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CIAO DATE: 6/00
NGOs and an Emerging Form of Peacemaking: Post-Westphalian Approaches *
International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA
March 14-18, 2000
The following article outlines the increasing focus of peacemaking activities on issues pertaining to human security and rights, and the emerging role of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in a third generation of multidimensional peacemaking activity. In the emerging post-Westphalian environment in which local, regional, and global actors and norms have accrued enhanced legitimacy, a third generation of multi-dimensional peacemaking is building on the development of ethical norms, utilising peacekeeping, traditional mediation, conflict resolution/ transformation, through transnational organisations and NGOs, and has a clear potential to unravel intractable conflicts and respond to urgent crises. It is in this context that the role of NGOs in complex emergencies, and in peacemaking operations may be usefully located and assessed as part of a socio-political fabric engaged in stabilisation and resolution activities. Conflict resolution/transformation techniques and methodologies can be exploited by NGOs in conjunction with more formally constituted methods and actors, in order to stabilise local environments in a regional and global normative context. This may enhance the legitimacy of NGOs (and their regulation) and will increase the effectiveness of the practice of peacemaking.
Introduction
NGOs of a humanitarian, developmental, human rights, educational, and conflict resolution orientation are forming a vital role in the development of new approaches to peacemaking in intractable, low and high-level conflicts, particularly in the context of their growing links with transnational organisations and their professed interests in human security issues, which are derived from normative macro-frameworks of political community. 3 These interests appeared to be constituted by their civic nature both at the local and international level; INGOs and NGOs may well express partisan interests, but ameliorating the root causes of conflict appears to be their over-riding objective in most cases. The same tension exists between the goals of IOs and ROs in particular pertaining to human security, and the rule of law in national and international political systems ( particularly with respect to the elevation of group rights and justice at the local level). At the national level, the rule of law often reinforces majority rule and assimilation and becomes a by-word for minority oppression, while at the international level it endorses problematic Westphalian versions of sovereignty. Consequently, there has been an increasingly normative reaction to both local and international politics, relating to the wider existence of political communities, an 'international society' and a 'global civil society'. In the emerging post-Westphalian system in which identity, representation, and human security issues are becoming priorities, space is emerging for far more dynamic approaches to peacemaking than ever before. 4 Though problematic in terms of the rule of law and political interests, humanitarian intervention of an unofficial and official nature is clearly increasing. This paper argues that it is in this post-Westphalian context that NGOs derive their legitimacy, at both the local and global level, and hence their access. As the UN Secretary General has pointed out, NGOs provide access to a global civil society which they themselves have been instrumental in highlighting and promoting. Understanding in particular the role of NGOs in constituting global civil society may enable peacemaking approaches to tap into the relative success that NGOs have had in micro-political environments, and the macro-political changes which are also occurring. Hence, it is important to understand the linkages between their local legitimacy and their role in global civil society.
Two clearly defined generations of mono-dimensional peacemaking activities have emerged so far in an attempt to settle or resolve conflict. International mediation and classic forms of peacekeeping, derived from traditional diplomacy is described in the typology put forward here as 'first generation' and operates at the level of the state in a Westphalian international system characterised by state-centric notions of sovereignty and self-interest via a communitarian world view. Conflict resolution/transformation approaches, which here are described as 'second generation', operate at the level of civil society and developed out of a need to find a process which could facilitate the 'resolution', rather than management, of intractable conflicts. They were derived from a grass-roots movement that decried the state-centric and power-political leanings of high politics as described by dominant theories of the international system. 5 It is in the context of conflict resolution approaches that NGOs find a conceptual basis based on their emphasis on norms relating to human needs and human security derived from local and global emergent civil societies. Space has been provided for their activities by second generation, multidimensional peacekeeping activities which have emerged since the end of the Cold War.
In order to illustrate these points, this paper provides looks at the inadequacies of first generation traditional diplomacy, followed by a brief examination of the contribution made by second generation approaches to peacemaking. It then looks at the role of NGOs before investigating the normative implications of global civil society and the potential of NGOs to contribute to broader forms of peacemaking practice based on more comprehensive definitions of security. It is argued that NGOs can, in the context of the emerging post Westphalian environment and through the lens offered by conflict resolution/transformation approaches to conflict, provide a cross-over point between the forces of regionalisation, globalisation, democratisation, interdependence, of global and local civil societies, taking the debate beyond the proposals for preventative diplomacy and peacebuilding contained in Agenda for Peace. This is leading to a new generation of multi-dimensional peacemaking, which promotes cultures of pluralism, negotiation, and interdependence in civil society rather than acute and often violent competition. This new generation operates at all levels (local, state, regional and global), including IOs, ROs, states, and NGOs in the context of the post- Westphalian international system, which is characterised by a more cosmopolitan view of world society and global civil society.
Inadequacies of International Peacemaking
First generation approaches are based upon the tradition, norms, and culture of western diplomacy and operate at the level of the state in the context of an assumed Westphalian international system. As such, first generation peacekeeping operations (like UNFICYP, for example) are based on state interests; international mediation and negotiation represent stylised and formal communication between official and sovereign representatives, based upon zero-sum interests. Such interests can be manipulated and co-ordinated, but only through the use of coercion, in the presence of ripe moments, mainly engendered by hurting stalemates of the external provision of large incentives, of which the settlement of the Egypt Israel conflict at Camp David, or the more recent settlement at Dayton, are good examples. In this high level process there is little room for unofficial actors, whose separate legitimacy tends to be unrecognised and subsumed by officialdom. Thus, it is an inflexible process best suited to state-centric types of conflicts that seem to have declined.
The very obvious weakness of first generation approaches have been highlighted by the emergence of ethnic actors, identity claims, humanitarian and development issues, all of which are now often components of conflict and complex emergencies. First generation traditional peacemaking activities therefore attempt to operate in the realms of traditional diplomacy in which the state holds [a somewhat contested] thrall. 6 International mediation therefore aims at outcomes based on the intricacies of potentially fragile status quos. Mandell has argued that mediation could influence the creation and internalisation of new norms for conflict management, 7 but this is unlikely if such norms are limited to the local and are not derived from a global or regional dialogue. Power-based mediation, because of its mono-dimensional nature, can do little more that manage short-term strategic interactions, particularly given the fact that under the auspices of a state sponsor, or of the UN, it must observe the norms of international law and international society. Thus, it often falls victim to the tensions between the two. Because mediation is constructed as a mono-dimensional activity it lacks co-ordination with other peacemaking activities at other levels, and falls victim to the ethical void that traditional diplomacy depicts the international system as being indicative of. It is merely assumed that citizen interests will trickle up to form the national interest, which will influence the formation of foreign policy. Clearly, such assumptions do not accurately mirror the issues and actors engaged in intractable conflict or complex emergencies, and therefore the whole process of diplomacy tends to become ensnared upon the need for official legitimacy, recognition, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.
