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Great Powers and Nuclear Non-proliferation Norms: China in South Asia

T.V. Paul

McGill University

International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA
March 14-18, 2000


This paper explores the role of great powers, especially those of rising powers, in the creation, sustenance or destruction of non-proliferation norms. Contrary to the positions of institutionalist and constructivist schools regarding the centrality of norms in international politics, this paper will argue that great powers are driven more by power and interests than normative considerations in supporting or violating particular security norms. After discussing great power motivations in this realm, I will explore the case study of China and its role in nuclear proliferation in South Asia. I will argue that China is both a cause of, and a contributor to, proliferation in South Asia, despite its acceptance of some of the instruments of the nonproliferation regime. This is largely because there exists a tension between China’s increasing role as a system-determining great power and its desire to be a balancer in the South Asian regional sub-system. China’s position as a great power and regional ally of Pakistan and an adversary of India will be explored in detail.


This paper explores the role of great powers, especially that of rising powers, in the creation, sustenance or non-observance of non-proliferation norms. Contrary to the institutionalist and constructivist school’s positions regarding the centrality of norms in international politics, I argue that great powers are driven more by power and interests than by normative considerations when they support or violate particular security norms. 1 After discussing great power motivations in this realm, I will explore the case study of China and that power’s role in nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in South Asia. I will argue that China is both a cause of, and a contributor to, proliferation in South Asia and that Beijing’s motivations derive from considerations of regional balance of power and global leadership. In fact, a tension exists between these two interests and this underlines the continuing contradictions in China’s non-proliferation policy. As China is becoming increasingly a stakeholder great power, its non-proliferation policy has become more attuned to maintaining its status, which means supporting outwardly the norms prohibiting nuclear acquisition by new states. Yet, regional and global balance of power considerations simultaneously determine Chinese policy in this regard as evident in its support for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.

Great Powers and Nonproliferation Norms

The United States, the former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom have been the greatest champions of the non-proliferation regime since the 1960s. The superpowers took the lead in the creation of the IAEA safeguards system and the conclusion of the NPT in 1968. The two remaining great powers and permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), France and China, refused to sign the NPT at that time, arguing that the Treaty was designed to maintain superpower hegemony. However, they subsequently changed their stance and acceded to the NPT in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998, all the nuclear-armed great powers have shown strong opposition to nuclear proliferation and stepped up their support for the nonproliferation regime.

Despite this declared support for the regime, the great powers have also been the biggest contributors to proliferation; a record often ignored by Western scholarship on this subject. For instance, the US assisted in different forms both Britain and France in the acquisition and maintenance of nuclear weapons after initial opposition to their programs. The Soviet Union assisted China in the early days of its nuclear weapons program before pulling out support in August 1960. 2 France’s assistance to the nuclear program of Israel is well-documented. 3 India’s nuclear program in its early days was helped by the US Atoms for Peace Plan, although the objective of the nuclear assistance was to prevent proliferation. French and Chinese materials may have been used by Iraq and Iran and those of China and Russia by North Korea in their nuclear weapons programs. 4 Pakistan is the most recent case of great power assistance in nuclear proliferation. China, a nuclear-armed great power, has been the most ardent supporter of the Pakistani nuclear program since the program’s inception in early 1970s.

Commercial interests may explain some of the great power nuclear industry transfers to new or aspiring nuclear states. However, in the case of state-approved transfers, regional and global balance of power considerations have been the dominant factors. Propping up the military capabilities of a regional or global ally vis-à-vis its regional adversary was perceived as the overriding security interest of the nuclear power even though such a policy might have hampered global efforts at non-proliferation.

Over time, nuclear-armed great powers have placed substantial restrictions on nuclear transfers. All great powers, except China, seem to have formally ended their supply of nuclear materials to non-NPT signatories unless they are safeguarded by bilateral or IAEA safeguards systems. Despite this, China has remained a steadfast supporter of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. Before the Cold War ended, France and China were the two P-5 states least willing to abide by these norms. However, the end of the Cold War resulted in changes in their non-proliferation policy. The progression of France and China to becoming supporters of the regime reflects these countries assuming a stakeholder role in the international system. The change of status has been less prominent in the case of China than that of France. China still continued its support for Pakistan’s covert nuclear acquisition even after Beijing became an NPT member state. The South Asian nuclear tests in May 1998, however, seem to have affected the Chinese calculations to the extent that China emerged as the most vociferous outward critic of the nuclear tests, especially those by India. What explains this apparent contradiction in China’s nonproliferation policy?

