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CIAO DATE: 10/99
Semantics or Substance? Showdown Between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization *
Department of Political Science
University of Kansas
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Part A
Introduction
Dateline: Gaza City, Occupied Gaza Strip, 9 December 1987. Israeli soldiers opened fire Wednesday on bottle-throwing Arab protesters in a wave of violence triggered by a traffic accident. Two people were killed and 18 wounded.... The unrest was sparked by a traffic accident Tuesday night in which three Arabs were killed and seven injured when an Israeli [military] tractor-trailer collided head-on with two vans carrying Palestinian workers. (Associated Press)
Within hours of a serious traffic accident in Gaza, rumors spread that the incident was a deliberate act in retaliation for the killing of an Israeli salesperson two days earlier. The Palestinian intifada—a sustained popular uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip —had begun. Massive demonstrations filled the streets and Palestinian youth, wearing the distinctive Arab keffiyeh, took to the streets throwing rocks, garbage, and bottle rockets at Israeli soldiers, earning the label “children of the stones.” The soldiers, not trained for this type of engagement, responded to the barrage with tear gas, water cannons, and weapons of a deadlier kind: plastic and rubber bullets and live ammunition. Within the first month of the uprising, official reports indicated at least twenty-six Palestinians had been killed and another 200 wounded. 1 The outbreak of the intifada had been spontaneous, but local Palestinian political activists quickly organized themselves and began to produce clandestine communiqués that directed events on the ground, praised or criticized various individuals and groups, and presented clear political arguments.
As the Palestinian revolt continued to build, Israel implemented additional measures to suppress the disturbances, cutting off water, electricity, and phone lines to some of the refugee camps, establishing curfews and closures against entire villages, arresting more than a thousand Palestinians, and expelling perceived intifada leaders. Nothing worked to stop the rebellion. Writing in April 1988, Amos Elon Israeli journalist commented:
Thirteen weeks after the start of the popular uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—which right-wing Israeli politicians and a part of the local press still insist on calling the “unrest,” the “events,” the “discrepancies,” the “disorders” in the territories—it is safe to make at least one sweeping generalization. The status quo... is shattered forever. ...Clearly a new leadership class is growing underground. It still pays lip service to the PLO bureaucracy abroad, but the true extent of its dependence on the PLO is not known. 2
International reaction to the Israeli crackdown was severe. In the United States, media coverage evoked public criticism of Israeli government tactics and sympathy for the Palestinians who until this point had often been viewed as terrorists rather than as victims. In a break from its generally pro-Israel stance, the United States joined with other members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in condemning Israeli actions as a serious violation of human rights. 3 The last time the U.S. had supported a UN resolution condemning Israel was after Israel annexed the Syrian Golan Heights in 1981. The intifada was changing the international political landscape.
The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians
As the major Western power at the end of World War II, the United States was expected by the international community to take a leading role in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The U.S. government first become intimately involved in the controversy over Palestine in the 1940s and was instrumental in the passage of UN Resolution 181, which led to the partition of the British Mandate and the creation of the State of Israel. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration developed the central goals that would characterize U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East for decades to come: the protection of U.S. and European access to critical petroleum resources, maintenance of regional stability, and the prevention or reduction of Soviet influence. 4
U.S. policy regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict came directly out of these more general concerns. Successfully managing the dispute was important to the extent that the failure to do so could damage U.S. and Western relations with the Arab world and Iran, make countries in the region susceptible to Soviet influence, or jeopardize Middle Eastern oil supplies. While these goals continued to be important, after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war U.S. governmental rhetoric and actions became increasingly supportive of Israel which, U.S. policy makers believed, could serve as a “strategic asset” and a surrogate for U.S. interests. By the late 1960s, “the strategic asset thesis came to be accepted... as absolute dogma in the conventional wisdom of American political culture.” 5 It formed the basis of the 1969 peace plan developed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the shuttle diplomacy of National Security Advisor (and later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War that led to the Sinai I and Sinai II disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel. 6
In 1975, as part of a secret U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding attached to the Sinai II agreement, Kissinger made a critical pledge to Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that restricted United States diplomacy for more than a decade:
The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 7
Kissinger believed that this promise was essential to obtaining Israel’s approval of Sinai II, which was critical to U.S. interests in the region. The two UN Security Council resolutions referred to—242 and 338—marked the end of the June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli wars respectively (Appendix A). Palestinians maintained these resolutions were an inadequate basis for negotiation because, among other issues, they did not address Palestinian demands for self-determination, referring instead only to a “settlement of the refugee problem.”
Later, in 1984, Congress wrote into law the terms of the Kissinger-Allon agreement and added that the PLO had to renounce the use of terrorism as well. 8 Acceptance of these three conditions was a necessary prerequisite for any kind of formal diplomatic discussion between the two parties. This did not stop individuals within the United States government from dealing with the PLO in secret, either independently or through Arab emissaries. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency’s 1974 arrangement with Palestinian security chief Ali Hassan Salameh to protect U.S. citizens living in Beirut held until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. During the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war, the PLO helped with the evacuation of U.S. citizens, leading President Gerald R. Ford to thank the organization publicly. 9
Under President Jimmy Carter, several private U.S. citizens “were empowered directly by the president, his national security advisor or the secretary of state to conduct talks with Arafat and his senior political and military advisors.... The contacts forged by these envoys... all were kept secret from Israel.” 10 In addition, during a three year period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, John Gunther Dean, “held more than thirty-five secret meetings with PLO officials, including several with Arafat’s top aide, Abu Jihad....” 11 When contacts between U.S. officials and the PLO became publicly known, however, such as when Andrew Young, the chief U.S. representative to the United Nations under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, met with Zehdi Labib Terzi, the head of the PLO’s UN mission, in a private home one evening in July 1979, these actions were quickly denounced.
Using the no-negotiation policy as a justification, the United States under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Ronald W. Reagan attempted to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by working with Egypt (as in the 1978 Camp David Accords) or Jordan. One scenario envisaged a joint confederation between the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, whereby the Jordanian government would represent Palestinian interests in peace negotiations and help in the administration of any subsequent Palestinian entity. Jordan’s ties to the Israeli-Palestinian issue stemmed from its control of the West Bank between 1948 and 1967 as well as the presence of a large Palestinian refugee community in the Hashemite Kingdom. Although Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel in the June Arab-Israeli War, the Kingdom continued to assert its claim to speak for the Palestinians throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the “Jordanian option,” as it came to be known, served as the framework for the 1982 Reagan Peace Plan and later for Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s “Initiative for Middle East Peace” in 1987 and early 1988.
An ex-Marine and a strong supporter of Israel who disliked and distrusted the Palestinian leadership, Shultz had done little to promote Arab-Israeli negotiations until this point. His proposal called for an international conference at which all participants would be required to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and renounce terrorism. This would be followed by direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians who would be represented within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In early March, Shultz delivered his proposals to King Hussein of Jordan, Syrian President Hafez al-Asad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, meeting with each of the leaders personally in an attempt to win their support. However, as he later wrote, “ no one truly wanted substantive change.” 12 A new round of shuttle diplomacy in June again met with no success.
Shultz returned to the U.S. dejected, but not without hope. This confidence quickly faded, however, as King Hussein dropped a political bomb on 31 July. Faced with the intifada’s strong articulation of Palestinian nationalism and widespread Palestinian rejection of his claim to represent them, King Hussein shocked the world by announcing that Jordan would severe all “legal and administrative links” to the West Bank. This action put Arafat and the PLO “under intense pressure to fill the perceived vacuum created by Jordan’s disengagement from the area.” 13 Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Arafat’s close associate until his assassination in January 1991, later remarked:
We knew that the king had not made his decision for the benefit of the cause. I believe personally that the king was betting that the PLO would not be capable of making an initiative. The bet was that either there would be a failure to take a decision, or a failure to implement it, and that in either case the PLO would have to go back to him again. 14
King Hussein’s action also forced the Reagan administration “to realize that the Jordanian option was in fact, a figment of one’s imagination. It had never been realistic, and, clearly, after July 31, it was no longer worth pursuing in any way, shape or form.” 15 Unless the United States was prepared to give up its efforts to achieve a breakthrough in the ailing peace process, it would need to deal directly with the Palestinians. At the same time, many expressed skepticism that the Palestinians would be able to satisfy U.S. requirements for talks. Martin Indyk, the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israel think-tank, commented: “Any effort by the United States to get the PLO to meet the American conditions for the peace process is bound to fail. We know that from 10 years of experience.” 16
Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians
Living in exile in Tunis, the energetic and controversial PLO chairman Yasir Arafat faced a difficult situation. Arafat, an engineer by training, had witnessed the original 1936-1939 Palestinian Revolt against Jewish immigration to Palestine and had dropped out of school to fight in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Living in Kuwait in the late 1950s, Arafat, along with Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Abu Iyad, had founded the Fateh guerrilla group. Arafat remained unknown to much of the world, however, until 1968. In July of that year, Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other guerrilla groups gained control of the PLO (which had been established in 1964 by the Arab states as a way of controlling Palestinian military activity). Seven months later, in early 1969, Arafat was elected leader of the umbrella organization, a position he continued to hold.
