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CIAO DATE: 3/99
NATO’s Identity at a Crossroads: Institutional Challenges Posed by NATO’s Enlargement and Partnership for Peace Programs *
Department of Political Science
US Air Force Academy
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Introduction
In the post-cold war era, NATO has confronted the challenge of remaining relevant in a transformed European security environment devoid of the threat of an all-out attack on Western Europe from the East. Indeed, NATO’s primary task in the past decade has been adapting NATO’s political and military infrastructure to new threats while simultaneously responding to the demands of former Warsaw Pact adversaries for inclusion in NATO processes in order to meet their own transformed security needs. The result has been the gradual shifting of NATO from a realist-based military alliance, forged through mutual commitments to protect vital national interests to include national survival, to a pluralistic security community 1 intent on managing instability and other diffuse threats to peace and prosperity.
This paper argues that NATO’s institutional and procedural adaptations to its perceived post-cold war security challenges have simultaneously solved and created new problems related to the allies’ security needs. This analysis will focus in particular on developments related to NATO’s outreach efforts to non-NATO member states in Europe. The concurrent introduction of the enlargement and Partnership for Peace (PfP) processes five years ago has had a dramatic impact on the character of the North Atlantic Alliance.
I argue that a series of decisions to strengthen relationships with non-member states, that will culminate with the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland this spring at the Washington Summit, has positioned NATO at a critical crossroads. NATO’s gradual evolution away from a military alliance, held together by and focused almost exclusively on collective defense obligations, has been motivated by the Alliance’s desire for continued relevance to post-cold war geopolitics. However, the adaptations adopted may have transformed the very nature of the Alliance without a deliberate debate on whether or not the outcomes inherent in the enlargement process to date are desirable.
This reality needs to be recognized and its implications deliberated among the allies. Furthermore, I will argue that the gradual evolution of the Partnership for Peace program into a permanent alliance fixture with much practical utility 2 , may in the next decades be recognized as the innovation that secured both the primacy of NATO in European security affairs, the security needs of NATO members, and the security of NATO’s permanent “associate members” — the partners. In years hence, PfP, and not enlargement may be heralded as the most important adaptation to the security challenges of post-cold war Europe.
Whither NATO: Security Alliance, Security Community, or Security Regime?
NATO was indisputably an alliance created in response to a threat — the potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Most analysts would also agree that the national representatives responsible for crafting the NATO treaty also put a high priority on framing the commitments to collective defense within the broader principle of consolidating the still recovering postwar democracies of Europe. 3 As the Cold War dragged on NATO’s attention and resources were devoted primarily to the function of collective defense. A key question in NATO’s post-cold war life is whether or not NATO will reclaim part of its institutional heritage and successfully transition from a military alliance poised to ward off specific and defined threats to an effective security organization capable of serving other and less definite purposes. 4 This section will explore the viability and utility of three disparate outcomes: NATO as a classical military alliance, NATO as the geographic space of a European security community, and NATO as a security regime.
The adaptations that NATO has implemented in the post-cold war era indicate that the NATO-member states have already concluded that continuing an exclusive emphasis on collective defense against a power that has effectively collapsed in balance of power terms is not the recipe for sustaining NATO in postcommunist Europe. Russia’s and many of the former Warsaw Pact states’ declarations of democratization as their political aims further mitigates the viability of maintaining the Cold War status quo. Both the object of NATO’s collective defense organization and the ideological basis of the political context of European conflict have been removed. Consequently, a classical military alliance, that was held together by the common interest of military security from the coercive power of the Soviet Union and the parallel interest in protecting democratic values, is unlikely to remain intact once these goals have been achieved.
Another alternative is to explore the prospect of NATO’s reconfiguration as a security community. Karl Deutsch’s concept of a security community as a geopolitical space where war as a means of resolving disputes between states in that space is unthinkable 5 has often been cited when describing the relationship that exists today between states of the European Union (EU) and NATO. 6 These states (with the exception of Greece and Turkey) neither contemplate nor divert resources toward the prospect of war with each other. They seem to have established the separate peace that Kant predicted would be possible among states that adopted republican governments, developed respect for other Liberal societies that also embraced representative institutions, and established transnational ties of commerce and other forms of exchange that foster mutual understanding.
The achievement of this Euro-Atlantic security community may be attributed at least partially to the habits of cooperation cultivated in the Cold War among NATO allies, but the benefits of membership in the Euro-Atlantic security community also transcend NATO to include the neutral Western European allies and other former Warsaw Pact states. It is not the nature of alliance membership in and of itself that reaps the benefits of a conflict-free security space. Rather, it is the embedding of the military alliance in a broader process of political, economic, and social integration 8 that results in the emergence of a security community.
It follows, then, that NATO expansion alone, without the embedding of the enlarged alliance in other political, economic, and social institutions, will not guarantee the broadening of the geopolitical space where conflict is inconceivable. NATO may aspire to be the institution upon which the post-cold war zone of peace will be expanded and deepened. But if other institutions, such as the EU, do not embrace the states undergoing transition in the East then, those states may not ultimately enjoy the full benefits of a security community.
Furthermore, an emphasis on NATO’s post-cold war role as the caretaker of a security space forged in the Cold War, that is determined to expand that space to the East, puts too much emphasis on NATO as an inwardly focused institution. The stress is on becoming a member of the alliance in order to be within its zone of security. Conflict and other variants of instability that take place near this zone of security, but outside of its geographic borders, do not necessarily concern an alliance whose main goal is to protect its own members. Such a configuration does not address the non-Article 5 threats to national security that emanate from the Balkans today or that may intensify across the postcommunist region of Europe or beyond.
