veil. The reason for this lies in Ahmed’s recognition that the positioning of women within debates on Islam is encoded with political meanings and references that seem to have little to do with women at all (Ahmed, 1992:2). “The peculiar practices of Islam with respect to women [has] always formed part of the Western narrative on the quintessential otherness and inferiority of Islam” (Ahmed, 1992:148). This is illustrated in the 18 th century Western narrative of women and Islam, in the 19 th century colonial co-optation of the language of feminism, (e.g. colonial feminism) and in current Western geopolitical discourse (Ahmed, 1992).
As is also noted in the discussion of Ahmed’s film Women and Islam, “Islam explicitly and discreetly affiliated itself with traditions already in place in the region” (Ahmed, 1992:4). Not only were the positions of women in Islam influenced and informed by unique and diverse cultures but, the primary interpreters of Islamic law and tradition were men from those cultures; “The Word of God...was interpreted and applied in sociohistorical contexts by human beings” (Haddad & Esposito, 1998:xii). Therefore, while the Koran does not explicitly call for veiling, but rather modest dress for both men and women, many argue that the laws of Islam say otherwise. Similarly, the Koran does not mandate inferior positions for women vis a vis men but instead, Ahmed argues, a vast difference exists between “political Islam” or “establishment Islam” and “ethical Islam”. Ahmed traces the relationship between the increasingly subordinate position of women and the rise of urban centers, the increasing importance of military competitiveness, private property and thus the rise of the “patriarchal family” in the first urban centers of the Middle East. “The patriarchal family, designed to guarantee the paternity of property-heirs and vesting in men the control of female-sexuality, became institutionalized, codified and upheld by the state” (Ahmed, 1992:12). Veiling, under Assyrian law (circa 1200 BCE) for example, also came to signify the upper class status and more importantly, to differentiate between “respectable” women and those who were “publicly available” (Ahmed, 1992:15). Veiling spread throughout the region and became an ordinary social practice, in fact as Ahmed explains, the spread of misogynist ideas through the region was striking and within each particular culture, Mesopotamian, Hellenic, Christian and Islamic, the more humane ideas regarding women were consistently lost while male control increasingly gained ground (Ahmed, 1992:19).
Interpretations of Islam were heavily influenced by the prevailing social and political mores of the day. “...Establishment Islam (institutional and legal Islam) articulates a different Islam from the ethical message that the layperson justifiably hears or reads in the Quran...” (Ahmed, 1992:225). Establishment Islam is often intolerant of other religions, authoritarian, androcentric, hostile to women and continues to be the Islam of the politically powerful to this day (Ahmed, 1992:225). An example of establishment/political Islam is the Taliban of Afghanistan (Ahmed also points to Saudi Arabia in this context). Haddad and Esposito point out that no image better captures the perceived threat of political Islam than that of Iranian women in black chadors, following the Iranian revolution (Haddad & Esposito, 1998:xviii). However, contrary to the representation of Islam by the Western media, this strand of Islam is not representative of Islam as a whole, for Islam in its “ethical voice” also calls for the moral and spiritual equality of all human beings (Ahmed, 1992:238).
This is not to deny that in the midst of political/establishment Islam, numerous women have experienced great hardship and repression; Ahmed’s discussion of Saudi Arabia and discussions of Afghanistan’s Taliban have certainly demonstrated the harm inflicted on many women under political/establishment Islam. However it remains important that one recognize such strands are not indicative of Islam, nor the diverse experiences of women vis a vis Islam, as a whole. The “woman as victim” construct, however, is not the only construct of women within Western discourse. Chowdhry points to three ways in which Third World women are represented in colonial/neo-colonial discourse. The zenana representation/construct refers to Enloe’s (1989) assertion that veiled women are portrayed as “mindless members of the harem, preoccupied with petty domestic rivalries rather than with artistic and political affairs of their times” (Chowdhry, 1995:27). Here, women live under overt patriarchy in the private/domestic sphere where they remain oblivious to the “real” world and unquestioning of their confinement (Chowdhry, 1995:27). This image is dominant, for example, in the current Southeast Asian mail-order bride industry (Chowdhry, 1995:28). The zenana representation also suggests the inferiority of Third World veiled women vis a vis Western modern women with the veil as both a marker of inferiority and of difference. The double standard of the colonial hierarchy also becomes clear in this context as the public/private divide has been used to relegate both Western and Third World women to the household, however “Western women are deemed superior whenever the public/private divide and cultural conventions governing non-Western women are different than those affecting their European counterparts” (Chowdhry, 1995:27).
Secondly, as demonstrated by the practices of sex tourism in Thailand and Korea and the semi-pornographic postcards promoting vacations in the Caribbean, Third World women are portrayed as sexualized objects (Chowdhry, 1995:28). Images of unclothed, eroticized native women were/are used to justify the “civilizing mission” of colonial and neo-colonial forces (Chowdhry, 1995:28). Finally as previously discussed, women are portrayed as victims, which is often used in the service of Western feminist agendas which seek to intervene in “other” cultures on behalf of Third World women in the hope of civilizing them and in short, making them more like Western women. As Chowdhry explains “in all three representations, Third World women are discursively created, separate and distinct from the historical, socio-political and lived material realities of their existence” (Chowdhry, 1995:28)
Mernissi contends that the desire to identify female liberation movements in the Middle East and North Africa which are similar to those in the West has distorted the analysis of Muslim women and have kept analysis “...at the level of senseless comparisons and unfounded conclusions” (Mernissi, 1987:7). This level of analysis precludes one’s recognition of women’s agency and relegates the experiences of women and Islam to that of subjugation. For example, Haddad and Esposito point out that despite images of oppressed women in chadors and despite laws which constrained women’s rights, the last decade has witnessed an incredible flourishing of women’s intellectual and cultural productions in Iran (Haddad & Esposito, 1998:xix). Moreover, oppression of women is not characteristic of Arab or Middle-Eastern societies or Third World countries alone, but is a primary component of the economic, political and cultural structures characteristic of most of the world (El Saadawi, 1980:1). What becomes necessary is analysis which takes into account the diverse and complex experiences of women as well as the diverse and varied impacts of economic, political, social and religious developments on their lives, as well as the nature and forces shaping the discourses in which women tend to be anchored (Ahmed, 1992:175). However, the “analysis” provided by the media sources surveyed below fall far short of these goals. Not only do these sources fail to problematize the stereotypes of women and Islam previously mentioned, but they in fact serve as a handmaiden to current Western neo-colonial ventures against “other” countries perceived as inimical to all that is sacred to the West, as is argued in current Western geopolitical discourse.
Western Discourse on Islam and the VeilIn discussing Western media discourse in the veil several themes emerge. For instance, much of the time women tend to be represented as victims and with one exception, the articles on veiling do not focus their attention on veiling among non-recent Western immigrants. In fact according to the rest of the articles, veiling does not occur in the West at all. What is most surprising is the lack of analysis presented by these articles on the veil. Instead, Western media discourse almost exclusively represents veiling as a religious issue in which women are victimized by Islam and its male adherents.
