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CIAO DATE: 3/99
‘Rogue’ States and International Relations *
Department of Political Science
West Virginia University
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Draft Copy: Not for Citation Without Author’s Permission.
| “As we work for peace, we must also meet threats to our nation’s security — including increased dangers from outlaw nations and terrorism.” |
| Bill Clinton, “State of the Union Address”, January 19, 1999 (italics added). 1 |
| “We are here to discuss the emerging threats to America’s security as we reach a new century. How do we respond to the threat of terrorists around the world, turning from bullets and bombs to even more insidious and potent weapons? What if they and the rogue states that sponsor them try to attack the critical computer systems that drive our society? What if they seek to use chemical, biological, even nuclear weapons? The United States must deal with these emerging threats now, so that the instruments of prevention develop at least as rapidly as the instruments of disruption.” |
| National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, “On Keeping America Secure For the 21st Century”, January 22, 1999 (italics added). 2 |
Introduction
Over the last few years a new concept has taken on heightened emphasis in the public rhetoric of American policymakers: that is, the “rogue state” and the related “pariah” and “outlaw state” designations. 3 In American post-Cold War thinking, these states have emerged as one of the major, if not the most preeminent, of America’s security concerns. As fears of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union recede into memory, “rogue states” tend to be joined with such international evils, and perceived threats to U.S. interests, as terrorism (commonly associated with rogues), drug syndicates, and organized crime.
In response to the perceived threats from rogues, American policymakers have undertaken a host of policies and regulations intended to counter these trends and compel a change in their behavior. Economic and/or political sanctions are commonly employed against these rogue states (for example, Libertad sanctions and the Helms-Burton Act against Cuba, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and UN sanctions against Iraq). The United States has also made efforts to undermine political stability in such rogue states (for example, the Iraq Liberation Act, the Cuban Democracy Act, and federal moneys allocated to fund opposition groups in Iran and Iraq). Furthermore, the United States has pushed hard for the adoption of certain international agreements and treaties under the argument that their existence would be of benefit in limiting the flow of dangerous materials to so-called rogue states (for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement).
While the rogue threat is perceived by decisionmakers to be quite real, resulting in the formulation and implementation of a number of policy remedies, the statement of what serves to define a “rogue state” is, at best, hazy. Despite the wide-ranging use of this term by decisionmakers, neither they nor foreign policy analysts have yet identified what characteristics a state must display for it to fall into this category.
This study of the political dynamics between “rogues” and the United States therefore must begin with an effort to systematically unpack the components of the underlying concept. While any single reference to a “rogue state(s)” is unlikely to be sufficiently specific to serve as the evaluative standard for defining a rogue, this research argues that through an examination all references to rogues by policymakers, a set of component and associated concepts will emerge. This research project thus seeks to discover if there is an underlying representation of a “rogue state” operating among American foreign policy leaders, and if so, just what are the components of that representation. 4
To get at this topic more precisely, this paper will seek to empirically answer three sets of questions relating to the rogue state concept:
The paper closes with some observations about the ultimate lack of fit between the alleged policy actions of rogue states and the application of the rogue label. The lack of complete correspondence between the states so labeled and the policies attributed to rogue states presents an interesting political puzzle appropriate for further research. That incongruity in U.S. foreign policy will be examined in subsequent research by the author.
Methodology
To generate a database of mentions of the terms “rogue state” and “pariah state”, documents were collected using the built-in search engines of the White House and Department of State web pages. 5 Using the search terms “rogue” and “pariah”, 266 total documents were gathered (164 from the Department of State search and 102 from the White House search) covering the period from May of 1993 to December of 1998. 6 The collection represents the publicly released documents of the two major foreign policy agencies of the U.S. government which mention either “rogue” or “pariah” during the years of the Clinton Administration, 1993-present. Most of the documents were transcripts of speeches or press conferences given by President Clinton, Secretaries of State Christopher and Albright, National Security Advisors Lake and Berger, or Press Secretaries at the White House and State.
Of the 266 total documents, 59 were coded as Missing Data and removed from the database. Items were removed for one of the following three reasons:
Each valid document was then content analyzed by three independent reviewers. Each reviewer was trained to analyze the document for the term “rogue state” or “pariah state” and to then identify associated concepts and policies. For the research reported in this paper, coders were instructed to identify elements in each document relating to the following areas:
Results
Emergence and salience of the terms “rogue state” and “pariah state” in American political rhetoric
An initial task was to determine whether or not “rogue states” are even “on the radarscope” for American policymakers. That is, does this concept, and those states so categorized, command the attention of policymakers and thus warrant analysis? To examine this question two types of evidence were sought. The first were qualitative statements by the policymakers themselves which assess the level of criticality of this political phenomenon. The second entails a quantitative analysis of mentions of rogues and pariahs over time in an effort to ascertain any trends in their usage.