What remains, then, is the prospect of NATO transforming into a security regime. Stephen Krasner has described an international regime as, “a set of rules, norms, and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area.” 9 States participate in security regimes so that common expectations about international behavior can be fostered and implemented. In the case of NATO in the post-cold war era, the principle that the security regime would be centered around is the collective management of security interests. These interests would include whatever the alliance members determined by consensus to be in their mutual interest. Presumably this would include the traditional core mission of collective defense, but could also include other identified principles such as regional instability beyond the zone of peace, proliferation of nuclear weapons around the globe, terrorism, and peacekeeping. NATO could devote itself to establishing the norms or standards of behavior expected in its geopolitical sphere of influence along with rules that would outline the specific rights and obligations of states participating in the regime. Finally, these objectives could be formalized through procedures adopted in NATO’s transforming institutions with the aim of sustaining the principles of the regime. 10
I contend that NATO is shifting toward becoming a security regime that provides the institutions and cooperation necessary to address the evolving threats to security that have emerged in the post-cold war era. The latest actions taken with regard to the Kosovo quagmire illustrate this evolution well. Consensus was reached early around the principle that an enforced peace on warring parties in an intrastate conflict outside NATO’s zone of security was in the interests of the alliance. 11 NATO’s earlier change in institutional procedures to allow for the deployment of resources for “out of area” operations, and the expansion of regime rules to include a broadened view of member obligations to include stepping up to contain instability in the Balkans, support this view. Regime norms or expected patterns of behavior now include the actions of actors within NATO’s geopolitical sphere of influence, but beyond the geographic confines of its member states. Slobodan Milosevic is in NATO’s cross hairs for violating norms prohibiting excessive violence against his Kosovar citizens. His oppressive behavior has exceeded the norms agreed to by the alliance for actors within its sphere of influence and coercive force is being considered to maintain the European security regime.
The landscape of European security has been transformed, and with it Europe’s premier security institution. The challenge now is to define the security interests of all democratic and democratizing states of the Euro-Atlantic region and determine how best to collectively address common threats to security and to manage the new threats beyond NATO’s borders. NATO must then decide which institutional mechanisms to adapt or add to meet these challenges and choose whether further enlargement or a continually enhanced PfP process will achieve the objectives of the democratic and democratizing states of the region.
I argue that NATO’s post-cold war adaptations add up to the trappings of a security regime approach to managing the post-cold war security interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. This transformation of what was at the start fundamentally a military alliance has been gradual and less than completely deliberate. I will argue further that the evolution of NATO’s enlargement and Partnership for Peace programs may have reached the point where the potential exists for the combined institutions of NATO and its Partnership for Peace to achieve many of the principles around which the post-cold war security regime is centered. It may be possible to achieve the principles of the evolving security regime without further enlargement if NATO continues to respond to the security interests of non-member associated partners through a robust Partnership for Peace program.
First Steps Toward the East
The development of a process for enlarging NATO and the creation of a program to facilitate cooperative military relations with NATO were both responses to the dramatically changed security environment in post-Cold War Europe. The 1991 Rome Summit announced NATO’s first steps toward adapting to its new security context. Two significant measures adopted in Rome included a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance and the first attempt to institutionalize NATO’s outreach effort to the East.
The new Strategic Concept reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to its fundamental principle of collective defense, while recognizing security risks of a broader nature to include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and regional crises. 12 Specifically, the concept called for the restructuring and reduction of military capabilities in order to move away from an emphasis on massive mobilization so that crisis management and peacekeeping roles could be fulfilled. 13 In addition, the new Strategic Concept called for European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security. 14
The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the end of 1991 was the result of a culmination of efforts to date to respond to the rapid changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Formalizing NATO’s relationship with the former Warsaw Pact states through NACC provided an institutional basis for consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. 15 NACC became a tool through which first the Central and Eastern European states and eventually the entire former Eastern bloc (once the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991) could establish a security relationship with NATO. NATO policymakers feared a re-nationalization of defense forces in the East and understood that the creation of NATO had prevented such a re-nationalization of defense after World War II in Europe. NACC fulfilled the specific purpose of being an outreach program to prevent the development of a security vacuum in Europe. 16 This was a first step in the process that would expand to include the concept of enlargement with the adoption of the Partnership for Peace process two years later.
Almost immediately after its adoption, the limitations of NACC became apparent. 17 Overnight, a forum to accommodate a liaison function with six states was put in the position of serving as the NATO bridge to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well. The 36-member forum proved to be too big and too diverse to satisfy the demands of the Central and Eastern European states with membership aspirations. The four Visegrad states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, expressed a desire for a differentiated role in NATO and for criteria and time-lines for becoming alliance members. 18
Further Steps Through Partnership for Peace and the Possibility of Enlargement
Skeptics of extending NATO’s security guarantees eastward have criticized the expansion of NATO as the product of an incomplete, presidential, and personality driven U.S. policy process developed wholly outside a regular bureaucratic process of strategic review. 19 Most analysts agree that US domestic partisan politics drove the hasty policy decision to at least some degree. 20 The personal commitment of President Clinton and his national security advisor, Anthony Lake, to enlargement in the end overruled widespread bureaucratic opposition 21 and the lukewarm support of NATO allies. Both Clinton and Lake viewed NATO enlargement as a means of guaranteeing the security needed so that former Warsaw Pact allies could consolidate their democratic transitions.
Just as the new Strategic Concept reflected the consensus among allies regarding the need to respond to the transformed security environment in Europe, individual NATO member states were also redrafting their national security and national military strategies to reflect the new realities of the post-cold war era. The Clinton Administration’s adoption of A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement in 1994 22 , though it did not specifically mention NATO enlargement, placed a great deal of emphasis on promoting democracy in order to enlarge the community of democratic and free-market nations. US justifications of NATO enlargement eventually would be based on providing stable security environments for the consolidation of fledgling democracies. The National Military Strategy followed suit by highlighting “dangers to democracy and reform” and “regional stability” as two of the four main post-cold war threats in the international environment. 23
An additional rationale for reaching out to the East through NATO was to satisfy the German desire for a multilateral approach to eastern integration. Germany’s increasingly assertive foreign policy toward the East was rooted in the understanding that Germany had clear national interests there. Germany feared the costs of assuming burdens beyond the cost of integrating East Germany unilaterally, while the U.S. realized that the forging of unilateral German relationships with the East could possibly decouple Germany from NATO. 24 Partnership for Peace was seen as a vehicle for multilateral outreach that could also export stability to the region, a value that the Kohl government appreciated more than any other on the European continent due to its experience importing stability from the West after World War II. 25
Germany’s desire not to overstretch its unilateral engagement in the East, a desire to maintain NATO’s relevance to post-cold war Europe, the transition to a new U.S. Administration willing to consider adaptations to NATO, the linking of stable security environments to the consolidation of democratization efforts, and U.S. domestic politics all contributed to the rationale for some sort of outreach to the East.