His leadership role did not mean, however, that Arafat could dictate the behavior of all the PLO’s constituent parts. For instance, while the mainstream groups, including Fateh, began to place an increased emphasis on political activities, the PFLP and other members of what was called the Rejection Front took the opposite path, attempting to gain attention for the Palestinian cause through a series of plane hijackings, bomb attacks, and other acts of terror. One of these hijackings, in September 1970, triggered the Jordanian-Palestinian War that led to the expulsion of the Palestinian fighters from Jordan; they eventually regrouped in Lebanon. The kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, eleven of whom where killed during a rescue attempt, was equally dramatic and resulted in widespread international condemnation of the Black September Organization that claimed responsibility for the operation.
Arafat had a different idea. For many years, he had desired an official dialogue with the United States, convinced that the U.S. role as Israel’s chief supporter meant that only with U.S. acquiescence could the Palestinians achieve their political goals. 17 More than once, Arafat had stated bluntly that “the U.S. holds the key to Israel.” 18 Arafat’s intelligence cooperation with the United States in Lebanon since the early 1970s and his indirect messages to Henry Kissinger both before and after the October 1973 War, were among the different ways he had tried—unsuccessfully—to get the U.S. to listen to him. 19 There were two secret meetings in Rabat, Morocco, between a senior PLO representative and Deputy Director of the CIA General Vernon Walters in November 1973 and March 1974; however, nothing came of them. Commenting on the lack of progress during the short-lived dialogue, Kissinger later wrote: “This was no accident. At this stage, involving the PLO was incompatible with the interests of any of the parties to the Middle East conflict.” 20
Now, under Arafat’s leadership, the Palestine National Council (PNC) began to shift its focus away from its previous goal of a unified, progressive, secular state in all of Palestine. Instead, at the June 1974 PNC meeting, the parliament-in-exile advocated a Palestinian “national authority” in any part of historic Palestine that was freed from Israeli control. That October, at the Arab League conference in Rabat, the Arab states had acknowledged the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” giving Arafat increased international legitimacy. Most significantly for the Palestinian movement, Arafat was invited to address the members of the United Nations on 13 November 1974. The Palestinian leader was greeted by a standing ovation, with only the U.S. delegation refusing to rise (the Israelis boycotted the meeting). Arafat gave a passionate two hour speech that ended with the words: “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” 21 Two weeks later, the United Nations granted the PLO observer status.
The apparent response of the United States to this sequence of events had been the 1975 Kissinger pledge to Israel, hardly what Arafat had in mind. At this point, members of the PLO were quite divided about how to proceed. Egyptian Mohamed Heikal later commented:
One part of the organization was groping in the dark for an unknown partner in Israel, another part was trying to thwart the efforts of the first, while a third and larger element was looking about for some alternative way forward. This third element, which at the time included Arafat, felt that negotiations alone could not be the answer. 22
Nonetheless, Arafat continued to make small moves toward accommodation and compromise with Israel.
In January 1976 the PLO supported a Security Council resolution (vetoed by the U.S.) which called for a two-state settlement on the pre-June 1967 borders with “appropriate arrangements... to guarantee... the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders”—in effect an acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 with a modification to allow for a Palestinian state as well as an implicit recognition of Israel by the PLO. 23
Three years later, in November 1979, the PLO played a significant role in obtaining the release of thirteen of the U.S. hostages who were being held in Iran after the takeover of the U.S. embassy by student activists. In 1981, the PLO approved a Soviet proposal calling for a settlement that would “insure the security and sovereignty of all states of the region including those of Israel” and in 1984 it offered to negotiate with Israel to establish mutual recognition. 24 The following year, Arafat indicated in the Cairo Declaration that the PLO condemned “all operations outside [Palestine] and all forms of terrorism. 25
Yet, despite these statements and actions, the PLO seemed no closer to its goal of winning over the United States. To the contrary: In September 1987, after extensive lobbying efforts by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Justice Department declared that the PLO was a terrorist organization and demanded the closure of the PLO information office in Washington (over the objections of the State Department which argued the PLO office had broken no laws). The following spring, the Justice Department attempted to terminate the existence of the PLO observer mission to the United Nations (although the legality of this was eventually challenged and the Justice Department was forced to back down).
By mid-1988, Arafat desperately needed a political victory to validate his authority and prove that diplomacy could accomplish Palestinian objectives. 26 The PLO’s 1982 defeat in Lebanon at the hands of Israel meant that the Palestinians had lost their last military foothold on territory with direct access to Israeli-controlled lands. With few countries willing to host the Palestinian fighters, Arafat had ended up in Tunisia, far from the majority of the Palestinian people. Now, the actions of Palestinians from “inside” the West Bank and Gaza Strip—the anonymous intifada leadership that was responsible for writing the communiqués as well as the newly created Hamas movement—had created a new social and political reality that challenged Arafat’s claim to be the one individual whose leadership could achieve Palestinian self-determination. The popular committees, which were responsible for underground education, garbage collection, policing the streets, the coordination of food distribution during curfews and sieges, and everything in between, required a high level of local mobilization and entire sectors of society had been brought into the process. Further, the Israeli assassination of one of Arafat’s closest friends and colleagues, Abu Jihad, on 16 April 1988 had eliminated the one clear, direct link between the PLO in Tunis and the intifada leadership. 27
At the same time, the intifada, with its David and Goliath images, the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank the previous summer, and the thawing of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union all had created an opportunity that the Palestinian leader did not want to waste. 28 In Tunis, one of Arafat’s closest associates, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), spoke with a colleague about the possibility of pursuing a two-state solution. Abu Mazen, who had been a teacher before becoming involved with the PLO, had for a number of years been involved in the evolution of the PLO’s policy. As Abu Mazen recalled the conversation: “ I asked him, should we consider recognizing Israel? He said yes.” 29
Shortly thereafter, the PLO embarked on yet another effort to pursue nontraditional avenues for reaching out to Israel and the United States. A key player in this activity was Arafat’s spokesperson, Bassam Abu Sharif, an individual with long-standing “revolutionary” credentials. In June, 1988, Abu Sharif circulated publicly a position paper in which he advocated a two-state solution to the Palestine problem and expressed the willingness to recognize Israel as a separate country:
Israel’s objectives are lasting peace and security. Lasting peace and security are also the objectives of the Palestinian people. No one can understand the Jewish people’s centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it means to be stateless and the object of fear and prejudice of the nations.... We feel that no people—neither the Jewish people nor the Palestinian people—deserves the abuse and disenfranchisement that homelessness inevitably entails. We believe that all peoples—the Jews and the Palestinians included—have the right to run their own affairs, expecting from their neighbors not only non-belligerence but the kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure, no matter how massive its war machine, and without which no nation can truly prosper, no matter how generous its friends in distant lands may be.The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins of another’s. We are confident that this desire and this realization are shared by all but an insignificant minority in Israel. 30 (Appendix B)
Amid widespread international speculation about whether Abu Sharif was speaking only for himself or for Arafat as well, the PLO looked for additional ways to convey its message.
Track I : A Private Enterprise
One approach that interested the PLO was to work through private individuals who had links to the U.S. government. On 2 August 1988, Palestinian-American Mohammed Rabie met with his friend William B. Quandt, senior fellow of the Brookings Institution and former National Security Council staffer in the Nixon and Carter administrations, who had played a key role in the 1978 Camp David Accords. Rabie, an economist by training and the head of a Washington, D.C.-based center for conflict resolution, was a former university classmate of several high-ranking PLO political figures. Thus, he had access to the top levels of PLO leadership. Since February 1985, Rabie had been working with German intellectual and political advisor Rudolf Hilf and individuals from the International Center for Peace in the Middle East to promote Israeli-Palestinian civilian interactions. 31 Progress had been slow. Now he and Quandt were to discuss Rabie’s proposal for stimulating a U.S.-PLO dialogue. Just days after King Hussein’s dramatic disengagement announcement, Rabie felt the PLO could be convinced to accept U.S. conditions for a dialogue if the PLO was certain the U.S. would provide an expression of support for Palestinian self-determination. 32 Quandt commented later:
As far as I knew then or know now, it was his own proposal, not one initiated by the PLO in Tunis. At this initial meeting we agreed to try to develop language that would meet the requirements of both sides. Rabie assumed that I had contacts in the State Department, and he assured me that he could communicate easily with the PLO leadership. 33
Over the next week, the two drafted a proposed statement for the PLO as well as a possible U.S. response that would satisfy the conditions of both parties. Quandt then met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Kirby on 12 August, asking Kirby directly: “If the PLO could say this, would you be interested?” 34 The answer came quickly. Shortly after returning home, Quandt received a phone call. Charles Hill, Shultz’s executive assistant and a senior diplomat previously stationed in Israel, had reviewed the document and thought it had potential. 35 Quandt and Rabie had a green light to proceed, provided they informed the PLO of several key points:
Shultz’s office also indicated that the final statement by the U.S. would probably be quite similar to that proposed by Rabie and Quandt, but that this would have to be confirmed by Shultz himself.
