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CIAO DATE: 6/99
The Internal Dynamics of the Organization of American States: Hegemonic Influence and Organizational Autonomy *
Department of Government
University of Texas at Austin
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
DRAFT: Please do not quote without permission of the author
Introduction
The past decade has seen a remarkable revitalization of the Organization of American States (OAS) with the end of the Cold War and renewed US foreign policy interest in Latin America. Changes in international relations have resulted in revived member commitment to the OAS and its principles. Despite these new relations and bright future, however, the inequality of power between the United States and Latin American members remains a reality within the organization. This reality has challenged the organization in the past and continues to do so. In acknowledging the dominance of the US within the organization, however, it is easy to overlook that the OAS has not always been a simple pawn of the United States as many assume. The activities undertaken by the organization do not correspond directly with the preferences of the US. An explanation of the organization’s actions goes beyond the delineation of US interests and relative power balances which are often the focus of international relations literature when considering institutions such as the OAS. Neither realism nor hegemonic stability theory look within institutions to explain the dynamic relations between members and their impact on organizational behavior. This paper is a preliminary exploration of variables within the OAS, separate from the hegemon’s level of interest and power, that influence the organization’s autonomy. 1
This paper will first briefly assess international relations literature as it pertains to the study of international organizations and discuss the scope of the research in terms of case selection. The paper will then introduce four different aspects of the organization (structure, procedures, membership dynamics, and principles) and theorize about their impact on hegemonic influence within the organization. In the final section of the paper, an analysis of three different cases will be presented to determine if structure, procedures, membership dynamics and principles affect organizational autonomy as predicted.
International Relations Literature and International Organizations
Although the international relations literature provides a starting point from which to explore international organizations such as the OAS, it is clear that most of the approaches do not adequately explain the behavior of international institutions, particularly in terms of their more autonomous actions. Realists, for example, argue that states are the primary actors in the international system and that the balance of power between states largely shapes relations among them. Realism places little focus on international organizations at all, believing them to be mere tools for powerful member states to use as they choose. These arguments are advanced in the writings of Hans Morganthau (1948) and Inis Claude (1962) and are more fully fleshed out by Kenneth Waltz (1979). Other realist scholars (Gilpin, 1981; Grieco, 1988) also base their arguments on these tenets, which lead them to generally pessimistic conclusions concerning the prospects for international cooperation and peace.
Several implications stem from realist claims about the malleability of international organizations (IOs). If organizations are merely pawns of their most powerful states, then the interests of an organization as articulated by the organization are simply those of its most powerful members. Furthermore, if organizations are fully dependent on member states for their existence even after they have been established, then they have no power beyond that given to them by their members. In such a system, one would not expect independent action by an organization unless a powerful state had no preference or interest in the particular actions it was taking. Furthermore, such independent action, if taken, would be expected to be ineffective. Realism predicts either hegemonic dominance and manipulation of an organization, or a minimal impact of the organization when hegemon has no interest on a given issue being considered.
The deficiencies of realism as they pertain to IO’s are addressed to some degree by neoliberalism. The neoliberal approach takes issue with realism on the potential of international organizations to mitigate the effects of anarchy within the international system. By stressing the potential for cooperation through the establishment of institutions and regimes, scholars such as Keohane (1984), Axlerod (1984), Krasner (1983), and Stein (1982) emphasize the importance of international organizations in the international system. This literature focuses on the bargaining dynamics between states within the institutional context but does not address the actual internal functioning of organizations. For example, Keohane and Axlerod (1986) emphasize how international institutions can effect such factors as the shadow of the future, the sanctioning problem, and the payoff structure to promote cooperation between states in an anarchic system. Similarly, Stein (1982) elaborates on how international regimes can promote coordination and collaboration within an anarchic system even when states have divergent interests and preferences by helping them achieve more efficient outcomes than would otherwise occur.