Partnership for Peace and enlargement originally emerged as separate and sequential processes. The Pentagon favored an exclusive emphasis on the Partnership for Peace proposal at first that would allow NATO to foster ties with all the former Warsaw Pact states and the European neutrals, but without having to differentiate between the partners or draw “new lines” in Europe. 26 PfP was originally envisioned as a means of putting off formal questions of enlargement indefinitely.
Since the introduction of the enlargement and PfP into the lexicon of European security in 1993, strategic, political, and institutional developments have pushed the parallel initiatives to evolve dramatically and to ultimately merge. Ultimately, the enlargement advocates won out by ensuring that enlargement was possible through a modified PfP process that turned several of the original PfP concepts on their heads — non-differentiation and an indefinite timetable for enlargement.
Partnership for Peace was launched at the January 1994 Brussels Summit with the purpose of communicating NATO’s long-term commitment to expansion while leaving vague both the criteria and timelines for accession. It offered participating states the opportunity to take part in non-Article 5 alliance activities according to each state’s individual interests and capabilities. Partner states understood that active participation in PfP would play an important role in the process of including new members in NATO, but that such participation was both a necessary and insufficient condition for joining NATO. 27
NATO’s September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement attempted to clarify the goals of the enlargement process and the PfP framework through which security aspirations could be fulfilled by allied and non-allied states. “Enlargement of the Alliance is aimed at extending stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and enhancing long-term security for all NATO countries and others as well.” 28 “PfP will play an important role both to help prepare possible new members, through their participation in PfP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all.” 29
PfP served dual strategic purposes for the Alliance. First, it established a process with membership as the target for some partners. PfP allowed for self-differentiation among partner states without extending the full benefits of NATO membership to the partners. Second, PfP was one means of carrying out the Alliance’s goal of exporting stability as envisioned in the Strategic Concept. It was understood that “exporting stability” involved helping to create the key conditions, such as economic growth and development that would be essential for democratic consolidation in the postcommunist region of Europe.
To this day, NATO policymakers lament the skeptical reception of PfP when it was first introduced, as a mere enlargement “delaying tactic” that was vague by design and not extremely well thought out. The policymakers present at PfP’s inception and still serving on the International Staff at NATO headquarters today, contend that PfP was always intended to serve objectives greater than enlargement. In this view, the focus on enlargement has been overstated from the start. 30 PfP was intended to both build on the institutionalization of the relationship with the former Eastern bloc begun in NACC and contribute to the achievement of the Alliance’s goal of fostering stability in Europe.
Interested states joined the PfP process by signing a framework document that committed each to core NATO values: the preservation of democratic societies, the commitment to international law, and the intent to cooperate with NATO to develop compatible military forces. Such interoperability would be required to undertake NATO missions consistent with non-Article 5 applications of these principles. Partners subsequently submitted their Presentation Documents to NATO, which outlined the aims and level of cooperation that each Partner was willing to undertake. Relationships have been specified further with the development of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) which highlight specific areas of cooperation and the partner assets that will be made available to the Alliance. A Partnership Work Program (PWP), prepared jointly by NATO and partner states, describes the areas of cooperation possible and specific activities sponsored by NATO and partner states. Military aspects of cooperation, and especially preparations for field exercises, are coordinated through the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium.
Military exercises focusing on peacekeeping skills, search and rescue operations, and humanitarian missions have accounted for most of the participation in PfP. Three military exercises took place in 1994, eight in 1995, 14 in 1996, 24 in 1997 31 , and 21 in 1998. 32 In addition, numerous bilateral “in-the-spirit-of” Partnership exercises have taken place along with other workshops and training activities. These concrete activities have had the effect of transitioning PfP from a “fluff and feel good” process to a program with real substance capable of serving both NATO’s and the partner’s states’ security objectives. 33
However, the real impetus in PfP in the military operations dimension of the process has been partner cooperation in NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR), and now Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia. Fifteen partner nations contributed nearly 5,200 personnel to the total IFOR contingent of 51,300 troops. Partnership liaison officers at the PCC were called upon to transition from coordination and training roles to operations and planning for a real world mission. 34 IFOR represented the evolution of PfP from training and exercises in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations to joint implementation of a critical NATO support operation. 35 The timing of IFOR, in the midst of the debate surrounding NATO’s relevance and the viability of PfP, has led many analysts to the conclusion that the IFOR deployment was “a means of saving NATO rather than saving Bosnia.” 36
The Bosnian operation pushed both the cooperation and enlargement aspects of NATO’s relationship with the East to new levels. Partner participation in IFOR illustrated both the substantive capabilities of partners to contribute to the mission and the limitations of the PfP process for facilitating such military operations. It was clear that with IFOR an operational role for PfP had outstripped the alliance mechanisms in place to accommodate such missions. Second, Russian participation in IFOR gave them an inside look at NATO that made the potential expansion of NATO more palatable. The opportunity to learn more about NATO and to see its transparent nature helped to alleviate Russian fears about the organization. 37
Greater participation in substantive NATO missions understandably resulted in demands for more of a role in both the operational and political components of NATO structures relied upon to carry out these missions. At the same time, NATO was preparing to issue its first set of invitations to prospective members, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 and was concerned about the reaction those destined to remain in indefinite partner status would have. There were fears that at a time when PfP was coming into its own that Madrid might take some of the steam out of the process. 38
It was clear that PfP would have to be modified to accommodate the Alliance’s interest in building on the momentum and success of the first five years, while also reassuring non-invited partners that PfP was still a substantive vehicle through which to fulfill their aspirations for NATO membership. PfP would also have to continue to satisfy partners without NATO membership aspirations to continue to meet security objectives through a relationship with NATO.