The films Women and Islam and Conversations Across the Bosphorous provide entirely different discussions of Islam, women and the veil. The “monolithic Islam” constructed in Western media discourse on veiling is nowhere to be seen in either of the films. Instead, viewers are exposed to examples of the diverse interpretations of Islam, as well as the unique experiences of women vis a vis Islam. In so doing, many of the stereotypes reflected in the Western media of women and Islam are challenged by both films.
Western Media Discourse and the Veil
Eighty-two percent of the articles surveyed represent veiling as a religious issue, as opposed to a cultural issue (12% of the articles) or a women’s rights/human rights issue (29% of the articles). For the Western media, veiling is not only a religious issue but entirely an Islamic one. Discussion of other religions in the context of veiling generally does not occur in the articles surveyed. In discussing Afghanistan, two of the articles do include the argument that the repressive laws and actions of the Afghanistan state (i.e. the Taliban) have less to do with Islamic mandates and more to do with the laws which emerged from the Pathan tribes along the Pakistani-Afghan border from which the Taliban originate. However, this argument is not generally voiced in the rest of the articles. With respect to veiling as a human rights/women’s rights issue, Shirin Ebadi a former judge, argues unequivocally that dress restrictions as enforced by the Iranian state are “...violations of our human rights” (Taubman, 1997:A38) however, this perspective is again given little voice across the articles surveyed for this project. Instead, the focus remains resolutely on veiling as a religious/Islamic issue.
One is also left with the impression that veiling occurs only in Non-Western countries. At no time do the articles discuss or even mention veiling in the United States, for example. In fact, these media sources generally focus upon either Afghanistan (41% of the articles) or Iran (35% of the articles). Malaysia is mentioned in 12% of the articles and Algeria in 6%. Similarly, little attention is given to regional variations within these countries or to differences existing among peoples within these countries. Instead, Afghanistan and Iran are constructed simply as “Islamic countries”, as particularly repressive ones and as the exemplars of all “Islamic countries”.
Why Women Veil
The media sources surveyed focus upon Islam as the primary motivating force behind veiling; 82% of the articles focus upon Islam in this context. Related to this is the notion that women are ordered to veil, as per the mandates of Islam, in order to control their sexuality or rather, to stifle their sexual lure. This is mentioned in 24% of the articles. As one New York Times article explains, the failure of women to wear shoes without socks, even when wearing the head to toe “shroud” or burqa, provokes impure thoughts in men, because “...men are deeply vulnerable to corruption through unregulated contacts with women...” (Burns, 1997:A4). In other words, it is often noted in the Western media discourse that women are blamed for the provocation of impure thoughts among men. Men however, are not held accountable for those thoughts. Men are highlighted as those responsible for the mandates which require the veiling of women in 18% of the articles. Men’s role vis a vis veiling will be discussed further in the latter part of this section. In contrast, the role of patriarchy in the veiling of women is mentioned in only one article.
As has been mentioned, many scholars writing on the subject of veiling are quick to point out that veiling is not explicitly called for in the Koran and that Islam is not in and of itself “anti-woman”. Furthermore, not every social phenomenon affecting the lives of women and girls in so-called Islamic countries is related to Islam (Walther, 1993:14). Many regard Muhammad as a champion of women’s rights given his restrictions on female infanticide and polygamy (Zuhur, 1992:4). Islamic “modernists” suggest that many of the so-called Muslim customs criticized as sexist by “outsiders” are not necessarily Islamic in origin at all, including veiling (Anderson, 1982:167). While the Koran does call for sexual modesty on the part of women, the social custom of keeping women veiled and/or in seclusion is not specifically Muslim, but reflects “traditional” Middle Eastern concerns for the purity and honor of the family and the integrity of the male line (Anderson, 1982:30 & 167). Others argue that what was initially regarded as pious behavior became an upper class custom which was followed with varying degrees of strictness in different Islamic countries (Walther, 1993:91). There exists, according to one author, a tendency among “rank and file Muslims” to imbue “traditional” practices and attitudes with the sanctity of Islam; this is also true of the ulema. Muslim jurisprudence recognizes consensus of the ulema as one criterion of religious truth, therefore giving “traditional” attitudes about women, including the notion that female sexuality threatens the social order, quasi-religious status despite their lack of direct basis in scripture or theology (Anderson, 1982:169). However, not unlike the two articles which refer to veiling as a cultural issue, notions of “culture” and “tradition” used here are essentialized and represented as backwards and primitive.
Women and the Veil
As odd as it may sound, women are not the focus of discussion vis a vis veiling in the Western media. The focus for the majority of the articles surveyed is upon Islam and Islamic states as the antithesis to Western values and states, with particular emphasis on Islamic states as threats to Western security and well-being. Veiled women are shown and discussed merely to exemplify the “evil” of Islamic states such as Iran and Afghanistan, as though to imply that authors need only show a picture of a veiled women or mention the existence of the veil as proof positive of the barbarism of Islam.
In depth analysis of women vis a vis veiling is nearly absent from the articles surveyed, save for their positioning as victims of Islam and Islamic men. Ninety-four percent of the articles represent women as victims; 65% of the articles position women as helpless victims of Islam and 18% of the articles position women as victims of men, who are generally Muslim men. Women’s victimization in this context ranges from their being forced to veil to being beaten in the streets for not adhering to dress codes. It should also be noted that women are not only portrayed as victims with respect to veiling, but also in the context of the Afghan state’s refusal to allow women to work, go to school or receive adequate medical treatment, all of which are said to fall under the mandates of Islam. As one article simply suggests “the Koran teachings and male dominance have caused this situation” ( The Economist (c), 1994:110). Regardless of the source however, women are victims according to the articles surveyed. Only 35% of the articles mention any agency on the part of women, whether in support of veiling or against veiling. Within this, only one article mentioned women’s support of veiling although as is the pattern, no analysis is provided. Women’s overt resistance to veiling is mentioned in 35% of the articles. It is interesting to note however, that two of the articles (within the 35% which mentioned agency at all) did point out “other” forms of resistance among women, such as the slipping off of the veil when the “coast appears clear”, to the allowing of one’s hair to fall from the veil. However, it is also mentioned that Islamic security forces, particularly those in Afghanistan, always quickly crack down on such behavior Nevertheless, the two articles did not present any analysis of resistance or agency, only offhand remarks. The importance of recognizing “non-political”, “everyday” forms of resistance cannot be understated, just as agency in terms of both activism both for and against veiling cannot be ignored. Western media discourse tends to recognize agency only as it is expressed in overt political/revolutionary and/or organizational terms (if at all). Thus, everyday forms of resistance are overlooked. I argue that the failure to recognize less overt forms of resistance may allow Western feminist organizations to overrun already existing, local forms of resistance to veiling, which only breeds resentment and distrust among those women who activists seek to “help”.
