|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 3/99
Reuniting, When Does It Feel So Good? The Causes of Irredentist Movements or Four out of Five Irredentists Agree: Size Does Matter, Relatively *
Stephen M. Saideman
Department of Political Science
Texas Tech University
R. William Ayres
Department of Political Science
University of Mississippi
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Acknowledgements:
The authors would like to thank Ted Gurr, Anne Pitsch and The Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland for generously providing access to the Minorities at Risk Dataset and help with using both Phase I and Phase III. All errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
Political movements to unite the territory of part of an ethnic group with the territories of other segments, otherwise known as irredentism, have caused some of the most significant threats to international peace and stability in the 1990’s. The effort or sentiment to re-unite “lost territories” and bring together ethnic kin has caused conflict in the Balkans: the war for Greater Serbia, the quest for a Greater Croatia, the Kosovo conflict’s potential to spawn a Greater Albania, as well as Greek fears of Macedonian irredentism. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is an irredentist one, as the Armenians have fought to “retrieve” Nagorno-Karabakh (Kaufman, forthcoming). The disintegration of Somalia is largely a product of its failed efforts to unite all Somalis in a Greater Somalia (Saideman 1998a). One could argue that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an irredentist one, as Israeli extremists claim portions of Jordan as their own, and as the Palestinians desire more control over their lost territories. The possibility of a Kurdistan threatens the territorial integrity of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. The recent nuclear tests by Pakistan and India are more alarming than would otherwise be the case due to the competing claims over the Kashmir region, with Pakistan seeking to unite their kin in Kashmir with the rest of Pakistan. Finally, perhaps the greatest threat to peace in the next decade is the growth of Chinese nationalism and its implications for Taiwan’s security. 1
While much work has focused on whether a state will give assistance to its ethnic kin (Chazan 1991a, Saideman 1998a, McMahon 1998), and on other aspects of the international relations of irredentism (Carment 1993, Carment and James 1995, 1997), relatively little research has focused on why groups desire to be joined with their ethnic kin elsewhere. The focus of this study is to consider under what conditions will an ethnic group want to be united or re-united with their ethnic kin elsewhere.
Serbia’s varying support for Serbs in the former Yugoslavia suggests this paper’s puzzle: why do some groups seek to reunite with their homelands and others do not. In a study of Serbia’s irredentism (Saideman 1998a), it was most striking that Serbia strongly supported Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, but not those in Slovenia or Macedonia. The usual answer is that there were no Serbs in Slovenia (which is not true). A second answer is that there were Serbs within Bosnia and Croatia that wanted to be part of a Greater Serbia, while Serbs elsewhere did not have such desires, or at least, did not organize to express them. While the existence of irredentist movements in the former was partly a consequence of Serbia’s policies, it still raises the interesting question: why do some groups seek to be united with ethnic groups elsewhere while others do not? This question is important for international security since the existence of an irredentist movement not only challenges the host state’s stability, but also raises the salience of that group’s plight in the domestic politics of other states. For instance, if Russians in the Baltics were to agitate for re-integration into Russia, the probability that Russia’s politics will focus on Russians in the Near Abroad increases. In turn, this would affect Russian politics in two ways: it might change the policies of those in power as they anticipate the issue or it might change the balance of power.
Parallel to the puzzle of why groups choose irredentism is the question of ethnic separatist movements; Donald Horowitz argues that secession and irredentism should be considered together since they are sometimes alternatives to each other (1991, 9). 2 Therefore, we should also consider whether the forces that cause groups to seek independence are similar to the factors causing groups to seek annexation by their ethnic kin elsewhere. Elsewhere, we (Ayres and Saideman 1998) have studied some factors (domestic political dynamics and international forces) that can cause groups to be actively separatist. Because separatism can refer to both irredentist and secessionist groups, and the data we used includes both kinds of phenomena in the dependent variable, 3 our previous study did not differentiate between secession and irredentism. By using different dependent variables, one indicating the presence or absence of secessionist desires and the other indicating irredentist designs on the part of ethnic groups, we may be able to determine if whether the two phenomena really are alternatives, and if so, what causes a group to desire independence or union with kin elsewhere.
We have chosen to approach these questions by developing hypotheses about why groups choose irredentism and secessionism, based on the Yugoslav experience, literature in the field, and some of our own previous work (Ayres and Saideman 1998, Saideman 1998b). We believe that the existing literature and recent history suggest five competing explanations, focusing on: the nature of the group; the characteristics and behavior of the group’s kin elsewhere; contagion processes; ethnic security dilemmas; and the end of the Cold War. The next section will outline these different logics and draw out testable hypotheses from them. We will then go on to test these various hypotheses, using both Phase 1 and Phase 3 of the Minorities At Risk dataset. Finally, we will draw out the implications of this study for future work.
Different Explanations, Different Logics: Hypotheses About Irredentism and Secessionism
Group Characteristics
The work on Serbia’s irredentism (Saideman 1998a) was ultimately inconclusive as to which factors caused Slovenia and Macedonia to be less salient in Serbia’s domestic politics. The first contrast between Slovenia and Macedonia on one hand and Bosnia and Croatia on the other relates to size. The number of Serbs in the former, both absolutely and relative to the rest of republics’ population, was much smaller than the Serb populations in the latter. There are good reasons to suspect that size matters: that really smaller groups are unlikely to be irredentist because the likelihood for success and the consequences of failure are in part related to size. Small groups are very unlikely to be successful, and are very likely to lose quite badly. This logic suggests some general, testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Groups that are a larger percentage of a state’s population are more likely to be irredentist or secessionist.
Hypothesis 1b: Groups with larger populations (in absolute terms) are more likely to be irredentist or secessionist.
There is another logic in the importance of demographics, separate from numbers: the relative placement of populations. Separatist groups of all types have claims to a particular territory, and usually reside in that territory. Secession is about claiming independence for a territory, so widely dispersed groups cannot pursue this option. Likewise, if a group were very dispersed, it would be quite difficult to unite with their ethnic kin elsewhere. This leads to another hypothesis regarding group demographics and tendency to separatism.
Hypothesis 2: A more widely dispersed group is less likely to seek independence or union with their kin.
