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CIAO DATE: 6/00

Ukraine on the Periphery of Europe

Sanders

International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA
March 14-18, 2000

 

Ukraine on the periphery of Europe

It has been nearly eight years since the Ukrainian state emerged from the rubble of the USSR. During this time Kiev has tried to 'return to Europe' and has actively pursued policies with an aim to being seen as a European as opposed to a Eurasian state. Despite this attempt by Ukraine, and proclamations from the UK and the US that Kiev is the linchpin of Europe's security, it remains on the periphery of Europe. This paper argues that Ukraine's unique relationship with the Russian Federation ensures that it has been and will continue to be on the periphery of Europe and that recent events have exacerbated this peripheral position.

Divided into three main sections, this paper begins by examining Ukraine's attempt to regain what it sees as its rightful place in Europe. It considers the direction of Ukraine's foreign policy which has become increasingly pragmatic under the careful guidance of President Kuchma. It also examines Ukraine's active involvement in NATO and in particular the PFP programmes and suggests that this indicates a strong commitment to Europe and attempt to emulate and finally adopt certain key European values. This theme of values is continued with an analysis of Ukraine's decision to join the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and give up its strategic nuclear weapons as well as join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and curb nuclear co-operation with ‘undesirable’ regimes. The second part of the paper considers why Ukraine remains on the periphery of Europe and how recent events, particularly in Kosovo and the proposed enlargement of the EU have institutionalised Ukraine's peripheral status. The third part of this paper concludes with some suggestions as to what the West can or perhaps should be doing to avoid Ukraine becoming too peripheral and by outlining the implications of the West's inaction or disengagement.

 

1. Ukraine attempts to return to the common European home

Ukraine's foreign policy since independence has been aimed at achieving closer co-operation and integration with Europe and being perceived by the international community as a European as opposed to a Eurasian state. This has been most clearly visible in Ukraine's attempt to strengthen relations with NATO and be an active participant in the PFP programme. In March 1992 Ukraine became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). This marked the first stage in Ukraine's relationship with NATO. Ukraine's active co-operation with NATO within the framework of the NACC signalled its commitment to join Europe's security architecture and achieve full integration into Europe's economic political and, where possible, military structures. In 1994 Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP) which focused on practical, defence-related and military co-operation activities between signatories and member states. As early as 1995 Ukrainian naval infantry participated in the exercise 'Cooperative Osprey' in North Carolina. This has been followed by exercises in Ukraine every year since. The most recent of which is 'Sea Breeze 1998' - a joint naval exercise involving Ukraine, other Black Sea states and several Western powers which was held around the waters of the Crimea.

As well as PFP programmes many members of NATO also have bilateral programmes of co-operation with Ukraine. For example, the UK, has set up a programme of bilateral defence co-operation between the Ministry of Defence and Ukraine which this year has been extended and enlarged to cover education, training, high level visits and exchange programmes amongst military and governmental officials. Ukraine's active involvement in PFP and bilateral programmes provides many benefits not least of which are legitimisation and institutionalisation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Active engagement of Ukraine also provides Kiev with considerable economic benefits. It has been estimated that a visit by NATO forces to Ukraine can generate up to $300,000 in port fees, tugs, chandlers and sailors' spending. Finally, and perhaps most significantly in terms of enhancing Ukraine’s European status, PFP and the bilateral programmes gives Ukraine the ability and support to achieve certain acceptable norms and values. For instance, some of its key aims are to facilitate democratic control over the armed forces and to generally improve civil-military relations as well as encouraging and supporting the development of PSO. By making progress in these areas Kiev is increasingly perceived as a European state.

