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CIAO DATE: 3/99

NATO Enlargement: International Relations or Civil-Military Relations? *

Glen Segell

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

(C) Copyright Glen Segell 1999. All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. The Author, Glen Segell, has asserted his moral and ethic rights.

 

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is question wether the latest NATO enlargement into East Europe is an issue of civil-military relations or of foreign policy decision making. Inherent to this is the question of the sources of foreign policy decision making. Is NATO enlargement as a foreign policy a response to any external threat driven as crises decision making? Is it an initiative to form a renaissance military alliance for an offensive as a foreign policy goal? Is it an issue of domestic politics such as civil-military relations and if so is it driven by organisational, bureaucratic or elitist considerations? This paper therefore looks at a segment of a long term pattern of routine foreign policymaking other than crises decision making with a case study of NATO enlargement.

 

Introduction

The theme of this Annual Meeting is “International Relations: One discipline many fields”. I believe that it is therefore appropriate to consider NATO Enlargement as a question of the sources of foreign policy decision making as being a question of:

  1. domestic or trans-national civil-military relations (CMR) and/or
  2. a process of foreign policy or international relations (IR) ie crises event driven organisational/bureaucratic management.

Inherent to this is the question of the sources of foreign policy decision making. Is NATO enlargement as a foreign policy a response to any external threat? Is it an initiative to form a renaissance military alliance for an offensive? Is it an issue of domestic politics and if so is it driven by organisational, bureaucratic or elitist considerations? This paper therefore looks at a segment of a long term pattern of routine policymaking other than crises decision making.

The title of my paper poses this as a question rather than a statement or answer. I believe that this is of significance as a relationship between two fields of study within one discipline: that of foreign policy decision making and that of civil-military relations. Writings from neither field mention each other directly even though there is an implicit overlap in case studies such as NATO enlargement. These case studies are a reflection of reality in many ways unseen in other fields. The commonality is the use of military force or the preparation for the use of military force.

Despite this I contest that foreign policy is a not a pre-requisite for civil-military relations in the legitimate use of military force and vice-versa. This is seen in NATO enlargement which can be used as a case study for both foreign policy decision making and civil-military relations. In the case study of NATO enlargement, civil-military relations can exist as if representing the domestification of foreign policy decision making and as the internationalisation of domestic civil-military relations into a trans-national organisational structure and bureacracy.

This is because NATO has its own well developed organisation functioning now for almost fifty years which is transnational albeit consensual permitting the military of member countries to influence the domestic policy (civil) formation of other member countries. (eg defence budget allocation and military structures). Each national military is also acting through the same NATO structure on the international (system) level. In the case of NATO enlargement this is because:

  1. it is the main long term foreign policy goal of member states elites without the immediate need for the use of military force with no apparent immediate opposition from any other state in the international arena
  2. the process of legislative ratification and funding arrangements to approve the enlargement must occur in each member and application state through a domestic political process

 

Wither Foreign Policy?

The starting point is to question wether we are actually in a condition of Cold Diplomacy with Russia. If this is the case then NATO enlargement has significance for IR as much as it does for CMR. 1 This is a paramount consideration for if we are not in a state of Cold War then we must turn elsewhere to find the relevance of NATO enlargement for IR, maybe the Balkans. If the Balkans is the true IR rationale for NATO enlargement then we must consider the CMR of the relationship between NATO and the EU or the relationship between the foreign policy of the USA in Europe and the formation of a EU common foreign and defence policy!

For a start Russia is a European Power which has contracted in size from that of the USSR but still retains a major nuclear arsenal. It is isolated so far as international security alliances pertains. It also is tottering on the bring of financial and social disasters at every moment. It cannot however be considered a major military or political threat to anyone, other than by accident! In understanding this we can then turn to NATO enlargement and ask “Who is NATO enlarging against?” — is it a symbolic victory against that of the former USSR to encompass its vassal Warsaw Pact nations? if so then the answer leaves us with the answer that Yes, we are in a state of cold diplomacy with Russia. Such a condition is strengthened by the fact that the Russian Duma is holding NATO to ransom over the process of enlargement by refusing to ratify the START II/III Agreements.

This leaves us with a nice IR Theory feeling of bi-polarity but an imbalance of military and political power when considering NATO enlargement as an issue of IR. We are still playing the Cold War games but now as Cold Diplomacy because one side no longer has military and political intent, even though it retains the nuclear capability to do so if it wishes.

The main focus of NATO enlargement is therefore to look at European Security issues where if Russia has moved to democracy then it would be suited for EU membership. This would be the ultimate satisfaction of European security needs but is a long way away for I believe that present condition of Cold Diplomacy with Russia could at any stage revert back to a state of Cold War. Russia could have played its card of shrinking in size and capability to regroup its resources. Such a perception results from the lake of any substantial noticeable moves to alleviate the capabilities of the Cold War while the West in the form of NATO has not taken any substantial steps to include Russia actively in any European Security arrangements. Cold Diplomacy after A Cold War but maybe before The Next Cold War!

This is an alarming prospect for Russia is still a major nuclear power. Traditional Soviet control of those nuclear weapons was political. This may seem rhetoric at filling the space of a conference paper or it may even seem to be scare-mongering. For everyone in Europe, however the quest for European Security is an endless and extremely important one. NATO enlargement and START II/III are relics of the bi-polar Cold War between the USA and USSR but dominate efforts for European to attain its stability.

Fragmentation and integration in Europe are iterative processes. When it seems that one part of Europe has just attained a lasting peace such as provided by the European Union then another part such as the Balkans reerupts into violence. This is no surprise to students of history, security studies and foreign policy analysis. Europe comprises of highly intelligent but claustrophobic tribes — each with its own identity, culture, language, religion and needs. War like diplomacy and trade is an option of foreign policy that has seen success in the past and will continue to be perceived as a means of attaining objectives in the future. The Russian Duma like the Russia people are Europeans who have played the game of war and diplomacy for centuries. Russia like other European countries have expanded and contracted and then expanded again as and when desired with great political and economic acumen.

In 1998, Europeans including Russia seeking stability even for a short while from war have two options, each of which has already been pursued in the past: a strong collective security organisation or disarmament. Historically both have proven to work and to fail as foreign policy objectives. In 1999 the immediate options appear to be NATO enlargement and the various START agreements and related arms control treaties. The other option over the horizon but not yet practical due to residual nationalistic tendencies is a common defence, security and foreign policy arrangement for the European Union which would encompass all European states including Russia. This however might exclude non-European countries such as the USA.

 

Wither Civil-Military Relations?

The above is just one perspective. Another is civil-military relations which is a long established discipline within the Social Sciences and within the Armed Forces. It inter alia considers the relationship between society at large and the military establishment within a nation-state. 2 In this paper consideration of such a relationship of civil-military relations is considered in the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which is intended to initially comprise of Poland, Hungary and the Czech State. 3 The value of undertaking such a consideration is to consider the role of civil-military relations in different cultures where there is a political goal to establish a joint military alliance as a relationship of domestic to foreign policy. In other words is civil-military relations a source of foreign policy when considering NATO enlargement in 1999.

For an alliance such as NATO to be successful there has to be a coalescence of values and politico-military goals. First and foremost it must be understood that NATO membership currently comprises of democratic countries where the study of civil-military relations is more complex than in dictatorial, warlord, or tribal states. This is because all soldiers are also citizens though not all citizens are soldiers. A soldiers professionalism is sometimes compromised by his civil rights and vice-versa. 4

Freedom of speech and an elected government mean that the Prime Minister or President is not able to conduct unrestricted war, declare war at a whim or enlarge a military alliance without legislative approval. Further there are there are many competing interests for allocations of national resources. For NATO enlargement to take place, a legislative process has to succeed in all existing and prospective member countries. Democratic countries also have complex organisational relationships between civil and military services. A military alliance between democratic countries such as exists within and between NATO members is therefore an extremely complex arrangement of civil-military relations comprising a myriad of committees to determine economic, military and political consensus. It is even more complex when such a military alliance embraces new members who have just proclaimed democratic intentions. This paper will therefore look at these two aspects of civil-military relations in NATO enlargement: the organisational complexity and the legislative process when considering the foreign policy decision making analysis of NATO enlargement.

