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Forms of State, Governance and Regime:

**Reconceptualising the Prospects for
Democratic Consolidation in Africa**

Early draft.

by

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The author is a PhD Candidate at Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden. My doctoral dissertation concerns the relationship between international developments and transitions towards democracy and how this affects the prospects of democratic consolidation. The empirical focus is on sub-Saharan Africa. I have published a similar reasoning to the one pursued in this paper, in the book *Democratization in the Third World* by Göran Hydén *ed.* (1998: in Swedish only, Lund: Studentlitteratur) and presented a paper on the same theme at the ECPR/ISA Joint Conference in Vienna, September 1998. Besides this, I have recently conducted a study on the UN World Conferences during the 90s (forthcoming 1999).

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Building on the growing body of literature on the verge of international relations and historical sociology, this paper develops an alternative conceptualisation of different forms of states, governance and regimes. The discussion departs from contemporary writings on sovereignty, security and state formation in the African context. In an effort to synthesise insights from international relations and historical sociology with neo-institutional theory, a heuristic model is suggested. It is argued that this model can be used in a heuristic sense to better understand of the relationship between forms of states, variations in the institutions of governance and transitions between regimes. Taking the model to be fruitful, the paper finally suggests some hypotheses that can be put to test in future empirical research.

In 1989 only five¹ of the (then) forty-seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa, hereafter referred to as Africa², had some sort of democratic regime. Before the end of 1990, twenty-one states had launched significant reforms towards political liberalisation. Eleven out of the twenty-one had even scheduled competitive multiparty elections. (Bratton & van der Walle 1992:27,40) During the next few years, thirty-eight countries held competitive elections. In 1994, thirty-three of the forty-two non-democratic states gained substantial points in civil liberties while twenty-three of these had also made substantial improvements in political rights. (Bratton & van der Walle 1997:218-9) In terms of outcome, completion of a transition to democracy occurred in sixteen states during 1990-94³, twelve flawed democracies, twelve blocked and two precluded transitions as compared to 1988⁴.

Economically, only three of the twelve states that had completed at least one democratic transition in leadership between 1989-95, had a per capita income higher than the African average of \$530 (World Bank 1994:162, 228) The remaining states had lower incomes, suggesting that there is a systematic reason behind this. Perhaps the poor states, and their leaders, had no choice but to accept early adaptation to the standards set by the international financial institutions and bilateral donors (cf. Bienen & Herbst 1996:29) while wealthier states like Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe were able to sustain neopatrimonial systems of governance and suppression of independent civil society organisations for a longer time. This interpretation is apparently supported by Bratton's (1998) empirical findings that generally say "the later the transition, the poorer substantial gains in liberty and

¹Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe.

²The label 'Africa' has more and more come to denote what is properly called sub-Saharan Africa including some 48 states. In economic analyses South Africa is normally excluded from this group because of its exceptional (with regard to African conditions) economic resources and development. In this paper, however, South Africa is included but 'Africa' used to mean sub-Saharan Africa.

³ Whereas this had happened only once before in Africa's post colonial history when the independence leader in Mauritius, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, was removed from office in 1982.

⁴Flawed' here indicates that multiparty elections were held but these were not free and fair, 'blocked' indicates that multiparty elections were either not scheduled at all, or prohibited for some reason.

democracy". The logic might simply be that stronger economies had greater resistance to external as well as internal pressures on change through better ability to sustain neopatrimonial networks and therefore transitions generally began later in these states and led to less substantial reforms and concessions.

In the period between 1995-97, another eleven states held founding elections but with clearly less positive results than in the founding elections during the first period: not one of the elections was judged free and fair, leadership alternation occurred only in one case⁵ and opposition frequently boycotted the elections and/or refused to accept the results. During the same period, however, sixteen states embarked on a second elections run⁶ while four states' transitions were reversed by military coups before second elections could take place⁷. (Bratton 1998:54-5) Seen from another perspective, however, as many as twenty autocrats who were in power in 1990, still held, or had come back again in, the highest office in 1997 (Baker 1998:116).

I

OPENING THE CASE

Leaving aside for a while, the profound differences between individual states in the African wave of political liberalisation and democratisation⁸, the common direction of change and almost simultaneous timing, force us to address two basic questions: First, are the "winds of change" best accounted for by a focus on domestic or international factors? Many of the comparative studies carried out on Africa and other regions hold the view that the veritable outburst of increased political freedom and democracy in Africa can be sufficiently explained in terms of domestic factors.⁹ Why then, I ask, do all these domestically geared processes occur almost simultaneously? Obviously, the African transitions from military or civilian authoritarianism to democratic rule or liberalised oligarchies, display strong indices on international determinants of the timing as well as the direction of this change. An attempt will be made in this paper to suggest *conceptual tools that can be used in order to better understand the international linkages of democratisation*.

⁵This was Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's displacement of Brigadier Julius Maada Bio in Sierra Leone in February 1996.

⁶Namibia July 1994, Niger January 1995, Benin March 1995, Côte d'Ivoire October/November 1995, Cape Verde December 1995/February 1996, Comoros March/December 1996, Sao Tomé July 1996, Mauritania October/December 1996, Madagascar and Zambia November 1996, Ghana and Gabon December 1996, Mali April/May/July 1997, Burkina Faso May 1997, Cameroon May/October 1997 and Kenya December 1997.

⁷Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi, Niger and Sierra Leone.

⁸Political liberalisation is used to denote the establishment of basic civil rights in states where these rights have previously been denied. Democratisation then, signifies the enactment on basic procedural requirements of liberal democracy, i.e. free, fair and regular elections of executive and/or legislative branch of government.

⁹See also scholars that have discussed other areas than Africa in particular: O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Hadenius (1992), Diamond et al. (1990).

The second, and interrelated, basic question is: Do we better explain the course of events by looking at actors or structures respectively? The wave of political liberalisation in Africa during the early 90s inspired many Africanists to become transitologists and as such, to propose models, analogies, ideal types and theories based on the new empirical material thrown up by the winds of change. These authors seem to have followed the general move among transitologists and consolidologists from structural determinants of democratisation, towards actor-oriented analyses (cf. Osaghae 1995, Schmitter & Santiso 1998:61). It is *not* argued here that this move has been inappropriate, only that it remains unsatisfactorily. Actors *do* have a room for manoeuvre and their subjective-contextual interests, goals and calculations matter for outcomes, of course. Not *every* course of action is possible, however, neither for old or new rulers in transitory states¹⁰.

Therefore, I have chosen to focus on structures in terms of politico-economic institutions that provide leverage for international actors. The argument here is that *a focus on the logic inherent in different forms of state institutions, displays potentially strong constraints on domestic actors' range of choice and external actors' leverage, during the transitional phase in Africa* in the present period. Structural constraints inherent in state institutions, may well be judged to have been more important than actors in both starting-off the transitions in Africa and in shaping the various outcomes. If these relatively "die-hard" institutions did affect the timing and trajectories of transitions, they may as well be equally important for the prospects of consolidation. Hence, it is also argued that the framework here may contribute to understanding the prospects for a consolidation of democracy in African states.

As such, the present paper seeks to provide some insights to in what 'circumstances not of their own choosing' actors make choices, to use the standard phrase. The paper is theoretical and speculative rather than empirical and evaluative¹¹. Since no empirical analysis is presented here, the argument should be judged on its analytical clarity and logical coherence. Yet so, empirical examples are used to illustrate the theoretical points and corroborate its fruitfulness for further testing. The main result is the hypotheses generated by this venture which may be put to empirical tests in further research.

¹⁰In later years many have argued for various variations on the theme of structuration theory, following the lead of Giddens (1984, 1994). While both structures and actors obviously interact and both play important parts in every form of social change (Sztompka 1993), good thinking may also be produced by trying to separate the two and judge on their distinct contributions at different conjunctures. This is, for example, often the main task of historians (cf. Carr 1990/61).