In a further sign of Ukraine's attempt to be seen as European, between 1995 and 1997, Kiev moved even closer to NATO. In Spring 1996 on the eve of elections in Russia, Kuchma declared this a foreign policy priority for Ukraine. 1 In light of the completion of the NATO enlargement study by late September 1995, Ukraine forwarded a proposal for a draft agreement between Kiev and NATO, which envisaged a 'special partnership'. 2 Ukraine's relationship with NATO was strengthened further in the first half of 1997. At the Madrid Summit, on 9 July 1997, the NATO Heads of State and President Kuchma signed the 'Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine'. This endorses the Alliances' support for Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, its territorial integrity and democratic development. It also states the belief that economic prosperity and the inviolability of Ukraine's borders are key factors in the stability and security of Europe. In many ways this Charter represents an explicit recognition of Ukraine's importance to Europe and European security and the alliances commitment to remain engaged with Ukraine.

Ukraine has also attempted to move closer to Europe by being seen as a committed and loyal member of the international community who is willing to be involved in PSO. The Ukrainian Government has achieved this by active involvement in both UN led and NATO led peace support operations (PSO). During the past five years, over seven thousand Ukrainian service-personnel have taken part in peacekeeping operations. According to official data, by May 1997 Ukrainian representatives had participated in seven out of 18 UN peacekeeping operations. Ukraine has also contributed to NATO led peacekeeping. Most notably Ukrainian soldiers took part in the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) to distribute humanitarian aid and food in Bosnia and also sent forces to participate in IFOR (the Implementation Force). In addition there are currently 400 Ukrainians in the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia, as well as over a 100 in Eastern Slavonia. 3 Ukraine has also demonstrated its recent commitment to NATO PSO with the detachment of Ukrainian helicopters and support which are current deployed in the vicinity of Skopje. 4

As well as strengthening ties with NATO, and being an active participant in PSO, Ukraine has also attempted to move closer to Europe by improving its standing as a trusted and respected member of the international community who remains bound by certain norms and values. In November 1994 the Ukrainian Rada voted overwhelmingly to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear state. In addition Kiev has agreed to join the MTCR and to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Ukraine's decision to surrender its nuclear weapons and to join the NPT ended Ukraine's pariah status and isolation on the periphery of Europe. The Ukrainian Foreign Minster in a speech to the Ukrainian Rada outlined the importance of Ukraine's decision,

In the real situation that has come about, our tactical and strategic interests lead us to the only possible decision of Ukraine's accession to the NPT. This will unequivocally support Ukraine's prestige as a state that abides by its international obligations, as a reliable and predictable partner devoid of the Byzantian diplomacy complex. 5

President Kuchma also pointed out that signing the Non Proliferation Treaty would enhance Ukraine's "good reputation, which today we lack." 6 He went on,

We demonstrate by our action that Ukraine intends neither to haggle with nor, moreover, profit from or blackmail the world community by a threat to security, using formal legalistic gimmicks, rather than fundamental legal grounds. 7

Through membership of this international regime the Ukrainian state was therefore able to ameliorate Western uncertainty about its future intentions and its willingness to be bound by international law. Regime membership improved Ukraine's tarnished reputation and assuaged international concerns about whether in fact Ukraine would adopt Western non-proliferation norms and values.

In a more recent sign of Ukraine's attempt to become a respected member of the international community, as well as gain considerable economic investment, it has signalled its willingness to join the MTCR. The purpose of this regime is to co-ordinate export efforts amongst its 29 members to control proliferation of missile technology to developing countries. In 1994 the Ukrainian government signed a memorandum of understanding in which it agreed to conduct its missile related exports according to the criteria and standards of members of the MTCR. Membership was delayed however, because of Kiev's insistence on the right to produce offensive missiles to support its large defence industrial base and future security requirements. In March of last year, however, Washington announced that it would support Kiev's entry into the MTCR without insisting that Kiev gives up all of its offensive missile programme. In exchange for the considerable financial rewards associated with Kiev's participation in international space launch projects with the US, Ukraine also pledged to end its nuclear commerce with Tehran. This decision is expected to delay the completion of Iran's 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor project being completed by Russia at Bushehr as Ukraine was to provide a custom-built turbine for the light water reactor. This decision by Ukraine, and the concessions by the US - which allows Ukraine to join the MTCR -gives Kiev the ability to portray itself as a trustworthy member of the international community of states who remains bounds by certain non-proliferation norms and values. As such this strengthens Ukraine's case for being seen as a European state who shares common values.