The starting point to understand these issues of civil-military relations in NATO enlargement in 1999 is to understand that NATO enlargement is not a new or unique phenomena for NATO has included in its founding Treaties the possibility for additional countries to join NATO by acceding to its Treaties. This has happened on four previous occasions. The most important was when West Germany and Italy joined in 1955 after the abortive European Defence Community. 5 The purpose then was to keep Russia out, Germany down and America in. The next most important was when Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 (agreed upon in 1981). This was a package deal to their joining the EEC as a bid to stabilise the Western Mediterranean region both economically and politically. The large Portuguese Navy was also viewed as a desirable addition. The 1998 proposal for a further expansion of NATO to initially include Poland, Hungary and the Czech State with possibilities of other former Warsaw Pact countries at a later date is clearly not based on the necessity for the need of their military contribution against a clearly defined enemy. 6 So why was it proposed?

It is only when considering civil-military relations that the reasons for this latest enlargement of NATO are those than can be found. These are the economic and political considerations both in existing and prospective member states for a military alliance to further a commonality of economic and political goals. The military alliance provides the regional stability with a superpower umbrella in order to foster democratic practises and free trade. This can be equated to the origins of NATO and Marshall Aid for Western Europe, after World War II. It could be said that entry into the European Union would be more appropriate for these Eastern European countries in 1998, but there are strong considerations for keeping the USA involved in European affairs. These strong reasons centre around both the potential revival of the USSR as Russia possesses large nuclear forces and the psychological feelings of security when the worlds only super-power agrees to defend the region. The military alliance enlargement of NATO is therefore a means to achieve an economic and political end both domestically in each country, regionally in the EU and with the trans-national NATO alliance.

Linking NATO enlargement to the enlargement of the EU would accomplish several things: It would underscore the connection between Europe’s security and its economy, and offer certification that entrants to NATO could afford to meet its defense obligations. It would permit the Partnership for Peace to demonstrate that it should be the proper association for countries outside NATO. It would allow the United States and Russia to focus on the gravest security problem still before us, the formidable hangover of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The US Senate would be wise to link NATO and EU expansion. If that link is made, it is essential to stipulate that admission to the European Union is not sufficient qualification for entry into NATO, which should weigh any future applicant against the contributions and burdens its membership would entail. As John Maynard Keynes noted at the time, the central failure of Versailles lay in the fatal miscalculation of how to deal with a demoralized former adversary. 7

This can further be seen from the criteria for new membership who are selected on their adherence to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and treatment of minorities, as well as the existence of a market economy and their ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the aims of political and monetary union. These are all aspects of civil-military relations. To meet these criteria of membership the military in the prospective countries have to be subservient to the civil authority while the legislative in existing members have to approve the applications. The military in both existing and applicant states are thus placed on the back benches and behind the scenes in NATO expansion, albeit with a strong voice. By doing so, two clear problematic issues of civil-military relations in NATO enlargement become apparent. 8

One is posed within and between existing NATO members who pursue a process of decision making between the military, legislature and government executive. This is on wether and how expansion should occur and who will fund it. This is concurrent with a similar process in the prospective members countries. This type of civil-military relations is the more traditional mainstream and formal type of civil-military relations described in current literature. 9 The other type of civil-military relations more akin to studies of western democratic countries 10 will occur once agreement has been reached on how and when NATO will be enlarged and how to fund NATO enlargement. This second issue relates to the organisation of civil-military relations in the new structure of the NATO organisation which must adapt to include new members. NATO defence ministers have already approved a new command structure for NATO, which will reduce the number of headquarters from 65 to 20. 11

One example, is a new joint German-Danish army corps has also been established in Rendsburg, northern Germany, into which Polish units will be incorporated once Poland joins NATO. It will then be based in the Polish city of Szczecin which actually shows that NATO is ‘advancing towards the Russian border with weapons in its hands’. 12 In this second issue also comes the questions of how much can the new members be trusted with secrets and how they can join or contribute to NATO’s goals of rationalisation, standardisation and interopertability in policies and in collaborative weapons procurement projects. 13

These two issues and problems of civil-military relations posed in NATO enlargement are very similar for considering NATO enlargement for NATO is not just a consensus on the use of military force in a specific geographical region. Since its inception NATO has been a bureaucratic organisation comprising tens of committees and sub-organisations. Within these consensus is necessary from all its members from scientific to industrial to political to military matters. NATO has never been a supra-national alliance. In these committees it is often civil-servants from foreign ministries and scientific organisations which make the decisions based upon consensus which the military of each country will eventually have to implement. This is military subservience to the civil which has not been traditional in the prospective new NATO member countries.

In addition to this organisation where consensus must exist for anything to take place, there is also the process of budget allocation which is dependent upon the allocation to defence spending of each members national legislative. In this process there is a domestic decision making process which includes industry, military, government and competing claims on each countries resources. Each country takes these decisions independent of each other. Many proposals have been thwarted by lack of budget approvals. Understanding this side of civil-military relations in national budget votes is crucial for understanding wether or not NATO enlargement will succeed. NATO enlargement will necessitate additional funding both to provide the new member states with the capability to interoperate with existing NATO forces and to extend existing NATO command and control infrastructures eastward. There have ben suggestions that NATO enlargement may eventually result in savings with additional partners for collaborative weapons procurement or additional sales for the larger equipment manufacturers in the USA, for example. There therefore exists potential non-governmental interest groups in each NATO country for promoting NATO enlargement. The role of such interest groups in civil-military relations will become apparent once legislative process commences for the approval of NATO enlargement. It is when considering such issues that it becomes clear that there is an enormous amount of civil interactions and decision making prior to any form of military in the NATO enlargement process.

When considering NATO enlargement in this light it therefore becomes of extreme relevance to consider the enlargement process not as issue of the future role of the military in European affairs but as a means to other political and economic ends. This is even more accentuated when noting that there is no identifiable enemy for NATO’s conventional military forces. This view is supported by historian Walter McDougall of the University of Pennsylvania that “A defensive military alliance in the absence of a commonly perceived enemy would be unique in history. One would expect it to disappear.” It is the US State Department which provides the basis for which this paper contends that NATO enlargement is an issue of civil-military relations by noting that “We don’t need an enemy to have an alliance, in the past, particularly in the 19th century, alliances not only served to wage and deter war. They’ve also been a device for managing constructive, non competitive relations among member states.” 14

 

The contention!

This article therefore contends that NATO expansion is primarily an issue of civil-military relations closely linked to the economic and political conceptualisations of European unity and as foreign policy in the future role of the USA in these affairs. 15 In saying this it is possible to see why NATO expansion is an expansion of civil-military relations into the studies of international studies and diplomacy. This is because diplomacy in the NATO expansion process is neither to prevent a war, nor to prepare for war nor to bring about the cessation of any war. The acts of diplomacy in the alliance expansion take on more political than military solidarity within and amongst member states. This is as a process of the extension of civil-military relations from within to outside the sovereign states. This is why NATO expansion is acceptable to politicians and public opinion more than to military professionalism. The military have difficulty in seeing the utility of NATO expansion from a tactical purpose though understand from a strategic view political and economic solidarity are a deterrent to war. Ideally therefore NATO expansion will depend on a consensus of an agreement on how not to deploy troops, how to abolish conscription and how to reduce defence equipment procurement. This is fully within the scope of military professionalism for small, highly trained units. Such units also suit NATO member countries “out of area considerations” such as global humanitarian or other UN related missions.

If NATO enlargement is comprehended an marketed in such a fashion of civil-military relations then it becomes understandable within the scope of the disarmament process such as START-2. NATO is vital to ensuring arms control and maintaining the kind of industrial base that provides a solid defense. NATO provides the institutional home for coalitions to meet crises beyond Europe.

