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CIAO DATE: 3/99
Domestic Politics and International Relations in Trade Policymaking:
The United States and Japan and the Gatt Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations
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Columbia University
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
This paper is circulated for discussion and comment only and should not be quoted without permission of the author.
Linked to American efforts to achieve trade liberalization through trade negotiations has been the recognition of the need not only to improve American trade policymaking processes, but also to analyze more effectively other countries' trade policymaking processes.
In order to address these needs, this paper, which is a summary of my Columbia University Political Science dissertation, develops a contextual two-level game approach that can be used to analyze trade policymaking.
The first part of this paper sets forth the contextual two-level game approach to analyzing trade policymaking. The second part of this paper demonstrates how the contextual two-level game approach can be used to analyze American and Japanese trade policymaking, and U.S.-Japan trade negotiations. The third part of this paper uses the contextual two-level game approach to examine American and Japanese trade policymaking and U.S.-Japan trade negotiations during a particular trade negotiation — the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations (1986-1994). The paper concludes by assessing the effectiveness of the contextual two-level game approach, and suggesting areas for further research.
I. The Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyzing Trade Policymaking
There is both a practical and a theoretical need to better understand the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in trade policymaking. From a practical perspective, efforts to unify the world trading system and globalization have increased the need to better understand and coordinate various countries' trade policies. Such coordination requires better managing the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in trade policymaking. From a theoretical perspective, as Robert Putnam has emphasized, while "[e]mpirical illustrations of reciprocal influence between domestic and international affairs abound," what is needed are "concepts and theories that will help us to organize and extend our empirical observations." 1
James Caporaso identifies three different ways of exploring the relationship between domestic politics and international relations 2 — two-level games 3 ; the second image reversed 4 ; and Caporaso's domestification of international politics approach. 5 This paper focuses on the two-level game approach, which has been developed in the work of Putnam 6 ; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 7 ; Milner 8 , and Schoppa 9 .
The contextual two-level game approach developed in this paper is distinct from earlier work concerning two-level games because it focuses on the relationship between domestic politics and international relations concerning a particular issue area — trade policymaking. Similar to Schoppa's Bargaining with Japan, this paper refines Putnam's two-level game approach by focusing on U.S.-Japan trade negotiations.
However, in contrast to Schoppa's Bargaining with Japan and Milner's Interests, Institutions, and Information 10 , this paper starts from a broader and more comparative perspective. The contextual two-level game approach to analyzing trade policymaking involves a two-step process. The first step requires determining which domestic and international factors are relevant to analyzing a country's trade policymaking during a particular trade negotiation. The second step involves the designing and testing of a series of hypotheses concerning the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in the countries involved in a particular trade negotiation.
Developing such an approach to analyzing trade policymaking is best done by using a strategy that blends the strengths and weaknesses of a variable-oriented and a case-study-oriented approach. 11
The First Step: Identifying the Relevant Domestic and International Factors
The general features of a country's trade policymaking process can be specified in terms of variables that represent the fundamental attributes of trade policymaking.
One way of conceptualizing the relationships between these variables is by designing a comparative framework of trade policymaking, as is done in Diagram 1. In constructing such a comparative framework of trade policymaking, it is necessary to strike a bargain between theoretical parsimony and the complexity of the trade policymaking process.
| Diagram 1: A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK OF TRADE POLICYMAKING |
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The domestic level of the comparative framework of trade policymaking set forth in Diagram 1 consists of three variables — the state [bureaucracy], the legislature, and other actors in the policymaking process. 12 Since the major negotiator is often somewhere within the state [bureaucracy], the state [bureaucracy] plays a major role in trade policymaking. 13 Constitutional rules help to determine the organizational structure or set of laws and institutional arrangements that govern the legislature's role in trade policymaking. 14 Other actors in the policymaking process reflect the preferences of particular social forces, political groups or classes in society that are struggling for influence in the trade policymaking process. 15
At the domestic level, many diverse actors, whose alliances may shift, participate in trade policymaking. The formations of coalitions between elements of the state [bureaucracy], the legislature, and other actors are affected by the structure of domestic preferences, the nature of domestic political institutions, and the distribution of information. 16
At the international level, the nature of the international system, including the international trade regime 17 and the position of a particular country in the international political economy 18 affect a country's trade policymaking. As well, a country's desire to cooperate 19 , the number of countries involved in a particular trade negotiation 20 , and countries' negotiating strategies 21 can affect a country's trade policymaking.
The domestic and international variables set forth in Diagram 1 are all interrelated and constitute a comparative framework of trade policymaking that can be used to analyze and compare the trade policymaking of various countries. By studying the correlation between the variables in the framework and comparing their correlation across countries, empirical generalizations can be made about trade policymaking in and among countries. Through such research, a typology of various forms of trade policymaking can be developed, although the full elaboration of such a typology is beyond the scope of this paper.
The Second Step: Analyzing the Relationship Between Domestic Politics and International Relations in a Trade Negotiation Between Two or More Countries
In order to analyze the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in a trade negotiation between two or more countries, it is necessary to conceptualize the trade negotiation as a whole. 22 Thus, a two-country trade negotiation between Country A and B can be conceptualized as follows:
| Diagram 2 |
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| Diagram 3 |
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Cultural factors, the history of past relations, the possibility of future relations, and conflict tendencies within the relationships between two or more countries can affect international trade negotiations. Problems resulting from information asymmetries, role allocation, and incentives can affect a particular trade negotiation. 23
The individual who negotiates for a particular country occupies a role in between the domestic politics of his or her country and the negotiator on the other side. The negotiator must negotiate in two directions at the same time — both with actors in the domestic politics of his or her own country and with the negotiator from the other country. 24
Thus, to fully understand such negotiations it is necessary to understand not only the domestic politics concerning the negotiation within each country, but also the relationship between the negotiators of the countries involved. As a result, describing such negotiations becomes "complicated and nuanced." 25
Important questions that can be asked about a particular trade negotiation, include:
This paper focuses on the last of these questions and its relation to international trade cooperation, and addresses the question "To what extent does domestic politics affect the degree of cooperation achieved in an international trade negotiation?"
