Mediating Ethnic Conflict

CIAO DATE: 2/99

Mediating Ethnic Conflict: A Task for Sisyphus? ₁

Intercollege, Nicosia, Cyprus

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

“So many of today’s conflicts are within States rather than between States. The end of the Cold War removed constraints that had inhibited conflict...As a result there has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty.” ₃

“Ethnic problems are intractable, but they are not altogether without hope.” ₄

“Mediation is crippled by its own logic...” ₅

1. Introduction

The clash of identity groups is generally acknowledged to be amongst the most difficult of conflicts for third parties to become involved in. Because ethnic conflict generally entails disputes over sovereignty it has often been argued that the principle of non-intervention makes third party involvement implausible, although as Ryan has pointed out, if the “...UN is to remain true to its Charter, the ideals enshrined in Article One means it may have to respond to ethnic conflict.” ₆ While there are other ideals, espoused within the international system which fit uncomfortably, if at all, with this observation, this illustrates that a diplomatic compromise is the foundation of all attempts to resolve ethnic conflict, ₇ despite that fact that diplomacy of this sort is essentially a state-centric activity that tends to lack the necessary sensitivity to the conditions of ethnic conflict. Consequently, the development of a global society requires that an unlikely reconciliation take place between ethnic actors and the international system though the medium of international mediation.

Ethnic conflict, like other forms of internal conflict, is created by the existence of discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, or elite politics. ₈ So called ‘ethnic realists’ have argued, with some justification, that the greater the proportion of state-seeking nationalities that are stateless, the greater the risk of war, ₉ and danger exists in situations where an ethnic group has not attained statehood, but perceives that it can. ₁₀ All forms of international peacemaking therefore entail the difficulty of breaking into the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of a state, this being a move which statesmen and international organisations have been reluctant to make because of the threat of setting a dangerous precedent, ₁₁ which might serve to weaken the norms of sovereignty on which the contemporary international system is based. Such processes tend to be made more spurious and problematic by the tendency for ‘legal’ governments (which may be internally fragile or even impotent in parts of its own territory) to refuse to allow outsiders in, or regard them as legitimate (as has recently been illustrated by the cases of religious turmoil in Algeria and ethnic conflict between Albanian separatists and Serbs in Kosovo) because of the fear of the effect that such intervention may have on their sovereignty and independence. Therefore, ethnic conflict (defined as forms of identity conflict that take place on a sub-state and regional level) is now regarded as being at least as significant as interstate war in the contemporary global system. Between 1989 and 1996, 96 out of 105 conflicts were internal. ₁₂ Many of these internal conflicts, 63 in fact, have been ‘settled’ through negotiations often with third party assistance. ₁₃ Despite this, international mediation has generally come to be regarded as ineffective: the reason for this increase in the success rate of negotiated and mediated settlements may have been partly due to the increase in international intervention as a consequence of the liberating effects of the end of the Cold War. ₁₄ This success rate may prove to be illusory and short-term as many such settlements are based on highly complex constitutional frameworks, or backed by the coercive resources of third parties, and represent the replication of what appears to be an outdated framework of state-centric diplomacy. Settlements should be self-enforcing, or even better, self-sustaining, requiring a serious commitment on the part of ethnic disputants, regional actors, and the international community alike, based on a mutually agreed and clear understanding of the international system itself as well as the political and constitutional arrangements to be implemented at the level of civil society. ₁₅ Most settlements which have been arrived at thus far appear to be flimsy and unlikely to last without constant monitoring and adjustment.

This paper posits the view that inconsistencies within the international system are responsible for the general level of discreditation which has been ascribed to the process and outcomes of international mediation. Arriving at a definition of the international system clearly presents an obstacle in this argument as there is much debate over the nature of the system in the context of the terms of the UN Charter, which are themselves complicated by security issues, self-interest, interdependence, regionalisation, and the process of globilisation. The humanitarian norms and regimes that seem to have been emerging since the end of the Cold War may result in an alteration in the association of legitimacy with sovereignty in the international system, thus reducing the conflict between ethnic identity and national states, and untie the knot which makes mediation in ethic conflict so difficult. This article, therefore, aims to identify the particular difficulties the international system presents for the mediation of ethnic disputes, and possible remedies which could emerge as the international community re-evaluates its system in the light of the end of the Cold War. This is particularly important, in the light of the current burgeoning of violent, latent, ethnic disputes, the shifts towards regionalism and the inability the international community has illustrated to mediate the interests of states (which have demonstrated varying levels of unity and stability, tending to be defined by the international system in the inflexible manner associated with traditional notions and interpretations of sovereignty), with the interests of ethnic groups. The difficulties faced by international mediation, which is the international community’s main tool of conflict resolution as defined in the UN Charter, provides important insights into the failings of the contemporary international environment.

2. The Weakness of International Mediation as a Tool of Conflict Resolution

The international system is based on the fundamental precept that states are the highest and most important level of analysis and have certain concrete rights which give a sovereign state’s essentially abstract legal nature a forcible and legitimate presence in the international system. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an identifiable but small shift in the nature of sovereignty in order to make a state’s domestic situation a legitimate concern of the international community, particularly with respect to humanitarian issues, and increasingly, ethnic conflict. ₁₆ While it is a difficult task to describe the nature of the international system, it is possible to draw out a set of conditions which influence behaviour and hence the shape of the international system, and mediation therein. The changes since the end of the Cold War have produced a reaction from states that are unwilling to relinquish their absolute sovereignty ₁₇ and a reaction from groups which find themselves trapped in states which they feel do not provide them with the resources, political, social and economic, that they require, and which were previously subsumed within the wider security needs of the Cold War environment. It can therefore be assumed that the reason why ethnic conflict was immediately seen as such a threat to stability at the end of the Cold War was because of the threat it posed to the post-WWII states system, based on the hierarchy of the permanent Security Council members and the sanctity of the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the inflexible territorial control of states. This indicates that new ways of thinking about the international system are required, as attempts to prevent the system from changing may only exacerbate ethnic conflict, and identity politics, and harden the conceptual barriers for their successful mediation.

One of the international community’s traditional reactions to conflict has been to utilise the methods of international mediation, which, as defined by Bercovitch and Houston is,

“a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organisation to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.” ₁₈

During the Cold War, mediation was largely unsuccessful in that not many solutions were found or implemented without the application of substantial external coercion and rewards, and many conflicts remained in stasis. ₁₉ Because of its lack of credibility, international mediation became obscured by a plethora of suspect and dubious international practices aiming at producing a status quo that may not necessarily be perceived by ethnic antagonists as ‘just.’ What has emerged in the post Cold War world has been that the international community has tended to focus on methods of conflict management, such as the UN’s wide utilisation peace-keeping to stabilise conflicts, has engaged in experimental approaches such was peace-enforcement, and has increasingly been drawn into multi-dimensional operations in order to rebuild and sustain failed states, through democratisation and development. Yet mediation has increasingly lost credibility and has been replaced by a focus on preventative diplomacy, notwithstanding the recent success of the American mediator, Senator Mitchell, in the case of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, much analysis has revolved around the types of political structures that can be used to facilitate power sharing in torn states. While preventative diplomacy and the emphasis on constitutional structures are important, this does illustrate a shift of attention away from international mediation; this may risk the consigning of intractable conflicts (in which the actors perceive that they cannot take the risk of displaying the large amount of trust needed to move from conflict to a modification of the power-sharing arrangements which led to the conflict itself) to the scrap-heap of failing and troubled states. This is indicative of the failing credibility of international mediation in situations where serious ethnic conflict has flared up, in particular, in regions where the international community does not have sufficient interests at stake to intervene decisively as it did, eventually, in Bosnia, and as the US did in the Middle East. Extending this line of thought leads to the supposition that there may well be emerging regions and conflicts which returning to a Cold War philosophy, the international community are happy to isolate and stabilise, but have abandoned attempts to bring a greater harmony to—zones of intractable conflict. The international community either allows this to occur, or invests more effort in international mediation in ‘intractable’ disputes, which are often defined as intractable by the international community itself because of the failure of its efforts to make decisive progress. Intractable disputes have nonetheless normally been significantly advanced by third party mediation; one only needs to look at the current situations in Bosnia, Lebanon, the Middle East, Cyprus, and Ireland, to see that third party involvement produces results by building a negotiation culture and creating stability, though not necessarily self-perpetuating and consequently heavily dependent on external guarantees. The definition of success in such cases must span talks for the sake of talks to a solution, self-perpetuating or not, and the failure of international mediation to create solutions in the short term should not lead to the denigration of its value. Discussions about power-sharing arrangements and extensive international intervention in failed or failing states cannot hide the fact that international mediation with the consent of the disputing parties is the most cost-effective method of conflict settlement and at some point, regardless of the scope, span, and depth of intervention, mediation will be required to bring disputing parties into a co-operative relationship.

