|Map of Europe|
CIAO DATE: 02/01
European Security, the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management
International Studies Association
41th Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA.
March 14-18, 2000
The Cold War system was based on the concept of "balance of power." For Hans Morgenthau 1 , alliances are the "most important manifestation of the balance of power." In this observation members of alliances have common interests based on the fear of other states. Stephen Walt 2 has since modified this concept, viewing alliances as the result of a "balance of threat." He shows that the overwhelming coalition led by the United States against the USSR and its allies was a result not of the power of the USSR but of its perceived threat. This traditional model, where the existence of alliances and a potential threat were inseparable, is consistent with the bipolarity of the Cold War.
While the dramatic events of 1989/90 indelibly transformed the global political landscape, the greatest changes remain visible in Europe. The main threat upon which defence planning was based during the Cold War has faded away, and global and European security requirements are undergoing profound change as a consequence. Today there is no major threat to deter, as in the past, and many of the new dangers tend to be smaller in scale, regional in nature, and located on the periphery or outside of Europe; the very nature of the security threat has changed. A single, overriding threat originating from a monolithic source has been replaced by a multitude of different threats, including the resurgence of centuries-old ethnic conflicts frozen by the Cold War.
Security institutions are forced to adapt as, from Portugal to Poland and beyond, the dissolution of the unique political and strategic milieu of the Cold War compels a reappraisal of national security policies. European countries are seeking security for a continent that has undergone a major structural transformation. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of a new system of international security which, in turn, faces a far wider array of threats than during the Cold War. By far the greatest proportion of the operational efforts of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) have already shifted away from collective defence toward this type of activity.
Whether members of an alliance or in the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) states will have to participate in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action and even peace-enforcement operations. All EU members, whether or not members of the WEU could take part in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action but also peace-making in the framework of the "Petersberg tasks". Concerning these operations they also would have equal rights to decide. The tasks of allied and non-allied states would be blurred in the field of crisis management.
Based on the assumption that alliances can hardly survive without a sufficient threat, some analysts concluded after the end of the East-West conflict that "NATO's days are not numbered but its years are" 3 . No alliance in history survived its enemy for very long. This is true for the coalition against Napoleon, the First World War Entente against Germany and the anti-Hitler coalition. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, however, NATO shows no signs of its demise. The prediction that alliances would weaken without threat appears to be wrong. NATO looks like it will be an exception to these rules and the fundamental logic of alliance theory. How can NATO endure in the absence of a serious opponent?
The reason lies in NATO's capacity for change. NATO is redeveloping its basic structure: preparing for a coalition war is no longer the only or even primary item on its agenda and its focus now includes crisis management or crisis response operations, peace-keeping, humanitarian action, as well as peace-enforcement. The "new NATO" looks and acts in part quite differently from the old NATO. Simultaneously, the definition of the NATO area (Art. VI) is losing relevance-the NATO-led operation in Bosnia and in Kosovo/Yugoslavia are a case in point. NATO will be focusing on new areas in the time to come. It will and can no longer focus on a single mission of collective defence as during the Cold War, for if NATO remains a traditional alliance of collective defence as enshrined in Art. V of the Washington Treaty it is likely to die out or deteriorate. The new NATO's challenges lie beyond its territory in international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of Gulf oil supplies and instability along NATO's southern and eastern flanks. Since these challenges do not represent a direct threat to NATO territory, the real issue for NATO's future is not territorial defence but rather its structural transformation into a crisis management alliance. However, NATO's capabilities are still aimed at mobilising large numbers of forces set to defend against a major attack in central Europe, but not at the capability of quickly moving and supporting limited forces trained and equipped to perform specific crisis management or peace keeping operations 4 .