In order to answer this question, this paper examines a series of "if, then" testable, clearly falsifiable hypotheses concerning the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in trade policymaking. 27
First, concerning the relationship between the structure of domestic preferences and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Second, concerning the relationship between domestic political institutions and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Third, concerning the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Also, this paper examines four hypotheses derived from negotiation studies concerning advice on best practices to be followed in negotiations:
II. Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze American and Japanese Trade Policymaking and U.S.-Japan Trade Negotiations
The following paragraphs describe how the contextual two-level game approach can be used to analyze American and Japanese trade policymaking and U.S.-Japan trade negotiations.
Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze American Trade Policymaking
A framework of American trade policymaking can be derived from the comparative framework of trade policymaking set forth in Diagram 1. Such a framework is set forth in Diagram 4.
| Diagram 4: A FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICYMAKING |
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At the domestic level, the key players in American trade policymaking are the USTR, the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State, the relevant Congressional committees, and the affected industries or interest groups. Congress and the Executive Branch struggle between themselves to manage American trade policy, at the same time that they remain responsive to pressure from other actors concerning trade policymaking. 35 In conducting its international trade policy, during the postwar period, the United States has acted through the GATT, and now the WTO, as a hegemonic power, supporting "the interdependence principles of liberalization and multilateralism in the global trade regime." 36
The extent which domestic politics affects the degree of cooperation achieved by the United States in an international trade negotiation, can be examined by testing the following hypotheses.
First, concerning the relationship between the structure of American domestic preferences and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Second, concerning the relationship between American domestic political institutions and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Third, concerning the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Also, four hypotheses concerning how American trade negotiators might more effectively manage the relationship between domestic politics and their efforts to achieve international trade cooperation can be examined. 38
Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze Japanese Trade Policymaking
A framework of Japanese trade policymaking can be derived from the comparative framework of trade policymaking set forth in Diagram 1. Such a framework is set forth in Diagram 5.
| Diagram 5: A FRAMEWORK OF JAPANESE TRADE POLICYMAKING |
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The key domestic players in Japanese trade policymaking are the LDP, MITI, and the ministries concerned, as well as importing and exporting companies and the Japanese business associations. 39 While the bureaucracy has always maintained an important role in trade policymaking, the LDP, when it has been dominant in the Diet, has exerted substantial influence on trade policymaking. As the postwar period has progressed, Japan has emerged as a major actor in an international trade regime that it played little part in creating. As a result, Japan has had to cope with increased calls for the liberalization of its traditionally more closed economy.
The extent to which domestic politics affects the degree of cooperation achieved by Japan in an international trade negotiation can be examined by testing the following hypotheses:
First, concerning the relationship between the structure of Japanese domestic preferences and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Second, concerning the relationship between Japanese domestic political institutions and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Third, concerning the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of cooperation achieved,
Also, a number of hypotheses concerning how Japanese trade negotiators might most effectively manage the relationship between domestic politics and their efforts to achieve international trade cooperation can be examined. 40
Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze U.S.-Japan Trade Negotiations
Using the conceptualization of a bilateral negotiation set forth earlier in Diagram 2, a U.S.-Japan trade negotiation can be very simply conceptualized as follows:
| Diagram 6 |
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A multilateral U.S.-Japan negotiation can be depicted by expanding the above diagram to include other countries, as suggested by Diagram 3.
After considering cultural factors, the history of past relations, the possibility of future relations, and conflict tendencies within the relationship between the United States and Japan 41 , the extent to which domestic politics affects the degree of cooperation achieved in a particular U.S.-Japan trade negotiation can be analyzed by testing a series of hypotheses similar to those set forth earlier concerning American and Japanese trade policymaking. 42
Also, a number of hypotheses concerning how American and Japanese trade negotiators might more effectively manage the relationship between domestic politics and their efforts to achieve cooperation in international trade negotiations can be examined. 43
III. Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze a Particular Trade Negotiation — American and Japanese Trade Policymaking and U.S.-Japan Trade Negotiations during the GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations
The following pages demonstrate how the contextual two-level game approach can be used to examine the extent to which domestic politics affects the degree of international trade cooperation in a particular trade negotiation.
While recognizing the dangers of developing an approach to analyzing trade policymaking by concentrating on a single case study, this paper focuses on the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations for three reasons. First, because, since 1948, when the GATT came into effect, until January 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created, the GATT served as the basis for the most comprehensive trade policy process at the time — the postwar series of Rounds of GATT negotiations through which the GATT evolved from an international trade treaty to a form of multilateral trade institution which has a large number of signatories whose domestic politics affect and are affected by their relationship to the GATT. Second, because agriculture was one of the issues in the Uruguay Round that was most influenced by domestic politics. Third, because agricultural negotiations were of particular importance to the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. 44
In order to limit the scope of research, this paper focuses on the countries with the two largest single-state 45 economies among the signatories of the GATT — the United States and Japan. This paper covers the negotiations from the September 1986 Punta del Este Conference — which marks the beginning of the Uruguay Round — to the April 15, 1994 signing of the Uruguay Round agreement in Marrakech, Morocco, and the late 1994 passage of the Uruguay Round agreements by the American and Japanese governments. 46
Postwar American and Japanese Agriculture Policy and U.S.-Japan Agricultural Trade Negotiations
Before analyzing American and Japanese trade policymaking and U.S.-Japan trade negotiations during the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations, it is important to place the negotiations in historical context.
American and Japanese agricultural policies have historically been quite different. American agricultural policy has generally been quite market-oriented. In contrast, Japanese agricultural policy has been marked by "a highly interventionist approach, guided by a long-range strategy which seeks to target specific commodities for development by Japanese farmers." 47 During the postwar period, the United States has always been an agricultural exporter, while Japan has become increasingly less self-sufficient in agriculture.