In the literature on international mediation, there is very little in the way of discussion of how it actually fits into the contemporary international system, other than in the vague manner contained in Article 3 and Article 33 of the UN Charter. There appears to be an underlying assumption that as a technique of conflict settlement or management, it is certainly constrained by the ‘realities’ of the international system, but must do its best to operate in the environment in which it is located. Yet this is the source of one of its fundamental weaknesses as the principles and norms of the international system are themselves often contradictory; in itself this is enough to account for the reason why mediated agreements in ethnic conflict so often remain elusive, or unimplemented. For example in the case of the UN peacemaking process on Cyprus, since 1964, the Turkish Cypriot side has used the language of self-determination and human rights for oppressed minorities in order to justify its claim for autonomy from the Republic of Cyprus; the Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, have used the language of intervention and sovereignty to argue that the Turkish Cypriot action constitutes secession, and is in fact spurred on by Turkish irredentism. The third party must tread a fine line between such appeals to two confused, but legitimate set of principles, and can achieve little more in such circumstances than the promotion of talks for the sake of talks, which incidentally tend to prevent violent conflict from re-emerging. Thus, contradictions in the international system related to sovereignty and the rights of ethnic groups hinder mediation efforts. They may actually lead to escalation because of the tendency for local ethno-political entrepreneurs to drive conflict based on what they see to be a legitimate understanding of what the international system offers for such groups though the emphasis and exploitation of ‘oppressive’ constitutional structures, while legal though shaky governments use the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity to justify their normally inflexible stances vis-à-vis ‘rebels,’ and deny the existence of ‘ethnic’ conflict. The involvement of third party mediators in such cases illustrates how international mediation in general has a suffered from a problematic synthesis with the contemporary international system when applied to intractable ethnic conflicts of the type observed in ex-Yugloslavia, the Middle East, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland, to name but a few. As the international system is status quo oriented, mediators find themselves often able to do little more than strengthen the local and emerging status quo, regardless of their professed objectives. This leads to the proposition that international mediation has become little more than ‘status quo diplomacy’ partly as a consequence of the devious objectives of the disputants related to the rewards they attempt to reap from the third party. ₂₀ This is exacerbated by the fact that the international community is united for once in its avoidance of any issue which threatens to establish a clear norm against the sanctity of sovereignty other than the use of aggression against a state by another state ₂₁ unless no other way can be found to alleviate high levels of violence, as was observed in the case of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, and to a certain extent, the USSR. In general, however, “...stasis, even UN facilitated stasis, may be preferable to some alternatives.” ₂₂ However, this tendency is currently being challenged by the development of a human rights culture in the international system, which seems to emphasise the contradictions ethnic conflict raises in the contemporary environment and highlights the weaknesses of existing international mediation apparatus, based as it is on interstate conflict.

3. The International System and Ethnic Conflict

Anthony Smith has argued that the ‘...paradox of ethnicity is its mutability in persistence, and its persistence through change.’ ₂₃ This being the case, it is remarkable that the international system has not, throughout its recent history, evolved a suitable method in order to allow the expression of autonomous ethnicity in a framework which does not create friction between states and ethnic or non-state groups. Methods have spanning assimilation to ethnic cleansing, and from the Minorities Treaties of the League of Nations to the Declaration of Human Rights and de-colonisation have all attempted to situate ethnic groups within the notion of the Westphalian state. For example, the League of Nations’ Minorities Treaties were established mainly to prevent the destabilisation of the peace settlement at Versailles by providing for the German and Hungarian minorities then scattered about the region in order to prevent Germany and Hungary from using these minorities to expand, or develop a case for irredentism. ₂₄ In order to prevent the Pandora’s box of an escalation of ethnic secession and separatism UN resolutions defined self-determination as being for colonial peoples during the Cold War; the principle of non-intervention meant that ethnic conflicts, particularly in Africa went untouched— ₂₅ the only postcolonial attempt to mediate ethnic conflict during this period was between the Arabs and Israel. Most attempts since have depended on the application of coercion or vast incentives offered by the third party and its sponsors, or both. Such conflicts were often merely stabilised by peacekeeping forces, to which a tentative peacemaking operation may have been linked, as in the case of Cyprus in order to prevent a wider regional escalation of conflict. After the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts began to receive more attention, although mechanisms for dealing with non-state actors are still not present. At the Forty Eighth session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1992, a draft was approved on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities which for the first time give special status to such groups under international law. However, it only strengthened the role of states, which were identified as responsible for protecting those rights. ₂₆ It is within this framework which the three main alternatives for ethnic disputants—reconciliation, separation, and war—are drawn. This is also the reason why intervention in ethnic wars is unlikely to be successful unless diplomatic efforts are backed by the threat of military and economic sanctions, or the status of ethnic disputants, state or non-state, is clarified. The prospect of losing or gaining sovereignty on the part of the disputants is an impediment to mediation particularly in cases where the UN is involved, as the Security Council is the only international body able to provide legitimacy. Internal conflicts often arise from the declining legitimacy of states and governments, but paradoxically states and international organisations are still responsible for preventing conflict—internal and external. This means that third party involvement will generally be derived from within the state system, either through the UN or directly representing a state (although the activities of non-governmental organisations is increasing, as is the activity of inter-governmental organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, partly in response to the dead end that international mediation seems to have found itself in). This being the case, third party mediation in the case of ethnic dispute tends to carry a bias against non-state actors, especially as one element of the disputant’s agenda is normally directed at preserving the unity of its state in the face of an internal, or external threat from an ethnic group and its sponsors, which may want to split the existing state or create their own.

Consequently, in line with Smith’s conclusion that “...warfare between states serves to enhance and maintain ethnic identity in history...,” ₂₇ the international system itself can serve to exacerbate the perceptions of ethnic groups as to the inequalities of their situation within the state system, particularly when it comes either to a struggle on their part against oppression (often from a state), or on the part of ethnic entrepreneurs who also tend to reject the existing system, while at the same time often promoting and exploiting ethno-nationalism. ₂₈ It appears that in many cases, international mediation has merely been plugged into this gap to prevent a further deterioration of the states’ system and the associated regional and global upheaval that may go with its alteration or weakening. This is crucial as a general perception of mediation in ethnic disputes is that it favours new, and more representative power-sharing arrangements within states, rather than the creation of new states, or even the modification of the international system. Where new states have been created, as in ex-Yugoslavia, it is generally after much inter-ethnic violence and because of a lack of will on the part of the disputants to find a compromise and a lack of ability on the part of the international community to hold the state in question together. However, the recognition given to secessionist policies amongst the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, and the Croats in Bosnia indicates that the concept of secession is far less opposed in the contemporary international system, ₂₉ although in the case of Cyprus the international community has encouraged the retention of the state in a loose framework, as has also occurred in Lebanon and Israel. International discussion of the Kurdish issue in Turkey has on occasion recognised the plausibility of the Kurds claim for a state, ₃₀ but has only applied pressure on Turkey to improve its human rights record in general terms. Intervention in ethnic conflict in the form of mediation has often occurred too late to prevent widespread violence and bitterness, thus making the agenda of the international community to hold states together even more difficult and unlikely to achieve; ₃₁ in the Cyprus case, and after three decades of UN peacemaking aimed at producing a power-sharing arrangement within a federal state, it looks increasingly likely that partition may even become formalised in the future. This would, of course, turn the conflict in Cyprus into an inter-state conflict, as may occur if the Palestinians go ahead with their recently stated intention to declare independence in 1999. ₃₂ David Held has argued that there have been six main developments in the history of the states’ system. These included the growing coincidence of territorial boundaries with a uniform system of rule; the introduction of standing armies; the creation of new mechanisms of law-making and enforcement; the centralisation of administrative power; the alteration and extension of fiscal management; and the formalisation of relations between states through the development of diplomacy and diplomatic institutions. ₃₃ The nature of diplomacy is a direct by-product of this system, and it is under these constraints that international mediation has traditionally operated. In the sixteenth century, as a consequence of the struggle between church, state and community, sovereignty offered an alternative way of conceiving the legitimacy of claims to power. ₃₄ The Westphalia model was organised along the lines that there is no higher authority than states, that law-making, enforcement and settlement of disputes is in hands of states, international law is oriented to create minimum rules of coexistence, all states are equal before the law, conflicts between states are ultimately settled by force, and consequently the collective priority is the minimisation of impediments to state action. ₃₅ This provides non-state ethnic actors with a powerful incentive to become states, as this is perceived as the most efficient framework though which interests and needs can be pursued. It also provides state actors with a powerful incentive not to share power (and to defeat ethno-nationalism with nationalism) as this would mean a perceived compromise of the state’s (and its dominant interest groups) ability to act. As soon as one recognises that states should be held accountable for their actions with respect to internal interest groups, the prospect of finding a new solution is raised based on a mediated modification of the state or the creation of a new state, which will tend to occur through the use of violence as states are unlikely to give up sovereignty over part of its territory without a struggle. ₃₆ It is well-known that the Treaty of Westphalia codified the principles of the secular state system ₃₇ while the Paris Peace conference after WWI interjected a somewhat contradictory doctrine of self determination. The dissonance between the two was defused by the League of Nations’ confirmation of the principle of territorial integrity its Covenant, which gave priority to historically established state boundaries over the secessionist demands of minorities. ₃₈ The development of the states’ system recognised that the universal principles of the international system needed clarifying. For Metternich and the Vienna Congress of 1815 the system was based on dynastic legitimacy, while for Wilson at Versailles it was the right to self-determination: both redrew the map of Europe according to these principles. The tension between identity and sovereignty was apparent, the international community opting for a national form of identity as the basis for international order. The question remains, as Hassner has asked, as to how the international community should resolve conflicting claims of historical legitimacy, self-determination, economic viability and regional security? ₃₉