Shortly thereafter, on 18 August, Rabie left for Tunis to discuss the proposal with Arafat and the PLO administration. After lengthy deliberations within the PLO Executive Committee both statements were accepted with only minor changes. 37 Rabie returned to the United States on 2 September and immediately contacted Quandt. That afternoon, Quandt met with Kirby and with Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia Richard Murphy to discuss Rabie’s meetings in Tunis. The session went well but the U.S. officials remained hesitant regarding the text of the proposed U.S. statement. 38 Rabie and Quandt later learned the reason for the lack of commitment: While Shultz was interested in starting a dialogue with the PLO, he was not prepared to accept Palestinian “self-determination,” which he viewed as a code word for a Palestinian state. 39 On 12 September, Shultz briefed President Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s approach to foreign policy was generally far more hands-off than his recent predecessors and he had not been involved in the earlier discussions. Instead, Reagan was content to articulate broad policy outlines and leave it to his advisors to fill in the details. Shultz showed Reagan the PLO statement and asked what the U.S. response would be. Reagan thought the approach being developed “was just right.” 40
With the President behind him, Shultz sought to clarify his views on Palestinian political aspirations in a major speech on 16 September 1988 at Wye Plantation before the strongly pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In his speech Shultz outlined the basic components of peace negotiations, reiterating the U.S. position regarding Palestinian participation in such a process.
The status quo between Arabs and Israelis does not work. It is not viable. It is dangerous. It contains the seeds of a worsening conflict.... The existence, security and well-being of Israel are the first principles of any settlement....Palestinian political rights must also be recognized and addressed.... They want, and they are entitled to, political participation, and influence over political and economic decisions that affect their lives. This can occur if opportunities for peace and dialogue are seized....
At the same time, each party is free to bring any position it chooses to the negotiating table.... Palestinians are free to argue for independence.... The United Sates cannot accept ‘self-determination’ when it is a code word for an independent Palestinian state or for unilateral determination of the outcome of negotiations. 41
The call for recognizing the political rights of Palestinian people was new language, implying but not stating explicitly U.S. recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, as demanded by the PLO. 42
A week later, on 23 September, Quandt met with Rabie to pass along a message from Secretary Shultz to be delivered to Arafat: “We welcomed the receipt of the initiative, which we recognize as a serious effort. This issue has been given careful consideration and will continue to be seriously considered. We expect to provide our reaction in six weeks or so,” that is, after the upcoming U.S. and Israeli elections. 43 One reason for Shultz’s continuing caution may have been the concern raised by chief of staff Ken Duberstein, who feared that Vice President George Bush’s presidential campaign would be harmed if the U.S. opened a dialogue with the PLO before the elections. 44
Two important messages were exchanged during the month of October in an effort to keep the initiative alive. The first communication was delivered to the Reagan administration by Rabie on behalf of the PLO on 19 October 1988. It indicated that the PNC meeting in Algiers, Algeria, would be pushed back until after the U.S. and Israeli elections and would occur 14-16 November 1988. Included was a summary of the positions it was anticipated the PNC would adopt at the upcoming meeting. The second message was from the United States to the PLO, again transmitted through Quandt and Rabie, that declared the U.S. intention to begin talks in Tunis within twenty-four hours of an appropriate PLO statement; Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Pelletreau would be designated to head the U.S. delegation. 45
Events appeared to be moving smoothly, with both parties awaiting the outcome of the U.S. elections and the PNC session in Algiers before beginning the dialogue. By the end of October, however, the secrecy that had been essential to the unofficial exchanges was lost when Jordan and Egypt somehow learned of the Quandt-Rabie initiative and its prospects for success. The leadership in both countries were unhappy to have been left out of the discussions, particularly since in the past they had been the main channels of communication between the U.S. and the PLO. Their belated attempts at involvement exacerbated the existing suspicions between the U.S. and the PLO and threatened to derail the entire process.
The Jordanians argued that U.S. recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination was unnecessary since the Jordanian government no longer had any claims to Palestinian territory. When Israel began to withdraw from the West Bank following PLO acceptance of UN Resolutions 181 and 242, therefore, the PLO would be the only ruling authority. According to a Jordanian diplomat who spoke with Quandt, King Hussein and Yasir Arafat had discussed this formulation at a meeting in Aqaba, Jordan, on 22 October 1988. Despite U.S. skepticism about the accuracy of this story, the Jordanian position meant the U.S. felt less pressure to commit itself to Palestinian self-determination, thus impeding the U.S.-PLO confidence building process. 46
The other setback to the initiative stemmed from an Egyptian communiqué with the State Department. The Egyptians claimed that Arafat felt uneasy about the Quandt-Rabie channel because it passed through Abu Mazen, who had certain external ties of which Arafat did not approve. Because the U.S. couldn’t talk to Arafat directly, the Egyptians offered themselves as an alternative channel of communication, an offer that the United States did not pursue. Thus, the U.S. hesitation to open discussions with the PLO until after the PNC meeting, coupled with the outside interference of the Jordanians and the Egyptians, threatened to undo all of the progress that had been made to build confidence between the two parties up until that point.
The PNC meeting in Algiers issued two major documents, a Palestinian Declaration of Independence and a Political Program. According to the text of the Political Program, the PNC acknowledged:
The necessity of convening the effective international conference on the issue of the Middle East and its core, the question of Palestine, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict in the region, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing, and by considering that the international peace conference be convened on the basis of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338....The PNC reiterates its abidance by the UN resolutions that acknowledge the people’s right to resist foreign occupations, colonialism, and racial discrimination, as well as their right to struggle for their independence. The PNC also reiterates its rejection of terrorism in all its forms, including institutionalized terrorism, stressing its commitment to its previous resolutions in this respect.... 47
The Declaration of Independence issued by the PNC was similar:
[The PNC] also declares in this respect that it believes in the settlement of international and regional problems by peaceful means according to the UN Charter and its resolutions, and that it rejects threats to use force, violence, or terrorism or to use these against its territorial integrity and its political independence or the territorial integrity of any other state, without infringing its own natural right to defend its own territories and independence.... 48
While these documents mentioned that all parties had the right to exist in peace, there was no mention of Israel by name. This was an issue for U.S. officials. Secretary of State Shultz claimed the language in the two documents was “blurry and ambiguous.” 49 State Department Spokesman Charles Redman issued a statement on 16 November, after the PNC session had ended, indicating that “the reference to [UN Security Council] Resolutions 242 and 338 is an advance over previous efforts by the PNC. Nevertheless, it is ambiguous both in its placement in the text and its meaning. Possibly implied or indirect reference to Israel’s right to exist is not sufficient.” 50 With the Quandt-Rabie initiative seemingly at an impasse, Shultz redirected his energies in the direction of a second back channel which had opened some months earlier.
Track II: The Swedish Connection
The origins of this track, which stemmed from a private lunch time discussion between Shultz and Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson in April of 1988. Andersson, a soft-spoken individual, charming, but tenacious, told Shultz that “in twenty-five years of dealing with the [Middle East] region, the hatreds had never seemed more intense. But he said he also sensed a strong, new desire for peace.” 51 Andersson felt a real empathy for both Israelis and Palestinians and believed that the Swedes, outsiders to the conflict but with a long history of international peacemaking activities, could serve as impartial mediators.
Like Arafat, Andersson was convinced that the road to Jerusalem passed through the United States. While his long-term goal was an Israeli-PLO dialogue, he believed this could only be accomplished if it was preceded by conversations between the PLO and the American Jewish community. He hoped that such discussions would place added pressure on Israel to enter into negotiations with the PLO. 52 Andersson told Shultz that Arafat himself had encouraged Andersson to pursue this approach with the Americans; the Swede also expressed his desire to arrange a meeting between PLO officials and U.S. Jewish personalities in order to break the gridlock. Andersson later commented: “I knew Shultz couldn’t say yes because [official U.S.-PLO contact] was against the law in the United States. But he could say no.” Shultz made no response to the proposal. “I looked upon that as a silent yes. He didn’t say it but I felt we were of the same mind.” 53 So with his silent yes, Andersson embarked upon plans for such a meeting.
In a letter to Arafat dated 6 July 1988, Andersson expressed Sweden’s interest in facilitating a dialogue between the PLO and a group of U.S. Jews. In his letter, Andersson mentioned he was encouraged by the recent statement issued by Arafat’s spokesperson, Bassam Abu Sharif. Andersson went on to note that several prominent American Jews had contacted him and expressed a strong desire to see the PLO leader endorse Abu Sharif’s statement. He concluded by proposing to arrange a meeting between Arafat and “an appropriate gathering of Jewish leaders,” believing that they could serve as an effective vehicle for jarring U.S. administration complacency. 54 Despite Andersson’s encouragement, Arafat was initially unwilling to commit to this course of action, perhaps not trusting the intentions of the Andersson’s U.S. partners.
Inspired by Secretary Shultz’s September Wye Plantation speech concerning Palestinian political rights, Andersson intensified his efforts to bring the two sides together. On 3 October, Eugene Makhlouf, the PLO representative in Stockholm, met with one of Andersson’s aides. Makhlouf learned of the Swedish hope for a meeting that would result in a joint statement calling for peace and mutual recognition. 55 Makhlouf traveled to Tunis to obtain permission from the PLO leadership to pursue this idea. . Apparently galvanized by the Rabie-Quandt track, Arafat now agreed and arrangements were made for a delegation headed by Khaled al-Hassan, a member of the Fateh Central Committee who had served as foreign minister within the PLO, to meet with the Americans in Stockholm following the PNC session in Algiers. 56
On 7 November 1988, Andersson wrote formally to Arafat:
I have the great pleasure to invite leaders of the PLO to a joint meeting in Stockholm 21-22 November 1988 with representatives of prominent American Jews.In extending this invitation it is my firm belief that a dialogue between the PLO and prominent American Jews on the basis of internationally recognized principles could play an important role in promoting a genuine peace process in the Middle East....