But a cornerstone is not a sponge. The function of a cornerstone is to protect its own integrity to support a wider security structure, not to dissipate its cohesion by absorbing members and responsibilities beyond prudent limits. A powerful NATO undergirds other institutions, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western European Union. It makes possible the Partnership for Peace to promote cooperation among countries that are not NATO members. NATO enlargement as an issue of civil-military relations also means that Russia will have less objection because it is part and parcel of European political and economic unification and military disarmament. This is despite Russian insistence that US actions in the Persian Gulf could threaten ratification of START-2 by the Russian Duma. 16 It will also be easier to reconcile the differences of opinion between the public, media, military, governmental legislature and executive both within and amongst existing and applicant states over NATO expansion who have voiced doubt on why NATO should even continue to exist. To this end Czech television and the Czech Ministry of Defence have been working together on a new 20-part television series called ‘NATO — What’s it to Us?’. 17

 

The pattern of time

Such a comprehension, marketing and understanding of NATO enlargement as an issue of civil-military relations is important for it takes many years before politicians change their views. 18 It is even more important for NATO enlargement was not a pre-meditated act as an psychological initiative nor as a result of a threat perception as was the case of most international events during the Cold War. It is when looking at the origins of the idea for NATO enlargement that it can be seen that it was an issue of civil-military relations.

The idea of NATO expansion was first successfully planted with President Clinton in April 1993 during a Washington ceremony to open the Holocaust Museum. With time on their hands before the speechmaking, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, the Presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland, cornered Clinton to urge that NATO admit East European countries. It was not surprising that Clinton was so proposed. The US is the most politically, economically and militarily formidable member of the Alliance. In addition Article 10 of the North Atlantic treaty signed in Washington DC, on 4 April 1949 states that any state wishing to join NATO should deposit its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America who would then inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. The first point of call for any enlargement is therefore, by treaty agreement, the civil-military relations of the USA. Havel and Walesa had initially got nowhere with George Bush on the idea, but Clinton, in office only three months, was intrigued. It seemed a foreign policy goal with no perceivable dangers to American lives that would enter him into the annals of history. At that point National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher also favoured expansion. There was therefore a consensus between political elites.

The military of both existing and prospective member countries had not yet ben consulted and there was no clear plan on how to implement the organisational expansion of an Alliance based on consensus of all its members. Not uncommon of the 1990s, the press entered the debate before it had even started. The press noted, that as had been the case in the aftermath of the Second World War, the US could never save Europe from itself. As valuable in the long run as NATO expansion was the refashioning of Europe’s defence umbrella. 19 This introduced similarities between the earlier two NATO enlargements and the proposed future enlargement. 20 In addition to the consensus between Clinton, his chosen and appointed advisers and colleagues and the East European leaders, there arose three disparate groups favouring enlargement. President Clinton will have to rely on these to make a case to Congress to ratify expansion as well as approve the budget for it. The task has actually been made easier with the onset of the current Gulf Crises. On 29 January 1998 President Clinton addressed Congress noting three main focuses of military action as part of foreign policy where Congress stood firmly behind all three. These were the Persian Gulf, US troops in Bosnia and NATO enlargement. ‘Within days,’ the president said, he will ask the Senate to ratify the alliance’s decision to enrol three new members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Mr. Clinton indicated that he expected to take an active part in the congressional debate that could begin in a few weeks. In focusing on major pending US decisions in foreign affairs, Mr. Clinton conjured up prospects of greater presidential teamwork with Congress and by implication underlined his own stature as a president capable of quick results. 21

Of the three disparate groups favouring enlargement, the first group includes a conservative wing led by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former president Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. These see NATO enlargement as a strategy for keeping Russia weak. This group was and still is living in the spectre of the Cold War with comprehending the issue of civil-military relations nor the true nature of the military threat facing Western Society. This group does not comprehend that Polish, Czech and Hungarian troops will not make a significant military contribution to keeping Russia militarily weak nor will extending the NATO frontline across Germany and Poland to the Russian border. Air-power, missiles and nuclear weapons have long made geo-political strategic depth irrelevant to the reality of winning a war or defending a country. This group does not comprehend that economic might is more important than military might and the best way to make Russia militarily weak is to make it economically strong with both Germany and Japan as good post war examples. Russia is also no longer an enemy with a political ideology that is not favoured by the USA. The value of this group is therefore solely for US public opinion and will have no value in civil-military relations and diplomacy within and between existing and prospective NATO members.

The second group includes voters of Central European extraction who Clinton believes “want their motherland firmly under American protection.” This is the group that Clinton identifies with Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa who proposed NATO enlargement to him. This group is the proxy extension of three thousand years of East European civil-military relations to North America. They understand that European is a tribal affair in constant conflict. This group is of extreme value in linking civil-military relations between the US and the prospective member states whose military will have to follow the US military after having opposed it during the Cold War. This group has value in the diplomatic process of democratising prospective member states to meet the civil criteria of NATO membership, mentioned above. This group also understands that the high technologically proficient a state becomes, the less likely that it will need men for war ie abolishment of conscription. It is not surprising then that ethnic lobbying groups such as the Polish American Congress are constantly flooded the White House and Capitol Hill with telegrams demanding that NATO enlarge. 22

This is significant for civil-military relations but as a White House poll during the 1996 campaign, it was not an issue of American domestic politics. NATO enlargement wasn’t a litmus test for the voting behaviour nor patterns of the 21 million Americans of East European descent. The poll Clinton paid more attention to, showed that foreign policy successes improved his reelection chances. “The idea that Reagan brought down the Berlin Wall, Bush unified Germany, and Clinton will unite Europe sounded good at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue,” said a senior Presidential aide. 23 Further studies will no doubt spend considerable time analysing this link between domestic and international politics where the most interesting will bet the link between the military of the various NATO member countries operating in unison and their collective influences on the political/civil echelons of each country.

The third group is the liberal wing of the pro-expansion coalition led by key Clinton aides who see expansion as a strategy for spreading “free-market” democracy across all of Europe, including Russia. This group will have to come to grips with two issues. Firstly in how the expansion of NATO can achieve a task which is more suited towards private entrepeneures where it is historically plain and clear that government intervention in East European economies has been a failure. The second issue is of course how and why NATO expansion can achieve this and not EU expansion. For civil-military relations these issues can be left on the side for a moment for the most blatant consequence of NATO enlargement appears to be the proposal that the new NATO members increase their defense budgets at the behest of U.S. arms manufacturers who are expected to capture the bulk of new weapons procurement as part of any modernization effort. 24

On the surface it seems that NATO enlargement for this group could then be considered a US governmental subsidisation of its local defence industries, while achieving a foreign policy success for domestic election purposes. If understood in this light, one could suspect a reemergence of the US military-industrial complex where military and industry would be pushing for NATO expansion. However this is not the case for the Pentagon has noted its reluctance to NATO expansion. This can be understood in the aforementioned military threats facing the US and understanding that NATO expansion is more civil than military. This is not to say that Eastern Europe was not a focal point for the US or NATO military forces. The Pentagon initially pushed a plan called Partnership for Peace, which allowed East European nations to join in NATO military exercises but not be full members. The Pentagon wanted no part of a larger, more costly alliance, and Strobe Talbott, Christopher’s top Russia expert and now Deputy Secretary of State, feared that a rush to admit new members would anger Moscow. In this one suspects that the attitude of the American Joint Chiefs must be similar to those of their British equivalents at the negotiations of the Locarno Treaty in 1925: The treaty is “interesting” but, in the light of all of America’s prior obligations from Korea to the Persian Gulf, the military can only “take note” of this increase in their foreign-policy obligations. They can hardly feel comfortable in asserting that the US armed forces could give adequate protection to Poland’s eastern border, following a period when those very forces are being significantly reduced. So essentially, what we were looking at is a large gap between American foreign policy and military strategy. 25

This gap is even wider when looking at the US defence industrial capability and corporate direction. The US military has been moving rapidly towards mobile rapid deployment units and high technological warfare. US defence industries have been pursuing a path of mergers and rationalisation of factory lines to cater for a reduction in heavy conventional weaponry. Research and development has been geared towards high technological developments. A return to large production of conventional weapons of medium technology which is factory line labour intensive is not considered a lucrative market.