I argue that the evolution of China’s non-proliferation policy coincided with the change in China’s status in the international order from a challenger to a semi-challenger of the order. Contemporary China has accepted many norms of international governance as its status as a great power was acknowledged by other great powers, especially the United States. The progression in Chinese policy reflects its acceptance of some of the elements of the international order that gives legitimacy to China’s status as a great power and as a preponderant power in Asia. 5 However, the tension between China’s role as a great power that needs to support those norms that favor great power dominance of the international system and China’s regional balancing concerns vis-a-vis- the rising power, India, explains the current contradiction in China’s non-proliferation policy in South Asia.

China and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, especially with respect to South Asia, contains several elements. First, China is both a cause of and a contributor to, proliferation in the region. Yet, China appears to give the impression that as a P-5 nuclear weapon state, China has a responsibility in limiting proliferation in the region. Second, Beijing uses non-proliferation objectives to maximize its national interests, which include retaining China as the sole and predominant recognized nuclear weapon state of Asia, especially in East Asia. For that reason, China is reluctant to see any other states in East Asia acquiring nuclear arms. Here, China seems to make a distinction between its immediate or most strategically vital region and less vital regions. South Asia and Middle East are less vital to China than is East Asia. China has been uncomfortable with the North Korean nuclear efforts and Beijing shares the desire of the US and Japan that the Korean peninsula remains non-nuclear. China does not want to see Japan using the North Korean nuclearisation as a pretext for acquiring nuclear weapons or adopting a policy of large-scale militarization. 6 China would, however, provide nuclear assistance to Pakistan if that means its regional rival India could be contained, although China would not formally recognize the two states as nuclear powers.

Third, over time China has come to see nonproliferation as an avenue to confirm its great power status and gain recognition from other great powers, especially the US. China’s accession to the NPT (March 1992), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (September 1996) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (April 1997) and its joining the Zangger Committee in October 1997, and Primier Li Peng’s issuance of nuclear export control regulations in September 1997, gave it greater legitimacy as a nuclear weapon state and as a major power. The US and its allies have rewarded these actions with increased trade and access to advanced Western technology, which have helped China to strengthen its military and economic capabilities. However, joining the nonproliferation regime and other cooperative regional or global institutions does not automatically mean China complies fully with the values, norms and principles of the regime or the multilateral security institution. 7

China’s joining of the regime occurred as a result of its realization that the regime does not constrain much of China’s sovereignty as a major power. China has been an ardent supporter of the Westphalian sovereignty norm, which enshrines both internal and external autonomy of a state and non-interference by other states. This conception of sovereignty has been described as a "normative obstacle to agreement on limits on weapons proliferation, since it is the sovereign right of a major power to make money and influence people, as the US example amply demonstrates." 8 China, however, seems to make a distinction between the sovereignty of powerful states and that of less powerful states, despite its rhetorical support for the juridical concept of sovereign equality of all nations. Thus, in spite of its formal and often eloquent support for equality of nations, "China uses the concept of equality as a way to protect its territory and sovereignty. Apart from a declaratory policy of equality based on the five principles, there is little evidence to suggest that China cares too much whether the world is organized according to some universal hierarchical order as long as its own order in the immediate neighborhood is maintained. Apparently, the Chinese government makes more noises than takes concrete actions to right the inequality that exists in the world." 9

Becoming a full-fledged great power in the 21st century remains a core national objective of China. Chinese policymakers justify their goal of great power status in order to "prevent the historical humiliations suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism." 10 Interestingly, Chinese writings on major power relations in Asia rarely mention India as a rising power of much significance. For instance, Xue Mouhong, a former ambassador and vice president of the Society of Asian-African Studies, argues that the international system is led by one superpower (the US) and four other powers: EU, Japan, Russia, Japan, and China. Within Asia, the triangle of relationships involving the US, Japan and China is the deciding factor for peace and stability. 11

Fourth, Beijing applies nonproliferation norms selectively in order to strengthen China’s exports of nuclear materials and, thereby, improve China’s own nuclear and missile industries. This is evident in China’s continued nuclear assistance to Iran. The supply of nuclear and missile technology to countries in regions where China would have very little influence otherwise is part of this policy posture. China has especially been keen to use nuclear and missile supply as a leverage against the US. The expectation seems to be that the supply of these materials to Middle Eastern countries would increase Chinese influence at the cost of US policies in the region. China’s reluctance to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), despite promises to abide by its principles in 1992, was partially driven by the implications for commercial dealings with states such as Iran and Pakistan.

