From the CIAO Atlas Map of Africa 

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South African Economic Diplomacy in the Age of Globalisation

Marie Muller

Department of Political Sciences & Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa

International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA
March 14-18, 2000


Diplomacy may be defined as the implementation of foreign policy through peaceful means and employing official representatives at various levels . The literature on foreign policy commonly distinguishes between the political instrument (diplomacy), the economic instrument/s (including a variety of positive and negative economic techniques), the military instrument (the use of force or the threat thereof, including deterrence) and the psychological instrument (propaganda, which also employs a variety of techniques). 1 However it is also commonly accepted that these instruments are not only closely related and intertwined, but that diplomacy (the political instrument) is invariably employed in the course of the use of the economic, military and psychological instruments. The reverse is also often true. Put differently, diplomacy could also be described as ‘a peaceful political process between nation-states that seeks to structure, shape, and manage over time a system of international relationships to secure a nation’s interests.’ 2 As such it is utilised in ‘the pursuit of many kinds of objectives &-; political, economic, national, trade, aid, human rights, arms control, scientific, cultural, and academic enrichment’, but it is in essence ‘a peacebuilding and peacemaking activity’. 3

Globalisation is a multidimensional and complex process of which the origins are contested and the impact is uneven. 4 As a result, definitions abound. One source describes it as a process whereby state-centric agencies and terms of reference are dissolved in favour of a structure of relations between different actors operating in a context which is truly global rather than merely international. 5 What is of importance for purposes of this paper, is to note at least the following four dimensions of globalisation and the fact that these offer both opportunities and present risks: integration through flows of trade; investment capital and skills; knowledge; and implications of the evolving institutions of global commerce. 6 Seen as such, there is by definition a very close relationship between globalisation and economic diplomacy, but the exact nature of that relationship in a specific case, such as that of South Africa, is not self-evident and warrants exploration.

This paper focuses on the use of diplomacy in the deployment of the economic instrument. More specifically it focuses on the role of the South African Foreign Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in one specific aspect of economic diplomacy, namely export promotion . The paper does not deal with issues of economic policy in any detail. The latter is only relevant in providing the very broad framework within which economic diplomacy in general and export promotion in particular, are conducted. The paper is primarily concerned with determining the role of the DFA in this regard and this is viewed in the broader context of South African diplomacy in general (including the sum total of the DFA’s functions) as well as in the context of other government agencies involved in export promotion. The emphasis is on post-1994 diplomacy, but some reference is made to the earlier period as well. South African economic diplomacy is also placed in the context of developments of modern diplomacy in the age of globalisation.

South African diplomacy: change and continuity

With the political transition in South Africa, heralded by FW de Klerk’s historical speech of February 1990, followed by the first inclusive democratic elections in the first part of 1994 and symbolised by the inauguration of President Mandela shortly thereafter, South African foreign policy changed. Olivier and Geldenhuys described the evolution of South African foreign policy as follows:

For symbolic and political reasons, the South African foreign policy continuum, which existed since autonomy from British rule, had to come to an end with the accession of the new ANC-dominated Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1994. The old regime’s foreign policy and culture had to make way for political legitimacy defined by the ANC’s vastly different political philosophy, external experience, constituency, and priorities. 7

For a number of years commentators complained that the new South Africa was incoherent and even contradictory in its foreign policy and that much more prioritisation was needed. 8 During January 1999 a 10-day conference of South African heads of mission from more than 90 countries and other senior DFA personnel were called together to redefine the core business of the department and reprioritise its focus areas ‘with the aim of realising government’s domestic priorities’. 9 The new Director General (Jackie Selebi – see below) stressed that ‘domestic policy had to be translated into foreign policy’ 10 and that a clear vision of South African foreign policy would emerge from the conference. 11 After the conference, a day-long (29 January) debriefing session for representatives from civil society was arranged to explain the processes of transformation and reprioritisation that would take place on the basis of the work done, inter alia , during the heads of mission conference. 12 During this session it was revealed that the creation of wealth and security for South Africa had been defined as, in summary, the over-aching goal of the DFA. A number of themes were identified in pursuit of both the creation of wealth and security. The themes relevant to the creation of wealth were globalisation; international organisations; arts, culture, sports and tourism; science and technology; environment and marine; trade and investment; and, finance and development. Those relevant to security were identified as: legal issues; crime; migration; conflict resolution and disarmament; and, human rights. For each of the themes mentioned, specific goals, strategies and actions to be undertaken were set out in a Thematic Review document drafted by the DFA.

On 4 February 2000 President Thabo Mbeki in his State of the Nation Address before the National Assembly summarised South African involvement in global affairs in the following way: 13

As much as the rest of the world stood with us as we fought to end the system of apartheid, which struggle brought about the announcements that were made by the apartheid parliament ten years ago, so do we have an obligation ourselves to contribute to the construction of a better world for all humanity.

We should aim to make a meaningful contribution in this regard because with regard to all the important objectives we have to pursue, at no point during our entire history have we ever been as well placed as we are to meet the challenges that confront us.

From this we cannot walk away.

Also in February 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Zuma, emphasised South Africa’s responsibilities towards ‘the international community in general and Africa in particular’ and summarised the country’s programme for Africa thus: 14

In spite of the great changes in South African foreign policy since 1994, the country’s diplomacy did manifest some continuity as well. South Africa’s bilateral relations and the DFA itself, post-1994, will be discussed in terms of both change and continuity. Subsequently, the more distinguishing features of South Africa’s (general) diplomacy since 1994 will be noted: summitry and multilateralism. 15

Change and continuity in bilateral relations

After 1990 the reintegration of South Africa into international society transformed it from the most isolated state in modern times 16 and a true pariah, into a fully integrated participant. By mid-1995 South Africa had formal ties with most countries in the world, have extended many existing ties and established many new ones. During this early phase (1990-94) of the ‘new South African diplomacy’ it was, therefore, more a question of adding than changing. 17 Even during the subsequent phase (immediately after 1994), the new Government did not bring about changes in a zero-sum fashion. 18 Relations with the West were not downgraded - in fact, in some ways these relations were raised to ‘a higher plateau than previously’. 19 At the same time, new ties were forged, including the cementing of relations with countries formerly known for their animosity toward Pretoria and including some so-called pariah states. Most African states (including the ‘pariah’ Libya), India, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Mexico and Cuba, were examples of the new additions. 20 This ‘universal foreign policy’ drove a vast extension of South African diplomatic communications (permanent and ad hoc). However, resource and other constraints (such as the lack of sufficiently trained and experienced personnel) and special circumstances in individual cases, resulted in some difficulties. In addition, relations with the ‘pariahs’ put a strain on South Africa’s relations with the United States (US), necessitating some diplomatic manoeuvring. 21

During October 1997, when US state department officials protested against President Mandela’s visit to Libya, Mandela made no secret of his fury. He went ahead with the trip and lashed out at the US saying that it would be immoral not to acknowledge the role that countries like Libya had played in the struggle against apartheid, and accusing the US of arrogance in ‘dictating’ to South Africa where ‘we should go and who our friends should be’. 22 Both during and after the historic visit of US president Bill Clinton to South Africa in March 1998, the complex relationship between South Africa and the one remaining superpower – and major trading partner of South Africa - and by extension with the ‘West’, and with the American defined ‘pariahs’ came in for renewed scrutiny. One pole of public opinion in South Africa berated the South African government for maintaining good relations with countries such as Cuba, Iraq, Iran and Libya, and in so doing embarrassing the country in the presence of its important guest, whilst another defended the Government’s position saying that it was precisely this ‘principled consistency’ that earned the respect of the world, including the US. 23 It was argued that ‘there are different views on what was meant by human rights’ and that there was ‘no international consensus that in Cuba, Iran, Iraq and Libya the rights of the people of those countries (we)re being systematically violated’. 24 It was further argued that these countries had contributed enormously ‘to the freedom of other peoples, including that of South Africans’ and that the ANC proved, through its relations with these countries, that it based its international relations ‘not on political expediency but on principles’. 25 In terms of this argument ‘political expediency’ would refer to ‘pleasing big countries’. Increasingly, it seems, the point was being made by those supporting the policies of the government, that ‘any relations with the West must help to develop the African Renaissance by enhancing the continent’s autonomy’. 26 It was further argued that ‘an African renaissance (wa)s first and foremost in the interest of Africa by enhancing the continent’s capacity to determine its own fate as an autonomous regional bloc in the global arena, which (wa)s very much in Pretoria’s geopolitical and economic interest’. 27 It was then argued that though there was support for the African Renaissance at the level of government and the private sector in the US, there was no complete identity of interest between Pretoria and Washington. Support for the Renaissance should rather be sought with South Africa’s constituency in the US, in other words with that section of the American public that contributed to South Africa’s liberation and would like to see sustained and equitable economic development in South Africa. A sub-constituency was the African-American, which should be reactivated along with the rest of the constituency by means of ‘a public education campaign’. 28 Such a campaign would, inter alia, highlight ‘how US protectionism present(ed) an obstacle to fulfilling the renewal agenda of South and Southern Africa and the continent at large’. 29

As tensions mounted between the US and Iraq about the latter’s stand-off with the United Nations about weapons inspections, South Africa, together with Russia, China and France, called for diplomacy. 30 When the worst of the tensions subsided, it was announced that the government was entering into talks around formal diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 31 Post-1990 South African diplomacy was now firmly into its third phase where the Acting Director General had manifestly different views from that of her predecessor. It was argued that the Middle East was South Africa’s fastest growing trade partner, but commentators also suspected this to be a move aimed at bolstering South Africa’s international standing ahead of the NAM meeting in Durban later in 1998. 32 Later in the year it was announced that South Africa would be establishing diplomatic relations with five NAM countries, including Iraq and North Korea, before hosting the NAM Summit in Durban in late August/early September 1998. 33 It was explained that South Africa would not feel comfortable hosting countries at the Summit with which it did not have formal ties and that it was recognising states, not governments. 34 While some welcomed the news, others objected and argued that in the case of Iraq this was contrary to United Nations (UN) sanctions and that the leader of that country was a human rights violator. 35 It was also argued that it simply did not make sense to close down missions in countries with whom South Africa had lucrative trade relations and who invested substantially in South Africa, ‘while opening missions in countries where the aforesaid is virtually non-existent’ and that this would damage relations with the US and in the case of North Korea, with South Korea as well. 36

As the debate was going on, deputy president Thabo Mbeki left for Washington to attend a meeting of the Bi-national Commission between South Africa and the US. 37 Also known as the “Gore-Mbeki” Commission, this innovative form of diplomacy contributed to a continued expansion of policy-related exchanges between the two countries and, presumably, to some insurance against a substantial worsening of political relations between the two countries. On the face of it at least, sound relations between South Africa and the US continued despite some real differences in foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the US defined pariahs. In February 1998, Mr Mbeki’s office announced that it was ‘a matter of time’ before the US would lift its arms trade embargo against South Africa and that it was ‘just a matter of an administrative act on the part of the US’ to lift the debarment that was still in place against companies in South Africa. 38

The much debated and analysed love/hate triangle between South Africa, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China/Taiwan, is another interesting foreign policy and diplomatic case study. 39 It took the new South African government quite some time to finally make a decision on the issue: prior to the political change in South African diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level had been maintained with Taiwan and this was retained after 1994. In the meantime a ‘special type’ of diplomatic representation was exchanged with the PRC. At the end of 1996 the decision was finally made to opt for full diplomatic relations with the latter and to downscale relations with Taiwan. At the end of 1997 this came into effect and the special type of representation was put in place for Taiwan. 40 This decision was very much based on economic considerations relating to the sheer size of the PRC market (1,2 billion people). Trade ties with Taiwan could be continued under the new arrangement. By the end of 1999 it was reported that RRC investment projects (involving the manufacture of such items as television sets, washing machines, refrigerators, garments, and creating jobs in a number of locations in South Africa) had increased from forty-one in 1997 to ninety. 41 It was also reported that the value of South African exports to the PRC had grown from about R84 million in 1991 to almost R10 billion in 1998. This consisted mainly of iron ore, copper, chrome, timber and paper pulp. 42

In early 1999 it was made clear that a thematic review – see the discussion above - would in future determine the priority given to relations with specific regions, countries and organisations: political relations would be developed with ‘like minded countries and organisations’. This could, of course, impact on the deployment of overseas missions and choices made in other aspects of South African diplomacy. It still remains to be seen what exactly this will mean for South African bilateral relations and also if the successor of Jackie Selebi, Sipho Pityana – see below - will continue at all along the lines of the thematic review.