The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program
At their June 1997 meeting in Sintra, just one month before the Madrid Summit, NATO’s defense and foreign ministers agreed on a new set of initiatives to further strengthen PfP as an enduring element of the European security architecture. 39 Enhanced PfP had three main objectives: (1) to strengthen the political consultation element in PfP, (2) develop a more operational role for PfP, and (3) provide for the greater involvement of partners in PfP decision-making and planning. 40 Overall, the goal was to either help partners prepare for possible membership or to keep them happy if their security objectives did not include NATO membership. 41
The Political Dimension of Enhanced PfP
NATO officials and partners agree that enhanced PfP is a qualitative improvement in partner engagement — especially in the realm of decision making. 42 A Slovak officer explained, PfP had been like a “bird flying with a broken wing,” because it lacked a substantive political component. 43 A Romanian NATO diplomat remarked that the provisions of enhanced PfP give them greater participation in decision-making processes, greater access to committees and NATO bodies, and features more exercises. All of this will “help to build an allied mentality” 44 even among those left behind in the first round of NATO enlargement.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created to “be a new cooperative mechanism, which will form a framework for enhanced efforts in both an expanded political dimension of partnership and practical cooperation under PfP.” 45 Its Basic Document, which was also prepared in the months immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, installs the EAPC as a multi-national forum that affords partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision making opportunities for the activities in which they participate. 46 EAPC supersedes and is intended to be a qualitative improvement over the NACC, whose meetings developed a reputation of being little more than “briefing parties” where partners passively listened to briefings from NATO representatives. 47 The EAPC is also supposed to expand the scope of potential issues discussed to include a broad range of political and security issues as well as practical areas of potential cooperation, such as peacekeeping operations. 48
Improving the potential for consultation on a broad range of issues related to regional cooperation is also designed to serve the interests of the non-former adversaries — Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Austria — who have developed strong records of participation in PfP. These states represent a new category of partners — states without ambitions for NATO membership, but whose security interests are compatible with NATO’s post-Cold War Strategic Concept focused on encouraging stability in Europe. These partners, as well as many of the aspirant partners, are particularly interested in enhanced PfP’s emphasis on crisis management, terrorism, and disaster response and would like to see the EAPC become the NATO body capable of preventing the next “out of area” regional crisis.
This potential was partially realized with respect to the current crisis in Kosovo. Last summer, the Albanian Prime Minister, as part of his effort to solicit NATO assistance, addressed a North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in the morning, and called an EAPC meeting in the afternoon as a forum to address the crisis in a broader forum. 49 The hope is that by 2005, with the enhanced operational and political mechanisms in place, NATO will be able to respond to a regional crisis with its traditional institutional mechanisms, instead of resorting to the ad hoc approach which was all that was possible in the IFOR operations. 50
Aspirant members have conflicting responses to the new forum. While they applaud the opportunity for deeper consultation across more issues, they complain that the forum’s membership’s interests are too diverse. Aspirant nations would like a forum where their specific security interests are considered. 51
The EAPC, however, is also limited by design in several important respects. First, EAPC is not intended to be an organization of equals. Distinctions between NATO and non-NATO members will remain significant. The purpose of the forum is to serve as an outlet for non-member states to engage NATO at the political level, but NATO’s political decision making body, the NAC, will retain its primacy. 52 The intention is to extend the political reach of the alliance beyond the 16 members without being dependent on other independent European security organizations not subject to NATO control. 53
However, some uncertainty remains regarding the EAPC’s potential impact. For instance, paragraph 4 of the EAPC Basic Document names the EAPC as the principle vehicle available to non-members to establish a political relationship with the alliance, but there is no further elaboration on how this is supposed to happen. The Basic Document also allows for a (16 + 1) or (16 + n) format in addition to the multi-national 44 member forum, but there have not yet been any further elaboration on the smaller formats. 54 Nonetheless, the EAPC meets regularly for political discussions in both ambassadorial and working meeting formats. Highlights of its first year include frequent consultations with SFOR-participating partners, discussions on security in Southeastern Europe, and the introduction of a US and Sweden co-sponsored initiative on defense environmental issues. 55
The Operational Dimension of Enhanced PfP
Operationally, enhanced PfP calls for greater regional cooperation and participation in Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operations at earlier stages, expanding the scope of PfP missions to include the full range of the Alliance’s new missions, especially peace enforcement, and partner participation in crisis management exercises. The goal is to expand the range of operational cooperation to include all missions, including peace support missions, short of Article 5 operations. The main changes operationally involve improvements in the depth of cooperation between partners and NATO members. For instance, for the first time partners will participate in planning the exercises that they participate in and can serve as the exercise authority for PfP exercises.
Another enhancement aimed at improving the operational role of PfP is the establishment of Partner Staff Elements (PSEs) at various NATO headquarters. Thirty-eight partner officers have already begun to work on non-article 5 issues in an international capacity as NATO staff officers. The establishment of PSEs is a significant step because it gives partner access to NATO procedures and documents beyond the PCC.
Enhanced PfP and the Enlargement Process
Enhanced PfP also has the aim of convincing the Madrid non-selectees that NATO’s door remains open. A key element to further the preparations of the aspirant states for the next round of enlargement is the intensified dialogue process. US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, has characterized intensified dialogues as a process “that tells aspiring allies exactly what they must do and how they must change to make membership a possibility.” 56 However, NATO officials and aspirants alike admit that intensified dialogues do not significantly alter NATO’s long-standing policy of being non-directive to aspirants about criteria for membership. 57
Intensified dialogues are general discussions focused on the membership aspirations of partners. Two dialogues annually take place at the level of the North Atlantic Council (NAC + 1) and concentrate on political factors. An additional dialogue is conducted with a NATO team. The agenda is prepared jointly by the team and the aspirant partner, but the dialogue itself tends to be a one-way forum where aspirants report how they are doing in their various processes of reform. The NATO team can then take this information back to the rest of the allies. 58
The NATO team shares with the partner developments within the alliance, however, the team will not give country specific advice. Meaningful feedback is difficult to achieve through the intensified dialogues because official NATO feedback has to be the result of consensus among the 16 members. The NATO team can only tell the partner what it thinks the alliance response is likely to be on an issue. NATO officials admit that there “is still a ritual quality about the dialogues” 59 meaning that they have little substantive value. Aspirants complain that the standard response of the NATO team to an inquiry about how the candidate for accession is doing is “Everything’s OK” and the team does not always tell the aspirant what is not going well in its candidacy. 60
As with all parts of the enlargement process with a role in either setting the criteria or evaluating candidacies, intensified dialogues do not come with any guarantees that the information exchanged will lead to NATO’s increased support for a particular partner’s candidacy. Aspirants depend on feedback from individual NATO countries and have come to expect little in the way of concrete feedback from NATO as an organization. 61
Enhanced PfP and the Planning and Review Process
In January 1995, a Planning and Review Process (PARP) modeled on the Alliance’s defense planning system was introduced into PfP. The goal of PARP was to advance NATO interoperability in partner states and to increase transparency among allies and partners. 62 In phase one of PARP partners are given a questionnaire that asks a wide scope of questions relevant to the defense planning process. Questions address a broad swath of issues ranging from the status of civilian control of the armed forces to the status of NCO training to the relationship between society and the armed forces. 63 These are general defense reviews where NATO may inquire into systemic shortfalls in the reform process. For instance, in the Lithuanian case as a result of the questionnaire, NATO was able to evaluate two shortfalls in Lithuania’s potential to take part in partner activities. According to Lithuanian law, CIS states are not allowed to participate in exercises on Lithuanian territory and the number of Lithuanian troops allowed to participate in NATO exercises is limited. 64
This first year in PARP tries to focus the whole government on what needs to happen in the armed forces to advance the reform process. PARP involves the comprehensive context within which units preparing for NATO operate. The emphasis is on encouraging the partner-state to adopt a new system of defense planning that is more compatible with the NATO defense planning process. 65 Progress in Western defense planning processes helps to create local defense policy experts, and implementation of a force planning process provides a means of justifying the defense preferences that are these newly created experts espouse. 66
Phase two of PARP focuses on the assignment of interoperability objectives. After NATO reviews the surveys from phase one it may identify a set of interoperability objectives that the partner should concentrate on in order to contribute to PfP activities. However, NATO will not prioritize the objectives. Partners must decide which interoperability issues, if achieved, would both advance their candidacies and simultaneously achieve their priorities for national defense. 67
While PARP is a voluntary program for partners, it could be considered as a requirement for aspirant states. PARP is an example of an enlargement mechanism charged with passing on specific feedback to aspirant cases. Indeed, the PARP is the only official feedback on candidacies from the alliance that aspirants receive; however, the NATO inputs on accession requirements are never decisive and they apply only to PARP-identified units. PARP exchanges take place in a (16 + 1) forum.