Neoliberalism’s focus on inter-state cooperation, with its emphasis on relative gains instead of absolute gains, provides greater insight in explaining the cooperative actions taking place within international organizations. The section below on Membership Dynamics illustrates that consensus among members is an important element in an organization’s ability to resist hegemonic pressure. Neoliberalism, however, does not look beyond the issue of cooperation to the other aspects within international organizations that potentially impact organizational autonomy. Empirical realities suggest that international organizations are not always dominated by hegemons, and inter-state cooperation alone is not the only important factor in explaining organizational behavior. Neither realism nor neoliberalism portrays international organizations as independent actors in the international system, thus the issues of organizational autonomy on which the project focuses remains unaddressed by this literature. 2
In the case of the Organization of American States, the US has admittedly played a dominant role within the organization. The organization clearly failed to stand up to US intervention in the region in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and during the Guatemalan coup in 1954. Not all of the actions of the organization, however, have corresponded to the preferences of the US. For example, despite US opposition to ending the regional economic sanctions against Cuba, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs rejected the blockade as outdated at their meeting in San Jose in 1975. The OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers (acting as Organ of Consultation) was also able to frustrate the US in its oversight of the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979. The OAS called for the immediate resignation of Somoza and rejected any external intervention, thus preventing the US from sending in a peacekeeping force to control the new government (and perhaps installing a “baby Somoza”). The strength and interest level of the hegemon in these events does not adequately explain the OAS reactions to them. Another approach is needed to explain these occurrences of more autonomous organizational behavior. Rather than attempting to explain IO behavior based on IR theories of state power, this study shifts the focus to the internal dynamics of organization itself.
Selection of Cases
In order to focus on the organization specifically, one must first pick a particular aspect to examine. Although the OAS is active at many levels, including cultural exchanges and technical councils, its primary function since it was first formed in 1948 has been the maintenance of regional security. This study thus focuses directly on conflict resolution efforts made by the OAS. The two principle mechanisms for peaceful settlement of conflicts, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the OAS Charter, have been invoked over 30 times in the past 50 years to resolve regional disputes. As is the case in most disputes, the interests of member states in each of these instances have been diverse, leading to tensions and debates within the organization. This diversity of interests, particularly concerning the preferences of the United States, allows for a comparison between members’ preferred outcomes and the actual settlement of the dispute. The following analysis will examine three of the cases in which the Rio Treaty or OAS Charter was invoked in order to achieve peaceful settlement of a dispute. The examination of the internal dynamics of the organization in these three cases will provide information from which preliminary conclusions can be drawn concerning what conditions must prevail for the organization to take autonomous actions, particularly when it is opposed by the hegemon (i.e., the United States).
In the following sections, four different aspects of the OAS will be examined: organizational structure, procedures, membership dynamics and principles. First, each aspect will be defined and example will be given in the context of pacific settlement. Second, the theoretical potential of each aspect to affect organizational autonomy and hegemonic influence will be examined. Structure and procedures are both fixed elements in the organization that have changed little over the years, particularly in the area of pacific settlement. Thus whatever impact they have on the organization and the hegemon remains relatively constant. The membership dynamics and principles of the OAS, on the other hand, are more variable than structure and procedures. The evolutionary changes seen in the OAS’s principles are not changes in actual norms, but shifts in the priorities given to them. For example, non-intervention was once of paramount importance, but now intervention to safeguard human rights is beginning to be justified. Membership dynamics is far more fluid than shifting emphases on principles. This variability of membership dynamics makes it particularly difficult to evaluate in terms of the effects it has on organizational autonomy and hegemonic influence.
Organizational Structure 3
The first aspect of the OAS that potentially influences organizational autonomy is its internal structure. Structure refers to the official bodies within the organization, their hierarchy, and their authority and duties. There are several bodies within the OAS which are responsible for acting when the Charter or Rio Treaty is invoked. The OAS Council is the primary actor, either designating itself as the Provisional Organ of Consultation and/or setting a date and place for a Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to serve as the Organ of Consultation. Under Articles 39 (Charter) and 11 (Rio) the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are designated as the Organ of Consultation to be convened when the Council votes to invoke the peaceful settlement provisions of the Charter or Rio Treaty. Under the Charter and Rio Treaty, the Organ of Consultation (or Provisional Organ) has the authority to impose a variety of sanctions which include: recalling diplomatic missions; breaking diplomatic relations; interrupting economic relations; and using armed force.
Another actor in the pursuit of peaceful settlement in the region is the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) which frequently is sent to investigate the incident under discussion within the Organ of Consultation. The IAPC has no authority to negotiate agreements. Its purpose is to investigate and to recommend steps conducive for dispute settlement. 4
Investigating committees are also involved in the process of conflict resolution. They are established by the Organ of Consultation for the express purpose of investigating the incident under review and reporting back to the Organ. Such committees usually have five members who are appointed by the Organ of Consultation.