Change and continuity in the DFA

Immediately after 1990, some changes began to occur in the Department, one of which was the ‘upgrading’ of multilateral affairs from a directorate to a chief directorate (1991). However, it was still housed within the Branch: Overseas Countries and the range of issues reflected in its structure was not yet as extensive as it is today. 43 By March 1992 there was a complete Multilateral Affairs division, separate from the Branch: Overseas Countries and gradually the range of issues provided for were being extended. 44 Other changes were also being effected to provide for new ties being forged: Eastern Europe, which had previously been conspicuously absent from the organisational chart of the DFA, appeared early on and the Africa Branch had shown considerable growth. 45 Other more subtle changes were that a greater awareness of the different countries in, for example, Asia was manifest from the structuring of the section responsible for relations with that part of the world, and the fact that, at that time, the Middle East was apparently increasingly seen as part of Africa. 46

After the political transition of 1994, the political map of South Africa changed and the TBVC ‘states’ were ‘reincorporated’ into South Africa and ‘disappeared’ from the organisational chart of the DFA. The way in which the various sections of the Department were listed, also seemed to suggest a shift in emphasis: Branch: Africa was listed before Branch: Overseas Countries , the Multilateral section was listed before any bilateral sections and within branches where multilateral sections were also included, the latter were listed before the bilateral component. 47 Multilateral relations remained a growth area for some time and the relevant section of the DFA was further expanded and diversified. 48 By early 1996 the Multilateral Branch, taken together with the division of Branch: Africa and the Middle East which concerned itself with multilateral relations, almost balanced those sections of the DFA burdened with bilateral relations. 49 By mid-1998 the multilateral sections outweighed the bilateral. 50

Reference has already been made to the fact that the new Government did not follow a ‘zero-sum’ foreign policy, but rather a ‘universal’ one. This implied that ties with Western countries were not downgraded at the expense of the forging of new ties with countries which had distanced themselves entirely from the old South African regime – at least not initially. This approach was reflected in the fact that, by 1997, ample provision was still made at head office for relations with North America and (Western) Europe, in spite of all the new additions, such as for Africa, Asia and the Far East. 51 However, by mid-1998 the sections dealing with Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Russia and other former republics within the USSR, the Central Asian States, and Central and Eastern Europe, did outweigh by far those dedicated to North America and (Western) Europe. 52 This change underscores the distinction between the 1994-97 and the 1997 to mid-1998 phase in the transformation of South African diplomacy.

Towards the end of 1997 an organisational chart of the DFA listed five Branches ( Bilateral Relations (Africa) ; Bilateral relations (Americas & Europe) ; Bilateral Relations (Asia & Middle East) ; Multilateral Relations ; Administration. Also listed were two Chief Directorates (Legal Affairs and Corporate Liaison) and a Sub-Directorate (Work Study) independent of the branches. 53 Effective from 1 December 1997, a Democratic Transformation section was also added. 54

The breakdown of these divisions, when looked at in detail, illustrated the extension of South Africa’s foreign relations to include all regions of the world, many functional aspects and a great intensity of interaction. 55 However, this was not a static picture. Budgetary problems would prevent too much further extension, and could even cause shrinkage in some areas. The organisational chart of the Department was, as in the past, continuously changing in its detail. A prime example of this was the change which was effected in the Multilateral Branch in January 1998 and which entailed the scrapping of the NAM Sub-directorate as a subsection of the Directorate: ASAS, NAM and the Commonwealth - which in turn had formed part of the Chief Directorate: Multilateral Political and Security Affairs - and replacing it with a separate Chief-Directorate of Branch: Multilateral Relations . 56 This was due to the capacity required in South Africa to organise the NAM Summit in 1998 and also to support the Chairmanship of the Movement thereafter.

By mid-1998 the DFA consisted of four Branches (Africa; Asia and the Middle East; Europe and the Americas; Multilateral Affairs), a Chief Directorate: Legal Affairs , and Directorates for Ministerial and Departmental Media Liaison; Protocol; and, Protocol Administration and Diplomatic Liaison. 57 The internal composition of these main divisions had also changed further. The Chief Directorate: Non-Aligned Movement was by now greatly extended to deal with the August/September 1998 NAM Summit and subsequent tasks emanating from the South African Chairmanship. 58

By November 1998 the Foreign Affairs List reflected little change to the overall structure of the department. However, the Chief Directorate: Non-Aligned Movement had apparently been ‘reabsorbed’ elsewhere and the Branch: Multilateral Affairs consisted of five chief directorates: Multilateral Development and Economic Affairs; Environment, Marine, Scientific and Technical Affairs; Disarmament and Non-proliferation; Multilateral Political and Global Security Affairs; Social Affairs.

At the conference of heads of mission held in January 1999, it was also stated that fundamental transformation of the DFA was envisaged 59 and Transformation and Thematic Reviews: Strategic Planning documents were drawn up as part of the strategic planning for this. In the latter it was foreseen that the various desks of the Department would be reorganised and strengthened ‘to enable them to effectively implement the policies identified in the Thematic Review’. Whether this implies a complete reorganisation of the DFA according to the foreign policy themes listed above, still remains to be seen. According to the official Department of Foreign Affairs List of June 1999, SADC and OAU matters (as well as matters relating to other African regional groupings) were provided for, not in the Multilateral Branch, but in Branch Africa. However, this configuration does not correspond exactly with that given on the DFA website by November 1999 and it is therefore difficult to know whether the ‘foreign policy themes’ plan has been implemented as yet. 60 According to the DFA website the Department consisted of the following main sections:

Branch: Bilateral Relations: Africa, consisting of four chief directorates:

Chief Directorate: Southern Africa, consisting of three directorates:
Chief Directorate: Equatorial Africa and (non-SADC) Indian Ocean, consisting of two directorates:
Chief Directorate: North Africa and Regional Issues, consisting of three directorates:
Chief Directorate: Regional Development , consisting of three directorates:

Branch: Bilateral Relations: Americas and Europe, consisting of two chief directorates:

Chief Directorate: Americas, consisting of three directorates:
Chief Directorate: Europe, consisting of three directorates:

Branch: Bilateral Relations: Asia and the Middle East , consisting of two chief directorates:

Chief Directorate: Asia , consisting of three directorates:
Chief Directorate: Middle East , consisting of two directorates:

Branch: Multilateral Relations , consisting of five chief directorates and a directorate:

Chief Directorate: Multilateral Development and Economic Affairs , consisting of two directorates:
Chief Directorate: Environmental and Technical Affairs , consisting of two directorates:
Chief Directorate: Multilateral, Political and Security Affairs , consisting of two directorates:
Chief Directorate: Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, consisting of two directorates:
Chief Directorate: Social Affairs , consisting of two directorates:
Directorate resorting directly under the Deputy Director-General Multilateral Relations: Culture, Sport and Communications

Branch: Administration , consisting of three chief directorates, each consisting of a number of directorates, as well as a directorate:

Chief Directorate: Human Resources
Chief Directorate: Foreign Service Management
Chief Directorate: Financial and Logistical Administration
Directorate resorting directly under the Deputy Director Administration

Chief Directorates resorting directly under the Director-General :

Chief Directorate: Legal Affairs
Chief Directorate: Corporate Liaison

Directorates resorting directly under the Director-General:

Directorate: Democratic Transformation
Directorate: Operation Centre

After 1994 the DFA’s capacity to handle the many and varied challenges resulting from the extension of the country’s relations with the external world, had been sorely taxed. The Department had to deal with the challenges of the process of integration of six different ‘diplomatic services’ - those of South Africa, the four TBVC ‘states’, and the ANC’s ‘foreign service’ - all of which came with different levels of training and experience and, of course, with often divergent perceptions of the world and the role South Africa should play in it. 61 All of this had to be dealt with at the same time as the DFA was subject to very serious budgetary constraints due to the great need for funds to get the Reconstruction and Development Programme and other domestic policies off the ground. The DFA was also subject to constant criticism and often in the news due to rumours and accusations about appointments, the ineffectiveness of the Minister and his possible replacement, and the stepping down of and successor for the Director-General, Mr Rusty Evans - who had stayed on after 1994. 62 After months of speculation about when Evans would vacate his post, where he would go and who would succeed him, the Director General finally retired towards the end of 1997 and he was temporarily replaced by one of the Deputy Directors General in the DFA, Ms Thuthu Mazibuko. 63 Rumours persisted as to who would be permanently appointed. In May 1998 Mr Jackie Selebi, Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, was appointed as Director General of Foreign Affairs and he took up the position in June 1998. 64 The choice seemed to have been a popular one, both inside and outside the Department. The press commented favourably, describing Selebi as a robust, confident and unconventional diplomat. 65 Soon after assuming the position, he promised to lead South Africa into a ‘new, high-profile era of international leadership where the country would occupy the place it deserved’. 66 He spoke about ‘punching above our weight category because we are trying to make up for lost time’ and undertook to make South Africa’s foreign policy ‘predictable’. 67 It was felt that Selebi would bring to the Department a much needed ‘genuine understanding’ of multilateral dealings. 68 He also pledged his efforts to ‘transforming the department’. 69 Evans had declared at the end of 1997 that he was leaving behind a department which had already reached the affirmative action goals it had set itself for 1999. 70 According to him the situation in the Department in September 1997 was the following: the total staff complement of the Department consisted of 1774 members of which 940 were white, 712 black, 69 coloured and 53 of Indian descent. 71 Non-whites therefore comprised 47% of the Department. Of the 147 appointments made since 1994, 90 were black, 26 Indian, 20 white and 11 coloured. Since 1994 more than 70 new heads of mission were appointed at 97 overseas missions, of which 70 were non-white. 72 According to some foreign affairs officials the transformation had not gone smoothly and they had insisted that ‘the cracks will only start showing when Evans leaves’. 73 The new Director General clearly had his work cut out for him, both inside and outside the Department. His response to the challenge was to set in motion a fundamental transformation process that involved a ‘reconstruction’ of the way the Department functioned. This was set out in the Transformation Document mentioned above, and would include the ‘empowerment’ of each and every DFA employee to deliver at the highest level of efficiency and effectiveness. The process would be a continuous one and would be aided by an ongoing process of consultation with civil society. The transformation process would also include changes to conform to employment and labour legislation (including the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998; and implementation of a performance management system) as well as the restructuring of senior management echelons. It was expected that the practical implications of these transformation goals would become clearer in due course. 74 Though not the first time women had been appointed to senior positions in the diplomatic service of South Africa, 75 the appointment in January 1999 of women in the top four postings abroad (Washington, London, Paris and Bonn), seemed to underline just how serious the Department now was about affirmative action. 76

Selebi’s ‘reign’ was, however, destined to be fairly short-lived and did not really give him adequate opportunity to effect all the changes he had planned. 77 At the end of 1999 he was replaced by the youthful Sipho Pityana, former Director General of Labour. The forty year old’s surprise appointment to the DFA was reported to be part of a ‘broad strategy of (President) Mbeki’s to bring management skills and accelerated change to key government departments’. 78 He was described as ‘part of a group of bright, well-educated younger men and women whose commitment to the ideals of the African National Congress (ANC) has, over the past five years been deployed to make the Albatross fly again’. 79 He was contrasted with his predecessor as having ‘run a big department whereas Selebi had only headed a foreign mission’. 80 He was described as a hard taskmaster who believed that foreign affairs had ‘suffered from drift’: 81

In foreign affairs, observers note, the policies driven by Mbeki and Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma are in place. What is lagging is the organization’s ability to always respond effectively, translating the theory into practical foreign relations activities supportive of the continent’s renewal and SA’s developmental goals.