In general therefore, first generation approaches peacemaking approaches depend upon the application of substantial external coercion and rewards. 8 International mediation has become subject to 'devious objectives', 9 fallen victim to the asymmetries caused by the state-centricity of diplomacy and has become obscured by a plethora of suspect and dubious international practices, that aim at producing a status quo which may not necessarily be perceived by antagonists in any form of conflict as 'just'. The fact that mediation is subject to a failing credibility has significant ramifications for regions where the international community does not have sufficient interests at stake to intervene decisively as it did, eventually, in Bosnia, Kosovo, orin the Middle East. There may well be emerging regions and conflicts which, returning to a Cold War philosophy, the international community are willing to isolate and stabilise, but have abandoned attempts to bring a greater harmony to- zones of intractable conflict. Intractable conflict tends to be defined as such because disputants have located their argumentation and bottom-line negotiating positions on what they consider to be legitimate aspects of the international system: often the role of the third party becomes one of mediating between two [partly ambiguously] legitimate sets of principles inherent in a flawed international system- for example, self-determination and sovereignty and the continuing controversies over the issue of legitimate intervention, which draw on different approaches to international law and ethics. 10
Reformulating First Generation Peacemaking
In response to the inadequacies of first generation approaches, it has been argued that settlements need to be based upon just political orders which promotes democracy and human rights, new norms, participatory governance structures, civil society, international tribunals, and truth commissions. Disarming, repatriating refugees, building a consensus for peace under the auspices of the UN, and moderate local political leadership play a role in this method. 11 The latter approach is based on conflict resolution perspectives of conflict, and requires deep access into local environments, something which NGOs can often provide, though it is clear that these approaches may themselves come into tension with the rule of law where sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity are invoked (unless there is no central recognised authority at all, in which case access is, paradoxically, easier). State centric approaches cannot operate at this level. What this means is that first generation approaches fail in many conflicts because of the structural asymmetry between state and non-state actors make compromise unlikely. 12
The emergence of INGOs and NGOs as actors on the local and international scene since the 1960s has partly been a normative response to the flaws of the international system, and its perpetuation of injustices relating to human needs/security, humanitarian intervention, and human rights vis-á-vis the inflexible perceptions that states have held with respect to territorial sovereignty. INGOs have been a high profile response to the inadequacies of the international system, while NGOs have often been a low profile response to the exploitation of power by political entrepreneurs in domestic environments, and to intractable conflicts, economic inequality, and humanitarian abuses. Their emergence is indicative of the need for a basis from which all actors can approach a range of security issues in the post Westphalian context, as the logic of state-centricism in the Westphalian context provides a serious impediment to compromise and concessions in anything other than a zero-sum manner- which has often been transposed from inter-state to communal relations.
The search for new approaches implicit in Agenda for Peace including preventive diplomacy, and the UN's wide utilisation broader forms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding to stabilise conflicts, or peace-enforcement, saw the realisation that the NGO community can play a relatively greater, if not vital, role. This is part of a framework in which traditional concepts of security are being significantly redefined. 13 Boutros Ghali's proposals for peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy offered an avenue through which existing techniques of peacemaking could be developed and enhanced. The concept of preventative diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding has moved some way in recognising that the international community could do more to prevent conflict and that '...comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people...' are needed to provide security for individuals and citizens in cases where states can not do so alone. 14 Furthermore, the point was also made that under a fully functioning Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, regional actors could play a significant role. Ghali's ideas represented an important change of emphasis and provide opportunities for the reconfiguring of peacemaking activities through the contribution of activities that also focus on the citizen or individual. Ghali also pointed out that the local conflict arena can be addressed with the help of NGOs: "If UN efforts are to succeed, the roles of the various players need to be carefully coordinated in an integrated approach to human security." 15 Boutros Ghali recognised the assistance that NGOs could provide for UN peacemaking efforts, though he also recognised that '...government are central...' to peacemaking. 16 Consequently, NGOs require procedures which will not compromise their independent status, but allows their action to be coordinated with the UN. 17 What this implies is that NGOs must be bound to the rules and norms of the Charter, once again underlining the tensions between independent actors, the UN system and its member states.
First generation peacemaking tends to be overpowered by the tension between the relative interests and leverage of sponsor-states, third party states and actors and the disputants themselves, situating the practice firmly in the realm of traditional diplomacy and power politics. It is this stumbling block that the international community has attempted to address since the end of the Cold War, and in doing so it has turned to ROs and NGOs. It has done this in the light of a modified view of conflict and peacemaking provided by conflict resolution/transformation theory. It is to this that this paper now turns.
A Critique of First Generation Approaches: Conflict Resolution/ Transformation
The field of conflict resolution/transformation provides an alternative approach to conflict and moves away from the Westphalian view of the international system by rejecting reductionism's de-emphasis of civil society. Initially it was drawn from several strands, including Mitrany's ideas on functional integration among countries to create a common interest in peace, and Haas' empirical analysis of how this had occurred in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951. 18 The elevation of ethnopolitics, and the inclusive and exclusive politics of group representation as a competitor of the state-centric system created areas which traditional diplomacy could not address, as they tended to resist efforts towards a compromise. Conflict resolution approaches, which emerged in the late 1960s, developed in reaction to the 'balance of power' conflict management techniques associated with positivist Realpolitik approaches. This approach sees conflict outcomes as not determined by power in the long run, as power is difficult to define and conflict viewed as subjective, but attempts to understand conflict in terms of human needs, which are inexhaustible, but often are not allocated correctly. As these needs are not negotiable and are distinct from interests, their suppression can lead to conflict because their pursuit is said to be ontological drive common to all. 19 While interests are subject to negotiation, cultural values and universal needs are not. While they may be suppressed, they will always reappear. The suppression of these needs tends to lead to protracted conflicts, and the coercive mediation derived from traditional diplomacy and first generation peacemaking of the sort which state-backed mediators or the even UN engages in is said to 'promote protracted conflict, even after a settlement...' 20 According to Burton, techniques for the resolution of conflict should reflect the needs of the actors within the 'world society'. 21 Therefore, opportunities for individuals at all levels to communicate with each other in the context of a supportive framework are essential to avoid conflict.
Initially, conflict resolution was developed through an analysis of the process of mediation, in which the process was 'to explain conflict, its origins, and its escalation sometimes by reference to other conflicts, sometimes by analytical means, but within the context of a continuing discussion between the parties.' 22 Conflict is approached as a socio-biological problem to be solved, in which the third party must establish conditions in which the disputants attempt first to define and identify their conflict, before solving it. A de-escalatory mechanism is therefore introduced by focusing on a super-ordinate goal, 23 encouraging the two sides to look at each others' needs in an objective fashion. They can therefore explore each other's fears and hence acknowledge their legitimacy, leading to the possibility of a win-win situation. Enemy images are deconstructed in the context of a global set of common needs or norms, the suppression of which provides a significant imperative for conflict and which are therefore a serious obstacle to conflict management and a reduction of tensions.
