Nation Versus State: The Dilemma of Seoul’s Foreign Policymaking Toward Pyongyang

CIAO DATE: 3/99

Nation Versus State: The Dilemma of Seoul’s Foreign Policymaking Toward Pyongyang _*

Northwestern University

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

Preliminary draft: no citation or quotation without author’s permission. Note: at present, this document is missing several tables referenced within the text.

I. Emerging Challenges to State-Centric Foreign Policymaking

Of the three major Cold War legacies, Korea is the only one that still remains divided. Vietnam was united as the North won the “war of liberation” against external forces, while Germany became one when the East self-disintegrated. In both cases, the nation — people — was more or less ready to accept the change. Korea is different in that there has hardly been any sign of the two peoples trying to unite with each other despite the emotional outcry for unification, especially from those South Koreans who have separated family members in the North.

This is largely due to three factors. First and foremost, there exists a deeply rooted distrust between the two peoples. The Southerners cannot erase the bitter memory of the Korean War along with subsequent guerrilla infiltration and terrorist acts perpetrated by the North, which go on even today. On the other hand, the Northerners have been indoctrinated to attribute their misery to the “Yankee imperialism and its running dog that occupy the southern half of the fatherland.” Second, the two Korean states have been in firm control of inter-Korean relations, leaving little room for communication and exchanges at the non-governmental level. Undoubtedly, those in political power saw such interactions potentially harmful to the viability of the states. Lastly, the international environment of the Korean peninsula has not seen any structural changes during the last decade since the end of the Cold War. Political rhetoric notwithstanding, the four surrounding powers — the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia — are presumed to favor the continuation of status quo in which they can play the game of “divide and rule” against the two Koreas.

Such Cold War-like confrontation is not likely to diminish between the two Koreas any time soon. If anything, the experiences of unification in Germany and Vietnam must have heightened the mutual fear, and hence may work against an early union between the two Koreas. North Koreans have watched the former East Germans become second-class citizens after the absorptive unification while South Koreans witnessed the disappearance of a U.S.-backed regime in South Vietnam. As long as the peoples across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) continue to suspect each other, there should be no compelling reason for the two states to embark on a new course of action that might undermine their very existence.

Being a garrison state, the North would find it easy to control its people as far as the interactions with the South are concerned. With the survival of the state at stake, the Pyongyang government would continue to keep a tight lid on its people as any opening of the system might lead to its collapse. What about the Seoul government, however? Would it be possible, or desirable, to maintain a posture similar to that of the North? This is not a question with an easy answer. For starters, Seoul’s intention has been to bring about some reform in the North in a manner that would not threaten the Pyongyang regime. As such, the Kim Dae-jung government has adopted what is known as the “sunshine policy” ₁ in which politics and economics are to be separated in its dealings with North Korea.

It is one thing to proclaim the principle of separating politics from economics. But its implementation at the level of policymaking could be an entirely different proposition. Given the complex interconnection of the two, how would the Seoul government draw a dividing line between politics and economics? As argued by some conservatives in Seoul, for example, can the free supply of grain to North Korea on humanitarian grounds be interpreted as an entirely non-political act? Whether the South Korean rice is diverted to military consumption is not an issue. The soldiers — the backbone sustaining the regime — would have to be fed first no matter what. As long as there is enough food to keep the North Korean population from starvation, it would matter little whether the military is fed with the rice from South Korea or somewhere else. The bottom line in this reasoning is that even the humanitarian aid helps sustain the dictatorial regime in Pyongyang, and hence would prolong the suffering of the North Korean people. Proponents of the argument appear to believe that the famine in the North, however massive it may be, is a price to pay in order to bring about a quick end to the Pyongyang regime and to free the North Korean people once and for all.

While the Kim Dae-jung administration does not seem swayed by the logic of such argument, it still faces the tough task of defining how far it will have to go in tolerating the North’s “rogue behavior” in political and military affairs while providing aid and promoting economic cooperation? And this question is not limited to governmental level interactions. How much freedom will the government allow its citizens in people-to-people interactions with North Koreans? If and when some non-governmental interactions in economic areas are to “spill over” into politics, how will the Seoul government respond? Further complicating the problem is that South Korea is experiencing a gradual maturation of substantive, as contrasted to procedural, democracy, and has begun to nurture a civil society. A major consequence of this development is that the people are raising their voices about governmental policies, even in the area of external relations. The government can no longer ignore the public in foreign policymaking in general and the North Korea policy in particular. If anything, the public input to the government’s foreign policymaking will see nothing but growth.