One of the classic arguments in the field of comparative ethnic politics is that the more distinct a group when compared to others living in the state, the more likely ethnic conflict will develop (Lipset, 1960, 211-225). A group that speaks a different language but shares the same religion and race with other groups is less likely to be as frustrated, as alienated, and as vulnerable as a group that speaks a different language, is of a different race, and practices a different religion than the rest of society; in addition, the latter sort of group presents an “easier” target for political discrimination by elites seeking to manipulate resources. In addition, the ancient hatreds or primordial arguments suggest that the ethnic differences are more important than political or situational variables, because they form the base antecedents for political discrimination. 4 Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Groups having more ethnic differences with the other inhabitants of their state are more likely to seek independence or union with their kin.
The Role Played By Ethnic Kin
Another argument, separate from the logic that internal demographics determine separatism, looks outside the state to a group’s nearby ethnic kin. This argument is also suggested by the Yugoslavia case (it has been popular to blame the Serb irredentist movements not on the Serbs in Krajina or other regions, but on Milosevic in Belgrade). Scholars have examined some aspects of this question; Saideman (1998a) focuses on how ethnic ties and political competition interact to cause leaders of states to support irredentist movements or even invade, despite the consequences of such actions. McMahon (1998) takes a similar line of argument, but stresses the constraints imposed by the international system to consider under what conditions states will initiate irredentist crises; she also focuses more directly on the importance of territory. Like McMahon, Carment and James (Carment 1993, Carment and James 1995, 1997) consider various features of irredentist crises. However, their questions focus more on whether irredentist conflicts are more likely to be violent, what kinds of political systems are more likely to engage in aggressively irredentist foreign policies, and what kinds of crisis management techniques are used.
The only book-length study of irredentism in the 1990’s focuses on irredentism as “nationalistically rationalized state territorial expansion (Chazan 1991c, 141).” The book does note that a second kind of irredentism can occur: an ethnic group that resides in multiple states but does not rule any may want to join together to form a new state (Chazan 1991a, 2). The most obvious example of this would be the Kurds. The starting logic here is that the existence and behavior of ethnic kin outside the group’s state are crucial. Thus,
Hypothesis 4: Groups having kin elsewhere that are separatist will be more likely to be irredentist or secessionist. 5
Further, the greater the number of segments of an ethnic group existing in other states, the more likely that group is to get help from at least some of their kin, and the more likely it is to desire a tighter relationship with at least one segment. The logic here is simply that the more states in which an ethnic group’s kin resides, the more opportunities exist for at least one supporter to develop and one potential homeland with which to reunite:
Hypothesis 5: Groups having more segments in other states are more likely to be secessionist or irredentist.
Weiner (1971) uses as his inspiration the Balkans as well in his influential and presciently entitled “The Macedonian Syndrome” to develop a better understanding of irredentism. While he focuses largely on the international politics of irredentism, he does argue that an ethnic minority is most likely to become irredentist if its ethnic kin are in the majority in a neighboring state (1971, 674). If the ethnic kin are not in majority, then the group will be secessionist. This suggests one area where the forces generating irredentism and secessionism may be different.
Thus,
Hypothesis 6a: Groups whose kin dominate a nearby state are more likely to be irredentist.
Hypothesis 6b: Groups whose kin do not dominate a nearby state are more likely to be secessionist.
Contagion and Diffusion
Analysts have argued that ethnic conflict spreads across state boundaries. 6 Scholars have argued either that ethnic conflict directly causes other conflicts nearby (diffusion), or that it causes more conflict as actors elsewhere learn from the example set by the original combatants
(contagion) (Vasquez 1992, 162). While some of our own previous work (Ayres and Saideman 1998) explores whether contagion and diffusion are causal factors for separatist movements in general, we have not yet looked at whether they effect irredentism or secessionism as separate phenomena.
Ted Gurr (1993a) has provided some empirical evidence supporting these arguments as they relate to rebellion and protest. He develops indicators to capture the notion of diffusion: what is the highest level of protest (violent or nonviolent) of a group’s kin in another state
[ISEGPRO]; and what is the highest rebellion level for a group’s ethnic brethren in another state [ISEGREB]. Gurr also develops separate indicators for contagion: the mean level of protests among all groups in the same region and category [ICONPRO]; and the mean level of rebellion among the same reference group [ICONREB]. He finds that the diffusion and contagion variables are highly correlated with group protest and rebellion. (Gurr 1993a, 181). However, once multivariate regressions are performed, diffusion and contagion indicators play a much less significant role. Since our focus in this study is different, we use different dependent variables, desires for independence or ‘reunion’, to determine whether contagion and diffusion apply to these phenomena.
Diffusion refers to processes inherent in ethnic conflict that cause it to spread. For instance, ethnic conflicts can cause refugee flows that destabilize neighboring states (Robertson 1995, Weiner 1996). Millions of Bengalis escaping to India in 1971 stressed the ethnic relations of the region to which they fled. More recently, Rwanda’s ethnic conflict has been exported to other Central African states, particularly the Congo, as the combatants in Rwanda have become participants in the conflicts in neighboring states.
Contagion refers to the spread of ethnic conflict through the lessons drawn by outside actors. A particular conflict may cause others to develop new calculations regarding their chances of success, the costs they are likely to face, or simply increase the salience of ethnic identity (Kuran 1998). One conflict can cause others to learn and adopt new strategies (Hill, Rothchild, and Cameron 1998, 97).
Diffusion suggests that ethnic conflict in neighboring states is likely to spill over, increasing the likelihood of a group’s separatism. While the empirical literature focuses on how rebellion encourages rebellion, and protest encourages protest, it is logical that rebellion and protest in neighboring states may increase a group’s desire to secede or join with another state, by raising the salience of ethnic identity, by increasing the fears of the ruling regime (and perhaps causing an over-reaction), and through refugee flows and the like. 7 This suggests the following:
Hypothesis 7: The existence of anti-regime activity by kindred groups in neighboring states will increase the likelihood that a group will seek independence or seek union with their ethnic kin elsewhere.
Contagion arguments suggest that groups are more likely to focus on the behavior of groups in their region than elsewhere since these groups are more similar and because news of these other groups is more likely to reach activists within the group in question. Therefore, local events are more likely to increase the probability of secessionism or irredentism than events elsewhere.
Hypothesis 8: If a group resides in a region characterized by a high level of protest or rebellion by other ethnic groups, then the group will be more likely to seek independence or union with their ethnic kin elsewhere.