It is my understanding that this meeting would constitute a preparatory step towards a possible subsequent meeting between prominent American Jews and the Chairman of the executive Committee of the PLO, Mr. Yasir Arafat or his mandated representative. Consequently, the main objective of the preparatory meeting would be to agree on the modalities for the high-level meeting. 57
Attached to Andersson’s invitation was the text of the proposed joint statement that declared PLO readiness to recognize the state of Israel and negotiate a political settlement “on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination.” 58
The first meeting occurred on Tuesday, 21 November, 1988, less than a week after the apparent collapse of the Quandt-Rabie initiative. In addition, to Makhlouf, the Palestinian delegation included Khaled Hassan, PLO Executive Member Yasir Abed Rabbo, and PLO Ambassador to the Netherlands Afif Safieh. Three members of the U.S. Jewish community—private citizens representing only themselves—were present: Stanley K. Sheinbaum, a wealthy, liberal California publisher, Rita Hauser, a respected New York attorney and a Republican who had promoted Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in the past, and Drora Kass, director of the U.S. office of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East (with which Sheinbaum and Hauser were also affiliated). Hauser and Sheinbaum attempted to underscore the importance of the meeting by divulging that they had spoken with Richard Murphy and National Security Adviser Colin Powell before leaving for Stockholm. 59
Initially, the conversation was difficult. The PLO representatives indicated they were unwilling to sign off on the draft prepared by the Jewish delegation because it would satisfy U.S. demands without the U.S. making any concessions in return. Avoiding a possible impasse, the participants drafted a new document—known as the Stockholm Declaration—that served to clarify the PNC declarations. The text stated that at its meeting the previous week the PNC had:
With this statement, the Jewish delegation pronounced that there was no further impediment to a direct dialogue between the United Sates government and the PLO.
On 24 November, Arafat formally applied for a visa to come to New York in December to address a special UN session on the Palestinian issue and elaborate on the recent PNC declarations. The following day, Shultz received a copy of the still secret Stockholm Declaration from a Swedish diplomat. Shultz’s initial reaction was “Well, this really advances things. It’s clear we can do some business here.” 61 Along with the copy of the private declaration was a letter from Andersson requesting a final, precise indication of what Arafat would have to say to meet U.S. conditions.
But before Shultz could reply to Andersson, he had to make a decision about whether or not to issue Arafat a visa. For a full day, Shultz listened to the opinions of top administration officials. The majority, including Colin Powell, Richard Murphy, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Vernon Walters, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost favored approval of the request. Shultz’s Executive Secretary Charles Hill and the Chief of the State Department’s counter-terrorism office L. Paul Bremer disagreed, however. Shultz also knew that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had told U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering that Israel opposed Arafat receiving permission to enter the U.S. Furthermore, Shultz recalled that two months earlier fifty-one Senators had signed a letter urging him to refuse any future visa request from Arafat. 62
Ultimately, Shultz sided with those calling for Arafat to be denied a visa. Referring to the Anti-Terrorist Act, which required that a waiver be refused to anyone who was actively involved in organizing or abetting acts of terrorism, Shultz declared that as the head of the PLO Arafat was “an accessory to terrorism” 63 and insisted that there be “no concessions to Arafat until he met our terms.” 64 In doing so, Shultz violated the U.S. host country agreement with the UN to allow free access to anyone invited to the United Nations on official business. In a letter to President Reagan, Vernon Walters criticized Shultz’s decision, calling it “baffling and contradictory” and said it did “incalculable damage to U.S. credibility.” 65 According to a Reagan Administration official, Shultz’s action also upset incoming Secretary of State James Baker and President-elect George Bush: “They were annoyed that [Shultz’s] actions were going to make it extremely difficult to get anywhere in the Middle East.... Their sense was that [Shultz] was creating a mess that he could walk away from in a few weeks.” 66 Bush and Baker feared that Shultz’s hard-line approach would further tilt international sympathy towards Arafat’s underdog image against a bullying U.S.. 67
International reaction was swift and severe in its criticism of Shultz’s decision. The Italian foreign ministry expressed “deepest amazement” and urged the U.S. to revise itself: “If unchanged, the American decision would contribute to the weakening of the moderate position which emerged from Algiers and which Italy sees as the correct way to overcome rigid, contrasting positions.” 68 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak came out against the decision; UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and Pope John Paul II expressed their dismay. In an unprecedented action, the representatives to the United Nations voted to move the entire General Assembly to Geneva, Switzerland, so that Arafat could address the organization during a special session on the Question of Palestine. A total of 154 countries supported the resolution, with only the United States and Israel voting against it. (Great Britain abstained.) The estimated cost of this move was half a million dollars for the two day session. 69
Later the same day that he rejected Arafat’s visa request, Shultz received a message from Swedish Ambassador to the U.S., Wilhelm Wachtmeister. Wachtmeister indicated Arafat was going to Stockholm to meet with the Jewish-American group (now enlarged to include Princeton University professor of Middle Eastern history Abraham Udovitch and Menachem Rosensaft, who was born in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp). Would Shultz please inform the Swedes of the official U.S. position?
Shultz sent a letter to Andersson on 3 December 1988, along with a statement to be issued by Arafat (Appendix C). In his letter Shultz stated that he would not accept counterdrafts of the text. The U.S. would not, however, object if the PLO wanted to add certain pronouncements regarding its position, provided that those additions neither conditioned nor contradicted PLO acceptance of U.S. positions. 70 Shultz also attached a state that the U.S. was prepared to issue in response. Shultz gave Andersson specific instructions not to inform the Jewish delegation of Shultz’s correspondence, but indicated: “You may share this letter with your visitor [Arafat] if you believe it would be useful.” 71
Before going to Geneva for the United Nations special session, Arafat, accompanied by Yasir Abed Rabbo, PLO Executive member Mahmoud Darwish, Khalad al-Hassan, Bassam Abu Sharif, and Afif Safieh, traveled to Stockholm on Tuesday, 6 December. The Palestinian delegation was immediately provided with a copy of Shultz’s letter and proposed texts. With growing interest, Arafat checked the statements against the ones that had earlier been worked out by Rabie and Quandt. In doing so he noticed that the proposed PLO statement was almost exactly the same, but that the U.S. response had been changed with regard to nearly all the points addressing Palestinian concerns, including the convening of an international conference, the exchange of land for peace, and the right of Palestinian self-determination. 72 This was a problem.
With the help of the Swedes, the Palestinians and Americans began a series of last minute negotiations across the Atlantic that eventually produced a draft acceptable to both parties. Arafat abandoned his demand for U.S. recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination. In exchange, Shultz agreed that “an American official would answer a planted question about whether the Palestinians could table their position on statehood, to which the answer would be ‘Yes, the Palestinians, as far as we are concerned, have the right to pursue an independent state through negotiations.’ 73 A second planted question would follow whereby the official would express his support for an international conference followed by direct bilateral negotiations. The PLO penciled in a few minor changes to the draft and Andersson faxed a copy back to Shultz for final approval. 74
At this point, Arafat hesitated. Perhaps recognizing the enormous significance of what he was about to do, Arafat indicated that while he personally agreed to the language, he would have to return to Tunis to obtain approval from the PLO Executive Committee. Before leaving Stockholm, the PLO chairman publicly issued the statement that had been previously worked out during the 21 November meeting. The language was close to what Shultz had proposed and included Arafat’s acknowledgment that the PLO “accepted the existence of Israel as a state in the region.” Acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations was, however, contingent on the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. In addition, Arafat “rejected and condemned” terrorism, rather than “renouncing” it or promising never to use it in the future. This, Shultz felt, was an improvement but was not sufficient for U.S. recognition.
Meanwhile, the United States was under significant international pressure to deal with Arafat in a more conciliatory manner. As Time magazine later reported:
Ronald Reagan... had been getting a fusillade of transatlantic telephone calls urging him to be more sensitive to Arafat’s position and readier to accept his concessions. Repeated pleas came from Egypt’s Mubarak, Jordan’s Hussein, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd. Just as important, such close U.S. friends as Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, France’s François Mitterand and West Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl joined the persistent chorus.The common element in this high-level pitch: if Arafat could not get some favorable response from the U.S. for his painful and personally dangerous efforts, he would face a radical Arab backlash, perhaps headed by Syria. A rare chance for peace would be lost. 75
Through messages from British, Egyptian, Saudi, and Swiss channels, Arafat confirmed that the Reagan Administration was serious about initiating a dialogue with the PLO if Arafat unambiguously met the long-standing U.S. conditions. Finally, on 12 December, the word came from Tunis: The PLO Executive Committee had signed off on the basic deal worked out between Shultz and Arafat. Arafat was free to indicate this in his speech to the United Nations special session in Geneva the following day. At the same time, Arafat had encountered some resistance within the PLO Executive Committee regarding the precise language that Shultz had provided Andersson. Thus, Arafat had to balance the demands of the United States against the need to avoid alienating those members of the PNC who were unhappy with the political document that had come out of the Algiers PNC meeting.