Selebi was moved to the National Police Force and immediately became embroiled in controversy. 82 Time will have to tell whether moving Pityana into the DFA will be more successful than moving Selebi into the police force.

South Africa’s overseas missions grew quite spectacularly after 1990: in 1990 South Africa had representation in only thirty states and by 1997 this had grown to 160 states. 83 This meant ninety-six missions, including a mission accredited to the Palestine National Authority and located at Ramallah on the West Bank, and five multilateral missions: New York (United Nations), Geneva (United Nations), Addis Ababa (OAU), Brussels (European Communities, including the European Union) and Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency). 84 The ninety bilateral missions were made up of twenty-four in Africa, 85 forty-five in America and Europe, 86 and twenty-one in Asia and the Middle East. 87 Many of these bilateral missions were actually accredited to more than one country, which accounted, at the height of the extension of its overseas service, for the 160 countries South Africa was represented in. 88 This was in very many cases a cost saving practice and certainly not uncommon. The result was that, by 1997, South Africa was able to establish representation (including diplomatic and consular representation) in all but twenty-two states in the world, a number that included some very small states and ‘none of major significance to SA, except Iraq’. 89 This number also included some potential trouble spots, such as North Korea and Haiti, several Pacific island states, three African countries (Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone), and some central American states, including El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. 90

By 1997, South African representation abroad was a good illustration of the country’s ‘universal foreign policy’ though it was clear that, at least at that point in time, economic pragmatism weighed heavily in the allocation of missions abroad. According to the DFA, the expansion process began slowing after 1995 and by 1997, was all but over. 91 There was no doubt that financial considerations played an important role in this, though it was not necessarily the only consideration. South Africa was already facing some new dilemmas, including the problem that there was not full reciprocity in the country’s foreign representation. There was a number of countries maintaining a presence in South Africa despite the fact that South Africa had no representation in those countries, and there was also not full reciprocity as to the status of representation. 92 In addition there was great disparity in residential and non-residential representation. 93 Of course, reciprocity is not an absolute rule in diplomacy, but too great a disparity could well be cause for growing irritation in the long run.

In early 1997 it was reported in the press that due to budgetary pressures South Africa was keen to discuss sharing resources with other SADC countries, possibly by accrediting South African representatives to the embassies of other countries in exchange for allowing representatives of SADC countries to share South Africa’s resources. 94 However, nothing has apparently as yet come of these plans of sharing missions as a moneysaving idea, though the idea may still be taken up in future. Instead, by the end of 1997, the Presidential Review Commission was told that South Africa would have to close some of its overseas missions. 95 It was then announced that the Department’s top management would be giving serious consideration to the deployment of missions abroad and that South Africa’s new international interests would have to be reflected in its representation in the various regions of the world; some missions would have to be closed, and others may be opened or reopened. 96 South Africa’s first priority was Africa and Southern Africa, relations with the Middle East and Asia would be looked at very seriously, whereas South Africa’s extensive representation in Europe, in particular Central Europe, would come in for reconsideration. 97 It was announced that missions would be opened in Algeria, Venezuela, Peru and Kuwait, and this was subsequently done. 98 However, it was also announced that a number of missions (mainly in Europe) would be closed in the course of 1998. 99 The closures were prompted by big cuts in the foreign affairs budget and it was said that the officials to be recalled would be filling several vacancies at headquarters in Pretoria. 100 However, earlier it had been suggested that in future fewer people would be stationed at the head office of the Department. 101 By June 1998 there were (still?) many vacancies at head office and this situation persisted in June 1999. 102

By May 1998 it was already being said that further decreases in the foreign affairs budget were in the pipeline for the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 financial years and that spending levels for the three years of the medium-term expenditure framework meant that further closures and cutbacks in staffing were planned. 103 Missions in the US (Los Angeles and Beverly Hills) were mentioned, as were the ‘second mission’ in Brussels. 104 Closure of the latter would result in the ambassador stationed there threatening a civil suit against the Department. 105 However, the rationalisation was effected and a new ambassador appointed for both Belgium and the European Union. 106

By June 1998 the situation pertaining to reciprocity had deteriorated slightly when compared to the position eighteen months before and closure of more South African missions after June 1998, referred to above, would certainly not improve the situation. By June 1999 the reciprocity ratio had further deteriorated. A comparison of the Foreign Affairs Lists of June 1998, November 1998 and June 1999 shows the following:

Number of South African Representatives Abroad: June
Embassies/High Commissions: 76 76 73
Consulates/Consulates-General: 18 12 14
Countries with Honorary Consulates: 13 40 44 107
Missions representing interest of third Countries:* -- -- 25
Non-residential accreditations:** 62 56 108 78
Other (e.g. Liaison Offices): 3 3 4***
Satellite Offices:****      
International organisations: 7 7 7
* This category was listed for the first time in the June 1999 List. According to information provided by a fax sent to the author by the DFA on 2 March 2000, this category entails the following:
SA missions that liase with third countries that SA does not have diplomatic relations with as yet or where there are SA interests, e.g. SA citizens, that the SA government has a responsibility towards. Such formal or informal interactions with these countries do not imply that diplomatic relations will be established. The following SA missions perform such functions, in a total of 25 third countries: the SA High Commission in Australia (in a number of small island states); the SA Embassies in Austria (Slovakia), Gabon (Chad, Cameroon, Sao Tome e Principe), Cote d’Ivore (Benin, Niger), Hungary (Croatia), Cuba (Haiti), Egypt (Syria), and Mexico (El Salvador and Nicaragua).
** These are described (fax from DFA to author, 2 March 2000) as cases where SA does have diplomatic relations with a country, but no office physically established in that country. The country is ‘serviced’ by a SA mission in another (often neighbouring) country by means of official visits by the ambassador or other representative attached to the relevant mission. SA’s Ambassador to Norway is, for example, non-resident in Iceland.
*** Taipei, Palestine, Abuja, Gaza
**** In some countries, for example the US, SA has an Embassy in one city (Washington) and Consulate-Generals in other centres. However, in some cases a ‘satellite office’ – not a separate mission - of the actual/main mission is based in another city, but forms part of the actual/main mission. Since Berlin became the capital of Germany and until the actual move to Berlin, the SA Embassy in Bonn had a satellite office in Berlin. Current satellite offices are: the office in Lagos, Nigeria of the SA High Commission in Abuja, the new capital of the country, whilst most of the business is still in Lagos; the office in Gaza, Palestine of the SA Representative Office to the Palestine National Authority in Ramallah; the office in Dubai, United Arab Emirates of the SA Embassy in Abu Dhabi. This information (provided by means of a fax to the author on 2 March 2000) does not correspond entirely with the information printed in the June 1999 List however. For example, in the fax the Abuja office is described as a satellite office, whereas the List describes it as a Liaison Office – see above.
Foreign representation in South Africa was listed at follows: June
Embassies/High Commissions: 98 99 102
Consulates/Consulates-General: 59 55 57
Countries with Honorary Consuls in SA: 19 61 64 109
Trade Offices and Liaison Offices: 2 2 2*
Non-residential accreditations: 9 8 8
Missions of International Organisations: 16 16 16
* 1 Trade Office: Oman; 1 Liaison Office: Taipei

With regard to permanent foreign representation, mention should in conclusion be made of the nature of the missions exchanged between South Africa and the two Chinas. As was explained before, the new South Africa initially continued diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with Taiwan - a ‘left-over’ of the old South Africa. However, in 1991 an informal representation agreement was concluded with the PRC and in March 1992 informal offices were established in the form of a South African Centre for Chinese Studies in Beijing and a Centre for South African Studies in Pretoria. 110 From 1 January 1998 South Africa and Beijing exchanged embassies and the respective missions in Taiwan and South Africa were downgraded to a liaison office. Initially it was hoped, by Taiwan in particular, that relations could be maintained at a level just short of diplomatic relations. However, Beijing had consistently exerted pressure on South Africa in this regard and Taiwan got rather less than it had hoped for. 111 South Africa’s mission in Beijing had to be extended, amidst other serious cutbacks, after it became an embassy. 112

Summitry as a feature of the new South African diplomacy

Due to a clear awareness of the value of the ‘Mandela Magic’ in the post-1994 years, summitry as a form of diplomacy was put to very good use by the new South Africa. It could even be described as one of the main characteristics of the new South African diplomacy. 113 However, it was not only Mandela that engaged in summitry; then Deputy President Mbeki played as big a role, even if the impact may not have been as dramatic. As president, Mbeki has continued using this form of diplomacy to great effect. 114 Since 1994 summitry has been used in the implementation of many aspects of South African diplomacy, but probably most noticeably to further South Africa’s economic interests, to forge relations with countries in Africa and the rest of the Third World (underlining the importance of these relations by adding the symbolic value of diplomacy at the highest level), and in South Africa’s role as regional agent for peace. 115

Multilateralism as a feature of the new South African diplomacy

Support for international institutions and for multilateral diplomacy generally, became a feature of South African diplomacy after 1994. As was mentioned before, the Multilateral Branch of the DFA became very prominent and active largely as a result of the shifts in South African foreign policy as well as the fact that South Africa was once more acceptable in international society and joined a great many international organisations. This was a reflection of the importance attached to membership of international organisations, the demands of effective participation in international conferences, the need for the conclusion of many new agreements in a globalising world, and the special importance the new Government attached to certain issues (such as non-proliferation, disarmament and more recently the restructuring of the global economic order). South Africa concluded increasing numbers of international agreements, 116 many of them multilateral, and has in fact been called to positions of leadership in some important international fora. This included the election of South Africa as Chairperson of SADC (Southern African Development Community) at its Summit in August 1996, a position the country held until 31 August 1999; 117 the chairing of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in April-May 1996, and the assumption of the UNCTAD presidency by South Africa’s Trade and Industry Minister; the hosting of the NAM Summit in late August/early September 1998 and the assumption of the chair of the organisation by South Africa; 118 as well as the hosting of the Commonwealth Summit in late 1999. 119 The country was also co-founder of some new international arrangements, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation. 120 South Africa is now participating in a vast number of international organisations on a regular basis. 121

The extensive involvement of the country in multilateral affairs is reflected in the Annual Report of the Multilateral Branch of the DFA, which was published for the first time in June 1996. 122 The activities of this Branch of the Department revolve around five main functional areas: multilateral development and economic affairs; environmental, marine, scientific and technical affairs; disarmament and non-proliferation; multilateral political and global security affairs; and, social affairs. 123

The report of the Multilateral Branch lists a variety of international commitments, involvements and responsibilities taken on by South Africa in the fields mentioned. All of this not only meant greatly increased activity for South African officials, but also a vastly increased need for thorough knowledge about issues and procedures, the ability to communicate easily and effectively with the representatives of other participating countries and to report accurately and timeously on developments and results achieved. As the old South Africa was so thoroughly isolated from multilateral diplomacy in most areas, the country started with a very serious lack of experience, skills and knowledge. This was further depleted by the loss of some experienced people in the process of attempting to rectify the non-representativeness of the DFA as a whole. Though some new appointments certainly contributed to the pool of skills and experience particularly in multilateral affairs, the ever-increasing needs in these areas are putting tremendous strain on the diplomatic ability of South Africa. Function-specific as well as diplomatic training are going a long way towards dealing with this, as well as frequent consultations with academics, experts and other members of civil society. 124 It seems to have almost become DFA practice to involve such ‘outsiders’ in various aspects of the performance of its functions, such as the development of policy, the working out of some of the details of its implementation, and consultations with overseas visitors. In some ways this may be quite innovative and is a deviation from past practice. Anything that can contribute to the ability of South Africa to function effectively in the international arena is to be welcomed and there is every indication that multilateral diplomacy will become increasingly important. 125 Certainly, it represents a distinguishing feature of the ‘new South African diplomacy’ when compared with the pre-1990 situation. It is also highly relevant to South African economic diplomacy.