Women’s agency is not completely absent from the academic debates surrounding veiling. Bauer’s (1997) metaphors of reaction and action are instructive in this context. The “metaphor of reaction” embodies many of the stereotypes used to represent “fundamentalism” and women’s positions within so-called fundamentalist religions. Religious fundamentalism (cross-culturally) is seen as a reaction by members of the “traditional” or poorer classes to the modern, secular, morally decadent world. In other words “the idea one often hears about fundamentalism is that it is an archaic phenomenon, a desire to return to medieval thinking” (Mernissi, 1987:xxii). In this context, women are perceived as victims of religious fundamentalism, within which all members are characterized as uneducated, poor and “distinctly unmodern” (Brink, 1997:222-23). For instance, Karen McCarthy Brown (1994) suggests; “...the varieties of fundamentalisms found throughout the world today are extreme responses to the failed promise of Enlightenment rationalism” (Hawley, 1994:175). Further, fundamentalism is constructed as the religion of those both seduced and later betrayed by the promise that human beings can comprehend much less control the world and their existence within it (Hawley, 1994:176). “Fundamentalists” not only reject the “modern” world, but seek to “...control the fearsome, mute power of the flesh. This characteristic ensures that fundamentalism will always involve the control of women, for women generally carry the greater burden of human fleshliness ” (emphasis added) (Hawley 1994:176). In sum, agency among women is non-existent in this context. All that exists are irrational reactions to the “modern world” within which non-Western women’s bodies become the site of contests between the forces of modernity and tradition.
The “metaphor of action” in contrast, recognizes that “the donning of the veil does not...automatically signify retrogressive resubordination of women (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997:361). The implication here is that women’s agency whether in opposition to, or support of the veil is not wholly absent; recognition is given to the ability of women to define their own existence. This recognition, as previously mentioned, is barely voiced in Western media discourse in veiling.
Discussions among scholars on “new veiling” are also instructive in this context (Zuhur, 1992). Often, “new veiling” serves as a conscious attempt to redefine the meanings of womanhood and femininity among Muslim women in Egypt. Further, the “new veiling” among women in Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s did not signify a retreat from the affirmations of female autonomy made by the preceding generation of women, but rather, signified their efforts for one, at “carving out legitimate public spaces for themselves” (Ahmed, 1992:224). Thus, the adoption of the “new veil” did not declare women’s place to be in the home as evidenced by the entry of women into the university, the professions and the public space in unprecedented numbers (Ahmed, 1992:224).
On the other hand, the notion of “accommodating protest” should also be recognized (Macleod, 1991 & 1992). “New veils”, as worn by women in Cairo during the last fifteen years, can symbolize protest and can thus help to eradicate women’s inequality with respect to gender, class and global positioning. However according to Macleod, “new veiling” may be a double edged sword &-; on one hand, it may convey protest, but on the other, it may symbolize the desire to acquiesce to existing relations of power (Macleod, 1991:137). 20 As one example, some women in Cairo according to Macleod, veil in order to lesson their sexual objectification by men. Macleod suggests “rather than placing the blame and the need for change in behavior onto men, women accommodate by altering their dress to fit the prevailing norm that men should not be tempted by women” (Macleod, 1991:139). Moreover, the acquiescence which accompanies this form of resistance may in fact strengthen women’s inequality (Tadros, 1994:126). What becomes evident through the discussion of these academic debates however, are some the diverse and nuanced experiences of women vis a vis the veil. Such experiences cannot be simply subsumed under the rubric of Islamic victimization of women through forced veiling, although this is precisely what the Western media sources surveyed in this project tend to portray.
Men and the Veil
Men are said to support veiling in 24% of the articles and to oppose veiling in only 6% of the articles surveyed. Three of the articles (18%) make a distinction between men and Islam and argue that veiling and the seclusion of women are not in fact mandated by the Koran. Instead, the authors suggest that men are to blame for their particular interpretation of the Koran in such a way as to necessitate the repression of women. However, the authors fail to go beyond this simple assertion in their analysis.
Men’s complicity vis a vis veiling is not overlooked in the academic debates surrounding veiling either. For instance, Judy Brink in her piece entitled “Lost Rituals: Sunni Muslim Women in Rural Egypt” notes that when women in Sadeeq were asked why they veil, they did not speak of a personal decision, but spoke of the wishes of a male relative. In other words, it is generally not the personal decision of many rural women to veil (for they cannot veil if their husbands object to it) but the decision of their male relatives (Brink, 1997:201). Therefore as in the articles surveyed, not only is men’s complicity highlighted to some degree but women’s agency is again negated.
In her analysis of the power relations between feminists, Muslims and the state in Egypt, Azza Karam brings attention to Muslim men in Egypt, whose voices act as the voice of official or state Islam and who wield a significant amount of influence within Egyptian society and government. Sheikh Al-Sha’rawi has been adamant that all Muslim women wear the veil (Karam, 1998:179-183). Al-Sha’rawi’s interpretations of the Koran have been both widely publicized and taught in religious institutions in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. According to Al-Sha’rawi, the veil is commanded by God and represents the “true” and “original” sign of faith (Karam, 1998:184). Similarly, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi documents numerous references in the Koran which justify the veiling of Muslim women. Both Al-Qaradawi and Al-Sha’rawi regard Western dress as not only heretical, but catastrophic. Such fashion is indicative of loose morals, which in turn points to the inability of men to control their women; the weakness of men is perceived as a weakness of the religion itself (Karam, 1998:195). For Al-Qaradawi, religion and manhood are one in the same thus, anything resembling women’s rights is indicative of the loss of manhood (Karam, 1998:195).
In both Western media discourse and the arguments of many scholars, veiling becomes at once an issue revolving around the mandates of Islam as well as those of Muslim men. However, despite the attention placed upon patriarchy within many academic debates, (Bauer, 1997; Dorkenoo, 1994; Riesebrodt, 1990) patriarchy is given little attention in the Western media as it relates to veiling. Patriarchy is mentioned in relation to veiling in only one of the articles surveyed here. Thus, men are highlighted in Western media discourse on veiling, not the structure of patriarchy.
Fundamentalists, Extremists & Fanatics
As I have alluded to, the agenda of the Western media as exemplified in the articles surveyed here, is not to illuminate the varied and multiple experiences of women and Islam with respect to the veil. Instead, the agenda seems to be that of demonstrating the evil of Islamic countries and the threat they pose to the “American way of life”. When Islam and its adherents are discussed, the Western media more often than not refer to “religious fundamentalism”, “religious extremism” and “religious fanaticism”. These phrases embody a particular set of stereotypes, assumptions and images which portray Islam and its adherents as inferior, backwards, violent, fringe groups in the world “out there”. Women’s bodies are used within this discourse as proof positive of the evils of Islam and Islamic countries. In addition, despite the frequency with which phrases such as “religious fundamentalism” are used, rarely are they problematized in the Western media.