 

2. Why is Ukraine on the periphery of Europe?

This section examines why, despite Ukraine's attempt to move closer to Europe, it remains and will continue to remain on the periphery. It starts by examining relations between Russia and Ukraine and argues that this unique relationship binds Kiev to the periphery. It also suggests that while these ties were loosening as relations between the two states improved they are likely to be tightened again in light of recent events in Kosovo. It then considers how enlargement of the EU has pushed Ukraine onto the periphery. Finally it argues that Ukraine's economic situation and association with corruption hampers its ability to be anything other than a periphery state in the medium term.

Russia's special relationship with Ukraine ensures that Kiev will in the near future continue to be viewed as a periphery state. Few Russians, even enlightened Russians, are totally comfortable with and willing to accept Ukraine's independence. Ukraine's peripheral status is therefore assured by Russian attitudes to the Ukrainian state. This attitude exists at all levels of government and state. The state of relations between the two states provides a good indicator of just how tightly Ukraine remains bound to Moscow and the extent to which it is likely to remain on the periphery of Europe. In the early years of independence it was clear that the Russian Federation was struggling to come to terms with the 'loss' of Ukraine. Russia has consistently pursued policies and made statements which were seen by Kiev as challenging Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and most importantly its territorial integrity. Ongoing claims against the Crimea, the control of Sevastopol as well as Moscow's willingness to use economic levers to influence decision making in Kiev have all revealed the lengths to which Moscow has been prepared to go to ensure a degree of control and influence over Ukraine. Russia's perception of Ukraine as falling within its sphere of influence and the sharing of a common history, religion and culture have proven powerful ties that Ukraine has struggled to break away from. In the early years of Ukraine's independence its failure to ratify the START Treaty and sign the NPT paradoxically ensured that Kiev was unable to move out of Russia's orbit. The international community misunderstanding Ukraine's motives for retaining nuclear weapons cast it in the role of rogue state and berated rather than engaged Kiev. Western - in particular US - attention was also firmly fixed on the Russian Federation and tended to ignore the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Even when relations between the West and Ukraine improved in 1994 this has always been with careful and cautious glances towards the Russian Federation. Moscow casts a long and enduring shadow over relations between the West and Ukraine.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have, however, steadily improved during the last few years. This can partially be explained by Russian concern that Ukraine was moving too far West and as such moved quickly to reach accord with Kiev on a number of issues blocking the normalisation of relations between these two neighbours. It can also be explained by the pragmatic and dual track foreign policy that Kiev has pursued. This is aimed at balancing attempts to move towards Europe with improving and strengthening relations with Moscow. By 1999 the agreements were in place for the eventual normalisation of relations between Russia and Ukraine as they entered the new millennium. In May 1997 Kiev and Moscow, after a number of false starts, finally signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership.

The treaty is made up of a package of fourteen documents including agreements covering the future of the Black Sea Fleet, and several political and economic arrangements. The Black Sea Fleet agreement ends five years of difficult negotiations over the disputed Soviet fleet. In this agreement Russia was granted a 20-year lease to key port facilitates in Crimea. In return, the treaty is a clear Russian acknowledgement that Crimea and Sevastopol, are Ukrainian. The treaty also provides Ukraine with rent for the facilities in the form of debt relief and access to port facilities in Sevastopol. The Friendship Treaty provides the first legally binding recognition of Ukraine's existing borders without conditions. This treaty laid down the legal foundations for bilateral relations based on the principle of mutual respect for each other as sovereign states. By finally recognising Ukraine's legal status, its ownership of Sevastopol and its equal status as a sovereign state, Moscow was attempting to improve relations with its neighbour and remove the Ukrainian incentive to move ever westward. The link between the treaty and Ukraine's membership of NATO has been made by both the Russian First Deputy Premier and the Russian Foreign minister. 8 This attempt at normalising relations does not mean, however that Russia has finally comes to terms with the loss of empire generally and the loss of Kievan Rus specifically. Instead, it suggests that the ties which firmly bound Ukraine to the periphery were beginning to ease slightly by the start of 1999.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine are, however, likely to change, quite considerably, after NATO's bombing campaign against Serbia earlier this year. Operation Allied Force has increased Moscow's sensitivities about future NATO enlargement and operations and Ukraine's involvement in the organisation as well as directly compromising relations between these two neighbours. On March 23 after all diplomatic efforts had collapsed, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana ordered air strikes by NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The objective of the attacks was two fold: to target the infrastructure which enables President Milosevic to control his military machine and to cripple his instruments of ethnic cleansing. The jury is still out on the success of this operation, the consequences for Ukraine, however, are likely to be serious and long term - the ties that bind Kiev to the periphery of Europe are likely to be tightened.

