|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 2/99
Turkey and the European Union: A Never Ending Story
Center for Security and Defense Studies
Vienna
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Draft copy — no quotation without permission of the author.
EU and Turkey at the begin of the 1990s — in search of what?
The decay of the former Soviet Union brought a number of fundamental changes in the international system. The bipolar system has been substituted by a multipolar system with a number of newly emerging actors and some more reshaped old ones. 1 The terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ became a new meaning. 2 The Mediterranean countries have developed to one of these reshaped old actors, thereby posing a number of highly interlocked and each other reinforcing ‘new old’ security challenges. 3 Since then, the transformation and the power redistribution process are still under way. Europe itself as well was affected by this broad restructuring process. International institutions like the European Union became a new boost in importance and parallelly had to reposition themselves.
On the edge to 21 st century, the European Union has reached a difficult position. A fundamentally changed environment and an internal renewal and reshaping process have made the European Union facing one of its greatest challenges in its existence. On one hand, the Union cannot wait until the internal restructure will be finalised and let interested states in a waiting room without telling them how the things will proceed and which are the necessary conditions. On the other hand, it is seen as a precondition for the ‘widening step’ that the deepening procedure has been almost finished.
Turkey has a special position in this concert of interested states. For decades it has been a buffer towards the Soviet Union and a reliable western ally. Turkey’s relations with Europe in general and the European Union in particular have been representing a major facet of the country’s economic and foreign policy since World War II.
After the decay of the Soviet Union Turkey has been in search of a new position in the international context and, parallelly, in search of a new identity.
A strong linkage — in which way ever — between the European Union and Turkey could support stability and security in a troubled region, reaching from the Balkans to the Middle East and Central Asia and the Caucasus. This new ‘arc of crisis’ would require a reliable stronghold which could be represented by Turkey. 4
On the domestic level Turkey of today represents itself as a very volatile and therefor weak state. The party landscape has become very splitted in the past five years. After the parliamentary elections in December 1995 and the following troubled search for a government the military gained more and more power. Since then the army has influenced the daily political activities as well as the strategic issues considerably. In the coming spring the country will face again parliamentary elections, ending a period of changing governments and domestic troubles which have paralysed the country for months. Several times Turkish politicians, but not only, claimed that Turkey has to play a pivotal role. They required the country to become a middle-level regional power. It is accepted, that a domestically strong Turkey which additionally bridges the gap to the newly emerged countries in Central Asia and Caucasus could not only be a regional pillar. Thereby, it is not clear whether Turkey has the necessary personnel, the resources, the know-how and the economic capabilities to stand firm in this role.
The changes on the global level, the reshaping in the European system and the search for a new place and identity within Turkey have happened almost at the same time. This can be seen as a very good example for a complex problem. The result of this still ongoing multifacet process is still open. This mixture of levels and the tricky overlayered situation make assessments of the current situation challenging and future forecasts even more.
“..., Turkey’s future role in relation to Europe remains ambiguous. Unquestionable a member of the European “system”, Turkey is less clearly a part of Europe in cultural and political terms. Yet its role in the Southern European environment and its prominence in transatlantic strategic perceptions cannot be ignored.”
The purpose of the paper is a multiple one. It will investigate, whether Turkey should become a member of EU and if yes, under which conditions. Moreover it will seek to find a modus for a step-by-step rapprochement between EU and Turkey. In doing so, the following set of questions will be a guideline:
The paper consists of three parts.
The first part will cover a historical overview on the Europeanness of Turkey and so far Turco-EU-relations (questions 1-3). This is necessary to understand the ambigious position of the country and the difficulties to give a clear answer to the question whether Turkey is a European country or not.
Thesecond part will deal with an assessment of the status-quo-fullfilment of the conditions set by European Union for Turkey and other applying countries (questions 4-5). It will show an ‘asset and liability balance sheet’ which will build the basis for possible rapprochement options.
The third part will cover concrete options for a reasonable rapprochement between the European Union and Turkey (questions 6-7). The Turkish position and the options of the European Union will be evaluated.
As the paper covers a complex problem, an adequate approach for analysis and assessment is required. Therefore, a multi-disciplinary and systemic approach with a focus on historical sociology will be used.
Turkey’s place in Europe: A historical-sociological Analysis of the Roots of the State
“Turkey is sometimes portrayed as a bridge between east and west, with a foot in each world. This is the wrong image. Individual Turks belong to either east or west: these worlds are so different that there is no effective bridge between them. Turkey is more like a tree, with roots in many different cultures and ethnicities. In its early years it was pruned and trained to grow strictly in one direction: Turkish. Now in its maturity, its branches tend to go their own way, seeking their own kind of light. Each branch knows where it is going, but the tree as a whole does not. Westernised Turkey is down to Europe, Turkish nationalists want to look east to fellow Turkic-speakers, fundamentalists south or other Islamic countries. Each group seeks models outside Turkey, betraying perhaps the lack of a common identity. But identities shift with the twist and turns of history. Turkey is undergoing the greatest change in its short life, and its identity is bound to evolve, too 6 “
The history of Turkey’s coming into existence is has been crucial for its identity, its self-perception and its societal development. For reason, a historical-sociological analysis of the roots of this state, of the socalled Turkish identity and at the same time the Ottoman heritage, is essential to understand and assess Turkey’s place in Europe. 7
The following section will provide an overview on the transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. Special attention will be paid to the societal transformation, its thriving force — the Turkish nationalism, which is a conscious blending of nationalism and religion. Turkish nationalism and Turkish identity stand in a very close connection. An effort of clarification of these two issues will help to find an answer whether Turkey has a EU-vocation or not and if yes, at which level.
The ‘umma concept’ as a roof for a multiethnic empire 8
The Ottoman Empire was not based on the nation-state concept but on the umma concept. Nationality was determined on the basis of one’s membership in a religious community. ‘Umma’ refers to community of brothers in faith. It is a ‘paranthesis’ or ‘roof’ for all Muslims. Even though there are big differences in the interpretation of basic sources, the concept which is not bound to states in a political sense keeps all Muslims across the world together. State and society are closely linked to religion. The umma concept is based on the principle of collectivity, i. e. the individual human being does not have rights, but derives his/her identity and status from the fact of being part of the umma. The religious core within the multiethnic Ottoman Empire was represented by Sunni Muslims.
In fact, there were no big differences between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe in the sixteenth century. Then religion constituted the basis for one’s individual identity. When the European powers referred to ‘Turkey’ and the ‘Turks’, the Turks considered themselves as Muslims belonging to the umma. They were subjects of the Sultan and the Caliph. Religious affiliation dominated the thinking of the Muslims. It was far more crucial than ethnic or national identity. Basically, the Turks were the largest ethnic group in the Ottoman Empire, easily to be distinguished from outside observers — although they themselves only were aware of a Muslim identity. They had their own language, culture, tradition and history. 9
At the end of the nineteenth century during the Tanzimat-Period the structures of the Ottoman Empire became loose. The Tanzimat Movement was a political movement which started to promote its reform and modernisation ideas already in the 1840s. Intellectual elites, military officers and leading bureaucrats played a crucial role in replacing the Ottoman structures and rules by a new leading class with new principles. The modernisation movements tried to overcome the weak and not well grown linkage between state and society which “... is best described as a patrimonial authoritarian system that depended upon traditionalism, with foundations derived from Islam and Islamic law . 10 ” The key target of the Tanzimat movement was the creation of a Turkish national identity as a basis for a new nation-state. Ottoman patriotism was used as mobilisation bases to bring the vehicle of Turkish nationalism into going. The defunct Ottoman empire was replaced by an identity based on Turkish ethnicity. 11 De facto, a mixture of the old empire and the new state was the outcome. This heritage is still seen in the Turkish society of today and it is the main burden and obstacle for development.
After World War I the political landscape of Europe was re-designed. Instead of the multiethnic empires a number of nation states came into being. It is a fact that most of the newly established nation states were based on ethnicity and religion, i.e. there were no real nation states in a very strict understanding as all of them had minorities living on their newly shaped territories. Those who did not fit the new national paradigm covering ethnicity and religion were minorities and were suspect.