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has already been designed according to the new requirements. Cooperation of the Partners with NATO can be organised on an individual level through peace-keeping exercises, military-to-military contacts, and similar activities. IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia was NATO's first joint operation with PfP and 20 non-NATO states. In Madrid in July 1997, NATO formally launched an enhanced form of PfP which widened the range of participation. Military exercises can now cover the whole spectrum of possible crisis interventions. Partners will be involved in planning and preparing for contingency operations. Partners will have a stronger presence at NATO Headquarters. All in all, the Partnership for Peace will facilitate NATO's ability to integrate Partner forces in future operations. In February 1998 PfP-Partners participated for the first time in a crisis management exercise (CMX). The scenario focused mainly on actions that NATO might have to take to implement a UN-mandated peace support operation.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) provides a mechanism for productive consultation and more meaningful communication among Partners as well as a framework in which the enhanced PfP can develop. There will also be possibilities for closer political dialogue, consultations and greater scope for joint decision-making and coordination. With the creation of the EAPC, NATO carries forward its transformation on the basis of a broad, cooperative approach to security. Partners will have new opportunities to consult with the Alliance more regularly and more substantively. The EAPC is thus the logical political complement to a stronger, more operational Partnership for Peace. As the Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of May 30, 1997 states:
In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate.The specific subject areas in which Allies and Partners would consult within the framework of the EAPC might include, but are not limited to: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; international terrorism; defence planning and budgets; defence policy and strategy; and security impacts of economic developments. EAPC's scope will include consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations.
This array of options and cooperation provides for an innovative capacity in the face of new challenges not requiring an Art. V (collective defence) response. This broad security approach encompasses not only military, but also economic, political, societal and environmental concerns. These occur simultaneously at global, regional and local levels. As non-Art. V contingencies they will be addressed by "coalitions of the willing" which include, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, both NATO and non-NATO members. NATO will create flexible military assets, suitable for use by varying "coalitions," which it can employ when taking on crisis management tasks itself but also to lend to the Europeans according to the idea of "separable but not separate" capacities.
More than merely a new form of cooperation, NATO's new instruments and tasks will blur the differences between members and non-members (i.e. partners). PfP/EAPC offers almost all the benefits of NATO except the collective security guarantee articulated in Art. V of the Washington Treaty. As the former U. S. Defence Minister Perry foresaw in December 1996 during a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Bergen: "The difference between membership and non-membership in NATO would be paper-thin." Indeed, in some cases non-NATO members may play an even more important role in the new operations than NATO members as NATO's focus gradually shifts away from Art. V missions (territorial defence) to non-Art. V missions (crisis management) 5 . Washington believes that PfP/EAPC will draw Partners much closer to NATO in the field of peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and crisis management. Non-NATO states could participate in those missions and cooperate with NATO while retaining their current defence profile 6 .
NATO promised that it will provide Partners with all the standards required to allow them to interoperate with NATO with no loss to NATO's operational capability. Although Partners will not operate with the Allies in Art. V situations, it is vital for NATO that the high standards maintained by the Allies also be used as the measures for Partners in non-Art. V operations and exercises. Non-Art. V standards for NATO must be the same for Allies and Partners if true interoperability is to be achieved. Thus Art. V training for allies has to be in addition to non Art. V training 7 .
At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government endorsed the report on then Enhanced and more operational Partnership and the development of an Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) as a new element of this partnership. The OCC seeks to improve the interoperability of Partner forces and the Alliance's capability to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustain NATO-led PfP operations such as SFOR and KFOR. It also links regular PfP cooperation with the NATO force generation process for specific NATO-led PfP operations, thereby reinforcing PfP's operational capability to support NATO-led PfP operations 8 .
The Combined Joint Tasks Forces (CJTFs) are specifically designed to include the participation of non-NATO countries for both non-Art. V contingencies outside Alliance territory and Art. V tasks. The concept builds on NATO's practice of multinational, multiservice operations and, therefore, could involve humanitarian relief, peace-keeping or peace-enforcement. The CJTF concept would also facilitate the use of NATO's collective assets by the WEU, as well as provide a mechanism for involving non-NATO PfP Partners in NATO-led operations. Finally, as not all allies may be engaged in every non-Art. V contingency, the CJTF concept is designed to deal flexibly with the ad hoc nature of participation without sacrificing cohesion, effectiveness and reaction time 9 .
The Washington Summit Communiqué of April 1999 10 , and NATO's new Strategic Concept 11 , stress that NATO will be larger, more capable and more flexible. On the one hand NATO still will be committed to collective defence, on the other hand it will be able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management and crisis response operations. However, the latter are as yet, undefined. In addition to territorial defence (covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty), the Alliance security must also take into account the global context. Alliance security interests could be effected by risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources (arrangements and consultations as responses to risks of this kind can be made under Article 4).
NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise 12 .The Communiqué acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged; Europeans (EU members and other Allies) should strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication. The Strategic Concept wants the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) to be developed within NATO, but in close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, "if and when appropriate, the European Union." The objective of the Washington summit launched Defence Capabilities 13 Initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations of Alliance missions. This includes non-Article 5 crisis response operations with a special focus on the interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable, also between Alliance and Partner forces.
EAPC consultations 14 should contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including civil emergency planning and scientific and environmental affairs. Although NATO pledges that it is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational, the implementation of this promise still has not been put into practice. There was no involvement of the partners in the planning and decision making of a peace-keeping force in Kosovo.
In the plenary resolution "NATO and Humanitarian Intervention" adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Amsterdam, 15 November 1999 NATO emphasised that any intervention with the purpose of preventing or ending massive human rights violations can only be the last resort, and that any intervention has to respect the principle of proportionality. NATO stressed its preparedness, according to the 1999 Alliance's Strategic Concept, to "contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations" in the Euro-Atlantic area 15 .
The European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)
The origins of Art. V of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 can be found in the Cold War. 16 Since the so-called "Petersberg declaration" of 1992, the WEU will also focus on missions that include crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action, and peace-making. If the above observation of shifting challenges and tasks is correct, the "Petersberg missions" will become more important than Art. V. José Cutileiro, Secretary General of the WEU, acknowledges: "Today the WEU is a politico-military tool for crisis management. It will run operations that Europeans decide to undertake and in which North Americans do not wish to participate directly." 17 At their meeting in Rome in November 1998, WEU Ministers expressed the wish that a process of informal reflection be initiated at WEU on the question of Europe's security and defence. As part of this process, it was decided to conduct an audit of assets and capabilities for European-led crisis management operations. The Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Union of June 1997 included the "Petersberg tasks." It states in Art. 17 that "the Union can avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU on the tasks referred to ...." These are "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making." The Treaty did not merge the WEU and EU. It simply states that "the WEU is an integral part of the development of the EU ... The EU shall ... foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union ...." The precondition is a European Council decision and adoptation of such a decision by the Member States only "in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU shall, according to the treaty, "include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy ... which might in time lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide." Such a decision has to be "in accordance with [the Member States'] respective constitutional requirements." Based originally on a Swedish-Finish proposal, the Treaty allows "all (EU) Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU." Membership in the WEU, therefore, is not necessary to participate in the "Petersberg" tasks 18 . The European institutions, WEU and EU, will limit their defence ambitions to crisis management and will try to build up separate force structures for this. The federal approach still aims to merge the EU and WEU, and Art. V (collective defence and binding security guarantees of the WEU treaty) should be incorporated into the EU. This would lead to the creation of a new military alliance 19 . Such a radical development is very unlikely and not an option for a very long time. The EU after Amsterdam focued on the "Petersberg missions," including crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action, and peace-enforcement, rather than Art. V operations (collective defence and security guarantees). The following options have been discussed after the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty:
--Britain proposed in October 1998 that mutual security commitments are included into a fourth pillar of the EU. The WEU would change dramatically and abandon Art. V or dissolve entirely and main European defence role would remain with NATO. The fourth pillar would be based on NATO.
--The declaration issued by France and Britain at St. Malo in December 1998 stressed the necessity of Europe to develop the full range of capabilities needed for the sort of crisis management tasks and humanitarian operations where Europe might take the lead. The European Union "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis. 20 "
--In March 1999 the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, criticised that Europe's military capabilities are too modest for these security problems of the 1990s and the 21st century. The Europeans need to restructure their defence capabilities to be capable to project force, to deploy troops, ships and planes beyond their home bases and to sustain them their. However, Blair underlined that the deployment of forces is a decision for governments and not for the European Parliament, the European Commission or the Court of Justice 21 .
--According to the declaration of the European Council 22 in Cologne in June 1999 which is based on a proposal by the German EU-presidency 23 a common European policy on security and defence requires "a capacity for action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies and procedures." The focus therefore should be to assure that the EU possesses the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) to conduct crisis management operations in the scope of the Petersberg tasks. The main characteristics include: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility. Further arrangements to enhance the capacity of European multinational and national forces to respond to crisis situations will be needed. NATO remains the foundation for collective defence (Art. 5). In the case of integration of the WEU into the EU the commitment of this Article and of the Article V of the Brussels Treaty will be preserved for the Member States already party to these Treaties. The document stressed that the policy of the EU shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states.