Despite the US military and defence industrial reluctance, the US elected government has had its way. That is to say the military was subservient to the desires of the elected governmental executive in the policy formulation process. This came about in September 1994, when senior Defense officials gathered in Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s office for what turned into a shouting match. “The President has made the decision, and you’re being insubordinate!” Holbrooke accused them. The US military had thus become subservient to a US Presidential policy move conceived at a museum opening. 26

The most important part of this US military’s reluctance to NATO expansion is the hope that it is aimed more at political solidarity than for a war purpose. This hope is echoed in the reluctance of the military of other NATO countries who although have equal member status have smaller armed forces which in comparison would be the United States 1,483,800, France 398,900, Germany 358,400, Britain 226,000 and Canada 70,500. 27 In further comparison the total number of men under arms in NATO is less than 0.01 % of the total population. The significance of these numbers is to comprehend the insignificance of NATO expansion for the civil populations of the Western World at large in light of no clear and present conventional military danger against NATO.

The significance for civil-military relations is that it took many months of wrangling between the Pentagon, the White House and organisational politics and lobbying, before the advisers agreed to proceed cautiously. NATO expansion in the USA was an issue of domestic politics in the form of civil-military relations. Clinton therefore announced in a Prague speech in January 1994 that the question was no longer if NATO would expand but when. 28 This was a quick and painless expression of intent which still left the practicalities unanswered. Clinton’s national security adviser, Sandy Berger, claims that Clinton took this initiative at the NATO summit early in 1994, to hedge against political uncertainty in Russia and strengthen fledgling democracies. 29 In doing so Clinton’s decision and announcement split much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. The argument that ensued within the foreign policy establishment was about the impact of expansion on Russia and the post-Cold War disarmament process. 30 This as already mentioned is not an issue for scholars of civil-military relations who see NATO expansion as a step towards and part and parcel of the disarmament process. Perhaps scholars of international relations of the neorealist school would differ!

Irregardless of which school of thought is correct, the two issues did further a debate of civil-military relations in the form of a letter dated 26 June 1997 sent to President Clinton. It came from an influential group of more than 30 former lawmakers, diplomats, and foreign affairs mandarin. The formidable list included three former senators — Democrat Sam Nunn, who was long regarded as the Senate’s leading defense expert, and Republicans Gordon Humphrey and Mark Hatfield. Also on the list were Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991, and Paul Nitze, President Reagan’s chief arms control negotiator. The group was organized by Susan Eisenhower, granddaughter of the former president who was NATO’s first commander, and other national security analysts. The letter argued that Clinton should concentrate on arms control efforts, which have been hampered by Russia’s pique over NATO enlargement. 31

 

The Internationalisation of Civil-military relations

The Russian parliament is aware of this and on the eve of ratifying the START-2 treaty stressed the need to keep the existing balance between the activity of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO expansion. 32 These delays have also held up discussions on a START III treaty which would further trim nuclear arsenals. Roman Popkovich, a member of the Russian lower house State Duma’s defence committee, linked ratification to strict observance of the 1972 ABM treaty, and guarantees that Washington “will not deploy any nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO members.” 33 This poses a dual dilemma for the US Senate is uneasy about the role being assigned to Russia in the new Permanent Joint Council set up to give Moscow “a voice but not a veto” in European security. 34

For Moscow’s its main task in the western direction is to check the possible enrolment of the three Baltic states in the NATO bloc. In this respect, the first significant step by the Russian side was already taken at the beginning of the year. Before the Fundamental Act between Russia and NATO was signed in Paris, the Russian Foreign Ministry made it known to the leaders of the Western countries that the inclusion of former Soviet republics [Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia] in NATO would result in a cardinal change in Russia’s foreign political course, and even step out of the Fundamental Act. 35

These arguments will no doubt ensue for many years though more immediate is that of NATO enlargement funding arrangements. The actors and players for this are the same as those that have to decide wether or not to proceeded with NATO enlargement. So economics is as much a catalyst towards NATO enlargement in the form of East European development of free markets as it is a hinderance to the US congress and taxpayer in the funding of the process of enlargement. The US which will bear the brunt of the funding as well as the ultimate troop and equipment deployments. If the US agrees to this then it is with almost certainty that the other NATO member countries will have little or no objection to extremely small relative contributions. It is not as simple as this for no-one knows exactly how much NATO enlargement will cost. It was originally expected that the collective bill for expanding NATO into Eastern Europe would cost the existing members pounds 800 million pounds over 10 years. NATO officials then revised this to 17-22 billion pounds. 36 It is estimated that the enlargement of NATO to include the first wave of central and east European countries will cost Britain an estimated pounds 110 million over the next 10 years, Government defence spokesman Lord Hoyle told the House of Lords on 29 January 1998. Lord Hoyle promised a full parliamentary debate on the matter before April 1999, the deadline for the UK to ratify the NATO enlargement. 37 Despite this the NATO organisation’s democratic watchdog, the North Atlantic Assembly, is expressing increasing concern at the lack of transparency in the debate over the costs of enlargement. “At this rate, national parliaments will have to ratify the new treaty with almost no discussion of the issues,” said one NAA spokesman. This was the case with Canada and Denmark who ratified the enlargement without having all the budgetary information. 38

This economic debate enters the realm of civil-military relations for it depends on the approval process of national assemblies such as the US Congress. In these it is well recognised that votes are cast after a formal and informal process of lobbying by interest groups. As already noted the Pentagon and defence industries will not be at the front of the lobbying effort as had been the case throughout the Cold War. It will therefore rest on the White House to lobby Congress for funding and the Senate for enlargement ratification where in a unique occurrence, never to have been seen during the Cold War, Foreign Ministers Bronislaw Geremek of Poland, Laszlo Kovacs of Hungary and Jaroslav Sedivy of the Czech Republic, visited Washington in early February 1998 to convince the US Senate to support their NATO membership applications. 39 During their three-day visit their moves were carefully coordinated in impressive formations of three, even the interviews with CNN and PBS’s ‘News Hour.’ They also made troika appearances at major American newspapers and think tanks, with US senators, with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, for lunch at the Capitol Hill Club and for dinner at the Metropolitan Club, the mother of all Washington clubs. Their message is substantive and well orchestrated. 40

Never before in the history of US Senate voting has there been such a vagueness in the issue to be voted where the issue is the main foreign policy goal of the President. Two basic questions will shape the outcome of the Senate’s vote: First, will the White House succeed in keeping together the diverse coalition currently in favour of enlargement? ie what ramifications will it have on US domestic politics given the lack of military and defence industrial enthusiasm. In short will there be an even greater rift in opinion between the civil and the military. Second, will the three (or more) candidate countries succeed in reinforcing the impression that they can become reliable members ready to make a contribution to the alliance? ie will their military be willing to follow the US Commander in Chief. Both of these are extremely hard issues considering that the main strategic goal of enlargement has yet to be specified. Looking at the Senate finds equi-values. Critics have found it easy to magnify the actual or presumed side-effects of enlargement. Yet the Administration’s vagueness has been a political necessity as well: it has served to make enlargement attractive to a very diverse coalition of supporters. 41 Even if the Senate approves the current enlargement proposal, it may impose conditions on future enlargement where Romania, Slovenia and the Baltic states are aspiring to be part of a second wave of enlargement that is expected to be launched at a NATO summit in Washington in 1999. 42

 

Organisations

The Senate is not the only US civil-military relations forum that has to be convinced regards to NATO enlargement. An important element of civil-military relations is public opinion expressed through the media. The Washington Post, for example, has already raised the Phoenix of Vietnam. It has asked wether American troops should promise to die for Ljubljana, Tallinn and Bucharest if need be. It has strongly pointed out that American political leaders and their diplomatic advisers are now deciding this where the American people should make a stand of their opinion. 43 In order to counter such media disapproval the White House is planning a major public relations effort to persuade Congress and the US Nation to approve NATO expansion. 44

This US media aversion creates a potential rift within NATO for the press outside the US generally approves if enlarging NATO. Few commentators in this press question the basic wisdom of bringing new members into the alliance. In World Press Review’s latest Opinion Index, 23 of the 50 leading world newspapers surveyed clearly approved. Only seven were flatly against; 14 had mixed opinions, and six did not comment. The 50 newspapers surveyed were chosen for their national and regional importance as opinion leaders. The sampling was heavily weighted toward Europe, with 33 newspapers. There were 10 Asian sources, six from the Americas, and one from Africa. 45 The significance of this press and subsequently public opinion will be relevant in the forthcoming years when and if NATO is required to flex its muscle such as happened in Bosnia.