The Ottoman Empire, the territorial integrity of which has been placed under the protection of the major European powers (Paris Agreement dated March 30 th,1856), was dissolved. The successor, the newly founded Republic of Turkey was intended to represent a radical break with the Ottoman history. De facto, it was impossible for the state’s founder, Kemal Atatürk, to delete the legal, societal and political Ottoman past completely. The heritage was brought in the new state as integral part of it.
The Republic of Turkey — a new approach for a new identity?
The Lausanne Treaty (1923) is the basis for the foundation of modern Turkey. It substituted the Sévres Treaty (1920) which marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty made the creation of a single ethnic Turkey possible, thus perpetuating a Turkish nationalism which can still be seen in nowadays. 12
This Turkish nationalism has always been representing a potential for crisis in the Turkish society. The ‘Turkish roof’ tried to hide the still existing multiethnicity of the new state. According to several reports there are close to fifty identifiable ethnic groups in Turkey. All rights indicated in Section III, Articles 37 to 45 in the Lausanne Treaty apply only to non-Muslim minorities which are clearly named. 13 Every step or activity which has been trying to jeopardize the ‘Turkishness’ has been abolished sofar. Otherwise the fragile concept would have been toppled.
The concept of the new Republic of Turkey is rooted in the Kemalist nationalism . Nationalism is one of the six arrows of the Kemalist ideology . 14
Turkish nationalism instead of umma was the new basis to overcome the obstacle of a multiethnic and multicultural empire. The core of the new state was formed by the dominant ethnic group of the Turks. This nation is both self-defined and defined as such by others. On one hand, Atatürk and his followers promoted a Turkish national identity based on the features of a civic nation. On the other hand, the ethnic centre of the Turkish nation was intended to be based on Turkish ethnicity with the Turkish language and culture. The ‘nation of Turkey’ (Türkiye Milleti) and the ‘Turkish Nation’ (Türk Milleti) were the catch phrases. The 700 years of Ottoman history were replaced by 1500 years of history of Turks.
Which are the roots for Turkish nationalism as a basic principle for the existence of the Republic of Turkey? Nationalism and nation stand in a close connection with each other. In the modern understanding, nationalism can be traced back to the 18 th century. It is connected with the success of the French and the American Revolution. The origins of Turkish nationalism as a politically powerful concept are seen in the reformist movements of the late nineteenth century, formed by two Kurds, a Tatar and a Circassian. The main target was to develop a concept transcending religious and ethnic differences. 15 The main hope was to find a new integrating power to maintain the Ottoman Empire and to save it from disintegration under the pressure of nationalist uprisings coming from the Balkans. Slowly, this nationalistic movement became a political factor. Nationalism was used as a concept of power politics by elites and as a tool for manipulation. 16
Especially during the Young Turk period beginning 1908, one faced a gradual emphasis on Turkism in place of Ottomanism and of Islamism. This process was strongly supported by the First World War when Turkism came to the fore with a vengeance with the chimera of ‘Turan’. This ‘concept’ covered an ethnic state of all Turks and Turkic people, not including the Arabs and other Muslims like the Albanians who had shown their ‘treachery’. Although from time to time scholars have been questioning and re-interpreting the term ‘Turk’, the ethnic group of Turks is seen as the dominant group. It represents the core of the newly founded Turkish state.
Atatürk slowly pushed the religious component out of the public discussion and made it a private issue. The blend of religion and politics did not prove as successful, as one could see in the history of the Ottoman Empire. ‘Turkishness’ replaced the Ottoman identity. The terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkishness’ were given a new meaning. They became a functional concept and a basis for a new national identity. ‘Turkishness’ was a kind of transformation vehicle to transform an old society based on Ottoman rules to a new and modern one, the Turkish society.
Atatürk’s key assumption was that within the Turkish borders only one nation, the Turkish one, exists. Two key premises are fixed in the Turkish constitution. First, Turkish citizenship automatically implies to be Turk. Secondly, the state Turkey is indivisible in its territory and people. The language is Turkish. People, language and territory build a kind of troika of indivisibility.
The concepts of Turkey and Kemalism could not hide one issue: Turkey still has been remaining a state with a ‘multi-identity’.
Turkey's Place in the European history during the Cold War period
Security as trigger factor: NATO as the first step to become part of the Western system
Between 1923 and 1945 Turkey performed a policy of neutrality and non-engagement. This was seen as the only way to consolidate the newly emerged state. Nevertheless, the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the burden to become a punching ball of the great powers was still very much alive.
Turkey’s role after World War II was similar to the one the Ottoman Empire played for centuries. In the heydays of the Empire, Istanbul was situated in the core of politically important areas. The Empire could easily manipulate power politics for its own interests. The key task was to build a firewall against Russia. The young state and its policy was — again - very much influenced by its geography.
In the last days of World War II Turkey, which stayed neutral during the war, allied itself with the Western countries. Even the borders were redesigned after the war, Turkey’s geopolitical position combined with its ambiguous geographical and cultural location built the basis for the country’s place in the concert of states after World War II. 17 One can say that Turkey’s tasks did not differ so much from the one of the Ottoman Empire. Within a few years Turkey has been made a buffer against the Soviet Union, respectively the South-eastern bastion of the NATO alliance.
Actually, Turkey did not have a lot of choices within the bipolar system. Turkey was locked in a manyfold cage. It was kept in an ideological or systemic struggle. Due to its geopolitical position it was imprisoned between East and West. Its own weakness forced Turkey to go again for Western support to prevent Soviet aggression on Turkish territory.
Moreover, the protection of the strategically and economically relevant Turkish Straits became an issue again. The Black Sea which was regarded as the ‘soft underbelly’ of Russia turned to a strategic area for the Western Allies. Control over the Black Sea meant control of the Red Army in Central and East European areas. The Straits became a manyfold bottleneck. Their protection was one of the key issues. The deterrence of Russia was substituted by deterring the Soviet Union. A NATO-membership — the first step into the Western world - seemed to be the best guarantee against the Soviet Union.
The close Western-Turkish relations which started with the Truman Doctrine 18 and the Marshall Plan were completed by the Turkish NATO-full membership. Turkey together with Greece was the main protector of the strategically so important Southern flank of NATO. The common borders with the Soviet Union and the geographical proximity to the troubled regions in the Middle East gave Turkey a special position.
Euro-Turkish relations and, generally speaking, Western-Turkish relations have to be always assessed in the context of development of Greco-Turkish relations. Until the late 1950s the bilateral relations were friendly. They were characterised by a high level of mutual acceptance, understanding and cooperation. Both countries served a defenders against the Soviet Union and are NATO members. Tensions started in the 1960s because of the still unclear Cyprus-question. Overlayers are the territorial waters and the airspace in the Aegean, the continental shelf, the demilitarisation of Eastern Aegean islands and minority questions in Thrace and Instanbul.
Already in 1964 after the eruption of the Cyprus crisis Turkey changed its oneway focus on the United States, which have been seen as the foothold to gain access to the Western world. Turkey changed the relation of heavy dependences and made a first conservative step towards the Soviet Union. In 1972 a Declaration of Principles of Good Neighbourhood was signed between the two states. This agreement was a breakup in the relations.
Since the end of the 1980s, the situation on the Southern flank of NATO has become very complicated. Greco-Turkish relations still affect very much the relations between United States and Turkey and the now Russian Federation and Turkey. 19 In sum, Turkey’s geographical position and the emerging power structure in the period following the Second World War were the two main factors which determined its place in Europe during the Cold War years. 20 ”
The European Community and Turkey — a slow train moving where?
The Western organisations which came up after World War II had one key goal, namely to protect Western core values and ideals or the so-called ‘Western order’. These institutions covered a very different understanding of Europe. NATO represented the security perception of Europe in a narrow sense and the Western world in a wider understanding. The European Community stood for the economic understanding — at least on the surface. CSCE was a more vague roof.
Which role Turkey plays in these different understandings? Turkey is part of the security conception via NATO, the member of which it has been since 1952. Moreover Turkey has been OECD member since 1948 and Council of Europe member since 1949.
Especially the NATO accession was seen as a fulfillment of Atatürk’s dream to become part of the Western hemisphere, the Western society of states and in the longrun a ‘European power’.