When the general requirements for statehood were linked in the first article of the Montevideo Convention of 1933, whereby a ‘state’ as a subject of international law should have a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states, ₄₀ identity was clearly viewed as less crucial and perhaps more malleable than territorial integrity. Clearly, such positions in the contemporary environment could be inherently contradictory if a state contains more than one identity group which has perceived itself to be a victim of oppressive assimilationist tactics or perceives the opportunity in the new normative and security environment to pursue long held dreams of ethnic autonomy. Mechanisms to respond to such developments could be sought through a modification of existing UN principles, but since the end of the Cold War the UN has not been able to respond adequately, mainly because of the fact that while the Charter has modify the Westphalia system substantially, it has also legitimised the role of the great powers, and of course, states.. Art 2(7) codified the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention that had emerged from Westphalia and while some have argued that Article 1 of the UN Charter contains a promise of self-determination, Kelsen argues that this refers to relations among states and that self-determination of peoples actually means the sovereignty of states. ₄₁ The principle of self-determination in thus basically a principle of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty equality of the UN’s member states. ₄₂ Consequently, while the need for the consent of states has been marginally reduced, it remains in the sense that the UN Charter in many respects just extends interstate system. ₄₃ Thus, as Held argues, the logic of state-centric security has profound consequence for national systems of accountability and for democracy. It denies democracy internationally by reinforcing the sense of separateness of states and their ultimate responsibility for their own defence and security. This has the effect of legitimising traditional diplomacy, ₄₄ of which international mediation has been part. However, this also means that the international system, and third party peacemaking derived from its structures, are singularly ill-equipped to deal with ethnic conflict as, in effect, it contradicts the logic of statist security. This is so because the underlying framework on which the triad of mediator and disputants (plus sponsors and constituency) rests must be derived from the norms and principles of the international system itself, which determines how the parties frame their perceptions and expectations of a mediation process in an ethnic conflict. It illustrates how the agenda of the third party will be defined by the legitimate interests of its constituency, according to the international system. In a general sense this means that the mediator will tend to support the integrity of the state, the government party will strive to deny the ethnic level of the conflict and concentrate on its inevitable international level, and the ‘rebel’ party will claim self-determination on the basis of oppression.

Partly as a consequence of the lack representation of ethnic groups outside of a state framework, minorities at risk are estimated to constitute about one sixth of the globes’ population; such a potential proliferation of internal conflict indicates the declining legitimacy of the current form of the state, but also indicates an increasing danger of the spill-over of ethnic conflict into other states. The international community is faced with several choices with respect to this problem. It can allow such states to split, either into separate states, or at least autonomous units within a state. The first option is problematic in that government actors, or those who claim to represent the governance of the entire territory, part of which is in dispute, will tend to favour solutions which prevent the state from being divided, and will therefore argue for the unity of the existing state, or at least for the preservation of the state through a compromise of autonomy for what they will view as being insurgents. This is aptly illustrated by the stand of the government of the Republic of Cyprus over the last thirty years, in that it first favoured majoritarian rule until the Turkish Cypriot ‘rebellion’ was reinforced by Turkish interests and intervention, and then the Greek Cypriot side moved their position to a single state, but with two relatively autonomous administrations. Similar shifts can also be observed by the British government vis-à-vis the catholic community in Northern Ireland and the Israeli government with respect to the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel. A second option, that of creating two autonomous powersharing administrations within a state is thus seen as a threat to the party which still has at least nominal control of the institutions of state. For the ‘rebel’ group, autonomy is often viewed as being an unjust compromise on their primary objective of self-determination, both on ethnic and humanitarian grounds. Consequently, both the option of separation into two states and autonomy within one state provides the mediator with a knotty problem, as both parties can point to a set of international principles and argue that whatever the stand that is taken by the international community, or the third party, their treatment has been unjust. On the local level, they can argue that their adversary has no grounds for either preserving or splitting the state, on the basis that either their rights were oppressed by the state, that they are a community with the right of self-determination, or on the grounds that the ‘rebel’ party is essentially a secessionist movement which threatens the integrity of all states across the globe. This is often made more problematic if the failed state was once a colony, and was given independence on the criteria provided by, and for, the majority group as was the case with India, which was partitioned on independence, and with Pakistan when East Pakistan seceded and was recognised as Bangladesh. Minority groups can plausibly claim they have a right to exercise self-determination which was overlooked by the international community at the time that the state in which they reside became independent. As Ryan points out, minority groups tend to feel more badly treated after independence and regard the dominant group as new colonisers. ₄₅ In turn majorities may try to coercively assimilate minorities in order to prevent such discontinuities from emerging.

Within multiethnic states, consequently, international morality tends to apply in that borders are drawn around interest groups. ₄₆ This is particularly problematic, if one of the interest groups has a set of perceived borders that pass around another group outside their state. Much then depends on this group, and its relative control of local and regional resources. For example, the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq do not present the states of Turkey or Iraq with an overwhelming threat, but Turkey’s inclusion of the Turkish Cypriots in their perceived area of interest (and vice versa) has exerted a strangle hold on the ability of the Republic of Cyprus to function internationally, and on the viability of any power-sharing arrangements which the Cypriot parties might agree too. The same has been true, to greater or lesser extent, with the relationship of Greece and with the Greek Cypriots, Eire and the Catholics of Northern Ireland, and ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia. The Westphalian conception of the state, even with the modification provided by the UN system, is ill-suited to the heightened awareness of ethnic groups and the emergence of identity politics, which has been spurred somewhat ironically by the international communities’ normative reaction to human rights and minority abuses. Yet states still cannot completely accept the principle of national self-determination, even if it is on this very basis that they became independent and autonomous, as this would undercut their own legitimacy. Consequently, ethnic groups are often seen as ‘Trojan horses’ by states, ₄₇ leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy based on the pursuit power and domination. Consequently, security dilemmas emerge within states as well as between states. This contradiction can even be found between a single state’s domestic and foreign policies: Turkey’s attitude to UN peacemaking in Cyprus based on the creation of a federal state has long constricted its stand on its own Kurdish issue, which it argues is not actually an issue at all. Turkey’s support of UN peacemaking in Cyprus in terms of a federal state is in itself ambiguous. The hard-line Turkish Cypriot leadership would prefer complete secession from the Republic of Cyprus or to become part of Turkey rather than a federal solution. Turkey itself seems best served by the Turkish Cypriot community becoming part of Turkey rather than a federal solution or independence for the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey, while supporting the Turkish Cypriot attempt to increase its autonomy on the grounds of Greek Cypriot oppression during the 1960s, has generally opposed all attempts by the various Kurdish factions to gain autonomy at any level and has subsequently been engaged in a guerrilla warfare in areas of Turkey where Kurds are predominant. ₄₈ The Kurds themselves, of course, appeal to the principles of self-determination (although the Marxist-Leninist PKK have not contributed to the credibility of such claims) and point to the Treaty of Sevres which might have provided for a Kurdish state (but which was never ratified). ₄₉ The international community has continually called on the Turkish government to improve its human rights record, but no further. ₅₀ Even after Turkey’s military incursions into Northern Iraq to cut off the supply route of Kurdish guerrillas, the international community has had little to say. Implicit in this is the norm of non-intervention, despite the fact that Turkey has technically intervened in the affairs of Iraq several times since the Gulf War. ₅₁ Making the scenario more complex is the inevitable entry into the dispute of external actors or states, which tend to enter on the basis of ethnic affinities with one disputant or other, or plain interest. The internationalisation of the conflict tends to lead to its escalation, yet it is often one of the main methods for the government actor to find support against the rebel group and any alliance it may have made across state borders. For the rebel group, alliances with external actors may be the only way they feel they can make their case. Whatever the reasons, ethnic disputants will welcome allies with open arms, as the Turkish Cypriots did with Turkey or as the Greek Cypriots have done with Greece and sporadically, Russia (USSR), and just as has occurred in the case of Israel and the Arab world, and throughout the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia. Furthermore, disputants will actively engage in a search for allies and appeal to principles and norms that they perceive confirm the justice of their negotiating positions, althougth they often operate within the grey areas of such principles and norms. Crucially, this tendency relates to the long-standing reluctance of the international community to find a way of mediating between the sanctity of sovereignty and the sanctity of ethnic identity. ₅₂

Kaufmann has argued that the only answer to ethnic conflict is the separation of failed states into separate defensible enclaves to prevent hardening of ethno-nationalist rhetoric because of atrocities, and the security dilemma provided by the intermingling of populations. In this case, sovereignty becomes secondary to partition, ₅₃ though it is difficult to see how this could be brought about peacefully. Chipman argues that the international community should remain very reluctant to sacrifice the principle of territorial integrity to self-determination, and should avoid admitting unstable entities into statehood. ₅₄ He argues that territorial reform may turn an ethnic conflict into an international one, and therefore that a simpler option is greater observance of group or minority rights. However, this continues to locate the framework of ethnic conflict, management, and settlement within the sphere of the traditional state system and overlooks the fact that such conflicts may, at least in part, be brought about by that system itself. Clearly something more is needed. An internal/ external division allows identity groups to dwell on parochial politics, and allows dominant groups within states to believe that they are not accountable for their actions beyond the state, which they may feel they can control with the exertion of force backed by the majority. Thus, states have great difficulty in relating to sub-state actors, and such actors have difficulty in relating to the states that they feel that they have arbitrarily been made a part of.