So at the end of the day unless the United States hesitates or Western public opinion turns far more negative than it is now, the parliaments of NATO countries will certainly ratify NATO’s decision without excessive debate. 46 Canada was the first to do so on 3 February 1998. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy of Canada signed the instrument of ratification that would admit formerly communist Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to full NATO membership in April 1999. 47 On the same day the Danish parliament overwhelmingly approved the alliance’s invitation to the three formerly communist countries for full membership in April 1999. 48

The Italian Defence Minister Beniamino Andreatta told Polish MPs on 17th February some 90% of Italian parliamentarians were in favour of ratification of Poland’s NATO entry. He recalled that his government had already approved of the ratification documents and sent them to the Senate. The Italian parliament is likely to vote on the mater in late April or early May. 49

This is interesting to note for civil-military relations because such governmental agreement does not always reflect public opinion. While the German public, for example, is definitely moving along a learning curve in that respect, it will take some time before Germans, in fulfilment of treaty obligations, agree to accept the participation of their soldiers in crisis management operations. Key German politicians state that a “culture of military restraint” will continue to characterize German foreign policy. NATO expansion for the German public has therefore been one of apprehension but for the government an issue of acceptance to political cues from Washington. 50

The same debates and issues of civil-military relations that are being conducted in existing member states of NATO are also being conducted in the prospective members. This is unique in its own right but also poses dangers. It is unique that a debate can wage in countries which were once one-party Communist dictatorships. This if of particular significance in the Czech state where Petr Necas, chairman of the Chamber of Deputies defence and security committee and a deputy for the former government Civic Democratic Party (ODS), attacked the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) for jeopardising the chance of ratifying NATO enlargement before early elections. The Chamber voted to send the government’s ratification bill to the committee stage but a proposal shortening the discussion period from 60 to 40 days, which would possibly have allowed the ratification process to be completed before early elections are held in June, was defeated. The ODS, Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and Freedom Union (US) voted in favour of the proposal, while the KDU-CSL, main opposition Social Democrats (CSSD), Communists and extreme-right Republicans voted against it. 51

The dangers therefore present themselves very clearly in the lack of power for either the military or the civil to win the debate absolutely and in the subsequent organisational difficulties in sending representatives with authority to NATO organisations. This will test NATO’s unwritten rationale of “one for all and all for one”, if enlargement occurs.

The starting point of this part of the civil-military relations debate of NATO expansion is the belief of the political executives of these prospective NATO states believe that they are not entering NATO — but rather that NATO is coming to them! This despite the initial “museum approach” for they cannot believe that they swayed the US president so easily. In part this is true but in part they did sway Clinton’s opinion. Swaying Clinton’s opinion was by far easier than swaying their own public opinion, which now counts in the domestic political process. This public opinion is perhaps more significant for civil-military relations than that in existing NATO member states. This is because of the diversity between the applicant countries and their ethnic populations who in the process of rejuvenating their nationalistic identities. Public opinion all counts for the prerequisites of entry into NATO require democracy in theory and practice — no lingering territorial or ethnic disputes, civilian control of the military, respect for the rights of ethnic minorities, public defense budgets and policies, market economies — and a willingness to contribute to the alliance. 52

This prerequisite creates a dilemma for civil-military relations for NATO has never been an effective instrument for promoting either free markets or democracy. Public opinion and political astuteness must consider that in the second half of the 1940s, when the fate of democracy and free markets in Western Europe was the preeminent international issue, the principal response and an extremely successful one-was the Marshall Plan and not the formation of NATO. The plan provided capital, market access, and incentives for economic cooperation, all of which central Europe currently needs. 53

It is therefore not surprising that proponents in East Europe for extending NATO membership to the Visegrad countries — are divided into two camps. Those in the first camp assert that the purpose is solely to promote democracy and free markets in central Europe and has nothing to do with the military power and political aspirations of any other country. This was echoed in Portugal where the Prime Minister Antonio Guterres in meeting with President Clinton to encourage his stance in US-Russia talks on the alliance noted that “The expansion of NATO is, as is the expansion EU a basic condition for democracy, for peace and stability in Central and Eastern European countries.” 54

For the second group, NATO expansion has everything to do with the threat from Russia. 55 For this second group the answer is that the country most important to the West that is immediately vulnerable to a renewal of aggressive Russian behaviour is Ukraine. Yet no one is suggesting that Ukraine join NATO. Indeed, discussions of NATO expansion tend to treat Ukraine as marginal. Ukraine, however, is the opposite of marginal: it is central. So long as it remains independent it is a buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. More important, an independent Ukraine is the best guarantee that Russia will remain a peaceful nation-state. Conflict between the two would have adverse repercussions to the west. And if Moscow absorbed Ukraine or attempted to do so, Russia would again become a multinational empire harbouring a large, resentful subject nation, with poor prospects for the construction of a stable democratic system. It is not an exaggeration to say that NATO expansion will be good or bad depending on its effect on the peaceful coexistence of Ukraine and Russia. 56

As noted above there is a similarity between both these groups and those who favour NATO expansion in the US. Time will tell of there will be a coordination between the groups across national boundaries to sway government policy.

Public opinion may vary from time to time but at present local pollsters in Poland found that 9 of 10 people of a population of 38 million support NATO membership, a level of support that tops any other country in Eastern Europe. Despite this support it is doubtful if Poland could meet the cost of making its equipment interoperatable with NATO standards, especially as there are a large number of other spending priorities than military. 57 The government may also change before the 1999 expected NATO entry date. 58

By contrast, a recent Gallup Poll in Hungary found that slightly less than half of the people favoured joining NATO and nearly one-quarter were undecided. 59 This figure was incongruent with the referendum that was held on joining the NATO Alliance. The Hungarian Government claimed that the results showed that the support for NATO membership expressed by the high percentage of those who voted demonstrated the broad support among the Hungarian people for membership in the Alliance. 60 All seven political parties represented in parliament favour membership though the parliamentary composition may change before NATO entry in 1999. 61 A more serious issue of civil-military relations in Hungary is the political desire and military willingness to serve under Western military commands. This is especially significant after Hungary refused to cooperate with NATO’s effort to police a no-fly zone over Bosnia because of concern over the Hungarian minorities within the province of Vojvodina in Serbia. 62 A further test of this was made on 12 February 1998 when the Hungarian Foreign Ministry has received an official request from the USA for support in a possible military action against Iraq. The response was that the deployment of Hungarian military forces abroad is only possible with parliamentary approval, for which at least a two-thirds majority is required. 63 An unbiased and substantial survey has not yet been conducted in the Czech Republic though diplomats admitted that the task ahead would be hard. 64

These differences in public opinion and military and economic ability and capability highlight where the focus for East Europe should have been. This is and was the expansion of the European Union which is intended to be meshed with the West European (Defense) Union and not that of NATO Expansion. Any East European country joining the EU would automatically become part of this European military structures. It has oft been noted that if the former Warsaw Pact Eastern European members want security and economic well-being this is the place to find it, all in one. The Russian Foreign Minister for example has stated that “Russia continues to be opposed to NATO enlargement” although “Hungary’s integration into European organizations is a fait accompli.” 65