Ethnic Security Dilemmas
A very different kind of argument focuses on domestic political dynamics. The ethnic security dilemma, inspired by the concept from international relations, 8 focuses on the competition between ethnic groups for control of the government if its impartiality is in doubt (Saideman 1996, 1998). 9 If ethnic groups are relatively secure, as the state is seen as impartial or irrelevant, then groups will not compete for control of the state. However, if they are insecure, then they will either seek to control the state, create a new state that they can control—secession, or join a state where their ethnic group is more secure—irredentism. Our previous work (Ayres and Saideman 1998) has looked at these as factors in ethnic separatism, but as with the contagion and diffusion arguments above, we have not yet examined their impact on irredentism and secessionism as separate “choices.”
What makes an ethnic group insecure? If other groups within the state or the state itself threaten a group’s political, economic, or physical security, then the group will be insecure. This suggests different kinds of ethnic insecurity, which in turn suggest different hypotheses.
Political Security
Because the government controls the means of coercion, it is the most powerful potential ally and the greatest possible threat for any ethnic group. The security dilemma in this context is where one group tries to gain control over the state, or perhaps just access. This effort threats the ability of others to control the state, or perhaps only threatening the impartiality of the government. The other groups respond by trying to capture the state. Consequently, groups having less control over the government will be more insecure and seek other means to ensure their security, including secession or irredentism. The Yugoslav experience suggests this same logic; it could be argued that the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia faced more significant threats to their security and well being than those elsewhere. The Badinter Commission ruled in January 1992 that Slovenia and Macedonia deserved diplomatic recognition because they met the various human rights criteria while Bosnia and Croatia did not. While there is much controversy over these rulings, 10 they do reflect significant differences in how each government treated its minorities. This suggests a basic hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: Groups facing discrimination will be more likely to seek independence or union with their ethnic kin elsewhere.
It might be argued that democracies are better equipped to handle ethnic conflict. The ethnic security dilemma is agnostic when it comes to regime type, as ethnic groups in democracies may be disenfranchised (Palestinians in Israel, African-Americans in the US before 1965, etc.), and political competition within democracies may be at the expense of minorities (Horowitz 1985). Indeed, an essential element of ethnic security dilemma arguments is competition between politicians within a particular ethnic group exacerbates the ethnic security dilemma (Saideman 1998b). While competition exists within both authoritarian and democratic systems, it is probably stronger and more influential in democracies.
Hypothesis 10: Groups in democracies are equally likely to seek independence or retrieval.
Economic Security:
A similar logic suggests that when group identities coincide with economic differences, groups will feel more insecure. To gain control over their economic destinies, they will seek to become more autonomous, increasing the likelihood of secession or irredentism. Thus, the economic component of the security dilemma produces another hypothesis that is in common with hypothesis 9: economic discrimination leads to separatism. We will test this hypothesis in conjunction with its political variant using political and economic differentials measures, outlined in the next section.
In addition to the importance of economic differentials, there may be a general effect from overall economic conditions. Negative economic trends may cause ethnic groups to have more conflicts with each other over increasingly scarce resources, and may exacerbate existing economic differentials; while positive economic trends make it easier for governments to satisfy the concerns of all groups, and lessen the effects of differential treatment by applying the logic of “a rising tide lifts all boats.” This suggests a separate testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 11: Groups in states with higher levels of economic growth are less likely to seek independence or union with their kin.
Physical Security:
One aspect of physical security is a factor discussed above: size. Smaller groups are more likely to be insecure, as they are out-manned and probably out-gunned. In any violent conflict numbers matter, so such groups should want to be in a different state. This hypothesis predicts behavior that is contrary to what we have gleaned from the Yugoslav experience; this prediction will be tested when we test Hypothesis 1a, above.
There is another aspect to physical security: the existence of ongoing violence as a threat to group members. Groups facing violence will seek independence or union so that they are no longer in the same state as their attackers.
Hypothesis 12: The more conflict a group has within a state, the more likely it desires to secede or to be retrieved.
The End of Empire
There is one final explanation for separatism not included in the above groups—the end of empire phenomenon. In Chazan’s conclusion to her study, she argues that irredentism has been correlated with “major political reordering... [and] usually tied to the breakdown of empires (Chazan 1991c, 143). In our own previous work, this logic has been suggested (Ayres 1997) and tested with regards to separatist movements in general (Ayres and Saideman 1998). This broader logic suggests an immediate prediction when studying forms of separatism in the 1990’s—that recent irredentism and secessionism are largely a function of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, both within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. This, our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 13: In the 1990’s, groups in the former Eastern bloc should be more likely to be irredentist than those elsewhere. 11
Data and Methods
We will use both Phase 1and Phase 3 of the Minorities At Risk dataset 12 to test the hypotheses derived above. Using both datasets is advantageous for several reasons. First, Phase 1 focuses on the 1980’s while Phase 3 focuses on the 1990’s, allowing us to consider whether the dynamics of irredentism and secession have changed due to the end of the Cold War and disintegrations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Second, Phase 1 contains some data that is not included in Phase 3, while Phase 3 has better data for other variables. Third, the breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia caused certain groups to become ruling majorities and other groups to face greater risks, so the two datasets do not contain the all of the same cases. 13 By using both, we are dealing essentially with a larger number of observations than if we only used one dataset.
To determine what may cause the desire to be independent and the desire to be reunited with one’s ethnic kin, we use two dependent variables. For Phase 1 data, we have recoded the AUTON2 variable which indicates whether a group seeks union elsewhere into the dichotomous variable IRRED80X, so that a value of 1 indicates that the issue of union with kin elsewhere is at least somewhat salient. 14 We did the same to recode AUTON3, whether a group seeks independence, into SECES80X. For Phase III, we re-coded AUTRIG25 and AUTRIG35 to develop IRRED94 and SECESS94. 15
The chart below depicts the testable hypotheses and the related variables from the two datasets.