In order to move away from post-colonial, weak and unconsolidated states or the Westphalian consolidated nation state with relative autonomy, which tend to fail where multi-ethnic interest groups exist, a complex and transnational entity, immersed in a regional and global norm of humanitarianism and co-operation, is needed. ₅₅ Such entities would clearly be less prone to ethnic conflict; but in order to arrive at such a broad solution, the international community must come to terms with the weaknesses of the current state system with respect to ethnic based conflict, ethnic disputants’ lack of representation, and the inherent contradictions in the international system which exacerbate such conflict. Significantly, the international system was willing eventually to recognise the new states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Macedonia despite opposition to their secession from the government of Yugoslavia; consequently there seems to be a growing willingness to tolerate secessionist claims on the part of ethnic groups. Yet the creation of new states may just replicate the difficulty of multiethnic states: the dissolution of Yugoslavia has not meant that its constituent parts have been free of ethno-politics, notably in the case of the ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo.

4. The International System and Mediation

In the light of the above discussion, there are two main questions pertaining to the relationship of international mediation to the international system. The first refers to the nature and legitimacy of mediation itself, and the second refers to the context provided by the international system; of course defining both is a highly complex and perhaps implausible task here, given the immense amount of information and variables which would have to be examined and accounted for. Given the fact that the passive form of mediation exercised by international organisations such as the UN, by small state actors or private individuals, has rarely been successful unless the disputants themselves have shown a clear and unequivocal commitment to the process, the ‘successful’ third party activity has generally been the result of the flexing of military, political or financial muscles on the part of the mediator or its sponsor. This has meant that settlements such as between Israel and Egypt at Camp David, have been highly focused on the disputants’ respective relationships with, and gains from, interaction with the third party and its sponsors (in this case the US), ₅₆ or have occurred at ‘ripe moments’ in ‘hurting stalemates.’ ₅₇ Such settlements are due to the provision of incentive and reward structures sufficient to bring the disputants to an amicable if tentative agreement, ₅₈ or simply because the disputants have exhausted all zero-sum options. This means that passive mediation is rarely able to succeed unless a member of the international community has sufficient interest in the conflict to lend its own resources to a settlement of sorts, or the disputants and their regional sponsors are committed to the process. The nature of the international system dictates that a settlement could be a compromise of the nature of the Egypt-Israel talks; alternatively, it could be of the sort illustrated by the Cyprus problem, in which the conflict is contained indefinitely, but the international community will not commit enough resources to bring the two sides to a final solution. Alternatively, it could be militarily enforced from the outside as in parts of ex-Yugoslavia, the result of exhaustion as in Lebanon, or the result of co-ordinated diplomacy, international pressure and incentives as in the Israel-Palestinian case. In rare cases could be the result of UN mediation as in the end of the Iran-Iraq war, or the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan. A further exception could be case of Senator Mitchell’s mediation in Northern Ireland, although this success can in part be explained by the existence of a hurting stalemate, exhaustion and war-weariness, and the end of the Cold War. ₅₉ Thus, except in rare cases where external actors have sufficient incentive to inject capital into a conflict to persuade disputants to sign a final agreement, the international system dictates that international mediation is of a traditional diplomatic nature, focusing on preserving the status quo for its own sake, rather than aiming at a more ambitious settlement. This tends to indicate that the current debates around the existence of hurting stalemates, ripe moments, impartiality and bias, presuppose the fact that the international system lends itself to the mediation of ethnic conflict if these conditions exist. ₆₀ This, however, is not the case unless the mediator can provide significant incentives to offset the costs of concession and the possible loss of sovereignty by ethnic disputants; yet, the international system is having to consider ethnicity as part of the system, rather than merely a threat to its state-centric structure. The fact that normally ethnic conflict is couched in terms of a state versus a non-state actor or rebel, is sufficient to provide an initial obstacle to the process of mediation of significant proportions. The third party is in such cases put into the unconscionable position of having to work on the basis of the norms of the state system, which will immediately appear to favour the government actor, or must admit defeat. This illustrates the fact that the tools the third party has at its disposal are limited to improbably difficult efforts at stabilising the state in question, with or without coercive resources. ₆₁ Clearly, there is a need to increase the legitimacy of the third party in ethnic conflict, and to circumvent entry problems for mediators and third parties.

This relates to a contradiction deep within the international system over the grounds for providing certain groups with the right of self-determination while not others, and the general rule that a state is sovereign irrespective of its actual assets, control over its territory, legitimacy amongst it population, and its ability to function reasonably on social, political and economic levels vis-à-vis the Montevideo Convention. ₆₂ An important question seems to be, therefore, to ask whether there is any place for mediation in the international regimes that exist? One potential answer is that mediation falls under the auspices of diplomacy and is subject to its faults. Diplomacy as defined by Berridge is the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than force, ₆₃ but the convention of secrecy prevents the revelation of objectives, and the weaknesses and habits of disputants’ negotiating tactics. Placing international mediation in the context of the diplomatic conduct of the international system tends to lead to mediation becoming viewed as ‘status quo diplomacy,’ in which the basic objective is to prevent a reversion to open conflict through stabilising the status quo by the building of a negotiation culture—a solution being an ‘ideal’ outcome and therefore unlikely to emerge in the short term. If greater honesty in diplomacy is a sign of the maturing of the diplomatic system, ₆₄ this tends to be a far cry from the conduct of negotiations in ethnic conflicts. This indicates that it is unlikely that mediators can bridge the gap between government and non-state actors in ethnic conflict, ₆₅ and therefore the dichotomy between sub-group forms of legitimacy and international legitimacy cannot be resolved in the traditional state system. Some sort of modification of state sovereignty needs to be negotiated in order to allow more accountability for the role of identity politics and minority rights.

The outcome of the current and long-standing discussion of UN reform has important ramifications for this problem. Reform may have to take into account non-state actors and identity groups as being legitimate interest groups, and find a way to mediate between them and state actors. Even if the UN had this capacity, it would also need to narrow the gap between conflict formation and mediation, ₆₆ which itself is exacerbated by the safeguards which the international system has constructed against ethnic protagonists. Consequently, third parties are placed in a difficult position with ethnic groups because of their difficulty in deciding which international norms and principles to apply, and conducting a credible relationship with a non-state actor. Mediators cannot reconfigure resources or rewards in a manner that will be perceived as non-partisan by both disputants without having a clear set of guidelines on which to base their adjustments of sovereignty, territory and power-sharing arrangements. Once again, international principles conflict and negotiating asymmetries are institutionalised. Such asymmetries tend to lead, as we have seen, to hard-line negotiating and ethno-nationalist positions, which in turn indicate the possibility of a future escalation of the conflict.

5. Mediation and Ethnic Conflict

Since the formation of the first multilateral conferences last century, states have attempted to balance the preservation of their territorial integrity with the need to form arrangements on which to base reciprocal arrangements of sovereignty (associated as this is with security). This means that in an ethnic conflict the best the mediator can do is bring ethnic disputants to an agreement amongst themselves about any modification of sovereignty or the lessening of demands for ethnic self-determination, assuming that it can establish a credible position while trying to maintain a cease-fire status quo in which discussion can flourish without the distraction of the battlefield. Even if the conflict is ‘cold,’ tension is often too intense to enable mediation to flourish unless it occurs on the basis of its own and substantial resources, or those of a parallel actor. As Kaufman has argued,

...third parties cannot change ethnically defined grievances, negative stereotypes, symbolic disputes, threatening demographic trends, or histories of ethnic domination in foreign countries; and they cannot eliminate the fears of extinction that may result. ₆₇

Because mediation in ethnic conflict is necessarily intrusive due to of the conflict’s structural nature, and because of the nature of the sovereign state system, it can thus achieve little without leverage beyond the normally passive authority of the third party itself (often the UN in such cases), ₆₈ and seeking to mediate in a secessionist conflict can be seen as a hostile act of interference by the state concerned. Differences in the disputants’ military capability also work against third party intervention. ₆₉ Consequently, if and when talks do begin a settlement is rarely initially valued as much as the indirect resources the process or mediator provides; mediation tends to produce side effects, or ‘devious objectives,’ such as gaining time, appearing conciliatory, improving intelligence gathering, internationalisation, acquiring allies or legitimacy, and discrediting the adversary. ₇₀ The government party first aims to receive an implicit confirmation of its sovereignty by the international community, as the Greek Cypriot side did at the Security Council in 1964, and may see talks as an attempt to freeze conflict, and legitimise its adversary’s (often secessionist) negotiating positions. Therefore, mediation itself tends to become a victim of the inconsistencies in the international system as the third party is faced with the almost impossible task of offering incentives for both sides that negate the government’s recognition and control of resources, the ethnic group’s appeal to the principle of self-determination and attempts to illustrate how it has been oppressed by the majority. This means that the mediator can offer little more than expertise on power-sharing arrangements within the existing state framework, and success tends to depend on the third party’s coercive resources. As Walter has illustrated, the only way enemies in a civil war can prematurely end bloodshed is to force themselves through a transitional period during which they can neither encourage co-operation nor survive an attack. As soon as civil war rivals comply with a settlement, they become powerless to enforce the terms over which they had bargained for so long. Since each side understands the profits to be gained by exploiting a peace treaty, and both sides know that the other recognises this, their promises to honour and respect the terms of the agreement cannot be trusted and under these conditions, fighting suddenly seems far more appealing than settlement. ₇₁ Consequently, mediation is weak in ending civil war and without the ability to provide security guarantees, mediators cannot convince groups to implement treaties. In such cases, devious objectives on the part of the disputants will tend to emerge, perhaps implicitly supported by the third party in that it accepts that the continuation of a deadlocked negotiating process (talks for the sake of talks) is the best option. Ultimately, third party activity therefore becomes chained to the need not to upset the status quo—status quo diplomacy. As the disputants tend to base their negotiating positions on their interpretation of which elements of the international framework are most pertinent to its cause, a mediator must either rely on coaxing the two parties towards a mutual agreement within the grey areas of the international system and ultimately, mediates not just between disputants, but also between the international system, imperfect and ill-defined as it is, and all direct and indirectly interested parties.