"States will retain in all circumstances the right to decide if and when their national forces are deployed."
There should be the possibility of all EU member states (NATO members, neutral and non-aligned states) to participate fully and on equal footing in European operations drawing on NATO assets and capabilities; and there should be satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU member states. Both EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities or EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities should be possible, and unnecessary duplication should be avoided. Planned are regular meetings of Defence Ministers, a permanent body of representatives with political and military expertise. This declaration included many changes proposed by European neutral and non-aligned states, explicitly excluding Art. V commitments. The equal role of these states is underlined.
--In July 20, 1999 the British Prime Minister Blair and the Italian Prime Minister D'Alema launched an initiative to improve European defence capabilities 24 . The declaration proposed to set criteria for improved and strengthened European defence capabilities and effective crisis management, including peace-making. These efforts should be complementary to the Union's and the Member States' capabilities concerning the non-military aspects of crisis prevention and management, and improving co-ordination between military and non-military aspects.
--In November 1999 for the first time the defence and foreign ministers of the European Union, including those from its quartet of neutral countries. The United Kingdom launched to the idea of developing a rapid-reaction corps which would act at the EU's behest in crises that were too big to ignore but not big enough to demand the involvement of America, and therefore of NATO. Britain cited a number, 40,000 men, to indicate the rough size of the force, which would come together only in times of crisis, and therefore fall well short of a standing European army. And Germany laid out a timetable: the EU, they suggested, should give itself a "defence identity" by 2003, if not sooner.
--The European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 adopted the two Presidency progress reports on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence. The Finish presidency 25 of the EU has set priority to the mandate given by to the mandate given by the Cologne European Council to strengthen the common European policy on security and defence by taking the work forward in military and non-military aspects of crisis management. The document stresses that the Atlantic Alliance remains the foundations of the collective defence of its members. The common European headline goal has been adopted for deployable military capabilities based on a British and French proposal that called for a European rapid reaction force up to 60,000 troops capable of deployment within 60 days that should tackle military crises without outside help. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO "as a whole is not engaged," to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. (It is not clear whether the EU first has to ask NATO before it conducts an EU-led operation, however). This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.
--A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) has been established that deals with all aspects of the CFSP including the common European security and defence policy. The Military Committee (MC) will provide for consultation and cooperation between the Member States and give advice and make recommendations though the PSC. The report stresses that the European Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Also, a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States. The Portugese EU-presidency establishe a Commitee for Non-military Crisis Management.
Transatlantic Link: "PfP and Petersberg"
We have bifurcation within NATO and EU (WEU). We have collective defence on the one hand and crisis management on the other. There also is a duplication of missions. We have the Amsterdam Treaty with the inclusion of the "Petersberg" tasks here and the new NATO with PfP and EAPC there. We have crisis management here and crisis management there. We have non-Art. V of the WEU here and non-Art. V of NATO there. Clearly, there is a great deal of overlapping. Why not combine some of the new elements. Rather than merge WEU and EU, it would be more logical to merge the non-Art. V missions, to combine "Petersberg" and PfP.
Europeans and Americans face the same challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of world energy resources, international terrorism, transnational organised crime, ethnic conflicts etc. All affect US as well as European interests. 26
NATO's command structure is still focused on the defence of Europe and its territorial waters, however 27 . Designed for the now obsolete task of blocking of Soviet military power, it is not appropriate for the new challenges. These crisis management missions would require the members to rapidly deploy forces far from Europe's borders - in overwhelming strength if necessary. To date, only the United States has that capability. If Europe is given a major stake in the power projection enterprise it would have to share the burden as well. The Economist 28 concludes: "If America is to remain willingly engaged in Europe, increasingly Europeans must be willing to do their bit elsewhere".
The following chart compares the key areas of the EU and NATO.
|Area||NATO-Summit in Washington, April 1999 (Communiqué)||Cologne EU-Summit, June 1999||British-French Declaration on European Defence, Dec. 1999||Report of the Finish EU Presidency in Helsinki, Dec. 1999|
|EU's capacity to act||- We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.