Table 1: Hypotheses and Indicators
| Hypotheses | Phase 1 Indicator | Phase 3 Indicator |
|---|---|---|
| H1a: Groups that are a larger percentage of a state’s population are more likely to be irredentist. | GROUPOP | PRO95 |
| H1b: Groups with larger populations are more likely to be irredentist. | BESTPOP | POP95 |
| H2: A more widely dispersed group is less likely to be secessionist or irredentist. | CONCENXX | GROUPCON |
| H3: Groups that have more ethnic differences are more likely to be secessionist or irredentist. | ETHDIFXX | ETHDIFXX |
| H4: A group that has kin elsewhere that are separatist will be more likely to be irredentist. | SEPKIN | SEPKIN |
| H5: Groups having more segments in other states are more likely to be secessionist or irredentist. | NUMSEGX | NUMSEGX 16 |
| H6: Groups whose kin dominate a nearby state are more likely to be irredentist, and those whose kin do not dominate a nearby state are more likely to be secessionist | IDOMSEG | IDOMSEG |
| H7: Anti-regime activity by kindred groups in neighboring are more likely to be secessionist or irredentist.. | ISEGPRO8 ISEGREB8 |
ISEGPRO9 ISEGREB9 |
| H8: If a group resides in a region characterized by a high level of protest or rebellion by other ethnic groups, then the group will be more likely to be secessionist or irredentist.. | ICONPRO8 ICONREB8 |
ICONPRO9 ICONREB9 |
| H9: Groups that are disadvantaged are more likely to be irredentist. | POLDIFX 17 ECDIFX | POLDFIX ECDIFX |
| H10: Groups in democracies are equally likely to be secessionist or irredentist. | NDEM86 | NDEM94 |
| H11: Groups in states with higher levels of economic growth are less likely to be secessionist or irredentist. | NECGRO | Not Available |
| H12: The more conflict a group has within a state, the more likely it will be secessionist or irredentist. | REBEL80X | REBEL90X |
| H13: In the 1990’s, groups in the former Eastern bloc should be more likely to be irredentist than those elsewhere. | FSU 18 | FSU |
To test the relationships of these variables to the dependent variables, we chose to use logistical regression procedures since our dependent variables are dichotomous. Table 2 depicts the regressions, and tables 3 and 4 depict how changes in the significant independent variables increase or decrease the probability of irredentist and secessionist desires.
Table 2: Determining the Sources of Irredentist and Secessionist Desires
| Concept Group | Variables | Irredentism 1980’s | Irredentism 1990’s | Secessionism 1980’s | Secessionism 1990’s |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demographics | Relative Group Size | 10.08** | 5.52** | 11.18** | 1.72 |
| Absolute Size of Group (in 1000’s) |
-0.20 | -0.05 | -0.01 | -0.01 | |
| Concentration of the Group | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.63 | 0.52** | |
| How Ethnically Distinct is Group? | -0.01 | -0.13 | 0.31* | 0.00 | |
| External Segments of Ethnic Kin | Is Kin Separatist? | 2.21** | 2.29** | 0.31 | 1.11** |
| Number of Segments Elsewhere | .69* | 0.19 | -0.26 | -.33 | |
| Does Group’s Ethnic Kin Dominate Neighboring State? | 1.58* | 1.13* | 0.49 | .67 | |
| Contagion and Diffusion | Highest Level of Protest by International Segments of Ethnic Group in 1980s | -.70* | 0.30* | -.64* | -0.15 |
| Mean Level of Protest in Region in 1980’s | -0.17 | 4.76** | 0.20 | 2.23** | |
| Ethnic Security Dilemmas | Economic Differentials | 0.31 | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.17 |
| Political Differentials | 0.16 | -0.39 | 0.34 | -0.10 | |
| Regime Type of Host State | 0.28 | 0.10 | 0.37** | 0.15** | |
| Country’s Economic Growth Rate | -0.48** | — | -0.07 | — | |
| Level of Rebellion, 1980’s | .28* | .24** | .39** | .53** | |
| End of Empire | Eastern Europe and (Former) USSR | 3.41 | 0.92 | -7.23 | .14 |
| Constant | -6.62** | -13.74** | -11.44** | -8.56** | |
| Correctly Predicted (model) | 88.17% | 91.32% | 84.65% | 84.47% | |
| Correctly Predicted (irredentism/secessionism) | 55.00% | 38.46% | 62.50% | 48.98% | |
| Reduction of Error | 44.99% | 26.89% | 40.52% | 30.59% | |
| Reduction of Error: Irredentist/Secessionist Cases | 42.67% | 30.17% | 49.46% | 34.27% | |
| Pseudo-r squared | 0.532 | 0.489 | 0.584 | 0.408 | |
| N | 93 | 219 | 93 | 219 | |
| Significance | 0.0006 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
Values are logistic regression coefficients
* = p <. 1, ** = p <.05
Table 3: Influence of Significant Variables on Irredentism
| 1980’s | 1990’s | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change | Change | |||
| From Mean Relative Group Size (1980= 10.9%; 1994=11.5%) | 19.9% | 11.5% | ||
| to Smallest (1980’s=.04%; 1990’s=.07%) | 7.7% | -12.2% | 1.7% | -9.8% |
| to Largest (85%) | 99.8% | 79.9% | 64.8% | 53.3% |
| From No Separatist Kin | 12.5% | 2.0% | ||
| to Existence of Separatist Kin | 56.6% | 44.1% | 17.0% | 15.0% |
| From One Segment Elsewhere | 17.0% | Not significant in 90’s | ||
| To No Segments Elsewhere | 9.3% | -7.7% | ||
| ToMaximum (4) Segments Elsewhere | 61.9% | 44.9% | ||
| From No Adjoining States Dominated by Kin | 15.2% | 2.3% | ||
| To At Least One State Dominated by Kin | 46.5% | 31.3% | 6.8% | 4.5% |
| Ethnic kin are engaging in protest (1980’s=.83; 1990’s=1.8) | 19.9% | 3.1% | ||
| To Minimum Level of Protest (0) | 30.8% | 10.9% | 2.7% | -0.4% |
| To Maximum Level of Protest (5) | 1.3% | -18.6% | 7.7% | 4.6% |
| Protest in the Region (mean = 1.67) | Not Significant in 80’s | 5.6% | ||
| To Minimum Level of Protest (1.3) | 0.5% | -5.1% | ||
| To Maximum Level of Protest (2.13) | 22.3% | 16.7% | ||
| Mean Economic Growth (1.527) | 19.9% | Not available for 90’s | ||
| To Host With Worst Growth Rate (-7.2%) | 94.3% | 74.4% | ||
| To Host With Best Growth Rate (8.3%) | 1.0% | -18.9% | ||
| Mean rebellion (1980’s=1.79; 1990’s=1.69) | 19.9% | 3.1% | ||
| To No Rebellion | 13.1% | -6.8% | 2.1% | -1.0% |
| To Protracted Civil War | 71.3% | 51.4% | 10.2% | 7.1% |
Table 4: Influence of Significant Variables on Secessionism
| 1980’s | 1990’s | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change | Change | |||
| From Mean Relative Group Size (1980=10.9%; 1994=11.5%) | 2.1% | Not significant in 90’s | ||
| to Smallest (1980’s=.04%; 1990’s=.07%) | 0.6% | -1.5% | ||
| to Largest (85%) | 98.9% | 96.8% | ||
| Mean Concentration of Group (2.09) | Not significant for 80’s | 12.7% | ||
| to Lowest Concentration (0) | 4.7% | -8.0% | ||