The need for export promotion in South African diplomacy

In an economic sense the term ‘export’ refers to the movement of goods and services between economic systems. 126 According to classical economic analysis and drawing upon the concept of comparative advantage, the exporting of goods and services should be viewed as a desirable activity. As a corolly, exporting encourages specialisation and, left to itself, an international division of labour. According to this viewpoint, exporting states (and trading blocs) create wealth by such activity, which in turn provides for growth in incomes and possibly employment. 127 This represents a particular point of view that is not shared by everyone. 128 In spite of some deviating points of view, qualifications or warnings about the dangers of a liberalised global order, 129 and some change of emphasis over the years, at no point in time was it ever official South African policy to oppose export promotion.

From Union in 1910 to about 1925 South African foreign trade policy was characterised by a liberal, ‘laissez-faire’ approach towards international trade. 130 In the course of the nineteen-twenties South Africa adopted a more protective inward-looking policy with an emphasis on import substitution rather than export promotion. 131 In the years that followed import substitution played an important role in South African economic development. 132 ‘However, in the early nineteen seventies doubt arose as to the ability of import substitution to provide further employment and growth in the economy’. 133 South African foreign trade policy entered a third phase when the philosophy was in favour of policies to stimulate growth through the acceleration of exports. 134 However, during the days of sanctions and isolation, the South African government also had to work against active attempts to stop South African exports and to prevent general trade sanctions against and disinvestment from South Africa. Since 1994 a policy aimed at the creation of an open, internationally competitive economy could be pursued unfettered. 135 This implies a rapid liberalisation of trade, a more complete set of measures for the promotion of export and a more market related exchange policy. Currently the aim of the country’s primary trade and industry policy is to create a more diversified export oriented production sector that is internationally competitive. 136 This is, of course, aimed at realising socio-economic objectives such as job creation and higher growth rates and incomes (poverty alleviation). The macro-economic growth strategy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), announced by the South African government in 1996, was aimed at this and presupposes an annual ten percent increase in manufactured exports (as opposed to the export of raw materials). The strategy does not only necessitate export promotion, but also other measures such as the promotion of increased direct investment in the South African economy and of tourism to South Africa. The renewed emphasis on export promotion should also be viewed against the background of Africa’s and South Africa’s position in the global economy and the changing nature of the latter.

African countries are, much like the rest of the world, struggling to find direction in the post-cold war era. However, debates about the structure of these societies and how they should fit into the world, have less to do with the aftermath of the East-West conflict and more with the legacies of the colonial era and the failures of the first post-colonial generation. The following rather lengthy quotation summarises this very well: 137

From the 15 th into the 19 th century, Africa’s primary link with the world was through the export of slaves. In the 19 th and 20 th centuries, export of raw materials became the dominant link. This role as commodity supplier – whether of high-valued ivory, gold, diamonds, and oil or of precariously priced crops such as coffee and cocoa – largely excluded Africa from the more dynamic sectors of manufacturing, financial services, and information technology.

Political independence beginning in the 1960’s did not change this fundamental reality. Today Africa’s primary export remain unprocessed agricultural products and, for a handful of countries, minerals and oil. Even South Africa’s relatively developed economy is extremely vulnerable to the fluctuating price of gold. ...

Africa’s first post-independence generation – broadly speaking, from the 1960’s to the end of political apartheid in South Africa in 1994 – made significant advances ... (for example, in education, health, infrastructure development, industrial production for the domestic market.)

The generation’s failings were also considerable and painful – repressive, ineffective, and corrupt bureaucracies, military dictatorships, and one-party states; deep indebtedness to international institutions and banks; a stifling of grassroots initiatives, public debate, and other civil liberties. These failings were compounded by an international system that fostered ill-conceived, nonfunctional, and costly development projects, heavy financial borrowing, and cold war-linked civil wars, which left newly independent countries with little economic cushion or political leeway for policy errors. ...

Yet, at the turn of the millennium, Africa is clearly entering a new political phase, variously referred to as a ‘second independence struggle’, a ‘third wave’ of change, or, as popularized by ... Thabo Mbeki, an ‘African Renaissance’. ...

The transformation needed for new voices and social forces to make a real impact will not be easy, and it will be uneven. Its chances will depend, above all, on African initiatives, not only by African governments but by groups and individuals in African countries on both national and local levels.

But the chances of success also depend in large part on whether African realities and priorities are recognized in decisionmaking arenas in multinational and rich-country institutions. ...

Achieving economic growth is indeed indispensable for achieving other goals, and it does require greater competitiveness and freedom from inefficient or corrupt bureaucratic restrictions. But growth will be neither sustainable nor fair unless it: 1) is directed toward job creation and poverty reduction, 2) produces for domestic and regional consumers and not only for international markets, 3) is undergirded by public investment in health and education, and 4) is protected from abuse of worker rights and the environment.

These views about what is needed to improve South Africa’s position have also been echoed by local South African leaders, in particular of late. 138

The processes of globalisation, so often referred to, have of course changed the global economy in fundamental ways, with implications for South Africa: 139

All of these fundamental changes took place roughly over the past two decades. 140 This overlapped with South Africa’s ‘re-entry’ into the global economic arena after the end of sanctions and isolation. The South African government’s reaction, amongst other things by means of GEAR, would therefore seem to be a rational response to the global dispensation as well as the country’s position within the system. However, it is true that South Africa is not sufficiently internationally competitive (yet?) to make the task an easy one. ‘In spite of the distortions and inequities created by apartheid, South Africa is a “high wage” economy when compared to other developing economies’ and ‘(i)n comparison to other possible candidates for both local and direct foreign investment in export-oriented manufacturing, South African is an inefficient and high-cost economy’. 141 Therefore, much needs to be done to facilitate the work of those who would try to direct more foreign investment to South Africa and, ultimately to sell its products abroad. 142 In the meantime, however, the aim is to engage in these and other forms of economic diplomacy, even though the task is not made easy by local circumstances such as labour legislation and crime statistics.

In his address in August 1999 to the consultative conference in preparation for the WTO Seattle Ministerial and the upcoming round of multilateral negotiations, the Trade and Industry Minister, Mr Alec Erwin, highlighted the challenge posed by the upcoming round of multilateral trade negotiations. 143 He declared that if the process and objectives of that round of negotiations remain similar to those of the Uruguay Round, it would be to the detriment of the developing world. South Africa is to some extent ‘a bridge between the developed and developing world in view of its location in Africa, while at the same time finding some interests aligned with those of the developed world’. South Africa had to ‘be able to articulate the interests of developing nations, while its interests as a trading nation are not bypassed’. He echoed the point made by Selebi’s DFA during the early 1999 thematic review process (see above) when it was said to be essential to form alliances with like-minded countries. The following quoted from the Erwin address further elaborates on the South African viewpoint:

(t)he current underlying assumption that economic problems will be overcome if developing countries simply model their economies on that of developed countries, is inaccurate. The future impetus for growth is unlikely to come from developed countries, since their rate of growth is not dramatic anymore and they have utilised the bulk of their raw materials. If developing countries continue to expect their growth impetus to come from selling to developed countries, it would lead to further stagnation. The real growth impetus for the next millennium comes from development, and the real challenge is for development to take place. ...

a major paradigm change is necessary – one which calls for major structural changes in the developed world. For South Africa and Southern Africa to grow, there has to be development of their industrial economies and the level of trade between the countries in the region. ...

South Africa argues that a rules-based system is the correct approach. ... South Africa must target many of the clauses that are preventing youngsters from coming into (the) world market. ...

South Africa has a major interest in giving leadership. The developing world should strive to lead the process not merely follow it. ... there is a lacuna in world leadership... South Africa needs the system to be open to its economy and must approach the negotiations with confidence to lead, and not to merely react. In this regard, alliances with like-minded countries ... will be important. ...

... there needs to be a genuine balance of interest with outcomes (in the upcoming negotiations)... there needs to be a genuine balance of interest with development and the unlocking of the trade system as primary objectives. Secondly, a balance in the process would require that we do not leave the majority of developing countries behind who do not have the same capacity to engage in trade negotiations. ... Thirdly, the outcomes must be balanced by ensuring proper consultation between government and other stakeholders. ... South Africa (should) focus on the structural dimensions of the world trading system relating to both the built-in agenda items (especially agriculture), and also to new agenda items, e.g. competition policy, investment, and trade facilitation. ... it would be better to have rules about these aspects than to have nothing. ...

An important area on which South Africa differs from virtually all its developing partners, (is) the concept of sustainability. couldn’t foresee a sustainable world trade system if it is not based on some degree of equity. In this regard, one cannot avoid addressing issues such as human rights, labour standards, and even the structure of the financial system. ... these measures can be abused as protectionist mechanisms, but if they are not taken into account, the system cannot be sustainable....

Considerable influence can be exerted if developing countries stand together. However, South Africa is not favouring a comprehensive round of industrial negotiations, but will have to target specific barriers that exist in the system.

In February 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Zuma, having emphasised South Africa’s responsibilities towards ‘the international community in general and Africa in particular’ and having summarised the country’s programme for Africa, also referred to the need to reverse the isolation of Africa from the economic mainstream, to eradicate poverty world-wide and for ‘joint and integrated development’. 144 It is therefore quite clear that the South African government puts great emphasis on not only the need for the country to join the economic mainstream, to develop and to alleviate poverty whilst doing so, but also on doing this largely by means of multilateralism and for the benefit of the its region and the developing world in general. The changes it would like to see and is willing to take the lead in bringing about, are also quite far-reaching.

Having established the need for export promotion, both in terms of the global economic dispensation and South Africa’s position in it, as well as current South African policies, we turn to the nature of South African economic diplomacy and to answering the questions of who is responsible both for export promotion and for creating the circumstances favourable for it, as well as what exactly the role of the DFA is in export promotion in particular.

South African economic diplomacy, the Department of Foreign Affairs and export promotion

The history of South African diplomacy started to a large extent with trade promotion. A majority of the earliest representatives of the Union of South Africa post-1910, were trade representatives. 145 This was an expression of the importance attached to the promotion of trade and in particular export promotion in those early days, as well as the fact that Britain was still responsible for conducting the 'political' diplomacy of South Africa. The economic aspect was therefore the main focus of South Africa’s early diplomatic effort. The earliest trade commissioners were stationed in the United Kingdom (London), on the European Continent (initially Rotterdam and later Milan and Hamburg), and in North America (New York). The Union also had an agent in Lourenço Marques, Portuguese Mozambique. The latter represented all the government departments of South Africa in that territory, as was the case with some of the trade commissioners. 146 The Union Government also made use quite extensively of honorary trade commissioners in various European countries. As the Union of South Africa became constitutionally (after the Balfour Declaration of 1926) and subsequently also politically more independent from Britain, 147 foreign representation began to develop a stronger political component. South African overseas representatives found it difficult in the immediate post-1926 period to convince officials in foreign countries that South Africa was no longer a colony of Britain and that they could liase directly with foreign governments. However, gradually the new constitutional reality was also reflected in the political sphere. South Africa would still rely to some limited extent on the British overseas service to perform certain functions for it, but developed its own ‘political’ representation abroad. After the Second World War, South Africa would come under increasing international pressure due to its domestic policy of apartheid. As a result the political aspect of South African diplomacy became very prominent. When South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961 (under pressure due to its domestic policies that were no longer acceptable to the majority of Commonwealth members), this special relationship would change. South Africa would have to extend its foreign representation to provide for this. 148 By the sixties, seventies and eighties its main function was to try and counter international criticism and condemnation. South Africa’s economic diplomacy also changed in nature. During the height of sanctions and disinvestment, countering these forms of punitive economic diplomacy became its main focus. 149 Here the South African government came up against the liberation movements (such as the ANC) and other opponents, who would spearhead the call for sanctions and disinvestment. 150 Meanwhile, the South African government began to move away from the policy of import substitution to export promotion early from the nineteen-seventies. 151 The interplay between these aspects of policy would shape the conduct of South Africa’s economic diplomacy up to the political transition in South Africa. 152 The South African government would attempt to extend its economic diplomacy, but would be met by international resistance resulting in a limited deployment of such diplomacy during this time. 153

Since the political change in South Africa and with a renewed emphasis on economic diplomacy and export promotion, South Africa could join hands with ‘like-minded’ countries in multilateral fora for purposes of shaping the global environment to make it a ‘friendlier’ place for developing economies. Though South Africa is doing much by way of bilateral relations to improve its own economic position, it has also been expending much effort in doing what it can for others in its position and to bring about changes in the environment to make it more conducive to successful export promotion efforts by developing countries. Both export promotion as such and creating a favourable global dispensation, entail economic diplomacy and South African has been engaging in both types. This is very evident from numerous policy statements and has already been referred to above both in a policy context as well as when South African diplomacy in general (bilateral relations, the DFA, summitry and multilateralism) was discussed. We will now turn to a more detailed look at those responsible for carrying out these tasks.