In arguing the ignorance and irrationality of Muslims, author Milton Viorst argues “...Islam’s problem is a failure to evolve: there has never been the equivalent of Christianity’s Reformation to release economic and intellectual creativity” ( The Economist 1994:81). The Taliban, for example, are portrayed by some Western media sources as “simple people from the countryside” ( The Economist, 1997:37) as “simple country boys” and as “country bumpkins” (Nordland, 1996:51). The Taliban is said to unite a harsh interpretation of the Koran with modern forms of enforcement (Burns, 1996:A8). Although a great deal of attention is focused upon the Taliban within the articles surveyed, “Islamic violence”, like “Islamic ignorance” is by no means exclusive to discussions of the Taliban. Terms such as “terrorists”, “warlords” and “militants” in reference to Muslim men are used routinely across the articles surveyed. Discussions regarding public executions, beatings and the chopping off of hands and feet are also common. So pervasive are the references to Islamic violence that one has very little chance of walking away with an understanding of Islam as anything but violent.
Western media discourse has constructed “Islamic fundamentalists” as unscrupulous, uneducated, uncultured, bloodthirsty, women-hating terrorists with bombs and loaded guns aimed at all that is near and dear to the United States, whose citizens are peace-loving, cultured, educated and moral (Mernissi, 1987:xviii). However, Mernissi demonstrates that several of the primary representations of the so-called fundamentalist, that for example “he” is uneducated, unscrupulous and archaic are incorrect, rather “he is the product of two extremely modern phenomena: rapid urbanization and state-funded (therefore democratic) mass education” (Mernissi, 1987:xviii) as is the case in certain areas of Egypt. Mernissi goes on to present the data compiled during a survey of “Islamic militants” in Egypt which show them to be well-educated high-achievers (Mernissi, 1987:xviii).
This is certainly not to deny that violence occurs in “Islamic countries” or that violence is often justified by political/establishment Islam. Recent Amnesty International reports, based on eye-witness and survivor accounts, suggest that thousands have died at the hands of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the take-over of the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in August of 1998 (Amnesty International (d), 1998:1). While the exact number of those affected by the take-over of Mazar-e-Sharif is not known, estimates range from 7,000 to 16,000 people (pp. 2). According to Amnesty, citizens were deliberately killed and arbitrarily left along streets for several days (pp. 2) while others (possibly thousands) were/are detained and still others, including ten Iranian diplomats and one journalist, were detained and have since disappeared (pp. 2-3). Allegations of torture among those who survived detention are also numerous (pp. 3). This is but one report of many which illuminate such violence. As another example, Physicians for Human Rights has recently brought attention to the deteriorating condition of women in Kabul. Women in Kabul are often denied medical treatment as a result of the Taliban’s enforcement of the perceived Islamic mandate which precludes male doctors from viewing or touching the female body. This becomes somewhat of a catch-22 given the Taliban’s refusal (with few exceptions) to allow women to work as doctors, or to work at all. Therefore, numbers of Kabuli women are needlessly dying of diseases left untreated (Herbert, 1998:1-3).
However, what results from the representation of Islam in the Western media is a simplistic and essentialized understanding of Islam as wholly and always violent, repressive, backwards, ignorant, and irrational. No attention is given to regional variations of Islam, nor is attention given to the multitude of interpretations of Islam, nor to the varied and diverse experiences with Islam by men and women alike. Islam instead, has become the new “evil empire”. Women are simply victims of this “evil empire” with no agency, no voice and no identity save for that which the veil connotes.
Veiling And The Films “Women In Islam” &Amp; “Conversations Across The Bosphorous”
Both Women and Islam, which features a discussion with scholar Leila Ahmed and Conversations Across the Bosphorous directed by Jeanne Finely provide very different and much more nuanced portrayals and discussions of women, veiling and Islam. Both films discuss Islam and women’s experiences without reverting to a construction of “monolithic Islam” as Western enemy number one and without constructing women entirely as victims. However, this is not to say that each of the films present a wholly “positive” portrayal of the manner in which Islam has been interpreted nor the history of Islam. In other words, the films are able to illuminate many of the faces of Islam, both the “good” and the “bad”. Moreover, both films are able to exemplify many of the diverse experiences and understandings of women vis a vis Islam. Women are agents who are able to define their lives and the role of Islam within them. Women are not simply at the mercy of the irrational whims of Islam, as the Western media would have us think.
“Women and Islam”
Leila Ahmed, professor of women’s studies at Amherst, does not represent veiling as a wholly cultural issue, religious issue or rights issue. In fact, Ahmed takes great strides in illuminating the multi-dimensional character of veiling, the multiple “Islams” as well as the numerous regions in which varieties of Islam are practiced. Ahmed argues that veiling predates Islam and prior to the rise of Islam, the Mediterranean region was in fact generally Christian and Jewish. It is not clear according to Ahmed, how veiling became a part of Islam, particularly given that only Muhammad’s wives veiled and not until the latter part of his life. Many women began to veil after Muhammad’s death, perhaps in response to the practice of veiling by Christian and Jewish women as a marker of upper class status. Even so, veiling is not specifically mandated for women by the Koran, only modest dress which is prescribed for both men and women. As mentioned, Ahmed points out the “interpretive” dimension, which illuminates the chasm that exists between what Ahmed, and others, see as the message of the Koran (egalitarianism) versus the manner in which the Koran has historically been interpreted, which has lead to the Islamic laws regarding veiling and segregation, for example. Similarly, Ahmed speaks of the “rights” dimension, and challenges the arguments highlighting the Koran as oppressive of women. Simply stated, the simplistic construction of veiling as a religious issue, as offered by the Western media, is challenged by Ahmed’s nuanced discussion of veiling and its many dimensions.
Motivations Behind Veiling
As mentioned, Ahmed argues on at least four different occasions that veiling is not explicitly called for in the Koran, only modesty among both men and women. However when asked why more and more women seem to be donning the veil, Ahmed explains on one occasion [to paraphrase] that given the Western denouncement of the veil, many women have decided to veil as a form of resistance to the West. On another occasion, Ahmed notes demographic transition as a possible reason. As more and more people leave rural areas for urban areas, they adopt Western dress, but also add or keep the veil [to paraphrase]. In fact, Ahmed notes that this is not a regressive action but in fact, a modernizing action. This stands in direct contrast to the assumption within the Western media of Islam as static and unchanging.
Therefore, although 82% of the media sources highlight religious/Islamic motivations for veiling, Ahmed counters this notion with the assertion among others, that there are many kinds of Islam, and that vast numbers of Muslim women choose not to veil at all, but still consider themselves devout Muslims.