Thus one critical yardstick in measuring Seoul’s future approach to Pyongyang will be the dynamics of interaction between the nation/society (people and their interrelationship) and the state (political institutions and their handlers). ₂ In this context, this essay is an attempt to shed some light on this emerging, yet crucial, aspect of South Korea’s foreign policymaking toward North Korea. It starts with a discussion of the frames of reference that Seoul’s foreign policymakers are likely to use in responding to the changing state-society relationship. As in most situations that require substantial policy changes, Seoul’s decision-makers will look for the models from which to draw lessons. Two particular cases should be considered most pertinent to Seoul’s policymaking toward Pyongyang: the German and Vietnamese unification. A comparative case study of the process and policies that led to union in these two countries would help us understand how the interplay of state and nation affects the integration of divided countries. The paper then discusses some determinants of foreign policy that may become instrumental in changing Seoul’s hitherto state-centric posture.

II. Tale of Two Countries

When Saigon fell in the mid-1970s, South Koreans were justifiably worried about the possible Vietnamization of the Korean peninsula. The fear led to a tighter security against North Korean threats and an increased dependence on America’s military umbrella. Domestically, economic development drives were accelerated as it was believed that only from the position of strength Seoul would be able to deter Pyongyang’s military adventurism. About 15 years thereafter, the Cold War ended and Germany was united. This time, too, Seoul’s leaders became worried albeit with different reasons. Their primary concern was whether the South could ever muster financial wherewithal to shoulder the burden of carrying a disintegrated North. If the West German economy, many times bigger than South Korea’s and with many years of preparation for unification, had to undergo hardship after the integration, South Korea may even face bankruptcy in the process of absorption. Another concern with almost equal weight was how the North Korean regime would react to the possibility of dissolving into the South, should that by any chance become inevitable. Wouldn’t it resist the absorption till the end with everything it has in its military arsenal?

South Korea’s policymakers and intellectuals have studied — in reality, over-studied — the experiences of Germany and Vietnam. Lessons from the two cases will be invoked, whenever applicable, in making foreign policy toward Pyongyang. Especially in the uncharted area of the interrelationship between state and nation as it affects foreign policymaking, South Korean leaders would rely heavily on what had happened in those two countries.

A.The West Germanization of East Germany

From the perspective of state-society relationship, the most critical point South Koreans must have noted in the German unification of 1990 was that when the East German state collapsed, most of its people were ready and willing to become part of West Germany. Whether East Germans would be satisfied with the outcome of such integration much later was not a major question. Would this aspect of the German experience be relevant to the Korean unification? Not directly. Why?

From the early 1970s the two Germanys had maintained numerous channels of communication which included television reception, mail exchange, visits, and so on. In essence, East German residents had been exposed to the western way of life for a long period before the formal merger took place. The culture shock, though significant as it would turn out, was not considered intolerable at the time of integration. In contrast, North Koreans are far from where East Germans were at unification. Despite the existence of a basic agreement on reconciliation, cooperation, and exchanges, which went into effect in 1992, North Koreans remain in essence blocked from the firsthand information about the South. The interactions that have taken place since 1989, when Seoul officially opened its door to Pyongyang with a policy of exchange and cooperation, have affected only a small number of North Koreans. Personal contact has been kept to a minimum, for example, in the special industrial zones where North Koreans supply their labor and South Korean firms provide capital, raw material, and technology for the production of textile and consumer electronics. Even in the historic tour of Mt. Kumgang area which has been taken by more than ten thousands South Koreans since it began in November 1998, all the visitors came to meet were North Korean guides and occasionally some passersby. Simply put, North Korea has eagerly accepted South Korean money and technology, but has been extremely cautious in personal interactions that might “corrupt” its people with capitalist ideas.