This is of extreme relevance to the civil-military relations in Russia. There is no ambiguity of the impact of the NATO expansion strategy on Russian domestic politics. The NATO enlargement project is no Versailles. It was not conceived as punishment. But in Russia, NATO expansion is the functional equivalent of Versailles — evidence to many of the West’s hostile aims. 66 It is easy to predict what will happen if Mr. Yeltsin signs a Russia-NATO document void of contractual obligations. The State Duma, facing the prospect of a foreign military alliance approaching Russian borders, would not ratify the START-2 treaty, thus seriously hurting prospects for START-3. The Russian military would have to plan not on the basis of NATO intentions but in terms of the enhanced military, intelligence and logistical capabilities of the other side. 67 Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has also warned President Bill Clinton that rapid expansion of NATO into central Europe could undermine the government of President Boris Yeltsin. 68 The NATO issue has pushed all political elements in a nationalistic direction. It could very well foster a “Weimar psychology” and produce the same atmosphere that set the stage after World War I for the vicious revival of German nationalism under the Nazis. 69 It is unlikely that Russia will turn to fascism. But the risk is large enough that Western governments ought to refrain from giving extremist political forces an emotional rallying cry like NATO expansion. 70

 

Reflections

The debate over NATO expansion has therefore been a dangerous distraction from the main task for it has complicated matters for the EU in its efforts to bring the countries of east and central Europe into the Union. 71 NATO expansion on the face of it therefore seems to Russia as being American expansionism 72 while to the US it has been the theme is building bridges across the Atlantic. 73 The logical source for all three of the prospective new members is not therefore NATO; it is the European Union, membership in which is a matter of the highest priority for each of the Visegrad countries. 74 The economic side of the civil in the process of democratisation will eventually reach towards strife with the military and the political side of the civil over NATO expansion. For civil-military relations this shows how dependent Western Europe is on the US. The Europeans still find it easier to take their main political cues from Washington than cede a centralized control of foreign policy and military coordination to a European directorate. 75

So much for opinion but can the new member states actually be full members when looking at their organisational civil-military relations? Poland, the Czech State and Hungary have all had ministries of defence as the cinderellas of their political establishments. These will acquire new political leverage by convincing their treasuries and public that extra expenditure is needed to meet membership requirements, citing international obligations. Political control over the military is supposedly not a problem. But the reality is that proper civilian control over the armed forces has yet to be established. Civilian defence ministries coexist uneasily with general staffs and security policy is dominated by men in uniform.

Most of the threat assessments are being done by military personnel rather than civilians. Parliaments exercise only a perfunctory control over military affairs. Even if this parliamentary control were to be expanded, it would be of little practical value for the long-term as there is an increasing militarisation of the political echelons when military officers stand for election. The lack of defence experts in civilian life and of defence correspondents capable of reporting such matters compounds the isolation of the military from the democratization process. The absence of women and ethnic minorities with the reluctance of young men to make a career out of the military inhibits the restructuring of the former communist military into resembling anything close to the West NATO counterparts.

On joining the Alliance, new members must accept the full obligations of the Washington Treaty. This includes participation in the consultation process within the Alliance and the principle of decision-making by consensus, which requires a commitment to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues of concern to it. New members must also be prepared to contribute to collective defence, to the Alliance’s new evolving missions and to Alliance budgets. This may include appropriate contributions to the Alliance’s military force and command structures and infrastructure. New members must accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join. In this respect, new members deciding to participate in the integrated military structure must accept the applicable policies and procedures. This is a crucial element of civil-military relations for there has to be close coordination and communication between the Foreign Offices, Defence Ministries and Cabinet within and between all NATO countries.

Further to this, NATO is based upon consensus upheld in committee meetings. More members will inevitably dilute the U.S. role. And bringing more divergent interests into NATO could make managing conflicts among its own members the alliance’s full-time business. The civil-military relations of expansion will also face tension once the new members send representatives to NATO headquarters. The representative on the North Atlantic Council must come from the foreign office. He is expected to work closely with the military staff and to coordinate policies with the defence and finance ministries. The new members would then have to iron out constitutional disputes such as exist in Poland between the Prime Minister and the Head of State and between diplomats and the military. Even if this was to occur it is doubtful at this stage if the new members have enough qualified staff to send to NATO headquarters, both in the ability to converse fluently in the English language and to make independent decisions without constant consultation to superiors in their home countries.

The entire military establishment in central Europe may also discover that it may not be capable at least initially of absorbing the sheer quantity of information disseminated and decisions which will need to be taken in the run-up to NATO membership. In defence procurement, corruption may ensue.

That said, some attention should be paid to continuity in military and intelligence personnel. Bluntly put, can those who once served the Warsaw Pact, and thus Moscow, protect NATO’s secrets? The issue is not so much the present orientation of an elected president or prime minister; such people’s pro-Western credentials have been tested in the post-1989 political arena. Many of their aides have also had the opportunity to show — for ten long years, by 1999 — that in their view too NATO membership is the best guarantee of their countries’ independence from Russia. Moreover, since few people in the old anti-Communist opposition have the background to serve as generals or intelligence officers, NATO must be patient toward some continuity for a few years. Yet, as the Senate may well raise this issue, it behooves the candidate members to provide for transparency in personnel when it comes to their ambassadors as well as military and intelligence liaisons assigned to Brussels and NATO capitals.

These positions should not be held by leading members of the old Communist nomenclature, whose loyalty to NATO invites scepticism. Only this way can the new members show that, despite the necessary continuity in personnel, their ties with the past have been conclusively cut. Meanwhile, NATO should consider additional options to assure confidentiality in its dealings with the Central Europeans. One possibility is for clearances to be approved initially not only by national boards, which is the current practice, but by a joint NATO-appointed committee. After all, NATO will still have secrets to protect. 76 It is for these reasons that many in European governments and in the Pentagon doubted the wisdom of pushing for a tight admission date despite the insistence of the White House. 77

Having presented the above tasters of civil-military relations issues for NATO expansion, it appears that the military validity of the alliance is in serious doubt despite the political willingness to proceed with enlargement. This is an unfortunate oversight for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has lived up to its military promise almost half a century after it was formed even thought it has failed politically for civil-military relations. NATO has succeeded to counter the threat to Europe from Stalin’s Soviet Union. Russian troops are farther than ever from the heart of the continent, Germany poses no military threat to its neighbours, and the United States is still firmly committed to defending Europe. 78

NATO however has so far proven unsuited to the task of coping with disputes between members, whether actively dangerous (for example, between Greece and Turkey), or merely historic (between Spain and Britain). 79 It is these types of disputes of civil-military relations which in enlargement may bring about the end of NATO. Civil-military relations shows that the very problem of ethnic conflicts is the most daunting threat to stability in Central and Eastern Europe. There is some uncertainty over whether NATO states would actually honour their treaty obligations and come to the aid of a threatened fellow member when the issue is trans-national ethniticity. Further it is in doubt wether the United States and Canada, would be affected or even concerned over by a crisis in Central or Eastern Europe. 80 Bosnia is a case study where NATO took too long to act and when doing so did too little.

 

Conclusion

To conclude then NATO enlargement for foreign policy decision making and intrnational relations is a symbolic enlargement to enact a victory of the Cold War in the same sense that the Cold War never reached Hot War in Europe. Enlargement is the symbolic occupation by the victor of the losers sphere of control. It is the extension of the victor’s lines of power towards the final battle, that of occupation of the enemies capital. It is the victor taking control and the spoils of war, symbolically. This view is supported by diplomatic historian Paul Schroeder of the University of Illinois who notes that “To survive, alliances have historically had to include (their) defeated foe.” 81

This is even more significant for the main potential threat perception to any Western security is chemical and/or biological weapons from sub or non-state actors while the conflicts waging world-wide are low-intensity conflicts. NATO has no military role for either of these two. In this sense NATO enlargement cannot cease until it expands to include Russia. When that happens NATO will be able to disband as being the absolute symbolic winner of the Cold War. To disband NATO prior to NATO enlargement would be symbolic of defeat. The victor without the spoils of war. It is in this context that it is possible to accept and welcome NATO enlargement Once NATO enlargement is complete, at the doors of Moscow, then it will serve no further purpose for international relations. At such a stage both the USA and Russia and other countries can move towards a Zero nuclear option. This may be the “bomb in the basement” with a civil monitoring agency and nuclear free zones in many parts of the world including Central Europe. It is also in this context that we can approve of the continued existence of NATO.