This perspective on conflict, and the methodology which is derived from it for solving conflict, is thought to remove the critical difficulties inherent in first generation peacemaking where the common argument is made that mediation is crippled by the intensity of the dispute, the resources or lack of that the mediator has access to, and the type of issues at stake for the disputants. 24 It is in this context that the international system dictates that mediators must view their role as one of conflict management in order to bring about compromise through bilateral and trilateral negotiations. As the logic of the Westphalian international system is believed at this level to be zero sum, the relationships between disputants and mediator are similarly based and as Mitchell has pointed out, mediation is crippled by its own logic. 25 This knot can, according to the conflict resolution perspective be untied by a bottom up approach in which individuals who have certain influential positions in the conflict environment are provided with an alternative and positive-sum understanding of their conflict, which through a trickle-up effect, will eventually play a role in the official peacemaking process. This brief analysis of the basis of the conflict resolution debate illustrates an important critique of first generation approaches to peacemaking which may replicate conflict, rather than manage it; the shift into a post Westphalian world seems to be partly derived from this understanding.
Conflict Resolution/transformation Approaches and the Significance of NGOs
Problem-solving workshops aimed at protracted internal and international conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Moldova, and the Middle East, have increasingly come into use. 26 Problem-solving workshops move through several distinct stages and their participants may become quasi-mediators upon returning to their community. It is important to note, that Track Two is actually multi-track in which citizen and unofficial diplomacy incorporates many aspects of civil society, 27 and the development of a contingency approach to conflict resolution strategies indicates that there are short and long term strategies which can be applied at various stages in a conflict. However, there is a difference in the emphasis placed on the various approaches which can be applied and when the various methods of conflict escalation and resolution may be appropriate. The relationship between traditional mediation and negotiation at the official level and conflict resolution approaches is the subject of much analysis. For some, nonofficial or Track Two methods that precede the more traditional diplomatic approaches may prepare the ground for official negotiations. Negotiations initiated at the Track Two level or channel may then be passed to an official negotiating forum. Sometimes, the two work side by side in a related or a non-related manner. Perhaps the traditional diplomatic channel reaches an impasse which conflict resolution can help overcome; often there has, however, been no clear relationship between the two processes- raising the possibility that there may be no basis for a connection, as has occurred in the case of Cyprus where conflict resolution and official processes have been disconnected and have had relatively little impact upon each other. In the case of the 1993 negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO representatives conducted in Oslo, conflict resolution approaches and traditional forms of negotiation where interchanged successfully at different stages of the negotiations. The Tajikistan Dialogue provides another example in which a wide range of Tajiks where brought together in 1993, after a vicious civil war had erupted after the Soviet Tajikistan had become independent. A series of meetings resulted which entailed five separate stages,
(a) deciding to engage in dialogue to resolve mutually intolerable problems;(b) coming together to map the elements of the problems and the relationships that perpetuate the problems; (c) uncovering the underlying dynamic of the relationships and beginning to see ways to change them; (d) planning steps together to change the relationships; and (e) devising ways to implement their plan. 28
As with the Oslo Accords, some of the Tajiks from different factions also participated in the official negotiations. In Moldova, conflict resolution workshops have blurred the distinction between unofficial and official diplomacy. These examples also illustrate the fact that problem-solving workshops tend to extend themselves into a series of meetings involving similar participants over a several months or years. This has occurred with the emergence of conflict resolution groups in Cyprus and the Middle East as well; sometimes the groups are organised by the same convenors involving the same participants while it is also common for participants to go on to join other workshops and groups.
This kind of institutionalisation of conflict resolution practice is extremely important in developing awareness at the civil and semi-official level, and does contribute in a variety of ways to the unofficial level. As Kriesburg has argued, '...in large-scale conflicts various intermediaries and approaches generally need to be combined to be effective. If they are well co-ordinated, their effectiveness enhances the efforts of any one approach.' 29 It is exactly at this nexus that INGOs and NGOs become significant for the process and methodology of conflict resolution. This applies to intractable forms of conflict which might not qualify to be 'large-scale' in the sense in which Kreisburg implies, though my argument indicates that intractable forms of conflict do raise regional and global issues. 30 It has been argued that though conflict resolution approaches may not replace formal diplomacy, they are important in preparing the ground and complementing the overall settlement process; 31 therefore, conflict resolution should therefore be seen as sub-strategy with a contingency model, which attempts to co-ordinate complementary interventions. 32 However, this carries the danger of merely moving the debate back towards coercive mediation and traditional diplomacy. Consequently, conflict resolution activities need to be reframed as including all those activities of NGOs relating to local stabilisation. What conflict resolution offers is a plethora of theoretical and practical approaches to developing peace in conflict environments, and which can be exploited at several levels in order to channel global and regional norms of interdependence, human security and democratisation into unstable local environments. It is here that the contribution of NGOs to the process of conflict resolution in civil society may be critical. NGOs can play an important role in facilitating a tunnel between global and civil society and thus resolving one of the most serious problems of the conflict resolution genre related to the trickle-up (and down) effect; this can also contribute to the diplomatic process of peacemaking in the realms of official diplomacy. NGOs that conduct humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and conflict resolution activites contribute to the objectives that second generation approaches have delineated. Conflict resolution theory provides a framework for understanding and responding to conflict.. Indeed, conflict resolution has always been undertaken by NGO-type, independent, actors. Conflict resolution approaches also provides a methodology for NGO activity; it identifies the post Westphalian space they fill and in which they operate.
First and Second Generation Peacemaking and the Significance of NGOs
It is no surprise that NGOs have become a vital part of the emerging multi-level and multi-dimensional approaches to peacemaking. The international community's response to the complex emergencies that have emerged with the end of the Cold War has involved heightened roles for IOs and ROs and a turn to various types of NGOs to provide humanitarian aid as well as to work on early warning, preventative peace-building, conflict resolution and reconciliation type projects. Both large and small NGOs have the ability to contribute to peacemaking, as well as to the reframing of state sovereignty and economic and social structures of oppression at the global, regional, and local level, 33 particularly as it is the emergence and identification of social and political space which attracts them. It is the space between officialdom, state and human security, which NGOs have begun to fill; no other actor has this potential in world politics. As Natsios, has argued the emergence of numerous centres of power ranging from the civil to the global has in part prompted this turn, 34 particularly as NGOs have access to local civil societies and their authority structures. This has prompted the international community and the UN to try to develop the role of NGOs in preventing, managing and resolving conflict. 35 In some cases, NGOs may now substitute for local government, and encourage the development of civil society in a post Westphalian context, through conflict resolution techniques. 36 The increasing legitimisation of NGOs at the local, state, regional and global level, means that their agendas are more widely propagated; it also means that civil society has a linkage with global civil society as NGOs are legitimised in international organisations like the UN. NGOs are relatively unencumbered by sovereign concerns and therefore are themselves relatively free of claims to sovereignty, enabling them to work in normative frameworks which may not be tainted by official and systemic interests. NGOs tend to have the advantage of familiarity with the local conflict environment and close contacts with grassroots movements and therefore have been ascribed with the ability to play a preventive role. They can also play an important role through the gathering of supplementary information in areas of tension pertaining to human rights and their abuses. This is part of their peace-building role of strengthening civil society and the social system through the ability for small-scale projects (the training of local leaders, etc.). This means that NGOs are able to aid in the creation of the general conditions which enhance peace building, promoting peace constituencies, which include cross-cutting segments of different sectors of civil society involved in the development of sustainable peace. 37
An important question relates to the goals of NGOs. Such NGOs engaged in humanitarian and conflict resolution activities must address the question of impartiality in the context of their objectives. But as with traditional forms of mediation in complex and intractable conflicts, the asymmetry of the legal environment in which conflict occurs means that even impartiality can be perceived as evidence of bias. For example, if a legally constituted government still exists it will regard any assistance given to non-state actors or rebels as evidence of bias; paradoxically in situations where a government no longer exists and the state has collapsed it may be easier to play a neutral role, although of course, asymmetries still exist between competing actors or warlords who may thus tend to see the roles of NGOs and mediators alike as biased.