Do American policymakers see rogue states as a politically relevant issue deserving of their attention?
One possibility in this line of research was that while the term “rogue state” and “pariah state” were being used in American political rhetoric, they really were not considered to be of any great significance vis-à-vis American policy interests. To assess the level of criticality attached to these states, the documents were first coded with regard to speaker and were then content analyzed for statements which assessed the degree of significance of these states for American policy. Table 1 presents a list of speakers and the number of documents in which they used either the term rogue or pariah.
Table 1: Frequency of Use of Term “Rogue” or “Pariah”
| Speaker | # of Mentions (n=190) 7 |
As Percent of Total |
|---|---|---|
| President Clinton | 59 | 31% |
| Secretary of State Albright | 32 | 17% |
| Asst. Secretary of State for African Affairs Rice | 13 | 07% |
| White House Press Secretary McCurry | 12 | 06% |
| National Security Assistant Berger | 8 | 04% |
| DOS Spokesperson Burns | 7 | 04% |
| Asst. Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Pelletreau | 7 | 04% |
| National Security Assistant Lake | 6 | 03% |
| Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the NSC Bell | 4 | 02% |
| Secretary of State Christopher | 4 | 02% |
| DOS Spokesperson Foley | 4 | 02% |
| DOS Spokesperson Rubin | 3 | 02% |
| Other Sources (24) with 2 or fewer mentions | 32 | 17% |
Table 1 reveals that the concept of rogue states and pariah states has indeed reached the very highest levels of the American foreign policymaking structure, with the President, Secretaries of State, and National Security Assistants constituting a combined fifty seven percent of the mentions of these states, and their officially designated spokespersons adding an additional fourteen percent. To have such key officials commonly using these terms suggests the significance of these perceived threats or concerns to the United States. This is underscored by the widespread use of these terms, as they appear in the official statements of thirty six different government officials within the White House and Department of State. Hence, both vertically and horizontally, the overall rogue state concept has become well-established in American foreign policymaking circles.
Are rogue states a significant political phenomenon? Is this an issue that commands attention?
Having established that the existence of rogue states has been noted at the highest levels of American policymaking, it is relevant to ask whether such states are seen as truly significant by these policymakers, requiring their attention. As the following statements by President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright illustrate, the existence of “rogues” is indeed a priority. American policymakers have uniformly assessed rogue and pariah states to be priority concerns for American foreign policy.
“This attack [on American facilities in Saudi Arabia] underscores the struggle of all those who share tolerance and freedom and security. Our struggle at the end of the Cold War is to deal with these new perils — the rogue states like Iran and Iraq...” “Defeating these organized forces of destruction is one of the most important challenges our country faces at the end of this century and the beginning of the next.” 8
President Bill Clinton, 6/26/96.
“We’re all vulnerable to the reckless acts of rogue states and to an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and international criminals. These 21st century predators feed on the very free flow of information and ideas and people we cherish.” “These forces are our enemies. We must face them together because no one can defeat them alone.” 9
President Bill Clinton, 9/22/97.
“The third group are the rogue states — those that not only do not have a part in the international system, but whose very being involves being outside of it and throwing, literally, hand grenades inside in order to destroy it.” 10
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 2/19/98.
“In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals...”. 11
President Bill Clinton, 2/17/98.
Are rogue states becoming more and more of a political issue over time?
A final consideration was to identify whether these terms have become a more prominent feature in American rhetoric over time. The operating hypothesis was that these terms would gain in usage over time as the emphasis on the Cold War security relationship with the Soviet Union/Russia receded and was replaced by a concern over other perceived threats to American interests.
To examine this possibility, a frequency count was performed on the data, aggregating the number of documents per month which used either term. The results are summarized in Figure 1 below.
While references to rogues and pariahs began early in Clinton’s first term, their usage would become considerably more frequent from early 1996 through 1998, with a dramatic spike in February of 1997. These results support the contention that these concepts are increasing in their relevance in U.S. foreign policy.
Countries associated with “rogue state”
Having made the case that the terms “rogue state” and “pariah state” are both fairly recent yet common in usage, the research next turned to seeking a better understanding of the concept of “rogue” and “pariah”, first through an examination of which states have explicitly been placed into these categories by American policymakers. Again, frequency counts were performed on the data aggregating the number of times in which a specific country was labeled as a rogue or pariah (total number of country mentions — 133). The results, by country as percent of total mentions, are presented below.
Three states clearly emerge as those most frequently designated as rogues or pariahs in American political rhetoric. They are Iraq with 31 percent of all mentions, Iran with 29 percent, and Libya with 25 percent. The other states mentioned (Sudan, North Korea, Cuba, Serbia and Croatia) are for the most part not very surprising from a political standpoint (with the possible exception of Croatia) though their frequency of mention is considerably less.