Between 1945 and 1952, the American government continued production restraint programs under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, while supporting "the interdependence principles of liberalization and multilateralism in the global trade regime." 48 The principal objectives of Japanese agricultural policy were to provide staple food supplies through the implementation of the 1942 Food Control Law, and to "alleviate hunger, to carry out national land reform, and to create employment opportunities, as well as to democratize rural society." 49
From 1953 to the early 1960s, the United States sought to export its growing agricultural surpluses. In contrast, the Japanese government supported agricultural development along with manufacturing, in order "to maintain the income of farmers relative to the wages of urban workers," 50 while Japan reasserted itself into the world economy, becoming a member of GATT and other international institutions, and began to gradually liberalize imports. 51
From the early 1960s to mid-1970s, the United States "emphasized the export of basic commodities, and achieved remarkable success with that strategy" as world markets suddenly expanded. 52 As American trade hegemony lessened starting in the mid-1960s, the United States "from the Kennedy Round on began to favor the interdependence principle of agricultural trade liberalization over the sovereignty principle of exemptionalism," and "was more willing to incorporate agriculture in the GATT framework." 53 During the GATT Kennedy Round (1963-1967), nontariff trade barriers, so important in agricultural trade policy, "were first systematically discussed with a view toward possible negotiation." 54 During the same period, Japan was transformed from "a relatively small country exporting primarily labor-intensive goods" to an important actor in the world economy that exported sophisticated machinery. 55 While agriculture's share in Japan's overall economic output declined, Japan lagged behind other industrial economies in reducing the size of its agricultural labor force. Japan came to have a high self-sufficiency ratio for food for the consumer, such as rice, but also began to heavily rely on foreign sources for raw-material types of agricultural products. 56
Between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, the United States confronted increased competition in the international market for many agricultural products such as grains, citrus, and rice. From the beginning of the Reagan administration, the gradual but steady appreciation of the dollar versus other major currencies affected the United States' preeminence in export markets, and led to an "overall contraction in world agricultural trade." 57 The principal U.S. response was "to criticize subsidized agricultural exporters as unfair traders and to call for more free trade, while watching U.S. market share shrink." 58 Japan came to assume a much larger percentage of world industrial production and trade. 59 Japanese agricultural policy focused on gradual structural adjustments, such as the beginning of the liberalization of beef and oranges, as part of a transition to more of a full-time system of commercial farming that would more closely match domestic production with consumption. The United States insisted on greater access to Japan's agricultural market, while Japan occasionally used gaiatsu (foreign pressure) to promote domestic agricultural reform. The GATT Tokyo Round (1974-1979) led to not only "specific tariff and import quota concessions," but also to the establishment of "behavioral codes" and "international consultative agreements for dairy products, beef, and general agricultural policy." 60
From 1986 to 1994, the United States continued to criticize subsidized agricultural exporters as unfair traders, even though agricultural exports as a percentage of total American exports increased. "The return to foodgrain surpluses and the loss of U.S. market share" in the late 1980s "pushed the United States to adopt a much more aggressive stance" towards agricultural trade. 61 As Japan emerged as the second largest economy in the world, Japanese domestic efforts at deregulation were often linked to international trade negotiations. As the American trade deficit with Japan increased dramatically, US-Japan trade friction escalated, and the opening of Japan's closed rice market became an objective for American rice producers.
The GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations
Between 1986 and 1994, the GATT Uruguay Round was negotiated. Because of the mounting fiscal difficulties resulting from the Common Agricultural Program in the EC and from agricultural subsidies in Japan, both the EC and Japan were more willing in the Uruguay Round than they had been in the GATT Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds to pursue comprehensive "fundamental agricultural trade reform." Thus, such reform became "a key element" in the Punta del Este Declaration with which the Uruguay Round began in September 1986. 62
Between early 1987 and November 1988, a split developed between the American and the EC and Japanese negotiating positions concerning agricultural reform. A July 1987 United States proposal called for "the elimination over a 10-year period, of all export subsidies, all barriers to each other's markets (including tariffs and quotas), and all domestic subsidies that affect trade." 63 Japan did not welcome this proposal, particularly because of its impact on Japan's closed rice market. 64 In contrast, the EC's October 1987 proposal stressed the need for a more gradual reduction of protection for domestic farmers, and was more in line with Japan's thinking. 65
The impasse between the United States and the EC and Japan over agricultural reform delayed the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round Midterm Review. The Midterm Review was supposed to be concluded in Montreal in December 1988, but was delayed until April 1989, when the United States finally agreed to the compromise language which GATT Director General Dunkel proposed — long-term "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection, sustained over an agreed period of time." 66
In October 1989, the United States introduced the concept of comprehensive tariffication of agriculture in a revised proposal to liberalize global farm trade that called for "the conversion of all non-tariff barriers in agriculture into tariffs and the progressive phasing down of these tariffs over a period of ten years." 67 While Japan opposed this tariffication-without-exception plan until the end of the GATT Uruguay Round, the European Community by June 1990 began to prepare "its own tariffication scheme." 68
Partially as a result of "the lack of an agreed framework for negotiations in agriculture," the December 1990 Brussels Ministerial meeting which was supposed to conclude the Uruguay Round came to a close without concluding the Round. 69
On December 20, 1991, Arthur Dunkel, Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, in an effort to conclude the GATT Uruguay Round, presented the "Draft Final Act" which covered all issues in the Uruguay Round. After January 1992, the "Draft Final Act" was discussed, the United States and EC reached the so-called Blair House accord in November 1992, Japan announced its rice liberalization decision in December 1993, the negotiations were concluded with the signing of the final agreement in Marrakech, Morocco in April 1994, and the Uruguay Round agreement was approved by the American and Japanese governments in late 1994.
Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze American Trade Policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations
American trade policymaking concerning the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations occurred in the midst of debates between the executive and legislature concerning how best to conduct American trade policy. By the mid-1980s, American agriculture was "squeezed by the worst collapse in farm-asset values in a half century." As a result, the 1985 farm bill was designed "to maintain farm income, to expand American agricultural exports, and to contain or reduce federal budget expenditures on farm price and income supports." 71 These policies were coupled with efforts to reduce agricultural subsidies in the GATT Uruguay Round. 72 American proposals for agricultural reform during the Uruguay Round "were more broad ranging than ever before, and U.S. threats to link the agricultural talks with the outcome of the entire round were more serious." 73
There was a general consensus within the USTR, and Departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce in favor of the incorporation of the comprehensive tariffication of agriculture into the Uruguay Round negotiations. As a result of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Congress came to play an increasingly important role in the evolution, implementation and oversight of the negotiations. The Rice Millers Association petitioned the United States government to pressure Japan to open up its closed rice market in 1986 at the start of the Uruguay Round, and before the 1988 election, by filing Section 301 petitions with the USTR.