In 1959, Turkey’s ambitious endeavours to become Western reached a certain paramount with its application for an associate membership of the then European Community (EC). The reasons behind the application can be summarised as follows. Turkey saw in an association with EC a confirmation of its Western orientation and vocation. On one hand, EC offered a tremendous market potential for the Turkish economy which was then still under a reshaping procedure. On the other hand, EC provided the necessary pouvoir for direct foreign investments to fuel the economic restructuring process. The final and probably most important reason for the application was the fact, that Greece applied almost at the same time. Greece was a positive thriving force for Turkey, even this is not assessed in such a way. It was a competition fuelled by historical burdens, mutual misperceptions and jealousies. A certain ‘winner-looser syndrome’ which is still predomenant. It is reflected on the bi- and the multilateral level.
For political and stability reasons EC accepted both application although the two countries were far away from fulfilling the necessary development criteria. Turkey and Greece saw the positive reaction of EC as a carte blanche for a privileged status within the concert. This carte blanche was seen as going beyond a customs union agreement. EC referred to Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome in the positive confirmation. Within a short period of time negotiations between Turkey and the EC and Greece and the EC started.
In 1960 Turkey faced a military coup d’etat (May 27 th), which caused an interruption of the dialogue with EC. Parallelly, Greece was more skilled and received the Athens Agreement on July 9 th, 1961. Turkey observed the developments with suspicion and even formally protested against the very comprehensive Athens Agreement.
Though there was a domestically troubled situation after the coup and the Turco-EC-relations were quite tensed after the Athens Agreement, in July 1962 the talks between Turkey and the EC were resumed. The target was to come to the association agreement according to the Greek model. Complaints on the domestic level, different standpoints between governmental departments involved in the negotiations delayed and finally even damaged the process sustainably. A divided Turkish government was unable to speak with one voice and to present an unanimous proposal to the EC. This weakenend the Turkish position considerably and led to a dissatisfying result. Nevertheless, the Ankara Agreement was signed on September 12 th, 1963 and came into effect on December 1 st, 1964.
Both parties to the contract had reached different targets. Turkey saw the agreement as a main step to become part of the European and Western order. The EC could bring one of the strategically most important states in the boat. Political considerations dominated. Economic issues were only the second issue on the agenda.
The Ankara Agreement covered three main stages, each of them to be negotiated separately. The start was done with a preparatory phase (five to nine years), followed by a transitional phase (twelve to twenty two years, including the realisation of the customs union) and ending up in a final stage (this phase will begin only in the case Turkey is able to go for a full membership). The switch from one step to the next was planned not to be done automatically, but Turkey had to complete one phase and then to go for new talks and negotiations.
In 1970, an Additional Protocol brought a review and finally a modification of the Ankara Agreement. The final Protocol target was to set up of a customs union by the end of 1995. The Protocol is seen as the starting point of the transitional phase. The realisation of the Protocol brought a number of very practical problems. The first group of obstacles was represented by the harmonisation of the agricultural policy of EC. The second issue was the deep going change in the EC’s Mediterranean Policy in the wake of the oil crisis. Finally, the Protocol was cancelled and Turkey lost its preferential treatment.
Since the cancellation of the Additional Protocol the relations between Turkey and the EC became worse and worse. The Cyprus crisis in 1974 and the Greek application for full membership in 1975 led to a sustainable deterioration. In 1978 Turkey decided unilaterally to stall the dialogue with the EC, referring to Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the so-called Self-Protection clause. Turkey put itself in a dangerous outsider position and could not hope for a lot of understanding among the EC-memberstates. In Turkey the understanding for the EC arrived at its lowest point. People questioned the reason and the benefits of the Ankara Agreement.
Within the EC a number of developments took place as well, bringing the Community under heavy pressure. Greece, Spain and Portugal applied for a full membership. The ‘danger’ that Turkey could apply for a full membership as well caused a number of fears in the EC.
In 1979, Greece signed the full membership treaty. Turkey felt that the self-induced outsider position was very negative for the country and that the still main enemy was one step in advance.
In June 1980, a full membership application of Turkey was announced to be formally done in the following autumn. This step was delayed by another military coup d’etat on September 12 th, 1980. All talks between Turkey and the EC were stalled. In 1982 the Ankara Agreement was officially suspended. The relations were resumed in 1986. The Agreement was put active again in 1988.
In the post putsch era, Turgut Özal was the leading political personality, stressing the European vocation of Turkey. On April 14 th, 1987 Turkey submitted its application for an EC-full membership. It took more than two years for Ankara to receive a negative answer. As unofficial justifications demographical, economic, structural and social reasons which were brought into discussion. Officially, internal reshaping activities of the Community were named.
In its answer, the Commission worked out three conditions for Turkey. First, political pluralism has to be increased (which was quite normal after a coup d’etat) and the human rights record has to be improved considerably. Secondly, the conflict with Greece has to be settled and third, the Cyprus question has to be solved.
The overall position of the Commission was very reluctant. The time framework had a very broad and longranging dimension. EC did not want to bind itself more than necessary. An integration of Turkey was seen as a very challenging task. The Commission decided to assess Turkey’s status from time to time. The reluctance in the answer reflected the EC-policy towards Turkey of the years to come.
EU-Turkish relations in the 1990s: Still a long way to the customs union
Since 1989 the EU-Turkish relations have been very much influenced by the global changes. After the dismantling of the Soviet Union a new Europe has come under construction. The dissolution of the post Cold War era and the coming up of a multi-polar system of powers led to a search for new policies in the community of states. This searching process has been influenced very much by the highly uncertain global environment. During the Cold War Turkey’s role was clear. Within a very short period of time the basis for Turkey’s incorporation in the Western system — the Soviet Union - has vanished. At the same time, the question for Turkey’s European vocation has been raised again. 21
The broad reshaping of identity and the search process has been covering also the EU-Turkish relations. Due to a number of insecurities in the societal environment and some unsolved issues between Turkey and EU-members the 1990s have been characterised by increased tensions and difficulties in the EU-Turkish relations.
There were at least the following key hurdles.
On the international level, the dispute between Greece and Turkey which has become more and more obvious, and thereby endangering the security in an anyway troubled area, turned out as a main obstacle. This issue still includes open issues in the Aegean, the Cyprus issue and the minority questions.
In the Aegean the following problems can be made out (without going into details): 22
This multifacet network of open questions involves aspects like power politics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans and predominance in a NATO-relevant area. Moreover it involves the tricky issue of territorial sovereignty.
The second obstacle has been the still pending Cyprus issue. The question which has been on the diplomatic tables for years turned into an official blocking factor after the Dublin summit in 1990. Since then EU has started a linkage policy. The situation became even more complicated when the Republic of Cyprus submitted its application for full membership and EU gave the approval. EU hoped with the approval and the start of negotiations (after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996) to give a boost to solve the pending question. The contrary happened because EU did not have any concept in hand to contribute to a reasonable and sustainable solution. Within a short time, EU had imported a number of conflicts between a memberstate (Greece) and one of its most difficult to handle non-member but partner.
The issues named above are highly interlocked. Moreover, both countries differ in the perception of what is a bilateral problem (Greece acknowledges only the continental shelf issue as pending, but would accept any verdict by the International Court of Justice on the other issues; Turkey perceives at least the above mentioned questions as bilateral problems) and how to solve them (Greece prefers a legal solution via the International Court of Justice; Turkey wants only a negotiation solution on a political basis).
Onthe domestic level, the unsolved Kurdish question, the still strong influence of the Turkish Army on domestic questions (but not only), the lack in democracy and the poor human rights record have been main obstacles so far.
Even these problems and the negative opinion of the Commission on the application for membership did not close the door completely for Turkey. The Commission stated in its opinion that the cooperation with Turkey should be resumed because the country shows a general openness towards Europe. For reason, it has been in the interest of the Commission to support the country’s efforts to complete the process of political and economic modernisation.
In February 1990 the Council adopted the general content of the Commission’s opinion and asked it to make detailed proposals for strengthening the ties between Turkey and EU. Already in June 1990 the so-called ‘Matutes package’ was adopted by the Commission. This set of proposals included the completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties. However, the package was NOT adopted by the Council. This small piece in the ‘relation puzzle’ between Turkey and the EU shows the problems in the opinion creation process in a supranational institution. It was not the only example the Council and the Commission did not meet.