According to the official South Africa Yearbook , several organisations currently promote exports and external trade relations in general. However, the major government agency involved in export promotion is the Directorate: Export Trade Promotion of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 154 The functions of this directorate are: ‘to promote exports by developing the export market and providing assistance to South African exporters, to encourage the creation of an export culture in South Africa, to formulate and maintain a long-term plan aimed at promoting exports and to manage the personnel and functions of the Department’s offices abroad.’ 155 Further functions are to provide miscellaneous services such as organising trade fairs and exhibitions, providing advertising and publication services, and cataloguing South African export products in order to assist companies with entering the export market. It is therefore quite clear that the primary responsibility for export promotion lies with the Department of Trade and Industry. In performing this and other functions, there are however close linkages with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). As has already been indicated above, the latter is the government department primarily responsible for the overall co-ordination of South African relations with the outside world. The closeness of the linkages between the functions of the DFA and that of other government departments such as Trade and Industry, have often resulted in difficulties and even tension. At best, there is a real need for proper co-ordination and integration of South Africa’s economic diplomacy efforts. One of the solutions suggested has been to merge the two departments as this, it was argued, would facilitate policy homogeneity and would enhance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ expertise in foreign trade and multilateral economic issues. 156 The issue was hotly debated a few years ago, when it was described by one commentator as ‘probably ... the most crucial issue in the near future’ for the South African leadership to resolve. 157 However, the issue seemingly died down for a while when the two ministries found a partial solution through ‘synchronised political and economic approaches towards particular countries’. 158 Every now and again it resurfaces again, however. In 1997 it was reported that a merger was again under discussion. 159 The view was expressed that a section to be known as ‘foreign trade’ should be created within the Department of Foreign Affairs in order to see to trade. 160 Those in favour of a merger argued that this would bring about rationalisation and greater productivity and referred to both Australia and Canada where the two departments have been merged and argued that these have been successful experiments. 161 Those who were against, emphasised the primary political emphasis of the work of the DFA and argued that the political aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy should not be watered down, but should remain its first priority. 162 They argued that neither Canada nor Australia has a strong political identity in international politics and could not serve as examples for South Africa. 163 Meanwhile, Nzo was criticised for ‘failing to assert himself with his own colleagues in the cabinet’ and as a result allowing other ministers to ‘seize the foreign policy initiative’. 164 Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, who ‘has completely taken over the free trade area negotiations with the European Union’ was quoted as an example of this and it was said that the DFA had also ‘lost control of some foreign policy responsibilities because the government had wanted to keep them out of the hands of the previous Director-General, ...Rusty Evans, who (had been)... appointed by the previous National Party government’. 165

In July 1998, shortly after he took up the position of Director General, Selebi stated that South Africa’s diplomatic efforts ‘had to be more closely co-ordinated with the trade and industry department to attract investment and new business’. 166 In February 1999 Foreign Minister Nzo, in a briefing, referred to an agreement that had been reached on ‘joint training with officials from other Departments, especially the Department of Trade and Industry’ and said that officials from the DFA would ‘be seconded to other Departments as a way of building capacity’. 167 In November 1999, however, it was again reported that ‘interdepartmental rivalries between trade and industry and foreign affairs were criticised ...for slowing down SA’s cooperation with its neighbours’. 168 A former foreign affairs official was also quoted as blaming the trade department for ‘the haphazard way talks to review the Southern African Customs Union were being conducted’. 169

At the present point in time there does not seem to be any moves afoot to integrate the two government departments. 170 However, the importance of building synergy remains as ‘both participate in international trade negotiations whilst remaining separate units, run by different ministers with independent budgets and visions.’ The exact division of labour and the nature of the relationship between the two departments with regards to economic diplomacy vary from case to case. 171 The DFA currently maintains roughly one hundred missions abroad – see Bilateral Relations , above. The DTI’s foreign office establishment, on the other hand, currently consists of forty-four offices that are staffed by 61 transferred officials from the DTI and assisted by additional personnel recruited locally in each country. 172 These offices are attached to the DFA missions (mostly embassies or high commissions, but in some cases consulate-generals) in the following countries and also deal with the countries mentioned in brackets: Argentina (Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia); Australia (New Zealand); Austria (Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia); Belgium (Luxembourg); Brazil; Canada; China (Mongolia); Taiwan; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Cote D’Ivoire (Senegal); Czech Republic; Egypt (Tunisia); France; Germany – both Bonn and Hamburg; Hong Kong (Southern China, Macau); India (Sri-Lanka); India; Israel; Italy – Rome (Albania, Sardinia, Malta) and Milan; Indonesia; Japan (Vladivostok, Coast of Pacific Ocean); Kenya; Malaysia (Philippines, Brunei); Mauritius (Reunion, Malagassy Republic, Seychelles, Comores); Mexico ; Mozambique; The Netherlands; Russia (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan); Singapore (Papa New Guinea); South-Korea; Spain (Portugal); Sweden (Denmark, Norway, Iceland); Switzerland (Liechtenstein); Tanzania; Thailand (Viëtnam, Cambodia, Laos); United Kingdom (Ireland); USA – Washington and New York; Uruguay (under Argentina); Zimbabwe (Zambia). In addition, the DTI has an office at the South African Mission to the European Union in Brussels, Belgium, as well as at the WTO in Geneva, Switzerland. Presumably these offices are deployed in those countries that present the most promise by way of the objectives pursued by the foreign trade representatives, which are: 173

Clearly, some countries would feature more prominently as far as potential foreign investment is concerned (such as the US, (Western) European and some Far Eastern countries), whereas others (such as the African, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries) are more exclusively relevant as far as export promotion is concerned. 174

DTI is responsible for deciding priorities as far as trade is concerned and will decide where its offices will be. 175 DTI officials are the technical experts and DFA relies on this expertise. However, in terms of normal diplomatic practice, trade representatives attached to diplomatic missions fall under the authority of the diplomatic head of mission, DFA officials will provide advice on cultural and political aspects, are responsible for changing negative perceptions about South Africa (relating to violence, crime, HIV/AIDS, an unskilled and inflexible labour force) and generally play the role of co-ordinators of various activities. 176 Also, in those approximately sixty countries where DTI has no foreign offices, the DFA foreign missions will have to and do perform trade-related functions themselves. 177 Personalities often play a role in how well co-operation between DTI and DFA works. A complicating factor, however, is the Performance Management System, effective in both departments since late 1998/early 1999. DTI and DFA officials have different priorities and therefore performance targets, and as a consequence will not always work in tandem. 178 DFA officials are, of course, recruited and trained as generalists and though some substantial economic modules are included in the training program, it is not easy for such persons to keep abreast of developments in the economic sphere in specific countries and regions. 179 In the fast moving world of today circumstances both in foreign countries and the home country, South Africa, change constantly and it is not easy always to be sufficiently au fait to answer complicated technical questions.

In summary, the problems encountered in South Africa’s bilateral economic diplomacy and export promotion in particular, lie in these areas: 180

As far as the multilateral component of South Africa’s economic diplomacy is concerned, these would probably apply to a large extent as well. With regard to the technical aspects, the DTI clearly has the advantage and must play a greater role. Some speak of ‘a formidable team of negotiators’ in the DTI, 181 but one could safely assume that the need for expert capacity in negotiating in international fora is not fully met in the light of the leadership role that South Africa would like to play in this regard. 182 Also, South African negotiating teams are made up of both DTI and DFA officials and the relative roles of the DTI and DFA in prominent multilateral (economic) negotiations vary. 183 Therefore, problems of co-ordination and available expertise persist. Though the DTI, in the person of Erwin, was reported to have ‘completely taken over the free trade area negotiations with the European Union’, 184 the political aspect of the negotiations required a prominent Foreign Affairs involvement. 185 This is apparently less so in the case of WTO negotiations, as South Africa is a member of that organisation and matters can be left to the technical experts to a greater extent. 186 In the case of the SADC free trade protocol negotiations, the DFA again took second place to DTI. 187 To the extent that DFA is involved in the SADC negotiations, it is Branch: Africa that acts on its behalf. In the EU/SA and WTO negotiations, the Chief Directorate: International Economic Affairs (within Branch: Multilateral Affairs ) is the relevant section of the DFA. 188 According to the DFA Multilateral Affairs Annual Report, 1998 (p.3) the Chief Directorate is responsible for the Department’s ‘interaction with other Government Departments especially economic departments and with the outside world in the multilateral economic field’. ‘In terms of the promotion of trade, investment, technology transfer and tourism, the Department works in close collaboration with the Department of Trade and Industry, Investment South Africa and the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism’. The Report also states that ‘it is envisaged that South African missions abroad will be playing an increasingly important role in these fields’ and lists the following as of key interest in the field of international economic affairs:

In addition to the government departments (primarily Trade and Industry and Foreign Affairs) involved in export promotion, summitry has been very important. President Mbeki has taken a particular interest in both this aspect of economic diplomacy, as well as in gaining support for ‘a better deal for the developing world in the next round of international trade talks’. 189 Mbeki has been described as ‘a very skilled diplomat and international statesperson’ with an outlook that is ‘distinctly internationalist’, 190 but also as ‘a foreign affairs junkie who tightly controls decisions without much reliance on the experts, ambassadors and desk officers in Foreign Affairs’ – no mention of DTI – and who had appointed Zuma as successor to Nzo because he needed ‘an assertive, loyal implementer able to charm and to hustle in a way that laid-back Alfred Nzo was not’. 191 It was reported that Nzo had followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Pik Botha, by venturing into ‘the international trading arena’ by helping to ‘forge trade links to China’ after having stepped down as minister of foreign affairs . 192 Foreign Minister Zuma, however, became involved in economic diplomacy early in her term of office when she visited Brussels with a view to improving the ‘overall relationship between South Africa and Europe’, but including the hitch at the time with the EU/SA agreement. 193

It should be noted that there are also a number of other organisations that promote trade generally between South Africa and countries abroad. Some examples are the South African Foreign Trade Organisation (Safto), the South African-German Chamber of Trade and Industry, the Netherlands-South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South African-British Trade Association and South African bi-national chambers of commerce abroad. 194 The provinces (sub-national entities/regions) within South Africa have also been involving themselves in building foreign relations, 195 including export promotion, and the South African Government has been involving the business sector as well in trade negotiations and in export promotion. The fact is that in a globalised world, governments do not become less important, but they have to transform their role. 196 Involving many different actors, both within and without government, means that total capacity to deal with aspects such as export promotion could be enhanced. However, it is also creating considerable problems of co-ordination and integration. This is true of economic diplomacy, but also of diplomacy in general. Greg Mills warns: 197

As the constant interaction of people and ideas, foreign policy will in the future require a co-ordinated design and not consist merely of short-term responses to domestic, regional, continental and world-wide problems. In today’s global economy it is no longer appropriate to attempt to maintain a highly-compartmentalised approach which in practice differentiates between aspects of policy (trade, political, military), governmental departments and business.