China and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

China’s involvement in nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been long-standing. As a military ally of Pakistan and an adversary of India, China has helped Islamabad to build its nuclear and missile capabilities. China has used this assistance to Pakistan as a way to balance India militarily and politically. By helping to continue the India-Pakistan rivalry, China has also sought to keep India as a regional power and not recognize it as a global power. Realpolitik considerations are behind these Chinese calculations. The rise of a new great power with nuclear weapons in Asia would adversely affect China’s pre-eminent status on the Asian continent. China has argued that its alliance with Pakistan has been in response to what it views as "Indian imperial tendencies to annex and develop territory, which Beijing deems too close to its own borders." 12 Therefore, China has offered the most strident opposition among all major powers on the question of recognizing India as a nuclear weapon state, even on a de facto basis.

According to Robert Ross, China continues its support for Pakistan by supplying nuclear and missile technology as "China views a credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power…. In this respect, China’s relationship with Pakistan is similar to America’s relationship with Israel. Washington and Beijing prefer that their respective smaller and vulnerable allies be able to deter attacks with nuclear threats rather than have to commit to their defense and risk complicating relations with other countries…" 13

The China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the 1970s during the tenure of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This cooperation reached its peak in the 1980s and early 1990s when Beijing assisted Pakistan in building its nuclear capabilities. The precise nature of the Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation is not fully known, but US intelligence sources have long contended that the Pakistani nuclear bomb project would not have come into being without the active support of China. This support included: a secret blueprint for a nuclear bomb in the early 1980s, highly enriched uranium, tritium, scientists and key components for a nuclear weapons production complex. As a report in the New York Times presented it: "Beginning 1990, Pakistan is believed to have built between 7 and 12 nuclear warheads–based on Chinese designs, assisted by Chinese scientists and Chinese technology. That technology included Chinese magnets for producing weapons grade enriched uranium, a furnace for shaping the uranium into a nuclear bomb core, and high-tech diagnostic equipment for nuclear weapons tests." 14 The relationship between the two countries "forced the U.S. to impose sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani companies several times- most recently in 1993 and 1996. However, former CIA officials now claim that to prevent a US-China bust-up, the Clinton Administration avoided heavier sanctions, especially after China supplied 34 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1992." 15 According to a Time Magazine report in 1997 the CIA has discovered that China has helped Pakistan to set up a factory to manufacture M-11 surface to surface missiles near Rawalpindi in addition to supplying 30 ready to launch M-11s that are stored at the Sargodha Air base near Lahore. These missiles with a warhead of 1,100 pounds and 185 mile range could be ideal for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and can be targeted on Indian cities closer to the Pakistani border. 16 The Clinton Administration generally ignored these intelligence reports, or, after raising a limited threat of sanctions, often backed down for the larger policy interest of continued engagement with China. 17 Even after Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, China is reported to have continued its assistance to Pakistan by helping to establish the 50 MW Khushab reactor which will produce weapon grade plutonium, "although such a help is in direct violation of article III of the NPT. 18

Sino-Pakistani collaboration was evident in the Pakistani delegation visiting China immediately after the Indian tests in May 1998 with the aim of gaining nuclear guarantees and politico-military backing. Although the precise nature of the Chinese support was not clear, it is believed that China was not opposed to Pakistan conducting nuclear tests in response to India’s. No open security guarantees were forthcoming from Beijing, and then Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests claiming that it needed an autonomous atomic capability to deter India.