| to Highest Concentration (3) | 19.0% | 6.3% | ||
| From No Separatist Kin | Not significant for 80’s | 10.6% | ||
| to Existence of Separatist Kin | 26.4% | 15.8% | ||
| From Mean Ethnic Distinctiveness (5.90) | 2.1% | Not significant in 90’s | ||
| To No Ethnic Differences (0) | 0.3% | -1.8% | ||
| To Maximum Ethnic Differences (11) | 9.6% | 7.5% | ||
| Ethnic kin are engaging in mean protest levels (.83) | 2.1% | Not significant in 90’s | ||
| To Minimum Level of Protest (0) | 3.6% | 1.5% | ||
| To Maximum Level of Protest (5) | 0.2% | -1.9% | ||
| Protest in the Region (mean = 1.67) | Not Significant in 80’s | 12.7% | ||
| To Minimum Level of Protest (1.3) | 6.0% | -6.7% | ||
| To Maximum Level of Protest (2.13) | 29.0% | 16.3% | ||
| From Extreme Authoritarian Regime (0) | 0.7% | 6.5% | ||
| To Democracy (10) | 22.8% | 22.1% | 24.4% | 17.9% |
| Mean rebellion (1980’s=1.79; 1990’s=1.69) | 2.1% | 12.7% | ||
| To No Rebellion | 1.1% | -1.0% | 5.6% | -7.1% |
| To Protracted Civil War | 35.0% | 32.9% | 71.1% | 58.4% |
Interpreting Our Findings
The logistic regressions for the two time periods and two dependent variables produced some very consistent results, but also some interesting differences among the four analyses. 19 First, we will focus on the findings that were consistent between the secession and irredentism tests. Then, we will discuss those findings that suggest real differences between the two phenomena. Finally, we will address the dogs that did not bark and other interesting findings.
Explaining Separatism: Consistent Findings
The first finding that we should note is that relative size does matter, except for secessionism in the 1990’s. Groups that are large when compared to the populations of their host state were significantly more likely to desire union with their brethren elsewhere and to desire independence. Tables 3 and 4 indicate that changes in relative size have perhaps the largest impact on whether groups desire some form of separatism. However, the absolute size of groups does not seem to matter. One of the problems in focusing solely on the Yugoslav case was that it was hard to disentangle the possible effects of relative and absolute size. This study suggests that only relative size matters. Groups that are relatively big are more likely to desire independence or seek union with their kin elsewhere, while groups that may be quite large on an absolute scale are less likely to seek independence or union if they happen to reside in countries with larger populations. Some possible explanations include: relatively larger groups will have a greater probability of being successful since the numbers of likely allies compared to likely enemies is critical in war; and relatively larger groups are more likely to have resources with which to mobilize support domestically, compared to the host state. Clearly, we require more theoretical and empirical work to determine precisely how relative size influences the desires of groups.
Another observation within the context of group demographics is that where relative size matters, group concentration does not (and vice versa), as group concentration is only significant for the 1990 test of secessionist desires. While possible explanations for the importance of relative size include both physical (numbers in war) and political (group mobilization) resources, the finding that concentration does not matter where relative size does suggests that the latter may be more important than the former. If mobilization to ethnic separatism were a matter of physical security (as suggested by Posen’s argument on ethnic security dilemmas; Posen 1993), concentration should matter precisely because a group’s distribution in space affects its ability to defend itself. If, on the other hand, ethnic separatism were a more political and social phenomenon, we would expect the important factors to be communications channels among members of the group, which may easily transcend distance. While this finding does not prove that politics are more important than physical security, it suggests a dynamic that would be a useful target of further study.
Second, the existence, power, and behavior of ethnic kin seem to play a powerful role in influencing the desires of ethnic groups. A group with their ethnic kin dominating a neighboring state had a significant higher probability of desiring retrieval. This is as expected, since a group would generally find it more attractive to join a state dominated by their ethnic kin than a state where their brethren did not rule. Likewise, the existence of separatist kin provided strong, positive and significant results. Specifically, in the 1980’s, if there was active separatism among a group’s kin elsewhere, the likelihood of the group desiring union increased by more than forty-four percent, while the impact of this variable is somewhat smaller in the 1990’s’s. To be irredentist, a group must join with another state or with ethnic kin who are seeking independence or union themselves. Thus, the fact that these two variables provide strong, positive correlations with irredentism is not surprising since they are necessary conditions for any irredentist effort.
These two variables, ethnic kin dominance of neighboring state and separatist ethnic kin, are not as consistent in the shaping of secessionist desires. They do not seem to play a significant role in shaping secessionist desires in the 1980’s, but separatist kin does seem to influence secessionist desires in the 1990’s. The influence of separatist kin nearby suggests that there may be something to the contagion arguments.
Third, external events seem to impact groups similarly, regardless of they desire independence or union. International protests by one’s ethnic kin reduces the likelihood that a group will desire independence or re-union in the 1980’s. This is the opposite of what a diffusion argument would expect. Instead of increasing the salience of ethnic identity and mobilizing greater opposition to their regime, protests by segments elsewhere seem to make opposition, in the forms of either secessionist or irredentist sentiments less likely. This may make some sense: a group’s kin that is not actively separatist (we control for that with SEPKIN) but is protesting their situation may discourage their kin from desiring independence or union by showing another way to achieve one’s goals.