Although there have been the EU-internal problems and the open issues between Turkey and Greece, EU went into a customs union agreement with Turkey after some hesitations. The agreement was signed on March 6 th, 1995. The main target was the creation of a free-tariff area between the EC and Turkey. This goal has been set already in the Ankara Agreement and was seen as the end of the second stage, the transitional phase. The agreements between the EC-Turkish Association Council also included the resumption of financial cooperation and cooperation in several sectors. Furthermore both parties to the agreement decided to intensify the political dialogue and to the strengthen institutional cooperation. 23
The agreement was accompanied by a lot of ‘political noise’ and reservations in the different institutional bodies of the EC. In December 1995 the European Parliament ratified the agreement after harsh discussions. The approval of the customs union by the European Parliament was accompanied by a number of conditions to be fulfilled by Turkey.
The agreement came into effect on January 1 st, 1996. Even after the ratification, doubting voices about this step could be heard. But also in Turkey one could hear politicians who argued for a resignation from the agreement. Especially members of the former Welfare Party, but not only, put the issue on top of the agenda. The current interim prime minister Ecevit is seen as very distant to the EU.
The customs union agreement has to be assessed mainly as a political agreement and less as an economic arrangement. The then Turkish government saw it as a big victory within its battle to be part of Europe. What remained hidden was the fact that the Turkish economy would have to go a long and winding road to become competitive in European terms. Turkey has been showing a tremendous and sustainable inflation rate, a growing budget deficit, a far too high proportion of the public sector, deep going inefficiencies, a bureaucratic system, by far not enough foreign investments and a high level of international debts. Moreover it remained unspoken that politics and economics cannot be separated anymore and the EU is not only an economic community but has always been a very political institution as well.
Already in January 1996 a break in the relations followed. The ‘Imia crisis’ between Greece and Turkey led to increased tensions on the bilateral level and negatively influencing EU-Turkish relations as well. One of the consequences was that the EU-Parliament called the Commission to block the MEDA funds for Turkey, except the parts reserved for the promotion of democracy, human rights and civil society.
In the wake of the informal Apeldoorn meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, Turkey’s European eligibility was reaffirmed. Moreover, the EU said, that a Turkish application would be judged on the same criteria as the other applicants. In the following the Association Council could not come to an unanimous agreement on the 1995 customs union financial regulation.
The Agenda 2000 from July 1997 gave an assessment of the political and economic situation. 24 The Commission states Turkey’s eligibility and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the same objective criteria as other applying countries. The document comprises also recommendations, saying that Turkey should give a firm commitment to resolve its regional problems and the Cypriot issue. Moreover, the Agenda repeated the general support for Turkey and a reinforcement of the bilateral communication. This ‘communication’ comprises a number of measures to consolidate the customs union and the extend it to new areas (services and agriculture). The Agenda covered also the support for an improvement of the democratic standards and the human rights level.
The Luxembourg summit from December 1997 is seen as a negative hallmark in EU-Turkish relations. Instead of giving a full member perspective, the Council suggested to draw up ‘A European Strategy for Turkey’. The ‘Strategy’ should bring Turkey closer to EU by intensifying the customs union, implementing the financial cooperation, approximating the laws, adopting the Union’s acquis and participating on a case-by-case decision basis in certain programmes. Moreover, the Luxembourg summit established the ‘vehicle’ of a European Conference as a dialogue and cooperation forum. 25 De facto, the Luxembourg summit brought only disappointment for Turkey. The European Conference was seen as a ‘political excuse’. Luxembourg led to a massive deadlock in the relations. Turkey made no effort to keep down its disappointment over the EU decision to exclude the country from the list of candidates for membership in the next expansion round. It had hoped to be given at least the same treatment as a kind of ‘slower-track approacher’. Turkey considered the EU-treatment a discriminatory in comparison with other applicants and refused a participation in the European Conference, finally cutting all dialogue lines with the EU. According to Ankara, the existing relations between Turkey and EU are based on existing documents, like the Association agreement, the Additional Protocol and the Customs Union — nothing more, but also nothing less.
“If the European Union summit ... ever becomes to be regarded as historic, it is likely to be because of a historic mistake. Useless matters ar put right, historians may look back to the Luxembourg meeting and judge it to be the occasion when Europe needlessly offended Turkey, this increasing that country’s sense of exclusion, its reluctance to reform, its awkwardness over Cyprus and NATO and perhaps its readiness to embrace either Islamic or quasi- military role. 26 ”
The Luxembourg decision did not only lead to massive tensions in the Euro-Turkish relations but influenced considerably the Euro-US relations. One of the strongest supporter of Turkey, the United States, could not understand the rebuff of the EU. United States would have liked to see Turkey on the membership list because it feared, that otherwise Turkey’s NATO-membership may start to unravel. 27 Washington blamed the EU not to have a global view of the position of Turkey. It does not honour the extraordinary meaning of Turkey in a shaky but very important geopolitical region, namely Central Asia and the Caucasus. The United States obviously had a far clearer picture of the role and importance of Turkey for the Western alliance than most of the European governments.
In parallel to the Luxembourg decision, EU made clear that it would start negotiations for accession with Cyprus on March 31 st, 1998. Already a few months later, some members assessed the way the decision making procedure came to public as a not very lucky one.
Luxembourg brought several crucial issues on the surface:
For Turkey EU had become a main political target. It were full membership aspirations and the customs union which tied Turkey politically almost down. One could speak of a ‘Euro mania or Euro-Fixation’ in a negative sense. It is an ideological obsession which has been driving Turkey’s foreign policy in general and the policy via the EU in special for years. Turkey saw its accession isolated from the overall integration process and in a rather narrow perspective. It left the inner-EU-processes of deepening and widening out of the assessment and did not take the parallel going dual transformation into account.
The Cardiff summit (June 1998) and the Vienna summit (December 1998) did not bring the fundamental change in both sides’ positions. In Cardiff a small step was achieved, which was just seen as an ‘amendment’. The European Council adopted the communication strategy and the approach on an evolutionary and sound basis. In September 1998 both sides started talks on technical issues. Political questions still are not discussed.
It seems obvious that the Luxembourg decision led to a massive change in Turkey’s policy and to a new mood towards EU. Turkey obviously has given up hopes for a fast membership. Moreover, the schedule for accession has been reshaped. EU has lost its magic touch. Turkey and its politicians have shifted the focus in foreign policy. The new Turkish position enables the country to see the direction which EU will go in the future. Overlayered by the difficult domestic situation — the country has been without government for weeks and will face early parliamentary elections in coming April — EU has vanished from the current public daily discussion.
On the edge to the 21st Century: How ready is Turkey to join EU?
For Turkey, but not only, the change in the overall situation brought out the question, how readiness of the country for joining the EU currently is. A thorough status-quo analysis could bring one closer to a more objective assessment and would open up future perspectives for a possible rapprochement. Moreover this analysis could provide an answer to find the location for Turkey in the regional and global context.
In the following section, a status quo analysis of the readiness of Turkey to join EU will be done. As an assessment basis, the fulfillment of the conditions usually by the EU applied for accession as a full member will be investigated. These conditions stand in a close connection with the deficits or ‘liabilities’ that Turkey objectively shows. Moreover, assets or positive aspects of Turkey will be included in the following discussion.
Evaluation bases: Benchmarks for both parties to the discussion
There are a number of evaluation bases for the readiness for membership concerning not only Turkey. The conditions for joining the EU are generally valid. During the Copenhagen Summit (June 1993) the EC/EU formulated a number of criteria as a kind of precondition for a state to submit for a full membership.
The political criteria catalogue requires that the candidate state has achieved stable institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect and protection of minorities.
On the economic side, the country applying for accession has to have a functioning market economy and must be able to cope with the competitive pressure and the market forces within the Union.
Moreover, an ‘internal criterion’ was fixed, namely that the EU has to be able to take new members in.
During the ratification procedure for the customs union, the EU-Parliament fixed the above mentioned four conditions, which can be seen as a specification of the Copenhagen criteria.