This point illustrates that much of the work that is taking place currently within the field on modifying political systems which have failed to balance the interests of ethnic groups, must attend first to the irregularities of the international system, and the position which this places the third party mediator in, before any decisive insight can emerge on which systems operate most efficiently in multi-ethnic states. Modern states control territory and the means of violence, through an impersonal structure of power, which gives them legitimacy. Consequently, the strengthening of democratic institutions can do little to resolve ethnic conflict while democracy between states does not exist, and as Held has pointed out there exists a level of the accountability of power within states and the pursuit of power outside. ₇₂ Where ethnic groups exist within states, de facto borders tend to be erected, which actually mirror the structure of the international system itself. Such borders result in the pursuit of power inside a state and present mediators with a powerful logic which cannot be resisted In the Cyprus case, for example, the Greek Cypriot side has the full support of the UN in preserving and strengthening the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, while the Turkish Cypriot side has tentative support in entering into a power-sharing agreement with the Greek Cypriot side, but within the framework of the existing state. ₇₃ Any attempt by a third party to mediate on the basis of the existing state will be perceived as being partisan by minorities and ethnic groups and may, in their view, confirm the existence on an ethnic security dilemma; this tends to lead to a hardening of negotiating positions vis-à-vis opponents and also the mediator. ₇₄ The mediator is therefore often faced with the task of moderating between a desire to split the state in question, and a desire to preserve it, in the face of a contradictory set of international principles which aim at safeguarding states from secession, while safeguarding ethnic communities from oppressive states. Underlying all such discussions is the formation of a stable state that deviates from, and impinges upon, the contemporary status quo as little as possible. ₇₅ Thus, what has tended to occur in such cases has been that mediators can do little more that preserve cease-fires, and conduct talks for the sake of talks, unless there is sufficient international interest to offer significant incentives for the disputants to modify their respective demands vis-à-vis sovereignty and territory at their behest. Such contradictions look set only to increase as the trend of negotiating a reduction in the sanctity in state sovereignty continues with respect to humanitarian intervention and regionalisation, unless the rewards for relinquishing the control of, or the dream of, statehood are outweighed by the rewards which a settlement framework can offer. Ethnic disputes clearly test the state far beyond its conceptual limits; consequently, it is not the conflict or dispute that should be defined as intractable, but the concept of statehood and perhaps even the international system itself. Much academic work on power-sharing relationships within states is itself circumscribed by the assumption that the concept of the state is itself eternal and inflexible. The guarantees that states have been perceived traditionally to supply their inhabitants, in terms of their rights and needs, have often proved illusory, making the third party’s task extremely tenuous.

These problems are compounded by difficulties of implementation of agreements, as the examples of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1962, Sudan in 1982, Uganda in 1985, Angola in 1975 and 1992, Cyprus in 1977 and 1979, Rwanda in 1994 and ex-Yugoslavia attest. On the other hand, [partial] settlements have been brought about in Cambodia, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, as well as Czech and Slovakia, Chechnya and Bosnia; yet such settlements mainly attest to their own fragility, and constitute flimsy status quos. These may be defined as successes of sorts, if success is defined as spanning a variety of outcomes, from merely a cessation of hostilities as in Cyprus, or a comprehensive solution as in Cambodia. Furthermore, as Lake and Rothchild have cautioned, the prevalence of analysts and practitioners alike tending towards a grim outlook on mediation may tend to result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, although this is a minor obstacle. ₇₆ If we accept that third parties cannot change the nature of ethnic conflict as Kaufman has argued, ₇₇ the only alternative besides mediation, patching the conflict up with peacekeeping forces, or implementing economic policies and creating coercive incentives for settlement, may lie in a modification of the norms and principles on which the international system is based. The belief that ethnic conflict is intractable is widely held and it has been argued that in states where ethnic conflict has already broken out little can be done until the conflict has spent itself. The question of how outsiders can mediate in ethnic conflict before it turns violent therefore has taken the international community into uncharted waters. However, even to bring about free and fair elections third parties need to be given access to a specific set of conditions in which it can legitimately intervene in a state’s affairs. Once conflict has broken out, the third party likewise needs a clear set of parameters through which to operate. When the military power of one side prevents a ‘just’ solution, the mediator needs a decision from international community whether to compromise on a just solution or to disengage. There appears to be an increasing acceptance of ‘human rights enforcement,’ ₇₈ and as Ryan has pointed out, any proposal which either supports or rejects the idea of a natural harmony between communities will be judged accordingly, ₇₉ although in late 1993, the mediators in ex-Yugoslavia reluctantly concluded that the only solution was the partitioning of Bosnia into Muslim, Serbian and Croatian regions. ₈₀

Third parties play a crucial role in promoting new norms of conduct in the conflict environment, particularly with respect to human rights. However, the latter may clash with the need to establish power-sharing arrangements through multilateral negotiations. In such cases, this might well provide the third party with the necessary leverage to promote co-operation in the absence of trust. As in the case of Cyprus in 1964, implicit recognition of the Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus could have been withheld on suspicion of human rights violations; this might have led to a more conciliatory attitude from the Turkish Cypriot leadership and might well have increased the pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to accommodate them early on, thus circumventing later outbreaks of violence. However, as Mitchell has argued, peace and justice tend to contradict each other; thus mediation (and problem solving approaches) tend to support whichever party is the most powerful at the outset, ₈₁ normally those that retain control of the institutions of statehood. Attempts by the third party to solve an ethnic conflict may therefore often compound that conflict as the mediator’s objective of a compromise solution will contradict the disputants’ zero-sum objectives ₈₂ particularly if mediation is imposed from the outside. Consequently, mediators in ethnic conflict need to recognise and utilise their leverage (which often lies in recognition) as third party intervention is often seen as a defeat for the objectives of both parties. ₈₃ In the case of ethnic conflict therefore, mediation tends to be thwarted by its own logic: it must be undertaken by a party or sponsored by a state which is eminent or powerful, or by an international organisation of states—thus it is partisan. ₈₄ What is more, existing frameworks for the mediation of ethnic conflict can often have the result of exacerbating the conflict unless the two parties are in a sufficiently painful situation to perceive that their best hope lies in trusting its adversary and the third party and agreeing on a compromise; clearly a hurting stalemate must be extremely painful in this case.

6. The UN, Peacemaking and Ethnic Conflict

In the light of the preceding discussion the UN must be viewed as an international body based on an inherent contradiction. It is an association of sovereign states brought into existence by those states in order to curb the shortcomings of the state and the international system, although in this context expectations of the UN often far exceed its capacities. Roberts and Kingsbury have argued that the UN’s contribution is viewed as,

...being less in the field of peace between the major powers, than with respect to defusing regional conflict, advocating self-determination, assisting decolonisation, codifying international law, protecting human rights and providing a possible framework for social and economic improvement... ₈₅

As Calvecoressi has pointed out, the UN is a global attempt to moderate the interplay between independence and interdependence in a world where interdependence is inescapable but often unpalatable. ₈₆ The international system tried to come up with an equitable way of sharing power through sovereign equality, but this has failed to prevent states from being haunted by their minorities, although the UN has tended to de-emphasise ethnic problems despite the fact that many of its earliest conflicts such as in Kashmir and Palestine had an ethnic element. ₈₇ The inherent conflict between independence and interdependence is indicative of the conflict between ethnic disputants in a world of states, and of the flawed nature of international mediation based on the defence, or attraction, of sovereignty. The state-centricity that underlies the UN system tends to be an obstacle to UN efforts to prevent the oppression of ethnic groups, which have foundered on states’ fear of irredentism and secession, and of ethnic entrepreneurs. Consent for UN involvement in ethnic conflict is difficult to receive, making it difficult for the UN to retain credible impartiality. ₈₈ However, the UN also tends to be viewed as an important forum for the representation of non-state actors which, if they can gain the right to speak, they are anxious to use. Significant, too, is the fact that the act of addressing the Security Council, General Assembly, or other committees, or even merely accepting contact with the Secretary General and his representatives tends to be viewed by non-state actors as symbolic of the legitimacy of their cause, and of a level of acceptance and sympathy from the international community.