Despite this, NGOs offer the flexibility, expertise, rapid responses, and commitment in local environments to respond rapidly to emerging signs of trouble. In such situations they provide essential services, aid, and have the capacity to inform the public both at the national and global level in order to mobilise opinion. 38 While the erosion of regional and local self-help capacities, and state sovereignty, and the possibility that NGOs may actually aid one of the disputants indirectly have been put forward as criticisms of NGO activity in complex emergencies, 39 the role of NGOs in conflict resolution and prevention is undeniably vital to the emerging practices of peacemaking in intractable conflict. NGOs can try to empower parties to deal with conflict constructively, monitor and lobby for human rights and the protection of minorities, and enact capacity-building and protective measurements for disadvantaged or endangered groups. NGOs, consequently, can play an important role in the creation of 'peace-constituencies'. 40 Humanitarian NGOs may be manipulable in conflict environments by disputants, as Abiew and Keating have recently argued; 41 yet this is an indirect offshoot of their concern with normative issues like justice and human freedoms and rights. This, I would argue, is far less likely to be coloured by interests which overlook such rights than state-centric activities and this is why NGOs carry extraordinary local and global levels of legitimacy particularly with citizen groups. While states may still dominate the legal sphere, this entails a certain amount of cynicism which NGOs are less susceptible to. The problem is to retain the advantages of their unofficial status without incurring the wrath of sovereign actors which fear interventionary practices becoming institutionalised upon their territory, while guarding against the corruption of NGOs themselves. Thus, linkages between transnational organisations (which are themselves torn between normative concerns and the state-centric interests of the international system) and NGOs are very important with respect to peacemaking in contemporary world politics. NGOs contribute to the process of conflict resolution by directly using the methodology of conflict resolution to address aspects of conflict which official actors cannot reach; this is also supported by their role in humanitarian, developmental, media, and education issues in which NGOs contribute to the stabilisation of civil society through identifying and acting upon the human needs frameworks, the communicational, and psychological, deep-rooted aspects of conflict. 42 Citizen diplomacy can also become NGO diplomacy in which multi-dimensional efforts address the local, civil, regional and global aspects of the conflict, incorporating both an understanding of global norms and global civil society, the traditional international system of Westphalian states, and local identity, civil, and representational needs in the wider context of political and economic interdependence, regionalisation and globalisation.
Conflict resolution approaches have illustrated the need for local expertise and access to be built into peacemaking processes- something which NGOs can nurture. NGOs seem to have solved the conceptual problems of conflict resolution by becoming a vehicle for broad activities to occur at the civil level, but in the context of the world society perspective engendered by conflict resolution approaches. NGOs can emphasis the significance of cross-cutting forces working from the global to the local and vice versa, which have proven significant in an global system which many may still perceive to be neatly compartmentalised, but no longer is. Thus, NGOs can aid local actors in their awareness of how their existence, knowledge, and actions are constituted by their role in society, and also their role in global society. The point is to negotiate a shared 'reality' on which further negotiation processes can be installed into the fabric of local and regional systems in a global, post Westphalian context. NGOs can also aid if necessary by bypassing the state, or government or administration if it does not conform to basic common norms shared by all interdependent political communities. They provide a conduit through which, by exploiting the methodology of conflict resolution approaches, local environments can be pacified in a global context of human needs/ security, democratisation, regionalisation and globalisation. Natsios has argued that the evolving international system will demand expanded roles for NGOs in complex emergencies, 44 and that they are the best early warning system for impending conflict; clearly the presence of international NGOs in conflicts tends to restrain human rights abuses and thus also serves as a preventive function. It is the level of legitimacy which an NGO accrues in its local environment which is paramount, however, and this is directly related to the work it does in employing conflict-resolution models. 45
Bringing Global Civil Society and Local Civil Societies Together
With the emergence of complex emergencies in the post Westphalian environment there seemed to be a general rush to exploit the willingness and local expertise of many NGOs in this context, not least because alleviation of conflict did appear to occur, but also as a way of delegating responsibility. With some exception, the general assumption has been made that the objectives of NGOs coincide with the normative concerns which have received greater emphasis since the end of the Cold War. This, however, represents a contradiction (noted by Boutros Ghalis in Agenda for Peace) in that the system of sovereignty has often been used as a cover for humanitarian abuses and oppression by states, which international organisations and international law have been unable to respond to in a convincing manner because of the framework on non-intervention. Similarly, the rule of law in the local environment has often been used to impose ethnic, religious, and linguistic constraints, presenting NGOs and mediators with a dilemma about which framework should take precedence as a basis for their activities. Obviously, the legal and normative structures of non- intervention have been influential, though increasingly, a normative view of global society has taken precedence when human security has been threatened- even by states.
Clearly, therefore, the environment in which humanitarian and conflict resolution NGOs operate in is complex and confused. Yet NGOs have the advantage of providing a generally ethical perspective of politics and can undertake low level, inexpensive, and unobtrusive peacemaking efforts. It is clear that there currently exists a possibility in the current and changing environment of globalisation and regionalisation for the involvement of IGOs, NGOs, non-state and state actors, to facilitate the development of 'ethical actors' and 'ethical regimes' in local stabilisation projects. This can occur in the context of the shifts which are emerging vis-á-vis sovereignty, non- intervention and human rights. As some actors in the international community move to strengthen human rights regimes through the creation of institutions which deal with human and minority rights, sovereignty and its associated regime of non-intervention have slowly lost its pre-eminence. It is in this context that a new generation of peacemaking activity can emerge to which NGOs can contribute, based upon the methodologies and theories of conflict resolution. This can occur in the context of post-Westphalian norms based on the dominance of human security and needs over sovereignty, global and regional integration over isolationism.