- ... we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. ... these arrangements ... should address:
a) Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
b) The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.
|- ... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.||- .... to give the EU the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations.||- The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.|
|EU's contributions to Crisis Responses Operations||- The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension.
- We applaud the determination of ... EU-members ... to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities ...
|-For EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the main focus should be on the following aspects:
Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington NATO summit decisions of April 1999.
|-... by developing our military capabilities, while reinforcing the EU's capacity for action, we will also contribute directly and substantially to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance||-.... further steps will be taken to ensure mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO on the development of the Union's capability for military crisis management and on the appropriate military response to a crisis.|
|EU - NATO relations||- On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.
- ... NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency ...
|- ... we shall ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the European Union and NATO
- ... to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU.
|- ... the need to develop thereafter modalities for full co-operation, consultation and transparency between the EU and NATO||- ... The development of the common European policy on security and defence will take place ... with the maximum transparency between the EU and NATO.
- For the conduct of EU-led operations, the Union may use NATO assets and capabilities with NATO agreement ...
A new Command Structure
A new command structure could be created dealing exclusively with non-Art. V operations. Such a command structure would be based on both NATO and WEU. They would provide the infrastructure and experience indispensable for these new missions. A political "coordination group" could discuss and plan the crisis management tasks. The command should be headed alternately by an American and a European. Member states would assign special trained forces. It could be based on that part of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that focuses on non-Art. V operations. The CJTF has become a tool for NATO crisis management while it satisfies demands for a European identity. A first task could be a program for joint NATO-WEU crisis management. The first major crisis management exercise, CMX 2000, took place in February 2000. This joint WEU/ NATO exercise was based on a Petersberg mission scenario (peace support mission) leading to a WEU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities. It demonstrated the culture of close co-operation developed between the two organisations. The aim was to test WEU and appropriate NATO crisis management mechanisms and procedures as well as the consultation arrangements between WEU and NATO, including the interaction between each organisation's headquarters and WEU/NATO nations. And more exercises are to follow.
The advantages of a new Command Structure are:
A common command structure could avoid the problem that would emerge if the WEU used NATO assets and capabilities for its own operations - in which the U.S. does not want to take part - and got into trouble; the US eventually would have to come to its aid. The Americans would be part of the operation from the beginning. A UN or OSCE mandate for such operations would be preferable.
A new crisis management command structure would therefore meet the three fundamental objectives of NATO: to ensure its effectiveness, to preserve the transatlantic link and develop ESDI. 30 The overriding imperative is to develop a new structure that is mission oriented.
It also wood meet NATO Secretary General's Robertsons three "I's": the European Security and Defence Identity must bring an improvement in capabilities; it must be inclusive of all Allies; and it must reaffirm the indivisibility of Allied security. So it would meet US Foreign Minister's Albright three "D's" 1) no decoupling of European from transatlantic security commitments; 2) no duplication of defense assets; 3) no discrimination vis-´-vis non-EU NATO members.
|Deterrence, Collective Defence (security guarantees, Art. V)||No military significance (security guarantees, Art. 5)|
|PfP, EAPC||Petersberg Tasks|
|Crisis Management (humanitarian actions, rescue operations, peace keeping, peace enforcement, Non-Art. V)||Crisis Management (humanitarian actions, rescue operations, peace keeping, tasks of combat forces, including peace making, Non-Art. 5)|
Common crisis management program
Common coordination group?
Common Command Structure for crisis management?