In light of serious Russian opposition to NATO bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, Kiev has been placed in a precarious position vis a vis NATO and Russia. NATO's action led to the suspension of both Russian involvement in the Permanent Joint Council and its co-operation with the alliance. The bombing of Kosovo is seen by elites in Moscow as yet another failure by the West to recognise Russia's status and perceived legitimate interests. Relations between the West - in particular the US - and Russia have become increasingly strained as Moscow is treated as a junior partner or worse still, sidelined. Examples include the persistence of sanctions against Iraq, pressure on Russia to curb arms exports and nuclear co-operation, the enlargement of NATO, exploitation by third party actors such as Turkey and the US of 'opportunities' in the Caspian Sea area. NATO bombing of Kosovo therefore represented the straw that broke the proverbial camel's back and reinforced perceptions in Moscow that history is being made without them with no regard to their interests. 9 The reverberations throughout the Russian Federation are however, likely to seriously undermine Ukraine's relationship with NATO and strengthen attempts by Moscow to pull Kiev back into its sphere of influence.

One of the consequences of the Kosovo crisis is likely to be the weakening of pro-Western ideas within Russia and its elite and on a worse case scenario the election of a more nationalistic President and Parliament in the forthcoming elections. The institutionalisation in Moscow of anti-Western ideas in general and anti-NATO sentiment in particular is likely to place Moscow and Kiev on different sides of the European fence. Ukraine has worked hard to encourage Russian membership of PFP and engagement with NATO. It has also struggled to balance between Europe and Russia. If Kiev continues to co-operate with NATO, thorough its bilateral and multilateral programmes it is likely to cause a serious rift in relations with Moscow. This damage is likely to be even more severe if Ukraine was to actively seek membership in the second round of enlargement of the Alliance. In many ways NATO’s action has placed Ukraine in a no win situation. If relations deteriorate with Moscow because of Ukrainian support for NATO's actions in Kosovo and its continued engagement with NATO then Kiev is more likely to seek closer co-operation with and membership of the alliance to protect its security. This move is however likely to further damage relations with Russia and could precipitate the type of crisis that Kiev is keen to avoid. NATO's action has made Ukraine's balancing act between Moscow and the West a precarious and perhaps even dangerous foreign policy goal.

In addition the election of a more nationalist regime in Russia could increase the challenges to Ukraine's security in two ways. Firstly by increasing the prospects for Russian interference in Ukraine's affairs and secondly, by creating the justification for such action. A change of government in Moscow could result in a change in direction of policy towards the 'near abroad'. Operation Allied Force also created dangerous precedents for intervention on humanitarian grounds in the affairs of newly independent states in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine has large Russian minorities who at varying times have been particularly vocal about their rights. Ukraine's sovereignty over the Crimea for instance has been challenged by many politicians in Moscow and Ukraine is far from solving the separatist challenge in this region. Russia, taking a leaf out of NATO's book, could claim that economic sanctions - which would be a particularly effective tool against the resource dependent Ukrainians - or military intervention at the other end of the spectrum was justified on humanitarian grounds to protect ethnic brethren.