¹¹I have felt tempted to follow the procedure of Bull (1977:x) in this regard: "... to deal with a large and complex subject by simply thinking it through."

Among scholars interested in transitions to democracy, the external environment of the political entity(-ies) in question, seems generally to be dealt with in either of two ways: (i) treating international structures as constant and international actors as supportive of one or the other domestic actor. Hence, international influences are incorporated as parameters in domestic actors' calculations and capabilities. Or (ii) accepting that international "factors" interact with processes at the domestic level, in varied ways at different historical points in time, but having no adequate conceptual tools for dealing with them. Thus, the international 'factors' are left outside the analysis. (cf. Hydén 1994) This is unfortunate and Spruyt (1994:26), for example, notes that:

Many theorists have argued that the internal developments of a country cannot be understood without taking into account that country's position within its external environment.Hintze's [1975] explanation of how a state's external vulnerability, ... might lead to authoritarianism. The argument that changes in the economic market led to political realignment lies at the basis of Barrington Moore's [1966] explanation of authoritarianism and democracy. Theda Skocpol's [1979] explanation of revolutions and Peter Gourevitch's [1977] account of foreign economic policies also follow this logic.

Despite the obvious linkages between changes in the international system and the common off-set and yet, varied trajectories of African transitions (many still incomplete, blocked or have been reversed), the theoretical contribution of the growing body of literature in transitology and consolidology has been limited with regard to external factors significance as determinators of transitions (cf. Segal 1991). This paper argues that much can be gained in the study of transitions, particularly in Africa, from a merge with insights provided by structural IR, the new institutional economics and historical sociology. The key question is: *When do international pressure have the opportunity to fundamentally transform politics?* In order to approach this issue, the paper discusses the double nature of sovereignty and the double security dilemma. In conjunction, these two analytical complexes provides an entry to the intersection of the international and the national. Then three structural layers of the state are conceptualised in descending terms of unchangeability: forms of states, governance and regimes. Structural layers of the state can not be directly perceived but each layer expresses itself through different institutions. Institutions, hence, become the indicators of structures. Institutions generally have in-built incentives for actors occupying and using them, to extract and then use resources of various kinds in such a way as to re-articulate, adapt or restructure these very institutions. At the same time, established institutions as such, increase the cost

of setting up new ones. This is the essence of "path-dependency" which informs this study.

Institutional Constraints and Contextual Actors

Studies of democratisation focusing on actors, typically conclude that actors' freedom is greatest in the transitional phases characterised by uncertainty (e.g. Bratton & van der Walle 1997, O'Donnell *et al.* 1986, Rueschemeyer *et al.* 1992). The argument here is, to the contrary, that transitional processes in Africa have been characterised by structural-institutional constraints and hence actors' room for manoeuvre have been strictly constrained (cf. Lindberg 1998). State structures and institutional constraints affect the objective scope of choice, i.e. room for manoeuvre as well as rulers perceptions of possibilities. The latter will not be dealt with here, not because of lack of interests by because of limited space. Regarding the former, a newly established government in an African state may find it very hard to fulfil all the good intentions¹² when the informal as well as formal institutions are geared to function within a system of governance that builds on patronage, corruption, tribute-taking and coercive extraction of resources. Therefore institutions and state-forms matters. They matter a lot in some phases while they matter less in other. The focus in this paper is on different layers of states and states' institutionalised relations with their societies and the external environment. My approach may perhaps be labelled a "structural-Weberian institutionalist" framework. With the focus on institutions, the trajectories of transitions may be analysed in terms of outcomes of cost-benefit calculations *produced largely by* the incentives created by institutions. By focusing on the institutional expressions of the three structures layers of states proposed here, it may be possible to judge when international factors and pressures have the opportunity and possibility to impinge on long-term transformations of African states.

Premises and Promises

The basic rationale of this paper is the assertion that the vein in international relation (IR) which is concerned with forms of states and their institutional expressions, has a significant contribution to make in the study of political transitions. In the following discussion of what IR can provide in terms of insights, one is faced with the common problem of theory-building, phrased well by Smouts (1995:231):

"... either it simplifies drastically and takes account only of comparable entities, thereby side-stepping one of the major challenges of our age, or it faces up to the question of complexity, in which case it lacks the methods and concepts to move beyond description."

¹²However, old incumbents, even if now elected, may not have an interest in transforming old structures since their rule, even as leaders of democratically elected governments, rests on old structures of governance.

It is argued that the particular dimension of IR's potential in this respect taken up here, has been neglected, or overseen, so far. The paper seeks to highlight this aspect and gain theoretical points by presenting a simplified (side-stepping?) model which can be used heuristically.

Second, what is sought for is *not* a general theory of history, but a theoretical framework applicable to a specific period in history. I acknowledge the suggestion by Ferguson & Mansbach (1996) that "polities" rather than "states" is a better label to class of cases which includes Westphalian states, sovereign tribes, empires, semi-sovereign feudal systems and the like. I limit my reasoning here to concern *only* the historical period characterised by a system consisting of Westphalian states based on equal and exclusive, territorially based, sovereignty. Modern democracy grew out of a period in the Western history when national states – with exclusive sovereign claims based on territorial power – developed in a context of technological innovations, significant expansion of long-distance trade and the spread of capitalism¹³. Beyond IR, scholars doing historical sociology (on the macro-theory level) and neo-institutional economic history (on the micro-theory level) has pursued a similar reasoning, and these will be taken up too, to some extent. The existence of sovereign states in the juridical sense of the term, is hence a necessary condition for the present study without which, the logical deductions and analytical categories presented here, does not apply. This is the second premise of this paper.

Third, democracy itself is taken here to be a phenomenon best conceived of as an expanded-minimum procedural¹⁴ requirement presuming contested elections, full electoral suffrage and the absence of substantial fraud in combination with effective civil liberties (cf. Collier & Levitsky 1997). This is the third premise. Beyond the procedural definition, democracy as a concept has varied denotative meaning for people even between (in some cases within) Western countries. When we move to other parts of the world, and perhaps particularly in Africa, the word democracy may evoke subjective interpretations we have never thought of as Westerners (cf. Rudebeck 1997, Melin 1995).

What I hope to suggest is a framework that can be useful in examining the various institutional set-ups that shape and shove African rulers' way of relating to (i) political change, i.e. liberalisation and democratisation, (ii) the networks of social groupings within their territories, i.e. society, and (iii) the external environment. This understanding is crucial for an adequate comprehension of current development and prospects of democratic consolidation in Africa. Since the point

¹³The spread of capitalism was not only a territorial-spatial phenomena, however, but as much socio-spatial in that new social relations were commodified and incorporated in the capitalist logic of production.

¹⁴For a discussion of procedural definitions, see Schumpeter 1994:155-164, Huntington 1991:7-9, Hadenius 1992, Dahl 1971, 1989:218-222, O'Donnell et al. 1986:Ch.2, Diamond et al. 1989:preface.

of departure is the state and the state institutions, I will start with discussing the premises of these in terms of sovereignty and security. From that I will move forward to my suggestion for a new conceptualisation of state institutions on three different levels: the form of states, the form of governance and lastly form of regimes. At the end, some hypotheses will be suggested regarding the prospects for democratic consolidation in African states.

II

The Double Dilemma Of Sovereign States

Sovereignty is central to the discussion here for several reasons. First, the focus here on modern states as organisations dominating the political space, requires a discussion on the notion of sovereignty on which these states are founded. This is a theoretical requirement.