Source: Heinz Gaertner
There is a strong argument that European NATO-Members should spend far more money on modern arms and equipment to carry their share of responsibility in war. The war against Iraq an the Kosovo war had demonstrated the huge disparities between American and European forces and the growing gap between the two forces and its effect on even the most sophisticated armies to react quickly in war. 31 According to the Brooking Institution, NATO countries spend roughly 60 percent of what the United States does and they get about 10 percent of the capability. A lack of precision-guided munitions would have been chief among the European short-comings during the Kosovo-war. Transporting troops and equipment would be another large problem for the Europeans. Without changes, the Europeans would be unable to take the next step in creating their own defence and security arm within NATO. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies 32 reported that European military shortcomings highlighted in Kosovo included "command-and-control, in particular airspace management, secure date and voice communications, targeting procedures and the proper integration of the collection and analysis of intelligence...A major lesson of the campaign was that all participants, particularly the Europeans, held insufficient stocks of all types of precision-guided munitions." The WEU recommendations for "Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management" of November 1999 33 concluded that the Europeans have available the force levels and resources needed to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks. But it also identified a number of gaps and deficiencies:
John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft ask whether a European strategy of developing technologies internally ever could compete with the United States. Their answer is no. 35 But the answer also cannot primarily be "by American." That the Europeans should be spending more on defence for many Americans imply that much of the spending would be with U.S. firms. With financial difficulties for many European governments and the absence of a direct threat it is questionable whether Europeans should copy American capabilities, however. Besides, the US wishes to share with its European allies the burden stemming from its own commitments, new security problems and regional crisis-management needs. Of course, the Europeans and Americans will have to share burdens, risks and responsibilities in non-Art. V areas. Of course, European states will have to improve their ability to contribute militarily to the protection of common interests.
But here must be appropriate division of labour. The overwhelming U.S. contribution is war fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. It also implies political capability in the sense of foresight, intelligence, planning, creativity, vision 36 and conflict prevention. European forces and capabilities are more designed for peace keeping, humanitarian action and disaster relief rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. Smaller scale-operations can be conducted as autonomous European operation without deployment of NATO assets and capabilities.
The increased importance of crisis management operations not only has repercussions for the type of equipment procured for what is sometimes a wide diversity of operations, but also for the operating costs, as severe demands are placed on the equipment during the various deployment. European States should not want more than they can control. They are not able to prepare for war fighting, high-intensity combat, enforcing and making peace, peace-keeping, resolving conflicts and participating in humanitarian and rescue operations. While some militaries would like to get the equipment for this entire range of conflict contingencies, it is the involvement in low-intensity and soft security operational missions that are most appropriate for European states, rather than high-intensity conflicts against opponents using traditional forces and strategies (to be developed below). High technology equipment forces are not only not essential for soft-security and peace-keeping missions but also not very helpful. Most highly developed military technology are poorly designed to be used in crisis response operations. Advanced technologies based on absolute information to increase the ability to strike with precision over great distances and with great accuracy are not relevant to these missions. 37 Simulation centres like MITRE in Boston create virtual enemies and develop digital war fighting strategies based on the idea of absolute information. For them it is not important what capacities an enemy really has but what it might have. What counts is not what an enemy thinks but what it might think.
These technologies and correspondingly trained militaries are narrowly focused on high-end warfare - as used in the operation against the Republic of Yugoslavia - are incapable of intervening in conflicts that require militaries trained for humanitarian action and peace-keeping. The technological requirements of advanced technology, combined with the emphasis on sensing equipment, simply does not translate well into low intensity conflicts, and may even be counterproductive in some cases. Peace-keepers have to be physically present, visible and supportive to the population through mediation and advise (see below). A good soldier is not necessarily a good peace-keeper. A peace-keeper is a certain type of soldier. He should be qualified to perform police tasks, civil-affairs operations, speak multiple languages and should be trained in some psychology.
Officers are expected to broker diplomatic deals, shelter the displaced, protect human rights, supervise the return of refugees, guarding surrendered weapons, interacting extensively with local people, ensuring the safe delivery of food supplies, organise and monitor elections, Helping rebuild government agencies or police forces and support civil reconstruction. 38 People who are trained to be soldiers have to be re-trained for the new role of the mandate. The mandate defines in what way soldiers have to be trained and re-trained. Each unit sent on a peace operation must be trained for a number of months. 39 .