Expanded PARP is one of the enhancements of the PfP process with the goal of assisting aspirant states prepare for selection as new NATO members. Under expanded PARP partners identify specific forces that will be made available for PfP operations. This is similar to NATO’s force planning system, which requires member states to identify specific contributions to NATO missions. 68 The goal of expanded PARP, which is supposed to be fully implemented in 2000, is to get partner forces to contribute better to PfP operations. Eighteen partner states are currently participating in PARP.
Summary of Enhanced PfP’s Aims and Prospects
It is too soon to predict how well the Enhanced PfP Program will achieve its goals of facilitating aspirant states’ desires for membership and the political and operational depth to keep non-aspirant states contributing to NATO missions. Some NATO officials point to the progress made through enhanced PfP as a sign that PfP is finally moving out of the shadow of NATO enlargement and has come into its own as an enduring framework for relations with all partner nations. Such a development would, ironically, move PfP back to its original aims: (1) to be a tool for membership; (2) to be the Alliance’s principal vehicle to practically implement the Strategic Concept; and, (3) to be an enduring framework for a relationship with NATO.
Both NATO’s program for enlargement and its program for facilitating security cooperation in the region have evolved tremendously since the PfP process was launched nearly 5 years ago. One of the consequences of NATO’s ongoing adaptation has been the development of several separate categories of participants in NATO processes, each with different security objectives and goals for their relationship with NATO. The next section of the paper will explore these categories of participants, their goals, level of satisfaction with the Alliance, and their security objectives within the NATO context.
NATO’s Evolving “Caste System”
“The Haves” — Current Members and Invitees
The most satisfied participants in the NATO system are, of course, its members and the new invitees — the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary — which are just months away from enjoying the full privileges of membership. However, as the enlargement process continues it will become increasingly difficult to maintain consensus within the alliance on further challenges to its core mission and character that subsequent rounds of enlargement may pose.
The new invitees, meanwhile, are adjusting to their new status within the alliance and the practical challenges of preparing for accession. Invitees have assumed a greater burden of participation in terms of both financial and personnel resources. The qualitative improvement in participation has also resulted in a progressive increase in alliance activities as invitee staff officers and diplomats have been thrust into the full spectrum of NATO structures.
Yet the invitees are in a sort of awkward “in-between” state where they simultaneously behave as partners and future members. For instance, the partners’ Individual Partner Programs (IPPs) are still in effect and outstanding interoperability objectives are receiving extra attention from the alliance. Though invitees do not still participate in intensified dialogues, the PARP continues with the invitees even though separate accession talks and participation in NATO’s Defense Planning process have also begun. Invitees are also allowed to attend meetings of various NATO committees, but only as observers.
The general sense among NATO officials is that the invitees’ behavior in the alliance in the aftermath of Madrid is in accordance with the alliance’s expectations. 69 While there was some initial concern that “backsliding” may set in once membership was certain, all of the invitees have behaved responsibly and feel a special obligation to make the first wave of enlargement go smoothly. The Alliance is confident that the three invitees will continue to maintain their commitments through the ratification process. 70
There is also agreement, however, that the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary were not up to either NATO’s political or military standards when their invitations were issued. 71 There are still many areas of continued reform that have to take place over a long period of time that will require long-term national attention. It is possible that economic and other factors may intervene that could prohibit a case from fulfilling its obligations to the alliance, 72 but thus far invitees seem to understand both the rights and obligations that come with membership.
The “Have-nots” — the Aspirant Partners
Aside from the three countries invited to join NATO at Madrid, nine others also seek membership: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, Albania did not participate in the most recent round of intensified dialogues in Fall 1998. Among the aspirant partners still trying to navigate the evolving NATO enlargement process, Romania, Slovenia, the Baltic states, and Slovakia are the most committed to eventual inclusion in the alliance and are actively working to achieve this end.
The first round of enlargement has been both a source of hope and disappointment for the aspirant partners. Madrid was a turning point for all partners because the invitations proved that membership was an achievable objective. In this respect, the aspirant states look up to the three selectees. 73 The selection of three former Warsaw Pact states was also evidence of the significant progress made in the postcommunist sector of Europe. 74 Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltics each took heart in the fact, too, that they were specifically mentioned in the summit communiqué as eventual members of the alliance. The Baltics, in particular, were encouraged by their inclusion in the communiqué, which elevated their status from a hypothetical to a real case for membership. 75
Madrid was also a disappointing event for the aspirants left behind. From NATO’s perspective, the aspirants have accepted their fate with a good deal of realism and without bitterness because the limit of three invitations was widely understood. 76 However, Slovenia and Romania maintain that they were strong candidates at Madrid having achieved levels of progress comparable to the invitees’. There is some fear that the political climate will not allow another enlargement round in 1999 at the Washington Summit and that the cases that were justifiably close at Madrid do not relish the possibility of indefinite waits for their invitations.