For military minds and scholars of civil-military relations and foreign policy decision making this happen is a nightmare. The proponents of NATO enlargement have not only missed the first basic common denominator which made the original NATO members so close and NATO so successful: a common enemy ie an external or perceived external threat which generated crises decision making in a particular foreign policy event. They also have missed the second basic common denominator: common political systems and organisations in foreign policy decision making looking at prolonged patterns over time and the third common denominator: a common will to achieve a common goal on the system and state level of international relations based upon similarities in domestic political systems ie civil-military relations.

It is therefore possible to see that there are now two NATO’s working for different goals. One is the NATO of the Cold War which is the West NATO which still persists in its symbols and symbolism. The Cold War still exists or if prefer Cold Diplomacy prevails if one has to consider that the ideological struggle persists and that Russia remains an unconquered and unoccupied country. This is the NATO of international relations. The other is the NATO of Enlargement or the East NATO, which does not see itself engaged in further wars and is more an issue of civil-military relations

In both instances however this paper has shown that NATO enlargement is more a domestic political than a foreign military act where there is military subservience to the political goal. This means that on the weighing scales NATO enlargement is more civil-military relations in practise and more intrnational relations symbolically. This is an echo of the Cold War which means we are in a period of Cold Diplomacy. The long term significance of this is that the development of International Relations Theory evolved out of Two World Wars in the 20th Century which had their origins in Europe. Significant to these wars and IR Theory was the use and threat of use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the notion of Collective Security. NATO embodies the principle of Collective Security. Today in 1999, we are looking at the Enlargement of last remaining large Collective Security Organisation — NATO. NATO however does not find itself faced by any major external threat. So we dealing with little or any form of International Security or Foreign Policy agenda in the collective security organisation of NATO Enlargement while deadling with the paramount form of national security in domestic civil-military relations both in the existing and applicant member states? Can we apply any IR theories to NATO enlargement and can we develop any new theories? If the later is the case then where is IR Theory heading if Collective Security and the principles of WMD embedded in NATO are no longer valid IR Agenda in empirical terms for European Security but rather of the internationalisation of civil-military relations? Whatever the case it is clear that there is an Enduring Alliance which is the topic of this Panel and that International Relations is one discipline: Many Fields which is the topic of this Conference.

 


Endnotes

*: Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999.  Back.

Note 1: Henceforth CMR stands for Civil-Military Relations and IR for International Relations  Back.

Note 2: The seminal book on such a relationship was Huntington, S. 1957. The Soldier and the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. There have been numerous works since which have been equal in value such as Cochran, C.L. 1974. Civil-Military Relations, The Free Press, NY.; Danopoulos, C. (ed), 1988. The Decline of Military Regimes: The Civilian Influence, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press; Janowitz, M. 1981. Civil Military Relations : Regional Perspectives Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications and Sweetman, J. 1986. Sword and Mace: Twentieth Century Civil — Military Relations in Britain, London: Brasseys Defence Publishers. There has been little focus on the political and military aspects in the 1990s but rather a focus on the sociological ramifications.  Back.

Note 3: France for example wishes to enlarge NATO to include all former Warsaw Pact countries at once. Britain and the USA on their other hand desire a stage by stage process. Russia opposes NATO enlargement that does not include herself.  Back.

Note 4: The concept of military professionalism is well documented in Abrahamson, B. 1972. Military Professionalisation and Political Power, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications; Janowitz, M. 1960. The Professional Soldier, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Sarkesian, S. 1981. Beyond the Battlefield : The New Military Professionalism, New York: Pergamon Press.  Back.

Note 5: The legislative process of this is detailed in House of Commons Command Paper [9391], ‘Statement on Defence Estimates 1955’, British Parliamentary Papers Session 1954-1955, Vol X.  Back.

Note 6: The prospective countries force contribution will be Poland 248,500, Czech Republic 70,000, and Hungary 64,300. The next in line are Rumania 228,400 and Slovenia 9,500. In total this will increase NATO forces by around 3%. The cost of bringing these forces equipment to the level of rationalisation, standardisation and interopertability with existing NATO forces will be around 17-22 billion pounds over the next 10 years. Although most of this will be paid for by the US it should be compared with Britians annual defence budget which is currently at around 2 billion pounds.  Back.

Note 7: 06 Feb 98 Enlarge the European Union Before NATO: International Herald Tribune  Back.

Note 8: The basis of these are mentioned in McClellan, W.D. 1988. ‘Developing Exemplary Civilian Military Relations’, Management Information Report No.20, December pp.1-16.  Back.

Note 9: Cochran, C.L. 1974. Civil-Military Relations, The Free Press, NY; Huntington, S. 1957. The Soldier and the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Janowitz, M. 1981. Civil Military Relations : Regional Perspectives Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications; Sweetman, J. 1986. Sword and Mace: Twentieth Century Civil — Military Relations in Britain, London: Brasseys Defence Publishers.  Back.

Note 10: This emphasis on western democratic countries is because of the separate organisations and state organs for civil and military affairs. The military is answerable both to a legislature during budget allocation and to a Government and Parliament for its actions which may require a vote on a deceleration of war see: Angus, R. 1979. ‘The Organisation of Defence Procurement and Production in the United Kingdom’, ASIDES No. 13, Aberdeen: Centre for Defence Studies; Edmonds, M. 1985. Central Organisation of Defence London: Pinter; Edmonds, M. 1986. The Defence Equation, London: Brasseys Defence Publishers; Hobkirk, M.D. 1984. The Politics of defence budgeting: A study of organisation and resource allocation in the United Kingdom and the United States, London: Macmillan; Udis, B. 1978. From Guns to Butter: Technology Organisations and Reduced Military Spending in Western Europe, Cambridge, Mass, Ballinger.  Back.

Note 11: Federal Document Clearing House FDCH Washington Transcript Service 16/12/97  Back.

Note 12: 29 Jan 98 Russia Defence Chief Unimpressed By New Corps: Reuter News Service — Western Europe Reuter Textline.  Back.

Note 13: A good article on the procurement side is Gansler, G. 1988. ‘Integrating Civilian and Military Industry’, Issues in Science and Technology No.5, Fall, pp.68-72.  Back.

Note 14: 14 Jul 97 News — International news — Estonia, Slovenia on Eu short list: Australian Financial Review  Back.

Note 15: 14 Jul 97 News — International news — Estonia, Slovenia on Eu short list: Australian Financial Review  Back.

Note 16: 20 Feb 98 Russia: Attack on Iraq Will Stop Ratification of START-2, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Q1:43) Source: ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian 1124 gmt 19 Feb 98.  Back.

Note 17: 117 05 Jan 98 Czech Television o Air Series on NATO Enlargement: Cstk Ecoservice Reuter Textline (Q2:28)  Back.

Note 18: A perfect historical parallel is when in May 1947 Bevin was still considering Germany to be the main threat to British security despite his military advisors informing him of the Soviet threat see M.M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952 (London: Macmillan, 1974). p.40.  Back.

Note 19: 11 Dec 97 UK: America’s ‘Eurobashing’ Possesses the Power to Cause a Bad Headache. Bronwen Maddox. The Times 11/12/97 P31  Back.

Note 20: These similarities are expanded in the forthcoming publication. Segell, Glen, “NATO and CMR”.  Back.

Note 21: 29 Jan 98 ‘You Can’t Defy the Will of the World’: To an Ovation in Congress, Clinton Warns Saddam on Weapons: International Herald Tribune  Back.