It is obvious that the conduct of economic diplomacy in the age of globalisation is no easy matter. This is particularly true for South Africa, a country still lacking to some extent the capacity for effective economic diplomacy and export promotion. However, it is also true for other countries and even the major powers. In a major report on US diplomacy the following pronouncement was made: 198

American diplomacy is today at severe risk because it does not have the modern technology it needs to do its job. As astonishing as it may seem, the Department of State does not have the proper tools for gathering, processing, and disseminating information, nor for communicating effectively with an increasingly democratic world.

Having appealed for a strengthening of the USA’s ability to ‘expand global markets and assist U.S. business abroad’, the role of the USA government in commercial diplomacy is described as that of ‘mediator, moderator, and facilitator’. 199 In conclusion, the report states that the American ‘foreign policy machinery ... warrants a thorough examination’. 200 If this is true of US diplomacy, South African diplomacy is certainly not exempt. Constant re-evaluation of South African diplomacy is imperative. In diplomacy in general and economic diplomacy in particular, knowledge and skills are very important and can lend a country considerable influence. 201 These needs should receive more attention and in this the relevant government departments, tertiary education institutions and non-governmental organisations have a role to play. In addition the influence gained through participation in such vital negotiations as the Seattle Round, should be closely observed and studied.

It is always difficult to pronounce on the success/effectiveness or otherwise, of diplomacy. One could point to possible examples of successful South African diplomacy and specifically economic diplomacy, such as the reported eight percent growth in South African wine exports in the first nine months of 1999 amid ‘intense competition’. 202 It is a difficult thing, however, to determine whether such growth in exports is really due to the effectiveness of export promotion efforts. Other factors could be at work. It has been shown that an ‘improvement of the diplomatic climate’ by fifty percent may on average increase trade by about twenty-five percent. 203 Certainly, in the case of South African wine (and many other) exports, the lifting of sanctions combined with an ‘improvement of the diplomatic climate’ did contribute to better sales abroad. So, how effective was export promotion? Also, a decline in export performance could be a function of the depressed state of the world economy rather than a lack of energetic export promotion efforts. In comparing the trade figures of South Africa since 1994, one could wonder whether export promotion has made any difference if in 1994 the US, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan were listed (in that order) as South Africa’s main trading partners, 204 and by 1998 they were still in exactly the same positions. 205 Of course, trade did increase, but would it not have done so regardless of export promotion efforts in those countries due to the sheer momentum of trade relations? When will the shift in policy to greater emphasis on relations with some other regions, begin to show real results? Did the redeployment of foreign missions in regions such as Asia, the Middle East and Africa have any real impact? As was mentioned before, South African trade with the PRC did increase considerably after the establishment of diplomatic relations, but was this due to trade promotion as such? These are difficult questions. The need for a capable, integrated and well co-ordinated economic diplomacy remains, however, in spite of difficulties in gauging the immediate effectiveness of such efforts. Though the impact of export promotion is probably not direct and short term, it cannot be argued it is meaningless or a waste of resources.

In the case of South Africa the ultimate objective of export promotion is not just greater national wealth and/or a stronger position in the world economy. Ultimately, it is a question of survival for the young African democracy. South Africa’s survival is, however, in turn closely tied up with that of its region and the African continent as a whole. Trade, in this context, must be a matter of balance: South Africa already exports ‘too much’ to Africa when seen in the context of the ‘too little’ that is imported from Africa. The avoidance of such imbalances must also be accounted for in South African economic diplomacy. And in this, the age of globalisation, the greatest contribution of South African diplomacy could well lie in its role as a ‘shaper’ of a more equitable and therefore ultimately sustainable economic order – a daunting, yet worthwhile task. Diplomacy and in particular economic diplomacy, has become part of the processes of global governance and to quote President Mbeki again: ‘From this we cannot walk away’.


Note 1: See for example K.J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 7 th edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995; Abdul Aziz Said, Charles O. Lerche, Jr. & Charles O. Lerche III, Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective, 4 th edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995. Back.

Note 2: Louise Diamond & John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy. A Systems Approach to Peace , 3 rd edition, West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996, p. 26. The term ‘diplomacy’ can also be used to denote a concept broader than official/governmental/state interchanges of a peaceful nature. The term ‘multi-track diplomacy’ extends the use of the word ‘diplomacy’ to include eight other (non-state) tracks involving nongovernmental/professional ‘peacemakers’, business, private citizens, peacemaking through research, training and education, activism, religion, funding, and the media. In this paper, however, the focus is on governmental or official ‘diplomacy’, though some references will be made to the involvement of other actors. Back.

Note 3: Ibid. Back.

Note : See for example: J.A. Scolte, ‘The globalisation of world politics’, in J. Baylis & S. Smith (eds.), The globalization of world politics. An introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; Sean Cleary, ‘Discontinuous Change at the End of the 20 th Century: An Opening Salvo’, South African Journal of International Affairs, Volume 6, Number 2, Winter 1999, pp. 19-32. Back.

Note 5: Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations , London: Penguin, 1998, pp. 201-2. Back.

Note 6: Alan Gelb & Rob Floyd, ‘The Challenge of Globalisation for Africa’, South African Journal of International Affairs, Volume 6, Number 2, Winter 1999, p. 3. Back.

Note 7: Gerrit Olivier & Deon Geldenhuys, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism’, Business & the Contemporary World , Vol IX, No 2, 1997, pp.365-6. It should, of course, be borne in mind that at the same time as the internal changes took place in South Africa, the international milieu also changed at the end of the Cold War. Back.

Note 8: See some of the papers and articles by this author quoted below, note 12. Back.

Note 9: The Citizen , 15 January 1999, p.8. Back.

Note 10: Ibid. Back.

Note 11: City Press , 17 January 1999, p.10. Also see: Jackie Selebi, ‘South African Foreign Policy: Setting New Goals and Strategies’, South African Journal of International Affairs , Volume 6, Number 1, Summer 1998, pp. 201-16. Back.

Note 12: The session was attended by the author. Back.

Note 13: As quoted in: Briefing by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nkosazana Zuma. (2000) < > (publication 8 February 2000, accessed 21 February 2000). Mbeki replaced Mandela as President of South Africa in May 1999 and Nzo was replaced as Foreign Affairs Minister by Zuma in June 1999. See Ross Herbert & Peter Fabricius, ‘Zuma scores an A in her 100-day baptism of fire’, The Star , 4 October 1999, p. 11 for a discussion of Zuma’s merits as Foreign Minister and in particular in peacemaking in Africa. Back.

Note 14: Ibid. Back.

Note 15: Previous papers and articles by the present author deal in more detail with some of the earlier developments and broader issues of change and continuity in South African foreign policy and diplomacy: Rejoining the World: South Africa and the Diplomacy of Reintegration, presented for the Panel on Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, at the 37 th Annual International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, San Diego, Ca USA, 16-20 April 1996; The Foreign Ministry of South Africa: from isolation to integration to coherency , presented at the Conference on Foreign Ministries: change and adaptation, London, UK, 5-7 February 1997; Current developments in South African diplomacy , presented at the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy, Malta, 12-15 February 1998; ‘Developments in the conduct of South African diplomacy’, South African Yearbook of International Law (SAYIL) , Vol 23, 1998; South African Diplomacy and Security Complex Theory , DSP (Leicester) Discussion Paper, May 1999. Back.

Note 16: Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States. A Comparative Analysis , Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1990. Back.

Note 17: Olivier & Geldenhuys, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism’, p.366. Back.

Note 18: Ibid. Back.

Note 19: Ibid, p.367 cite actions of President Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, including the creation of a Binational Commission between the US and South Africa under the chairmanship of the two Vice Presidents and the starting of negotiations with the European Union on a free trade agreement and accession to the Lomé Convention, as proof of this. Back.

Note 20: Ibid, p.366. Back.

Note 21: See Roland Henwood, ‘South African foreign policy and international practise - 1997 - an analysis’, South African Yearbook of International Law, 1997, (Pretoria: VerLoren van Themaat Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa) for a brief analysis of the issue relating to Libya. Back.

Note 22: Mail & Guardian, 27 March 1998, p.3. Back.

Note 23: Sowetan, 27 April 1998, p.11. Back.

Note 24: Sowetan, 27 April 1998, p.11. Back.

Note 25: Ibid. Back.

Note 26: Sowetan, 20 April 1998, p.10. Back.

Note 27: Ibid. Back.

Note 28: Ibid. Back.

Note 29: Ibid. Back.

Note 30: Sunday Tribune , 5 April 1998, p.1. Back.

Note 31: Ibid. Back.

Note 32: Ibid. Back.

Note 33: The Sunday Independent, 2 August 1998, p.1. The other three countries were Gambia, Bhutan and Vanuatu. In the November 1998 Foreign Affairs List , the Libyan mission is described as the Libyan Arab People’s Bureau, but the head of mission is identified as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Back.

Note 34: The Sunday Independent, 2 August 1998, p.1; The Citizen , 3 August 1998, p.1. No mission is listed for North Korea, nor for Gambia, Bhutan and Vanuatu. In the June 1999 List no missions had appeared for these countries either. Back.

Note 35: The Citizen , 3 August 1998, p.1. Back.

Note 36: The Citizen , 3 August 1998, p.1; Die Volksblad , 3 August 1998, p.1. Back.

Note 37: Die Volksblad , 3 August 1998, p.1. Back.

Note 38: The Citizen , 19 February 1998, p.8. Back.

Note 39: See for example: SAIIA Research Group, eds., South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma , Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs & Foundation of Global Dialogue, 1995; Greg Mills, ‘South Africa and the Two Chinas’, in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1996, pp.165-171; Jean-Jacques Cornish, ‘New South Africa and China’, in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997, pp.250-256; Henwood, ‘South African foreign policy and international practise - 1997 - an analysis’. Back.

Note 40: See Henwood, ‘South African foreign policy and international practise - 1997 - an analysis’. Also see the discussion of overseas missions below. Back.

Note 41: Mxolisi Mgxashe, ‘China is a valuable ally for South Africa’, The Cape Times , 18 November 1999, p. 9. Back.

Note 42: Ibid. Back.

Note 43: Muller, ‘The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions’, in Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller, eds., Change and South African External Relations, Midrand: International Thomson Publishing, 1997, pp.55-56. Back.

Note 44: Ibid, p.56. Back.

Note 45: Ibid, p.57. Back.

Note 46: Ibid, pp.57-58. Back.

Note 47: Ibid, p.58. Back.

Note 48: Ibid, p.60. Back.

Note 49: Ibid, p.62. Back.

Note 50: Department of Foreign Affairs List, June 1998. Back.

Note 51: Muller, ‘The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions’, pp.59-60. Back.

Note 52: Department of Foreign Affairs List, June 1998. Back.

Note 53: Approved Organisational Structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs , 29 September 1997. Back.

Note 54: Approved Organisational Structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs , 20 November 1997. Back.

Note 55: See the Approved Organisational Structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs as set out in various charts dated between September and December 1997 - hereafter referred to as ‘chart’ or ‘charts’. Back.

Note 56: See the chart dated 22 September 1997. The January 1998 change was conveyed to the author by two Foreign Service Officers in personal and telephonic conversations respectively. Back.

Note 57: Department of Foreign Affairs List, June 1998. Back.

Note 58: Compare the official telephone list of the DFA, 4 August 1998. Back.

Note 59: The Citizen, 15 January 1999, p.8; City Press , 17 January 1999, p.10. Back.