NATO's action is also likely to further undermine Ukraine's attempt to move away from the periphery by exacerbating long standing conflict between its legislative and executive branches of government over the direction of Kiev's foreign policy. Suggesting domestic opposition to Ukraine's drift westwards, left and right wing parliamentarians opposed plans allowing NATO to hold military exercises in Ukraine in 1998. 10 After NATO's bombing the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution condemning NATO's aggression against a sovereign state, calling for a full review of relations with NATO and instructing the government to review Ukraine's non-nuclear status. Less than a month later a resolution containing provisions suspending programmes of cooperation with NATO, closing the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kiev and instructing the President to dismiss the 'ideologists of the pro-NATO course' failed to secure the required support. The election of an anti-NATO president and parliament in the forthcoming elections in Ukraine could result in a decisive shift away from Europe.

Ukraine's periphery status has been exacerbated further by recent developments within the EU. The Ukrainian Government has clearly and unequivocally stated that Ukraine's long term objective is to seek membership of the EU. The proposed enlargement of the EU to include six new members and the decision to place five Eastern European states on a slower track raises the possibility that Ukraine is being arbitrarily excluded from this important organisation. This concern is particularly strong given that several of the second tier states - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia - have economies as fragile and weak as Ukraine's. The sense of exclusion has also been strengthened by the staunch rebuttal by EU officials of Ukraine's bid for closer ties with the EU in June of last year. 11 The EU has claimed that it is premature to look further than the current accord on Ukrainian-EU cooperation and partnership signed last year. This aims to strengthen cooperation between the two parties in areas such as intellectual property, the environment, nuclear safety and energy and barriers to trade. Two big sticking points seem to be Ukraine's failure to impose a moratorium on the use of the death penalty and the closing down of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.

The result of Ukraine's exclusion from an enlarged EU will be to leave Ukraine politically isolated and to distort present trade patterns. An enlarged and militarily powerful EU - who has agreed to absorb the functions and capabilities of the WEU as well as implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy - will divide Europe into those who are members of this alliance and those who are not. This is likely to drive a wedge between those states who are seen and accepted as being European and those states which lie on the periphery. This policy runs the risk of sending the wrong message to Moscow - that Kiev falls within Russia's sphere of influence. Enlargement will also damage bilateral economic relations between Eastern European states and Ukraine further weakening its economy. The accession of Poland to the EU, for instance, could erect formidable economic barriers between Ukraine and its neighbour. This is a legitimate concern given that Poland is Ukraine's third largest trading partner. There is also concern in Kiev that Ukraine's free trade agreement with Estonia would also have to be scrapped when it become an EU member. 12

This concern about the damage to the Ukrainian economy of the admission of new members to the EU is particularly acute given its current economic situation and its association with corruption. Ukraine is likely to remain on the periphery of Europe because its economy is virtually insolvent and economic reform has not been attempted. The Kuchma government, four years after announcing a programme of radical reforms, has failed to begin the painful process of structural change that is required to stabilise Ukraine. The GDP for the first half of 1997 was 7.4 percent, less than in the first half of 1996. For the corresponding period the level of production fell by 4.5 percent. Unprofitable industrial enterprises and collective farms are subsidised by the state and little privatisation has occurred. Last year Kuchma called on lawmakers to support reducing budgetary subsidies which account for one-fifth of Ukraine's budget. 13 The lack of privatisation has meant that the state is not reaping revenues from the sale of privatised assets. Presidential spokesman, Oleksandr Maydannyk stated that Ukraine had failed to collect $2.5 billion in the first quarter of 1998. 14 Ukraine has not streamlined its taxation system and there is a bewildering array of regulations on domestic and foreign trade. Ukraine is nearing a budget catastrophe that is exacerbated by the collapse of the rouble in neighbouring Russia.