Repercussions in India

The Sino-Pakistani military relationship, especially nuclear, has had its impact on India’s policy. To New Delhi, the Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan, even after Beijing has acceded to the NPT and had made commitments that it would abide by MTCR guidelines, showed that a nuclear weapon state can blatantly violate its commitments and get away with it. 19 Barring occasional US protests, the international community, especially those nations and NGOs that ardently support the NPT, have kept their silence even when they have stepped up their pressure on India to adhere to the Treaty and abandon its nuclear weapons acquisition. Although China has followed the policy to balance India, the Indian leaders have viewed the relationship as a deliberate containment strategy by China in order to deny India a leadership role in the regional and global order. The Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation has contributed to India’s decision to accelerate its program and conduct open nuclear tests in May 1998. The stridently nationalistic BJP government that conducted the tests argued that China formed the most powerful long-term threat to India. Prior to the tests, India’s Defense Minister, George Fernandes, called China India’s number one potential threat. This statement led to vociferous denunciations from Beijing and an intense debate in India, with left-leaning political parties and intellectuals accusing Fernandes of inventing the China threat. 20 These latter groups cite China’s drifting away from Pakistani foreign policy positions on Kashmir, Afghanistan and Islamic fundamentalism to counter the BJP’s claim. Following the May tests, Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, in a letter to the US President Clinton, justified India’s tests largely because of the 1962 War, China’s own nuclear weapons policy, and Beijing’s support for Pakistani nuclear weapons program. This justification irritated China further, leading to Beijing making strong statements on the need for rolling back the Indian nuclear program. Since then, China has continued its policy of strident opposition to the open nuclear tests by India and, as a result, the diplomatic relations between the two countries have remained somewhat frozen, although the US, France and Russia have engaged in negotiations with New Delhi, accepting the Indian nuclear deterrent as a fait accompli. 21

Indian analysts believe that China has been pursuing a strategy of simultaneous containment of, and engagement with, India. 22 And there seems some truth in their contention. The Chinese containment strategy involves alliance with Pakistan and gradual military buildup in the Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal region through establishing military bases in places such as Myanmar. 23 The Chinese policy of containing India through military buildup has been noted by Western analysts as well. Quoting Chinese sources, Iain Johnston has argued that the dominant Chinese motivation in arming Pakistan has been to "help divert Indian military resources away from China." 24 The engagement policy has involved reduction of tensions in the border region, a series of high profile visits, and periodic proclamations in official and unofficial statements about the traditional friendship between the two countries. Since 1988, joint working groups have been negotiating confidence building measures and ways to promote mutual cooperation. However, the engagement policy received a severe backlash with the Indian nuclear tests in 1998.

Following the tests, the foreign ministers of the permanent five declared nuclear powers met in Geneva and condemned the tests. The meeting was chaired by Chinese foreign minister, despite the fact that China had helped to build the Pakistani nuclear weapons capability. The resolution adopted at the meeting declared that "notwithstanding the recent nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon states in accordance with the NPT." 25 The Chinese position, according to Jonathan Pollack, is that China as a permanent member of the UN views itself as a "stakeholder" in the nuclear arms race and would "want to keep it to be a small club." 26 Since the tests, the US has begun serious negotiations with India and Pakistan. The several round of these talks have began to bear fruit to the extent that both India and Pakistan have softened their position on CTBT and have begun a process of political dialogue. China has been the most strident opponent of the negotiations and de facto recognition of India’s nuclear status. According to Chinese foreign policy officials, even discussing with India the maintenance of a minimum nuclear deterrent would violate UN Security Council Resolution 1172. According to them, the tests "have severely interrupted the ‘good momentum’ of global non-proliferation efforts since the Cold War, and concerted efforts by the major powers are essential to ‘halt the slide.’ 27 To Chinese officials, Vajpayee’s letter was intended to "drive a wedge between the U.S. and China" and an attempt by New Delhi to "align itself with the US as a potential ally against China and to confront it in the region." 28 However, since April 1999, China’s relations with India seem to have been on a mending course. The joint working groups met in Beijing in April 1999 at which Chinese Vice-premier, Qian Qichen told Indian Foreign Secretary K. Reghunath that the "world needs to be democratized… China and India can make important contributions in giving shape to a multi-polar system." This is the first time that China has mentioned India as a player in the global system. 29 Despite this, China still holds the position that both India and Pakistan observe UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on both countries to disarm.

China has criticized India’s policies in the sub-continent as "hegemonistic" and has demanded India abandon its nuclear program and join the NPT as a non-nuclear state. This Chinese position has few takers in India and it has indeed made any possibilities of a genuine Sino-Indian dialogue on this issue improbable. It was not too long ago that China criticized the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the NPT as instruments designed by the superpowers to maintain their hegemony. India now uses the same justification as China did earlier. China’s transformation as a supporter of the NPT occurred in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War. China also supported the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and was instrument in introducing a clause in the draft Treaty that all 44 countries with at least one nuclear reactor should sign the treaty to bring it into force. To India, this was a deliberate attempt by China to coerce it into accepting a Treaty even though such a clause violated the Vienna Convention on Treaties. 30