“Arafat sent word to the Swedes that he would use the Shultz formulation in his speech, but that it would be scattered throughout the text.” 76 President Reagan and President-elect Bush were informed of the imminent PLO proclamation and Reagan for the second time authorized the State Department to enter into a substantive dialogue with the PLO. On 12 December, Charles Hill telephoned Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad to notify him of the impending U.S. decision. Shultz later called Arad himself to explain the U.S. position.
Thus the stage was set for a breakthrough. While Arafat stood at the podium before a packed house at the UN in Geneva, senior State Department officials—including Charles Hill, Michael Armacost, Richard Murphy, and Max Kampelman—huddled around a television on the seventh floor of the State Department. Arafat’s speech had been carefully drafted by two key members of the PNC who were knowledgeable about U.S. politics; however, Arafat had revised it at the last minute. 77 Speaking in Arabic, Arafat presented his message:
In my capacity as chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, presenting assuming the functions of the provisional government of the State of Palestine, I therefore present the following Palestinian peace initiative....The PLO will seek a comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbors, within the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests, especially our people’s rights in freedom, national independence, and respect the right to exist in peace and security for all. 78
When Arafat had finished his speech, the State Department officials looked at each other. How should the United States react? Had Arafat at long last satisfied the U.S. conditions?
Part B
When he finished speaking, a smiling Arafat was convinced the United States would respond quickly with recognition of the organization he had led for nearly twenty years. He returned to his suite at the Intercontinental Hotel and waited for the U.S. announcement.
Some State Department officials felt that Arafat had fulfilled the U.S. requirements; however, Armacost, Hill, Murphy, and Shultz disagreed. Expecting “verbatim compliance, [Shultz] felt the speech was another sign that Arafat could not be trusted.” 79 The Secretary of State later reported: “I reviewed it with President Reagan, who was following this closely, and I said ‘Well, Mr. President, in one part of his statement he said “Un, Un, Un” and the other part of his statement he said “cle, cle, cle,” but nowhere did he say “uncle,” so no, it’s not satisfactory.’” 80
State Department spokesperson Charles Redman’s statement was a disappointment to many:
The United States listened carefully to Mr. Arafat’s speech. The speech contained some interesting and some positive developments. But it continued to be ambiguous on the key issues which must be clearly addressed in order for the United States to enter a substantive dialogue with the PLO. 81
An Arab official argued that the PLO Chairman had indeed acknowledged Israel’s “right to exist” in peace. The Arabic word for “exist” can also mean to “live” which is how it was translated by the UN interpreter. Similarly, in Arabic, the word “condemned” is precisely the same thing as the word “renounce.” The Arabs argued that the only discrepancy was semantic. 82 Andersson commented, “When we analyzed the text we found that everything the U.S. wanted was there. But Arafat had split it up and had not used some of the agreed words and formulas.” 83
Sitting in his hotel suite, Arafat was stunned, angered, and depressed by Shultz’s negative response. Many of Arafat’s advisors urged him to stop making concessions and forget the United States. Others felt it was too late for such a choice. Palestinian businessman Hassib Sabbagh, who had worked intensely to get Arafat to Geneva, challenged the unhappy group: “What are you saying? That we’ve moved the entire UN General Assembly across the Atlantic for nothing? That this opportunity is simply to be thrown away? And what are we to tell the hundreds of journalists waiting out there?” 84
Part C
Back in Washington, Secretary of State Shultz was being bombarded by phone calls from Hosni Mubarak, Margaret Thatcher, King Fahd, King Hussein, and Helmut Kohl, all urging him to reconsider his decision to avoid damaging prospects for peace. 85 Mubarak told Shultz that if he would give Arafat one more opportunity, Mubarak could convince him to say the “magic words.” That evening, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismet Abdul Meguid had dinner with Arafat. Abdul Meguid tried to convince the Palestinian leader that Arafat had gone too far to turn back without gaining some political advantage for his concessions. It was essential that Arafat call a press conference for the next day to clarify his statement with still more explicit language regarding the renunciation of terrorism. Reluctantly, Arafat agreed. 86
Early the following morning, Mubarak phoned Shultz and told him that Arafat was prepared to meet U.S. conditions at a press conference that evening. A day of frenzied phone calls and negotiations followed, with Arafat “sweating blood” the entire time. 87 Most of the contacts between the two sides were handled by Richard Murphy for the U.S. and Swedish diplomat Ulf Hjertonsson for the Swedes. Hjertonsson spoke on two phone lines at once: On one end Anders Bjurner, an Andersson aide in Geneva, relayed the text of the Arafat statement to Hjertonsson at the Swedish embassy in DC, while on the other end Hjertonsson passed along the information to Murphy who then sent corrections back the other way. 88 Finally the parties settled on a statement. Shultz notified Colin Powell, now serving as National Security Adviser, who briefed President Reagan at about 9:30 AM. At 2:30 p.m. Washington time Arafat held another press conference, this time in English under the careful observance of an interpreter, in which he stated:
Let me highlight my views before you. Our desire for peace is a strategy and not an interim tactic. We are bent to peace come what may. Our statehood provides salvation to the Palestinians and peace to both Palestinians and Israelis. Self-determination means survival for the Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis as their rulers claim.Yesterday in my speech, I made a reference to the United Nations resolution 181 [on the partition of Palestine] as the basis for Palestinian independence. I also made a reference to our acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international conference. These three resolutions were endorsed at our Palestinian National Council session in Algiers.
In my speech also yesterday, it was clear that we mean our people’s rights to freedom and national independence according to Resolution 181 and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and, as I have mentioned, including the state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbors according to the Resolutions 242 and 338.
As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms and yet I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely reject all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism. Between Geneva and Algiers, we have made our position crystal clear....
Enough is enough. Enough is enough. Enough is enough. All remaining matters should be discussed around the table and within the international conference....
Finally, I declare before you and I ask you to kindly quote me on that: We want peace. We want peace. We are committed to peace. We want to live in our Palestinian state and let live. 89
The press statement was reviewed by the same U.S. government officials. This time they were in agreement: Arafat had done it. Later, a Palestinian political analyst commented that “Shultz dictated the [exact] words. Shultz did not allow Arafat to retain any pride. Shultz did not want Arafat even to save face. That’s why Shultz insisted on certain words.” 90
At 5:15 the same evening, Powell met with Reagan and informed him of the consensus. Reagan gave the go-ahead for an official announcement on the U.S. decision to enter into a substantive dialogue with the PLO. At 5:30, Charles Hill called Ambassador Arad and told him of the United Sates decision to go ahead with the dialogue despite strong Israeli objections. Key members of Congress and prominent heads of state were also notified. Finally, at 6:30 p.m., Secretary of State Shultz announced the decision at the Department of State briefing room. 91
The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, and renounced terrorism. As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives.I am designating our ambassador to Tunisia as the only authorized channel for that dialogue. The objective of the United States remains, as always, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.... Nothing here may be taken to imply an acceptance or recognition by the United Sates of an independent Palestinian state.... It is also important to emphasize that the United States commitment to the security of Israel remains unflinching. 92
European and Arab leaders cheered the news. In the West Bank, “jubilant Palestinians toasted one another with mabrouk, the Arabic word for ‘congratulations.’ To the foot soldiers in the intifadeh,... this was the first tangible victory. ‘If we succeeded in forcing American to sit with the P.L.O., we will force Israel to recognize the P.L.O.,’ crowed a 17-year old Palestinian activist from Jerusalem.” 93 Israel, however, was shocked and dismayed. Speaking on ABC News, Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad presented the official Israeli reaction, saying that he was “obviously disappointed... We don’t recognize the P.L.O. as a viable partner for negotiations. We regret the United States decision to establish contact with the P.L.O. and I don’t feel that this will bring the peace process further, or that it will advance the peace process.” 94 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was less diplomatic: “We cannot trust them. They are criminals, they are liars, they are enemies of our people.” 95 Shultz’s own perspective was not all that different. “When asked if his previous accusation that Arafat was a terrorist was now expunged from the record, Shultz replied: ‘No, when we have our dialogue you can be sure that the first item of business on our agenda... will be the subject of terrorism.’” 96
On Tuesday, 16 December 1988, exactly one year and one week after the outbreak of the intifada, United States Ambassador Robert Pelletreau held the first official meeting with representatives of the PLO in nearly fifteen years. 97
Analytical Epilogue 98
On the same day that U.S.-PLO talks began in Tunis, “Israeli troops cracked down hard on protesters at an Arab funeral in Nablus on the occupied West Bank, killing five of them in one of the bloodiest clashes since the Palestinian intifada (uprising) began....” 99 The intifada continued for several more years, finally petering out during the 1991 Gulf War between Iraq and the US-led coalition.
By making the decision to open a dialogue with the PLO at the very end of Reagan’s term of office, Shultz handed the incoming Bush administration a fait accompli. It would have been difficult for the incoming secretary of state, James Baker, to make such a dramatic move early in the Bush presidency, whereas the political cost of maintaining an existing dialogue was much less. According to a Gallup poll conducted in October 1989, a majority of U.S. citizens supported discussions between the United States and the PLO. When asked “Do you think the U.S. government should continue the talks [with PLO leaders] at the present level, expand the talks to include higher-level PLO leaders, or end talks with the PLO?” 26 percent thought the talks should remain at the present level and a plurality of 37 percent believed the talks should be expanded. Only 17 percent responded that the talks should be ended; 20 percent said they were not sure. These responses are particularly interesting given that a mere 12 percent of those polled said that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they sympathized more with the Palestinians than with Israel.