Ukraine is unlikely to attract foreign investment as the country is riddled with official corruption. Corruption has affected the economy in many ways. It cripples small business that are directly affected by official and private racketeering. It has been estimated that entrepreneurs were forced to pay $2,000 in bribes simply to obtain the permits needed to set up a small business. 15 Corruption is also endemic in the agricultural sector where regional officials have undermined private contracts by demanding farms first supply state granaries. Official corruption has had a disastrous effect on foreign investment in Ukraine. Lack of transparency and corruption in the decision making process led Motorola to withdraw from the competition to win the country's mobile-phone licence. Cases like these have prompted the US Congress to threaten to withhold Ukraine's aid allocation because of complaints by US investors. In April and May 1997, leading US newspapers ran several articles on inefficiency and corruption in Ukraine in connection with loan packages given by the US and on harassment of US companies operation in Ukraine. More recently a newspaper in Ukraine printed a series of reports in which it alleged that Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko bought a luxury Mercedes with money from a fund for the families of slain policemen. 16 These reports have done little to quell Western perceptions that Ukraine is racked with corruption. This perception is perhaps more damaging to Ukraine than the economic crisis and is likely to weld it firmly to the periphery of Europe. Although the US has faithfully advanced Ukraine's interests, we are likely to see increasing Western disillusionment with Ukraine as it proves unable to reform economically and unwilling to deal with the issue of official corruption. 17 In the next few years if the dominant image of Ukraine in western minds is that of a corrupt country, unable to reform itself where Western resources are squandered then Kiev is likely to remain firmly situated on the periphery as the West increasingly disengages.

 

3. The implications of Ukraine's peripheral status

The implications of Ukraine's increasing peripheral status are wide reaching. It is likely to impinge directly on European security as well as on regional development and evolution within the former Soviet Union. If Ukraine is pulled back into Russia's orbit because of recent events in Kosovo, enlargement of the EU and Western disengagement because of official corruption then this is likely to accelerate calls for second wave enlargement of NATO. An independent Ukraine firmly anchored to the West is a guarantee against a resurgent Russia. If Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence is seen to be compromised in the future, the states of Eastern and Central Europe who are not currently members are likely to seek immediate membership of the alliance.

A clamour for membership is likely to result in a strengthening of anti-Western sentiment and a redirection of Russian foreign policy as well as a tightening of Moscow's control over the NIS. An enlarged NATO would also severely and perhaps irreconcilably damage relations between the West and Russia. Security in Europe would be severely compromised by a return to an East-West confrontation. An independent Ukraine is a key strategic barrier between Russia and the West. If this barrier were to disappear, NATO would have to revise its defence planning.

The Russian Federation, fearing second wave enlargement and NATO’s new expanded role in intra-state conflict, is likely to respond by increasing control over the states of the former Soviet Union. In particular the volume of trade confers considerable Russian leverage over many of these states. In Ukraine trade with Russia is ten times greater than with Poland and six times greater than with Germany. Ukraine is also dependent on Russia's energy resources. Russia provides Ukraine with about 90% of its oil and about 60% of its gas. Russia is also not adverse to using more underhand techniques to ensure influence in the former Soviet Union. For instance it has used 'peacekeepers' to advance its interests in Abkhazia, Moldova and Tajikistan. In addition it is likely to attempt to strengthen the CIS in particular military co-operation a counter-weight to an expanded NATO. Russia could also respond to enlargement with an attempt to 'persuade' Central Asian states to move away from co-operation with third party actors like Turkey and the US - thereby limiting western influence in Russia's sphere of influence.

In addition the emergence of anti-Western forces in Russia would result in a change the direction of Russian foreign policy. Moscow could seek a strategic partnership with India and China and closer co-operation with the Arab countries and Iran. This would affect the transfer of sensitive technology and increase the possibility of arms sales to undesirable or rogue regimes. In power, Russian nationalists could also forego nuclear cooperation with the West and adopt an even more destabilising deterrent and war-fighting posture. The Yugoslav conflict is likely to produce revisions to Russia's military doctrine, with increased emphasis on air defences and tactical nuclear weapons. This is likely to result in further increases in the defence budget to meet these demands.