Sino-US Relations and Regional Dynamics

The contours of Sino-American relations have their implications for nuclear proliferation in South Asia. These implications highlight the consequences for regional security that flow from conflict or cooperation among great powers. The Clinton administration’s policy of "comprehensive engagement" with China has increased the Indian threat perceptions although it may have contributed to China’s acceptance of selected non-proliferation norms. In the early 1970s, the US-China rapprochement partially led to India strengthening its friendship with the USSR. The Clinton engagement policy has meant less US criticisms of Chinese nuclear transfers to Pakistan. In fact, despite the occasional threats of sanctions, the US has largely ignored the Chinese nuclear transfers to Pakistan as not so vital to its national security as to warrant stopping engagement or breaking relations with Beijing. Outwardly, the Clinton Administration officials insisted that China was abiding by the NPT and MTCR pledges, despite intelligence reports that suggested otherwise. Often a combination of geopolitical and commercial interests seemed to have guided US policy. As Ross contends: "Washington’s response to Chinese proliferation to Pakistan has been to apply relatively mild sanctions which have implicitly acknowledged China’s strategic imperative in Southern Asia but which also have the effect of establishing US commitment to resist proliferation to other regions. Washington has thus accommodated vital Chinese interests in Southern Asia, a region where its own interests are relatively minor, while achieving Chinese accommodation of American nonproliferation objectives in the Middle East, where the United States and not China has vital interests. This pattern is consistent with the realists understanding of strategic engagement." 31

More than the Chinese transfers to Pakistan, the larger systemic factors need to be addressed in order to understand the Indian position on nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War, India has perceived a dramatic shift in the balance of power. Since 1991, India has lost it alliance relationship with the Soviet Union and has found decreased value in non-alignment as a foreign policy framework. From the perspective of the BJP government, India’s national security has been severely affected by these systemic changes. Nuclear capabilities are essential to pursuing an independent foreign policy as well as to gaining strength in the face of a perceived deterioration in the security environment. 32 The US-Chinese engagement and the Clinton administration’s policies of strategic partnership with China seemed to have accentuated the Indian sense of insecurity.

A critical dimension of the US-China relationship is its underlying competitive nature despite the ongoing engagement. 33 China has been building its nuclear strength at an unprecedented pace in the face of the US offer of theater missile defense systems (TMD) to Taiwan and Japan. To China, such defensive systems would embolden Taiwan to opt for independence and Japan to become militaristic. Although the Japanese interest in TMD began with the test firing of North Korea’s Rodong-I missile in 1994, the Chinese coercive diplomacy against Taiwan in March 1996 contributed to this interest. In the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, "the development and research of TMD… exerts a negative impact on the global and regional strategic balance and stability into the next century, so China is very much concerned about it." He also warned that, if Taiwan is included under the TMD shield, that would "amount to an encroachment in China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity." 34

Other issues have cropped up in 1999 undermining the Sino-American relations. According to US intelligence reports, China has acquired technology for miniaturization of nuclear weapons from the Los Alamos Laboratory in the 1980s. 35 China has reportedly acquired the design of the US W-88, which is deployed on submarines and multiple warheads and ""packs more than 30 times the destructive power than the ‘Little Boy’ bomb that hit Hiroshima at the end of WW II." 36 This, again, has implications for proliferation in South Asia. Any improvement in the Chinese nuclear capability would put pressure on India, as the difference between the two countries would increase in the passage of time. Moreover, China has focused enormous attention to developing tactical and short-range missiles, weapons that are more useful in the Asian regional context than against the US mainland.

China’s nuclear modernization program has ramifications for the US as well as Asian states, including India and Japan. Of the estimated 300 nuclear weapons, China possesses less than 20 ICBMs capable of hitting targets in the US. All the other weapons are short or medium range systems intended for targets in Asia. In addition to Taiwan and Japan, the possible targets would logically include Indian cities. 37 Although China has an official no-first use policy, the heavy reliance on tactical weapons challenges that policy, since these weapons are known to be battlefield weapons ready to be used in a conflict situation.