Note 60: DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (1 September 1998) [ Home Page ] <> (updated on 5 November 1999, accessed on 8 November 1999). Back.

Note 61: For a more detailed discussion of the process, see Muller, ‘The Diplomacy of Reintegration: South Africa Back into the Fold’, in Jan Melissen, ed., Diplomatic Innovation, London: Macmillan, 1999; Muller, ‘The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions’. Back.

Note 62: See for example: Die Burger, 7 January 1997, p.7; Sunday Times , 12 January 1997, p.2; Rapport, 4 May 1997, p.8; Beeld, 16 July 1997, p.10; Sowetan, 8 August 1997, p.2; Rapport, 17 August 1997, p.7; The Citizen , 16 September 1997, p.19; Rapport, 21 September 1997, p.6; The Sunday Independent , 28 September 1997, p.2. Back.

Note 63: Beeld, 15 May 1997, p.15; Saturday Star, 13 September 1997, p.2; Sunday Tribune, 9 November 1997, p.14. Back.

Note 64: The Cape Times, 28 May 1998, p.5. Back.

Note 65: Business Day, 1 June 1998, p.11; The Star, 2 July 1998, p.2. Back.

Note 66: The Star, 2 July 1998, p.2. Back.

Note 67: Ibid. South African foreign policy after the transition had often been criticised for not being consistent – see the discussion above. Back.

Note 68: Ibid. Back.

Note 69: Ibid. Back.

Note 70: Rapport, 14 December 1998, p.8. Back.

Note 71: Ibid. Back.

Note 72: Ibid. Back.

Note 73: Mail & Guardian, 5-11 December 1998, p.7. Back.

Note 74: Muller, South African Diplomacy and Security Complex Theory , p. 23. Back.

Note 75: Muller, ‘The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions’, p.66. Back.

Note 76: See Rapport, 24 January 1999, p.23. Back.

Note 77: Stephen Laufer & Reneé Grawitzky, ‘Pityana’s TV spook training proves a waste’, Business Day, 13 December 1999, p. 7. Back.

Note 78: Ibid. Back.

Note 79: Ibid. Back.

Note 80: Ibid. Back.

Note 81: Ibid. Back.

Note 82: Selebi was accused of unprofessional behaviour towards certain employees of the police force. See various press reports for details. Back.

Note 83: Olivier & Geldenhuys, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism’, p.367. Back.

Note 84: Charts dated November-December 1997, as well as Mission Address and Telephone List of the DFA, 27 January 1997. According to the (Official) South Africa Yearbook 1997 , (published by the South African Communication Service, Pretoria), p. 213, there was also a multilateral mission in Gaborone, accredited to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, this was not reflected in the Charts of late 1997. Back.

Note 85: In the sequence listed by the DFA: Ivory Coast, Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Zaire, Algeria, Botswana, Nigeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Lesotho, Morocco, Angola, Swaziland, Tunisia, Zambia, Kenya, Namibia (Walvis Bay) and Namibia (Windhoek). Back.

Note 86: In the sequence listed by the DFA: Greece, Germany (Bonn), Romania, Germany (Berlin), Brazil, Hungary, Switzerland, Slovak Republic, Argentina, US (Beverly Hills), Belgium, Venezuela, US (Chicago), Germany (Hamburg), Peru, Denmark, Cuba, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, UK, Germany (Frankfurt), Ukraine, Spain, France (Marseilles), Canada (Montreal), Norway, Mexico, Russian Federation, Canada (Ottawa), Italy (Milan), Germany (Munich), France (Paris), Uruguay, US (New York), Czech Republic, Italy (Rome), Sweden, US (Washington), Chile, Netherlands, Brazil, Canada (Toronto), Bulgaria, and Poland. Back.

Note 87: In the sequence listed by the DFA: United Arab Emirates, China (Beijing), Indonesia, Jordan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Kuwait, India (Bombay), Malaysia, Japan, India (New Delhi), Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, South Korea, and Iran. Back.

Note 88: According to a report in Business Day (13 January 1997, p.1) South Africa had ‘accredited a nearby embassy to cover 44 countries’. It was not mentioned which embassy this is, but it is very likely a mission in an African country. Back.

Note 89: Business Day, 13 January 1997, p.1. Back.

Note 90: Ibid. Back.

Note 91: Ibid. Back.

Note 92: Ibid. According to this report South Africa had 75 embassies or high commissions in foreign countries, while there were 96 embassies or high commissions in South Africa, and South Africa has consulates in 18 countries, but 57 countries have consulates in South Africa. Back.

Note 93: For a listing of the Foreign Representatives in South Africa at this time, see: South African Yearbook 1997 , pp. 205 & 210-3; South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997 , pp.465-8; Mission Address and Telephone List , 27 January 1997. Back.

Note 94: Business Day, 10 January 1997, p.1; 13 January 1997, p.7; Beeld, 13 January 1997, p.4. Back.

Note 95: Beeld, 11 November 1998, p.2. Back.

Note 96: Beeld, 12 November 1998, p.4. Back.

Note 97: Ibid; The Cape Times, 27 February 1998, p.6. Back.

Note 98: Beeld, 12 November 1998, p.4; Department of Foreign Affairs List, June 1998. Back.

Note 99: Rapport, 30 November 1998, p.4; information faxed by the DFA , 27 August 1998, to author. For full details see: Muller, South African Diplomacy and Security Complex Theory , pp. 25-6. Back.

Note 100: Cape Argus, 11 December 1998, p.1. If the exchange rate impact was considered and inflation factored in, the cut was estimated to be as much as 20% ( The Cape Times, 27 February 1998. P.6). Back.

Note 101: Rapport, 16 November 1998, p.7. Back.

Note 102: Department of Foreign Affairs List, June 1998; June 1999. Back.

Note 103: Business Day, 12 May 1998, p.5; 8 May 1998, p.1. Back.

Note 104: Die Burger, 9 May 1998, p.10; Pretoria News , 12 May 1998, p.3. Back.

Note 105: Die Burger, 18 June 1998, p.9; Die Beeld , 18 June 1998, p.6. Back.

Note 106: Rapport, 4 October 1998, p.2. Back.

Note 107: It is interesting to note the increased use of this ‘cheap’ form of ‘diplomatic’ representation. Back.

Note 108: It is a little unexpected that non-residential accreditations should have gone down in number in November 1998. Press reports gave the impression that this was not the case. However, by June 1999 they had gone up considerably. Back.

Note 109: This increase is also an interesting and noteworthy development. Back.

Note 110: Greg Mills, ‘South Africa and Asia: New opportunities, lessons and dilemmas’, in Carlsnaes & Muller, Change and South African External Relations , p.192; Mission Address and Telephone List, 27 January 1997, p.23; South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997 , p.465. Back.

Note 111: See, for example, Beeld, 24 October 1997, p.17. Media Statement of the DFA, 22 December 1997. Back.

Note 112: Die Burger, 4 July 1998, p.9. Back.

Note 113: Muller, ‘The Diplomacy of Reintegration: South Africa Back into the Fold’. See the South African Yearbook of International Affairs, for a useful listing of South African state visits. Back.

Note 114: Though not ‘pure’ summitry, one could refer to Mbeki’s attendance at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 28-31 January 2000. (THE PRESIDENCY (2000) President Thabo Mbeki to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos . Pretoria: The Presidency <> (published 26 January 2000, accessed 21 February 2000). The WEF brings together both political and business leaders to discuss economic, financial and technological trends and issues of global importance. Back.

Note 115: For more details see: Muller, South African Diplomacy and Security Complex Theory, pp. 27-33. Since stepping down as president, Mandela has assumed the role of unofficial ‘peacemaker’ or ‘track two diplomat’ in African crises such as Burundi. See: The Citizen , 25 February 2000, p. 11. Back.

Note 116: For a useful listing of the international agreements, bilateral and multilateral, entered into by South Africa, see the regular feature on Treaties in the South African Yearbook of International Law , as well as a similar feature in the Foreign Relations section of South Africa Yearbook . Back.

Note 117: South Africa Yearbook 1997, pp.192-3. Back.

Note 118: Ibid, pp.203-4. Mills, ‘South African Foreign Policy: The Year in Review’, 1996, p.6; Greg Mills, ‘South Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement’, in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997 , p.160. Back.

Note 119: The Star , 10 December 1998, p.2. Back.

Note 120: See Media Statement of the DFA, 3 March 1997. For a critical assessment of this new initiative, see Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, ‘A Sceptical view of South Africa within the IOR-ARC’, The South African Journal of International Affairs , Vol 5, No 1, Summer 1997, pp.97-109. Back.

Note 121: See for example: the DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996 ; the South African Yearbook of International Affairs; the Foreign Relations section in the South Africa Yearbook; and the regular feature on South African participation in international organisations in the South African Yearbook of International Law. Back.

Note 122: DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1995 (MB1/96) & DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996 (MB1/97). Back.

Note 123: Department of Foreign Affairs List, June 1999, as well as Bilateral Relations , above. Back.

Note 124: See DFA Multilateral Branch Annual Report 1996 , p. 6. Back.

Note 125: The Thematic Review: Strategic Planning document asserts that South Africa should assume ‘a higher, more assertive and effective profile and engagement in international institutions’ and that involvement in international organisations will be prioritised taking into account ‘progressive proximity’ and considerations of where the greatest benefit can be obtained given limited resources. Also see: Greg Mills, ‘A Passion for Affairs’, Leadership, November 1998, p.48. Back.

Note 126: Evans & Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations , p. 162. One could also use the term in a broader sense to refer simply to the transferral of something from one international actor to another or from one actor to the global system. Thus, it is possible to refer to the ‘export’ of technology or knowledge or even of an idea or an ideology. Back.

Note 127: Ibid, p. 163. Back.

Note 128: See for example: N.A. Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, unpublished Masters thesis, Rhodes University, 1994, chapter 2. Also see: B.H. Sterley, Exports and economic growth: a test of causality in South Africa , unpublished MCom-thesis, University of Natal, 1994. Back.

Note 129: See, for example, Dot Keet’s presentation during the Consultative Conference in Preparation for the WTO Seattle Ministerial and the Upcoming Round of Multilateral Negotiations, 24-25 August 1999. < > (publication 11 October 1999, accessed 8 November 1999). Back.

Note 130: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, p. 78. Back.

Note 131: D.J.J. Jacobs, Implikasies van die aanbevelings van die Uruguay-Rondte van die AOTH op Uitvoerbevordering in Suid-Afrika, unpublished Masters thesis, Potchefstroom University, 1995, p. 25. For a fuller discussion of this period, see Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, chapter 3.
For an interesting comparison between import-substituting industrialisation and export-promoting industrialisation in ‘dependent capitalist countries’, see: Robin Luckham, ‘Militarism: force, class and international conflict’, in Richard Little & Michael Smith (eds), Perspectives on World Politics, 2 nd edition, London & New York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 372-3. Back.

Note 132: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, p. 59. Back.

Note 133: Ibid. Also see: Jacobs, Implikasies van die aanbevelings van die Uruguay-Rondte van die AOTH op Uitvoerbevordering in Suid-Afrika, chapter 3. Back.

Note 134: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, p. 78. South Africa could also learn from the experiences of other countries at the time. See for example Barend Vries, Export Promotion Policies , World Bank Staff Working Papers, Number 313, Washington: World Bank, 1979. Also see: C.V.R. Wait, Suid-Afrika se uitvoerbevorderingsbeleid en die versoenbaarheid met die Algemene Ooreenkoms Insake Tariewe en Handel, unpublished document, University of Port Elizabeth, 1987; D.G. Caras, Export Promotion and the Export Effort in South Africa , unpublished MBA-thesis, University of Cape Town, 1978; C.V.R. Wait, Uitvoerbevordering in Ekonomies-Historiese Perspektief , unpublished DCom-thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1977. Back.