In addition, some aspirants, particularly those who thought they were close to meeting the membership criteria, are uncomfortable with what they perceive to be a growing gap between them and the invitees. As a Romanian diplomat put it, “now invitees get to go to all the meetings and have access to the core of NATO.” 77 However, in the same conversation he admitted that the top three choices had met the criteria for membership better. Each had started some reform of their societies even before 1989 and the three were also the common sense geostrategic choices due to their proximity to the alliance. 78
Interviews in Brussels with military officers and diplomats from the aspirant states indicated widespread dissatisfaction with the continual reluctance of NATO to provide a “roadmap” to membership. While aspirants understand that selection for NATO membership has significant political components, including political developments both within partner states and the internal politics of member states, they are frustrated that they still have to guess at NATO’s priorities. 79 Road maps to membership, of course, will not be forthcoming as NATO remains committed to its policy of pledging an open door while avoiding “making specific commitments to specific countries” or raising expectations of candidates. 80
Aspirants are becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack of specific guidance on how to allocate resources within a process with no guarantees for membership. A Latvian diplomat complained that clearer guidance from NATO would help to justify defense-spending increases in a struggling domestic economy to a skeptical public. 81 Lithuania is also in the position of trying to explain to its parliament the need to set aside sufficient resources for defense in order “to have a decent shot at NATO membership.” 82 A Lithuanian government official added his complaint that NATO guidance is similarly lacking. “No one is telling us to develop this airfield or to build up that battalion.” 83 A Slovakian diplomat added that NATO was not specific about his country’s specific deficiencies for candidacy. 84 A Romanian official added that as membership continues to elude Romania his government is faced with pursuing the parallel goals of membership and taking care of national defense without knowing for certain what the spending priorities should be. 85
An ongoing concern for all aspirants is how to achieve their security objectives as NATO partners without a concrete timeline for membership. Each wants the security guarantee that NATO membership would bring and argues that their security interests would be much easier to achieve within an alliance framework. 86 Aspirant states remain fixed on their goal of NATO membership and many continue to evaluate every defense decision based on how it can contribute to this end. However, there is also growing concern with the prospect of long-term partner status. Sustaining domestic consensus that scarce resources should continue to be allocated to the elusive goal of NATO membership may be difficult. 87
A senior NATO official involved with NATO enlargement policy worried that if aspirants continue to be disappointed, they may pressure the alliance for another separate category of PfP participants — a special track for top-tier aspirants and neutral states committed to achieving substantive security objectives through their relationships with NATO. Such pressure for even greater substance than enhanced PfP presently offers may result in crossing lines that NATO does not want to cross. 88
“Have What We Want” — Western European Partners
A third, unexpected category, of partners has also appeared in the PfP process — a set of sophisticated Western European partners that is not interested in membership, but has discovered the value of developing increasingly closer ties with NATO. Switzerland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden have realized that the new nature of the threats to European security, especially regional instability, means that the neutral states and the NATO member states share common security objectives short of collective defense. These states have come to understand PfP as a program that offered many benefits short of article 5 obligations. 89
As PfP has become more substantial in operational content and more collaborative in its political decision-making dimension, these Western European partners have come to regard PfP as a venue through which they can retain their independence while also taking advantage of areas of cooperation where they can play a role. The neutrals have been satisfied playing a role in PfP that gives them a “voice without responsibility” while also enhancing their own defense training capabilities. 90
NATO officials point to the Western Europeans’ enthusiasm about PfP as evidence that PfP has moved way beyond its initial reputation as a way station for hapless postcommunist aspirants. These states have also provided regular financial assistance, training, and expertise to other partners in order to maximize recipient countries’ opportunities for PfP participation. 91 The neutral states, along with the aspirant states on the edge of qualifying for membership, are pushing the limits of PfP to the point where some argue that before long there may not be a significant difference between NATO members and active PfP participants.
The development of the argument that eventually PfP will evolve to the point where there is only a “razor thin” difference between members and non-members is leading to a contentious debate among partners and members over the role of PfP.
“Razor thin” proponents argue further that the 1991 Strategic Concept introduced the concept of the indivisibility of security in Europe and sent the message that instability in the region will be the Alliance’s business. As PfP continues to evolve, such non-Article 5 operations can be routinely dealt with through a PfP that is appropriately linked to NATO mechanisms. The difference between members and non-members participation in such operations, the argument goes, will be inconsequential. 92
Some partners fear that advocates of the “razor thin” argument have another aim of convincing aspirants that their security goals can be met without a membership card. The problem of repeated enlargements threatening the character of the alliance could be solved with a “PfP Plus” program that satisfies most of the interests of the partners short of Article 5 security guarantees. Continually Enhanced PfP, from the perspective of skeptical aspirants, could be an attempt to keep aspirants at bay indefinitely.
Prospects for Further Institutional Adaptation and Change
There is debate within the Alliance over whether the enlargement process has fundamentally changed the character of NATO. Those who argue that NATO has adapted to its new security environment without sacrificing its core mission of collective defense point to the process through which PfP has been incorporated into the Alliance. By design, responsibility for PfP was spread out across existing NATO committees. No separate “NATO Enlargement Office” or division was ever created in order to ensure that NATO enlargement and PfP issues were on every committee’s agenda. 93 NATO policymakers argue that changes that have occurred within NATO are not due to enlargement, but due to the changing nature of the threat; and that much of NATO’s adaptations can be traced to its implementation of the 1991 Strategic Concept. 94
Further adaptations will likely follow when an updated Strategic Concept is introduced at the Washington Summit in 1999. This new version will most likely involve a wider security role for NATO by specifying new threats. Some progress should be made toward deciding where NATO’s center of gravity should lie between a collective defense focus and the post-Cold War emphasis on exporting stability. 95 There seems to be a consensus among the allies that the 1999 Strategic Concept will also have a new emphasis on working with partners, include yet more enhancements of PfP, and without mentioning enlargement directly clarify that enlargement will be dealt with as an open-ended process. 96 The more contentious issues involve language that would commit allies to reshaping force structures to address new missions and language indicating that NATO may be reshaping itself into a global alliance. 97
Unresolved Issues
NATO’s “Open Door”
As stated previously, NATO remains committed to further rounds of enlargement, but any subsequent round introduces new challenges that will be difficult for NATO to resolve. For instance, the first three invitees are regarded as loyal supplicants who will be assets to the US in terms of loyally backing US policies. Subsequent candidates may have more distant interests. 98 The military implications of any further enlargement also have to be seriously studied before NATO takes on additional Article 5 obligations.