In Congress, however, support for the dialogue was tenuous. Under pressure from U.S. legislators, the Bush administration suspended talks with the PLO on 20 June 1990, three weeks after an unsuccessful attack on an Israeli beach by members of the tiny Palestine Liberation Front. The talks remained on hold for more than three years. Israel praised the U.S. decision. For Palestinians, already embittered by the U.S. veto on 31 May 1990 of a UN Security Council resolution calling for a commission to investigate Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians and provide recommendations to ensure their safety, it was another sign that the U.S. held Palestinians and Israelis to different standards.
There were few concrete results from the initial year and a half of U.S.-PLO discussions, although many analysts believed that their occurrence was itself a significant development in U.S.-Palestinian relations. In its first year, the Bush administration did not view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a matter of great urgency; however, by the middle of 1990 the Middle East had moved into a prominent position on the U.S. agenda. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August diverted the United States for the next seven months, but once Iraq had been defeated, Israeli-Palestinian relations became the focus of sustained U.S. attention. Throughout this period, the United States continued to reject the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, it supported the possibility of a Palestinian-Jordanian federation or some other option left unspecified.
In 1999, despite the 1991 Madrid Conference, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained unresolved, although some Israelis and Palestinians hoped that the election of Israeli Labor leader Ehud Barak as prime minister in May 1999 would allow significant process to occur.
Chronology
| November 1947 | UN General Assembly Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine | |
| 1947-49 | Internal conflict in Palestine followed by civil and international war after Israel declares independence on 15 May 1948; Israel, Egypt, and Jordan take control of territory designated for Palestinian state | |
| 1964 | Creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by Arab states | |
| June 1967 | Israeli war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria results in Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights; UN Security Council Resolution 242 | |
| July 1968 | PLO taken over by Fateh and other guerrilla groups; seven months later, Fateh leader Yasir Arafat is elected chairperson of the organization | |
| 1969 | PLO articulates its goal for the establishment of a democratic secular state in Palestine; Rogers Peace Plan | |
| September 1970 | Plane hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) triggers Jordanian-Palestinian War; Palestinian guerrillas regroup in Lebanon | |
| 1972 | Palestinian guerrilla group kidnaps Israeli athletics at the Munich Olympics; ends with the death of eleven Israelis and five Palestinians. | |
| October 1973 | Egypt, supported by Jordan and Syria, declares war against Israel; UN Security Council Resolution 338 | |
| 1974 | Arab League conference in Rabat, Morocco, declares PLO “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; Arafat gives speech at the United Nations; PLO gains observer status at the United Nations | |
| 1975 | U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding (part of the Sinai II Agreement) commits United States to avoid official contacts with the PLO until, inter alia, the PLO accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338 | |
| 1982 | Israeli War in Lebanon; Reagan Peace Plan | |
| 9 December 87 | Onset of the Palestinian uprising, the intifada | |
| April 88 | Beginning of Andersson initiative | |
| 31 July 88 | King Hussein announces Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank | |
| 2 August 88 | Beginning of Rabie-Quandt initiative | |
| 16 September 88 | Shultz speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy at Wye Plantation | |
| 1 November 88 | Israel election results in a National Unity Government | |
| 9 November 88 | U.S. presidential election results in victory for George Bush | |
| 12-15 November 88 | Meeting of the PLO’s Palestine National Council in Algiers, Algeria, culminates in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence | |
| 21 November 88 | Stockholm Meeting between PLO figures and U.S. Jews | |
| 1 December 88 | Arafat unable to address the UN General Assembly because U.S. refuses to grant him a visa; UN votes to meet in Geneva | |
| 7 December 88 | Stockholm Declaration | |
| 9 December 88 | First anniversary of the intifada | |
| 13 December 88 | N General Assembly holds special session in Geneva, Switzerland, to hear Arafat’s speech. | |
Appendix A
UN Security Council Resolution 242, 22 November 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East;
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security;
Emphasizing further that all Member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter;
UN Security Council Resolution 338, 22 October 1973
The Security Council,
Appendix B
Bassam Abu Sharif, “Prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement,” Algiers, 7 June 1988
Everything that has been said about the Middle East conflict has focused on the differences between Palestinians and Israelis and ignored the points on which they are in almost total agreement.
These points are easy to overlook, hidden as they are under a seventy-year accumulation of mutual hostility and suspicion, but they exist nevertheless and in them lies the hope that the peace that has eluded this region for so long is finally within reach.
Peel off the layers of fear and mistrust that successive Israeli leaders have piled on the substantive issues and you will find that the Palestinians and Israelis are in general agreement on ends and means:
Israeli’s objectives are lasting peace and security. Lasting peace and security are also the objectives of the Palestinian people. No one can understand the Jewish people’s centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it means to be stateless and the object of the fear and prejudice of the nations. Thanks to the various Israeli and other governments that have had the power to determine the course of our people’s lives, we know what it feels like when human beings are considered somewhat less human than others and denied the basic rights that people around the globe take for granted. We feel that no people—neither the Jewish people nor the Palestinian people—deserves the abuse and disenfranchisement that homelessness inevitably entails. We believe that all peoples—the Jews and the Palestinians included—have the right to run their own affairs, expecting from their neighbors not only non-belligerence but the kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure, no matter how massive its war machine, and without which no nation can truly prosper, no matter how generous its friends in distant lands may be.
The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins of another’s. We are confident that this desire and this realization are shared by all but an insignificant minority in Israel.
The means by which the Israelis want to achieve lasting peace and security is directed talks, with no attempt by any outside party to impose or veto a settlement. The Palestinians agree. We see no way for any dispute to be settled without direct talks between the parties to that dispute, and we feel that any settlement that has to be imposed by an outside power is a settlement that is unacceptable to one or both of the belligerents and therefore a settlement that will not stand to one or both of the belligerents and therefore a settlement that will not stand the test of time. The key to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement lies in talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Palestinians would be deluding themselves if they thought that their problems with the Israelis can be solved in negotiations with non-Israelis, including the United States. By the same token, the Israelis—and US secretary of state George Shultz, who has been shuttling to the Middle East for discussions on his peace proposals—would be deluding themselves if they thought that Israel’s problems with the Palestinians can be solved in negotiations with non-Palestinians, including Jordan.
The Palestinians would like to choose their Israeli interlocutor. We have little doubt that we could reach a satisfactory settlement with the Peace Now movement in a month. We know, however, that an agreement with Peace Now would not be an agreement with Israel, and since an agreement with Israel is what we are after, we are ready to talk to Mr. Shimon Peres’ Labor alignment, or to Yitzhak Shamir’s Likud block, or anyone else the Israelis choose to represent them.
The Israelis and Mr. Shultz would also prefer to deal with Palestinians of their own choosing. But it would be as futile for them as for us to talk to people who have no mandate to negotiate. If it is a settlement with the Palestinians that they seek, as we assume it is, then it is with the representatives of that people that they must negotiate, and the Palestinian people, by the only means that they have at their disposal, have chosen their representatives. Every Palestinian questioned by diplomats and newsmen of the international community has stated unequivocally that this [is the case. If this is considered an] unreliable expression of the Palestinians’ free will, then give the Palestinians the chance to express their free will in a manner that will convince all doubts: arrange for an internationally-supervised referendum in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and allow the population to choose between the PLO and any other group of Palestinians that Israel or the United States or the international community wishes to nominate. The PLO is ready to abide by the outcome and step aside for any alternative leadership should the Palestinian people choose one.
The PLO will do this because its raison d’être is not the undoing of Israel, but the salvation of the Palestinian people and their rights, including their right to democratic self-expression and national self-determination.
Regardless of the satanic image that the PLO’s struggle for those rights has given it in the United States and Israel, the fact remains that this organization was built on democratic principles and seeks democratic objectives. If Israel and its supporters in the US administration can grasp that fact, the fears that prevent them from accepting the PLO as the only valid interlocutor toward any Palestinian-Israeli settlement would vanish.
Those fears, as far as I can tell from what has been written and said in Israel and the United States, center on the PLO’s failure to unconditionally accept Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and on the possibility that a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza would be a radical, totalitarian threat to its neighbor.
The PLO, however, does accept resolutions 242 and 338. What prevents it from saying so unconditionally is not what is in the resolutions but what is not in them: neither resolution says anything about the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their democratic right to self-expression and their national right to self-determination. For that reason, and that reason alone, we have repeatedly said that we accept resolutions 242 and 338 in the context of the other UN resolutions, which do recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people.
As for the fear that a Palestinian state would be a threat to its neighbor, the democratic nature of the PLO—with its legislative, executive, and other popularly-based institutions—should argue against it. If that does not constitute a solid enough guarantee that the state of Palestine would be a democratic one, the Palestinians would be open to the idea of a grief, mutually-acceptable transitional period during which an international mandate would guide the occupied Palestinian territories to democratic Palestinian statehood.
Beyond that, the Palestinians would accept—indeed, insist on—international guarantees for the security of all states in the region, including Palestine and Israel. It is precisely our desire for such guarantees that motivates our demand that bilateral peace talks with Israel be conducted in the context of a UN-sponsored international conference.