China is a cause of, and a contributor to, nuclear proliferation in South Asia. China also holds some keys to limiting the extent and scope of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Chinese policy towards South Asia is driven by realpolitik considerations. Iain Johnston has argued that "hyper-sovereignty values are still a central driver of Chinese foreign policy. A realpolitik strategic culture still colors the world views of many of China’s senior security policy makers, a world in which military force is a potentially useful tool, among others for the pursuit of traditional power and prestige maximizing national interests in a competitive and relatively dangerous world…. It is still not clear that China’s decision makers fully understand the concept of the security dilemma where a defensive action taken by one status quo actor is interpreted as threatening by another, and a second actor takes counter-measures, leading to spiraling arms races and security dilemma." 38 The realpolitik approach also views international politics as an "intensely competitive struggle to acquire relative gains, a struggle in which military and economic power are crucial determinants." 39

China’s nuclear and conventional modernization creates security dilemma problems for India, and India’s counteractions create security dilemma problems for Pakistan. Even though China may be modernizing its nuclear and conventional capabilities to counter the US, it directly and indirectly generates insecurity in South Asia. The systemic interconnectedness factor is critical here to understand the multiple layers of security dilemmas experienced by Asian states. The US policies towards China also influence South Asia. US-China engagement causes concern for India as does US-China estrangement. Policymakers and scholars often overlook these sub-systemic effects of major power relations.

Chinese policies in South Asia have helped to undermine the effectiveness of NPT and have decreased the possibilities of India and Pakistan joining the regime as non-nuclear weapon states. China’s nuclear transfer to Pakistan violated Beijing’s obligations under the NPT. The NPT explicitly prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons materials by NWS to NNWS. Yet, the international community generally condones this policy as acceptable behavior by a great power. This has weakened the legitimacy of the NPT and has made the adherence of India to the Treaty virtually impossible. The contradictions in Chinese nuclear nonproliferation policy seem to have hurt the regime in the short and long run. These contradictions are unlikely to end anytime soon, given the balance of power games that China, India and Pakistan are playing in South Asia and China and the US in East Asia.


Note 1: According to these schools, "norms" are central to explaining state behavior. For the various perspectives, see Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983.; Peter Katzenstein ed. The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.Back.

Note 2: John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988:72.Back.

Note 3: Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990:151-57Back.

Note 4: Ibid., 121Back.

Note 5: Scholars of China have noticed the gradual progression of China in the 1980s as both a "system-maintaining" and "system-exploiting" great power as it began to ask "more and more what international organizations could do for China, and less and less what China itself could do to reform or transform the existing world order.…" The change in China’s position on international organizations coincided with "the dramatic rise of China’s international standing in the hegemonic world order and its sui generis status as a ‘poor global power’ can be explained by the change in China’s national role conception from a revolutionary system-transforming actor to a neo-realist system-maintaining status quo actor." Samuel S. Kim, "China’s International Organizational Behavior," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994:401-34. On China’s changing attitudes towards nuclear proliferation, see Weixing Hu, "Nuclear Nonproliferation," in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon, Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield, 1999:119-140.Back.

Note 6: Eric A. McVadon, "Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula," in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh eds., China’s Military Faces the Future, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999 Pp.273-76.Back.

Note 7: TSamuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," Current History September, 1997:246-51. "Within this limited framework, however, there is a potential basis for increased cooperation emerging from association with a group where values, norms, and institutionalized behavior provide intangible rewards of status or punishment of censure." Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," in Kim ed. China and the World, 297, pp.287-308.Back.

Note 8: Alastair Iain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim ed., China and the World, 4th edn, Boulder: Co, Westview Press, 1998:73 (pp.55-87)Back.

Note 9: Gerald Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations, Houndsmills, UK: Macmillan, 199:78. Although ideology has retained "identity defining dimension" of China’s foreign policy behavior, it has become "increasingly transformed into a set of abstract principles and behavioral norms used to criticize the conduct of other states." Steven I. Levine, "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 1994:39. Pp. 30-46. Back.

Note 10: Paul H. Goodwin, "Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-First Century," in Kim ed. China and the World, p.171, 171-92. China has been fairly successful in enhancing its major power status since the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 as evident in the Clinton administration bestowing on it the chairmanship of the P-5 foreign ministers meeting at Geneva in June 1998 to condemn the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.Back.

Note 11: Quoted in Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations, 110-11.Back.

Note 12: William T. Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," in Robinson and Shanbaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy, 152, pp.115-57.Back.

Note 13: Robert S. Ross, "Engagement in U.S. China Policy," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross eds. Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, London and New York: Routledge, 1999:p. 193. Pp.176-206.Back.