Consequently, it is safe to assume that most North Koreans would be unprepared and probably unwilling to be integrated into the South, should the North Korean state can one day no longer sustain itself. With the collapse of the Pyongyang regime, North Koreans will most likely come under the jurisdiction of the South Korean state. ₃ But there is no assurance that they will become part of the South Korean nation. Considering that East Germans are not content with the way they have been treated since the unification, that one-third of the population in the unified Korea would remain uncertain about their nationhood could become a serious obstacle to national integration. An East Germany-like disintegration of North Korea would indeed mean a monumental challenge to the building of a united community of people on the Korean peninsula.

The task for South Korea is then how to prepare for a German style absorptive unification. Surely the Seoul government would detest such an eventuality and has repeatedly proclaimed that it would not seek one. Regardless of the official stance, however, South Korea has to make some contingency plans as long as the possibility of North Korea’s collapse cannot be eliminated. One plausible way of dampening the sense of alienation to be felt by North Koreans is to separate the state-level contact from that at the level of the nation. At the level of the state, the South Korean government would stay the course of business-like dealings with the North, while at the same time encouraging people-to-people interactions at the non-governmental level.

Understandably, this is a difficult policy to execute as the Seoul government has been exercising monopoly over inter-Korean relations: interactions at the non-governmental level require prior approval from the Ministry of Unification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the relaxation of requirements for non-governmental interactions would produce increased interactions with the North Korean people. In fact, it may alarm the Pyongyang regime that could view the new policy as a subversive strategy to bring it down. Nevertheless, such a posture from South Korea could be a point of departure as long as it is presented in a non-threatening way to the North. Regardless of Pyongyang’s sensitivity, it is incumbent on Seoul to take an initiative given the lesson of Germany’s unification in which even the umpteen years of non-governmental level interactions were not sufficient to bring about a harmonious integration. Without adequate preparation, the Koreans may even be left with an undesirable option of having to set up a separate regime in the North under international supervision. South Koreans need to remember that the West Germanization of East Germany, though not entirely smooth, was possible in large part thanks to the years of interaction between the two peoples.

B. The North Vietnamization of South Vietnam

The 1975 fall of South Vietnam only two years after the departure of American troops sent shock waves through South Korea. Not only South Koreans feared the possible domino effect throughout Asia, but also they had to pay special attention to the fact that an estimated 70 percent of the people in the former South Vietnam welcomed the unification. ₄ As this was a model of merger Pyongyang had been pushing since the division, it served as a reminder to Seoul of the need to insulate its people from Pyongyang’s ideological offensive. Considering that North Vietnam had won the minds of the South Vietnamese people with an appeal to nationalism and national liberation, similar tactics used by North Korea against the Southerners could not but be considered threatening. Thus the South Korean government had to implement a set of policies to protect its people from the “infection” of such ostensibly nationalistic ideas as juche (self-reliance) — the prevailing philosophy in the North. Ironically, this was similar to what Pyongyang is doing nowadays to isolate its people — from the influence of Seoul’s capitalist ideas.

While South Koreans were pondering over the question of “what if the South Vietnamese government had not alienated its own people,” they were shocked once more with subsequent developments in Vietnam following the unification. The unified Vietnam launched its version of perestroika and glasnost for survival, but it has incidentally led to a unique form of national integration. Holding the productive rice paddies and industrial bases along with the tradition of running a market economy, the southern part of Vietnam has become much more prosperous than the northern half. As a result, those in the “liberated area” have ended up doing much better economically than the “conquerors.” The North may have won the war in the political and military sense, but the South attained the economic victory, so much so that many bureaucrats dispatched from the North have retired in the South to open private businesses.

What has happened in Vietnam since the unification marks a stark contrast with the situation in the former East Germany. Despite the astronomical amount of investment made by West Germans, the area still lags far behind in real income and does not enjoy a fair representation in governance. ₅ Euphoria of the falling Wall has not been matched by the delivery of economic and political rewards to the east. And one should emphasize that it was a total victory by the West in Germany, while in Vietnam the North had more or less a partial victory in the political and military aspect. It is an ironical twist that the former South Vietnamese have turned out to fare better than the former East Germans. This is not an observation based on a direct comparison of the two peoples. In their own settings, the former seems to perceive themselves doing quite well while the latter poorly in comparison to their respective counterparts.