Two features of our analysis suggest that the contagion/diffusion argument might still apply. The protests of ethnic kin have a positive, though quite small effect in the 1990’s. Further, the protest behavior of non-kin in the same region does seem to matter quite a lot. Groups in regions characterized by the highest levels of protest were sixteen percent more likely to desire irredentism or secession. This suggests that the protest of ethnic kin may actually discourage groups from desiring independence or union, but that the protests of unrelated groups may encourage groups to secede or become irredentist. We can understand this finding, as we comprehended the same kind of contradiction in the previous paragraph. That is, once we control for both the separatism and the protest activity of one’s ethnic kin, the protest activity of other groups in the region may raise the salience of one’s identity.
Fourth, rebellion matters quite consistently across the board, increasing the likelihood that a group will desire independence or reunion, and as tables 3 and 4 indicate, rebellion’s influence is more than marginal. The problem with considering rebellion as a cause of these desires is that it can also be a consequence. 20 Groups with greater desires to become independent or reunited with lost kin are probably more likely to be repressed, increasing the level of conflict between the group and the state. Here we have a severe chicken and egg problem—what comes first: the desire to depart the state (secede or be retrieved) or the hostile relationship between the state and the group? Only a time series analysis can get at this.
Fifth, neither political nor economic discrimination seemed to play a role here. Economic differentials consistently had small, positive coefficients with none reaching levels of statistical significance. Political differentials had small positive coefficients in the 1980’s and small negative coefficients in the 1990’s. These findings suggest that differences in political and economic power and security do not directly drive the desires of groups to secede, although they may either matter on the margin or matter through some other indicator. This contradicts the security dilemma argument, the lessons we gleaned from the Yugoslav experience, and the conventional wisdom.
Finally, groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were not significantly more likely to desire independence or secession in the 1980’s nor in the 1990’s. This again contradicts our common sense about the causal effects of the decline of empires, as Chazan avers and as the security dilemma suggests. Given the upheaval and uncertainty in this region, we should see groups there having a much greater likelihood of seeking independence or trying to re-draw boundaries created by the Soviet Union. Instead, other factors seem be capturing the variation that exists. 21
Overall, we can see substantially more support for some of the arguments than for others. Relative size clearly matters, as does the existence and behavior of nearby ethnic kin groups. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that contagion may work in directions opposite those expected, and that diffusion, while potentially important, is only important once the behavior of kin groups is taken into account. Likewise, the ethnic security dilemma arguments—as operationalized here—received less support than expected, although level of internal rebellion (with its attached problems of causality) does seem to play a role. Finally, the collapse of empire argument, while popular theoretically, finds no support here—another finding that suggests that conventional wisdoms need more careful empirical examination.
Different Choices: Secessionism vs. Irredentism
Several variables distinguished irredentism from secessionism. Two variables may have influenced irredentism in the 1980’s: the country’s economic growth rate and the number of segments elsewhere. The logic of the economic security dilemma suggests that it is important to control for economic growth because a country growing economically would be better able to satisfy their ethnic groups than countries facing economic declines. This study bears out our intuition, as table 3 indicates. Surprising, this variable does not seem to influence secessionism. Unfortunately, this data was not available in Phase 3, so we could not determine the effects of economic change (as opposed to economic differentials) in the 1990’s. Nevertheless, this finding suggests that economic well-being may be a more important factor for those considering reunion with others than it is for those considering complete independence—a finding which could have important policy implications for states dealing with potential irredentist movements.
The number of segments of an ethnic group in adjoining countries is also significantly and positively correlated with irredentism in the 1980’s. Just having one segment, as opposed to none, increased the likelihood of irredentist desires by about eight percent, and going from none to four segments (the maximum in the 1980’s) increased the chances of irredentism by fifty-two percent. The notion here was that the more countries in which a group’s segments resided, the more chances for support and the greater the potential targets for “re-union.” Interestingly, this indicator had negative correlations (though short of statistical significance) with secessionist desires. If secessionism and irredentism are truly alternatives to one another, then perhaps one of the key variables pushing a group to desire one or the other is whether irredentism is at all feasible. The absence of segments means that a group cannot be irredentist. 22 This does not contradict the results concerning dominant or separatist kin, because as one controls for the existence of ethnic kin, a group is more likely to be secessionist if those kin are either secessionist or dominant.
Several variables were significantly correlated with desires for secession. Most strikingly, the more democratic a state, the more likely groups will desire secession. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom that one can pursue one’s political demands within a democracy without seceding. However, one core aspect of democracy is political competition, and political competition in an ethnically divided society may be at the expense of particular ethnic groups. 23 The events of the past decade suggest that this finding should not be so surprising, given the upsurge in secessionism as democratization spread throughout the world. While being autocratic may not be a solution to ethnic conflict, 24 democratizing does seem to cause groups to desire independence, though not necessarily union with brethren.
Concentration of a group also seemed to matter for secessionism, but not for irredentism. It is hard to imagine an ethnically dispersed group seeking to become an independent state. Because of secession’s inherent territorial component, compactness of the population does seem to be a necessary condition. 25 Concentration does not seem to limit the desires of groups to be joined with their ethnic kin elsewhere, however. This may suggest that irredentism is not as territorial in nature as secession. 26
Ethnically distinct groups are significantly more likely to desire secession in the 1980’s, but perhaps not in the 1990’s. In the 1980’s, a group with no ethnic differences has an almost zero chance of desiring independence, but a group having the maximum number of differences is nine percent more likely to desire independence. Ethnic differences do not seem to influence irredentist desires in either decade or secessionism in the 1990’s. This finding can be interpreted to reinforce the above findings on the importance of ethnic kin outside the state and their differential impact on irredentism and secessionism. As the finding on numbers of ethnic segments points out, opportunity is important for irredentist movements, with greater numbers of ethnic allies providing more opportunity (in the form of potential allies and mobilization resources) to pursue reunion. This same general logic is likely true for leaders of secessionist movements: any group that seeks to overturn the status quo by engaging in separatism (of whatever form) will have to face the substantial costs of doing so, and believe that those costs can be borne before action is initiated. In the case of irredentism, external allies can provide support to overcome those costs; indeed, as the case of Milosevic in Serbia suggests, such support can be a crucial part of the irredentism decision. On the other hand, potential secessionists are less likely to have dedicated allies abroad, so they seek to establish an independent state on their own. Secessionists must therefore muster the resources to overcome the “startup costs” of launching a separatist movement internally. Here, a higher level of ethnic distinctiveness would be an asset as greater levels of ethnic difference can help strengthen the identity of a group and provide a point around which to mobilize the masses. This particular finding in our data is only suggestive of such an argument; more work—particularly in the form of comparative case studies—is necessary to determine of these kinds of processes are crucial in driving secessionist or irredentist decisions.