IOs, ROs and NGOs therefore can contribute to the emergence of ethical regimes which lie behind these shifts in the international system; it is here that their work can be located conceptually in order to promote the legitimacy of their roles. Their efforts at post-conflict regeneration and stabilisation should promote an awareness of this development, particularly in the case of situations where states or dominant actors are operating outside of this emerging post-Westphalian system. NGOs make an important contribution in the realm of civil society because they have access to groups and organisations that may bear some responsibility for intractable conflict and ethnic tension. Through a conflict resolution methodology, NGOs can try to play a role of undercutting nationalist and stereotype perceptions which perpetuate debates (though this must be implemented without incurring the wrath of those who stimulate such debates). In intractable and ethnopolitical conflicts hatred stems from the control of information to a large extent; NGOs can play an important role here. While local actors in civil society may try to prevent this, NGOs can retain their access through co-operation with high level diplomatic frameworks for stabilisation or a solution and through concurrent and complementary work with international and regional organisations. This involves co-ordination, but it allows NGOs to bring norms of interdependence, co-operation and human rights to local civil society in a manner which high level official and unofficial mediators and actors cannot do if they are caught up in the legalistic framework of international and state-centric debates. This can be achieved by virtue of their intimate knowledge of the local environment and allows NGOs a chance to influence the attitude of extremist local actors and organisations towards moderation. A note of caution must be added here, however, as such a role may well become heavily politicised by the tension between sovereignty and intervention.
With so many actors at different levels of the international system, global civil society and civil society, motivated through self interest or a notion of the greater good to intervene in complex emergencies, co-ordination is required to avoid overlapping and counterproductive efforts, that result in inefficient operations. The main point is to develop a multisectoral, multi-level and multi-dimensional approach to conflict prevention and resolution; conflict transformation requires that coalition-building occurs to create cross-cutting cleavages involving a wide variety of constituencies which can then find channels through which their activities can be co-ordinated, information can be shared and strategic planning and evaluation can occur. It is well known that one of the most difficult problems of conflict prevention is translating early warning intelligence in political will and action. 46 However, the mobilisation of political will for conflict resolution and the importance of mutual co-operation and codes of conduct are all indicative of the growing integration of local and civil society.
There is a clear need to mobilise the political will of IGOs, national governments and NGOs to act in time to prevent major humanitarian crises and acts of genocide. In line with Boutros Boutrous Ghalis' call for preventative diplomacy, calls have been made (going as far back as Kenneth Boulding and the founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution) for the creation of an early warning system in order to recognise patterns human-rights violations at an early stage. Diplomatic pressure can to be applied with the sending of observation missions and with the deployment of armed forces as a last resort. Because of their unique access NGOs can support and stimulate an effective response, and contribute to a multi-level and multi-dimensional peacemaking and/ or building operation. NGOs have a vital role to play both in these operations and also in building up a consensus about why these operations are required, through their ability to network and lobby, filling the gap between civil society and global society, exploiting cross-cutting cleavages. This requires that NGOs have greater access to governments and regional and international organisations. However, NGOs need to increase their credibility at these levels, including in areas pertaining to their legitimacy, efficiency, effectiveness, and conduct. Much more work needs to be done on the practical choices, and the political and ethical choices that confront NGOs, relating to their impartiality, and the possible knock-on effects of their activities.
Human rights abuses by states, oppression of minorities, and suppression of their claims for representation, democratisation, education and development tend to be highly politicised in local environments and therefore need to be addressed at a level at which states are marginalised. Given that states control the majority of the world's resources this is extremely difficult, but it may well be easier to mediate the interests of those engaged in intractable conflict via NGOs (directly or indirectly) and regional and international organisations, with state actors and interests remaining indirectly involved. This would ultimately aid in the channelling of norms of an ethical nature for peace, representation, democratisation and development into local environments. It is therefore important to consider the links between local and international actors and their relationship with NGOs, particularly as their work in the field of peacemaking impinges upon the sphere of influence of states and international organisations. NGOs which are dedicated to monitoring specific laws or specific institutions, lobbying, peacebuilding and early warning, play a valuable role, which needs to be expanded in order to curtail the credibility gap of traditional tools and methods of peacemaking, and to increase the effectiveness of the international system and community in responding to conflict. However, one difficulty lies in the fact that while NGOs can play a vital role in building civil and therefore global civil society, if their legitimacy and resources are enhanced by increased co-operation with states and international or regional organisations, they may either be forced to take on board the interests of states in the traditional diplomatic system or states may withdraw their support. An important question, therefore, relates to whether NGOs can help states and international organisations iron out difficulties in the peacemaking apparatus of the international system pertaining to intractable conflict, or whether states and NGOs are on a collision course with each other.
A tentative answer to this is that shifting post-Westphalian norms increasingly parallel those of local civil society, particularly in the context of emerging ethical regimes of a humanitarian nature and NGOs have played and can play a vital role in enhancing the parallel development of global civil society and local civil societies, thus reducing the impact of Realpolitik at state level of global society. Global civil society can be defined as an association between economy and state, citizens, voluntary associations and social movements, and forms of public communication. 47 It is important to note that evidence suggests that among NGOs a consensus appears to be emerging that conflict prevention is likely to be more effective if it operates in a multi-dimensional and 'multi-track' level in which local actors, external NGOs, governments and international organisations undertake complementary actions. 48 Such multi-dimensional approaches, however, require concerted and consistent co-ordination, and many critics have attacked NGOs, international organisations. and governments for their failure to sustain their initiatives. In particular governments and NGOs have been accused of a tendency to search for media attention, focusing on post- rather than pre- violence interventions. 49 It is clear, however, that peacemaking strategies which bring together IOs, ROs, states, and NGOs are more effective, despite the conceptual and practical conflict which exist between them.
In this context it is important to examine how NGOs can operate to transport and emphasise norms of peaceful coexistence in failing regions and locales, or in areas where violence has already flaired. Frost's recent work on constructing a normative theory of international relations is informative here. 50 He has argued that there exists a settled body of norms which include the preservation of the society of sovereign states, the rule of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, peace is a settled norm, collective security arrangements for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security are required, the preferability of democratic institutions, and the protection of human rights by both states and the international system. 51 This argument is predicated on the grounds that international order as explained by Hedley Bull requires the preservation of the system and society of states itself, the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, the goal of peace among the member states of society as the normal condition of their relationship, and the common goals of all social life, 52 in which states achieve the limitation of violence following a common code in which violence is legitimated only under certain circumstances. The development of a post-Westphalian version of world society- global society- has seen the extension of the societal aspect of this school of thought and the construction of new versions of human, rather than state, security, spanning much broader issues, new claims to sovereignty based on identity and human right, and subsequently greater recognition of the diversity of actors and issues in conflict. This has led to a
...growing concern and more effective activity by regional and global intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organisation (INGOs)-akin to an 'international civic society'-in safeguarding human rights and endangered minority groups... 53
Consequently, it is increasingly possible to see a pattern of some similarities between global and civil norms, or between the universal and the local within the post Westphalian context. 54 What this indicates is that those actors with access to the global and civil levels have enhanced levels of legitimacy, particularly in areas of interest where the importation of such norms could enhance human security- in particularly at the local level. It is important to note that both cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches agree that a single framework of legitimate politics can emerge; contention lies in whether this will be a single world community or an association of communities. 55 This means that the sequence of kin, tribe, city, state, does not have to be extended to 'globe' and produce a universal normative structure; this structure can be produced through a 'practical association' between political communities. 56 This association is based on a common social justice, and to relieve suffering. As Brown has pointed out, community therefore makes sense locally (at the level at which NGOs operate, in particular) rather than globally. 57 Brown argues that "[t]he goal would be an association of socially just communities which was, itself, constructed on socially just lines." 58 Thus a '...plurality of morally autonomous, just communities relating to each other in a framework of peace and law...' 59 provides an important perspective of world politics to which peacemaking in the post- Cold War must address itself. The fact that a plurality of just communities should be promoted emphasises the need for political delegation to actors which have an acute awareness of, legitimacy in, and access to local conflict environments; however, care must be taken that this is not sees as a mandate to impose outside norms and conditions which may only exacerbate conflict. Here NGOs can make a major contribution to preserving particularist, local values in the context of 'universalist' IO or RO peacemaking operations, which may lack local normative sensitivities. In turn this means that the root of conflicts are now more likely to be addressed.