Women, Veiling and Islam
Just as there are a variety of regions in which Islam is practiced (Ahmed notes Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Indonesia and others), there is no essential “Muslim women”. Ahmed argues that enormous variations of Islam exist among different regions and diverse groups of women. However in speaking of Islam, particular images are often conjured up which represent all Muslim women as victims, for example. Moreover, with the exception of some of the more conservative societies (such as Saudi Arabia, as Ahmed points out) Muslim women often have the same opportunities before them as Western women. Ahmed suggests that within the Koran, [to paraphrase] women rights are addressed, including women’s property rights as well as their sexual rights, which include the right to sexual pleasure, to contraceptives and to abortion. This stands in contrast to the Christian Bible, whose authors assume that men are the only receivers of the message; for Ahmed, women were very much a part of the early Islamic community.
Women’s agency with respect to Islam, not their victimization, is highlighted in Women and Islam. Women’s agency takes on many forms, from the recognition of those who support veiling, (mentioned on at least four occasions) to those who oppose veiling (mentioned on at least three occasions). Within this, “feminist” action to bring about equality for women in general is also mentioned. Although Ahmed notes that the struggle may not be as important as the West has made it out to be, she does mention the struggle of Egyptian women against veiling in this context. On at least six other occasions, Ahmed illuminates the activities of Muslim women which often do not fall in to the Western mold of “feminist action”. In other words, Ahmed points to women who in their everyday lives help to transform Islamic societies. Women do so as members of the workforce, as students and in their attempts to revisit and reinterpret Islamic texts.
This is not to suggest that the history of Islam has been wholly positive for women in fact, Ahmed notes that much of this history has been “dreadful” for women. However, this dreadfulness is not mandated by the Koran. Nevertheless, Ahmed recognizes the extremely conservative and limited environment for many women in Saudi Arabia (mentioned on at least three occasions). Furthermore, Ahmed regards fundamentalist Islamic conservatism [to paraphrase] as a dangerous force however, she adds that many follow this strain of Islam out of idealism. Similarly, Ahmed recognizes particularly patriarchal strands of Islamic thought as well. Nevertheless, even in discussions such as these, women are not represented as victims of Islam, nor victims at all.
Men, Veiling and Islam
As Ahmed mentions on numerous occasions, women’s inequality vis a vis men is not prescribed by the Koran. Instead, Ahmed provides extensive arguments on at least four different occasions indicative of the role of interpretation, as opposed to explicit Koranic statements, in terms of veiling and the segregation of women. To paraphrase, while male interpreters of the Koran may have done their best, they were nevertheless living in a highly misogynist society and thus, incorporated many of the assumptions of their society into their interpretations of the Koran. This is not to deny that women too, interpreted the Koran. However, men have interpreted the Koran in such a way, according to Ahmed, to confirm and maintain their dominance in society. Many Islamic laws, such as those calling for the veil, emanate from such interpretations.
Ahmed’s goal however, is not to place blame on men for their particular renderings of Islamic thought and law. Rather, Ahmed argues that the rules and social regulations of Islam today were creations of a historical process and not intrinsic to Islam. Therefore, these regulations can also be revisited, and in so far as they limit the capacities of human beings, they can be reformed and even rejected. Despite Western condemnations of Islamic sexism, the primary themes of the Koran are built upon egalitarianism and justice. Finally, despite the argument that to reject Islamic law is to reject Islam, the laws emanating from interpretations of the Koran which relegate women to second-class status can in fact be changed. Once again, this challenges the notion, as previously mentioned with respect to the Western media, that Islam has failed to evolve; Islam evolves with each passing day.
Women, Veiling And “Conversations Across The Bosphorous”
Like Women and Islam, Conversations Across the Bosphorous challenges many of the stereotypes of both women and Islam employed by the Western media. This film introduces its audience to a variety of women either residing in, or originating from Istanbul. Although the main character, Gokcen Havva Art an Islamic scholar, has ended her relationship with Islam, the film as a whole does not serve as a blanket condemnation of Islam. Rather, Conversations illuminates several examples of women’s diverse experiences and relationships with Islam, from one women who as a recent Western immigrant is rediscovering her Islamic roots, to several students, a writer, an immigrant to Istanbul and to a female member of the Islamic Welfare (Refah) Party, all of whom have their own unique understandings of the role of Islam in their lives.
Representing the Veil
While the focus of the film is on Islam, Conversations, like Women and Islam, does not represent veiling as only a religious issue, nor does it construct a “monolithic Islam” as is found in the Western media. Conversations recognizes not only the cultural and “rights” dimension of veiling, but the political as well. Art points out that in response to the colonizing ventures of the West as well as secularism and capitalism, fundamentalist Islamists intermingled “political Islam” with Islamic notions of solidarity and freedom. Art also draws attention, in this context, to differences between secular Islamic countries versus fundamentalist; in secular countries different and better laws can be made, still allowing she and others to be good Muslims. Thus, as in Women and Islam, the notion that to reject Islamic laws is not to reject Islam is again voiced.
Attention is placed upon Istanbul in this film, as opposed to numerous other countries in which Islam is practiced, the goal being the illumination of the many faces of Islam in this one country. In other words, although the Western media leaves one with the impression that countries such as Afghanistan and Iran are essentially and completely “fundamentalist” and portray a dichotomous relationship between Islamic and Western countries, Conversations illuminates the shades of gray vis a vis Islam in Istanbul alone, thus challenging this dichotomous media representation. It is also instructive to note that while terms such as “fundamentalist” are problematized by both films, such terms are used in Conversations, as in Women and Islam, to indicate the multiple levels, layers and understandings of Islam and Islamic practice. In contrast, the Western media uses such terms in such a way as to imply that all the variations of Islam are violent and irrational; this is not the case in either film.
Motivations Behind Veiling
Although discussion of veiling occurs in the context of Islam, this discussion is much more nuanced than that of the Western media. Veiling is not simply a “religious issue” nor is Islam simply blamed for veiling rather, many of the differing explanations for veiling are illuminated in this film. Related to this is the notion proffered by many in the Western media that veiling is enforced in order to quell the sexual lure of women because of the vulnerability of men however, they do not offer much analysis. This is also voiced in Conversations (on at least five occasions) but is also examined. Esra Konar, President of the Women’s Association for the Welfare Party suggests that [to paraphrase] the veil protects women and thus increases their value. She asserts that she and the Party [to paraphrase] value women and don’t want their bodies used as advertising tools. This belief is echoed by student Gulseren Kosakcioglu who, in disgust of advertisements in which women’s bodies are used as advertising tools, asserts [to paraphrase] that women are more important than what is shown; they have brains and can think. Similarly, author Emine Senliklioglu argues that the veil actually respects women’s rights.