While the Bush administration identified the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round as its "highest trade priority," 74 the Bush administration was not able to conclude the Uruguay Round before leaving office, but achieved the Blair House Accord concerning agriculture with the EC in November 1992.
During the Clinton administration, the negotiations were concluded, and the final agreement was signed. The House ratified the agreement and passed implementing legislation in late November 1994 by a 288-146 bipartisan vote, followed by the Senate in December 1994 by a 76-24 vote.
While the extent of agricultural reform advocated was gradually reduced in successive negotiating stances during the Bush and Clinton administrations, the comprehensiveness of reform advocated by the United States was not substantially altered throughout the Uruguay Round. As a result, the concessions which the United States finally made in terms of market access, domestic support measures, and export subsidies were already anticipated and not that controversial domestically, 75 although many American agricultural interest groups wish more could have been achieved. 76
In order to determine the extent to which American domestic politics affected the degree of cooperation achieved by the United States in the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural trade negotiations, the validity of the various hypotheses concerning American trade policymaking set forth in Section II can be assessed.
First, as for the relationship between the structure of domestic preferences and the degree of cooperation achieved, since the distribution of institutional powers within the United States favored the United States negotiating a global accord concerning agricultural trade liberalization, the United States was able to aggressively pursue such a multilateral agreement.
Second, as for the relationship between American domestic political institutions and the degree of cooperation achieved, there was relatively little division within the American government concerning the incorporation of agriculture into the GATT. This made cooperation more likely, because it made ratification more likely, and therefore Congress did not exert so much influence over the terms of the agricultural agreement.
Third, as for the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of cooperation achieved, since interest groups like the Rice Millers' Association encouraged the American government to pressure the Japanese government to liberalize its rice market, Congress was likely to endorse the results of the negotiation and thus the chances for the American government to convince other countries to cooperate increased.
As for the extent to which advice on best practices was followed by American negotiators during the negotiations, American negotiators were keenly aware of America's interests, needs, resources, and capabilities. This was because of Congress' increased monitoring of the negotiations which was required by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, and the necessity of Congress having to ratify the final agreement.
As for American trade negotiators' efforts to understand Japan's interests, needs and perspectives, early in the negotiations, during the Reagan administration, the United States, concerned mainly about losing its share of the European agricultural market, asserted an ambitious reform proposal without much consideration of the proposal's impact on Japan. Partially because America is the world's largest food exporter and because the market access negotiations involved minor concessions that would not have a significant impact on American's relatively open agricultural markets, American negotiators, in their efforts to reduce EC agricultural subsidies, initially paid little attention to Japanese domestic politics and seemed unaware of the extent to which discussions of the possible tariffication and liberalization of the Japanese rice market were politically sensitive. As the negotiations wore on, American negotiators became more aware of the bind that American advocacy of a sweeping agricultural trade reform placed Japan in.
Efforts by American trade negotiators to establish a strong professional working relationship with Japanese negotiators varied widely during the reigns of three U.S. Trade Representatives during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. American negotiators often found it difficult to empathize with Japan's reluctance to alter its virtual ban on rice imports, while attempting to work with Japanese negotiators to reach an agreement that would successfully conclude the GATT Uruguay Round.
American trade policymakers were initially not as effective as they might have been at packaging the initial proposal in way that identified opportunities where both the United States and Japan could be better off as a result of the agricultural negotiations. This can be argued to have slowed the pace of the negotiations.
Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze Japanese Trade Policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations 77
The 1986-1994 period was marked by the diminished role of the LDP in the Japanese trade policymaking process. 78 The bureaucracy, faced with a series of politically difficult reforms, was more divided, and less allied to the LDP and other political parties than in earlier periods. 79 The previous consensus between business and agriculture, and between the agricultural cooperatives and farmers concerning LDP rule was shattered. For Japan, the inclusion of the tariffication of agriculture in the Uruguay Round forced the Japanese bureaucracy, particularly MAFF, as well as the LDP, to commit themselves more to agricultural policy reform than they originally intended to do at the beginning of the Uruguay Round.
Agricultural policy reform became an important issue in Japan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, emerging as part of the administrative reforms espoused by Yasuhiro Nakasone. The Second Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform asserted that government expenditures for rice, along with expenditures for Japan's National Railway and National Health Insurance, were one of the three main sources of the Japanese budget deficit. A series of government studies, including the First and Second Maekawa Reports, espoused agricultural policy reform, and advocated supporting core farmers, easing import restrictions, and reviewing pricing policies so as to make greater use of market mechanisms. 80
When bilateral agricultural negotiations with the United States in the late 1980s led to bilateral GATT panels which were decided against Japan, partially because of the agricultural-exporter bias of the GATT treaty, Japan became resigned to handling agricultural reform at the multilateral level through the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations. 81 Because agricultural reform was difficult to gain political support for at home, particularly in the highly protected rice sector, Prime Minister Nakasone, in September 1986, opted to simultaneously pursue domestic agricultural reform at the multilateral level through the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.
In order to determine the way in which Japanese domestic politics affected the degree of cooperation achieved by Japan in the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations, the validity of the various hypotheses concerning Japanese trade policymaking set forth in Section II can be assessed.