A final set of actors within the structure of the OAS is the bureaucracy. The General Secretariat serves as the administrative body of the OAS, preparing agendas for conferences, keeping official records of meetings and resolutions, and reporting on organizational functions and actions. The Secretary General, while not endowed with the same powers as the UN Secretary General, has occasionally played a role in conflict situations. In the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Foreign Ministers gave the Secretary General temporary authority to help settle the conflict. Although the Secretariat has considerable power when arranging the details of Inter-American Conferences and Councils, it actually has little impact on issues of conflict resolution. This lack of influence is due to a distrust among many members of giving the Secretariat or the Secretary General any “political” (i.e., non-administrative) decision making powers. Since the authority given to the bureaucracy can change at any time if members choose to empower it, this structural element has the potential to be more significant in the future.
The structure of the OAS establishes a hierarchy of governing bodies within which member states conduct organizational business. It is important to have a clear outline of this structure within the OAS in order to understand its impact on decision making within the organization. One of the most significant structural consequences of OAS as it pertains to pacific settlement is that US power and dominance are undiminished by the hierarchal framework. Decisionmaking power remains with the representatives of member states in the Council (and the Meeting of Foreign Ministers). Decisionmaking is not delegated to the Secretary General or the Secretariat. Some organizations take on a ‘life of their own’ through the actions of an empowered bureaucracy. The OAS, however, does not gain autonomy in this way, particularly on issues of such significance as conflict resolution. Since no members cede their decisionmaking authority to the bureaucracy, all states remained empowered, and the US, as the most powerful member of the organization, maintains its dominance.
The US can use its power in only a limited way, however, working within the established structural framework. The authority of each of the bodies discussed above is relatively unambiguous, thus there are only limited opportunities for the hegemon to exert its influence through manipulation of the duties of these bodies. In other words, the US cannot unilaterally make decisions on whether to convoke Rio or the Charter articles on pacific settlement; nor can it authorize investigations, etc. without agreement from a majority of the Council. There are, however, two additional ways the US (or any other member with the necessary resources) can influence the organization’s actions.
IAPC and investigating committees have considerable power to influence decisions of the Council/Foreign Ministers through their reports. The reality of these committees is that although membership is generally based on a rotation among member states, not all Latin Americans have the personnel resources to serve when the opportunity is provided. Thus, the US is overrepresented on these committees, giving it the chance to influence committee reports to the benefit of US interests.
A second way a member state is potentially able to influence the organization is by offering or withholding resources for the organization’s use. Contributions of both personnel and finances are particularly important for non-budget items such as intervention efforts. The OAS is vulnerable in terms of resources. The availability of resources directly affects the organization’s ability to act and fulfill its goals. If inadequate resources are available, the organization’s response options are curtailed.
In sum, the structure of the organization provides several opportunities to those states that are able to take advantage of them (i.e. the hegemon and other members with personnel and other resources) to shape organizational responses in terms of their own state preferences. The structure of the organization, although not restraining US power significantly, does allow all other member states to retain their own political authority within the organization. This provides the potential for US influence to be diminished if other members choose to act in cooperation with each other to counter US dominance. Structure does not impede US exercise of its power, nor the cooperation among other members to counter US interests, thus structure alone does not explain autonomous actions or hegemonic dominance since either outcome could obtain.
Organizational Procedure
The second set of variables that may influence OAS autonomy are its procedural regulations. Procedures are closely linked to organizational structure. They define the channels through which member states can pursue their interests within the structural framework of the organization and the rules they must observe in doing so. As can be seen in Diagram 1, when a dispute (Event) occurs among members, four general procedural options are available: The Charter may be invoked, the Rio Treaty may be invoked, the IAPC may be asked to investigate, or no request may be made of the OAS. Once the Charter or Rio is invoked, the Council meets to determine whether the request is justified and votes to convene the Organ of Consultation. The Council has two choices if it decides to convoke the Organ of Consultation: 1) It can choose to establish itself as the provisional Organ while calling for a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs without setting a date; or 2) The Council can call for an immediate Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to serve as the Organ of Consultation.
Once the Organ is formed, the most common action taken is to form an investigating committee in order to establish the facts of the dispute. This committee travels to the countries involved and then reports back to the Organ. After hearing the committee’s report, the Organ considers resolutions proposed by various members and then votes on them. At this point the Organ may decide to take no further action, assuming that their resolutions adequately addressed the problem at hand. If the dispute is unlikely to be resolved by issuing resolutions alone, the Organ may choose to send an observation committee to the scene to report on further incidents and on compliance with the Organ’s resolutions. Additional resolutions may be declared based on further developments of the situation. At any point in this process, the conflict may be resolved and/or the organization may choose not to take any further action.
