CIAO DATE: 6/99

The Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflict and its Resolution:
A View through International Relations Theory _*

 

Shlomi Dinar

School of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

 

Abstract

Theories of International Relations such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism (NLI) offer students of the Middle East key analytical tools in understanding instances of cooperation and conflict. While both theories see states as rational, unitary actors, neo-realism takes into account security concerns and relative gains concerns to explain conflict. NLI, on the other hand, argues that security concerns and relative gains concerns can be mitigated by the use of institutions which foster cooperation.

This paper, however, argues that while neo-realism and NLI offer an explanation for cooperation and conflict, the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its resolution, and primarily the negotiations over water, necessitates additional perspectives. Based on that, the paper provides a number of main arguments. First, it challenges the theories’ definition of a state as a unitary actor by advocating and demonstrating the need to look at domestic politics, political ideologies and interest groups and their effects on policy within Israel, which make the concept of a unitary state quite problematic. Second, the paper challenges the notion of relative and absolute gains and rationality by demonstrating that perceptions of gains and rationality are often dependent on the government in power and the forces influencing it. Third, the paper argues that the success of institutions or epistemic communities are at the mercy of the government in power and thus the domestic influences on the government, which is a phenomena often not given much explanation by NLI and other liberal arguments. The theoretical framework is supported by extensive literature and interviews with political scientists, hydrologists, engineers and officials close to the negotiation arena.

Specifically,the paper proposes that the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict is one where low politics (water) is embedded in high politics (the struggle of both people to establish a state)—thus making water difficult to extract from the conflict itself. Using this analysis ideology and differing party positions become an integral component of the conflict. In addition, and associated with the above paragraph, the paper investigates the water conflict from the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict and then proceeds to analyze the conflict after the beginning of the water negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians in 1995. The paper looks at the changing ideologies (throughout the 50 years) and governments (especially after the 1996 elections). Lastly, after investigating the differing arguments for cooperation or conflict in the water arena, the paper challenges the mainstream view of security. In fact the paper argues that the definition of security after the Cold War must make room for environmental issues and natural resource scarcities. Overweighing military power and de-emphasizing environmental water problems- that can’t be defined to one country alone- leads to distortions of reality. Only after broadening the definition of security can we understand the underlying dynamics behind cooperation and conflict over a scarce resource such as water and the security implications that might be attributed to either cooperation or conflict between parties.

 

The Middle East is a thirsty land. What it wants is neither kings nor constitutions, but water.
New Statesman and Nation, 10 March in 1945, in: Wolf, 1995.

 

I.Introduction

Water scarcity has been viewed as one of the most urgent environmental problems with political ramifications facing the eastern Mediterranean region. Therefore, such a situation may lead to famine, economic crises, and war. In addition, water has become a difficult and important issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and now, its resolution. Embedded in the conflict are issues of water rights, equity, security and cooperation. Still, while being an important factor of the conflict, water can be a vehicle for cooperation (Wolf, 2). As the former Israeli Water Commissioner, Meir Ben-Meir, is quoted saying: “Precisely because it is essential to life and so highly charged water can—perhaps even tends to—produce cooperation even in the absence of trust between concerned actors.” Finally the pressures to cooperate might very well come from a clear understanding of the alternative. “If the people in the region are not clever enough to discuss a mutual solution to the problem of water scarcity then war is unavoidable (The Times, London, February 21, 1989 in Wolf). Nonetheless, the conflict is also embedded in a political and ideological matrix and is impeded by other issues such as ideology and nationalism. Therefore we must also look at the conflict from other angles which allow us to analyze the conflict in a more comprehensive sense. Only when we look at the water conflict through various lenses, can we understand that the water conflict is not simply about water but also over land and its autonomy. Water can in fact be harnessed as a cooperative mechanism, but first we must understand the layers that are preventing it from becoming such a cooperative mechanism.

 

II.Theoretical Analysis of Conflict and Cooperation

The peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis has been in stalemate for a long period. The stalemate has also led to schisms in other arenas of the process, one being the water negotiations. Still, there are many actions that can be taken or continued, in the Israeli-Palestinian arena to avoid intensive conflict, facilitate cooperation, and work to prevent water from becoming extinct. However, as this paper will argue and demonstrate, the water conflict is embedded within a situation of “high politics” (Lowi, 45). That means that water can’t be effectively isolated from the history of Israeli and Palestinian efforts to establish a state, in 1948 for the Jews and today for the Palestinians.

“Both today and in the past, interests and issues define the motivations and cognitions of the participants channeling them toward collision or cooperation. If interests are fostered or complemented by other actors, the pressure will be toward cooperation. On the opposite side, if interests are seen as deliberately and illegitimately advanced by another party then the threat of conflict is increased” (Lowi,46).

At the same time at stake here are the core values and principles of the parties and their concerns for identity. The symbolic, political and historic essence of water and its connection to land, control and sovereignty is therefore destined to make compromise, cooperation, and agreement quite difficult. Section 3 and 4 demonstrate the history of the conflict as a zero-sum game for both parties, thus marking how the conflict has in the past led the parties towards collision. From this phase of analysis not only can one demonstrate the manner in which the various interests have developed but also demonstrate how relative power relationships and asymmetries were elaborated and projected. However, within this framework, history becomes important in that it explains how relationships between actors and their positions and attitudes towards one another are based not only on power, interests, and economics but also on past actions and events as well as customs and internal institutions (Lipshutz,123). These become important in predicting the relative difficulty or accessibility of compromise. This historical approach demonstrates that foreign policies of states or quasi-nations can be characterized by a mix of material and ideal factors.