Note 135: See Karen Swart, ‘SA se uitvoer op groei gerig’, Finansies & Tegniek, 9 January 1998, p. 16. Also see: Jacobs, Implikasies van die aanbevelings van die Uruguay-Rondte van die AOTH op Uitvoerbevordering in Suid-Afrika ; Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade . Back.

Note 136: Swart, ‘SA se uitvoer op groei gerig’, p. 16. Back.

Note 137: William Minter, ‘Special Report: United States and Africa: Starting Points for a New Policy, Framework’, Foreign Policy in Focus. Internet Gateway to Foreign Policy. Interhemispheric Resource Center & Institute for Policy Studies <> (updated 5 November 1999, accessed 19 February 2000). Back.

Note 138: See for example the address of Dr. Mathole Motshekga, then Premier of Gauteng, on the occasion of the opening of the Export-Import Bank of China, 2 March 1999; Minister Alex Erwin’s address, referred to below (note 18). Back.

Note 139: Swart, ‘SA se uitvoer op groei gerig’, p. 16. Back.

Note 140: Ibid. Back.

Note 141: Patrick McGowan, ‘The global informational economy and South Africa’, in Walter Carlsnaes & Marie Muller, eds., Change and South African External Relations, Midrand: International Thomson Publishing, 1997, p.299. Also see Kuseni Dlamini, ‘South Africa in the Global Economy’, and Chris Stals, ‘The Need for Longer-Term Structural Economic Adjustment in South Africa’, both in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000 , Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1999, for a fuller discussion of the changing macro-economic environment, changes and problems in the South African economy. Back.

Note 142: Also see the following interesting article dealing with a framework for helping SA exporters reach their full potential: Jonathan Calof & Wilma Viviers, ‘The promotion of exports in South Africa’, Africa Insight , Volume 25, Number 4, 1995, pp. 248-53. This article focuses on what can be done domestically to encourage firms to export goods and services, rather than on the foreign policy/economic diplomacy aspect that interests us here. Back.

Note 143: Consultative Conference in Preparation for the WTO Seattle Ministerial and the Upcoming Round of Multilateral Negotiations, 24-25 August 1999 . < > (publication 11 October 1999, accessed 8 November 1999). Also see: Finansies & Tegniek , 14 January 2000, p. 16. Back.

Note 144: Briefing by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nkosazana Zuma. (2000) < > (publication 8 February 2000, accessed 21 February 2000). Back.

Note 145: M.E. Muller, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Verteenwoordiging (1910-1972) , Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1976, chapter 3. Back.

Note 146: See Ibid, p. 51 for a fuller discussion of the functions performed by, for example, Eric Louw who was South Africa’s first trade commissioner in North America. Before his appointment in 1925, the trade commissioner attached to the High Commission in London, was also responsible for promoting South African exports to the United States and Canada. Back.

Note 147: Muller, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Verteenwoordiging. Also see: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, p.1. Back.

Note 148: For details see: Muller, Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Verteenwoordiging. Also see: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, chapter 5. Back.

Note 149: For a full discussion of South Africa’s isolation see: Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States , Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1990. It should be noted that South Africa’s external economic relations had become a prime target of the isolaters (Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, p. 3). Back.

Note 150: See for example: Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress since 1960 , London & New York: Tauris, 1996. Back.

Note 151: Jacobs, Implikasies van die aanbevelings van die Uruguay-Rondte van die AOTH op Uitvoerbevordering in Suid-Afrika, p. 25. Also see: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade. Back.

Note 152: It is not possible to analyse this aspect in any detail here as the focus is on the post-1994 period. For some useful information, see: Dullabh, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade. Back.

Note 153: For some detail on SA foreign representation and the structure of the DFA during the years 1972-1994 – reflecting the relative importance/weight of economic diplomacy – see: Marie Muller, ‘South Africa’s Changing External Relations’, in Murray Faure & Jan-Erik Lane (eds.), South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions , London: Sage, 1996, pp. 121-150; Muller, ‘The institutional dimension: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Missions’. Back.

Note 154: South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook , 1997, p. 255. Back.

Note 155: Ibid. A separate directorate, the Directorate: Financial Assistance Schemes , is responsible for a variety of schemes to financially assist export promotion (pp. 255-6). Also seen as part of the ‘support package’ for export, are the establishment of industrial development zones and investment finance (see: Swart, ‘SA se uitvoer op groei gerig’, p. 17.) Back.

Note 156: Muller, The Foreign Ministry of South Africa: from isolation to integration to coherency. Back.

Note 157: Greg Mills, ‘South African Foreign Policy: The Year in Review’, in South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1996, p. 5. Back.

Note 158: Martin Creamer, ‘Rustomjee outlines trades mission strategy’, Engineering News , 3 May 1996, p. 13. Back.

Note 159: Johan Coetzee, ‘Handel en buitelandse sake dalk een’, Finansies & Tegniek , 49/46, 21 November 1997. Back.

Note 160: See: Ibid . Back.

Note 161: Ibid. Back.

Note 162: See: Ibid . Back.

Note 163: Ibid. For more details about the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and in particular Austrade, the Australian Trade Commission, the federal government’s export and investment facilitation agency, see: AUSTRADE: AUSTRALIAN GOVT EXPORT FACILITATION AGENCY, < > (accessed on 21 February 2000). Back.

Note 164: Peter Fabricius, ‘Virtuosity Versus Bureaucracy’, South African Yearbook of International Affairs , 1999/2000, p. 220. Back.

Note 165: Ibid. Also see: Garth le Pere & Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, ‘Making foreign policy in South Africa’, in Philip Nel & Patrick J. McGowan (eds.), Power, Wealth and Global Order, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1999, p. 206, where Erwin is described as ‘the chief steward of South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade diplomacy’. Back.

Note 166: Stephen Laufer, ‘SA to beef up foreign service’, Business Day , 20 July 1998, p. 5. Back.

Note 167: DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1999) Briefing by Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo . Cape Town: DFA < > (published 8 February 1999, accessed 19 Augustus 1999). Back.

Note 168: John Dludlu, ‘Trade, foreign affairs rivalries delay talks’, Business Day, 24 November 1999, p.5. Back.

Note 169: Ibid. Back.

Note 170: Telephonic interview with Ms Karen Lingenfelder, Deputy Director of :FS of the Subdirectorate: Global Economic Affairs, Directorate: International Development and Economic Affairs, Chief Directorate: Multilateral Development and Economic Affairs, DFA, 2 March 2000. Back.

Note 171: Ibid. Back.

Note 172: DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (2000) Foreign Offices. < > (updated 25 February 2000, accessed 29 February 2000). It is interesting to note that though this home page was dated 25 February 2000, the details pertaining to China (PRC) and Taiwan had not been rectified to bring it in line with the change in diplomatic relations between South Africa and these two countries that was effected at the end of 1997 – see above. Back.

Note 173: Ibid. Back.

Note 174: See for example: Swart, ‘SA se uitvoer op groei gerig’, p. 17. Back.

Note 175: Telephonic interview with Ms Lingenfelder, 2 March 2000. Back.

Note 176: Ibid. Back.

Note 177: Ibid. Back.

Note 178: Ibid. Back.

Note 179: Ibid. Back.

Note 180: Telephonic interview between the author’s research assistant, Ms Odette Hartslief, and a DTI official, March 2000. Back.

Note 181: Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, ‘Making foreign policy in South Africa’, p. 206. Back.

Note 182: See for example discussions during the Consultative Conference in Preparation for the WTO Seattle Ministerial and the Upcoming Round of Multilateral Negotiations, 24-25 August 1999. < > (publication 11 October 1999, accessed 8 November 1999). Also see: Wilhelm Smalberger, ‘Lessons learnt by South Africa during the Negotiations’, in Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Greg Mills & Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union, Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2000, pp. 49-50: ‘We would be wise to revisit our institutional make-up and the way we organise ourselves during international deliberations’. Back.

Note 183: Telephonic interview with Ms Lingenfelder, 2 March 2000. Back.

Note 184: See above. Back.

Note 185: For details of the EU/SA negotiations, that took place over a six year period from 1994 to 1999 and the fruits of which were to take effect in January 2000, see for example: Bertelsmann-Scott, Mills & Sidiropoulos (eds.), The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, Southern Africa and the European Union, 2000; South African Business and the Europan Union in the Context of the New Trade and Development Agreement , Seminar Report, Konrad –Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University, 18 June 1999; Fred Ahwireng-Obeng & Patrick J. McGowan, ‘The EU-SA Free Trade Arrangements’, South African Journal of International Affairs, Volume 6, Number 1, Summer 1998, pp. 101-12.
The dispute that erupted between South Africa and some EU members about the use of the names ‘grappa’ and ‘ouzo’ treatened the implementation of the agreement. This was finally resolved in February 2000, when the SA Cabinet accepted an EU proposal to end the dispute by making the WTO the final arbiter of whether these names should be protected (Wyndham Hartley, Patrick Wadula, I-Net Bridge and Reuters, ‘Govt accepts EU trade compromise’, Business Day, 17 February 2000, p. 1. Back.

Note 186: Telephonic interview with Ms Lingenfelder, 2 March 2000. Back.

Note 187: Also see: Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, ‘Making foreign policy in South Africa’, p. 206; Talitha Bertelsmann, ‘Trade Integration in Southern Africa’, South African Journal of International Affairs, Volume 6, Number 1, Summer 1998, pp. 47-51. Back.

Note 188: Telephonic interview with Ms Lingenfelder, 2 March 2000. Back.

Note 189: See for example: John Fraser, ‘Mbeki seeks world support’, The Star , 8 November 1999, p. 5. Back.

Note 190: Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, ‘Making foreign policy in South Africa’, p. 204. Back.

Note 191: Herbert and Fabricius, ‘Zuma scores an A in her 100-day baptism of fire’, p. 11. Back.

Note 192: Marc Hasenfuss, ‘Nzo to help forge trade links to China’, Saturday Star , 7 August 1999, p. 1. Back.

Note 193: ‘Dr Zuma in Europe for trade talks’, The Citizen , 21 January 2000, p. 11. Back.

Note 194: South Africa Yearbook , 1997, p. 256. Back.

Note 195: This was discussed more fully in Muller, The Foreign Ministry of South Africa: from isolation to integration to coherency , presented at the Conference on Foreign Ministries: change and adaptation, London, UK, 5-7 February 1997, also published in revised form in Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries. Change and Adaptation, London: Macmillan, 1999. Also see: address of Dr. Mathole Motshekga, then Premier of Gauteng, on the occasion of the opening of the Export-Import Bank of China, 2 March 1999; address of Dr. Mathole Motshekga, then Premier of Gauteng, at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing,1999; speech in honour of King Carlos of Spain by Dr. Mathole Motshekga, then Premier of Gauteng, February 1999. Back.

Note 196: See Greg Mills, ‘Our renaissance offers Africa a set of ideals and values’, Business Day, 4 February 1999, p. 11. Back.

Note 197: Old Dogs and New Tricks? South Africa, Foreign Policy, Business and the African Renaissance . Address to the Pretoria Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs, 3 December 1998. Back.

Note 198: Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age , A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age, Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1998, p. vii. Back.

Note 199: Ibid, p. 71. Back.

Note 200: Ibid, p. 77. Back.

Note 201: Compare Donna Lee’s findings on the role of Britain in the Kennedy Trade Round in the 1960’s ( Middle Powers and Commercial Diplomacy. British Influence at the Kennedy Trade Round, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 146. Dullabh, ‘South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: towards a diplomacy of trade, chapter 5, had a number of suggestions as to the skills and knowledge that South African diplomats would have to acquire to be effective in trade diplomacy. Back.

Note 202: See Marcia Klein, ‘SA’s wine exports grow despite strong competition’, Business Day, 13 January 2000, p. 4. Back.

Note 203: Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial Policy. Positive and Negative Sanctions in a New World Order, Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar, 1994, p. 163. Back.

Note 204: Africa Confidential, 15 March 1996. Back.

Note 205: Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Trade Ties’, South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 1999/2000 , p. 441. Back.