One way that procedures affect institutional autonomy is by allowing for a wide range of actions to be taken by the organization. Decisions must be made concerning the level and type of response as well as the timing of the organization’s action. Since there is no pre-determined set of responses to handle conflict resolution, all issues are open for discussion and debate. Each action taken by the organization will be crafted by members attempting to uphold their states’ particular interests on the issue. Not all members will be pleased with all decisions, but the large number of responses which the Organ crafts allow for some satisfaction of many members. Whereas one member may be pleased by the Organ’s decision to send an investigating committee to the scene, another member may not prefer an investigation, but will be satisfied by the particular wording of a resolution dealing with the situation. The options open to the Organ range from simply issuing a series of resolutions calling for peaceful settlement to sending in an extensive array of OAS personnel to observe and facilitate a settlement, or choosing an option somewhere in between. Resolutions can be expanded if necessary, or revised based on updated reports coming from investigating committees.
The impact of timing is also significant. If the Council delays a meeting, or does not call the Meeting of Foreign Ministers into session, critical negotiating time can be lost in a conflict. In the case of Guatemala (1954), the President lost his office in the short time it took for OAS bodies to swing into action. At each point in this extensive process, member states have the opportunity to pursue their own interests through the organization by attempting to influence the wording of resolutions and mission mandates, the sending of observer missions, etc.
A second way that procedures affect organizational autonomy is by providing numerous opportunities throughout the decisionmaking process for members to introduce information in support of state preferences. As each of the decisions noted above are being made, information from investigating committees is crucial to those shaping the OAS response. For example, if a committee names one of the two disputants as an aggressor, then certain sanctioning options are available to the Organ to force the aggressor into compliance with regional norms. If neither state is determined to be the aggressor, other means must be used to resolve the dispute. In many cases, it is not clear which state is the aggressor, allowing room for interpretation by the committee. Thus committee membership is a procedural factor with potential for hegemonic influence.
In sum, procedures allow for considerable input and debate within the organization in shaping its responses to regional conflict. It may even be possible for two members to claim a procedural “victory” in a given case even when they have opposing interests because of the variety of decisions being made, ranging from resolutions to sanctions. This allows Latin americans some small and potentially large victories over the US. All members are able to use these procedures to pursue their own state interests. The US, however, has an advantage within the committee structure because of its numerous trained diplomats. This is particularly useful when it seeks to influence the organization through committee reports and other procedural opportunities.
Membership Dynamics
Although this study attempts to go beyond realist and neoliberal theories concerning the behavior of international organizations, the third aspect of the OAS is closely linked to these theories. Membership dynamics (i.e., inter-state relations) are central to realism as well as this study. Realism, however, does not look at inter-state relations within the international institutional framework (as it is affected by structure, procedures, etc.). The term ‘membership dynamics’ is used to encompass the bargaining process between members as it is played out within the OAS. Some of the significant aspects of relations between members within the OAS include: a preference by a state to act unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally when pursuing its interests; states’ definition of security and other regional priorities (i.e. Latin Americans have traditionally viewed economic development as a key to security whereas the US has been most concerned with communist subversion); a preference for diplomatic or military action when attempting conflict resolution. Differences in these priorities clearly manifest themselves within the OAS. Each of these preferences and priorities of member states directly affects the agenda, actions and achievements of the organization.
The fact that there is a dynamic process between members in the OAS in decisionmaking does not, in itself, facilitate or mitigate the ability of the US to influence the organization. There is one outcome of this process, however, that indicates that membership interactions may put the US at a disadvantage in certain circumstances. The key is unity among Latin American members. Consensus strengthens the organization, particularly when the US opposes the preference of most other members. Unity allows Latin Americans to over rule US preferences through a majority vote. Both procedural maneuvers and membership dynamics affect voting which is the final determinant of organizational actions. There are several factors which may facilitate Latin Americans unity within the organization. First, Latin Americans are more dependent on taking multilateral actions in order to be effective in the region. Thus, they may be more committed to the group dynamic of the OAS and strive toward compromise to achieve their goals. Second, as noted above, Latin Americans have some common priorities that are not shared by the US (such as economic development). These can bring Latin American members together even when the US is opposed to a proposed OAS action.
If the US chooses to act unilaterally and is in disagreement with the OAS, its actions can still undermine those of the organization. By openly challenging the majority of the organization, however, the US exposes itself internationally. As the US becomes more concerned with its international image, it may be less willing to risk such exposure in the future. This concern with international image is linked to organizational principles and the constraints they also put on the US.