Second, at the heart of the discussion between neo-realism, structural realism and its contenders, lies the issue of sovereignty. When Waltz (1979) asserted that the international system has always been anarchic and units always like¹⁵, he referred to an equal and exclusive distribution of sovereignty between units. Socialisation and inter-unit competition constituted the mechanisms whereby anarchy impinged on polities, forcing them to adhere to the structural imperative of self-help. We know this to be wrong. History teaches us that many instances of systems consisting of unlike units, co-existing without converging on a single form, have persisted for long periods of time. (cf. Buzan *et al.* 1993, Hall 1986, Ericson & Hall 1998, Ferguson & Mansbach 1996:393-5) Yet so, in the present period of world history emanating some 500 years ago (Krasner 1988:66-7), like political units (in terms of equal and exclusive sovereignty) has come to cover the entire globe. As I am interested in the African continent in this paper, which is different from the typical IR focus on dominating states in the system, the fact the sovereignty is global carries important implications for us. The double security dilemma induces a specific logic for sovereign polities which can then be analysed with particular reference to Africa and international influences on the recent wave of democratisation.

Third, a claim to sovereignty is always accompanied by potential contenders. Like and unlike organisations may challenge states both from outside and from within. This is the logic of the double security dilemma as spelled out by Buzan (1991). The nature of the dilemma has been opened for debate however. Mann (1986, 1996) and Ericson & Hall (1998) argues that the dilemma arises from

¹⁵Or, rather, the units will have to become like immediately as the system is constituted because of the pressure of self-help. What Waltz must argue happened almost instantaneously, scholars like Tilly (1992) and Spruyt (1994) see as long term developments. Yet, the two latter basically end up telling the same story of convergence on sameness in form among spatially extended polities of the system. (Ericson & Hall 1998:6-7)

threats of units drawing on different *resources*, not only that they arise in different contexts. It is not the inside/outside that matters, but rather, the nature of the resources actors mobilize for the reproduction, redefinition or termination of political organisations. This clarification is particularly helpful for us since African states have generally been threatened by units drawing on different resources in the domestic *as well as* the international realm, e.g. domestic tribal groupings and international financial institutions.

Fourth, in the debate on African state formation, state building and regime transition, many arguments have been made on what has been labelled as semi-autonomous-, pseudo-, low degrees- and quasi-statehood. Arguments like these typically run on the lack of state effectiveness in governing domestic issues that traditionally have been set up as empirical criterion for statehood in the juridical, and indeed, normative debate. Issues brought up in this discussion particularly often are lack of control over territory, insufficient coercive-penetrative power to enforce societal control and insufficient spread of a coherent idea of what / who the state is.

Finally, sovereignty also lies at the heart of democratisation. A rule by the people demands a spatial unit to be identified containing the people and juridical autonomy in political space. Democracy, as we know of it, makes little sense without issues to govern on exclusive basis. Sovereignty and the double security dilemma, in sum, are central and must be discussed first. The road to a structural-institutional framework for explaining democratisation in Africa may therefore be somewhat outstretched and impervious.

On Sovereignty In Africa

Sovereignty in Africa is a contested issue. Different conceptions pervade the literature and, hence, the nature of the security dilemma, process of democratisation, principal contenders to the state and African state formation / re-articulation are matters of scholarly dispute. Jackson's (1987, 1990) formulation of quasi-states, building on insights gained in Jackson & Rosberg's (1982), has been much influential, however. Jackson's well-known notion of quasi-states almost echoes Buzan's (1991:100) formulation of "weak states" characterised by (i) high levels of political violence, (ii) a significant role of the political police in everyday life, (iii) major political conflict over ideology, (iv) lack of coherent national identity, (v) lack of clear hierarchy of political authority and (vi) a high degree of state control over the media. To this, Jackson adds the personalistic, or neopatrimonial, character of the domestic political systems in Africa. He argues that most African states are so weak in terms of what he labels "negative" (as opposed to "juridical") sovereignty that they would not exist, were it not for the

international norms of juridical sovereignty. African states, following Jackson (1987:519) are juridical artefacts of a highly accommodating regime of international law and politics. Inspired by Bull & Watson's (1984) discussion of "nascent", "quasi", or "pseudo" states, Jackson (1987:528) argues that African polities are not states since they "obviously are not yet substantial realities in the conduct of public officials and citizens."

Paying his respects to Jackson and Jackson & Rosberg, Clapham (1996a, b; 1998a, b) pursues essentially the same argument even if his standpoint is somewhat more sophisticated: Elites of African countries adopted the norms of sovereignty because it suited their purposes of wealth-extraction from the inside (revenue and rent) as well as the outside (aid and assistance), while the international system of states recognised the new states as a consequence of system-maintenance. Clapham (1996a:Ch.11) thus argues that the "negative sovereignty regime" developed in the post-World War II period in order to preserve African states in absence of empirical viability, because preservation coincided with the interests of both African and Western / Eastern political elites.

Recent African writings on this point, such as Ofuho (1998), seem to converge on an agreement with Jackson and Clapham, disagreeing only on the origin of the present situation. Ofuho (1998:16) argues that the major cause was colonialism which resulted in the creation of would-be nation-states in Africa that has remained fractured, ridden by crises of identity and authority and lack of governmental control. To use the words of Mazrui (1983), the crisis in Africa is a prolonged crisis "... whose main theatre is the state."

To all these authors, African states' measure of sovereignty is to a large extent a matter of international juridical convention, while the essential quality of sovereignty, its empirical manifestations, is lacking. The problem with their respective arguments should be obvious: The arguments tend to slip into a reversed "definitional fallacy" (cf. Holden 1993) and, hence, reify the notion of sovereignty. It remains undoubtedly true that African states do not fulfil the requirements of "empirical statehood". Yet, so do *neither* many Western and formerly Eastern states (cf. Ferguson & Mansbach 1996:12, Thompson 1994:3). Jackson, Clapham and Ofuho all commit the liberal fallacy of measuring sovereignty with an *absolute ability* to control flows of activities within and across borders that states never had (cf. Thompson 1995:213-5). Furthermore, historical narratives on state formation during the "rise of the West" produced by scholars like Tilly (1992, 1993), Mann (1986), Hobson (1994), Spruyt (1997) and Skocpol (1979), make quite clear that neither the "becoming" nor "failed-to-become" Western nation-states then had the empirical requirements spelled out in the sovereignty doctrine. Control over

territorial borders, military defence capacity, domestic coercive control, national identity and resource mobilization – these are all empirical variables and not constants. Historically, war certainly made *many* states – particularly the dominating ones – and war-making takes resources of various kinds. Yet, less important states – i.e. not dominating and not aspiring domination – have always been accepted at the fringes of the system as long as conquest or sovereign subordination did not have considerable pay-offs for dominating states in material or power-enhancing respects.

My argument against these Africanists then is that the existence of sovereign states, despite lack of "objective" empirical/positive criterion, has been a fact for long. This practice started well before the "scramble for Africa" even had begun in the late nineteenth century. One should not equal the international juridical norms of sovereignty with the empirical conditions of Western, or other, states. The notion of a Westphalian state has always been an ideal-type construction and its empirical actualisation has varied (Ruggie 1983:276, Ferguson & Mansbach 1996:12). There is, and have always been, a mismatch between the formal criteria and the empirical conditions far outside Africa.

Second, the authors above seems to assume that states in Africa, *as different from* Western states, were created from above. It is indisputable that the origin of almost all (save Eritrea and Ethiopia) African states lies in colonial rule and the proceedings towards independence. Thus states gave "must-be" nations. It is not true, however, that Western states were characterised by some sort of "organic" growth from "nations to states". The European state-formation project was carried out top-down with few, if any, exceptions. Modern states and sovereignty never developed to serve societal needs, rather they developed to make war and build power *vis-à-vis* other states and their own societies (Thompson 1995:216). On this occasion I need perhaps only to take my own country as an example. Sweden is often considered to be one of the most "home-grown", homogenous and consolidated nation-states in the world. Yet, our borders varied extensively during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries; sometimes including Norway (another home-grown, homogenous and consolidated nation-state...), Finland, parts of today's Poland, Baltic states, Russia, Germany and Denmark. At other times, Sweden has consisted of but the middle-central parts of today's territory. Our defence and control over borders has been less than firm during many decades and governmental coercive control, however firm today, was probably weaker at the beginning of the twentieth century than it is in many African states today.