Note 22: 11 Jul 97 On Tape, Chretien Slights Clinton: International Herald Tribune.  Back.

Note 23: How Clinton decided on NATO expansion, Waller, Douglas Time, v150, n2, p58(1) July 14, 1997.  Back.

Note 24: Stevens concerned about costs of NATO Expansion Defense Daily Oct 23, 1997 V. 197 NO. 16  Back.

Note 25: The false pretence of NATO expansion. Kennedy, Paul New Perspectives Quarterly, v14, n3, p62(2) Summer, 1997  Back.

Note 26: How Clinton decided on NATO expansion, Waller, Douglas Time, v150, n2, p58(1) July 14, 1997  Back.

Note 27: Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies.  Back.

Note 28: How Clinton decided on NATO expansion, Waller, Douglas Time, v150, n2, p58(1) July 14, 1997  Back.

Note 29: 09 Jul 97 Clinton scores foreign POLICY victory with NATO Expansion accord: The Associated Press.  Back.

Note 30: U.S.-Russia: U.S. Policy establishment split on NATO Expansion Inter Press Service June 27, 1997.  Back.

Note 31: Stanglin, Douglas U.S. News & World Report, v122, n24, p16(1) June 23, 1997  Back.

Note 32: 05 Dec 97 Russia: Russia and US Discuss European, World Security. Itar-Tass World Service 05/12/97  Back.

Note 33: 11 Feb 98 Cohen, Sergeyev to discuss Iraq during US defense secretary’s visit: Agence France Presse International  Back.

Note 34: Irish Times 30/12/97 P58  Back.

Note 35: Russian Press Digest Nezavisimaya Gazeta 17/12/97  Back.

Note 36: 20 Nov 97 NATO expansion bill shrinks: The Guardian  Back.

Note 37: 29 Jan 98 Lords: Britain Faces Pounds 110m NATO Enlargement Bill: Press Association  Back.

Note 38: 11 December 97 NATO: Concern Growing over Possible Cost of NATO Expansion. By Mark Turner: European Voice 11/12/97: The Economist Newspaper Ltd.  Back.

Note 39: 20 Nov 97 East European ministers to press NATO case in USA: Reuter Textline.  Back.

Note 40: 11 Feb 98 Diplomatic Dispatches: Rub-A-Dub-Dub, 3 Men On The Stump: The Washington Post  Back.

Note 41: Gati, Charles National Review, v49, n11, p27(3) June 16, 1997  Back.

Note 42: 11 Feb 98 Clinton takes NATO ENLARGEMENT to the Senate for approval: Agence France Presse International  Back.

Note 43: 20 Apr 97 Alice-In-Wonderland NATO: The Washington Post  Back.

Note 44: New alliances.(President Clinton to push expansion of NATO and most favoured nation status for China)(Brief Article) U.S. News & World Report, v122, n22, p24(1) June 9, 1997  Back.

Note 45: A qualified ‘yes’ to the deal with Russia. (NATO expansion )(based on surveys of 50 news dailies)(Column) World Press Review, v44, n7, p18(2) July, 1997  Back.

Note 46: Gati, Charles National Review, v49, n11, p27(3) June 16, 1997  Back.

Note 47: 03 Feb 98 CANADA FIRST TO RATIFY NATO ENLARGEMENT: REUTER NEWS SERVICE — CANADA Reuter Textline  Back.

Note 48: 04 Feb 98 World In Brief: Europe: Canada, Denmark Ratify NATO ENLARGEMENT: The Washington Post.  Back.

Note 49: 19 Feb 98 ITALIAN DEFENCE MINISTER SAYS ITALY SUPPORTS POLISH NATO ENTRY: PAP news agency, Warsaw, Text of report by the Polish news agency PAP Warsaw, 17th February  Back.

Note 50: The folly of rapid NATO expansion. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Kamp, Karl-Heinz Foreign Policy, n98, p116(14) Spring, 1995  Back.

Note 51: 12 Feb 98 NECAS ACCUSES KDU-CSL OF JEOPARDISING CHANCES OF NATO TREATY: CSTK ECOSERVICE  Back.

Note 52: National purpose and NATO expansion. (global military role of the US)(Column) Bresler, Robert J. USA Today (Magazine), v124, n2608, p15(1) Jan, 1996  Back.

Note 53: Preserving the new peace: the case against NATO expansion. Mandelbaum, Michael Foreign Affairs, v74, n3, p9(5) May-June, 1995  Back.

Note 54: 03 Apr 97 Portugal, US: Prime minister backs NATO expansion: The Associated Press.  Back.

Note 55: Preserving the new peace: the case against NATO expansion. Mandelbaum, Michael Foreign Affairs, v74, n3, p9(5) May-June, 1995  Back.

Note 56: Preserving the new peace: the case against NATO expansion. Mandelbaum, Michael Foreign Affairs, v74, n3, p9(5) May-June, 1995  Back.

Note 57: 10 Jul 97 In from the cold at last: NATO’s Madrid summit: Poles are palpably relieved to be invited to join ‘the West’: The Guardian  Back.

Note 58: Gati, Charles National Review, v49, n11, p27(3) June 16, 1997  Back.

Note 59: 24 Feb 97 Case of Nerves in Poland Illustrates Edginess Felt By Candidates for NATO: International Herald Tribune.  Back.

Note 60: 17 Nov. 1997 Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the results of the Hungarian referendum on NATO membership.  Back.

Note 61: Gati, Charles National Review, v49, n11, p27(3) June 16, 1997  Back.

Note 62: The folly of rapid NATO expansion. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Kamp, Karl-Heinz Foreign Policy, n98, p116(14) Spring, 1995  Back.

Note 63: 12 Feb 98 Iraqi Crisis: Hungary Receives US Request for Help in Attack on Iraq: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts  Back.

Note 64: 23 Sep 97 Czechs join NATO expansion exercise: Reuter News Service — Western Europe.  Back.

Note 65: 18 Feb 98 Russian FM sees real hope in Annan trip: Agence France Presse International.  Back.

Note 66: No NATO expansion now. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Dean, Jonathan Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v52, n3, p18(2) May-June, 1996  Back.

Note 67: 02 Apr 97 Russia AND NATO: A Case for Binding Security Guarantees: International Herald Tribune  Back.

Note 68: Russia — pm warns us about rapid NATO expansion (Feb 4/reu) Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, Feb 4, 1997  Back.

Note 69: Daniels, Robert V. The New Leader, v80, n12, p11(3) July 14, 1997  Back.

Note 70: No NATO expansion now. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Dean, Jonathan Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v52, n3, p18(2) May-June, 1996  Back.

Note 71: 08 Dec 94 Delors attacks NATO plan to expand east: Financial Times  Back.

Note 72: 16 May 97 Middle East Times: Britain’s role in Europe: Asia Intelligence Wire  Back.

Note 73: 14 May 97 Strobe Talbott remarks on US-EU relations, EMU: European Commission Press Releases  Back.

Note 74: Preserving the new peace: the case against NATO expansion. Mandelbaum, Michael Foreign Affairs, v74, n3, p9(5) May-June, 1995  Back.

Note 75: 01 Aug 97 Middle East Times: The NATO distraction: Asia Intelligence Wire  Back.

Note 76: Gati, Charles National Review, v49, n11, p27(3) June 16, 1997  Back.

Note 77: 08 Mar 97 The Very Tricky Consequences of a NATO Deal With Russia: International Herald Tribune.  Back.

Note 78: Phillips, Andrew Maclean’s, v110, n28, p26(2) July 14, 1997.  Back.

Note 79: Europe: NATO expansion and the European border states Inter Press Service, June 27, 1997  Back.

Note 80: The folly of rapid NATO expansion. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Kamp, Karl-Heinz Foreign Policy, n98, p116(14) Spring, 1995  Back.

Note 81: Newman, Richard J. U.S. News & World Report, v123, n2, p34(4) July 14, 1997  Back.