What would be the potential utility of the Vietnamese model of unification to the Korean case? Not insignificant. While that part on the majority of southern people welcoming the northern troops on their soil would not be applicable, the rest of the model may become quite relevant. Though extremely unlikely, suppose that Pyongyang succeeded in agitating a popular uprising in the South and followed up with a swift military takeover. Suppose further that the U.S. somehow lost the timing for massive retaliation and decided to accept the fait accompli, in return for a promise of political economic reform from the new government of the unified Korea. Should this scenario become realized, the world may see a copy of the Vietnamese model of unification.

The key question in this scenario is whether the South Korean people would accept the Vietnamese model of unification after the collapse of their own state. If they would not, there may occur popular resistance and armed guerrilla attacks on the invaders. If they would, they may go one step beyond the Vietnamese model and embrace the northerners with their superior economic power and the “addictive” capitalist culture. Just as the Taiwanese absorbed the Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in 1949 and just as the Han Chinese accepted the occasional rules by the invading barbarians, South Koreans too could be successful in this mode of absorption. The Northerners would surely try to control the economic system, but they would certainly not repeat the mistakes of nationalization and communization. The purge, though brutal, would be limited to the relatively small number of ruling elite in the South.

Then what would determine the response of the South Korean people in this scenario? The most critical determining factor should be their socialization about the relationship between state and nation. If the majority of the South Korean nation holds the sense of partaking in their governance, a civil society would take firm roots that may in turn defend itself with its citizen-soldiers. If, on the other hand, the gap in state and nation widens, the people would feel disenfranchised, the result of which could be a spread of the 1970s Vietnam syndrome. Consequently, the lesson South Koreans should draw from the Vietnamese unification is that they need to achieve symbiosis in the state-nation relationship. Like “fish in the water,” the state cannot survive without the nation, especially in a rapidly democratizing polity.

III. New Players in Seoul’S Northward Diplomacy

The German and Vietnamese models of unification pose a dilemma to Seoul’s foreign policymaking toward Pyongyang. On one hand, it needs to encourage the people-to-people diplomacy, as West Germany did, so that North Koreans would undergo some degree of socialization with the South Korean life style. Without such preparatory groundwork, a sudden collapse of the North Korean state would bring utter chaos not only to the South but also the entire region of Northeast Asia. On the other hand, people-to-people interactions carry an inherent danger of South Koreans becoming attracted to the North Korean way of thinking, which might lead to the Vietnamese style unification.

How could Seoul resolve this dilemma? How would it define a golden mean in controlling the nature and magnitude of non-governmental approaches to North Korea? Simply put, what does it have to do so that the Southerners would bring the Northerners more toward their side than the other way around? To avoid misunderstanding, it must be pointed out that the question is not whether the South Korean government can control non-governmental interactions. By law, the central government has the sole power to do so, which it has been guarding jealously. Instead, the real issue is how to modulate people-to-people interactions in order to achieve the desired objective. The answer is believed to hinge on the conjunction of two factors. One is the extent to which the government would initiate and stimulate non-governmental interactions, while the other is how to respond to and constrain the public’s rising demand for them. In a sense, it is like opening a floodgate. The government opens it, but can it control the flow against surging waves? The Seoul government opened the gate toward Pyongyang in 1989 and the bi-directional flow has since been growing — albeit small in absolute terms.

This trend is clearly visible in Tables 1 through 6 that contain data compiled by Seoul’s Ministry of Unification on personal contact and visits during the last decade. While a visit refers to the travel by South Korean residents to the North or vice versa, personal contact is defined as an act of meeting or communicating between the residents of the two Koreas either directly or indirectly. Personal contact would consist of exchanging letters or other means of communication with North Koreans as well as the meeting between South and North Koreans in a third country. Should personal contact require travel to the other Korea, it is counted as a visit. It is also possible that personal contact may develop into a visit. A few observations can be made about personal contact from Table 1 and 2.

[Tables 1 and 2 presently unavailable.]