On the other hand, sociologist Fatmagul Berktay argues that [to paraphrase] fundamentalist Islam depends upon the separation of the public and private sphere, with women belonging to the private. The transcending of this boundary by women is blamed for increased pornography and immorality in general thus, attempts are now being made to push women into the private realm. Others, such as Art refute the notion that the veil protects women at all. As a child, Art believed deeply in veiling. However, even when she veiled, men disturbed her because [to paraphrase] for men, women were creatures whom men were allowed to disturb, regardless of the veil.
Veiling and fundamentalist Islam as reactions to the West are discussed on at least five occasions in the film, but without the Western media’s use of the modern/traditional dichotomy. Art explains that [to paraphrase] many, including her family, were shocked and insulted by life in Istanbul. It is in Istanbul that Art’s father eventually became a fundamentalist Islamic leader. According to Art, the Refah party provided her father and others with a feeling of solidarity and a check on feelings of inferiority vis a vis the peoples of the city. Similarly, Senliklioglu explains [to paraphrase] although Western technological improvements may provide more comfort, they have also brought about the loss of morality among humans. For her something is missing, and it can be only be found within Islam.
Women, Islam and the Veil
As in Women and Islam, women are not represented as victims in this film. Rather, women are agents. Thus, attention is placed on the variety of reasons for which women veil and women choose not to veil. Women’s agency in opposition to the veil is exemplified on at least eight occasions while women’s agency in support of veiling is exemplified on at least six occasions. Other, “everyday” forms of resistance are exemplified on at least five other occasions.
Art, for example, explains that she faced hardship following her decision to stop veiling, however as she suggests toward the end of the film, she has managed. As a result of her decision, friends ostracized her, she was treated as a prostitute and her family, particularly her father, openly disagreed with her. Even a male stranger on the street stopped her and questioned her right not to veil. Finally, after a period of illness, Art moved away from her family. Given her dissatisfaction and disagreement with the treatment of women in Islam in this context, Art maintained her decision not to veil, despite these hardships.
Others, such as Konar and Senliklioglu are activists on behalf of veiling. Moreover, Senliklioglu and other Party members struggle for the right to veil. In the letters read during the film, the author explains [to paraphrase] that from the 1920s revolution came a “militant secularism”, which among other things, made the wearing of veils in universities and government buildings illegal (although many continued to veil in defiance of the law). Senliklioglu asserts [to paraphrase] that she and other Party members are constantly under attack and that there has been no democracy for them; girls cannot go to school veiled however, they also cannot go around naked as do those in the media today. Others, such as Teyze are caught somewhere in the middle. The scarf that she chooses to wear defies the secular stance which disapproves of veiling in any form, yet her mode of dress is not good enough to keep her from burning in hell according to “fundamentalists”. Teyze’s choice defies both stances however, she continues to dress in the way she perceives as her custom. Still others, as exemplified by the statements of student Demet Turna, do not see Muslim women and modern women in Turkey as contradictory, for [to paraphrase] what she does and how she chooses to do it is between her and her God.
Men, Islam and the VeilWhile the experiences of women vis a vis Islam and veiling are the focus of the film, men are not entirely excluded from the discussion either. Unfortunately, neither film represent men as agents against
veiling. On the other hand, men and men’s interpretation of the Koran in support of veiling is exemplified on at least six occasions in Conversations. Emphasis in this context is upon Art’s father as a Muslim fundamentalist, as well as men’s behavior in society in general. For instance, Art notes as previously mentioned, the tendency of men to disturb her even when she was veiled. Art also relates men to the mandates of Islam on two other occasions. She explains [to paraphrase] that at the age of 15 or 16, she came to the realization that God must be a man, for the laws of Islam favored men. This was so, given Art’s belief that God could have created men in such a way that their behavior did not require the veiling of women; i.e. the vulnerability of men to sexual lure. Later in life, Art explains, [to paraphrase] she decided that she did believe in God, but not in those men who professed to speak for him.
The differences between the Western media representation of veiling versus that of the two films are startling. Western media discourse represents Islam as a monolithic enemy force. The irrationality, violence and threat of Islam is evidenced through the mere mentioning of (or simply by showing pictures of) veiled women. Women vis a vis Islam are victims in Western media discourse and little more. The films in contrast, provide an entry point towards the recognition of the enormous variations within Islamic thought. While each film recognizes the dangers of fundamentalism, they do not portray Islam as a whole as dangerous nor women as simply its victims. Women are recognized in the films as agents, both supportive of the veil and opposed to it. In short, the veil in this context does not serve as the ultimate symbol of Islam’s evil, nor as the ultimate symbol of women’s oppression. However, as is discussed in the concluding section of this project, the portrayal offered by the two films is not that which is positioned in Western geopolitical discourse.
Conclusion: Non-Western Women And Constructing The “Other”
While it is not the central goal of this project to prove the link between Western media discourse and US foreign policy, the role of discourse in Western geopolitics and foreign policy does have important implications. 21 The work of Said in particular, has revealed complicity between the US academy, corporations, media and government (Said, 1997:vii) in the construction of Muslim men, or rather the “Islamic other”. This “other” is constructed as “...evil, violent and above all, eminently killable” (Said, 1997:xxxvii). The role of gender in the construction of the “other”, particularly as it relates to Islam, has not however, been addressed in Said’s work. Thus, this project builds upon the work of Said and others by examining the use of non-Western women’s bodies in the construction of the “other” in Western geopolitical discourse.
Whether on the basis of its representation as a human rights issue, cultural issue or religious issue, as veiling becomes a part of Western geopolitical discourse in order to further the global strategic interests of the West, so should it become a legitimate issue of analysis for scholars in the field of International Relations. Gender and race are crucial to the political mobilization of identity and the necessary creation of enemies characteristic of mainstream International Relations. The representation of veiling (e.g. forced veiling) and those who engage in its practice are crucial to the definition of the “other” in IR, and it is upon the creation of this “other” that Western global strategic interests, as reflected in Western geopolitical discourse, are furthered. Moreover, the position of veiling as an issue of women’s human rights takes a secondary place to that of the promulgation of Western interests. In other words, veiling is recognized as a human rights issue only in so far as that recognition promotes Western global interests. Hence the denial of asylum for Fisher. Thus, non-Western women’s bodies act as an important site upon which Western geopolitical discourse is constructed.
In response to the anarchic, threatening world perceived by realist scholars, policy makers must strive for the maximization of their interests, particularly their power, in the face of countless others attempting to do the same. Western policy makers depend on the creation of the “other” to justify their attempts at power maximization around the world. Western media representation of “other” countries whose citizens are irrational and violent “Islamic fundamentalists”, serves this purpose nicely. As Thussu explains “more often than not turban-clad, bearded members of these organizations are portrayed in the US-dominated Western media as fanatic terrorist groups bent upon destroying everything that is dear to the ‘liberal’ West” (Thussu, 1997:264).