My argument is that most African states, *like* most Western and other states, were created top-down and not bottom-up. Or, like Herbst has argued (1989:692):

"Borders are always artificial because states are not natural creations." This argument, however, is limited to the creation of, as opposed to continued existence or development of, states. Modern western states had then to make bargainings with their societies in order to achieve consolidation of the state and different governance-structures as such. Central to this venture were methods of extracting resources for both external security and to achieve domestic legitimacy which dismantled internal threats. That bargaining was about men, money and land, and arguably, came to lead to democratisation in the West. The question is what sort of bargaining – if this notion can be transplanted to the African context – has occurred and will occur in Africa.

Sovereignty and the Double Security Dilemma

I have discussed some conceptions of sovereignty above which are of interest to our purpose. Adding Herbst's "external-internal" labels on the two dimensions of sovereignty, these may be displayed as follows:

<u>Author/Sovereignty</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>
Herbst	External	Internal
Jackson	Negative	Positive
Clapham	Juridical	Empirical
Thompson	Constitutive	Functional

What this table shows is that despite various labels, there seems to exist an agreement on the double nature of sovereignty, or rather, its Janus-faced environment. This is not, however, a complete agreement. Herbst's external-internal divide is territorial-spatial in nature based on the borders of the given unit. Thompson, Jackson's and Clapham's notions of sovereignty rests, not on territorial, but on legal claims versus realised capabilities to enforce such claims which, in principle, may be discussed in both the international and domestic realm. While the external and the juridical/negative/constitutive sovereignty often coincide empirically as states are recognised as legal, sovereign units there is no reason to conflate the two analytically. Juridical-negative-constitutive sovereignty constitutes the modern system of equally sovereign units and hence, the units as such. It rests on a claim, not actual capabilities and modern history shows, to repeat, that units frequently merge, expand, dissolve and are redefined in the course of adapting to – or failing to adapt – to the international *and* the domestic environment.

Many scholars would contest the argument at this point, I guess. They would stress the *stability* of states as political constructions world-wide within the ideal framework of the Westphalian state. What is threatened is not the state but the rulers, the argument probably goes. Why be so seriously interested in states which do nothing? Why not focus on state actors, rulers, and organisations instead?

My reply would then depart from the understanding of the state as a political organisation in its own right, i.e. a set of institutions in different layers. Institutions, it has been argued, either constrain actors' capabilities and scope of choice (e.g. North 1990, Moe 1990, Bates 1989) or expand individual choice by influencing availability of information (e.g. Ostrom *et al.* 1993). I argue that we may fruitfully discuss three structural layers in polities: forms of states, forms of governance and forms of regimes. These three layers each have their expressions through certain institutions. Each set of institutions, I argue, may either enable or constrain actors at any given point in time. This is an empirical question however, which should not be determined analytically. All these institutions, hence structural layers of the polity, must be "defended" in terms of either re-articulation, adaption to changing conditions or restructuration in a more fundamental sense. If this does not succeed - it frequently has not succeeded - these institutions will fail to exist. In all three layers, the preservation, adaptation or restructuration of institutions take resources. Therefore the most fundamental activity of state, governance and regime institutions is to extract resources and then make use of them to preserve its continued existence¹⁶.

These three layers should be understood hierarchically in one sense: Forms of states are more hard to transform than are forms of governance. Forms of states as delineated here, express the deepest functional logic of any given state in terms of its extraction and usage of resources. One state may historically be "geared" to extract resources (through taxation or other means) coercively and from abroad while another state mainly extract resources co-operative and from the domestic sphere. In terms of governance, different forms are be expressed in the institutionalised patterns of bargaining and coercion between rulers, other elites and societal organisations, such as in corporatist or patrimonial systems. These institutionalised patterns of relationships are, however "stubborn" and long-lived, less unchangeable than the deeper forms of states. On the third and most shallow level is regimes - the formal institutions of government. As formal institutions, these are the least resistant to change.

This framework is not static, however. Change may be induced by exogenous changes in the environment of states altering the costs and benefits of certain modes of resource extraction and usage. In the African case, the calculation on external extraction through trade monopolies, aid, assistance and loans dramatically change during the late 80s and early 90s. Likewise, costs and benefits in the other side of

¹⁶The language used here should not be misunderstood to mean that institutions are given the ontological status of purposive actors. Individual human beings are always the locus of purposive action, however, the institutions mould these actors' interests as the holders of power in existing institutions are powerful partly because of the existence of these institutions. The institutions, hence, are necessary conditions of their present power and status.

the double security dilemma, the domestic sphere, may alter. I will start with discussing only with the first level in what will become my framework, the level consisting of different forms of states.

III

MODELLING THREE STRUCTURAL LAYERS OF STATES - For Heuristic Use

While this study does not contend that current mainstream theories of democratisation are inapt, it is argued that these theories suffer from inadequate conceptualisations of the state. Overstating the case, in the same way as neo-realism reified the de-contextualised state as an unchangeable, undifferentiated unit of the system (Hall 1998:260), theories of democratisation tend to reify and de-contextualise the state but in terms of empty shells that are passive and ahistorical. States are made up of actors of different kinds filling the state with a particular content. While it certainly remains true that certain actors occupy the state at any given moment, this does not preclude that there are other significant aspects of the state/polity as well; notably the most basic need to preserve, adapt or restructure the state as a political organisation. It is argued here that the Weberian view of the state as a power-wielding political organisation conferring its own particular logic, must supplement a liberal/marxist framework to explain the width and "cross-everything" nature of the last few years of transitions in Africa.

Forms of States

Taken seriously, this is the essence of the double security dilemma: Upon forming a political organisation like the state, external political bodies will (potentially) either be threatened by its powers, or be attracted by the resources accumulated within this state and hence potentially threaten to overtake the state in order to gain access to these resources. Similarly, internal organisations of individuals will have interests in alter the form of the state, or even terminate it, to better fulfil their interests as a group. The great majority of African states never faced any serious military threats from external powers in the post-independence period (Clapham 1996a:Ch.3). Since independence, most immediate threats to African states have come from the inside. Arguably, far most often, these threats have not been directed towards the state, but rather towards the rulers only. Yet, disintegration of some states, substantial threats to the viability of many others, show that this is not only so. External threats have mainly been economical (which not necessarily must be less serious) and come from international financial institutions, military assistance-partners and aid-donors.

Facing the double security dilemma, a state must use resources for internal as well as external re-articulation. Resources can be extracted either from its own society or from outside its territory, and in different manners. Historically, it seems that absolutism only was necessary to extract resources without consent. If it was possible and more efficient to make populations pay for wars on voluntary basis through some sort of bargaining, then absolutism was not necessary.

"It [the state] must thus decide whether, on balance, it is more efficient to extract resources from its own civil society or from abroad. Furthermore, there is the issue of whether it is more opportune for the state to extract the resources in a predatory manner or in a co-operative manner." (Hall 1998:268)

In any form it takes, the process of upholding the state as a political organisation takes resources. War, defence, propaganda, social benefits, patronage or else are all accompanied with costs. To extract revenue and then use it for, possibly among other things, the re-articulation or adaptation of itself, thus constitutes states' most basic functions and the logic of state formation and continued existence might hence be rendered through, in Hobson's (1997) terms, a fiscal-sociological approach. Resources must be extracted from someone and in some way. Categorically speaking, revenues can be *extracted* either by means of coercion (e.g. in typical monarchies and dictatorships) or bargaining (e.g. in corporative and democratic states), and either primarily from the domestic (most common) or the international context (e.g. in cases of imperialism, trade or inter-governmental aid and loans).