Policies associated with “rogue states”
Another method for identifying what constitutes a “rogue state” or “pariah state” in the representations of American policymakers is to examine the specific actions that such states are alleged to have undertaken which are seen to be antithetical to American interests. This method gives us a way to see past the issue of possible diplomatic niceties where direct accusations of another state’s misconduct can be rare — the preferred method being the reference to the action not the actor.
All documents in the dataset were coded for specific actions or policies that were allegedly pursued by a “rogue” or “pariah” state. A total of 138 discrete policy actions were mentioned by American policymakers as actions associated with rogue behavior. The items mentioned clustered into four broad categories of behavior/policy: they are the Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability; Involvement in International Terrorism; Posing a Military Threat (to either the region or the globe); and Challenging International Norms. Each category has been given a number of subdivisions for additional precision. Table 2 presents these charges of roguish foreign policy behavior and the number of times a particular item was mentioned.
Table 2: Alleged Policies of the Rogues
| Policies |
Combined-Rogue/Pariah (#,of mentions) |
% of Total (n=138) |
|
| WMD Capability | 61 | 44% | |
| * | Chemical | 22 | |
| * | Nuclear | 11 | |
| * | Biological | 6 | |
| * | Missile | 6 | |
| * | Unspecified | 16 | |
| Terrorism | 39 | 28% | |
| * | Support | 20 | |
| * | Sponsor (harbor, train, export) | 16 | |
| * | Use to Undermine Peace Process | 3 | |
| Pose Threat | 27 | 20% | |
| * | Regional | 10 | |
| * | Political | 4 | |
| * | Military | 6 | |
| * | Global | 8 | |
| * | Political | 4 | |
| * | Military | 4 | |
| * | Unspecified Target | 9 | |
| Challenge International Norms | 11 | 8% | |
| * | Weapons Proliferation | 3 | |
| * | Defiance of UN/ international sanctions | 3 | |
| * | Crimes Against Humanity | 2 | |
| * | Narcotics Trafficking | 1 | |
| * | General | 2 | |
| Total | 138 | ||
Three of the four areas of behavior clearly dominate the attention of American policymakers when they consider the actions of rogue states: their alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, their alleged support of terrorism, and the perceived threat such states pose to their neighbors and the world at large, including the United States.
Analysis
It would seem logical to assume that the pursuit of the policies listed in Table 2 serves as a set of criteria for the determination of rogue status and hence the listing of states discussed in Figure 2. Those states which pursue the roguish behaviors in Table 2 become the so-called rogue states of Figure 2. 12
Yet an effort to determine who are the rogues solely on the basis of the policies listed in Table 2 would ultimately fail. There are many instances in which roguish behavior has not elicited the application of the “rogue” or “pariah” label by American policymakers.
Regarding the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, it could be argued that the greatest challenge to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the 1990’s did not take place in countries such as Libya and Iran but instead occurred in South Asia where both India and Pakistan not only have acquired, but detonated, nuclear devices. From a security standpoint their possession of such weapons of mass destruction is at least as great a threat as wmd programs amongst the listed rogue states.
Yet, neither India nor Pakistan have been characterized as rogues or pariahs even at the time of their nuclear detonations in 1998. In fact, Secretary of State Albright, though critical of these states for the tests, went out of her way to explicitly state that they were not to be characterized as pariahs nor made into outcasts. At a meeting of the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the Perm 5 or P-5) in June of 1998, Secretary Albright stated,
There are many things we want India and Pakistan to do. But we do not want to isolate these countries or make outcasts or pariahs of them. We must engage them. We must persuade them that what the international community wants them to do, they should do, consistent with their legitimate security needs. 13
Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, spoke similarly in testimony before a Senate subcommittee. He stated that
We will firmly reject any proposal for India or Pakistan to join the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] as a nuclear weapon state. We do not believe that nations should be rewarded for behavior that flies in the face of internationally accepted norms.
At the same time, we do not wish to make international pariahs out of either India or Pakistan. We believe that the purpose of these sanctions should be to influence behavior, not to punish simply for the sake of punishment. They should not be used to cause the economic collapse of either state or prevent the meeting of basic humanitarian needs. Whenever possible, and as the law permits, we should work to reduce the adverse effects on the competitiveness or operations of U.S. businesses. 14
Similarly, Egypt and Syria do not appear as rogue states in the rhetoric of American policymakers despite U.S. government reports that they both are actively engaged in the pursuit of missile technology and Syria is reportedly actively seeking to further develop its chemical weapons capability. 15 Some states which reportedly act as suppliers of weapons of mass destruction, such as China and Russia, also have escaped the designation of rogue state, though others, such as North Korea, have not. 16
With regard to the policy of allegedly sponsoring international terrorism, again we see that engaging in this roguish behavior is insufficient to garner the rogue label. This is most clearly seen in the case of Syria, which has been cited as a “state sponsor of terrorism” in the annual report “Patterns of Global Terrorism” issued by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, for each year, at least, of the Clinton Administration. Such “state sponsors” are defined as those “governments [which] support international terrorism either by engaging in terrorist activity themselves or by providing arms, training, safehaven, diplomatic facilities, financial backing, logistic and/or other support to terrorists”. 17 Yet Syria has not been named by a member of the Clinton foreign policy team as a “rogue state”.