Organizational Principles
The final aspect to be considered is the organization’s principles. There are a number of important principles underlying the Inter-American System and the OAS. These include: the equality of states, rule of law, self-determination, promotion of representative democracy, promotion of living standards and human rights, and most importantly, non-intervention and pacific settlement of disputes. Much of the international relations literature on hegemonic stability suggests that a hegemon is responsible for establishing the norms and values within an international organization that it creates or in which it has membership. Thus, the regional values or principles are a direct reflection of hegemonic interests. 5
In the case of the OAS, however, the principles of the organization were a part of the Inter-American System long before the OAS was founded. Furthermore, at least one of these long standing principles, non-intervention, has run directly counter to much of US foreign policy toward Latin America. The principles of the OAS are not simply a reflection of US interests. OAS principles are truly long standing, regional values that many Latin American leaders strive to uphold. 6
The existence of these regional principles has an important effect of mitigating the amount of influence the hegemon can wield within the OAS. When the US and other members choose to participate in the OAS, they must frame their interests in accordance with the principles of the organization (or else act outside of the organization). Actions cannot be taken that are contrary to the organization’s principles no matter how they might be justified. 7
Furthermore, the existence of additional principles beyond pacific settlement suggests that if the organization’s priorities can be shifted away from security concerns, then Latin American members may have even more influence in shaping organizational policies on such issues as development and human rights.
Two principles give additional strength to the Latin American members of the OAS when they attempt to resist hegemonic influence: non-intervention and equality of all member states. Although these have a minimal impact, they have an impact nonetheless. The US regularly confronts the issue of non-intervention in the region. It has been condemned numerous times by the organization for its interference in the internal affairs of member states (as have many other members as well). Although such condemnation comes after the fact and may not truly harm the US in any significant way, it does provide an outlet for Latin Americans to document US violations and make formal complaints. It also affects the US’s international image. Equality among states gives every member an equal vote. Strength is, again, most evident in Latin American unity and consensus when the US is out voted in the governing bodies.
Case Examples
In the final section of the paper, an analysis of three different cases will be presented to determine if structure, procedures, membership dynamics and principles affect organizational autonomy as predicted.
Guatemala 1954
The first case to be examined is the case of the Guatemalan coup in June 1954. This was a case when the OAS failed to act despite regional upheaval and requests for OAS action. Several conditions resulted in the organization’s failure to take action to investigate Guatemalan charges, to defend President Arbenz, or to attempt to restore him to power after the coup. The OAS was faced with a limited structural authority, a preemptive procedural move by the US, a divided Latin American membership, and the sacrifice of the principles of democracy and non-intervention for anti-communism.
Structurally, the US did not need to exercise its influence in an investigating committee, nor to threaten to withhold mission resources from the OAS in order to achieve its desired outcome in the case of Guatemala. The one structural aspect that affected the organization’s autonomy was that the authority of IAPC and Council did not extend to the point of allowing action when faced with Guatemalan resistance. The organization could not act without the invitation of the member state in which there was conflict. Even though sovereignty was upheld by the organization, it was not respected by those members, including the US, who were acting in support of Col. Armas when he overthrew President Arbenz. This restraint of the organization weakened it’s ability to act in the Guatemalan case. Even if the IAPC had investigated earlier, before Guatemala chose to go to the UN, it is questionable as to whether Guatemala would have received a fair report from the Committee supporting its charge of foreign intervention. One scholar reports that the US preferred that the IAPC investigate because the IAPC members “generally share[d] US views” and that is where the US had “a greater degree of control” (Immerman, 1982: 169).
In terms of procedures, the US limited the range of options available to the organization by pushing the passage of the Declaration of Caracas at the OAS 10th Inter-American Conference in Venezuela in March 1954. This Declaration laid the foundation for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers and intervention in the region if the international communist movement extended its control to the western hemisphere and endangered the peace of America. When the military incursions in Guatemala began in June 1954, the US eventually used the Declaration to convoke the Council under the Rio Treaty. Since the Council was convoked to consider the security threat posed by international communism in Guatemala, once the coup occurred the Council was no longer obligated to pursue the matter further. The US focused the attention of organization on anti-communism rather than political instability or territorial violations which might have led to further actions by the organization.