First, as for the relationship between the structure of domestic preferences and the degree of cooperation achieved, since the distribution of institutional powers within Japan initially favored those who opposed the liberalization of Japan's rice market, cooperation was more difficult, and was greatly affected by those who opposed liberalization. Throughout the negotiations, Japanese negotiators were openly concerned about the extent to which the Japanese Diet would ratify an agreement that included the liberalization of the rice market. An anti-liberalization coalition comprised of bureaucrats from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery (MAFF), certain members of the LDP, the opposition parties, the agricultural cooperatives, most farmers, and consumer organizations opposed Japan signing an international agreement that would involve Japan altering its rice import ban. 82
Second, as for the relationship between Japanese domestic political institutions and the degree of cooperation achieved, contrary to Milner's hypothesis, the less unity there was within the Japanese government, the more likely cooperation became, and the more likely ratification became. The pro-liberalization coalition that emerged included elements of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Japanese business federations, the media, and some consumers and farmers. This pro-liberalization coalition empathized with the United States' desire to sign an international agreement on agricultural liberalization in order to conclude the Uruguay Round. Partially as a result of the efforts at agricultural reform that were undertaken during Prime Minister Nakasone's (1982-1987) and Takeshita's (1987-1989) administrations, the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House in the July 1989 election as individual farmers began to rebel against reductions in government support for agriculture. As economic growth slowed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the previous consensus between business- and consumer-oriented LDP Diet members, Ministry of Finance and MITI bureaucrats, and businessmen in favor of agricultural reform declined. Dissident LDP elements and former opposition parties gathered strength and built a majority coalition within the Japanese Diet around Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. This coalition was in power in late 1993 when Japan announced its agreement to partially liberalize the Japanese rice market in order to conclude the Uruguay Round. Gradually, the views of the pro-liberalization coalition prevailed as Japan announced at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1993 that its rice market would be exempt from tariffication "for a period of six years [from 1995 to 2000] in return for opening its market to imports equivalent to 4 percent to 8 percent of its annual rice consumption, and increasing these imports to 8 percent by the year 2000." 83 As LDP dominance (which included close ties between the LDP and the farmers) diminished, it became more possible for the Diet to ratify an agreement that included some form of liberalization of the rice market. A coalition which included the LDP, but that was led by a Social Democratic Party Prime Minister, Tomiichi Murayama, was in power when the Diet passed the Uruguay Round agreement in late 1994.
Third, as for the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of cooperation achieved, Japanese farmers and business groups played important roles in the anti- and pro-liberalization coalitions, acting as pressure groups and information providers. Agricultural-vote-oriented LDP Diet members allied with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) in order to oppose agricultural liberalization, whereas the internationally-oriented bureaucracies — the Foreign Ministry and MITI —as well as certain factions within the LDP, advocated Japanese agricultural concessions in hopes of easing bilateral tensions. As the pro-liberalization coalition that endorsed the partial liberalization of the Japanese rice market became more influential, the likelihood of the Diet endorsing the results of the negotiation increased.
As for the extent to which advice on best practices was followed by Japanese negotiators during the negotiations, Japanese trade negotiators were caught between domestic coalitions who had conflicting views of Japan's interests, needs, resources, and capabilities. Japanese negotiators ended up adamantly defending Japan's import ban until the end of the negotiations. Throughout the negotiations, Japanese trade negotiators had to work to help those interested parties in Japan in the pro- and anti-liberalization coalitions to understand the value-creating opportunities that existed in the negotiations. Eventually, Japanese trade negotiators were able to achieve their negotiating objectives, which was to promote domestic agricultural reform, though international pressure, but at a slow pace.
While Japanese negotiators publicly defended Japan's import ban until the end of the negotiations, in the end they demonstrated an understanding of the United States' interests, needs and perspective, by agreeing to minimum access provisions for the Japanese rice market in order to conclude the negotiations.
Efforts by Japanese trade negotiators to establish a strong professional working relationship with American negotiators varied. The negotiations involved a large number of Japanese Ministers of MITI, MAFF, MOFA, and MOF who served in a rapid succession of eight administrations — the Nakasone, Takeshita, Uno, Kaifu, Miyazawa, Hosokawa, Hata, and Murayama administrations.
Since Japan opted to hold out until the end of the negotiations before announcing its decision to liberalize the Japanese rice market, Japanese trade policymakers missed some opportunities to explore ways in which both Japan and the United States could be better off as a result of the negotiations.
Using the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyze U.S.-Japan Trade Negotiations during the GATT Uruguay Round Agriculture Negotiations
Several negotiations were being carried on simultaneously. Bilateral U.S.-Japan trade negotiations took place within the context of the larger Uruguay Round negotiation. These interlocked negotiations affected each other.
During the negotiations, American and Japanese negotiators were often negotiating in two or more directions at the same time — both with their own governments and with other actors in American and Japanese domestic politics and with the negotiators from the other governments.
Coalitions like the Cairns Group formed. Japan was among the countries that created a holdout problem, attempting, relatively unsuccessfully, to form a bloc of countries, including South Korea, which would oppose the comprehensive tariffication of agriculture.
Both American and Japanese negotiators held assumptions about each other, themselves, their own countries, and the domestic politics and culture of the other countries. The two countries' relation to the legal culture of the GATT also affected the negotiations. The United States sought for Japan and other countries to cooperate in an international trade regime that the United States had played a large part in creating. For Japan and other countries, how to respond to American overtures for cooperation, often was portrayed as more of a question of how to respond to American coercion.
In order to determine the extent to which American and Japanese domestic politics affected the degree of cooperation achieved in U.S.-Japan trade negotiations during the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations, the validity of the hypotheses set forth earlier can be assessed.
First, as for the relationship between the structure of domestic preferences and the degree of international trade cooperation achieved, because the distribution of institutional powers in Japan initially favored the anti-liberalization coalition, cooperation was less likely, and when it became possible, came to reflect the Japanese anti-liberalization coalition's preferences.
Second, as for the relationship between American and Japanese domestic political institutions and the degree of trade cooperation achieved, the more divided the Japanese government became, the more likely cooperation between the U.S. and Japan became, and the more likely Japanese ratification became.
Third, as for the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of international trade cooperation achieved, since, by the end of the negotiations, several informed domestic groups in the United States and Japan endorsed the results of the negotiation, the U.S. Congress and the Japanese Diet became more likely to endorse the results of the negotiation and the chances for cooperation increased.
As for the extent to which advice on best practices was followed by American and Japanese negotiators during the negotiation, while American negotiators generally appeared to understand American domestic politics concerning the negotiations, Prime Minister Nakasone, at the beginning of the negotiations, appeared to underestimate the domestic political impact in Japan of seeking a cooperative agreement on agricultural liberalization in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.
Second, as for the extent to which American and Japanese trade negotiators made efforts to understand each other country's interests, needs and perspectives, at the beginning of the negotiations, American negotiators initially paid little attention to Japanese domestic politics and were initially unaware of the extent to which discussions of the possible tariffication and liberalization of the Japanese rice market were politically sensitive. In contrast, Japan overestimated the extent that it could influence the domestic politics of the United States or many other countries by opposing the comprehensive tariffication of agriculture and advocating food security.