Second, resources necessary for the sustainment of states must be *used*, and can be so in a number of different ways. A basic conceptual distinction can be made between blocking or mobilizing social groups. Coercive blockage is used to label concerted efforts made in order to prevent other groups of actors, whether domestic or external, from constituting alternative and competing centres of dominating political power. Several opportunities suggest themselves for this, e.g. war, imperialism, terror, imprisonment of potential disintegrative individuals, propaganda, corruption, etc. Alternatively, a lion-share of the revenues might be spent on management of society and mobilization of social groups for state purposes. Social groups can be organised and empowered within the framework of the state by means of education and socialisation, economic management and profitable control, support to civil organisations, administration of state functions by semi-autonomous groups, etc. This amounts to a kind of penetration of society which increases the state's influence and control over civil society and individuals' socialisation at the same time as it provides effective feed-back channels, or, what

Mann (1986) called¹⁷ "infra-structural power". Yet, penetration must be mutual to some extent to be accepted by social groups (cf. Smith 1993). Thus state and society become more of an integrated whole rather than two distinct parts. Hence, a useful analytical distinction can be made between coercive extraction and usage of resources, and participatory extraction and usage for societal management respectively. Together it makes the first level in the heuristic model suggesting four forms of states as below.

Fig. 1: Four Methods of Resource Extraction and Usage, and Forms of States

<i>Extraction</i> <i>Usage</i>	Coercive / By force	Negotiation / By consent
Blockage / Subordination	Capstone	Penetrative Coercion
Organise / Mobilise	Capstone Management	Penetrative

Empirical examples - Capstone: Tsar Russia, South Africa before 1990, Africa
Capstone Management: Soviet, North Korea, Pinochet's Chile, Nazi-Germany
Penetrative Coercion: Imperial Britain, Penetrative: European welfare states, Japan, Taiwan.

The notions of capstone and penetrative states respectively, are freely adopted from John Hall and Martin Hall who both have employed them for analytical purposes. Capstone states here implies that the state is "sitting over" society and in the words of John Hall, (1986:35) has "strong blocking but weak enabling powers" and its concern, consequently "... was less with intensifying social relationships than in seeking to prevent any linkages which might diminish its power" (ibid. 52). The penetrating state then, is more part of society and has the power to reorganise it for societal purposes¹⁸. (J. Hall 1986, 1994; M. Hall 1998) The problem with John Hall's categories which later has been slightly modified by Martin Hall, is that they do not allow a distinction between extraction and usage of resources. While they acknowledge the significance of usage, the two-category model can only display one side of the game, in their case extraction. Both sides of the coin are arguably equally necessary, however. A state's relationship to its society is equally determined by the extraction and usage of resources. Waging war, suppression and domestic terror, mobilization of civil society organisations and educational services etc., etc. matter equally as much as do taxation systems, confiscation, trade

¹⁷However, Mann is principally different from my proposal in that infra-structural power in his conception is held over society whereas my usage implies power through or in conjunction with society.

¹⁸This distinction echoes Machiavelli's distinction between rule by force and rule through consensus embraced by Gramsci and his followers (Gill & Law 1995, Cox 1995:18). It also relates to Mann's (1986) despotic versus infrastructural state power. John Hall has commented on the latter in arguing that Mann is principally mistaken to consider infrastructural power to be held over society. Hall insists that while freedom from societal pressures increases state autonomy in one sense, state autonomy can actually be increased by the state working through independent social groups in the sense of being free to generate the largest possible sum of 'social energy'. (Hall & Ikenberry 1989:14) A standpoint which is shared by Martin Hall (1998) and reaffirmed in this paper.

barriers and the like. Furthermore, the usage-side may also contribute to strengthen, alternatively harm, the state's future possibilities of extracting resources from its society. This can be achieved in two ways: First, using state resources on mobilization of the society and providing services that the groups find attractive and legitimate to consume, generally can be assumed to increase societies willingness to contribute to the state budget. This makes higher levels of extraction/taxation possible at the same time as it decreases transaction costs of revenue collection. Second, resources can be used (with or without success) in order to enhance the productive forces in society, i.e. increasing the productive outcome within its territory. Thus, the revenue-base can be widened and transaction costs for extraction lowered and gains be doubled. Therefore four categories (as above) is suggested here based on the recognition of that both extraction and usage matters in the process of re-articulation, adaptation and restructuration of states.

One of the advantages with this formulation compared to the two-type categorisation, is that it makes it possible to see that a penetrative, and to some extent penetrated, state implies a greater freedom of the state to generate conditions favourable to its continued existence. The need to achieve some sort of consent through bargaining with its own society is a two-way process that may strengthen the power of the state. Capstone and penetrative in this sense obviously relate to the classical distinction between coercion and consent often used to distinguish between authoritarian and democratic rule. (Remmer 1996:616, 1995:117-9, cf. Pridham 1991) Consent is then usually assumed to imply lesser state strength and capacity. The approach here highlights the opposite relationship: a penetrative state works through and with society and societal organisations to accomplish its tasks. A mutual, yet asymmetrical, relationship enables the state to reorganise and mobilize society to create better incentives for its continued re-articulation, adaptation or restructuration. Hence, the penetrative state has a greater potential for flexible responses to changes in its environment. The power and ability to reorganise stems from the process of co-operative extraction which may increase material resources as well as lower the transaction costs. The relative consent through bargaining entails legitimacy which spills over to reorganising. Legitimacy means that implementation is less costly and tends to be more successful which in turn, helps to expand the resource-base if the reorganisation succeeds in increasing state revenues.

What must be added to this discussion is also the distinction between resource-extraction that is to a large extent, or mainly, based on borders-crossing activities and / or external sources, as opposed to the bulk of state-resources coming from domestic activities. The principal difference is that with resources mainly coming

from external sources and trade, the state must not bargain or wage war with its own population (society) but with external actors in its quest for survival, maintenance, development, reformulation or whatever seems a fruitful activity for the adaptation of the state to the type of environment it faces during whatever specific historical period. This has important implications. It may for example be easier to stay a capstone state when the state's resources come mainly from the external environment since blockage of society without triggering revolutionary forces may be easier when no substantial amounts of revenues are squeezed from the population. The condition is that the external providers of resources must be indifferent or positive to a capstonian state-character, which was arguably the case with the major powers' interests in Africa during the Cold War-period.

The reverse is true if resources mainly come from domestic sources (while mixes are frequent, of course). In Tanzania for example, Tripp (1998:25) has shown that the informal economy in Dar es Salaam accounted for 90 percent of urban household incomes in 1988. The power resources inherent in this sector could subsequently be used in an interaction between state and civil society to put pressure on the state for economic as well as political liberalisation. In other words, and contrary to scholars like Azarya & Chazan (1987), Chazan (1988) and Bayart (1986), Tripp's conclusion is that engagement in an informal economy does not necessarily entail disengagement from the state (cf. Emizet 1998:128-9). Popular involvement in licit economic activities, however informal, may actually strengthen both people's interest in, and incentives for, co-operating with the state in "constructive reciprocities", (to use Hyden's [1992] terminology). Hence, such a state may be forced to enter into "co-penetrative" relationships with its society when the external resources withdraw from the scene.

The real catch of this reasoning is as follows: Any given ruler of states must respond to the double security dilemma. The way they choose to do this – the *method* they use – is on a fundamental level a matter of utilising, adapting or restructuring existing institutions geared to extract and use state resources in a particular manner. Variations in method (hypothetically stated) affects:

- The structure of the state and its accompanying institutional set-up as discussed in the four forms of states.
- The structure of the society since societies – the different networks of social groups – respond to changing incentives structures of the state. Incentives here implies costs and benefits of interacting with the state in alternative ways such as through corporative or pluralist patterns, or, by exiting from interaction.
- The relationship between the state and its society through the interaction via both state and societal institutions.
- The state's external relations with the environment consisting of both other states and dissimilar bodies such as the international financial institutions, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, etc.