NATO has also arrived at this stage in the enlargement process without a set checklist or criteria for aspirants. Such guidance as the Perry Principles 99 and the criteria set out in the 1995 Study on Enlargement are often referred to, but NATO will not accept new members unless there is political consensus among the sixteen. 100 NATO officials are already indicating that there is no consensus on offering additional invitations at the Washington Summit in 1999. For instance Germany’s and Britain’s main candidate, Poland, has already been welcomed into the fold and these states are satisfied with the status quo. 101 Britain fears that additional admissions will cause the process to collapse under its own weight and will oppose future enlargement in 1999. 102
Balancing Russian and Baltic Interests
The Baltic states understand that their fate is tied to Russia’s comfort with their eventual accession. If the NATO-Russian relationship goes well, the concerns that the wider alliance has about Baltic membership leading to regional instability due to a negative Russian reaction should ease. The Baltics are encouraged that Russia has at least swallowed the first three new invitees and is beginning to play its role in the Alliance spelled out in the 1997 Founding Act. Russia’s participation in the Permanent Joint Council may narrow the distance between the poles, which favor and oppose Baltic membership.
The Baltic-US Charter went further than Madrid in suggesting that NATO membership may be at the end of a long process of preparation through PfP. For their part, the Baltics are challenging NATO to stand by the principle that every state in Europe is free to choose its own security arrangements — no state, especially a nonmember state — should be able to dictate the security fate of any other state. 103 The US and the Nordic states will continue to keep Baltic membership hopes alive.
Ensuring that Obligations of New Members Are Met
Finally, since there is no process for kicking members out of NATO, NATO will have to live with new members carrying over their unresolved problems of candidacy to the Alliance as member states. Once potential members reach “invitee” status, the assessment focus of the alliance changes to evaluating the achievement of NATO force goals. The hard look at internal matters relevant to meeting the accession criteria will be suspended as military interoperability issues take center stage. In subsequent enlargement rounds, if they occur, NATO must keep in mind that the window of opportunity for influencing candidates’ performance on internal matters related to deficiencies in the democratic consolidation process is brief.
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated the gradual evolution of NATO from a military alliance primarily focused on deterring threats to national survival, to NATO as a security regime re-tooled to be the primary institution in Europe for meeting the post-cold war security interests of allied and non-allied states alike. This ongoing transformation of NATO to a security regime is evident in NATO’s concurrent initiatives to enlarge the Alliance and to develop a program of military cooperation with nonmember states in the region through the PfP process. NATO is necessarily adapting to its new security environment and in the process has struggled to maintain consensus on what its core values are and what its post-Cold War purpose should be. Recent actions related to the management of the crisis in Kosovo give insights into the identity tensions that strain the Alliance. Maintaining NATO’s credibility in the region by using coercion to change the behavior of a sovereign state, that is in conflict with norms espoused by the Alliance and the international community at-large, indicates that NATO is shifting toward becoming a full-fledged security regime.
Partnership for Peace has simultaneously emerged as a vehicle capable of contributing to the actions necessary to achieve the principles of the emerging post-cold war European security regime. Though originally perceived by many as a delaying tactic to fend off dealing with the enlargement of the Alliance in the short-term, the Partnership for Peace program has evolved into a substantive initiative in its own right. “PfP should be seen as an end in and of itself.” 104 Once nations have prioritized and developed national security strategies and determined their place in Europe, they will appreciate that PfP embodies mechanisms that make it possible to work very closely with NATO and to achieve their security interests. PfP’s ability to accommodate the security interests of diverse categories of partners may, in the long run, make it a more significant aspect of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution than the admission of new members through enlargement. 105 It is unclear, though, where the enlargement process is headed and whether or not the PfP and the enlargement processes can continue to complement each other.
In the near term, the Alliance faces some significant decisions regarding its character as a collective defense organization versus its potential to be the institutional nucleus for enforcing a security regime in Europe or perhaps beyond. Achievement of the goal to export stability to Europe seems to be most compatible with a security regime approach to European security. NATO must decide which specific institutional adaptations and mechanism will best achieve its desired ends. NATO must absorb its first round of invitees and reach a consensus on if, when, and who will be singled out for membership in the second round. Will the “open door” really remain open indefinitely, or will NATO encourage aspirants to satisfy their security objectives through “PfP Plus?”
NATO is the best hope for the creation and sustenance of a post-cold war security regime in Europe and beyond. NATO’s recognition of this role and the continued adaptation of NATO’s institutional mechanisms, to include further enhancements of the Partnership for Peace process, will enable NATO to become the institution of choice for the achievement of the security interests of member and non-member states alike.
Endnotes
*: The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense.
Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: Philip H. Gordon, “Recasting the Atlantic Alliance,” in NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 24. Back.
Note 2: John Gerard Ruggie, “Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO’s Future,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20. No. 1, p. ? Back.
Note 3: Sean Kay, NATO and The Future of European Security (Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 31-32. Back.
Note 4: James E. Goodby, “Europe Undivided,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3; Obtained via Lexis and Nexus, p. 9. Back.
Note 5: Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Back.
Note 6: Ruggie, “Consolidating the European Pillar,” p. 109. Back.
Note 7: Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 474. Back.
Note 8: John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 85. Ruggie attributes the general concept to Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Back.
Note 9: Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) Back.
Note 10: The concept of regimes consisting of principles, norm, rules, and procedures comes from Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Back.
Note 11: Jane Perlez, “The Terrible Lesson of Bosnia: Will it Help Kosovo?” The New York Times, 1 February 1999, p. A11. Back.
Note 12: NATO Handbook, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” www.nato.int/docu/handbook/hb103003.htm Back.
Note 13: Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 12. Back.
Note 14: NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 12, “What is NATO?” June 1997. Back.
Note 15: NATO Handbook , “The Transformation of the Alliance,” (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1005), p. 37. Back.
Note 16: Interview with senior U.S. Diplomat in U.S. NATO Mission, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 18: Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1994), p. 39. Back.
Note 19: Stephen J. Blank, “Rhetoric and Reality in NATO Enlargement,” in European Security and NATO Enlargement: A View from Central Europe (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), p. 13. Back.