Overall, our findings do suggest that irredentism and secessionism are in some ways alternative choices, and that the situation—political and demographic—in which groups find themselves has a lot to do with which one they will choose. The different nature of the goals—a new state vs. potential merger with an already-existing state—dictate different political and physical needs. An interesting question—not addressed by this study—is whether groups choose one option or another before assessing the current environment; or whether groups decide first that separatism is necessary, and then determine which form is more appropriate.
Conclusions
What are we to make of these results? Clearly, irredentism and secessionism are driven by some common factors and differentiated by a few. As Yugoslavia’s demise hinted, relative size does matter, as relatively large groups are likely to desire independence or “re-union.” Likewise, one’s ethnic kin matters, as groups with separatist or dominant kin are significantly more likely to desire secession or irredentism. The existence, desires, and dominance of groups’ relatives may be necessary for irredentist desires to exist in any meaningful way. For secession, the correlation between the separatism of a group’s kin and the group’s secessionism in the 1990’s suggests that diffusion arguments may have some explanatory power, as secessionism seems to be encouraged by the separatist activity of their kin. However, we cannot read too much into this since, like rebellion, there is a chicken and egg problem: does the kin’s activity cause a group to desire secession, or does the group’s desires cause their kin to be separatist? A third possibility is that the secessionist desires of the group and the separatist activity of the kin are both caused by something else. To untangle the possibilities, we either need to develop a time series analysis of some kind, or go back to case studies to determine what the causal mechanisms might be.
Other factors separating groups with irredentist desires from those with secessionist desires are: the existence of ethnic kin elsewhere, perhaps the level of ethnic distinctiveness, and most interestingly, the regime type of the host state. Democracies are, apparently, much friendlier breeding grounds for secessionist sentiment, but regime type does not seem to influence whether a group develops irredentist desires or not. Because political competition in democracies may spur groups to desire independence, more work needs to be done to establish the connections between political competition and ethnic conflict. 27
Most strikingly, political and economic differences do not seem to play much of a role in all of this, and groups within Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union did not differ significantly from the rest. With the possible exception of the existence of violence (rebellion), it is not clear what motivates groups to desire independence or union. Consequently, the ethnic security dilemma may not be particularly helpful for explaining why groups develop irredentist or secessionist desires, while others with similar political and economic obstacles do not.
However, the contagion/diffusion argument only receives mixed support as well. Contagion only seems to work as predicted in the 1990’s while the protest behavior of one’s kin in the 1980’s (a test of diffusion arguments) works in the opposite direction from what was expected.
This paper is perhaps the first attempt to consider what causes a group to desire union with its mother country, and also one of the very few to compare secessionism and irredentism as alternatives. Consequently, we have more questions than answers. We have determined some of the important conditions for irredentist desires to develop—relative size, dominance or separatist behavior of a group’s kin, and economic decline. However, we have not determined much in the way of political causes or motives. Regime type, political and economic differentials, and other factors do not seem to matter for irredentism. However, regime type, concentration of a group, its ethnic distinctiveness do matter for secessionist desires. While these two phenomena have some commonalties—relative size perhaps, separatism of kin, they have differences as well, so we probably should not think of them as purely alternatives to each other.
The intention of this paper was to use cross-national data analysis to test some of the implications of case studies of ethnic conflict. Now that we have determined some of the key conditions, we need to go back to case studies to determine the causal connections and the causal directions, given the endogeneity problems we have—does separatism of kin cause a group to be separatist or vice versa; and does rebellion cause irredentist or secessionist desires or the reverse? Such case studies should focus on secessionist movements where irredentist was a possibility, on the irredentist movements around the world, and see if any movements have switched between irredentist and secessionist desires over time, and if so, what caused the group to change its goals.
Appendix
|
Irredentist Groups, 1980’s
|
Irredentist groups, 1994
|
|
Secessionists, 1980’s
|
Secessionists,1994
|
References
Ayres, R. William. 1997. “Conflict Resolution in National Secessionist Conflicts: Exploring the Universe of Cases,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
Ayres, R. William and Stephen M. Saideman. 1998. “Is Separatism as Contagious as the Common Cold or as Cancer? Testing the International and Domestic Determinants of Secessionism,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Rutgers, NJ.
Chazan, Naomi, ed. 1991a. Irredentism and International Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Chazan, Naomi. 1991c. “Irredentism, Separatism, and Nationalism.” In Chazan 1991a.
Carment, David. 1993. “The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory.” Journal of Peace Research 30:137-150.
Carment, David and Patrick James. 1995. “Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, 1, (March): 82-109.
Carment, David and Patrick James.1997. “Secession and Irredenta in World Politics: The Neglected Interstate Dimension.” In Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict edited by David Carment and Patrick James, University of Pittsburgh Press, 194-231.
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich. 1997. Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification. Translated by Thomas Thornton. New York: Broadway Books.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993a. “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945.” International Political Science Review 14:161-201.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993b. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
Gurr, Ted Robert. Forthcoming. Peoples Versus States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and Accommodation at the End of the 20th Century. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
Herz, John. 1959. Political Realism and Political Idealism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hill, Stuart, Donald Rothchild, and Colin Cameron. 1998. “Tactical Information and the Diffusion of Peaceful Protests,” in Lake and Rothchild 1998.
Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. “Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections,” in Irredentism and International Politics, ed. Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 9-22.
Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lake, David and Donald Rothchild. eds. 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Libal, Michael. 1997. Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992. Westport, CN: Praeger.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Lustick, Ian. 1979. “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control.” World Politics 31.
Kaufman, Stuart. Forthcoming. The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Ethnic Violence in Post-Communist Europe. Manuscript: University of Kentucky.
Kuran, Timur. 1998. “Ethnic Dissimilation and Its International Relations,” in Lake and Rothchild 1998.
McMahon, Patrice. 1998. The Quest for Unity: Divided Nation and Irredentist Ambitio ns. Ph.D. Dissertation: Columbia University.