When the Universal Declaration of Human rights was being drafted, Lebanon, the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Denmark, attempted to include a minority rights clause. However, the USA (and Australia) thought that this would prevent assimilation and consequently, as Ryan has pointed out, the UN protects states from minorities rather than the other way around. ₈₉ The UN has never become involved in an ethnic conflict in terms of decolonisation or peacekeeping because of that conflict’s ethnic dimensions. Rather, it has become involved because of a perceived threat to international peace and security. ₉₀ The same has been true of international efforts at peacemaking in the Middle East, Cambodia, Central America, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. It is clear that the UN has no direct mandate to deal with ethnic conflict, although as the concept of sovereignty undergoes a fundamental erosion, it is possible that the UN will have more opportunity to take initiatives in such cases, ₉₁ particularly as the dominant impulse within the contemporary system is to work through the UN framework to resolve ethnic conflicts, for example, as has been the case recently in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. ₉₂ This is also, of course, indicative of the tendency for difficult (most often ethnic) problems to be consigned to the UN agenda.

As Carment and James have argued, however, mutually incompatible dreams of ethnic self-determination make the resolution of ethnic conflict by the UN unlikely. ₉₃ Traditional diplomacy and power bargaining lead to the protraction of ethnic conflict, ₉₄ and conflict is more often resolved in favour of states rather than ethnic groups, although such groups tend to argue that their claims are superior to states. ₉₅ However, they tend to want to become states in their own right. ₉₆ The UN used peacekeeping to put down secession in Congo and the crisis reaffirmed the supremacy of statehood in the international system (despite the relative autonomy earned by Hammarskjold for the UN peacekeeping operation in Congo, which had hinted at a global supra-national authority). This led to restrictions being placed on future Secretaries General. ₉₇ UN action in the Yugoslav conflict was paralysed early on in the conflict by the inherent contradiction between the right of national self determination claimed by ethnic minorities and national groups to legitimate their statehood and the principle of territorial integrity. Initially, the West opted for the latter and, as Burg argued, increased the opportunity for local supporters of the status quo to use force against their opponents. ₉₈ In doing so, it also provided international mediators with an implausible task in their relationship both with recognised and non-recognised groups. ₉₉

If the international community wants to provide the UN with a clear set of parameters through which to settle such disputes, it must affirm the moral and political superiority of principles of human rights and democratic government over those of territorial integrity and national self-determination, and perhaps also over sovereignty itself. Human rights should therefore take priority over ethnic self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity should be subordinated to advancing democracy. In this case, sovereignty becomes a reciprocal prize for the disputants to share, rather than something which one part can use against the other. As the Yugoslav case illustrates, the emphasis on territorial integrity may encourage the use of force and adversely hamper peacemaking efforts on the part of the international community, which may finally have to accept that new states may be equally as unstable as their progenitors. Ethnic elites within ethnic groups can play on ethnic conflict for their own interests, and empowering the UN to deal with ethnic conflict must take account of the tendency for ethnic entrepreneurs to precipitate conflict by politicising ethnic issues for their own purposes. ₁₀₀ The empowerment of the UN to deal with such conflict is an essential part of reforming and improving the organisation’s ability to contribute to the preservation of peace and security, but it is also a major challenge to the framework which it is supposed to preserve. ₁₀₁

International consensus for intervention has developed with respect to threats to international peace and security; when there are large-scale humanitarian problems; and flagrant violations of human rights. ₁₀₂ Furthermore, the definition of human rights has been expanding to incorporate group rights, especially those of ethnic groups. ₁₀₃ The options for action by international organisations comprise the application of diplomatic pressure, humanitarian relief, observation and monitoring, good offices, economic sanctions, the supervision of cease-fires, mediation, and finally, military intervention. The aim is to end violence, restore order, relieve suffering, initiate negotiations which lead to interim agreements and settlements, apply international norms, promote human rights, punish oppressive regimes. The overall objective is to establish precedents for intervention that will deter future violations of such international norms. However, the interests of international organisation members tend to exclude ethnic conflicts from their agendas as has been the case with Tibet because of the Chinese veto in the Security Council, Corsica because of the French veto in the Security Council, and East Timor because of Indonesia’s connections with other states. The doctrine of sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs is still unreconciled with non-state group problems, and consequently, international organisations cannot intervene without its member states’ acquiescence. This is a serious short-coming in an era where conflict involving non-state actors is widely believe to constitute a threat, if not the most significant threat, to peace and security. Because this type of conflict is also a threat to the state system, it is a double-edged sword. The international community seems to act as if to solve the problem of non-state actors is in its interests in terms of preventing conflict, but not in its interests in terms of threatening the established rights of states.

Thus, the UN needs authority to intervene before a conflict becomes violent and more resources to intervene with, including humanitarian and military resources on constant standby. Furthermore, peacemakers need clearly defined policy goals, clear strategic objectives and tactics in order to create peace and maintain it, as in Cambodia where the state was rebuilt from the ground up with the aid of strong local, regional, and international commitment. ₁₀₄ While the international community cannot impose a cosmopolitan diktat, neither can it ignore the injustice that the traditionally narrow vision of state leads to. Ethnic groups need to be given a legitimate status which in some instances, such as in cases of clear oppression, will supersede state cohesion. ₁₀₅ Thus, those advocates of international action who seek to redress the failures of local political institutions by brokering power sharing arrangements, rebuilding a functioning state, reconstructing exclusive ethnic identities into wider inclusive civic identities, ₁₀₆ must first deal with the difficulties that the nature of the international system provides third party mediators.

One way of avoiding a [threat of a] relapse into anarchy because of failed negotiations and mediation as a consequence of the inherent contradictions within the international system is to shift the task of protecting and administering troubled areas to the international community. This could involve a return to the practice of protectorates and trusteeships, as with the UN’s role in Cambodia. ₁₀₇ However, the case of Lebanon indicates that the duration of an international organisation’s intervention should be as short as possible, it should be cohesive, determined, occur at beginning of crises or when players are exhausted, and needs to be accepted by antagonists, domestic and external, ₁₀₈ although this in itself may not be enough given the inconsistencies of the international system. The case of Cyprus illustrates that mediators backed by the UN can do little in the face of the ambiguities of the international system especially if the secessionists are backed by powerful allies. Negotiations can simply become hostage to intractable and legalistic positions, fuelled by ethno-nationalist rhetoric, despite major international efforts to bring the parties together.

One option is that the UN should concentrate on making states abide by rules which satisfy all groups and so avoiding call for ethnic self determination, ₁₀₉ but this seems difficult in the light of the tendency for ethnic entrepreneurs to emerge. Thus, the tools and technique of UN peacemaking need to be refined to enable the UN to intervene legitimately in the view of both parties, and it should not succumb to pressure to immediately recognise the party that controls the domestic institutions of state. Perhaps recognition could be left ambiguous until such point as both groups have sorted out their problems, thus providing them with an equal incentive to cooperate with the mediator. Given the continuing predominance of the state system and notions of sovereignty, it might be expedient to do so in the light of the possibility of humanitarian intervention on the part of the international community. This means that the possibility of ethnic self-determination and mass secessions are curtailed, and that the UN has dual leverage over all parties to the conflict, including, of course, sponsors and allies.

Conclusion.

What needs to be resolved in order to facilitate mediation efforts in ethnic conflict is how such conflicts are rooted in the system itself, from a structural point of view, and/or through the perceptions of ethnic disputants themselves. This allows allowing the analyst to seek its roots in the operation of the international system, and at a time of flux in that system, make proposals and suggestions as the shape of the new system emerges. This may on the one hand lessen outbreaks of ethnic conflict, and also provide third parties with a clear set of guidelines for attempting peaceful resolution—guidelines that at the moment are vague and contradictory. Currently, there appears to exist a clash between the objectives of disputants and the spectrum of action the international framework allows mediators to utilise. As Touval has written,

UN negotiators, however talented and experienced, have tried for years to resolve or reduce conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, all without success. In fact, UN mediation seems to have extended or aggravated many of those disputes, as belligerents have been able to manipulate the organisation’s obvious weaknesses. ₁₁₀

The weakness of the organisation, however, is derived from its member states to remain an inviolable state is an interest in itself and peacemakers and mediators cannot resist such logic when involved in conflicts between non-state and state actors. The division between internal and international security issues seems somewhat facile in the light if the tendency for ethnicity to be of a transnational nature. This often obscures the roots of the conflict, as the international system is only equipped, and poorly at that, to manage international conflict and internal conflicts tend to be brushed under the civic mat. This means that the implementation of settlements rarely satisfy the underlying needs and interests of all parties. In contrast they need to be enduring, largely self-implemented and monitored, built on standards of fairness and justice. This cannot take place, however, until the international system itself has been clarified with respect to ethnic conflict, and groups that reject the system in which they find themselves located are given recourse, other than violence, against repression.