 

Conclusion

These two worse case scenarios can be avoided or at least mitigated by a two pronged strategy by the West: active engagement of Ukraine and increased sensitivity to Russian interests in Europe. The West, in particular NATO, needs to encourage Ukraine to play a full and active role in PFP and to continue in the areas of co-operation set out in the NATO-Ukraine Charter. In addition bilateral defence co-operation can be stepped up to appease concerns in Kiev that the West has prioritised relations with Moscow in light of Kosovo. Ukraine also needs greater encouragement and economic support to facilitate its painful economic transition. The US in particular must continue to remain actively engaged irrespective of who wins the Presidential election in Washington or in Kiev. As well as maintaining links with Ukraine the West also needs to improve relations with Russia. This could involve greater involvement in NATO decision making and more attempt to engage Russia in consultation.

Recent events in Europe and in Ukraine have gone some way towards institutionalising Ukraine's peripheral status on the margins of Europe. This is not irreversible and can be halted. The long term costs of ignoring Ukraine's drift Eastwards are likely to be high.

Endnotes

Note 1: This was only done after a series of consultations with Boris Yeltsin. Back.

Note 2: Stephen Larabee, 'Ukraine's Balancing Act', Survival, 38/2, (Summer 1996), 148. Also see interview by Boris Tarasyuk in Transition, 28 July 1995, 19-22. Back.

Note 3: Figures cited by the Secretary General of NATO at the 'Ukraine House' in Kiev on 7 May 1997, http://www.nai.gov.ua/txt/nato/sg070597.htm Back.

Note 4: 'Non-NATO Nations in KFOR', http://www.isn.ethz.ch/phdocs/pfparchive/1999/PMSC-Sofia/Oomen/sld021.htm Back.

Note 5: 'Foreign Minister addresses parliament on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty', Radio Ukraine World Service, 16 November 1994, as reported in SWB SU/2156 D/1-D/4, 18 November 1994, D/2. Back.

Note 6: 'President Kuchma urges deputies to ratify the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty', Radio Ukraine World Service, 1245 GMT, 16 November 1994, as reported in SWB, SU/2156 D/4, 18 November, D/4-D/6. Back.

Note 7: Ibid. D/6.Back.

Note 8: For details see, 'Russian First Deputy Premier Gustov on ratification of treaty with Ukraine', Russian Public TV, 26 Jan 1999, as reported in BBC Monitoring Online, http://warhol. monitor. bbc.co.uk Back.

Note 9: This point is made by James Sherr and Steven Main, 'Russian and Ukrainian Perceptions of Events in Yugoslavia', Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 1999. Back.

Note 10: 'Left-wing MPs oppose NATO military exercises in Ukraine', Itar-Tass news agency, Moscow, 22 Oct. 1998, as reported in BBC Monitoring Online, http://warhol.monitor.bbc.co.ukBack.

Note 11: 'Ukraine: EU Rebuffs Bid for Association', RFE/RL http://search.rferl.org/nca/features/1998Back.

Note 12: 'Ukraine: Government Concerned about Isolation', RFE/RL, http://search.rferl.org/nca/features/1999 Back.

Note 13: 'Kuchma calls on Parliament to back spending cuts', RFE/RL Newsline, 2/90, 13 May 1998. Back.

Note 14: 'Ukraine fails to collect $2.5 billion in budget revenues', RFE/RL Newsline, 2/96, 21 May 1998. Back.

Note 15: 'Kleptocracy' IISS Strategic Comments, 4/4 May 1994. Back.

Note 16: Tiffany Carlsen and Katya Gorchinskaya, 'Verdict against Ukrainian newspaper threatens press freedom', RFE/RL News report 9 June 1998.Back.

Note 17: This has been seen recently with US pressure on the EU to strengthen cooperation in four areas with Ukraine and Russia. For details see 'US-EU Cooperation on Russia and Ukraine' Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary Bonn, Germany, June 21 1999, SMTP;Publications-Admin@Pub.Pub.Whitehouse.Gov Back.