Posen, Barry R. 1993. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival 35: 27-47.
Robertson, Lawrence R. 1995. “Ethnic Cleansing and Conflict Contagion in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” Presented at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Conference on The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict. Davis, CA.
Rothschild, Joseph. 1981. Ethnopolitics: A conceptual framework. New York: Columbia University Press.
Saideman, Stephen M. 1996. “The Dual Dynamics of Disintegration: Ethnic Politics and Security Dilemmas in Eastern Europe,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring): 18-43.
Saideman, Stephen M. 1998a. “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and The Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring 1998): 51-93.
Saideman, Stephen M. 1998b. “Is Pandora’s Box Half-Empty Or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence Of Secession And The Domestic Sources Of Disintegration,” in Lake and Rothchild 1998. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House.
Weiner, Myron. 1971. “The Macedonian Syndrome,” World Politics Vol. 23, No. 1 (October): 665-683.
Weiner, Myron. 1996. “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows.” International Security 21,1 (Summer): 5-42.
Vasquez, John A. 1992. “Factors Related to the Contagion and Diffusion of International Violence,” The Internationalization of communal Strife, ed. Manus Midlarsky (London: Routledge.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: Find appropriate cite. Back.
Note 2: However, Horowitz’s own definitions of secession and irredentism focus on completely different kinds of actors: ethnic groups secede, whereas irredentism is when a state tries to retrieve its ethnic kin. Back.
Note 3: Minorities at Risk Phase III: Codebook: Appendix C: New Groups Codesheet. Back.
Note 4: Cite appropriate primoridal stuff—Kaplan Balkan Ghosts Back.
Note 5: This is also a logical implication of the diffusion argument presented below. If one’s kin is actively separatist, that will have an impact upon the group. It will increase the salience of ethnic identity. The group may become a supporter of their kin, which may increase tensions not only with the neighboring state but with its government has well. The separatist group in the neighboring state may also assist the group’s efforts. Thus, we should expect ethnic groups near kin that are seceding to be more likely to be separatists themselves. Back.
Note 6: “Pure contagion plays an important role in spreading communal conflicts through demonstration effects.... (Vasquez 1992, 165).” See Lake and Rothchild (1998); Gurr (1993a); Gurr (1993b); and Gurr (forthcoming). Back.
Note 7: A different test of diffusion arguments is to look at the numbers of refugeee flows and see if their movement increases ethnic conflict and separatism. This is a possible direction for future research. Back.
Note 8: For the original discussions, see Herz (1959); Jervis (1976); and Waltz (1979). For the first application to ethnic conflict, see Posen (1993). Back.
Note 9: Posen’s conceptualization (1993) focuses on the translation of traditional military-security variables to domestic politics in the absence of a state, which is different from the security dilemma presented here. Back.
Note 10: Just ask the Germans about Croatia’s suitability for recognition, Genscher 1997 and Libal 1997. Back.
Note 11: This is also a logical implication of the security dilemma, sine the decline of an empire increases the competition between groups for the remnants of the empire’s resources, as well as stimulating competition within ethnic groups for leadership. Back.
Note 12: The dataset, codebooks, codesheets, and other information are available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu:80/cidcm/mar/. Our version of the dataset will be available at: website to be named later. Back.
Note 13: Only eleven of the twenty-four groups to be considered irredentist in the 1980’s are coded as such in the 1990’s. See appendix of this article for lists of irredentist groups. Back.
Note 14: We chose to re-code the variable with “less salient” as being irredentist to provide greater variance in the dependent variable, since the frequency is already skewed towards 0. The same held true for the secessionism variable. Using a more limited dependent variable, where only groups with highly salient irredentist desires are coded as 1 yields coefficients of similar size and direction, but statistical significance becomes weaker. Back.
Note 15: Phase 3 contains data for the periods 1990-91, 1992-93 and 1994-95, but we chose to focus on the last period to maximize the contrast between the Phase I and Phase 3 tests. Because very few of the independent variables change, and because there is almost no change in the level of irredentist or secessionist desires during the first half of the 1990’s, the results do not vary much regardless of time period studied using Phase 3 variables. Back.
Note 16: Neither NUMSEGX or IDOMSEG appear in the Phase 3 dataset available on the web. Using Phase I data, information provided by Anne Pitsch, and the best estimates of the authors, we were able to code these variables. Back.
Note 17: The datasets contain variables for both differentials and discrimination. We could not use both sets of variables since they are highly correlated with each other. POLDIFX is an index composed of six other variables measuring differences in access to political power, recruitment, voting rights, and the like (ECDIFX is constructed similarly). Since the security dilemma is about access and control, these kinds of differences ought to matter a great deal. We performed analyses with the discrimination variables, and little changed. Back.
Note 18: We re-coded the region variable to be a dummy variable for whether a group is in an Eastern European state or the Soviet Union/former USSR in the 1980’s/1990’s. Back.
Note 19: We tested for multicollinearity through bivariate correlations between the various independent variables, and found no highly correlated variables, once we dropped ISEGREB and ICONREB from the analysis. Back.
Note 20: Another possibility is that whatever causes rebellion may also cause irredentism and secessionism. For instance, political differentials may cause rebellion, which then causes irredentism, but we then attribute the causal significance to rebellion and not political differentials. Back.
Note 21: It is important note, however, that the coefficients for this variable are consistently positive for irredentism and consistently negative for secessionism. Back.
Note 22: In the 1980’s, the Germans of the Soviet Union and the Tripuras of India are the only two groups coded as both irredentist and lacking segments in adjoining countries. We re-coded the Tripuras as not being irredentist since we have reason to believe that they are not irredentist. In the 1990’s, one group fits this strange category: the Ingush of Russia. Back.
Note 23: Horowitz 1985, Rothschild 1981. Back.
Note 24: Some scholars do recommend relatively authoritarian measures, including Lustick (1979), and our previous article (Ayres and Saideman 1998) found that discrimination works. Back.
Note 25: In a run of the 1980’s secession just barely misses the.1 level of statistical significance at p =.1038. Concentration becomes significant and with a similar value to the 1990’s run. Back.
Note 26: McMahon (1998) emphasizes the territorial nature of irredentism, so this finding conflicts with her argument. Back.
Note 27: This is one of the research directions we intend to follow. Back.
Email this citation