These relations (1-4), in turn, contributes to defining the incentives for the states' *continuing* re-articulation, adaptation or restructuration. Once more, failure should be considered an open option. The institutional pattern of states' re-articulation as described above, then provides an entry to understanding to most basic kind of institutional constraints any given ruler in such a state must be confronted with. Such structures may be transformed, indeed they have been throughout history, but this generally is a long-term process. The linkage to democratisation and the prospects for democratisation should become obvious: Indirectly, a capstone state which is dependent on the external environment for the resources it needs in order to remain "capstonian" is hardly democratic by default. Yet, it's method of re-articulation makes it wide open for external pressures insisting on political liberalisation for example. This was arguably the case when donors for example attached demands for political reforms to the aid which financed up to 80 percent of Tanzania's development budget in the 90s. Yet, such an opening would still not automatically transform the capstonian character of the state since these institutional patterns of behaviour are deep-rooted and providing strong incentives for the actors to *continue* reinforce a capstonian state. This type of deductions, however, are still premature at this stage. I need first to consider to intermediate level of governance before I can discuss the issue of regime-transitions appropriately.

Forms of Governance

The issue here is if the above discussed forms of *states* relates to different forms of *governance*. Forms of governance¹⁹ makes the second level in our heuristic model. Governance here refers to various institutionalised practices of how the holders of power in the government, actually relates to civil society organisations and the public sphere. In Joseph's words (1997:376) it represents a " ... particular system of rule [that] has become consolidated..." Like states at the highest level of abstraction, forms of governance must re-articulate, adapt or restructure themselves. Empirically, these processes are intrinsically linked and can perhaps not always be distinguished from each other.

Conceptually there is a point in making the distinction, however. Forms of states and governance must be compatible if the system is to be stable in the longer run. That is, the methods of extraction and usage of resources that are available for each, must basically be the same. Hence, if empirical evidence shows that methods of extraction and usage are disparate and counter-active within the same state, one see signs of incompatible forms of states and governance. In those cases one can

¹⁹The understanding of governance in this paper is distinct from Hyden's (1992) proposal in that (i) governance here is exclusively focused on the system with which the act of governing is performed by whatever institutional regime is in place whereas Hyden's usage of governance is much wider. Hyden's concept of regime is very similar to Sandbrook's (1996:85) and these two roughly translates to my usage of governance.

expect either the form of state or the form of governance to change in the future. One must, however, remember that each form of state is theoretically compatible with more than one type of governance even if the account below does not make much of an effort to highlight that particular aspect. Neopatrimonialism is one form of governance while other forms (non-exclusively) include totalitarianism, pluralism and corporatism. For the purposes here these are sufficient to consider.

Neopatrimonialism is a form of governance which seems to be closely related to a capstone state. Neopatrimonialism as a political system is based on personalised rule. It is organised through clientistic networks of patronage, personal loyalty and coercion. Sustaining neopatrimonial institutions take regular flows of resources from leaders to followers whereas the extraction of these resources is largely coercive and predatory. (cf. Lewis 1996:100, Clapham 1985, 1993) Neopatrimonial systems tend to monopolize material resources turning the political game into a zero-sum struggle for control of the state. Therefore the middle class is not compelled to align with the ruling elite since the middle class is the primary object of state predation. Political liberalisation in this situation does not originate in a split in the authoritarian leadership. When oppositional movements, consisting of humiliated citizens, disillusioned military fractions or other social groups, are not institutionalised their power to intrude into politics rest heavily on the effectiveness of their leaders. Bratton & van der Walle (1997:269) argue that the primary institutional heritage in Africa is the neopatrimonial rule²⁰. The arbitrariness of both neopatrimonial rule and social oppositional groups mark the African transitions and displays their openness to political agency. Yet, the package of other institutional choices made within the confines of neopatrimonialism, such as military oligarchy or civilian one-party rule, inclusiveness or exclusiveness of political participation, and variation in institutionalised competition can account for much of the observed variation in the process of the transitions (Bratton & van der Walle 1997:40-2, 270-2).

From this perspective then, is it reasonable to discuss neopatrimonialism as a method – a form of governance? Obviously, it is easy to argue that neopatrimonial institutions function in order to enrich the political leaders and maintain their personalised rule. This seems to be the conventional interpretation (e.g. Callaghy 1984, Jackson 1987, 1990, Jackson & Rosberg 1982, LeVine 1980). Yet, the neopatrimonial system of rule display a significant continuity over time and different rulers and have manifested across space on the Africa continent. This indicates that

²⁰The characteristics of the African states have been labelled in many ways, among these 'lame leviathan' and patrimonial administrative' (Callaghy 1995), 'soft' (Forrest 1988, Rothchild 1987), 'kleptocracy' (Andreski 1968), 'accountable authoritarian' (Barkan 1993), 'parasitorial' (Kennedy 1994) and 'patron-clientistic' (Kanyinga 1995). These are all addressing basically the same thing labelled here as neopatrimonialism.

the neopatrimonialism functions as to maintain something more persistent than just temporal leaders; namely the political organisations these shifting leaders are heading. In other words, there are reasons for taking a closer look at neopatrimonialism as an institutionalised structure of governance. Neopatrimonial governance in Africa has employed a particular strategy for resource extraction and usage. Resources have been extracted through (i) monopolized structures of economic management whereby all surpluses were effectively removed from productive entrepreneurs, (ii) state control over trade surpluses, and/or (iii) external sources in the form of military or civilian aid, loans and concessions (Broad *et al.* 1990, Forrest 1988:431-4, Joseph 1977:368, Kennedy 1994). Extraction, or the subtype of taxation, has been deemed crucial in several respects. Taxation of the domestic population has been essential in the European state formation (Tilly 1992, Hobson 1997), for shaping the relationship between the state and civil society (Levi 1988, Moore 1998) and for developing state capacity to deliver services in the West (Sembodja & Therkildsen 1995) Moreover, comparative studies (e.g. Steinmo 1993) have shown that variations in taxation systems reflects long-lived political institutions.

In Africa domestic taxation has been very low apart from revenues of trade. Certain policies such as a general income tax, are in many cases unthinkable until the transaction costs of tax collection are made low by the existence of an appropriate economic structure and administrative capacity (Therkildsen 1999). Therefore a tight grip over material and coercive resources was necessary for African rulers using the neopatrimonial institutions to govern, in order to prevent competitive patronage-networks from rising up and threaten the state from *within*. What is important to notice here is that not only the leadership but also the state as a political organisation has been maintained by the neopatrimonial institutions. Framed within their capstonian states, the power of African rulers then came to depend on these particular structures of governance. To reiterate: the capstonian state and neopatrimonial governance shares the same methods in their coercive and arbitrary extraction of resources as well as in their usage of revenues primarily to blockage of social mobilization.

Another principally distinct form of governance is totalitarianism. Like with neopatrimonialism, within totalitarian institutions of governance rulers does not have to bargain over the resource-extraction. Totalitarianism is, however, distinguished from neopatrimonialism by the significantly more efficient control over resources and capacity to perform substantial managerial tasks in reorganising its society. Unlike neopatrimonialism, the totalitarian form therefore does not have to use the bulk of resources on domestic blockage of societal pressures. Instead it

can direct resources either for restructuring society or for territorial expansion and/or mobilization of social groups outside its territorial borders. As such totalitarianism is most functional in a capstone-management form of state.

Pluralist institutions, on the contrary, are characterised by open but relatively unregulated competition – yet not necessarily in the form of democratic practices – between social groups and actors for influence over the state. The institutions in a pluralist system of governance, are not geared to promote any particular group or even the stability between certain groups and the state. Pluralist governance presumes a multitude of independent social groups that are organised and capable of both competing for state power and of counter-weighting the state's institutions such as to act as checks and balances. Hence, the competition between social groups is primarily a competition of influence over societal blockage. The state performs only basic functions which take less resources and will therefore not have to rely heavily on coercion for the extraction-game. However, pluralist governance does not go well together with institutions geared to penetrate and mobilize society. Pluralist governance presumes a sharp distinction between the social sphere governed by civil society organisations and the limited sphere of the state where organisations does not have a say. In this sense, this form of governance relates best to the penetrative coercion form of state.