First, there has been a steady increase in the number of applications by South Koreans for contact with North Koreans and virtually all of them received approval from the Seoul government. Since the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung government in 1998, the number of applications more than trebled. But the actual number of contacts made, especially when measured by the number of people involved, shows little variance over time. Except for the 1993-94 crisis surrounding Pyongyang’s suspected nuclear weapons development, the number has remained just a little above 1,000. What does it mean? One plausible interpretation is that the North Korean government may have been controlling the pace of personal contact. That the level of ‘realized’ contact has not changed much may be construed as a signal to Seoul implying that regardless of ups and downs on the political or military front, Pyongyang is willing to keep its doors ajar only by this much.

Second, the rank ordering by areas reveals that ‘economic’ contact tops the list in both the number of applications and that of people involved. As to the second place, the category of ‘separated family’ far exceeds the ‘education and scholarly’ area in the number of applications, while is slightly outnumbered by it in the number of people involved. There is no question about the first place finish: the exploration of business opportunities in the North by South Koreans has been encouraged by the Seoul government and welcomed by the Pyongyang regime. With regard to the second place, direct and indirect contact between the scholars of the two Koreas has been increasing, particularly in third countries. Most importantly, however, one should pay attention to the contact initiated by South Koreans to seek out separated families. This type of contact is likely to increase for two reasons. One is that since 1993 the Seoul government has been operating regional offices where its citizens can make applications without having to come to Seoul. ₆ The other is that Pyongyang has reportedly been making money by charging fees for such contact — unofficially and no uniform amount but determined by individual circumstances.

Third, the data in these two tables contain both the governmental and non-governmental contact. Though a more detailed information is being sought to differentiate the two, it can be presumed from the break-down by areas (Table 2) that most contact has been made by non-governmental actors. This is indeed a significant development, considering the lack of symmetry in the initiation of contact between the two Koreas. There exists no information about the initiation of contact from the North side except for official approaches made by Pyongyang. Given the nature of the regime there, however, it would be difficult to imagine that the North Korean people would be allowed to take private initiatives in order to seek contact with South Korean residents. Hence the idea that virtually all non-governmental contact comes from the South may not be comforting to the Pyongyang regime. At the same time, however, Pyongyang could use it as an opportunity to “infiltrate” the South Korean society: no matter who started it, personal contact can have a mutually socializing impact.

A similar pattern of South Korea’s dominance in interactions is also found in visits. As shown in Tables 3 through 6, South Koreans outnumbered North Koreans by a ratio of seven to one in travels to the other side. But the similarity between personal contact and visits ends here. Whereas personal contact consisted mostly of non-governmental interactions, visits have been made either by government officials or those performing quasi-official functions. Though they are not government employees, athletes and reporters should be seen differently by the receiving side than the private citizens visiting their relatives.

[Tables 3 through 6 presently unavailable.]

Looking at the trend in visits between the two Koreas, from 1990 to 1992 the Prime Ministerial talks held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang accounted for most of them. During this period, there were also exchange performances by folk artists as well as soccer games between the two Koreas held in Seoul and Pyongyang. Then the nuclear weapons crisis erupted in 1993 and there has since been virtually no visits from the North to the South. In contrast, the reverse flow of visitors resumed in 1995 following the October 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework that put a temporary cap on Pyongyang’s nuclear program. In November 1994, Seoul turned to a policy of actively pursuing economic cooperation with Pyongyang, and by November 1997 the representatives of 55 South Korean firms paid visit to North Korea. In 1997 the light-water reactor project began in earnest resulting in the visits of 633 related personnel and led to long-term stays by construction workers. The number of visits associated with the project continued to grow in 1998 and would increase steadily in the future. In addition, 1997 saw the visits by 149 South Korean Red Cross workers to oversee the transfer of grain to North Korea.

The data contained in Tables 3 through 6 do not reflect the cruise/tour of Mt. Kumgang area. Setting aside this very unique development, the nature and number of visits taken place during the last decade reveal that the two Koreas have been extremely cautious as far as the face-to-face meeting by their people is concerned — especially the north side. But the increasing number of visits from the South should be taken as a signal that a change is in the offing, especially since the adoption of the “sunshine policy” by the Kim Dae-jung administration. This policy of separating political military concerns from others will surely encourage many groups in the South that have been awaiting for such posture by the government. An estimated ten million people with families separated between the two Koreas would love to see their relatives before they die; the business sector is eager to invest in the North and develop a new market; the media is in hot competition to bring the North Korean news to South Korea’s living rooms; scholars and intellectuals are trying to exchange ideas with their counterpart; and various professional, athletic, and civic groups want to build bridges with the North Korean people.