Third, the extent to which American and Japanese top-level negotiators established strong professional working relationships amongst themselves varied immensely. Given the turnover in top-level American and Japanese personnel during the eight years of the negotiations, and the fact that agriculture was part of a much larger negotiation, there was relatively little chance for top-level negotiators to develop strong professional working relationships concerning the agricultural negotiations. However, below the top level of the negotiations, there was greater discussion about the possibilities of reaching an agreement, between not only senior officials, but also between the various departments and Ministries involved, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.
Fourth, because the initial American negotiating position was developed without taking into much account Japanese domestic politics, it became more difficult later in the negotiations for American and Japanese trade negotiators to identify shared objectives and for the United States to try to pull Japan behind the United States' negotiating stance earlier in the negotiations.
IV. Conclusion: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Contextual Two-Level Game Approach to Analyzing Trade Policymaking
In comparison to Putnam's two-level game approach 84 which was applied to American and Japanese trade policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations by Robert Paarlberg 85 , and by David Rapkin and Aurelia George 86 , the contextual two-level game approach attempts to more systematically define with reference to the existing literature the nature of and relationship between domestic politics and international relations in trade policymaking.
At the domestic level, Putnam's two-level game approach focuses on the domestic preferences and coalitions and institutions that are involved in policymaking, without providing many clues how to analyze them. Although the length of this paper prevents a full elaboration, the contextual two-level game approach allows for more complex analyses of the subtleties of the domestic level of trade policymaking, emphasizing the role of more than just one or two of the domestic actors in the trade policymaking process, creating an alternative to state-centered 87 , society-centered 88 , ideas-oriented 89 , and rational choice 90 approaches to exploring the domestic level of foreign economic policy.
At the international level, the contextual two-level game approach includes a relatively complex vision of the international level of trade policymaking that can be used to devise hypotheses that concern not only the bargaining and agreement literature which Putnam focuses on, but that could conceivably incorporate concepts from regime theory, the cooperation literature, and other theories.
As for analyzing the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in trade policymaking, the contextual two-level game approach is relevant to the analysis of many different types of actors and forms of negotiations, whereas Putnam's two-level game approach is specifically designed for particular types of negotiations, those which occur in two simplified stages: (1) "bargaining between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement," called Level I; and (2) "separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement," called Level II. 91 In the case of the GATT Uruguay Round, the two stages were not that distinct because the bargaining process between the negotiators was often not that separate from the constituents involved.
As for the merits of the contextual two-level game approach when it is used to analyze American trade policymaking, in comparison to Putnam's two-level game approach, the contextual two-level game approach allows for more complex analyses of the domestic level of American trade policymaking. 92 Also, the contextual two-level game approach can be used to incorporate greater consideration of regimes, interdependence, the United States' position in the international system, and other factors.
As for the merits of the contextual two-level game approach when it is used to analyze Japanese trade policymaking, the contextual two-level game approach, in comparison to Putnam's two-level game approach, allows for more complex analyses of the subtleties of the domestic level of Japanese trade policymaking, creating an alternative to existing portrayals of the domestic level of Japanese foreign economic policymaking. 93 The contextual two-level game approach also sets forth a vision of the international system which is more complex and more clearly related to the existing international relations literature than other visions of the international level of Japanese trade policymaking. 94
Finally, the contextual two-level game approach can be used to conduct studies of U.S.-Japan trade negotiations that allow for more complex analyses of the interaction between domestic politics and international relations in American and Japanese trade policymaking, and their impact on U.S.-Japan trade negotiations.
While such research fills a gap in the literature concerning trade policymaking, and represents an essential step towards increasing the understanding of American and Japanese trade policymaking and U.S.-Japan trade negotiations, the contextual two-level game approach needs to be further developed by applying it to other countries and time periods, as well as to case studies in other economic sectors.
An effective starting point for further such studies would be the examination of a series of studies that would illuminate the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in trade policymaking in several important countries during the postwar period.
In contemplating such further studies, several important issues need to be addressed.
First, the universality of the conceptualization of the domestic level of the comparative framework of trade policymaking should be questioned, and its application to the analyses of the domestic politics of other countries should be carefully undertaken.
Second, the use of international variables that are based on cooperation theory should be done with careful consideration. More specific measurements that can be used to assess the extent to which cooperation is achieved in a particular trade negotiation should be developed. Such criteria might include speed; the extent to which initial objectives are accomplished; and the relationship between the intended results and the actual effects of the negotiations.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460, pp. 459-460. Back.
Note 2: James A. Caporaso, "Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics," International Studies Quarterly (December 1997), pp. 563-592. Back.
Note 3: Putnam; see Caporaso, pp. 566-575. Back.
Note 4: Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); see Caporaso, pp. 575-579. Back.
Note 5: Caporaso uses this approach to analyze "the merging of precisely distinctive systems of rules and laws among countries in the European Union." (Caporaso, p. 563, pp. 579-584.) Back.
Note 6: Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics." Back.
Note 7: Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert P. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). Back.
Note 8: Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Back.
Note 9: Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997). Back.
Note 10: See Schoppa, pp. 29-32; Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, p. 5. Back.
Note 11: See the "synthetic strategy" set forth in Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), pp. iv, 71. Back.
Note 12: These variables are derived from the neo-pluralist model of democracy set forth in David Held, Models of Democracy, Second Edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 217-218. Back.
Note 13: See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," pp. 431-433; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co: 1971); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. Press, 1978). Back.
Note 14: Held, pp. 217-218. Back.
Note 16: See Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, p. 11.
Various hypotheses concerning the domestic level of trade policymaking can be tested. For example, the following hypotheses are derived from the work of Milner.
Concerning the structure of domestic preferences,
As for the nature of domestic political institutions,
As for the distribution of information internally,
Note 17: See John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 379-415, p. 399; John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-35. Back.
Note 18: G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy," International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 1-26, p. 4; Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 85-92. Back.
Note 19: Cooperation can occur in order to realize gains, in order to maintain friendly relations, and in recognition of power asymmetries. (See Helen V. Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," World Politics 44 (April 1992), pp. 496-496, pp. 470-473.) Back.