A fourth type of governance can be delineated as corporatist. Corporatism has strong historical links with fascism (Levine 1995, Mansbridge 1995) at the same time as it often is associated with participatory governance in modern welfare states like Sweden²¹. "Liberal corporatism" has even been announced as the highest state of social democracy (Jessop 1990:132). Hence, one may conclude that corporatist institutions do not in themselves imply a particular form of regime but provide different options. Rather, corporatism may be conceived of as an institutionalised system where the state shares both extractive and executive powers with institutionalised interest groups in what might be labelled co-governance. The state is empowered by this arrangement as it strengthens its ability to co-opt and mobilize great parts of society for reproductive ends. (cf. Smith 1993:29-32) It institutionalises a flow of information from society to the state from which the latter can benefit. When corporatist mediums of mediating interests and policies between the state and civil society organisations are used to both extract *and* decide on the usage of resources, organisations are compelled to have vested interests in the continuation of such corporatist arrangements. That is the very meaning of co-option which circumvent the power of integrated organisations. Yet, some real influence of

²¹Sweden has been judged to be one of the most corporatist state in the world by many different sources using different kinds of measuring-criterias: Schmitter (1974), Cawson (1986), Williamson (1989), Rothstein (1994), Levine (1995).

the organisations is necessary to maintain the bargaining. This sort of bargaining (mediation of conflicting interests) may be the outcome when the state need to widen its resource-base through increasing the taxation base and the efficiency with which it is taxed (Etheshami & Murphy 1996:764-5). The state bargains over the means for re-articulation, adaptation and restructuration through corporatist institutions, yet, the other stakeholders in the bargaining have vested interests in the continuous reproduction of the corporatist governance. It seems safe to accept that with established corporatist institutions of governance, the state holds the upper hand²². Resources can be used to maintain the mobilization of society partly through the institutionalised interest groups so as to strengthen the corporatist governance. Hence, the corporatist form of governance is best performed in a penetrative state.

Forms of Regimes and the Model

Above I have discussed four forms of governance, each one relating – heuristically – to a particular form of state by means of similar methods of resource extraction and usage. Regimes are here suggested as the third and most shallow structural layer in the model. There are many potential regimes one might consider. Again, I will stick to a few for the sake of clarity: Two forms of democracy (defined on p.6): liberal and social democracy²³, and civil or military regimes built on single ruler or oligarchy respectively. The latter two functions similar to various forms of perverted democracy in terms of the aspects I am interested in here. In the figure below, I have added the third level in the model as well: regimes.

Fig. 2: Forms of States, Governance and Regimes

<i>Form of state</i>	Capstone Management	Capstone	Penetrative	Penetrative Coercion
<i>Form of governance</i>	Totalitarian	Neopatrimonial	Corporatist	Pluralist
<i>Regimes</i>	Civil/Military Single Ruler <i>or pervertation:</i> e.g. Virtual Democracy	Civil/Military Oligarchy <i>or pervertation:</i> e.g. Pseudo-Democracy	Social Democracy <i>risk diminishing:</i> e.g. Controlled Democracy	Liberal Democracy <i>risk diminishing:</i> e.g. Delegative Democracy

A note on the reading of the model: "*or pervertation*" does not imply that the civil/military single ruler-regimes are transformed into some sort of democracy.

²²If the state does not hold the upper hand governance is no longer corporatist by this delineation but rather something like the bureaucratic authoritarian governance often referred to in studies on Latin America.

²³Liberal democracy understood as Dahl's (1979) minimal-procedural criterias of a polyarchy summarised in demands on formally full suffrage, full contestation and civil liberties. Social democracy understood here in the sense of polyarchy but in combination with serious attempts to secure real equal opportunities via state interventions as for example in the modern Nordic and to a lesser degree, continental European welfare states.

To the contrary, it exemplifies the possible result of a degeneration of a formally democratic regime in a capstone state with a neopatrimonial system of rule. By perverted democracy I mean forms of regimes which are inherently non-democratic but usually are labelled as a form of democracy with an adjective negating the democratic nature as for example pseudo-democracy. Such regimes do not share the defining characteristics of the root concept "democracy" (see p.6) and hence, cannot be conceived of as subcategories. (cf. Collier & Levitsky 1997) Social and liberal democracy do fulfil these root-criterion of democracy. These subtypes of democracy runs the risk, however, of loosing or seriously weaken one of the defining characteristics: in the case of social democracy full contestation may be compromised with and if so happens, a diminished subtype is articulated, for example controlled democracy. With liberal democracy the risk is perhaps more evident that participation and accountability of leaders fail, turning it to something like the diminished subtype of delegative democracy²⁴.

Taking the step down to regimes one must first recognise that in short time periods, almost any set of formal institutions of a particular regime, is workable in nearly all different forms of state pursuing different strategies of state reproduction. The difference shows first in the longer term. The combinations in the model are only suggestions on *stable* combinations. The catch is again to consider the methods of re-articulation and adaptation of regimes, as well as for forms of governance and states. Structural tensions are then expected in combinations like capstone state – pluralist governance and representative democracy. In such an event, one will expect the tensions to pave the way for changes in at least one of the other layers. Under unchanging conditions, the shallow layer(s) would have to give in to the deeper structures. However, in times when the incentives for actors occupying these institutions change, this logic may be reversed and a change in regime may facilitate a transformation in governance- and state-structures.

Results: Starting Hypothesis

A few hypotheses regarding African neopatrimonial states can now be suggested:

- A capstone state using a patrimonial strategy for reproduction in combination with a one-party regime, military oligarchy or virtual democracy will remain quite stable. That is, stable as long as the resources needed for maintenance of the neopatrimonial governance can be extracted through trade, aid, tribute-taking and/or limited domestic taxation. The state will remain patrimonial and a capstone state.
- If the incentives for neopatrimonialism changes, e.g. through absent external resources such as aid, lesser incomes form trade through liberalisation or the breaking up of economic monopolies, or through popular disengagement form the formal economy, the state must try to adjust its methods

²⁴Which diminished subtype that is most likely to follow from particular subtypes of democracy in concrete cases, is not possible to specify at this point. More than regime obviously plays a part in this. The proposed logic only concerns the relations between different institutions as analytical ideal-type constructions. Delegative democracy as defined by O'Donnell (1994), controlled democracy as discussed by Bagley (1984), virtual democracy as defined by Joseph (1997) and discussed – very tellingly – as semi-authoritarian regimes by Carothers (1997).

of re-articulation and adaptation and structures of governance to the new circumstances. This reformation may be successful or not. Failures are rampant and levels of adaptation vary.

- When meeting an economic crisis the neopatrimonial state may try to redefine and adapt itself by merely changing regime into for example a representative democracy. If this succeeds in securing necessary resources for a continuous existence of the neopatrimonial institutions, these will prevail. Prevalence of neopatrimonialism will pervert the representative democracy through the workings of patronage networks where spoils are distributed and loyalty attained. A virtual democracy will be produced which reinforces the neopatrimonial strategy and the capstone form of state. Neopatrimonial governance remains.
- If a regime of social democracy succeeds in redirecting extracted resources from patronage networks, and instead support mobilization of society in interest groups, a corporatist strategy will be produced. Corporatism makes an opportunity for the state form to be transformed into penetrative. A penetrative state will benefit from benign corporatism and a corporatist strategy benefit from accountable representative democracy. A new form of state, pursuing a new strategy for re-articulation, adaptation and restructuring with a new constitutional set-up, will be produced. The risk is that new patrimonial-like structures will appear in the form of a controlled democracy which might initiate a return to a neopatrimonialism.
- If a liberal democratic regime succeeds in redirecting extracted resources from patronage networks, to strengthen the basic institutions of a *Rechtstaat*, social relations will change, however, in directions unable to foresee. If this process involves the isolation of leadership from other important socio-economic groups, however, the risk is that it recedes to a delegative democracy governed by a new form of strongman via decrees. If this happens, the risk for reversals to a civilian or military single ruler-regime and a neopatrimonial institutions in a capstonian state, is rampant.