NGOs fit themselves in between each level of analysis in the sequence of kin, city, state, regional and international organisations, facilitating and monitoring activities all these levels of analysis in a private capacity. This is crucial to peacemaking as NGOs have the ability to operate in this manner in these positions providing access, and independent monitoring and facilitation. In this way they form a sort of cartilage between the different levels of global society regardless of the issue area in which they operate; they promote a practical and normative exchange between them. 60
To play an enhanced role, NGOs need access to resources and the full range of actors in global society. There has been a increase in the number of NGOS, (though this tends to be dominated by agendas from the North) and frameworks have emerged for NGO access and participation at the global level, as well as at the governmental level, though often NGO activity has again been curtailed by state-imposed limits. Within the UN, for example, there is evidence that there exists a deepening society of global NGOs. Yet, states only provisionally accept NGOs' contributions to UN conferences as many governments refuse to see their claims to sovereignty over issues within their sphere of interest eroded. While the support of civil society is generally considered an important contribution to peaceful social transformation, some have argued that '...this concept often was equalled with the support of the NGOs in developing societies by Western donors which, without a sufficiently social basis, only created a fragmented and artificial society.' 61 It has also been argued that conflict prevention and transformation NGOs lack sufficient legitimacy with respect to their influence and their own internal structure; despite this NGOs are often perceived as more, rather than less, legitimate because of their conceptual location on the intersection between the norms of global and civil societies.
Conclusion: NGOs and a Third Generation of Peacemaking Activity
Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace presents a far broader definition of security than had been hitherto common in the diplomatic arena, calling for early warning systems, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building operations to become engaged in addressing the '...deepest causes of social injustice and political oppression...' Boutros Ghali makes clear that it is,
possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of the Organisation. 62
It is clear that Boutros Ghali lays the blame for the general failure of first generation approaches to peacemaking during the Cold War at the feet of states which did not see fit to respect the UN Charter and Chapter VI, and because of the fact that third parties generally did not possess much in the way of resources for leverage. 63 Thus, what was required in his eyes was a co-ordinated strategy which spanned preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping/ enforcement, and post- conflict peace-building as part of a general commitment to a broader notion of peace and security. This involved a long term commitment to post-settlement environments including disarmament, the repatriation of refugees, the restoration of order, election monitoring, the protection of human rights, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions, and '...promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.' 64 Thus, the peacemaking process comes to envelop a spectrum of actors from governments to NGOs, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public. 65 Conflict was to be viewed partly through the prism that conflict resolution offers. The somewhat uncertain discussion of international trusteeship, perhaps under the auspices of the UN, is also part of this development. 66
In the post Westphalian context many existing regional multilateral organizations have developed mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, as in the OSCE, OAU, and OAS. 67 Their close geographical proximity to conflicts, and their ability to bring pressure bear on the parties to a conflict, the methods and norms they espouse are often more acceptable to the parties in dispute than methods and norms imposed by external forces. 68 Added to this, the role of a network of NGOs (perhaps, as proposed by International Alert) that would work with the UN and ROs, can provide early warning and play a role in formulating and implementing responses to conflict. 69 Lund proposes a 'stratified, multilateral regime' of prevention, which I would argue has the organisational dynamics and normative principles third generation approaches to peacemaking in the post Westphalian context:
actions to prevent conflicts would be undertaken first in terms of direct involvement by local actors such as the disputants themselves, but with the indirect support of other actors outside the arena of conflict, acting through their representatives present at the local level, such as the ambassadors of major or medium-sized states. Only if greater resources and muscle seem necessary to bring the parties to an agreement would higher level actors become directly involved-in the first instance at the regional level and in the second at the global level. Thus, each of the three levels- local, regional, and global-would come into the foreground as necessary. 70
This framework mirrors the levels of analysis which I have used (local, state, regional and global), and also the three generations of peacemaking activity, from high diplomacy to conflict resolution, and increasingly to peacemaking methods which incorporate all of the levels of analysis. Lund rightly points out the clear sensitivities aroused by direct intervention by third parties in the local environment and calls for the strengthening of RO in this respect support by 'global-level actors'. 71 It is in this context that NGOs can become active in the area of human security in a private, non-threatening capacity. 72 In doing so a channel is created between local and global civil society which is vital for the resolution of intractable conflicts and the abatement of complex emergencies.
In the emerging post-Westphalian environment the potential and space for NGOs and conflict resolution approaches to utilise the reprioritisation towards human needs and security rather than state security has created the opportunity for peacemaking to function on many levels in a multidimensional manner, without threatening to overpower particularist normative systems, but in the context of a global [civil] society. Conflicts can now be discussed in the context of local, regional and global debates, which are no longer epitomised as clearly as the clash of interests that the world of Realpolitik knew so well. NGOs provide the crucial linkages between the local and global for this to occur and conflict resolution techniques provide a methodology through which this can be done, through the intersection of local, regional, and global norms inherent to the post Westphalian global society.
*: An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on’ "Nongovernmental Organisations and the Rule of Law: Exploring the Intersection of Universal Norms and Local Context", Georgia State University, Atlanta, September 4, 1999. Thanks go to the participants (in particular Henry Chip Carey) for their valuable comments. Back.
Note 3: It is important to differentiate between types of NGOs. This can be done in a number of ways, including size, membership, sources of funding, political, cultural and ethnic affiliation, their relationship with local, national, regional and global structures and the interests therein. This paper uses the term NGO as a generic term in order to examine their role and potential in peacemaking practice and theory. It does not attempt to address the question of whether NGOs encompass social movements, but does favour a broad definition of NGOs. Back.
Note 4: The Westphalian system of the Cold War era was characterised by inflexible versions of sovereignty which blocked responsibility for humanitarian issues, and focused on state sovereignty and interests in a narrow sense, providing little space in which actors, official or private, could address the roots of conflict. Indeed, this Westphalian system often replicated conflicts over identity and representation by focusing on state rather than human security. Back.