The location the international mediation of ethnic disputes within the theoretical domain of international relations leads to an understanding of the structural nature of ethnic conflict. While the twentieth century might have been regarded by some as a century of peacemaking, ₁₁₁ it is the contemporary international system, and parts of the UN Charter itself, which provides the reason why mediation in ethnic conflict has suffered a lack of credibility through its support of inflexible norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The post-Cold War world is one of an increasing pace of change and greater flexibility is needed; international mediation, particularly at the passive end of the spectrum, is consequently weakened by the norms of the international system. To mediate between disputants that cannot obtain a clear and objective stance from the principles and norms that underlie the international system is thus attempting the impossible, to the detriment of the emerging global society. Third parties cannot mediate unless disputants are persuaded to honour the conditions that the international system dictates. Yet it is to these that ethnic disputants often turn as they build their negotiating positions. Herein lies the main obstacle for the resolution of such conflicts—and also the international communities’ main hope that such conflicts can indeed be resolved before the doom-laden warnings of the burgeoning of ethnic conflict come to fruition.

Endnotes

Note 1: This article is derived from a research project investigating international mediation in ethnic conflict and the manner in which disputants build their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the international system. Thanks go to Hubert Faustmann for his comments on an earlier draft. Back.

Note 2: Oliver Richmond is an assistant professor of IR on the undergraduate and graduate Programme of IR at Intercollege, Nicosia, Cyprus. His book on Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the UN was published in 1998 by Frank Cass and he has published several articles ethnic conflict, the Cyprus problem, and mediation theory. Back.

Note 3: Boutros Boutros Ghali, Supplement To An Agenda for Peace, A/50/60/s/1995/1, United Nations Publications, 1995. Back.

Note 4: Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press: Berkley, 1985, pp.598-600. Back.

Note 5: Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Pinter: London, 1996, p.68. Back.

Note 6: Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Second Edition, Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1990, p.157. Bercovitch and Houston have pointed out that sovereignty constitutes one of the most prevalent issues of international conflict. See Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence,” in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation, London: Boulder, 1996, p.24. Back.

Note 7: While Haass points out that negotiating a compromise is the essence of diplomacy, the weakness of this in terms of ethnic conflict is that diplomacy is a rigorous practice pursued by states. Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending, Yale University Press, 1990, p.29. Back.

Note 8: Michael E Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynne-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Cambridge; MIT Press, 1997, p.8. Back.

Note 9: Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” in Ibid., p.29. Back.

Note 10: Ibid., p.37. Back.

Note 11: C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1981, p.295. This has been described as potentially leading to a ‘domino effect.’ Back.

Note 12: Brown has listed current ethnic conflict spots as the following: Bosnia, Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Burundi, Iraq, Latvia, Lebanon, Mali, Moldova, Niger, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Palestine/ Israel, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Russia, China, Tibet. See Michael E. Brown “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, New Jersey: Princeton, 1993, p.3. Back.

Note 13: See lecture by T. Sisk, Mediation and Negotiation Theory and Practice: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research, Intercollege Nicosia, Cyprus, 27 January, 1998. Sisk argued that this success rate is impressive compared to the rate of less that 20% conflicts ending in negotiated settlements during the cold war. Back.

Note 14: Hampson has also pointed to the general pessimism that exists in relation to third party roles. Fen Osler Hamspon, “Third Party Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict,” Millennium, Vol.26, No.3, 1997, p.727. Back.

Note 15: While this article does not examine the level civil society, it must be noted that the norms associated with this level are becoming more and more influential in world politics. This in itself is an added reason why ethnic conflict highlights the flaws of the nation-state system. For recent and illuminating discussions related to this see Emanuel Adler, “Imagined Security Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” Millennium, Vol.26., No.2, 1997: Nayef. H Samhat, “International Regimes as Political Community,” Millennium, Vol. 26., No.2., 1997. Back.

Note 16: Back.

Note 17: When located within the cosmopolitan—communitarian debate, this shift may well involve little more than pressure on states to conform to humanitarian norms, for which states will be the sole responsible party, or it may involve a movement towards what could be described as ‘neo-colonialism’ in which states are increasingly coerced into respecting global norms, which may or may not reflect their political culture. Back.

Note 18: J. Bercovitch & A. Houston, 'Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behaviour on the Success of Mediation in International Relations', International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol.4, No.4, 1993, p.298. Back.

Note 19: International mediation has tended to result in fragile compromises circumscribed by the interests and resources of great powers with a powerful interest in regional and systemic stability. The case of US mediation in Egypt and Israel is a good example of this. Cynics might argue that such ‘stasis’ has often been the preferred alternative to concessions by disputants, or to the active, coercive, or incentive-based activities of third parties in certain cases. Back.

Note 20: See Oliver Richmond, “Devious Objectives and The Disputants’ View Of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 6, 1998. For a detailed discussion of the Cyprus case as a specific example of this see also, Oliver Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the UN, Frank Cass, 1998. Back.

Note 21: See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books, 1992. Back.

Note 22: These alternatives include the exposing of the weaker party, keeping the item on the UN’s agenda so preserving UN principles, emphasising the legitimacy of certain issues, and keeping options open. See Thomas M. Franck and Georg Nolte, “The Good Offices Function of the Secretary General,” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World, 2^nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.179-180. Back.

Note 23: Anthony D. Smith: The Ethnic Origin of Nations, Blackwell: Oxford, 1986, p.32. Back.

Note 24: Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley (eds.), International Organisations and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University Press, 1995, p.24. Back.

Note 25: See Jenonne Walker, “International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts,” in Ibid., p.165. Of course, non-state actors, such as ethnic groups, played no role in the decision that self-determination would be applicable mainly with respect to colonial (and therefore oppressed) peoples. Back.

Note 26: Ted Robert Gurr & Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, p.141. Back.

Note 27: Anthony D. Smith, Op.Cit., p.41. Back.

Note 28: This rejection of the international system tends to be contradictory in that groups like the Kurds, Palestinians, or the Turkish Cypriots deny the supposed control that the legal state they inhabit has over them, while at the same time calling for their own state. Back.

Note 29: Stephen M. Saideman, “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerablity Versus Ethnic Ties,” International Organisation, Vol. 51, No.4, Autumn 1997, p.42. Back.

Note 30: This was mentioned as far back as the Treaty of Lausanne. Back.

Note 31: David Carment and Patrick James: “The International Politics if Ethnic Conflict: New Perspectives on Theory and Policy,” Global Society, Vol. 11, No.2, 1997, p.205. Back.

Note 32: This latter was declared in a recent statement by Yasser Arafat. Associated Press Release, 19 December, 1998. Back.

Note 33: David Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Polity Press; Cambridge, 1995, p.36. Back.

Note 34: Ibid., pp.38-39. Back.

Note 35: Ibid., p.78. Back.

Note 36: Of course, the so-called ‘velvet divorce’ between Czech and Slovakia in an exception to this general point, although the relations between the two states since the division of Czechoslovakia have been uneasy. Back.

Note 37: Oyvind Osterud, “The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereignty States,” Review of International Studies, Vol.23, 1997, p.170. Back.

Note 38: Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10. See also Michael E. Brown & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “Internal Conflict and International Action,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynne-Jones & Steven E. Miller, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Cambridge; MIT Press, 1997, p.174. Back.

Note 39: Pierre Hassner, “Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism,” in Michael E. Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security,

Note 40: Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1, 1933. Prior to recognition as a sovereign state, an entity must meet these four qualifications. See also Oyvind Osterud, Op.Cit., p.175. Back.

Note 41: Hans Kelsen,The Law of the United Nations, London, 1950, p.51. Back.

Note 42: Christopher M. Ryan, “Sovereignty, Intervention and the Law: A Tenuous Relationship of Competing Principles,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 26, No.1., 1997, p.176. See also Hans Kelsen, Op.Cit., p.51. Back.

Note 43: The neglect of the individual in terms of international law has been challenged on several notable occasions. The first was by the League of Nations Minorities Treaties, then by the Declaration of Human rights in 1948, and the Covenant on Rights in 1966. Fifty states at the then CSCE conference in 1992 stated that, “...the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE (that is, human rights) are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the States themselves. The protection and promotion of human rights and the strengthening of democratic institutions continue to be a vital basis for our comprehensive security.” CSE 1992, para. 8, p.2. Back.

Note 44: David Held, Op. Cit., p.119 Back.

Note 45: Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1990, p. xii. Back.

Note 46: Ibid., p.4. Back.

Note 47: Ibid., pp.29-32. Back.

Note 48: However, Turkey has not pushed very hard for international recognition of the TRNC, as has been acknowledged by prominent Turkish Cypriot politicians. Back.

Note 49: See Treaty of Sevres, 1920, Articles 62, 63, 64. Back.

Note 50: The recent tension between Italy and Turkey over the extradition of Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, has both highlighted Turkey’s internal difficulties related to its territorial and ethnic discontinuity, and may well result in an elevation of the Kurdish issue on the international agenda. Back.

Note 51: Fuller has argued that Turkey is gradually coming around to the need to having to seriously address the ‘southeast issue.’ Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation,” Graham E. Fuller & Ian O Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics, Westview Press, 1993, p.46. Back.

Note 52: This tends to be used as leverage in turn by the government actor to negate the ethnic level of the dispute in order to persuade the international community, (particularly in the guise of the UN Security Council), to enter the dispute on the grounds that it is of an international nature which threatens peace and security. This tends to be indicative of the government actor’s desire to reinforce the sanctity and integrity of their state, as the UN is viewed as a state-centric mechanism, which tends to favour the status quo and to be juxta-posed to the modification of the state system. Back.