Afghanistan stands out as one of the more obvious examples of the manner in which the representation of Islam is linked to US security concerns vis a vis the “Islamic world”. While the Mujahideen were once referred to by the Western press and the US government as “freedom fighters” who fought godless communism during the Cold War, they were later referred to as fanatic Islamic fundamentalists (Thussu, 1997:267). Despite the their label as “freedom fighters”, they were actually mercenaries for the CIA (Thussu, 1997:267). Once the Russians left Afghanistan however, this same group came to be regarded as part of the fundamentalist threat posed by Islamists to the Western world, with veiled women as the marker of their evil.
The reference to “godless communism” above brings us to the next point. Islam has come to replace communism as the greatest security threat to the West in the post-Cold War era. As former secretary-general Willy Claes has argued, Islam is as great a security threat to the West as communism once was. This explains and/or justifies NATO efforts to create joint military strategies with countries such as Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, in order to combat the Islamic onslaught (Thussu, 1997:267), despite recorded violations of human rights in these countries. This perspective takes much of its influence from Samuel Huntington’s article “The Clash of Civilizations” featured in a 1993 volume of Foreign Affairs as well as a 1995 volume of Moscow News. Huntington argues that we can anticipate a world in which the “clash of cultures” will dominate the international scene. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among nations are not ideological, political nor economic, but cultural. Thus, Western and “Westernized” nations must ally themselves to combat this international security threat. Huntington implicates Islam and Islamic countries as “public enemy number one” in several areas of his article. For instance, Huntington begins by noting the importance of Islamic states whose strategic locations, large populations, and in particular their oil reserves, make them important players in world affairs. One reason for the representation of Islamic countries as the enemy lies in the fact that the “Islamic world” sits upon three-quarters of the world’s known oil reserves; these reserves are crucial to the maintenance and continuation life as we know it in the “modern” world (Thussu, 1997:167). Huntington goes on to explain:
In the post-Cold War world, culture is both a divisive and a unifying force. For 45 years the Iron Curtain was Europe’s central dividing line. That line has moved several hundred miles east. It is now the line that separates the nations of Western Christianity, on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox people, on the other (Huntington, 1995:7).
For Huntington, “Islam has bloody borders” (Huntington, 1995:7). As the Islamic revival moves forward, more governments will be coerced into defining their identity and their interests in Islamic terms. Moreover, as Western power recedes, so too does its power “...to impose its values on non-Western societies”, thus strengthening the Islamic onslaught (Huntington, 1995:7). Thus, the West and Western allies must redefine their identities in cultural terms and develop new patterns of association with countries that are “...culturally similar” (Huntington, 1995:7). It is little wonder that critics of Huntington perceive his arguments as a call for a new Western crusade against Islam. Islamic fundamentalist terrorism has been constructed and/or represented as the threat to all that is sacred in our Western, liberal, secular society and to Western civilization as a whole.
The threat of “other” countries is exemplified through the use of non-Western women’s bodies in Western media discourse. Whether the issue is “cultural” or “religious” issue, non-Western women are perceived as victims of irrational systems; systems which are the antithesis to those of the modern, Western world. Postcolonial feminist analyses not only demonstrate the egregious error in representing women solely as victims, but demonstrate the power relations inherent in such representation. Just as Said demonstrates the manner in which representations of the Orient as the “other” were used to declare and maintain positional superiority, so too has the representation of non-Western women as victims been used to declare and maintain the positional superiority of the West over its “others”.
However, this representation of non-Western women in Western media discourse not only influences, and is influenced by, International Relations and policy making, but influences the internationalization of women’s human rights. Veiling becomes a human rights issues only in so far as its promotes Western global strategic interests as exemplified by the mobilization of women’s identity as victims during the Gulf War and subsequent Gulf crises. 22 Despite the strides made in international human rights law in terms of the recognition of women’s rights as human rights, these efforts remain meaningless as long as countries such as the US do nothing more than use human rights standards simply to promote particular political and economic objectives.
Furthermore, the construction of non-Western women as victims vis a vis veiling allows for, if not promotes, cultural insensitivity as well as the neo-colonizing ventures of Western feminists. At the very least, this impedes already existing programs and efforts on local levels addressing veiling, and serves to perpetuate stereotypes of the “other”. As postcolonial feminists have shown, feminist inquiry and activism must be grounded in an understanding of the relationships between gender, racial, class, social, national, historical, sexual, cultural and geographical locations. The creation and use of essentialized categories of “oppressed Third World women” in “other” countries will not advance “women’s rights”. Instead it serves the agenda of Western global (neo-colonial) interests. We must explore ways in which we as a global community can bring about respect for human dignity without resorting to savior/victim dichotomies and without serving as handmaidens in the promotion of Western global interests and neo-colonial ventures. I concur with El Saadawi in her condemnation of oppressive practices against women and her disagreement with the manner in which Western feminism has appropriated such issues. While Saadawi is speaking to female circumcision/genital mutilation, I argue that her statement may be applied to veiling as well.
I am against female circumcision and other similar...cruel practices...But I disagree with those women in America and Europe who concentrate on issues such s female circumcision and depict them as proof of the unusual and barbaric oppression to which women are exposed only in African or Arab countries. I oppose all attempts to deal with such problems in isolation, or to sever their links with the general social and economic pressures to which women everywhere are exposed, and with the oppression which is the daily bread fed to the female sex in developed and developing countries, in both of which a patriarchal class system still prevails. (El Saadawi, 1980:xiv).
El Saadawi also argues that it is Arab women alone who can and must (and do) formulate the theories, ideas and modes of struggle needed to liberate themselves from all oppressions (El Saadawi, 1980:xvi). The Western feminist argument regarding the need for Muslim women to set aside their cultures and adopt Western values is problematic if not ridiculous. As Ahmed explains, Western women may pursue their feminist agenda by engaging critically with, and redefining, their cultural heritage(s), however according to these same feminists, Muslim women must reject theirs (Ahmed, 1992:245). This stance simply perpetuates the “Islam as evil” construct in Western geopolitical discourse and moreover, legitimizes the notion that those in the West must go in and “save” all the poor, backwards peoples of the world. An awareness of these tendencies, at the very least, is “essential if we are to avoid complicity in the reinscription of the Western discourse of domination and if the study of women and the ideas of feminism are to be prevented from functioning yet again as a tool serving the political ends of Western domination” (Ahmed, 1992:246).
What remains for those of us interested in the intrinsic value of all life is much more work. We must continue to problematize the liberal, individualistic bias of human rights so that the dignity of all those on earth is recognized, fought for and preserved, as opposed to merely the dignity of some over the many. We must problematize the discourses which render some inferior and others superior in the promotion of Western global strategic interests. We must hold our governments responsible for the recognition of human dignity in all contexts, not merely those which seem to promote power maximization and global influence. We must also recognize, challenge and destroy the political, social and economic structures which impede the right to life and adequate standards of living on a global scale. Further, we as feminists must “remain vigilantly self-critical” and aware of the contemporary structure of global power, and Western feminisms’ historical and political situatedness within that structure, if we are to avoid becoming “collaborators in racist ideologies whose costs to humanity have been no less brutal than those of sexism” (Ahmed, 1992:247). Finally, we must stop seeing non-Western women simply as veiled victims.