Note 5: For the purpose of this article the term 'conflict resolution' is used to describe 'citizen diplomacy' and 'problem-solving workshops' that have as their objective self-sustaining solutions, as opposed traditional forms of third party mediation at the diplomatic level of international relations, which have as their objective settlements based on a balance of power. A clear tyranny of definitions appears to exist vis-á-vis the extant terminology in the field of conflict resolution and peacemaking. Here, I tend to use the word peacemaking as a generic term, though it must be borne in mind that in dealing with post- Cold War approaches, Boutros Ghali has implied that peacemaking only describes a part of the preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping/ enforcement, and peace-building framework. See Agenda for Peace, A/47/277- S/24111, 17 June 1992, para 21. Back.
Note 6: Andrew Linklater and John Macmillan, Boundaries in Question , (London; Pinters) 1995, p.5. See also Murray Forsyth, "The Tradition of International Law", in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics , (Cambridge University Press 1992), p.39. Back.
Note 7: Brian Mandell, "The Limits of Mediation: Lessons from Syria-Israel Experience, 1974-1994", in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation , (London: Boulder 1996), p.136. Back.
Note 8: See T. Princen, 'Camp David: Problem-Solving or Power Politics as Usual?', Journal of Peace Research , Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, Vol. 28, No.1, Feb. 1991; and also T. Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, (Princeton UP 1992). Back.
Note 9: See Oliver Richmond, "Devious Objectives and The Disputants' View Of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework", Journal of Peace Research, Vol.35, No.6 (1998). For a detailed discussion of the Cyprus case as a specific example of this see also, Oliver Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the UN (London: Frank Cass, 1998). Back.
Note 10: See Dorothy V. Jones, "The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law", in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, Op.Cit., pp.54-55. Back.
Note 11: Fen Osler Hampson, "Third Party Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict", Millennium, Vol.26, No.3, 1997, pp.736-740. Back.
Note 12: For an elaboration of this, see Oliver P. Richmond, "Mediating Ethnic Conflict: A Task for Sisyphus?", Global Society, Vol. 13., No.2., 1999. Back.
Note 13: David Held, Democracy and the Global Order , (Cambridge; Polity Press 1995) pp.266-286. For a discussion of the changing theoretical debates within International Relations Theory, see John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (eds), Op.Cit. Back.
Note 14: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping , (New York: United Nations 1992), esp. pp.5-22. Back.
Note 15: Supplement to Agenda for Peace , A/50A/60-s/1,3, January 1995, para, 81. Back.
Note 16: Ibid., para. 82. He argues that ad hoc groups within the UN and regional organisations are also important. Back.
Note 17: Ibid., para. 89. Back.
Note 18: See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System , (OUP 1943); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe , (Stanford University Press 1958). Back.
Note 19: E.A. Azar , "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in J Burton & EA Azar, International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, (Wheatsheaf Books, 1986) p.29. Back.
Note 20: H. Miall (ed.), The Peacemakers, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1992) pp.234-237. Back.
Note 21: J. Burton, Conflict and Communication , (London: Macmillan 1969) p.161. Back.
Note 22: J. Burton, Conflict and Communication, Op.Cit ., pp.61-62. Back.
Note 23: David Mitrany's work on conflict provides an important contribution to the critique of traditional diplomacy, as does Groom and Taylor's development of his work on functional institutions, which seem to point to an opening for the development of a new form of multidimensional peacemaking, as outlined below. See D.A. Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics , (London: Martin Robertson 1975); AJR Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation , (London: Pinter, 1990). Back.
Note 24: For example, see Mareike Kleibor: "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.40., No.2., June 1996, p.362. Back.
Note 25: Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Handbook of Conflict Resolution , (Pinter: London 1996) p.68. Back.
Note 26: Such workshops were based mainly on the work of John Burton, Leonard Doob, Herbert Kelman, Edward Azar, and Ronald Fisher. Back.
Note 27: Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy, (Iowa Peace Institute 1991). Back.
Note 28: Louis Kreisburg, "The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field", in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict , (USIP: Washington D.C. 1996). pp.67-68. Back.
Note 30: Kriesburg gives the example of the co-ordinated approaches to ending the Mozambique civil war (which involved a government and rebel party, and was therefore clearly intractable in the context of traditional diplomacy) during the peace process of 1989-92. A Catholic missionary order called the Community of Sant' Egidio used its links with both the government and the insurgent Resistencia National Mocambicano (RENAMO) group, which had been based upon its humanitarian work. Sant' Egidio was able to facilitative negotiations without raising the issue of the status and legitimacy of the disputants. The negotiations were also assisted by an archbishop, a member of the Italian parliament, and representatives of many governments, including the Italian, French, Portuguese, UK, and US governments, and representatives of the United Nations. Neighbouring governments also indicated a regional consensus for a settlement by contributing to the process. Humanitarian NGOs were also actively involved and consulted during the negotiations, which increasingly became co-ordinated at different levels and led to an agreement in Rome on October 4, 1992. Ibid., p.69. Back.
Note 31: E.E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1990) p.26. Back.
Note 32: For example, the International Negotiation Network has been involved in direct conflict resolution. It Secretariat at the Carter Centre assemblies academic analysis on conflicts appopriate for intervention. In the early 1990s in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia, it worked collaboratively with governments and NGOs and through the INN council comprised of eminent world leaders it networks between disputants and world leaders. As a consequence of its somewhat mixed experiences it has developed a third party assistance model based on broad academic analyses of conflict and appropriate multi-dimensional responses aimed at addressing all levels of the conflict, through official and unofficial political, social and economic strategies.Dayle E. Spencer & Willian J. Spencer, "Third Party Transformation: Experiences in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Liberia", in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation , (St Martin' Press 1995), pp.167-195. The Royal United Services Institute is currently involved in organising meetings between crucial Greek and Turkish military and political figures, both as a confidence building measure, to promote confidence and awareness, and to contribute to a reduction in regional tensions. NGOs are also becoming active in Cyprus, mainly in conflict resolution, where it is interesting to note that the formation of NGOs seen as a response to the inadequacies of high level diplomacy. Back.
Note 33: Francis Kofi Abiew & Tom Keating, "Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and UN peacekeeping operations", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6., No.2., 1999, p.90. Back.
Note 34: Andrew S. Natsios in I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen, Op.Cit., p. 338. Back.
Note 35: Pamela Aall, "Nongovernmental Organisations and Peacemaking" in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Managing Global Chaos, ( Washington DC: USIP), 1996, p.434. Back.
Note 37: However, NGOs may complicate the conflict environment as with the decentralisation of conflict a wide array of actors become involved in micro and macro level interventions. For instance, four voluntary agencies (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program, and the UN Development Program) and international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as donor-country foreign aid offices, donor-country diplomats, and military forces often constitute a complex response mechanism which suffers from low levels of co-ordination. Andrew S. Natsios, Op.Cit., p.339. Back.
Note 38: See, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict, (Final Report). (Washington 1997) p. 114. Back.
Note 39: See Eftihia Voutira and Shaun A. Wishaw Brown, Conflict Resolution. A Review of Some Non-Governmental Practices; A Cautionary Tale , (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstituet 1995). Back.