Note 14: Tim Weiner, "U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build the Bomb," The New York Times, June 1, 1998:A6.Back.

Note 15: Ahmed Rashid, "Comrades-in Arms," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1998:13.Back.

Note 16: Douglas Waller, "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, 149(26), June 30, 1997.Back.

Note 17: Mel Gurttov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military, Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1998:219.Back.

Note 18: K. Subrhamanyam, "Eight Months after the Nuclear Tests," Paper Presented at McGill University, 16 February 1999.Back.

Note 19: Article I of the NPT explicitly prohibits such transfers. It states: "Each nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or control over such weapons or explosive devices." Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Appendix IV, William Epstein, The Last Chance, New York: The Free Press, 1976:317.Back.

Note 20: On the debate that Fernandes’ statement caused, see India Today International May 18, 1998:10-13.Back.

Note 21: C. Raja Mohan, "Ending the Sino-Indian Drift," The Hindu, January 27, 1999:14.Back.

Note 22: Indian strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam has argued that the Chinese threat to India is indirect. China’s emergence as a superpower is bound to affect India’s security. "If China can transfer nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan and thereby countervail India, there is no need for China to pose a threat to India. China can continue to be friendly with India but at the same time lock India in a nuclear standoff with Pakistan. It can also treat both Pakistan and India in the same category as regional powers, not in the same class as China, which is a global player." K. Subrahmanyam, "Understanding China: Sun Tzu and Shakti," The Times of India, 5 June 1998:7.Back.

Note 23: "China has developed a commercial and military presence in Myanmar (Burma) through Hunnan and also has a military presence in the Coco and Hyunghai Islands, which give China military platform in the Bay of Bengal. China has established a long-range, low frequency facility in the Coco Islands," to use for submarine activities and also to monitor Indian missile tests. " Ashok Kapur, "China and Proliferation: Implications for India," China Report, 34(3-4), 1998:401-17, 402-03.Back.

Note 24: Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Kim ed., China and the World, p.63, pp.55-87.Back.

Note 25: Associated Press, June 4, 1998.Back.

Note 26: Quoted in Rone Tempest, "Dangerous Dynamic Between China and India," June 13? Or 12 1998:P?Back.

Note 27: "China Opposes Minimum N-deterrence for India," The Hindu, January 28, 1999:14.Back.

Note 28: Aziz Haniffa, "China Prevents P-5 from Softening Stand on N-tests," India Abroad, January 1, 1999:9.Back.

Note 29: The Times of India, 28 April 1999:1. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran visited Beijing in June 1999 and February 2000 increasing the tempo of interactions between the two countries.Back.

Note 30: Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," Foreign Affairs, 77(5), September-October 1998:46.Back.

Note 31: Ross, "Engagement.. p.193.Back.

Note 32: For these considerations, see T.V. Paul, "The Systemic Bases of India’s Opposition to the World Nuclear Order," Non-Proliferation Review, 6(1) Fall 1998:1-11.Back.

Note 33: On the US engagement policy, see James Shinh ed,, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996.Back.

Note 34: CNN News, March 18, 1999 (

Note 35: A US House of Representative report entitled the Cox Report has outlined the extent of Chinese procurement of sensitive American technology during the last two decades. This report and further revelations about the Taiwanese-born employee of the Los Alamos National Laboratory have caused uproar in the US Congress and the media. Shawn W. Crispin, "Drifting Apart," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 14, 1999:14-15.Back.

Note 36: CNNfn, March 8, 1999 Back.

Note 37: "China is currently developing two long-range ballistic missiles, the East Wind 31 and 41, with ranges of 8,000 and 12,000 kilometers, respectively. In addition, it is developing a nuclear submarine to carry its JL-2 ballistic missile." These missiles would allow China to target US cities from the coast of China Nigel Holloway, "Touchy Issue: China Gets Defensive on Missile Reductions," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 23, 1997:29. On China’s nuclear modernization program and the current status with respect to short and medium range missiles, see, David E. Sanger and Erik Eckholm, "Will Beijing’s Nuclear Arsenal Stay Small or Will it Mushroom?," The New York Times on the Web, March 15, 1999. This report includes Indian cities as possible targets of Chinese medium range missiles.Back.

Note 38: Alastair Iain Johnston, "China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," The China Quarterly, No.153, March 1998:1-30, p. 2-3.Back.

Note 39: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China Quarterly, 126, June 1996:548-76, 549.Back.