Timing was also an issue in terms of organizational response to the Guatemalan situation. There were only 3 days between the time Arbenz agreed to cooperate with the IAPC and the day he resigned. The Council further delayed the opportunity to act by not constituting itself as the provisional organ at the meeting in which it called for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The delayed response of the organization resulted in there no longer being an issue to address and the cancellation of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
Membership dynamics ultimately weakened the organization rather than allowing it to oppose US hegemonic influence. Tensions among members on the issue of international communism were evident at the Caracas Conference when Argentina and Mexico sided with Guatemala in defense of the principle of non-intervention, while Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela all supported the US position. The passage of the Declaration of Caracas despite abstentions from Argentina and Mexico convinced Guatemala that the US had leverage over the OAS and Guatemala would not receive an impartial hearing in the OAS (Immerman, 1982: 169). This mistrust resulted in Guatemala turning to the UN Security Council for investigation of the invasions from Honduras and Nicaragua. By the time that the Security Council turned the matter over to the OAS (after much US pressure on Britain and France to do so), there was little time left for any substantive action to be taken. The lack of unity within the organization prevented it from taking any actions beyond those proposed by the US representative.
During this early era in the OAS, the US used its influence to shape the guiding declarations of the organization. By establishing the Declaration of Caracas which addressed the issue of international communism, the US provided itself with a justification for the actions that were taken (or not taken) by the organization concerning Guatemala. Since the US acted covertly, however, and never openly acknowledged its role in the coup, it never had to fall back on the Declaration to justify its own involvement in the case. By establishing international communism as the highest security concern of the organization, the US prevented any further action from taking place in Guatemala.
This is a case where the concern with communism outweighed the principle of democracy. This is not particularly surprising since many of the Latin American governments at the time were not democracies, but it represents a departure from the founding principles of the organization. Similarly, the fact that intervention in Guatemala by other members was overlooked also indicates a weakness in upholding the principles of non-intervention. The organization chose to accept the US argument that it was an internal matter and not to protest the roles played by Nicaragua and Honduras.
Dominican Republic 1965
The second case to be examined is the crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965 which resulted in US military intervention. Although there had been signs of political instability in the Dominican Republic for several years, and a military coup had occurred on 24 April 1965, the OAS did not decide to take action on the situation until after the US military entered the country on 28 April. This left the organization in the difficult position of either accepting and legitimating US actions, or condemning them and attempting an alternate solution to reestablishing peace in the Dominican Republic. In this case the OAS chose to back the US’s unilateral actions despite some misgivings by some members. The conditions that resulted in the organization’s decision to legitimize US actions and to continue to support US preferences included: a strong US presence on the Ad Hoc Committee, the careful crafting and management of the Inter-American Peace Force, a lack of Latin American consensus on alternative responses, and the invocation of anti-communist rhetoric.
The US was able to take advantage of the structure of the OAS in order to promote its preferred outcome to this conflict through the two investigative committees sent to the Dominican Republic. The Special Committee composed of representatives from Argentina, Panama, Colombia, Guatemala, and Brazil, played an important, but short term role in the crisis. The Committee for the Dominican Republic on 1 May and asked to be terminated on 14 May due to the completion of its assigned tasks (offer good offices, obtain a cease fire, evacuate nationals and investigate all aspects of the crisis). In its concluding report, the Special Committee recommended the establishment of an Inter-American Peace Force for which the US had been pressing.
The Ad Hoc Committee was established and sent with the Secretary General to the Dominican Republic on 3 June 1965 and remained active until elections were held in June 1966. Although US General Palmer writes that the committee was balanced between a conservative from Brazil, a liberal from El Salvador, and the US which he considered a neutral third party (1989: chapter 4), the close cooperation between the three representatives resulted in a committee dedicated to serving US interests. The committee pressured the Loyalists under General Imbert to sign the Institutional Act regulating the provisional government. It also prepared for elections, helping set the conditions for Juan Bosch to lose. Although the US claimed it had OAS support for the distribution of USIA political posters in favor of Joaquin Balaguer, the OAS denied this. The the Ad Hoc Committee, however, failed to put a stop to their distribution.
The US was not only able to shape the organization’s diplomatic actions through the committee structure, it was also able to shape the organization’s military response to the crisis by its considerable contribution of resources. The OAS decided to form the Inter-American Peace Force on 6 May 1965. Since there were already considerable US forces on the ground (22,500 in mid May), these became the main body of the OAS force. 8
US General Palmer became the second in command to Brazilian General Alvim. Gen. Palmer noted, however, that this was not a problem because “as the international deputy and US commander, [he] had sufficient leverage to get IAPF decisions that were compatible with US desires” (Palmer, 1989: 73).