The Palestinians feel that they have much more to fear from Israel, with its might war machine and its nuclear arsenal, than Israel has to fear from them. They would therefore welcome any reasonable measure that would promote the security of their state and its neighbors, including the deployment of a UN buffer force on the Palestinian side of the Israeli-Palestinian border.
Time, sometimes the great healer, is often the great spoiler. Many Israelis no doubt realize this and are trying to communicate it to the rest of their people. As for us, we are ready for peace now, and we can deliver it. It is our hope that the opportunity that presents itself today will not be missed.
If it is missed, we will have no choice but to continue to exercise our right to resist the occupation, our ultimate aim being a free, dignified, and secure life not only for our children but also for the children of the Israelis.
Appendix C
Taken from William B. Quandt, Peace Process (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993)—use photocopy if possible.
Teaching Notes
Description of Case
This case examines a significant shift in official U.S. policy toward the Palestinians that set the stage for the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Agreement, and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the 1990s. The case describes the role of second track and third-party diplomacy in facilitating a ”breakthrough” in a protracted and deadlocked conflict and highlights the role of several key individuals involved in these specific events. Thus, it illustrates that, if much of foreign policy is conducted by massive bureaucracies that move ponderously, in some instances dramatic alterations in international relations can occur due to the actions of a relatively small group of individuals. In addition, by focusing on the infrequently examined Palestinian side of the equation, the case can be used to examine the difficulties facing a small nonstate actor such as the PLO when dealing with a major global power. This case could be used easily in classes dealing with U.S. foreign policy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or Middle East politics more generally. It could also serve a role in courses on international mediation.
In each of these settings, the case is better placed later in the term rather than as the first or second case discussed. It will be most successful if students have a general awareness of past U.S. foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before they attempt to analyze this series of events; however, detailed knowledge is not necessary.
Part A begins with the Palestinian intifada (uprising), then quickly turns to a brief description of past United States policy toward the Palestinians and Israel. This provides a context for the 1975 deal between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon that was attached to the Sinai II disengagement agreement. This secret “understanding” stipulated that the United States would not negotiate with the PLO as long as the PLO failed to recognize Israel’s “right to exist” and did not accept United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Under President Reagan, this was amended to include the requirement that the PLO also renounce the use of terrorism.
The case then reviews the evolution of PLO policy toward the Israelis after 1967 and turns to a consideration of the situation facing Yasir Arafat and the Palestinians at the end of the 1980s. The 1982 War in Lebanon, the beginning of the intifada in December, 1987, and the announcement in August, 1988, by King Hussein that Jordan was giving up any claims to the West Bank are particularly important events that are highlighted.
With this background, the case moves into a description of two separate but mutually reinforcing efforts undertaken by nontraditional actors pursuing the goal of gaining US recognition of the PLO. The first track highlights the work of two well-connected US citizens: former National Security Council staffer William Quandt and Palestinian-American Mohammed Rabie. The second involves a small group of prominent U.S. Jews, high-ranking PLO members, and the Swedish foreign office. Part A ends with Arafat’s speech at a special session of the United Nations held in Geneva, Switzerland, on 13 December 1988 at which time he dramatically called for a “comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned... including the State of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbors...”
The short Part B tells of the US assessment that, despite this speech, Arafat had not yet fulfilled the prerequisites for a dialogue with the United Nations and puts the ball back in Arafat’s court. Part C describes Arafat’s final (and successful) attempt to “say the magic words,” thus gaining Shultz’s approval to begin talks between US Ambassador Robert Pelletreau and members of the PLO. A brief analytical epilogue brings events up to 1999.
Teaching Plan
In a class on the Arab-Israeli conflict or Middle East politics, this case could follow David A. Korn’s “The Making of United Nations Security Council Revolution 242: Centerpiece of Arab-Israeli Negotiations” or Shibley Telhami’s “The Camp David Accords.” Both of these cases illustrate the United States’ past success in not dealing directly with the Palestinians regarding the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and provide information that sets the stage for the events of 1988. “Semantics or Substance?” could also be nicely paired with Denis J. Sullivan’s “The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles” or his “Oslo II: The Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” each of which examines the subsequent evolution of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the continuing role played by second track and third-party diplomatic activities.
For Middle East politics courses (whether general or focused on the conflict), students should be asked to read only parts A and B before coming to class. (Part C and the analytical epilogue can either be read in class at the end of the period or assigned for the following session.) This keeps the focus on the decision facing Arafat after the United States yet again tells him that he has failed to satisfy the requirements for a US-PLO dialogue as stipulated first by Henry Kissinger and later by Ronald Reagan. One way to begin the discussion is with the general question:
What was at stake for Yasir Arafat in the summer and fall of 1988?
This could lead into a consideration of the challenge to Arafat’s authority represented by the intifada and the new actors, such as Hamas, that were created as a result of the uprising. This is also an opportunity to examine in more detail the statement by Bassam Abu Sharif (contained in Appendix B) and ask how this document compares with the final statement by Arafat.
A slightly different beginning that I have used successfully is to draw on the interviews with Palestinian elites that I conducted in 1998, as follows:
A Palestinian political analyst has said that by 1988 “Arafat would have done anything to please the Americans.” What could account for this attitude on Arafat’s part? How did it influence the PLO’s bargaining stance?
This puts on the table immediately the importance of the United States to the PLO and the way this hindered the PLO’s ability to bargain effectively.
During class discussion, my students raised two related questions that could be quite provocative:
Did Arafat “cave in”?Where is Israel in this case? Why isn’t it a key actor?
The first forces students to think about what it means to be a weak actor negotiating with a superpower like the United States, while the second raises a variety of issues about the US-Israeli relationship and the conditions under which it is or is not critical in determining US policy choices.
Another option that is particularly appropriate in a class dealing exclusively with the Arab-Israeli conflict is to ask students to prepare ahead of time to role-play an imaginary discussion between Arafat and some of his close advisors (Abu Iyad, Abu Mazen, Bassam Abu Sharif, Khaled al-Hassan, Yasir Abed Rabbo, Mahmoud Darwish, Afif Satieh, etc.). Students could be given instructions such as the following:
This case does not report on the content of the discussions Arafat must have had with members of the PLO Executive Committee and other advisors between his Geneva speech and his press conference the following day. Based on your knowledge of Palestinian politics, speculate on the opinions that might have been presented to the PLO leader. Why did Arafat decide to make one final attempt at satisfying the United States? What arguments might have been raised in opposition to this action?
This approach would be particularly appropriate if one wanted to highlight the internal disagreements and debates within the Palestinian community, possibly as a prelude to a later class examining Palestinian reactions to the Oslo Agreement.
If this case is used in a U.S. foreign policy class, students should be asked to read only Part A before coming to class. This will place the emphasize on the choice facing the United States after Arafat’s speech. The type of conversation the class will have will depend a lot on the other cases that have been studied. One way of opening the discussion is to ask:
Does this case present a view of the United States that is consistent with your understanding of its general foreign policy approach? What U.S. “interests” are at stake here?
This could open the way for an examination of the international context in which this set of events occurred. Students might be asked whether the timing of the US decision was significant:
What combination of factors made the United States think it was possible/desirable to do something that had previously been considered unthinkable or at least politically risky?Is this a decision Reagan could have made earlier in his term? Was it a “favor” to Bush? If Reagan had not taken this step, what do you think Bush would have done?
What role, if any, did international public opinion play?
I have also found it worthwhile to spend some time exploring Shultz’s demand that Arafat follow a specific formula:
Why was the United States so insistent that Arafat speak the exact words the U.S. demanded? Is Ibrahim Abu-Lughod correct in his assessment that “Shultz did not allow Arafat to retain any pride. Shultz did not want Arafat even to save face.”? What other explanations can you think of?If the PLO was sincere in its recognition of Israel, etc., how important is the public declaration? If they were not sincere, would it matter what they said or how they said it?
Once students have read parts B, C, and the epilogue, I find it useful to explore what difference, if any, the decisions of 1988 have made:
In retrospect, what, if anything, did Arafat’s press conference and the U.S. decision to hold a substantive dialogue with the PLO accomplish for the PLO?, for the United States?Could Madrid have occurred? What about Oslo?
Finally, although I have not used this case in a course on mediation and conflict resolution, I think it would work well in that context. Many of the questions mentioned above would also be appropriate in such a class. In addition, one could ask:
Who were the key actors involved in the private U.S. track? The Swedish track?Are there any individuals beyond the obvious ones—Arafat, Andersson, Quandt, Rabie, and Shultz—who were essential to the evolution of this situation?
Were both tracks necessary to achieve the eventual outcome? Did they reinforce each other or did they conflict in any way?
Who took the greatest risks in this case? Arafat? Shultz? the American Jewish group? Someone else?
Is there any significance to the fact that the Swedes played such a significant role in these events?
Writing Assignment
I have had good results from asking this straightforward question as a follow-up writing exercise in a Middle East politics class:
How does the negotiating process here compare to one of the following: the events that led to UN Security Council Resolution 242? the Camp David Accords? The US diplomatic recognition of the PLO?