For the following assessment a number of EU documents were used as an analysis basis: 28
A Status Quo Evaluation: Between light and shadow
The status quo evaluation covers the political situation including the legal framework, the economic situation and a demographical assessment. Moreover, a geopolitical analysis is done. All perspectives should contribute to a comprehensive assessment. The time point of analysis is December 1998.
The political situation and the legal framework: The big weak points
The political situation and the legal framework, which provides a certain playground for political activities are very much interlocked. In a basis assessment, the current political situation still does not fullfill EU-standards.
The role of the military, combined with an ambiguous legal system creates a lot of doubts on Turkey’s readiness to join EU. There are a number of anomalies in the work of public authorities, human rights are persistently violated and minorities are not treated according to EU-standards. The deficit of civilian control of the military gives reason for concern. The role of the army performed via the National Security Council (NSC), which is seen as the highest informal decision making institution in Turkey, will never be accepted by EU. The NSC plays a crucial role in the formulation and implementation of national security policies and covers a far range of political issues. It comprises five civilian (President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Interior Minister) and five military members (Chief of General Staff, Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmarie). The recommendations of the NSC are not legally binding but nevertheless have a very strong influence on the country’s domestic and foreign policy (eg. in February 1997 when the Army forced the then Prime Minister Erbakan to sign a binding activity list to be implemented immediately by the then government). The Turkish constitution gives the Army the chance to play a civilian role without being subject to civilian control. Sometimes one has the impression that the Army acts without the government’s knowledge when it carries out military activities (eg. like in the case of the Syrian crisis in autumn 1998).
The standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law do not follow European lines. 35 Repeated cases of torture, unclear disappearances and extra-judicial executions give the impression that the government does not control the security forces in the necessary scope. 36 In the urban areas, the Turkish National Police (TNP) has primary responsibility for security. The Jandarma (gendarmarie) carries out this function in the countryside. The armed forces have been continuing to combat PKK in the state-of-emergency regions, therby taking on an internal security function. Although civilian and military authorities remain publicly committed to the establishment of a state of law and respect human rights, some members of the security forces particularly police ‘special teams’, Jandarma, and TNP staff, have committed serious human rights abuses. The government expanded human rights training for police and military personnel — with relunctant success.
Despite several announcements by the government to improve the situation nothing substantial has changed in the past years. The reforms started in 1995 are in a deadlock. Due to governmental instabilities future developments in this area are not foreseeable. Although Turkey has ratified a number of human rights conventions there is hardly a country in the western hemisphere showing so many violations since years. Turkey still keeps the death penalty in its legislation.
Minority protection in Turkey is done with reference to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). The treaty covers only religious minorities and the specifically named Armenians, Greeks and Jews.
“The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 had referred only to the presence of non-Moslem minorities — Armenians, Greeks and Jews — within Turkey. According to the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, non-Moslem communities were allowed a measure of self-government, but the Moslem inhabitants were considered to be united as members of the ‘nation of Islam‘ and were thus subjects of the Sultan who was also their Caliph. The Kurds, along with the Albanians, Arabs, Bosnians, Circassians, Laz, Pomak, Tatars and Turks, were grouped together within the single nation of Islam . 37 “
Kurds, which are generally accepted as minority in the Western understanding and represent roughly 20 % of the Turkish population, are neither recognised as national, ethnic nor racial minority. Officially or legally, there no barriers for Kurds to join political or economic positions. De facto, it is not advisable to unveil ones Kurdish identity because harrassment or prosecution usually are the consequences. The situation in the east and south-east is recognised by EU, but the fight against terrorism requires also the respect of human rights and the rules of law (eg. without large-scale evacuations, destruction of villages and abuses of human rights performed by the Turkish security forces). The state of emergency which has been in virtue since 1987 and the extension of power of the provincial governors have deterriorated the situation. Turkish government have had to be for a military solution for years. The governments’ incapability to come to a political solution played very much in the hands of the Army. One can say that the governments handed the issue over to the Army. EU called several times for a political solution. 38
The situation of economic, social and cultural rights is quite distorted. The rights to associate and to strike for instance are subject to a number of restriction. There is no unemployment benefit in Turkey. Child labour is widely used in the grey economy.
The right to use another language than Turkish in publications was granted in 1991. Foreign languages, including Kurdish dialects are allowed to be used in publications but not in education of in ‘political communication’, especially in TV or radio.
Religious education (Sunni) in state primary schools are obligatory. Although other religious communities are recognised and can perform their religious freely, in practise a number of bureaucratic obstacles have to be overcome.
Some religious communities like the Assyrian Orthodox or the Alevis face a lot of pressure. Especially the Alevis (at least 12 millions) are seen as outcasts because of their free interpretation of Islam. 39
The military plays a crucial role in the relation between state and religion. 40 It sees itself as guardian of secularism and tries to suppress the slights movements against this Kemalist principle. Although Turkey has tried several times to improve the legal framework concerning economic and social rights there are still a high number of restrictions preventing the enjoyment of rights to the same standards as that prevailing in the EU countries.
Freedom of expression in media is provided by Turkish legislation. Due to a number of very negative experiences there is a high level of self-censorship. Media are very well aware of the strictness in application of the legal regulations. Objective and independent reports on the Kurdish issue are not possible.
According to the Turkish constitution (Art 138) the judiciary is independent. The judiciary includes the Constitutional Courts, the Court of Appeals, the Council of State and the judicial and administrative courts. The judicial systems also includes state security courts which are emergency courts. They are not compatible with the EU’s democratic understanding. Judiciary is not really independent from politically motivated efforts. The Turkish legal system does not comprise measures against corruption. Amongst public workers corruption, favouritism and influence peddling is a common phenomenon.. In the judicial system one finds the phenomenon as well. This is due to very low salaries for public workers and judges and to very slow judicial procedures.
The governmental situation has been very unstable in the past years. Short-living coalition governments and an increased involvement of the military brought insecurity and instability for the country and the region. The ban of Refah in January 1998 is seen as a violation of the democratic pluralism and the freedom of expression. The parliamentary constellation has become very volatile in the past few years. The floating rate of parliament members from one party to another is quite high. Bribing and payment for changes are usual. Due to dissatifactory party politics a number of new parties with only a very small number of vote have been founded. The splitting process is not a signal for more democracy and multi-opinion but a result of not very fixed party structures and corporate identities within the parties.
Currently, Turkey is on the way to new parlamentary elections in coming April. A caretaker government acts to keep the country’s development at least at a minimum level going. The election’s results will not differ very much from the ones of the last elections. The government forming process will - as well — not be an easy job. The mediumterm future prospects for the country’s domestic stability are not very encouraging and do not provide the necessary basis for a membership country.
The economic situation: A would-be asset
Turkey has a population of more the 63 million with an annual growth rate of 1.6 %, thus representing a remarkable market potential.
Even though world economy pointed down in growth rates, Turkey performed well-growing for years (from 1980 to 1997 at an average of 6 %). This has been due to a well working grey economy but also to a deep going restructuring process and a gradual opening. Nevertheless, the high growth rate have been hiding still existing structural problems.
The relation of exports to GNP rose from 4.3 % in 1981 to 23.9 % in 1997. Imports on the other hands increased from 11.7 % to 29.5 %. The customs union led to another boost in this development. In 1997 the export to EU-countries accounted for 46.7 % and the imports for 51.2 %.
Until the begin of the 1980s Turkey’s economic policy was very much targeted at state-run enterprises and a dirigiste approach leaving only little space for market economy. In the past twenty years Turkey adopted step by step a market economy. Progress has been made in many areas, but there are still a number of considerable problems.
The weak points of the Turkish economy are that the share of state-owned-enterprises is still too high and represents a budget burden. Moreover a still large and ineffective agricultural sector, a very weak financial sector, chronic monetary stability, low productivity in farming and a very high proportion of small enterprises complicate the situation. Inflation has been high since years (between 60 and more the 100 % p. a.). The tax management is not very efficient, causing the state sometimes high losses in revenues. Foreign direct investments have not been sufficient for years because of the political instability. The social security system is very inefficient, causing every year additional budget problems. The infrastructure system is inadequate.