To wit, these are some of the major players in active pursuit of northern connection. Just as in the early days of “Wild West” in the U.S., they seem to treat the northern half as an “unclaimed territory” in which they can spread their ideals. For now, they are following the directives coming from the Seoul government, and they will continue to do so for some time to come. As they cumulate experience and know-how in dealing with the government and people of North Korea, however, they will be able to influence Seoul’s policymaking. The power balance between the government and various civic groups participating in northern exploration will change from today’s configuration in which the former dominates the latter to one in which the relationship is less lopsided.

A critical factor that makes such prediction possible is the definite trend toward democratization in South Korea. Progress in democratization is commonly associated with fundamental changes in the autonomy of the state from the society. As a society consists of the elite and the masses, the state’s autonomy too needs to be analyzed from the perspectives of these two groups. An often found feature of authoritarian regimes is that the state enjoys a high degree of autonomy from popular influence but remains quite vulnerable to elite influence, especially that of the military and business conglomerates. Democratization, however, would alter the relationships by lowering the state’s autonomy from the public. In contrast, the impact of democratization on state autonomy from social elites becomes more complex. Whereas the dominant elites in the previous authoritarian regimes may lose their political clout, a relatively large number of social groups are expected to emerge as new pressure groups. The likely candidates are labor unions, political parties, interest groups, civic organizations, and the mass media. Despite a widely held proposition that the increased state autonomy from social elites would generally boost a nation’s overall political performance, its impact on foreign policy capacity is not so straightforward. Because the new elites representing these social groups would have much broader popular bases than the elites of the authoritarian era, for instance, a government’s foreign policy capacity would not necessary increase as the result of an increased autonomy from the new elites. Instead, it can be hypothesized that a more reciprocal relationship between the state and these new social elites may help boost the nation’s foreign policy capacity. ₇

IV. Toward a Flexible Relationship Between the Government and Civic Groups in Foreign Policymaking

A most critical determinant to watch in Seoul’s foreign policymaking toward Pyongyang is then the unfolding of the government’s relationship with the private sector in general and civic groups in particular. ₈ Can the Seoul government continue to dictate the terms of both governmental and non-governmental level interactions with North Korea? Or will it have to devise a new modus operandi with non-governmental actors in order to maximize its foreign policy goals? Inasmuch as democratization and the growth of civic groups are irreversible, the bottom line is that the government will find it increasingly difficult to exercise absolute control over the interactions with the North. Consequently, the question would boil down to one of modulating the relationship between the government and non-governmental players.

Logically there may exist three ways in which such relationship can be configured: indifference, mutual inhibition, and mutual reinforcement. Which one shall prevail at a given time will be determined by the issue and the non-governmental actor involved. Before any further exposition, it must be noted that these three categories refer to not only the state of relationship but also the direction of policy change for Seoul. At the beginning, such policy change may not be palatable to the government that has hitherto monopolized the northward approach. Over time, however, the Seoul government would learn that it has to accommodate the demands coming from the private sector and that, simultaneously, it can utilize these non-governmental actors, especially civic groups, as a lever against the Pyongyang regime.

First, what are the issues in inter-Korean relations that would best fit the category of indifference between the government and non-governmental actors? Arguably, they may include the issues of the reunion of separated families, the exchange of athletes and other functional groups, and the onsite reporting from North Korea by the South Korean media. There is no question that all these are politically charged: the North has viewed them as potentially threatening to the regime, while the South has treated them as belonging solely to the domain of the state. As long as both sides maintain such attitudes, however, they can hardly make any real progress toward the settlement of these issues. While the North is most likely to stay the course, the momentum of change could come from the South as a result of the welling demands from the private sector. Given this pressure, a plausible option for Seoul would be to adopt a ‘third party’ attitude to the activities of various non-governmental actors with stake in these issues. That is, on the condition that they do not break the laws governing the inter-Korean relationship. As long as they remain procedurally correct, it would be better for the Seoul government to remain somewhat indifferent to their specific activities. On one hand, the force of democratization would make it hard for the government to retain the iron grip it inherited from the previous authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, such a neutral posture could help facilitate an early resolution of those issues as the North might soften its stance knowing that the South Korean government is not manipulating these groups to advance its political agenda. After all, any opening could be seen as threatening to the North. Just imagine the danger Pyongyang might perceive if it believed that Seoul is using the separated families, athletes, and the media to crack open its closed society.