Endnotes
*: A previous version of this teaching case was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 19 February 1999, in Washington, D.C. We are grateful for the valuable suggestions we received from Lou Ortmeyer, Peter Paraschos, Jon Pevehouse, Denis Sullivan, and the students in Gerner’s 1999 Middle East Politics course. Back.
Note 1: New York Times, 9 January 1988, p. 1. Back.
Note 2: Amos Elon, A Blood-Dimmed Tide: Dispatches from the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 135, 140. Back.
Note 3: Paul Lewis, “U.S. Joins U.N. in Vote Against Israel,” New York Times, 6 January 1988, p. 1. Back.
Note 4: Deborah J. Gerner, “Missed Opportunities and Roads Not Taken: The Eisenhower Administration and the Palestinians,” Arab Studies Quarterly 12(1-2): 67-100. Back.
Note 5: Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 188. Back.
Note 6: The 1991 Pew Case Study by Cecilia Albin and Harold H. Saunders, “Sinai II: The Politics of International Mediation,” discusses U.S. mediation efforts between 1973 and 1975. Back.
Note 7: U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, The Search for Peace in the Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967-1979. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 15. Back.
Note 8: Marianne van Leewan, Americans and the Palestinian Question (Amsterdam: Rodopi Publishing, 1993), p. 33. Back.
Note 9: Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, Inside the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution. (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991), pp. 162-163. Back.
Note 10: Janet Wallach and John Wallach, Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), p. 356. Back.
Note 11: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 359. Back.
Note 12: George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 1031. Back.
Note 13: Phil Baum and Raphael Danziger, “A Regenerated PLO? The Palestine National Council’s 1988 Resolutions and Their Repercussions,” Middle East Review (Fall 1989), p. 18. Back.
Note 14: Interview in August 1989, quoted in Gowers and Walker, Inside the Myth, p. 287. Back.
Note 15: William B. Quandt, “Conference: Palestinian Uprising,” American-Arab Affairs 27 (Winter 1988-89), p. 27. Back.
Note 16: Robert Pear, “U.S. will Use Third Parties to Press P.L.O. Over Peace,” New York Times, 2 August 1988, p. 6. Back.
Note 17: Interview with Ali Jarbawi, Director, Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights, Ramallah, 3 January 1999, by Gerner. Back.
Note 18: Time, 11 November 1974. Back.
Note 19: Gowers and Walker, Behind the Myth, p. 161. Back.
Note 20: Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 629. Back.
Note 21: quoted in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 335. Back.
Note 22: Mohamed Heikal, Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace negotiations (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 325. Back.
Note 23: Rubenberg, “The U.S.-PLO Dialogue: Continuity or Change in American Policy?,” Arab Studies Quarterly 11:4 (Fall 1989), p. 19. Back.
Note 24: Alexander Cockburn, “Twenty Years On,” The Nation 18/25 July 1987, p. 45. Back.
Note 25: “Cairo Declaration on the PLO and Terrorism as read by Chairman Yasir Arafat, Cairo, 7 November 1985,” reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies 15:2 (Winter 1986), pp. 214-216. Back.
Note 26: Interview with Salim Tamari, Director, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Jerusalem, 6 January 1999, by Gerner. Back.
Note 27: Interview with Imad Ghayathah, Instructor, Birzeit University, Birzeit, 5 January 1999, by Gerner. Back.
Note 28: Interview with Zuheir Khalaf, Assistant Deputy for Civil Affairs, Palestinian National Authority, in Ramallah, West Bank, 6 January 1999, by Gerner. Back.
Note 29: “The Fifty Years War, Israel and the Arabs,” Part Five: “Banging Heads, 1987-91.” Broadcast on PBS in January, 1999. Back.
Note 30: Bassam Abu Sharif, “Prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement,” Algiers, 7 June 1988. Reprinted in Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, p. 310. Back.
Note 31: Mohammed Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), p. 19. Back.
Note 32: William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 369. Back.
Note 33: Quandt, Peace Process, p. 573, fn. 28. Back.
Note 34: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 385. Back.
Note 35: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 34. Back.
Note 36: Quandt, Peace Process, p. 369. Back.
Note 37: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 52. Back.
Note 38: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 57. Back.
Note 39: Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1035. Back.
Note 40: Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1035. Back.
Note 41: Address by Secretary of State Shultz before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 September 1988. Reprinted in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1989), pp. 392-396. Back.
Note 42: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 59. Back.
Note 43: Quandt, Peace Process, p. 370. Back.
Note 44: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 61. Back.
Note 45: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, pp. 61-62. Back.
Note 46: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 62. Back.
Note 47: Text of the political statement issues by the PNC at the end of its 19 th session, 15 November 1988. Reprinted in Documents on Middle East Peace, 1982-1988. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, April 1989. Back.
Note 48: Text of the PNC Declaration of Independence, November 15, 1988. Reprinted in Documents on Middle East Peace, 1982-1988. Back.
Note 49: Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1037. Back.
Note 50: Daily press briefing by Department of State Spokesperson Redman, 16 November 1988. Reprinted in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1989, p. 396. Back.
Note 51: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 380. Back.
Note 52: Mohammed Rabie, “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 1992), p. 56. Back.
Note 53: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 381. Back.
Note 54: Rabie, “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” p. 57. Back.
Note 55: Rabie “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” p. 58. Back.
Note 56: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 71. Back.
Note 57: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, p. 172. Back.
Note 58: Rabie, “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” p. 59. Back.
Note 59: Rabie, “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” p. 60. Back.
Note 60: Rabie, The US-PLO Dialogue, pp. 174-75. Back.
Note 61: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 390. Back.
Note 62: Robert Pear, "51 Senators Urge that Arafat be Denied a Visa to Visit US," New York Times, 30 September 1988. Back.
Note 63: George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 277. Back.
Note 64: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 391. Back.
Note 65: Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1039. Back.
Note 66: Ed Magnuson, “A Dance of Many Veils,” Time, 26 December 1988, p. 24. Back.
Note 67: Time, 26 December 1988. Back.
Note 68: Steve Lohr, "Europeans Criticize U.S. Over Arafat," New York Times, 28 November 1988. Back.
Note 69: 1988 Facts on File, 16 December 1988. Lexis/Nexis. Back.
Note 70: Rabie, “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” p. 61. Back.
Note 71: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 393. Back.
Note 72: Rabie, “The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” p. 62. Back.
Note 73: Quandt, Peace Process, p. 373. Back.
Note 74: Wallach and Wallach, Arafat, p. 396. Back.
Note 75: Magnuson, "A Dance of Many Veils," p. 27. Back.
Note 76: Quandt, Peace Process, p. 374. Back.
Note 77: According to an internal PLO account, "Many voices were raised warning of the outcome of embarking on this step.... All of that led Abu Ammar (Arafat) to work to distance himself from the step, and for that reason he took another look at his speech to remove most of the commentary that it contained and that complied with the proposed text from the Americans. Abu Ammar feared for national unity and imagined that [several constituent groups within the PLO] might leave the PLO which might influence the intifada, just as it would affect the total credibility of the PLO which desired an acceptable democratic appearance." See Quandt, Peace Process, p. 575. Back.
Note 78: "PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat’s Address to the UN General Assembly in Geneva, "Reprinted in Abdul Hadi, Documents on Palestine, p. 337. Back.
Note 79: Quandt, Peace Process, p. 375. Back.
Note 80: “The Fifty Years War.” Back.
Note 81: "Daily Press Briefing by Charles Redman, 13 December 1988. " Reprinted in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988 (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 1989), p. 400. Back.
Note 82: Los Angeles Times, 16 December 1988, Nexis/Nexis. Back.
Note 83: Elaine Sciolino, "The Secret Effort on Arafat: Go-Betweens Seize the Moment," New York Times, 16 December 1988. Back.
Note 84: Gowers and Walker , Behind the Myth, p. 298. Back.
Note 85: Time, 26 December 1988. Back.
Note 86: Chicago Tribune, 16 December 1988, Lexis/Nexis. Back.
Note 87: Time, 26 December 1988, p. 23. Back.
Note 88: Sciolino, "The Secret Effort on Arafat:" Back.
Note 89: PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat’s Geneva Press Statement, 14 December 1988. Reprinted in Washington Post, 15 December 1988. Back.
Note 90: Interview of Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Ramallah, West Bank, January 1999, by Gerner. Back.
Note 91: Chicago Tribune, 16 December 1988. Back.
Note 92: "Statement by Secretary of State George Shultz, 14 December 1988," Reprinted in American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1989), p. 401. Back.
Note 93: Johanna McGeary, “Breakthrough,” Time 26 December 1988, p. 20. Back.
Note 94: Israelis Express Shock and Dismay," New York Times, 15 December 1988. Back.
Note 95: “The Fifty Years War.” Back.
Note 96: Ann Lesch, “The Reagan Administration’s Policy Toward the Palestinians.” In U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton, ed. Michael W. Suleiman, (Normal. Illinois: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1995), p. 190. Back.
Note 97: Members of the Palestinian delegation included Yasir Abed Rabbo, Head of the PLO Cultural Department Abdullah Hourani, PLO Ambassador to Tunisia Hakam Balawi, and Director of the PLO’s Political Department Abdul Latif Abu Higheh. Back.
Note 98: This description of events following the beginning of the US-PLO dialogue is taken in large part from Deborah J. Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 144. Back.
Note 99: Newsweek, 26 December 1988, p. 18. Back.
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