The relative stability of the number of SMEs hides the considerable floating rate in start-ups and closures. Their technical status and their management capacities are very low. Human development is actually missing. The state still intervenes in a number of cases like in the price policy of SOEs and in agriculture or in the energy sector. Price support and intervention are the order of the day. This policy bring the SMEs under heavy pressure.
One reason of the economic deficits is the political instability. The lack of an sustainable consensus on an economic strategy among the social, political and economic forces is another reason. Stabilisation programmes were started but never completed. Due to early elections, campaign economics dominated and torpedoed all efforts to stabilise the Turkish economy.
No government could still present a positively working privatisation programme. Short government periods were another obstacle to bring the unpopular intentions through.
Summing the economic assessment up, Turkey has a well-developed institutional and legislative framework, a dynamic private sector and liberal trade rules. Turkey has a high market potential and a potential for growth. The level of adaptability — esp. in the context of the customs union — is very high and promising. Turkey has established a workable legal framework and has handled the customs question in a very positive way. The weak points are the lack of a sustainable framework for economic stability and the deficit of a climate for the financial sector to act as intermediary has to be created. These are issues which can be realized with the necessary government’s efforts.
The demographic situation 41 : A manyfold obstacle
“Seen from Istanbul, Turkey looks like a nation on fast-forward: young, urban, dynamic and growing at a bewildering rate. New roads rip through old Istanbul, new factories and housing blocks leapfrog each other out of the city and into the surrounding hills, Planning lags behind change, as it often does in Turkey, and change brings the destruction of much of the country’s rich historical heritage. The spirit of Attila and Kemal - still common names in modern Turkey - lives on. But the history that created this city is no longer its master.
Istanbul’s population has grown from 5.5m a decade ago to more than 12m today, with over half a million people pouring in every year. Most come from farms and villages in eastern Turkey. The country’s 65m people are turning from small farmers to city-dwellers at surprising speed. In 1945 only 19 per cent of the population lived in towns; now the figure is over 75 percent Istanbul is much the biggest, but new industrial cities as Denizli and Bursa are growing just as fast.
Modern Turkey is not only overwhelmingly urban, but also predominantly young: more than half its people are under 25. Although the growth rate is slowing down, the number coming on to the job market will go on rising until 2003. The army and the civil service, which once attracted Turkey’s bright young men, have lost out to business. The multilingual, multicultural young people of Istanbul and Turkey’s western cities want to be economists, managers, lawyers and accountants. They live in the world of Take That, not Ataturk, and imbibe their culture from global television. The past and its borders appear to be dead.
But travel to the east in Turkey, and the picture changes. The people are poorer, the roads degenerate, and the newly built-up areas look more like refugee camps - which, often enough, is what they are, filled with people fleeing war of poverty, waiting for the chance of a job further west and a life in peace. When, eventually, you get to the eastern borderlands, you find emergency law, military occupation and civil war. Across the borders lie Syria, Iraq, Iran, Aremenia, and across the Black Sea, Russia - neighbours who would make anyone nervous. If Turkey’s head and shoulders are thrusting into the brave new world of global markets and universal culture, its legs are firmly stuck into history, geography, war and poverty. 42 ”
This description points out all the fundamental problems Turkey, which is by far the country with the highest number of population in this ‘concert of states’, has on the demographic level. The latest census conducted in November 1997 came to a total figure of roughly 63 m people. In 1990 Turkey had 56 m inhabitants. For 2000 the forecast assumes a population of 65m people in the medium assessment. The annual growth rate is roughly 1.5 %.
The relevant demographic issues are a rapid growth in population per annum, still high birth rates/fertility rates, constantly declining death rates and a decreasing infant mortality, a significantly growing life expectancy, a high and growing proportion of people between 15 and 64 years and, a comparatively high share of young population (below 15 years).
More indirect problems are a sustainable migration of the rural population into the towns, esp. in the west and the south of Turkey (but not only), a rapid and sustainable urbanization (’Gecekondus’), a significantly grown number of cities above 1 m inhabitants, overuse of resources, ecological problems like pollution, a dramatic income gap between rural and urban areas (rich west/northwest vs. poor east/southeast) and the coming up of radical political movements.
Taking the still growing figures plus the critical geopolitical position on a multifacet crossroad into account it is understandable that Turkey is seen as a pivotal country. Its stability, not only the economic or political stability, but also the demographic stability already influences the region’s balance. Analysing the above described network effects, Turkey’s demographic development has to be regarded as an additional problematique for the country’s ambitions to enter the European Union as a full member.
Although Turkey offers EU a large market (this is proved by the customs union) the growing population is assessed as a kind of threat for the Union. If Turkey became full member it would be one of the dominating countries in the European Parlament, thereby influencing all decision-procedures.
In the basic discussions the demographic development has also been seen in connection with the freedom to move and the freedom to settle within the Union. Many member states have been afraid that a surge of migrants could be the result of a full membership of Turkey. This would reinforce for instance the current problems of unemployment (especially in the low-salary range and in the less skilled job areas) which is a predominant issue in the European Union. Inner-Union pressure would be accelerated and a very difficult situation could get out of control. The consequences are not foreseeable.
Moreover, fears of alienation are as well an issue of discussion — most probably not on the official level. Old debates on what is ‘European’ and ‘whether Christendom and Islam co-exist’ have come up in connection with Turkey’s ambitions to enter EU several times. These discussions where never conducted with the necessary seriousness and in a thorough and objective way, thereby causing negative effects in the relation between the European Union and Turkey.
What has become obvious in the ongoing discussion is that demographical issues are one of several ‘keep-out factors’, which must not be analysed in an isolated way but have to be seen from a network perspective.
The geopolitical situation: Turkey between Europe and the United States
An assessment without taking the geopolitical situation of Turkey and its surrounding into account would leave a longterm facet out of discussion. As the EU is more than an economic circle of countries security issues have to be taken into the analysis. It is obvious that especially this issue has caused a number of discussions between the EU and the United States, making Turkey a ‘punching ball’.
Undeniably, Turkey is situated on the multifacet crossroad. It is seen as the ‘linkage country’ between three troubled regions: the Balkans, the Central Asia-Caucasus region and the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey, the now Russian Federation and the Iran have been standing in a century lasting competition for influence in the region. In the following a brief overview on the very complex situation will be given. 43 It should show the basic importance of a linkage between Turkey and the EU and a possible asset position the country has in a multiple troubled area.
Russian and Turkey have been in an economic and political contest for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Ankara’s ambitions to gain a foothold by showing a significant presence in the regions have always been against Moscow’s vital economic and political interests. The economic card covers the oil and gas and the transport routes for these ressources. Turkey wants to play an influential role in the ‘pipeline concert’. This desire is supported by the United States. The political card is very much historically founded and is targeted at Parturkism and Panislamism. The newly emerging countries in the region tried to perform a very conservative course between the two rivals. As the region is still very unstable and a number of questions are unclear, it will be very difficult for Turkey to create a stable and secure environment necessary for the country to develop economic alternatives to the ‘European card’.
The confrontation at the Balkans and the dissolution of Yugoslavia showed the interests of Turkey in another conflict area. In the near past, a strong influence concerning the Greek-Turkish relations could be seen. Both countries had to accept that their positions in the NATO have been decreased since the decay of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that both countries pushed national interests to the disadvantage of common security issues. The deterioration of the Greco-Turkish relations had a massive impact on the developments in the Balkans. The area became a location for a ‘clash of emotions’ between the two countries. Greece’s policy shows a more ‘orthodox facet’, while Turkey shows a high sympathy for muslims in the area. It is undeniable that Greece is in an opposition to the EU which tries to have a clear stance against Serbia. Moreover, some ‘special relations’ like the ones between Russia and Greece seem to exist. Nevertheless, one has to be careful in making allegations, that behind both countries other powers can be made out. It it would be an exaggeration to speak of ‘proxy positions’. What is clear, is the fact that the Balkans have become a more than troublemaker region in the past decade. Again, this is not an environment which Turkey would need as an economic and political alternative to the EU.