To spell out the logic, a new regime – for example representative democracy – might necessitate an alteration of the existing form of governance – for example from neopatrimonialism to something else – if the new form of regime is to survive in the longer run. If such a change succeeds and both regime and governance are reconstituted, a transformation in the form of state becomes necessary. A transformation in the form of state has consequences for the international system as this builds on the forms of states that occupy spatial extensions within it. Hence, there is a conceptual as well as empirical link between the internal structure of states and the function of the international system. If the international system changes, incentives for different forms of states, governance and regimes alternates according to the reverse logic²⁵. By this logic, not all forms of neither states nor governance and regimes, are attainable at every historical conjuncture. Thus, the international system impinges on the internal structure of its states.

With the end of the Cold War the incentives for the re-articulation, adaptation and/or restructuring of the African states changed quite dramatically. The logic of their external extraction of resources through aid flows, military and other assistance, loans and concessions which sometimes were transformed. Rulers of capstonian states using neopatrimonial structures of governance to sustain their autocratic regimes could no longer rely on external support when the Soviet

²⁵This part of my argument obviously relates to the "second-image-reversed"-discussion (e.g. Gourevitch 1977, 1978) which cannot be taken up here for reasons of quantity.

withdrew economically during the middle-80s and the West redirected their interest from anti-communist defensive action to pro-democratic progressive action during 1989-1994²⁶. By the late 1980s, according to van der Walle (1994:135) "more than half of the nations in sub-Saharan Africa were effectively bankrupt, and most of the others were popped up by Western public capital." Yet, the total sum of aid to Africa has declined during the 90s which in turn increased these states dependence on domestic resource-extraction, i.e. taxation or rent. The trend towards deregulation of trade reinforces such demands and the move towards democracy potentially may promise to induce accountability into these systems such as to challenge both the neopatrimonial system of governance as well as the capstonian character of these states. The combination of globalisation/trade liberalisation, fiscal crises and democratisation may prove to force a dramatic institutional revolution in Africa, inducing a bargaining over the extraction as well as the usage of state resources of a different kind than before. This remains to be seen, however.

The real catch in all this is three-fold: First with this approach we can begin to understand how the basic imperative of self-help translates into multiple possible forms of governance and institutional set-ups that have direct effects on domestic politics. Second, we acquire theoretical tools whereby we can conceptualise the relationship between forms of state, forms of governance and different regimes. With these tools we can begin to systematically study why a shift in regime not necessarily involves a shift in the form of governance or form of state. Conversely, a shift of regime may contribute to a transformation of both governance and form of state. Third, we can start to discern how regimes and forms of governance as methods employed for the re-articulation, adaptation and restructuring of the state, are closely linked to the function and pressures of the international system. By this, we can start to grip over the theoretical implications of international 'factors' manifest in the workings of the capitalistic world economy, in capital management, political conditionalities and much more.

²⁶It may be said to start with the announcement by Barber Conable, president of the World Bank, in 1989 that private sector initiatives must "go hand in hand with good governance." (World Bank 1989:xii) and ended when France in 1994 finally adhered to the international consensus on withdrawing support for autocratic rulers.

IV

CLOSING THE CASE

The model proposed here, as well as the hypotheses, needs of course elaboration and further specification. Crucially, no empirical indicators have been suggested here. Political institutions, or rather the institutions that make politics possible and take on specific routes according to a specific logic in different cases, must be clearly outlined and specified in such ways as to be empirically discernible. This remains to be done and will determine the empirical soundness and utility of this approach. However, the analytical and heuristic qualities should be possible to judge as the framework now stands.

A definitely common trait for all states is the need to reproduce itself continuously by means of re-articulation, adaptation or transformation. Throughout history, the two main external activities have been war-making and trade. Trade has been conducted either by private merchants or by state companies. In either way, the state has generally raised revenues from this activity. War-making has had many purposes which perhaps can be ordered in two principal categories: physical-strategic survival and extracting resources and wealth. In the former case, war-making could exploit significant state-resources without giving anything in return except security. In the latter case, wars had to bring revenue to the state, e.g. land, gold, slaves, trading routes and other valuable goods. States' basic domestic activities have been centred around the same issues: security (for the state which is a basis for the rulers) and acquisition of revenues and rent through taxation, tribute-taking, labour-acquisition, services and access to land, etc. What has differed, however, have been the means by which this has been accomplished, or, rather often, whereby states failed to accomplish these tasks *sufficiently* effective. Sufficiently here implies good enough relative to competitive political/economical organisations inside and outside the prevalent state.

One task is to clarify what is the value added of this framework? Do we find it to reveal some until now shadowed or neglected aspects of democratic transitions and consolidation? Does it spell out logical relationships that has not been properly understood as such before? Obviously, I tend to answer a "yes" to these questions. More of empirical examples had of course made the text more communicative. It would have enhanced understanding perhaps, without proving anything. Second, given the legitimacy and desirability of striving for integration of pre-existing theories, the very merge between traditionally so distinct fields of research, is a justifiable avenue in itself.

Third, many comparative accounts in the qualitative branch often relapse to explaining what happened with what happened, i.e. there is an inherent risk with de-theorising the explanations. Actor-oriented analyses that stress contextual factors in their explanations of outcomes, contributes little directly to theory-building even if the sum of such studies may generate good theory in the longer run (cf. George 1979) Given that our strive is to generalise and accumulate knowledge – at least to some extent – we have a problem as transitologists and consolidologists alike. By arriving on a merge between IR and comparative politics in this area, we may find that many domestically oriented findings in traditional studies of democratisation, can fruitfully be framed by the IR-components such as to give meaningful descriptions also in theoretical terms. Having said this, it must be emphasised that this reasoning does not imply any predetermination or simple reductionism prevalent in older IR-theory. The framework here – correctly read as non-determinate and non-exclusive – provides a structural logic, as opposed to causality.

In this paper, the reasoning has stayed highly theoretical. The model I propose should be understood in a heuristic sense, despite the somewhat formalistic approach. In reality, the methods of extraction and usage of resources, tend to be mixed and at the best, display tendencies in one direction or the other. The perhaps most important lesson to draw here, originally developed by Hall (1998) is that incentives for states' rearticulation, adaption and/or restructuring, *varies with historical time*. Furthermore, it varies not only with traditional conceptions of security threats but also, and perhaps more importantly, with institutionally constrained abilities and possibilities to collect and use state revenues both within and outside the state as such. It may well be that incentives varies with space as well, even if this aspect has not been explored here.

The incentives for state action originate from two contexts: the international and domestic. Not only the international 'factors' often referred to in comparative studies of regime change, can be discussed and comprehended in this theoretical framework, but also domestic processes that constitute internal incentives for state reproduction. Hence, the two spheres of international and national politics can be studied as parts of *one* process where states re-articulate or fail to re-articulate, adapt or fail to adapt, restructure or fail to restructure, themselves.

Arguably, in the field of state-society relationships, traditional comparative accounts from sociology as well as political science have much experience to draw on. We should not reinvent the wheel. There has been very much concern with institutional reform in Africa during the last one and a half decade or so. Perhaps, there is still something to learn from history, with temporal as well as spatial comparisons. This paper suggests that what should be compared is not so much

concrete events as the operative logic of institutions. It may be that the logic of the patrimonial/prebendal structure of governance in the typical African state is not that far from the logic of governance in earlier, as well as contemporary European political formations.

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