As further research will seek to prove, if rogues elicit policies of international isolation (as suggested by Secretary Albright in her speech of June 4, 1998 cited above) led by the United States, we should also expect to find a correspondence between states with whom the United States has no relations and those classified as “rogues” or “pariahs”. This addresses the possibility that the rogues are simply those states with whom the United States has broken diplomatic relations. While it is true that the United States has no official diplomatic relations with the “rogue states” of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, its official relations with the “rogue states” of Sudan and Libya, 18 and the absence of United States relations with the non-“rogue state” of Bhutan does much to weaken the overall correlation. 19
Next Steps (In Lieu of Conclusions)
This paper has shown that American policymakers have adopted the language of the “rogue state” into their vocabularies and also into their policies. While constructing a list of rogue states is not a difficult proposition, determining just what it takes for a state to be considered a state is a bit more complex. It is clear that while there is a relationship between state behavior and the application of the rogue label, it is not automatic nor absolute. In the absence of a direct correlation between policy behavior and the application of the rogue label, some alternative, or perhaps additional, explanation(s) for how countries come to be considered as rogues needs to be developed. Clearly some other set of considerations goes into the designation of a rogue and the resulting application of a set of associated compellence-type policy correctives.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: Clinton, William J. (1999, January 19). State of the Union Address. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990119-2656.html> (1999, January 21). Back.
Note 2: Berger, Sandy (1999, January 19). Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials. <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/u...eop.gov.us/1999/1/19/17.text.1> (1999, January 21). Back.
Note 3: For the purposes of this paper the terms “rogue” and “pariah” are treated as synonyms. Treating them as distinct concepts yielded similar results. Therefore in the paper the two datasets were aggregated. Back.
Note 4: This conference paper is part of a larger research project on the role of rogue states in international politics (The Rogue State Research Project). Since the aspects of the project under study in this paper are not directly related to the theoretical basis of the project, no literature review has been incorporated into this particular conference paper. Back.
Note 5: Documents which used the term “outlaw state” were also collected but were not coded in time for inclusion into this analysis. Back.
Note 6: As the quotes leading the paper demonstrate, the use of such terms as rogue, pariah, and outlaw continue to the present. Back.
Note 7: Seventeen documents were not included because the specific speaker could not be identified. Back.
Note 8: Clinton, William J. (1996, June 26). Remarks by the President Upon Departure. <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-r.../oma.eop.gov.us/1996/6/26/15.te xt.1> (1999, January 5). Back.
Note 9: Clinton, William J. (1997, September 22). Remarks by the President to the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. <http://www.state.gov/www/issues/970922_clinton_unga.html> (1999, January 4). Back.
Note 10: Albright, Madeleine K. (1998, February 19). Remarks at Tennessee State University. <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980219b.html> (1999, January 4). Back.
Note 11: Clinton, William J. (1998, February 17). Remarks by the President On Iraq to Pentagon Personnel. <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-r...//oma.eop.gov.us/1998/2/18/5.te xt.1> (1999, January 5). Back.
Note 12: This is essentially the argument made by Michael Klare in the only published scholarly treatment of the phenomena of rogue states, though he only looked at the behavior of the acquisition of wmd. See Klare, Michael (1995). Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy. New York: Hill and Wang. Back.
Note 13:
Albright, Madeleine K. (1998, June 4). Statement at the P-5 Foreign Ministers Meeting on South Asia. <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980604a.html> (1999, January 12).
Secretary Albright made similar statements in three other documents. Back.
Note 14: Inderfurth, Karl F. (1998, June 3). Testimony before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. <http://www.state.gov/www/policy.../980603_inderfurth_efforts.html> (1999, January 12). Back.
Note 15: Director of Central Intelligence (1997). Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997. <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html> (1999, January 4). Back.
Note 16: Director of Central Intelligence (1997). Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997. <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html> (1999, January 4). Back.
Note 17: Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (1998, April). Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html&g t; (1999, January 31). Back.
Note 18: While the United States embassy in Khartoum, Sudan has been closed since the August missile attack, the United States has not broken relations. Back.
Note 19: This information was taken from the following document. Office of the Geographer and Global Issues, U.S. Department of State (1998, December 2). Independent States in the World. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/independent_states.html> (1999, January 26). Back.
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