Note 20: See ibid., pp. 473-474. Multilateral negotiations are subject to the problems of coalition and holdout. Back.
Note 21: See Fen Hampson with Michael Hart, Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 3-51; I. William Zartman, ed., International Multilateral Negotiations: Approaches to the Management of Complexity (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1994); I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato, "Coping with Economic Conflicts" in Destler and Sato, eds., Coping with U.S.-Japanese Economic Conflicts (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 271-293, pp. 279-287. Back.
Note 22: Robert Mnookin uses such an approach to analyze negotiations between lawyers and clients, and between lawyers and other lawyers, in the domestic American legal context. (See Robert R. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet, and Andrew S. Tulumello, The Lawyer as Negotiator: How Lawyers and Clients Can Create Value in Legal Negotiations (Printed exclusively for the Exclusive Use of Students at the Columbia University School of Law, August 1998), pp. 113-118 (permission granted to cite). Back.
Note 23: See in general, ibid., Chapters 6 and 7. Back.
Note 27:
In this paper, some of the hypotheses examined are derived from Milner's Interests, Institutions, and Information, which represents a rare attempt to "explain in a systematic fashion how, why, and when domestic forces matter" by constructing "a fully developed model of the interaction between domestic and international politics to explain the pattern of international cooperation." (Daniel Drezner, review of Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, American Political Science Review 92 (June 1988), pp. 506-507, p. 506.)
Because Milner focuses on cooperation, the hypotheses selected in this dissertation focus more on cooperation. However, this bias could and should be compensated for in future research inquiries. Back.
Note 28: Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, p. 242. Back.
Note 31: See Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, p. 259 and Mnookin. Back.
Note 32: See ibid., pp. 192-193. Back.
Note 33: See ibid., Introduction to Part IV and Chapter 11. Back.
Note 34: See Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, p. 259 and Mnookin. Back.
Note 35: Concerning American trade policymaking, see, in general, Stephen D. Cohen, Joel R. Paul, and Robert A. Blecker, Fundamentals of Foreign Trade Policy: Economics, Politics, Laws, and Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics: System under Stress (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986). Back.
Note 36: Theodore H. Cohn, "The Changing Role of the United States in the Global Agricultural Trade Regime," in International Political Economy Yearbook, Volume 7: World Agriculture and the GATT, ed., William P. Avery (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 17-38, pp. 17-18. Back.
Note 37: Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, p. 98. Back.
Note 38: For example,
Note 39: This conceptualization of Japanese policymaking is based, to a certain extent, on Muramatsu and Krauss' patterned pluralist model of Japanese policymaking. See Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism" in The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 1: The Domestic Transformation, eds., Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 516-554. Back.
Note 40: Such hypotheses include:
Note 41: Several phases in the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in postwar U.S.-Japan trade negotiations can be identified: the American Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952; from the San Francisco Peace Treaty to the Revision of the Security Treaty, 1952-1960; a Period of Readjustment, 1961-1972; the Competitive Period, 1973 to the present; although the length of this paper prevents indulging in a more in-depth discussion of each of these periods. (See the periodization in Roger Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Back.
Note 42: First, concerning the relationship between the structure of domestic preferences and the degree of international trade cooperation achieved,
Second, concerning the relationship between the nature of American and Japanese domestic political institutions and the degree of trade cooperation achieved between the United States and Japan,
Third, concerning the relationship between the distribution of information internally and the degree of international trade cooperation achieved,
Note 43: Such hypotheses include the following:
Note 44: Examples of previous studies concerning the relationship between domestic politics and the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations, see, for example, William P. Avery, "Agriculture and Free Trade," in Avery, ed., International Political Yearbook, Volume 7: World Agriculture and the GATT, pp. 1-16. See also Nau's efforts to examine "the opportunities and constraints for export interests" in the Uruguay Round (Henry R. Nau, ed., Domestic Trade Politics and the Uruguay Round (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 15), and Hampson's assertion that, at the international level, during the negotiations, "insufficient attention was paid to how to make the ambitious package" "a politically marketable package" at the domestic level. (Hampson, p. 251.) Back.
Note 45: The European Community (EC) which became the European Union (EU) during the Uruguay Round of the GATT is a union of states, rather than a single state. Back.
Note 46: By focusing on the United States and Japan, however, this paper is in no way advocating a U.S.-Japan relationship to the exclusion of the interests of other countries, such as developing countries. Back.
Note 47: Michael R. Reich, Yasuo Endo, and C. Peter Timmer, "Agriculture: The Political Economy of Structural Change" in America versus Japan: A Comparative Study of Business-Government Relations conducted at the Harvard Business School, ed., Thomas McCraw (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1986), pp. 151-192, p. 155. Back.
Note 49: Reich, Endo, and Timmer, pp. 155-156. Back.
Note 51: Ryutaro Komiya and Motoshige Itoh, "Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy, 1955-1984" in The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context, eds., Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 173-224, p. 173. Back.
Note 52: Reich, Endo, and Timmer, p. 158. Back.
Note 53: Cohn, pp. 35-36. Back.
Note 54: James P. Houck, "Agreements and Policy in U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade" in Emery N. Castle and Kenzo Hemmi with Sally A. Skillings, U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade Relations (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1982), pp. 58-87, pp. 68-70. Back.
Note 55: Komiya and Itoh, p. 173. Back.
Note 56: Reich, Endo, and Timmer, pp. 153-158. Back.
Note 57: Terence P. Stewart, ed., The GATT Uruguay Round, A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Volume I: Commentary (Boston, MA: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), p. 172. Back.
Note 58: Reich, Endo, and Timmer, p. 159-160. Back.
Note 59: Komiya and Itoh, p. 174. Back.
Note 62: The Punta del Este Declaration stated that the Uruguay Round "negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines." ("Ministerial Declaration of the Uruguay Round," as reprinted in The GATT Uruguay Round, A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Volume III: Documents, ed., Terence P. Stewart , p. 6). Back.
Note 63: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on Proposed International Agricultural Trade Reform, July 6, 1987," Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1987, Book II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 797-798, p. 797. Back.