The third tensed area is the Middle East. For decades, the relations between Turkey and the Middle East countries have been bad or even very bad. The general reservations are the result of not forgotten historical burdens. Turkey is in troubled relations with Syria (PKK, water), the Iraq (Kurds, water, oil fields) and the Iran (religious-ideological reasons). The improved relations with Israel which have been popped up by a number of defence agreements, have caused a political earthquake and suspecion amongst the countries in the region. The cooperation has increased the differences and animosities between Turkey and a number of arabic countries. Again — this is not a basis for the necessary calm and stable environment Turkey would need to stabilize itself and to be economically integrated.
In a longterm perspective Turkey will not be able to create a stable, strong and calm surrounding. The different geopolitical assessment by its main partners does not make the situation easier for the country. It is locked between the US position — a stable and democratic Turkey — and the EU attitude — a democratic and stable Turkey.
A short summary of the assessment: Still a lot of work to do from both sides
The analysis showed that Turkey still has considerable weaknesses in the political and legal partsystems. It has not reached European standards sofar. Taking the current development into account the future perspectives for a substantial change are not very positive.
The economic part-system shows encouraging developments and gives hope for an alignment at least in this area. Nevertheless, still existing structural deficits must not be left out of the assessment.
The demographical evolution brought out strenghts in terms of a considerable market potential. It must not be overseen that the weaknesses in terms of ‘Turkey as a demographical power’ are dominating. It is the interplay with the other issues making demography to a ‘keep-out factor’ and therefore, leading to a very ambiguous assessment.
As the EU is more than an economic association, currently Turkey would have big problems to comply with the Union’s regulations, going beyond economic issues. Due to the domestic volatility, the coming elections and the past experiences, the short-term prospects and a medium-term forecast for closer relations seem not very encouraging.
It must not be overseen that the regional environment of Turkey has been unstable for years and the future perspective are far from being positive.
Rapprochement Options: Who wants what?
In the past decade the geopolitical environment of Turkey and Europe has changed considerably. The answer to the question on a possible future role of Turkey in the region and its domestic situation will be provided by the quality of Turco-EU relations. It is obvious that Europe gradually is finding its identity in a process coming more from within than being influenced from outside. Security issues have become less important and have been completed by economic, political and cultural issues. 44
Turkey as well is still in a ‘search procedure’. It has to find its identity, its domestic stability, its regional role and its place in the European concert. As security issues are not predominant anymore and the understanding of security has been broadened in the past years, Turkey has to define a new unique selling proposition (USP), i.e. it has to find a role in the concert of states under the changed conditions.
In the following, both parties’ perspectives on the options for a rapprochement are analysed and assessed.
The official Turkish line for a rapprochement: Between turn the back and bilateral agreements
It seems obvious that Turkey will not become full member during the ongoing enlargement process. The Vienna summit from December 1998 did not bring the expected invitation to be amongst the candidates for full membership. Even though media and some politicians hoped and even pressed EU to put Turkey on the agenda, they were not successful. The stance of the EU has not changed in basics — simply because a trigger to do so is still missing.
Many Turks perceived the EU-position in the wake of Luxembourg as an exclusion of Europe, but without having committed to self-criticism. Turkish politicians and the intellectual élites were not successfull to change their basic stance and to come to a change in paradigm. The reason for this lack is based in the fact that Luxembourg came quite unexpected for them and they were not prepared in the required manner. Domestic instability and the political instability in the surrounding were additional issues for the delay and the strategical deficit.
As a very first reaction, Turkey cut the political dialogue the Union is still cut. Turkey, however, wants to improve the bilateral relations with the European Union members. As announced already a few months after the Luxembourg decision, Turkey will seek to come to a kind of ‘enhanced customs union’ agreement, focusing only on economic issues. This selective approach brought Turkey already a lot of criticism by a number of member states. The ‘political turnaway’ has costed a lot of international reputation.
Moreover, it is still unclear what Turkey understands, when its politicians speak of a ‘customs union enhanced’. Considerung the fact, that political issues have been excluded since Luxembourg, the approach becomes even more doubtful. Furthermore, it seems to be a contradiction in itself, as a customs union per se de facto does not include only economic but also political aspects.
Ankara did not really care about that because it is still convinced about its European vocation without changing anything in its stance substantially. For the time being, the idea of a full membership has been given up because as Ankara argues nobody wants to remain in a ‘beggar’s room even if it is luxuriously furbished’. Of course, it is up to Turkey to determine whether it wishes to see itself as a beggar or whether it wants to be in this room.
The essential issue for Turkey would be to launch a coherent and sustainable strategy, fullfilling the customs union agreement from its side and thereby forcing the EU to comply to the agreement as well. It must not be forgotten, that main parts of the agreement are still open in their fullfilment.
In the past few months it became obvious that a ‘non-strategy’ does not bring a move in the issue. The road which seems to be reasonalbe could be called: First, the establishment of a working relationship between Turkey and EU has to be pushed forward. Secondly, the customs union has to be fulfilled within a proposed period of time. In a third step, negotiations on following opportunities like the customs union enhanced can be done. The resulting proposal should include already concrete issues to be realised.
Making the whole story short: Turkey cannot sit and wait but has to be active under the given conditions and the changed global paradigm.
The European Union’s options: Between linkage policy and a courageous approach without double standards
Years ago, Brussels has adopted a very specific approach by which it tried to defend its regional political and economic interests at a minimum cost level. Under the changed conditions, the EU has to reconsider its interests because security is not the dominating issue anymore. The current enlargement process cannot be separated from the ‘Turkish approach options’. Turkey together with Cyprus may become one of the test cases for any enlargement, simply because a separation of the two cases will be difficult for obvious reasons. By getting the Greek okay for the customs union with Turkey the Union has tied itself down. EU promised to enter into membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. One tried to satisfy the Greeks and to prepare the ground for a solution of the Cyprus issue. Finally, the EU hoped to settle the tensed relations with Turkey. These hopes did not materialize so far. In contrary, the Union imported tensions between a member and an associated country. Moreover, it has become involved in the complex Cyprus question — without any concrete solution in hands and a so far very helpless performance. 45
Which are the options for EU to settle the situation with Turkey? There are at least four scenarios.
From a medium-term point of view, the most reasonable approach seems to be a mixture of the first and the second scenario. Any special status is assessed as a serious challenge for dealing with future applicants. If an exemption which goes beyond the opting-out rights is permitted, the EU would build future walls at the same time. In consequence one would have to find an opting-out from the opting-out. This would decrease the seriousness and credibility of the EU as a whole.
In contrary, the European Union, should continuously remind Ankara that the European Union is not a philanthropic institution. It is a union of states whose practices, rules and customs should be respected and adopted by anyone who wants to join it.
Conclusions: Clears minds on both sides and a lot of work still to be done
EU-Turkish relations have become a permanent issue in the 1990s. The paper tried to find out whether Turkey should become a member of EU and if yes, under which conditions. Moreover it presented a modus for a step-by-step rapprochement between EU and Turkey.
The Euro-Turkish relations show clearly how difficult it is for both parts to comply with a change in geopolitical paradigm. The changed understanding of the concept of security, the change in the power system and the shift between core and periphery brought the EU and Turkey into troubled waters. This result of the analysis does not solve the basic problem between the EU and Turkey, but it is a fact and it seems to be one of the main obstacles for a rapprochement.
Since almost a decade the unsolved issue has become a burden for EU, showing the incoherence in the approach but also the lack of a common foreign and security. For years the EU has performed a ‘lingering policy’, thereby underminding the trust of Turkey in EU promises. It also showed the difficulties in handling a country which does not have a clear and outspoken European vocation, but is an important partner in economic and security issues.
Turkey itself has undergone a multifacet change. This procedure is still under way, without a final result can be seen. Deep-going domestic reshuffles, de facto governmentless periods, a more and more increasing involvement of the Army, economic troubles and societal change have brought the country in a nearly unsolvable position. Combined with the difficult geopolitical location, Turkey seems to have become a permanent trouble maker, nevertheless showing a high potential in several areas. This contradiction makes Turkey even more challenging and forms the background for future relations.
EU and Turkey have to find a way to approach each other — this seems to be possible only via clear targets and a longterm strategy set up by both sides on the basis of a mutual consent. Currently, the readiness necessary is missing on both sides. For reason, a strategy is far from being developed. The end of the never-ending story will not come soon — but a chance for a positive end for both sides is alive.