There is therefore a basic contradiction between this type of mission and the use of advanced technologies that are intended to reduce the need for forces on the ground. Such technologies are generally ill-suited to these missions 40 . Heavy airlift, precision targeting, absolute battlefield information, an advanced command and control system do not have much relevance in environments where there is no war against an enemy with mass armies and heavy weapons 41 . TABLE 3 shows that advanced technology is less relevant in low-intensity conflict and soft-security missions.
|Low MILITARY TECHNOLOGY high Soft security, humanitarian and Peace-implementation, Conventional rescue operations, peace-keeping Peace-enforcement War|
|CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS - PETERSBERG TASKS PARTICIPATION OF EUROPEAN STATES|
REFUGEE/DISPLACED PERSONS ASSISTANCE
|PEACE OPERATIONS (PSO)||WAR|
(Operation Allied Force)
|CONSENT (Chapter VI)||Usually NO CONSENT but consensual Chapter VII possible (Dayton, Kosovo UN resolution)
AGAINST CONFLICTING PARTY
BUT IMPARTIALITY (Chapter VII)
|Use of force for self defence||Use of force for the implementation of a mandate (agreement)||Use of force for defeat|
|e.g.: EARLY WARNING, PIONEER-, MINE SWEEPING-, RESCUE-, TRANSPORT-, DISASTER RELIEF- UNITS||COMBAT TROOPS
Prepared for Combat
One important dividing line falls between the extended peace-keeping and enforcement models. It does not presuppose the consent of the parties to the conflict or potential conflict. (Line x in TABLE 4). The relationship between consent and the use of force is a complex arrangement between mandate and clear rules of engagement. The use of force remains the ultima ratio. As a rule of thumb one may state that the stronger the international capability, the better the prospect of consent not being withdrawn. 42 In some cases, there could be a type of consensual Chapter VII, such as the Dayton and the Kosovo peace agreement. The other dividing line is the one between peace-enforcement and war (line y). However, there is some room for interpretation about a clear distinction between peace-enforcement operations and war, however. Legally, one could argue that peace-enforcement operations which are authorised by the UN are not wars. Yet the differences are blurring, as the example of the second Gulf War shows. The anti-Iraq coalition was authorised by a mandate of the Security Council; the liberation of Kuwait could also, however, have taken place on the basis of self-defence (Art. 51 of the UN Charter), which then would have counted as a war under the above definition.
A war describes a state when force is used between two or among more conflicting parties on the basis of partiality and clearly designated enemies absent any mandate from an international organisation. Conversely, UN peace operations are based on the three basic principles, namely consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence 43 . These principles have occasionally been jeopardised by the use of humanitarian action as a pretence for political intervention with ambiguous and ill-defined objectives, as in Somalia 44 . A clear, appropriate and realistic mandate has to be implemented in an impartial manner. Impartiality is not identical with consent and it is not neutrality or passivity. Activities to implement mandates, including the use of force, does not mean equal taking sides and it can be to one of the parties' detriment 45 .
In principal, European states would be able to take part in all operations. It can demonstrate that international solidarity is not something to be left to military alliances. Operations between lines x and y must be based on international legitimation of the UN or the OSCE, whether it is in the framework of NATO/PfP or Petersberg. In such circumstances the use of force requires strict impartiality. Limited force against any party that violates the mandate and impartiality will not be mutually exclusive.
In practice, European states should concentrate on the "soft security" and non-military crisis-response operations (left of line x in TABLE 4). Its participation in combat is unlikely to be decisive. Their expereinces range from infrastructure restoration to basic police, medical, and veterinary services.
Security can be defined as the absence of threat or the capacity to deter threat. Security lies at the intersection of threats and capacities. Capacities are resources with which an actor can pursue desired outcomes. Security is a universally desired outcome, and capacities are used to deter threats (with counter-threat) or defeat those who try to implement their threats. Increasing military capacities to achieve security dominated the period of the Cold War. A steadily growing security dilemma was the result. Balancing threats and capacities, not ensuring that one's own strength exceed the one of the adversaries, should be the strategy for European states after the end of the Cold War. This wider perspective of security challenges allow states to achieve security by threat-abatement instead of capacity enhancement 46 .
Security goes beyond merely military aspects. The Cologne European Council recommended that the Council examine all aspects of security with a view to enhancing and better coordinating the Union's and Member States' non-military crisis response tools. The Finnish Presidency has developed this concept further and is reflected in the Report to the Helsinki European Council on non-military crisis-management tools.