Note 20: Marc Rogers, “Driving the Alliance: NATO follows the US lead,” International Defense Review Special Report, 1 December 1998, p. 4; Internet, Lexis-Nexis. Back.
Note 21: James M. Goldgeier, “NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision,” The Washington Quarterly, 21,1, (Winter 1998) p. 85. Back.
Note 22: William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994). Back.
Note 23: The other 2 threats identified were weapons of mass destruction and transnational dangers. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995). Back.
Note 24: Interview with Joshua B. Spero, Political-Military Affairs Analyst, Joint Staff, NATO Division, September 1998; Joshua Spero and Frank Umbach, “US-German Core Stabilizes NATO,” Defense News, 4 April 1994, p. 23. Back.
Note 27: Simon, “Partnership for Peace,” p. 40. Back.
Note 28: Study on NATO Enlargement, Chapter 1, Paragraph 18, Brussels, September 1995. Back.
Note 29: Study on NATO Enlargement, Chapter 3, Paragraph 32, Brussels, September 1995. Back.
Note 30: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 31: Vernon Penner, “Partnership for Peace,” Strategic Forum, No. 97 (December 1996), p. 2. Back.
Note 32: “ACE Exercises and Seminars,” www.shape.nato.int/PFP/EX_PFP98.HTM#Totalof Exercises. Back.
Note 33: Interview with senior U.S. officer, SHAPE Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, June 1998. Back.
Note 35: Interview with senior U.S. officer, SHAPE Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, June 1998. Back.
Note 38: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 39: NATO Fact Sheet, no. 9, “The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme”, July 1997. Back.
Note 40: A detailed explanation of the goals behind Enhanced PfP and the specific elements of Enhanced PfP can be found in the Report of the Senior Level Group on PfP Enhancement, Brussels, May 1997. Back.
Note 41: Interview with senior U.S. officer in the U.S. Mission, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 42: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 43: Interview with Slovak Staff Officer in the PCC, Mons, Belgium, June 1998. Back.
Note 44: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 45: Report of the Senior Level Group on PfP Enhancement, p. 5. Back.
Note 46: NATO Press Release 98-2, 14 Jan 1998, “Action Plan of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council for 1998-2000.” Back.
Note 47: Interview with senior Slovenian Liaison Officer to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 48: NATO Press Release 98-2. Back.
Note 49: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 51: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 52: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 53: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 55: Report to Congress on the Partnership for Peace Developments Through July 15, 1998, p. 7-8. Back.
Note 56: Madeline Albright. “Prepared Remarks of Secretary of State Albright at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, 16 Dec 1997. Back.
Note 57: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 58: Interview with senior NATO official from the Political Affairs, Partnership and Cooperation Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 59: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 60: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 61: Interview with Slovakian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 62: NATO Fact Sheet no. 9, “The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Program,” Back.
Note 63: Interview with U.S. military officer in the U.S. Mission, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 64: Interview with Lithuanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 65: Interview with Slovenian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 66: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 67: Interview with Lithuanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 68: Interview with senior NATO official from the Political Affairs, Partnership and Cooperation Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 69: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 70: Interview with senior NATO official from the Political Affairs, Partnership and Cooperation Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 71: Interview with senior U.S. Diplomat in U.S. NATO Mission, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 72: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 73: Interview with U.S. military officer from the U.S. Military Delegation to NATO, June 1998. Back.
Note 74: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 75: Interview with Latvian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 76: Interview with senior NATO official from the Political Affairs, Partnership and Cooperation Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 77: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 80: Albright testimony. Back.
Note 81: Interview with Latvian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 82: Linas Linkevicius, Lithuanian Ambassador to NATO, 11 Feb 98 in Brooks Tigner, “Lithuania to Raise Defense Budget,” Defense News, 16-22 Feb 1998. Back.
Note 83: Brooks Tigner, “Lithuania to Raise Defense Budget,” Defense News, 16-22 Feb 1998. Back.
Note 84: Interview with Slovakian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 85: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 86: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998 and Interview with Latvian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 87: Interview with senior Romanian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 88: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 89: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 90: Interview with U.S. Diplomat to NATO, U.S. Mission, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 91: For instance Finland has provided various types of assistance to the Estonian armed forces, Switzerland to Albania, while Sweden and Austria have given various support to other partners. This activity is detailed in Report to Congress on the Partnership for Peace Developments Through July 15, 1998, p. 19. Back.
Note 92: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 93: Interview with U.S. military officer in the U.S. Mission, Brussels, June 1998. The only specific organs formed were the Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace (PMSC) which deal with issues that have a strict PfP focus. Back.
Note 94: Interview with senior NATO official from NATO Defense Planning Staff. Back.
Note 96: Interview with US state department official in the European Bureau, Washington, DC, September 1998. Back.
Note 98: Interview with senior US NATO official, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 99: Former Secretary of Defense William Perry stipulated five generalized standards for membership: support for democracy, including toleration of ethnic diversity and respect for human rights; building a free market economy; civilian control of the military; promotion of good neighborly relations; and the development of military interoperability with NATO. The Study on NATO Enlargement mandated that new members must: be committed to NATO’s principles, policies, and procedures, including democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law; accept the full obligations of the Washington Treaty, including the principle of consensus decision-making; demonstrate a commitment to the resolution of ethnic and external territorial disputes, promotion of stability, and establishment of effective civilian control of the military; be prepared to contribute to NATO’s collective defense under Article 5, through the command structure, exercises, and new evolving missions; meet minimum standards of interoperability; be prepared in times of crisis or war to allow other Allies’ forces to enter and operate on their territory, or to deploy their own forces outside their territory as part of the Alliance’s collective defense; and, be prepared to contribute to the budget and financial obligations of membership. Source: NATO Enlargement, US Delegation, www.nato.int:80/usa/info/info2.htm. Back.
Note 100: The new members are not able to reject the membership applications of subsequent invitees. Back.
Note 101: Interview with U.S. military officer from the U.S. Military Delegation to NATO, June 1998. Back.
Note 102: Interview with British staff officer, SHAPE HQ, Mons, Belgium, June 1998. Back.
Note 103: Interview with Latvian Diplomat to NATO, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
Note 104: Interview with Political-Military Analyst, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, September 1998. Back.
Note 105: Interview with senior NATO official from the International Staff, Brussels, June 1998. Back.
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