Note 64: "Japan and Europeans Cautious on U.S. Plan," The New York Times, 7 July 1987, sec. D, p. 7. Back.
Note 65: Julie Wolf, "EC's Agriculture Proposals on Subsidies, Tariffs Likely to Evoke U.S. Opposition," The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 1987, p. 27. Back.
Note 66: "Mid-Term Meeting," [MTN.TNC/10] as reprinted in Stewart, ed., Volume III: Documents, p. 33. Back.
Note 67: "Press Conference with Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture, and Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative re: U.S. Proposals Presented at GATT on Trade in Services and Agriculture," Federal News Service, October 24, 1989. See also Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. to Offer Plan to Curb Farm Support; Other Nations Will Be Asked for Similar Cuts at Meeting in Geneva," The New York Times, 23 October 1989, sec. D, p. 9. Back.
Note 68: Steven Greenhouse, "Trade Talks Stalemated After U.S.-Europe Clash," The New York Times, 31 May 1990, sec. D., p. 2. Back.
Note 69: See Carla Hills, USTR, "The Benefits of Open Markets and Trade, Remarks as prepared for delivery before Conect/International Business Centers, Boston, June 17, 1991" (Washington, DC: USTR Reading Room Speeches and Testimonies File, 1991). See also Clayton Yeutter, "Letter to the Editors: Blame Europe," The New York Times, 9 January 1991, sec. A, p. 20. Back.
Note 70: This paper attempts to offer an alternative to earlier analyses of American trade policymaking in the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations by using the contextual two-level game approach to analyze American trade policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations. See, for example, Robert L. Paarlberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?", International Organization 51 (Spring 1997), pp. 413-444; Paarlberg, "Why Agriculture Blocked the Uruguay Round: Evolving Strategies in a Two-Level Game" in Avery, ed., International Political Economy Yearbook, Volume 7: World Agriculture and the GATT, pp. 39-54; Cohn. Back.
Note 71: Dale E. Hathaway, Agriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the Rules (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, September 1987), p. 83. Back.
Note 72: See U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), "Multilateral Trade Reform: What the GATT Negotiations Mean to U.S. Agriculture" (Washington, DC: USDA Staff Briefing, August 1990), p. 4. Back.
Note 74: Economic Report of the President transmitted to the Congress, February 1990 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 256. Back.
Note 75: See Joint Report of the Committee on Finance, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate to Accompany S. 2467, "Uruguay Round Agreements Act," 103rd Congress., 2nd Session. (November 22, 1994). Back.
Note 76: See Report of the Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee (ATACs), "The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," January 1994. Back.
Note 77: This paper attempts to offer an alternative to earlier analyses of Japan's role in the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations by using the contextual two-level game approach to analyze Japanese trade policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations. See, for example, David P. Rapkin and Aurelia George, "Rice Liberalization and Japan's Role in the Uruguay Round: A Two-Level Game Approach" in Avery, ed., International Political Economy Yearbook, Volume 7: World Agriculture and the GATT, pp. 55-94. Back.
Note 78: See T.J. Pempel, "From Exporter to Investor: Japanese Foreign Economic Policy" in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), pp. 105-136, pp. 124-129. Back.
Note 79: Within the bureaucracy, the Foreign Ministry skillfully scored the end of the Uruguay Round without giving up too much in terms of agricultural concessions. Reform-minded MAFF and Ministry of Finance bureaucrats made some progress in the conducting of a difficult agricultural reform, and MITI lost out somewhat because the slow conclusion of the Uruguay Round impeded Japan's economic growth in the early 1990s, although the timing of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round was far from within Japan's control. Back.
Note 80: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Japanese Agricultural Policies: A Time of Change (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service Policy Monograph No. 3, 1988), p. 25. Back.
Note 81: Mitsuo Matsushita, "Constitutional Framework of the Major Trade Laws in Japan: In the Context of the Uruguay Round" in National Constitutions and International Economic Law, Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Volume 8, eds., Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Boston, MA: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), pp. 275-297, pp. 282-286. Back.
Note 82: For a description of these coalitions (but which does not discuss their evolution during the negotiations), see Rapkin and George, pp. 60-71. Back.
Note 83: "Japan Takes Historic Step to Partially Lift Rice Ban," The Japan Times, 15 December 1993, p. 1. These market-access rates proposed by Japan were higher than the rates proposed in the "Draft Final Act" which called for minimum access opportunities that "would equal at least three percent of corresponding domestic consumption in 1993 and would be increased to five percent by the end of 1999." (Stewart, ed., Volume I: Commentary, p. 213.) Back.
Note 84: Putnam's two-level game approach was used to analyze American trade policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations in Robert Paarlberg, "Why Agriculture Blocked the Uruguay Round. Putnam's two-level game approach was used to analyze Japanese trade policymaking during the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations in Rapkin and George. For a critique of these studies, see Paarlberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round," pp. 415-416. Back.
Note 85: See Paarlberg, "Why Agriculture Blocked the Uruguay Round." Back.
Note 86: See Rapkin and George. See critique of the studies in Avery ed., International Political Economy Yearbook, Volume 7: World Agriculture and the GATT, in Paarlberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round," pp. 415-416. Back.
Note 87: See, for example, Ikenberry, "Introduction," pp. 3-7. Back.
Note 88: See, for example, ibid., pp. 7-9. Back.
Note 89: See, for example, Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 90: See, for example, Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information. Back.
Note 91: Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," p. 436. Back.
Note 92: For other efforts, see, for example, Stefanie Ann Lenway, The Politics of U.S. International Trade: Protection, Expansion, and Escape (Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, 1985). Back.
Note 93: See, for example, T.J. Pempel, "The Domestic Bases for International Behavior," in Katzenstein, pp. 139-190, p. 139; Daniel I. Okimoto, "Political Inclusivity: The Domestic Structure of Trade," in Inoguchi and Okimoto, eds., The Political Economy of Japan: The Changing International Context, Volume 2, pp. 305-344, p. 340.) Back.
Note 94: See, for example, Calder's efforts to use "the character of the international system" in Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," World Politics 40 (1988), pp. 517-541, pp. 526-527; and Pempel's list of four constraints on Japanese foreign economic policy in Pempel, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for International Behavior," p. 142. Back.
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