Procedurally, from the convocation of the 10th Meeting of Foreign ministers under articles 39 and 40 of the OAS Charter to the supervised elections of June 1966, there were numerous decisions for the Organ of Consultation to make. The US continually pressed for resolutions which would legitimize its unilateral actions in the Dominican Republic. The creation of the IAPF and the extensive powers given to the Ad Hoc committee largely served this purpose.
In terms of membership dynamics, the Latin American members of the OAS were unable to use their greater numbers to their advantage against the strength of the US. Although there was general consensus that there should be OAS intervention, there was disagreement as to what form it should take. Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay endorsed US action and wanted the OAS to denounce the communist threat in the Dominican Republic and support the US. Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay and Mexico denounced US actions and lodged protests in the UN and OAS. Other OAS members including Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama simply wanted to find a resolution to the crisis and did not frame their proposals in pro- or anti-American terms (Kumar, 1987: chapter 4). There were continued debates about the maintenance of the cease fire, establishment of the provisional government, and the handling of election preparations. The divisions among Latin American members, however, prevented the organization from uniting against the US pressure shaping the organization’s responses.
Although the intervention force clearly violated the principle of non-intervention, the US justified its actions in terms of a defense against the threat of international communism, which, in retrospect, was considerably exaggerated. Considering past experiences, including the recent events in Cuba, this threat to regional security was given priority despite other organizational principles such as non-intervention. Not only did the issue of communism result in the US bringing all its forces to bear on the issue, it also divided and weakened the organization. The Special Committee reported on the suspected presence of communists among the Constitutionalist forces, but the committee opinion was divided in its evaluation of the degree of communist penetration within the Constitutionalists. Reporting on this issue to the Council actually hurt the Special Committee in terms of the cooperation it received from the Constitutionalists when it returned to the Dominican Republic.
Nicaraguan Revolution 1978-79
The case of the Nicaraguan Revolution is an instance when the OAS refused to adopt measures advocated by the United States. Several internal aspects of the organization allowed it to resist US pressures for OAS intervention in the form of a peacekeeping force. The factor that most affected the organization structurally and procedurally was that the Latin American members were resisting US influence to initiate an action rather than trying to adopt their own response in opposition to US preferences. The organization, however, was bold enough to go beyond simply refusing to take action, it also issued an unprecedented resolution calling for the replacement of Somoza and leaving the solution to the conflict ‘in the hands of the Nicaraguan people’.
The US was unable to use its advantages in committee membership or resource contributions to affect the decisions of the OAS in the case of Nicaragua. The only committee that investigated was the Ad Hoc Committee (membership unknown) whose report resulted in censure of Nicaragua for pursuing Sandinistas across the Costa Rican border. Since the Foreign Ministers were refusing to take action, there was no need for resources to carry out a mission. These two factors allowed the other members to have more equal influence on the decisions made by the Council and Foreign Ministers.
The fact that the organization was resisting any action meant that the US had fewer procedural options available to it to pursue its interests. The organization appeared reluctant to even act on the matter when the conflict was raised in the Council. The Council met four times before it decided to convoke the Meeting of Foreign Ministers as the Organ of Consultation. The Foreign Ministers sent only one committee to investigate and this was during the early stages of the crisis. After the initial Meeting of Foreign Ministers in October, the US had to request that the Meeting be reconvened in June 1979 to consider the continuing “critical situation” in Nicaragua. It was at this second Meeting that members voted down the US proposal to establish a peacekeeping force in Nicaragua, and recommended that Somoza be replaced (17-2-5 abstentions). Thomas Walker (1982) notes that “the reaction to [US representative Cyrus]Vance’s proposals may well have marked the nadir of US influence in the OAS”. The US representative was not even able to prevent the FSLN representative from addressing the Foreign Ministers meeting. The final US plan for a peaceful transition was abandoned by the US representative from lack of support.
Latin Americans were strengthened within the organization through their united opposition to Somoza. This opposition was evident in many ways: The Council refused Nicaragua’s request for an observation committee to monitor border incursions from Costa Rica. Cuba trained many of the guerrillas and Costa Rica provided them with bases. Panama allowed supplies to pass through its territory. Mexico, Panama, Ecuador and Costa Rica broke diplomatic ties with Nicaragua. The Andean Pact members condemned the Somoza government and recognized the Sandinistas as “belligerents” giving them official international status in the conflict. 9
Not only did the US have to contend with a united Latin America, it was also clearly concerned about its international image which limited its options in the case of Nicaragua even further. In February 1979, the US suspended economic and military aid to Somoza, but managed to use the IMF to provide him with more funds in May 1979. The US was eager to intervene in the country, but was unwilling in this instance to act unilaterally.