Note 53: Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynne-Jones & Steven E. Miller, Op.Cit., p.266. Back.

Note 54: This point is very hypothetical as many non-traditional states have already attained sovereignty. John Chipman, “Managing the Politics of Parochialism” in Michael E. Brown, (eds.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Op.Cit., pp.245-9. Back.

Note 55: Ibid., p.255. Back.

Note 56: T. Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992, p.100. Back.

Note 57: These two concepts are often indistinguishable in practice. Back.

Note 58: See K. Webb, “Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars: a Preliminary Approach,” Paradigms, Vol.9., No.2., Winter 1995, p.3. Back.

Note 59: For an elaboration of this latter point see Michael Cox, “Northern Ireland: The War that Came in From the Cold,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.9, 1998. Back.

Note 60: See Christopher Mitchell, “The Ripe Moment: Notes on Four Models of Ripeness,” Paradigms, Vol.9., No.2., Winter 1995. Mitchell argues that the key element involves the leaders’ perceptions of structural conditions to determine whether a ripe moment exists; this is also related to the international structures, however, as well as the structure of the conflict. Ibid., p.48. Back.

Note 61: For example, elaborate UN peacekeeping mandates have been established to stabilise failing states which have had to tread a fine line between restoring a state to its original condition (normally in the interests of the majority) and promoting a new solution (normally in the interests of the minority. The mandate of the UN force in Cyprus is a case in point. See UN Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964. Back.

Note 62: Touval has argued that the rejection of mediation in ethnic conflict would be supported by international law on the grounds of non-intervention. Saadia Touval, “Gaining Entry to Mediation in Communal Strife,” in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalisation of Communal Strife, London; New York; Routledge, 1993, p.266. Back.

Note 63: G.R. Berridge: Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead, 1995, p.1. Back.

Note 64: Ibid., p.7. Back.

Note 65: Assefa has argued that this gap must be bridged by the mediator without threatening the sovereignty of the government. However, this seems implausible as the rebel will also tend to claim sovereignty for itself, and if it is powerful enough, act is if it were sovereign. H. Assefa, Mediation in Civil Wars, Westview Press, 1987, p.15. Back.

Note 66: David Carment and Patrick James, Op.Cit., p.205. Back.

Note 67: Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to ethnic war: elites, masses, and Moscow in Moldova's civil war,” International Security, Fall 1996 Vol. 21, No.2, p.125. Back.

Note 68: It is unfortunate but true that the UN is often regarded in the international community as a ‘mediator of the last resort.’ Back.

Note 69: See Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, London: Frank Cass, 1991, pp.46-47. This tends to occur if one part feels that the intervention of a third party has prevented it from clear military predominance. Differences in military capacity can also benefit the weaker side in that it can call for international assistance. Back.

Note 70: Fred Ickle, How Nations Negotiate, New York, 1964, pp.43-58. See also Oliver Richmond, “Devious Objectives and The Disputants’ View Of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework,” Op.Cit., p.720. Back.

Note 71: Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organisation, Vol. 51, No 3, 1997, pp.338-339. Back.

Note 72: David Held, Op.Cit., p.73. Back.

Note 73: As Wilmer has pointed out, if the boundaries of the state are not always coterminous with the boundaries of a civil society, neither are they with ethnically homogeneous populations. Franke Wilmer, “Identity, Culture and Historicity: the social construction of ethnicity in the Balkans,” World Affairs, Summer1997, Vol. 160, No. 1 p.8. Back.

Note 74: The shared assemblies which are an integral part of the recent constitutional solution to the problem of Northern Ireland appear to provide a creative way out of this situation; but both parties must be willing to give up long desired notions of absolute sovereignty and territorial integrity. Back.

Note 75: Thus discussions over the Cyprus problem have revolved around the question of two states or three (should Cyprus be split between Greece and Turkey or become or remain independent). The expansion of the EU into the Eastern Mediterranean has altered the situation, but can only remove the obsessive reliance on the state as a mechanism for conflict management in the Cyprus case, if all actors, including Turkey, are members of the EU (even then the EU has shown an inability to move beyond the narrow framework of sovereignty over issues directly effecting the national interest of its members). Back.

Note 76: David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynne-Jones & Steven E. Miller, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Cambridge; MIT Press, 1997, p.128. Back.

Note 77: Stuart J. Kaufman, Op.Cit., p.194. Back.

Note 78: Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, “Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts,” in Michael E. Brown, (eds.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Op.Cit., p.182. Back.

Note 79: Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict And International Relations, Op.Cit., p.111. Back.

Note 80: Ted Robert Gurr & Barbara Harff, Op.Cit., p.3. Back.

Note 81: Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Pinter: London, 1996, p.x. Back.

Note 82: The concept of compromise is a product of the general assumption that negotiations are conducted rationally upon the introduction of a third party mediator. It tends to be assumed that at this point the disputants will ‘see the light of reason’ and will therefore compromise. Given the imperfections of the international system, it is more likely that the reasonable options for ethnic disputants is viewed as not to compromise and merely to wait to see whether the principles of self-determination or sovereignty will endure and take precedence over the other in their case. Back.

Note 83: Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Op.Cit., p.4. Back.

Note 84: Ibid., p.68. Back.

Note 85: Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, Op.Cit., p.19. Back.

Note 86: Peter Calvcoressi, “The Cold War as an Episode,” Occasional Paper No. 5, David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, London, December 1993, p.8. Back.

Note 87: Stephen Ryan, Op.Cit., p.206. Back.

Note 88: For this argument in the context if UN peacekeeping see Simon Duke, “The UN and Intra-State Conflict,” International Peacekeeping, Vol.1., No.4., Winter 1994, p.377. Duke also argues that it is often hard to differentiate between aggressors and the aggrieved. Back.

Note 89: Stephen Ryan, Op.Cit., p.165. Back.

Note 90: Jack Donnelly, The Past, The Present, and the Future Prospects, in Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley, Op.Cit., p.59. Back.

Note 91: Ibid., p.61. Back.

Note 92: Raymond F. Hopkins, Anomie, Reform, and Challenges, in Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley, p.74. Back.

Note 93: David Carment and Patrick James, Op.Cit., p.209. Back.

Note 94: Parts of UN resolution 1514 reveal the inherent dilemma in managing ethnic conflict: “(2) All peoples have the right to self-determination...(4) All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and fully their right to complete independence...(6) Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN.” Quoted in Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1993, p.13. Back.

Note 95: R.J. Barry Jones: “The UN and the International Political System,” in Dimitris Bourantonis and Jarrod Weiner: The UN in the New World Order, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995, p.23. Back.

Note 96: The OSCE illustrates the crux of the unresolved dilemma facing International Organisation. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 recognised human rights, and the collective rights of peoples for self determination (principles 7 & 8) but principle 6 reaffirmed the sanctity of sovereignty. The OSCE has, however, declared that on some occasions sovereignty must give way to international intervention when basic human rights have been violated, but because the organisation has no funds, authority or forces, it is easily ignored, as with the case of Yugoslavia or the CSCE initiative to inquire into human rights violations of Albanians in Kosovo. Back.

Note 97: R.J. Barry Jones, Op.Cit., p.35. Back.

Note 98: Steven L. Burg, The International Community, in Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley, Op.Cit., p.267. Back.

Note 99: As David Owen pointed out, European mediators in the Balkans could do little without coercive power, later to be exercised by Richard Holbrooke. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, Victor Gallancz, 1995, pp.401-402. See also Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: Random House, 1998, pp.94-5, for a description of how he pressed for NATO airstrikes. Back.

Note 100: Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley, Op.Cit., p.10. Back.

Note 101: The OSCE has been the most active international organisation involved in recognizing collective rights as an element of international law. See, for example, the conclusion of the 1991 Conference on National Minorities which committed the signatory parties to increase representation of minorities and establish autonomous administrative structures for them. The OSCE has also been very innovative in preventative diplomacy for ethnic conflict—it appointed a High Commissioner for National Minorities in Europe, and has seen some success in Romania and Estonia. See Timothy Sisk, Op.Cit., p.106. Back.

Note 102: Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley, O p.Cit., p.12. Of course, the recent developments of Iraq show sthat such unity is extremely flimsy. Back.

Note 103: Ibid., p.13. Back.

Note 104: UN Security Council Resolution 718, 1991. James A Shear, “Riding the Tiger: The UN and Cambodia’s Struggle for Peace” in William Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, St Martin’s Press, 1996, p.142 Back.

Note 105: Ted Robert Gurr, Op.Cit., p.145 Back.

Note 106: See, for example, Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynne-Jones & Steven E. Miller, Op.Cit., p.265. Back.

Note 107: Pierre Hassner, “Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism,” in Michael E. Brown, (eds.), Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Op.Cit., p.137. Back.

Note 108: Esman, Milton & Telhami, Shirley, Op.Cit., p.147. Back.

Note 109: Lev Voronkov: “International Peace and Security: New Challenges for the UN,” in Dimitris Bourantonis and Jarrod Weiner , Ibid., p.8. Back.

Note 110: Saadi Touval, “Why the U.N. fails,” Foreign Affairs, Sept-Oct 1994, Vol.73, No.5., p.45. Back.

Note 111: John Keegan, A History of Warfare, London: Pimlico, 1993, p.58. Back.