Note 40: See John Paul Lederach, "Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework", in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation, (Houndsmills; London 1995) p.201 - 222. Back.
Note 42: For example, in Sri Lanka, the Sri Lanka Forum was established in 1989 as an informal network of European funding agencies to support development, human rights and peace, as well as to provide information and promote research. This forum has also been involved in advocating constructive solutions has been involved in lobbying in intergovernmental bodies. 43 This led to a development of a coalition of Sri Lankan NGOs involved in conflict resolution, human rights, economic development, and relief issues. Another NGO, the National Peace Council, launched in 1995, aimed to create an environment conducive to achieving a long term negotiated settlement. It has initiated programmes directed at representatives in parliament, and local government, as well as organising workshops on conflict resolution for key actors in civil society. There are several other NGOs, including the Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality, which aims to achieve equal rights for the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, and the Free Media Movement which is an association of journalists. Also involved is International Alert, which has a comparatively long history of commitment to political development, including violations of human rights, conflict transformation, the promotion of cease-fires and their monitoring. See, Sri Lanka - War for Peace? http://www.euforic.org/euconflict/guides/surveys.htm. In Cambodia, with the democratic system, installed by the UN at huge cost, in ruins, civil society increasingly supports the activities of several local human rights organisations. UNTAC did not succeed in establishing a durable democratic system in Cambodia because the UN did not manage to solve the problem of the Khmer Rouge during the peace-building operation and the 1993 elections. Consequently, the human rights component of the UN operation suffered. Amnesty International called on the Cambodian government to arrest those suspected of having violated human rights, while the UN's special human rights envoy for Cambodia received the support of King Norodom Sihanouk and the Prime minister Hun Sen to bring Khmer Rouge to justice. Local NGOs are involved in human rights monitoring but their activities are often challenged by the political establishment. The Cambodian Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL) has hundreds of thousands of members, while the Cambodia Center for Conflict Resolution (CCCR) was founded in 1997 by the Cambodian Development Resource Institute. It has concentrated upon training programmes in conflict management for civil leaders and government officials as well as supporting provincial networks of support for conflict prevention. International Alert also runs a Preventive Diplomacy Project in Cambodia that focus on local projects as well as latent conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, including the problem of demarcation of the Cambodia/Vietnam border and the status of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and ethnic Cambodians in Vietnam. The Asia Foundation has also established programmes focusing on human rights and education, public policy and democratisation, elections, media development, and legal systems. See, Cambodia - The Endangered Peace, http://www.euforic.org/euconflict/guides/surveys.htm Back.
Note 44: Andrew. S. Natsios, Op.Cit., p.343 Back.
Note 46: The recent events in Kosovo have been part of a long and obvious process, going back in its most recent phase to 1988, and yet little concrete was achieved (before the intervention of NATO was necessitated). The plight of the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq has seen little concrete action (the no-fly zone included as it is only a stop-gap measure), and it took an intifada for the rights of the Palestinians to reach beyond mere international rhetoric. The case of East Timour provides little more reason for optimism. Back.
Note 47: See Fred Gale, "Constructing Global Civil Society Actors" in Global Society, Vol.12., No. 3., 1998, p.345. Citing Sandra Maclean, "Conflicting Boundaries? NGO Partnerships and the Development of Global and National Civil Societies in south Africa", Draft paper presented to the 37 th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, p.345. Back.
Note 48: Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, & Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution , (Polity Press 1999) p.119. See also L. Diamond & J. McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace, Washington, DC: Kumarian Press, 1996; K. Rupesinghe, General Principles of Multi-Track Diplomacy , (London: International Alert 1996). Back.
Note 49: Hugh Miall et al, Op.Cit., p.119. Back.
Note 50: See Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations A Constitutive Theory , ? 199? Back.
Note 51: Mervyn Frost, Op.Cit. , pp.106-111. Back.
Note 52: Cited in Mervyn Frost, Ibid., p.115. Back.
Note 53: Alexis Heraclides, 'The Ending of Unending Conflicts: Separatist Wars', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol.26, No.3, 1997), pp.680. Back.
Note 54: Global civil society Issues include the promotion of universal norms, cosmopolitan versions of justice, human security and rights, development and redistribution of wealth, environment, education, political stability and distribution of resources, political legitimacy, interdependence, regional integration, and freedom of expression and pluralism. Local civil society Issues include the sanctity of pluralist constitution and domestic law, observance of regional and international law structures which promote pluralism, communitarian versions of justice, human security and rights, interdependence, development and redistribution of wealth, environment, education, political stability and distribution of resources, political legitimacy, interdependence, local regional integration, freedom of expression and pluralism. Back.
Note 55: See Chris Brown, "The Idea of World Community" in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (ed.), International Relations Theory Today, ( Cambridge; Polity Press 1995), p.106. Back.
Note 56: See Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States , (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press 1983). Back.
Note 57: Chris Brown, Op.Cit., p.106. Back.
Note 60: This argument seems to complement an emerging debate amongst those interested in the development of a global civil society as to its nature with respect to the NGO community. For example, a recent article on this topic argues that the term 'global' represents a geographically diverse and balanced representation which includes non-state actors, while civil society represents a regularized participation in global interactions and NGO access to global forms of governance, in a environment with mutual behavioural expectations and a shared substantive understanding. Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochesteller, "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women", in World Politics , Vol.51., No.1., 1998, pp.3-4. Back.
Note 61: Luis Roninger & Ayse Gynes-Ayata (eds.), Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society, (Boulder: London 1994). Back.
Note 62: Boutros Boutros Ghali, Op.Cit., para. 15. Back.
Note 63: Ibid., para. 34. Back.
Note 64: Ibid., para. 55. Back.
Note 65: Ibid., para. 84. Back.
Note 66: This broadening of peacemaking debates mirrors Chopra's discussion of peace-maintenance, which incorporates diplomatic, military and humanitarian activities into one political strategy aimed a sustainable resolutions. See Jarat Chopra, "The Space of Peace Maintenance", Political Geography, Vol. 15, No.3/4., 1998, p.354. Back.
Note 67: However, recent Pakistani proposals to incorporate a conflict resolution framework into SARC met with rejection by India. See Hindustan Times , 24 September, 1999, p.1; 27 September p.18. India has also been reluctant to countenance the concept of humanitarian intervention. Back.
Note 68: Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts : A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, (United States Institute of Peace 1996) pp176-177. However, regional organizations also have some significant shortcomings relating to the financial, logistical, and human resources necessary for effective preventive action. They often lack professional experience in conflict resolution, and often find themselves constrained by their member states' determination to maintain their individual sovereignty. Back.
Note 69: Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts : A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, (United States Institute of Peace 1996) pp176-177. However, regional organizations also have some significant shortcomings relating to the financial, logistical, and human resources necessary for effective preventive action. They often lack professional experience in conflict resolution, and often find themselves constrained by their member states' determination to maintain their individual sovereignty. Back.
Note 70: Ibid., pp.180-183., & pp.185-188. Back.
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