The US was unable to rally the OAS around the principle of anti-communism in this case. The US warning of infiltration by Cuban communists was unconvincing to Latin Americans. With so many Central American states helping the Sandinistas, it was clear that Cuba was not the sole perpetrator of the Revolution. It was apparent that the US proposal of intervention was merely an effort to justify US action against the Sandinistas, not to restore peace in Nicaragua.
There is evidence in this case not only that the organization was no longer being driven by anti-communist concerns (stemming from US security interests), but that it was also shifting its priorities to uphold the principle of human rights. Nicaragua was censured for territorial violations, but was also censured for its air attacks that were directed against Costa Rican civilians.
Conclusion
The ability of the OAS to act contrary to the preferences of its most powerful member is not easily explained. In some instances members are able to simply exercise their majority number of votes to thwart the US. This has not always been easy when diplomatic and coercive pressure are brought to bear (as one would expect from the hegemon). Frequently, however, the situation is more complex than coercion and voting. The Council vote is merely the concluding act of a long series of steps taken by the organization when handling conflict in the region. The four aspects of the OAS outlined above provide a framework from which to analyze the options available to the OAS when attempting pacific settlement in the region. In contrast to previous studies of IOs which focus on the organization as a single actor in the international system, this framework allows a look inside the organization to determine how internal dynamics affect organizational actions.
Although this is a preliminary study designed to test the four internal aspects of the organization that have been advanced, several trends can be observed in these three cases. Structural and procedural elements provide opportunities for all members to influence the organization, but due to its extensive resources, tend to advantage the US. Only by refusing to take any actions can the organization resist US pressures through these aspects. Membership dynamics, particularly Latin American unity, give members more strength to resist US pressures within the organization. As the international system moves beyond the Cold War era, it appears that principles will continue to place limits on US dominance and will strengthen Latin Americans in their efforts to shape the actions of the organization. More conclusive results are anticipated as further work is done on additional cases of conflict resolution handled by the OAS in the past 50 years.
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Endnotes
*: Paper presented at the International Studies Association National Conference in Washington, D.C. in February 1999. Back.
Note 1: The definition of autonomy is uncomplicated in this study. An “autonomous” action by the OAS is one that does not correspond with the action preferred by the United States (the dominant regional power within the organization). Autonomy might also be evident in organizational ‘non-action’ when the US would prefer the OAS to act. Given the inequality of power between the US and Latin American members, autonomous actions are frequently subtle or rhetorical. Even these actions, however, require concerted effort on the part of Latin American members. Back.
Note 2: The author recognizes that there is an increasing body of “cognitive” literature on IOs that does not fit this general categorization. The focus of this literature, however, it directed more toward organizational norms rather than organizational autonomy in conflict resolution cases. Back.
Note 3: Since the majority of cases involving the Rio Treaty and Charter occur before the Charter’s first revisions in 1967, this paper refers simply to the OAS “Council” rather than making distinctions between the “Council” pre-1967, and the “Permanent Council” post-1967. Despite other significant changes to the OAS stemming from the 1967 charter revisions, the structural hierarchy between the Council and the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the issue of peaceful settlement has remained relatively unchanged. Back.
Note 4: In 1967 the IAPC became the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement (IACPS). In 1985, amendments to the Charter eliminated the IACPS. Back.
Note 5: The author finds the arguments in normative and cognitive studies concerning norms quite plausible. These approaches argue that norms frequently take on a life of their own once they are created and are thus no longer under the control of the hegemon. Back.
Note 6: Margaret Ball (1969: 44) has argued that Latin American leaders adhere to region principles because of their philosophies, not just out of pragmatism. Whatever the case, there is strong consensus within the hemisphere about what these principles are and efforts are made to adhere to them. Back.
Note 7: The author recognizes that some of these principles are in themselves contradictory, but in general, members choose to observe all of the principles as closely as possible when determining OAS actions. This is not to say that members do not make a variety of tenuous arguments justifying apparent unilateral violations in terms of the principles, but these are generally recognized for what they are. Back.
Note 8: The US reduced its forces by July to 10,900 men with additional troops from Brazil (1,000), Costa Rica (20), El Salvador (3), Honduras (250), Nicaragua (160) and Paraguay (180). Back.
Note 9: Only Argentina aided Somoza by supplying him with arms. Back.
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