In this context, it is encouraging to note that the Seoul government has been using the Red Cross as the front in negotiating the problem of separated families. Though South Korea’s Red Cross organization is under the government control, its actions could leave room for increased flexibility in dealing with its North Korean counterpart. Especially since the establishment of contact and, if possible, the reunion of separated families is by any definition a humanitarian issue, it can be placed in a larger package which may include the supply of medicine, food, and even fertilizers. Should such a package be presented on the governmental level bargaining table, Pyongyang would most likely suspect that Seoul might be trying to link the question of separated families with the other issues. It is because Pyongyang is in dire need of humanitarian aid, but in no hurry to make concessions in the politically sensitive issue of separated families. In contrast, a similar package offered through the Red Cross may have a better chance of acceptance by the North.

The same can be said about the exchange of sportsmen and other non-political actors. As they organize themselves into civic groups, they would try to build communication channels with corresponding organizations in the North. How would Pyongyang respond to this type of communication and exchanges between the two Koreas? Pyongyang would certainly monitor and control them, especially the face-to-face meetings. Nevertheless, its leaders may calculate that their chance of influencing the visitors from the South would improve, compared to the period in which the Seoul government controlled every aspect of such exchanges.

With regard to the travel to and coverage of the North Korean situation by the South Korean press, the time has come for both governments to leave the media alone. Until recently, it has been a known secret that Seoul’s media had to pay large sums of hard currency to Pyongyang for onsite reporting and the South Korean government condoned, if not encouraged, this practice. The ‘money for scoop’ deal would not last long, however. As the novelty value decreases — it has begun already — the profit-minded media in South Korea would stop making large payments. More importantly, increased visits by South Korean reporters would lead to a more objective reporting on the North, which should bring long-term benefits to North Korea even though there may be some short-term drawbacks emanating from critical reviews.

The second category of relationship between the government and non-governmental actors can be characterized by mutual inhibition in which one side’s action often brings damage to the other side. Prime candidates for this type are the issues of how to deal with the radical leftists and the ultra conservative right wingers in South Korea as they attempt to influence Seoul’s North Korea policy. The left has been criticizing Seoul for being too hard to Pyongyang while the right has been making exactly the opposite argument. The South Korean government is in no-win situation in relation to these groups. Even a slight shift on the soft-hard dimension would invite attacks from the side that feels being estranged. What can Seoul do to handle these extremists? It cannot, should not, persecute them as long as they do not break the laws. Can it just remain indifferent to them, however? No, since it cannot neglect the voices of the middle class that constitutes the absolute majority of population. And it is believed that the middle class expects the government to pursue northward policy in a business-like manner of give and take. Hence a desirable course of action for the Seoul government is to let the middle class set the tone of discussion for inter-Korean relations. ₉ Because the middle class citizenry is inherently quiet, it may be necessary to ignite a little debate between the left and the right. When such debate becomes heated, then the government may appeal to the middle class to intervene and take charge. ₁₀

Moving to the third and last category, what issues and actors would fit the relationship characterized by mutual reinforcement? Economic ones. Investment in and trading with North Korea would benefit from a cooperative arrangement between the government and the private sector. There will surely be competition among South Korean firms to beat each other in the “North Korea rush,” and Pyongyang will want to play one company off against the other. By using the Seoul government as a coordinator, however, some form of order can be maintained in economic transactions between the two Koreas. On the surface, such a setup may appear to go against the grains of a market economy that Seoul is pursuing. Given the fact that North Koreans have a long way to go in internalizing the mechanisms of a market economy, however, its benefits should far outweigh potential drawbacks. The North can be spared of exploitation by some unscrupulous businessmen from the South as well as unnecessary and duplicate investments, while the South can protect its firms from being drawn into “unproductive” deals.