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Appendix A: Articles Used For Content Analysis On Veiling
Christiane Amanpour (1997) “Tyranny of the Taliban,” Time 150, no. 15: pp. 60.
“The Battle for Afghanistan” (1997) The Economist pp. 37.
“Beauty and the Priests,” (1997) The Economist 344, no. 8031: pp. 31.
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Rod Nordland & Tony Clifton (1996) “The Islamic Nightmare,” Newsweek pp. 51.
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Barbara Smith (1997) “Behind the Chador” The Economist, 342, no. 8000: pp. 9.
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Phillip Taubman (1997) “The Courageous Women of Islam,” The New York Times 147: pp. A38.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: Much of this project is also featured in Urban (1998) Engendering Human Rights: International Relations, Postcolonial Feminism, Female Circumcision/Female Genital Mutilation and Veiling A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ. Back.
Note 2: “Geopolitics” most commonly refers to the “relations between countries or to colonial and settlement policies of large areas by great powers”, as simply the geographic dimension of foreign policy and/or as “applied political geography” (O’Loughlin (ed.), 1994: vi-ix). Geopolitics is also defined as a method of conducting IR in which the political or strategic importance of geographical factors are emphasized (Shafritz, et. al., 1996:72). However, a considerable amount of literature on “critical geopolitics” has come out recently which examines language and discourse in order to interpret the aims/goals behind geopolitical maneuvers. Geopolitical discourse is a phrase often used by critical theorists to “refer to the language and reasoning process of geopolitics and how they function politically” (O’Loughlin (ed.), 1994: 90). Discourse involves not simply language, but the assumptions behind geopolitical terms such as “East” and “West” and the political implications arising from the social values associated with the terms (O’Loughlin (ed.), 1994: 90). Authors such as Dalby (1988, 1990) use the term to suggest the “ideological operations of exclusion and demarcation” which define “us” and “them” (O’Loughlin (ed.), 1994:90). Other scholars who seek to expand and challenge geopolitics include Painter (1995) and Michaelson and Johnson (1997). Back.
Note 3: In discussing discourse, postmodern scholars also suggest that reality is in a perpetual state of flux, however, dominant discursive practice seeks to reduce that “flux of existence to a strategic framework of unity and coherence” (George, 1994:29). Discourse is not simply language, but the “matrix of social practices that give meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behavior” (George, 1994:29). Discourse then, generates “the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained [and]...makes ‘real’ that which it prescribes as meaningful” (George, 1994:30). Back.
Note 4: As Chowdhry and Urban (1998) suggest, content analysis and discursive analysis may appear at odds with one another, the former falling under the rubric of positivist methodologies and the latter under post-positivist methodologies, however, as in the aforementioned paper, a combination of the two allows for a richer analysis and is better suited to the goals of this project. Back.
Note 5: This is best exemplified by Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” which will be discussed at length in the final section of this project. Back.
Note 6: See for example, Peterson, 1997; Tickner, 1994; D’Amico and Beckman, 1994; Pettman, 1997 and Sylvester, 1994. Back.
Note 7: See Kautilya’s Arthasastra translated by R.P. Kangle New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972. While debates exists over who wrote Arthasastra, it is believed that Chanakuya was in fact a real person who worked for Chandrogupta Marya empire in 321 BCE thus, this text is believed to have been written around 400 BCE. Chanakya is thought to have helped establish the empire. In 1909, the translation was published by R. Shamasastry. This was the first translation and it is argued that Kautilya wrote Arthasastra in 4 BCE, although this is contested; many believe it was written much earlier. Arthasastra is actually comprised of two Hindi words; “Arth” refers to ways to sustain life and “Sastra” refers to the art of survival. Back.
Note 8: See Morgenthau, 1948; Carr, 1939; Bull, 1977; Huntington, 1989 and Kissinger, 1964 as examples. Back.
Note 9: See Waltz, 1959 and Krasner, 1978 as examples. Back.
Note 10: See Keohane and Nye, 1977; Kegley, 1993 and McMillan, 1997 as examples. Back.
Note 11: See also Sun Tzu The Art of War translated by B. Griffith New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Back.
Note 12: This is particularly evident in the authors’ discussion of President Reagan and his policies toward Central America. Back.
Note 13: Recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW) along with several other human rights organizations have undertaken the “Arrest Now” campaign which addresses the systematic use of rape during the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina as a central part of “ethic cleansing”. HRW draws attention to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia which seeks to prosecute those responsible for war crimes, including rape. The Tribunal has issued 27 indictments against suspects accused of rape and sexual assault, however, as of March 1998, 22 of those indicted remain at large (HRW, 1998:1). Back.
Note 14: “Patriarchy” denotes a system of oppression and exploitation characterized by unequal man/women relations, supported by direct and structural violence and interwoven into other social relations including the present international division of labor (Mies, 1986:7-8). The term is used to signify the systemic oppression and exploitation of women as well as the historical and societal dimensions of women’s oppression (Mies, 1986:37). Patriarchy is also “a system, of which capitalism constitutes the most recent and most universal manifestation” (Mies, 1986:13). Capitalism cannot function without patriarchy for capital accumulation cannot be achieved without patriarchal relations (Mies, 1986:39). Therefore, capitalist-patriarchy denotes the system “which maintains women’s exploitation and oppression” (Mies, 1986:37). Back.
Note 15: Influenced by the question asked by Sojourner Truth “Ain’t I a woman” as quoted in Tong, 1995. Back.
Note 16: This discussion is also featured in Chowdhry and Urban’s (1998) “Problematizing Human Rights”. Back.
Note 17: The following discussion is also featured in Chowdhry and Urban (1998). Back.
Note 18: When Said speaks of the Orient, Said is using the term in the same manner as was used by the French and British, who lumped the entirety of the Middle East and South Asia together into one convenient category (or “other”). For the French and British, “the Orient” held a special place in the European experience as the location of its oldest and richest colonies. Back.
Note 19: See also Darby (1998) The Fiction of Imperialism, London: Cassell. Back.
Note 20: It is possible that perhaps this argument is the result of this Western scholar’s failure to move beyond the “victimization” construct, furthermore, it is possible that she is falling into the same conceptual trap (that of comparison) noted by Mernissi earlier in this project. Back.
Note 21: See for example, Said (1997), Chomsky (1988) and Chomsky (1987). Back.
Note 22: See Cynthia Enloe (1993) The Morning After CA: University of California Press. Back.
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