Endnotes
Note 1: Andrea Riemer, Stabilität unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Multipolarität , Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , Heft 6/1997, pp.643-655. Back.
Note 2: Ian O. Lesser, Growth and Change in Southern Europe (RAND/RP-517, Santa Monica 1996), p.11.
James M. Goldgeier, Michael McFaul, A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era, International Organization 46, 2, Spring 1992, pp.467-491.
James M. Goldgeier, Michael McFaul, Core and Periphery in Post-Cold War Europe , Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the ISA, March 18-21,1998, Minneapolis. Back.
Note 3: Yannis A. Stivachtis, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a Response to Security Problems in the Mediterranean Region: Strengths and Weaknesses , Paper presented at the Third pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the Internationals Studies Association in Wien, 16.-19. September 1998, pp.11-29. Back.
Note 4: Ian O. Lesser, Growth and Change in Southern Europe (RAND/RP-517, Santa Monica 1996), pp.22-25.
Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean security: new challenges, new tasks, NATO Review , Vol. 44, No. 3, May 1996, p.25. Back.
Note 5: Ian O. Lesser, Growth and Change in Southern Europe (RAND/RP-517, Santa Monica 1996), p.12. Back.
Note 6: ‘Survey Turkey: Democracy at gunpoint’, The Economist , 8.6.1996. Back.
Note 7: For basics see Ayse Kadioglu, The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity , in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), Turkey. Identity, Democracy, Politics (London, Portland: Frank Cass 1998), pp.177-193. Back.
Note 8: For details see Andrea K. Riemer, Religion as a potential for crisis? - The Case of Turkey , Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of ISSS 1997, Norfolk, Fall 1997. Back.
Note 9: Kemal Kirisce, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), p.6. Back.
Note 10: Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s relations with a changing Europe (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.15. Back.
Note 11: Kemal Kirisce, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), p.91. Back.
Note 12: Kemal Kirisce, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), p.1. Back.
Note 13: Treaty Series No. 16 (1923): Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other Instruments, Signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, together with Agreements between Greece and Turkey signed on January 30, 1923 and Subsidiary Documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923). Back.
Note 14: Ayse Kadioglu: ‘The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity‘, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.) Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1998), pp.177-194. Back.
Note 15: E.J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor (Leiden: Brill, 1984). Back.
Note 16: Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago, Manchester: University of Chicago Press, Manchester University Press: 1982), p. 3. Back.
Note 17: Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s predictament in the Post-Cold War Era, Futures, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp.256. Back.
Note 18: The Truman Doctrine: The unstoppable boulder. US aid to Greece and Turkey after WWII, The Economist , March 14 th, 1987. Back.
Note 19: Richard G. Withman, Securing Europe’s southern Flank? A comparision of NATO, EU and WEU policies and objectives , Paper presented at the 39 th Annual ISA Convention, Minneapolis, p. 4-5. Back.
Note 20: Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s relations with a changing Europe (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.33. Back.
Note 21: Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey’s predictament in the Post-Cold War Era, Futures, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 255-256.
Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, Washington Papers No 163 (Washington, DC, 1994, p.110. Back.
Note 22: For details and a comprehensive overview see eg. Yannis A. Stivachtis: The New International Law of the Sea and the Aegean Dispute , paper presented at the Third pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the Internationals Studies Association in Wien, 16.-19. September 1998. Back.
Note 23: Commission of the European Communities: Proposal for a Council Regulation Regarding the Implementation of a special Financial Cooperation Measure for Turkey , Brussels, July 26 th, 1995. Back.
Note 24: In part two (The Challenge of Enlargement) of the Agenda 2000, Chapter VI. the relations with Turkey are discussed.
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/enlarge/agena2000_en/strong/26.htm Back.
Note 25: For the Luxembourg results see:
http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec97.htm#turkey Back.
Note 26: The Luxembourg rebuff, in The Economist , December 20 th, 1997. Back.
Note 27: Turkey and the EU: Not so fast, in The Economist , December 20 th, 1997. Back.
Note 28: The following list is sorted according to the chronological order and not according to priority. Back.
Note 29: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/enlarge/agena2000_en/strong/26.htm Back.
Note 30: Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament concerning the further development of the relations with Turkey, Brussels, July 15 th, 1997.
Guidelines proposed by European Commission concerning future relations with Turkey, Europe Documents, No. 2049, Brussels, August 27 th, 1997. Back.
Note 31: Report of the Commission concerning the Development of the Relations with Turkey since the Beginning of the Customs Union; Brussels March 4 th, 1998: Back.
Note 32: Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat: Europäische Strategie für die Türkei. Erste operative Vorschläge der Kommission, Brussels, March 4 th, 1998. Back.
Note 33: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/report_11_98/turkey_en.doc Back.
Note 34: Bericht über die Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament über die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zur Türkei (KOM(97)0394-C4-0490/97) und die Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat über eine Europäische Strategie für die Türkei-Erste operative Vorschläge der Kommission (KOM(98)0124-C4-0634/98), Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Sicherheit und Verteidigungspolitik, Dok. A4-0432/98, Brussels Nov. 19 th, 1998. Back.
Note 35: European Commission: Interim Report Concerning the Reform Process, the Human Rights Situation and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey, Brussels, July 5 th, 1995.
A permanent status is given by the Report of Human Rights Watch on Torture in Turkey (March 1997, Vol. 9, No. 4 (D)) presented to the European Parliament, Committee for Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy, Subcommittee Human Rights, Brussels, March 25 th, 1997.
Moreover, a thorough analysis is done by the U.S. Department of State/Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and its annual Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices. Back.
Note 36: Figures on extra-judicial killings are not available. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, which is a respected non-governmental institution, has reported several times in its publications a number of deaths under suspicious circumstances while in official custody. Some of them were an apparent result of torture. Back.
Note 37: Kemal Kirisce, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), p.1.
According to several reports there are close to fifty identifiable ethnic groups in Turkey. All rights indicated in Section III, Articles 37 to 45 in the Lausanne Treaty apply only to non-Muslim minorities which are clearly named. Treaty Series No. 16 (1923): Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other Instruments, Signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, together with Agreemments between Greece and Turkey signed on January 30, 1923 and Subsidiary Documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923). Back.
Note 38: For details concerning the Kurdish issue see eg.
Andrea Riemer, Nations and Minorities: A Comparative Analysis between the Western and the Islamic understanding in Stuart Nagel (ed.), Global Social Policy, forthcoming.
Andrea Riemer, Nations and Minorities: A never ending potential for crisis — the Kurdish case? , Paper presentend at the Annual ISA-meeting in Minneapolis, March 17-21,1998.
Andrea Riemer, The Kurds — as a minority a key potential for crisis for Turkey? Non-published research paper, Vienna 1999.
Henri J. Barkey, Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
Kemal Kirisce, Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1997). Back.
Note 39: For details on the Alevi factor in the Kurdish question: Henri J. Barkey, Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p.67-70. Back.
Note 40: See eg.: Politics and the Turkish military , IISS-Strategic Comments, Vol. 3, No. 5, June 1997. Back.
Note 41: See Andrea Riemer, Demographic Obstacles to Stability in the Middle East:‘Turkey as a case study country‘ , paper presented at the Third pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the Internationals Studies Association in Wien, 16.-19. September 1998. Back.
Note 42: The elusive golden apple, The Economist , 8.6.1996. Back.
Note 43: No details are presented. This would exceed the paper by far. Back.
Note 44: Dietrich Jung, Turkey and Europe or Turkey in Europe , in Mustafa Aydin, Turkey at the Threshold of the 21 st Century. Global Encounters and/vs regional Alternatives (International Relations Foundation: Ankara 1998), pp.159-163. Back.
Note 45: Even in the S-300 question the EU performed a policy of ‘noble reservedness‘ and non-envolvement. It was up to the UN to provide the resolutions and to the USA to make the necessary pressure. This stance seems strange as EU and Cyprus stand in accessions negotiations. Moreover, the tensions overshadowed the difficult Greek-Turkish relations and — at indirectly — the EU-Turkish relations as well. Back.
Email this citation