A mismatch between forces and missions, due to lack of a clear mandate and incomplete understanding of the missions, has been a common failing in many post-Cold War interventions 47 . For the involvement in operations mapped out on the right side of line x in Table 4, a European States should define conditions. Such a list of criteria could set guidelines for decision making. This would demonstrate a European state's willingness to participate in international peace operations, while preventing from being entrapped in military actions which are doomed to fail, such as the Somali disaster. The mandate for the operation in Somalia 1993 shifted back and forth between a humanitarian action, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and peace building 48 . This operation proved to be a failure because of the lack of knowledge about the differences among the different types of peace operations. A central point is to determine from the beginning to which category an operation belongs. Rules of engagement will differ with the nature of the mandate. It is impossible to answer the question of whether to intervene without also considering how to intervene 49 .
Such guidelines for political and military feasibility could include the following: 50
These criteria could also help in deciding on selective engagement. They do not imply an automatic refraining from all forms of military involvement beyond self-defence and not an automatic involvement. The participating state has to be associated with the conception, the planning and the command of the operation. The precondition is that participation takes place on a voluntary basis and with UN or OSCE authorisation. Participation could take place in the framework of NATO/PfP or as part of the "Petersberg" tasks. Under these circumstances, "case-by-case action" would be not only acceptable but likely.
Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of a new system of international security. By far the greatest proportion of the operational efforts of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) have already shifted away from collective defence toward this type of activity. Whether members of an alliance or in the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) states will have to participate in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action and even peace-enforcement operations. All EU members, whether or not members of the WEU could take part in crisis management, peace-keeping, humanitarian action and also peace-making in the framework of the "Petersberg tasks". Concerning these operations they also would have equal rights to decide. The tasks of allied and non-allied states would be blurred in the field of crisis management. Selective participation in international peace operations are inevitable for Europeans. In principal, Europeans would be able to take part in all operations. In practice, European states should concentrate on the "soft security" operations. The participation in peace-enforcement should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Its participation in combat is unlikely to be decisive. For the involvement in international operations Europeans should define conditions. Among others a participation in military operations is contingent on the Europeans interests and/or on the promotion of international law and international principals. Peace-enforcement and peace-implementation operations must be based on international legitimation of the UN or the OSCE, whether it is in the framework of NATO/PfP or Petersberg. In such circumstances the use of force requires strict impartiality. Limited force against any party that violates the mandate and impartiality will not be mutually exclusive. The mandate has to have clear political and military objectives that are both reasonable and attainable. Rules of engagement have to be formulated unambiguously. The conditions governing when and how troops may use force must be clear. The level of risk must be reasonable. These criteria could also help in deciding on selective engagement. Such a list of criteria could set guidelines for decision making. Concerning the participation in international operations Europeans have to rely on a legitimate authority. In most of the cases the UN will be the authorised agent.
3: Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), 75-76. See also John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 52. Back.
8: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace, The Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations (OCC), 10 November 1999. Back.
9: John Barrett, "NATO Reform: Alliance Policy and Cooperative Security," in New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions, Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989, ed. Ingo Peters (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1996, pp. 123-152, here 136. Back.
10: "An Alliance for the 21st Century," Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999. Back.
12: An Alliance for the 21st Century," Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999 (31). Back.
16: Art V of the 1948 Brussels Treaty states: "I any of the High Contracting Parties should be object of an armed attack in Europe ... the other High Contracting Parties will ... afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Back.
19: The WEU-Treaty prohibits such a development, however. Art. IV states that "recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." Back.
20: The declaration also states that "the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Art. V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained." Text of French-British European Defence Statement, Saint-Malo, France, Dec 4. Back.
37: Paul Van Riper and F. G. Hoffman, "Pursuing the real revolution in military affairs: Exploiting knowledge-based warfare," National Security Studies Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 3 (Summer 1998), 4. Back.
38: Michael C. Williams, "Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping," Adelphi Paper 321, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 1998, 4. Congessional Budget Office, CBO Paper, December 1999, xii. Back.
39: This reaffirmed also former US Secretary of State, Les Aspin, "Challenges to Value-Based Military Intervention,' Address to the Managing Chaos Conferences, United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks, no. 3 (February 1995). Back.
40: Andrew Richter, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Impact on Canada; The Challenge and the Consequences," Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia (Working Paper No. 28), March 1999, 36-50. Back.
41: This does not mean that some advanced technologies are helpful for soft security operations, e.g. mine-sweeping, counter mortar capabilities, technologies that can demobilise individuals without casualties, peace-keeping simulation. Back.
43: Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,' 3 January 1995, paras. 33, 80, 85-87. Back.