A clear conclusion emerges from our analysis. It is that the era of state dominance over nation in South Korea’s North Korea policy is drawing to an end. And the Seoul government will need to modify its hitherto state-centric control over non-governmental interactions between the two Koreas. It is a tall order to not only the political leadership but also more importantly the bureaucrats who have for long presided over Seoul’s northward diplomacy. But the time has come for them to adopt a new thinking. They can no longer resist the rising demands from the private sector — especially the civic groups. Politicians and bureaucrats should realize that they could better influence the activities of the civic groups by adopting a flexible posture and supporting their initiatives. In the long run, such flexibility will also help broaden their decision latitude in dealing with North Korea.

Endnotes

*: Prepared for delivery at the International Studies Association meeting, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.

Note 1: Taken from an Aesop fable in which the sunshine wins over the gale force wind, the “sunshine policy” may imply that Seoul intends to force Pyongyang to take off its protective cover. In fact, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy has been anything but. His sunshine policy has so far meant the exclusion of political military considerations in determining the level of economic assistance and cooperation. Back.

Note 2: For a review of contemporary discussion on nation, nationalism, and statehood, see Wendt, Alexander. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, 88:2 (1994), pp. 384-396, Haas, Ernst. The Rise and Decline of Nationalism (Volume 1 of his Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, and Kupchan, Charles A. ed. Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. Back.

Note 3: Though the probability is low, the four surrounding powers may try to impose an international settlement — e.g., a form of trusteeship — to the disintegrated North. South Korea will oppose such arrangement but whether it will prevail or not would depend upon its capability to effectively govern the restored territory in the North. Back.

Note 4: There was no official survey conducted, of course. The 70 percent figure is an estimate shared by many Vietnam watchers in Asia. Back.

Note 5: For a summary of the political economic status of the East Germans since unification, see Jun, Tae-kook, “Dokil Tongileu Joonggan Kyulsan (An Interim Assessment on the German Unification),” Keynote lecture delivered at the inauguration of the Korean Association for the Study of Society and History,” Seoul: Ewha Womans University, December 18, 1998. Back.

Note 6: From July 1993, the national headquarters and 13 regional offices of the South Korean Red Cross were designated as windows where applications can be submitted for contact with separated family members. In August 1994, 234 local branches of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification of Korea were added to the list while in April 1997 the offices of the Provincial Governments in charge of the five northern provinces were also given the same function. Back.

Note 7: For a more detailed discussion on the influence of democratization on foreign policy change, see Park, Tong Whan, Dae-Won Ko, and Kyu-Ryoon Kim. 1994. “Democratization and Foreign Policy Change in the East Asian NICs.” In Rosati, Jerel A., Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson III, eds. Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 164-184. Back.

Note 8: It is not assumed that the Seoul government would behave as if it were a unitary actor in North Korea policy. There has been conflict between not only different cabinet ministries, but also individual decision-makers about how to mix soft and hard line policies. Contestation within the government is not discussed here as the focus of this paper is on the relationship between the government and civic groups. Back.

Note 9: Since 1981 the Seoul government has been operating a semi-governmental body for this purpose. Created by a Constitutional mandate, the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification of Korea had 13,305 members in 1998. Of these, 5,325 were regional representatives from local districts and 6,059 were functional representatives selected from several hundred professions. Korean ethnic communities in 57 countries also sent 1,921 representatives to the Council. The Council’s main function has been to stage public relations campaigns for the government’s unification policy. Despite huge investment, its activities have yet to induce the kind of voluntary mobilization among the middle class that will help set the agenda in the debate over inter-Korean relations. Back.

Note 10: One may add human rights activists to this group although they may not identify themselves with any ideological camp. Human rights groups have been attacking the Seoul government for ignoring the issue in inter-Korean talks. Placing the highest priority on the stabilization of inter-Korean relations, however, the Seoul government has not been vigorously pushing Pyongyang in the human rights issue. Such posture was based on a realistic thinking that Pyongyang would not bend on the issue as the regime sustains itself only with watertight control over its people. Back.