It does appear that a major factor in the accumulation of national power for a state has been reliable access to resources. Strategy for resource accumulation is both a function of geography, political and economic power and it is in this respect that control of resources may become important to broader foreign policy objectives. At the same time only a state in control of a reasonably large territory, and in possession of the necessary resources, can have even the remotest chance of achieving self-sufficiency. Such a state protects its territory and sovereignty in both a physical, psychological and ideological sense. For the dominant party not only is sharing its spoils difficult but dependence on others equates to a loss of sovereignty. The challenge, therefore, becomes fostering cooperation between two unequal parties. While international law, international organizations, and international regimes are mechanisms that explicitly define basic property rights at the international level and foster cooperation, such regimes arise only where there exists basic agreement between actors on rules, principles and norms. Where these do not exist there may result what Krasner identifies as “structural conflict” (Krasner 1985,5—in Lipshutz pg. 22).

Theories of international relations, primarily neo-realism, claim that their view of the world as an anarchical environment, states as being unitary rational units and hegemony leading to cooperation can explain to students of international relations why cooperation is sometimes facilitated and sometimes not. One of the two central positions of hegemonic stability is that order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power. Since a cooperative water regime constitutes elements of international order this implies that the formation of regimes normally depends on hegemony. In addition, it implies that cooperation, defined as mutual adjustment of national policies to one another, also depends on the perpetuation of hegemony (Keohane, 76). While neo-liberal institutionalists may argue that cooperation may occur without coercion by a hegemon, in the case of the Middle East and in the case of the water crisis, Israel has used its power both in the past and present. Moreover, as realists contend, a dominant power will not vow for cooperation unless it stands to gain from the cooperative move. But in the Taba Agreement, Israel allocated a specific amount of water to the Palestinians, turned over control of various strategic cities (in terms of water importance) and at the same time agreed to settle the water problem during the final status talks. It seems as if this phenomenon of allocations is quite difficult to explain vis-a-vis realist arguments, especially when considering the importance of security, which in the Middle East is very linked to water.

From an environmental, future sustainability and international perspective, the hegemonic powers, Israel (with the Palestinians) and Egypt (with Ethiopia) for example, have an incentive to cooperate and negotiate on the water issue (Interview with Senai Alemu and Eran Feitelson). Despite the essence of compromise, stalemate has been demonstrated on the water front. State rationality, in terms of decision making, therefore, also deserves scrutiny especially in terms of how rational decisions are determined and how party politics and international views and scientific proposals and domestic politics may collide. While rationality in itself may be difficult to contend with, the manner in which preferences are linked to rationality are not. Since preferences within a state are multi-determined and multi-faceted, the concept of rationality can not be seen as a unitary consistent phenomenon. This becomes crucial in the application of international relations theory for as neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalists claim: “states are porposive rational actors: they possess consistent, ordered preferences, and... calculate costs and benefits to alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences”(Keohane, 27). Lastly, while hegemonic stability and neo-realist and institutionalist theories may add to the demonstration of why cooperative regimes break down or form, such theories neglect to explain other factors that may be involved, which pool parties out of negotiations (Interview with Helen Milner).

Neo-realists may explain the current stalemate by the relative gains problems and the underlying security concerns. Neo-realists explain the relative gains dilemma as states being naturally envious and caring about the benefits accruing to their neighbors, thus creating distributional conflicts. It is the preoccupation with security concerns, relative gains and power that prevents states from cooperation. However, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the Oslo Accords demonstrated that Israel would be ready to incur the relative costs as perceived to be the cost of peace. As we will see in a later section the debate between absolute and relative gains may be problematic depending on the government in power and the other influences involved. Under the Labor party for example, the party felt that it would benefit from the peace in an absolute manner. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that negotiations under Labor also fell into complications.

Neo-liberal institutionalists, while taking into account power-based realist arguments of cooperation, emphasize the role that international regimes play in helping states realize common interests. Using regime theory and institutions they portray states as able to care for absolute gains and less for relative gains thus making cooperation more probable. Regimes facilitate international cooperation through explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures in which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Similarly, as other liberal arguments proclaim: an “epistemic community” is a professional, knowledge based group that “believes in the same cause and effect relationships,truth tests to assess them and shares common values ...a common interpretive framework....- which can under certain circumstances, foster cooperation. Like an institution it provides information, reduces uncertainty and transaction costs (Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: the politics of International Environmental Cooperation, pg. 7 in Lowi). In addition, these communities are premised upon the assumption of spillover effects in which supranational institution-building in apolitical technical matters would provide the mechanisms for inter-state cooperation and regional integration in high politics (Haas-On neo functionalism in Joseph Nye)

Institutions that include monitoring arrangements may reduce the fear of cheating that is commonly experienced by actors involved. More important, the likelihood of being deceived in the first place is smaller because the greater the probability of being caught, reduces the expected utility of cheating. Thus regimes formulated through institutions help shape the reputations of members, raising the costs associated with non-compliance. Therefore, regimes are created by states as instruments to achieve certain selfish goals. They reduce the information costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements. The additional sources of information that become available through institutions also lead to a much more comfortable and equal environment (Keohane, pg. 245 and Keohane and Martin, pg. 45). Finally, institutions may also provide a norm of reciprocity, that makes it easier for states to accept relative losses now because they expect to be compensated later (Greico and Keohane in Mershon, International Studies Review, 204).

However, despite many institutional frameworks that have been offered, Israelis and Palestinians have been faced with many different issues that have made cooperation and accommodation under the Labor government and even more so under the Likud government difficult. In the water arena, the Joint Water Committee (JWC), which was set up in the Taba Agreement, played an initial institutional role and was active and relatively successful under the Labor government. Today, under the Likud government, the JWC barely meets (Interview with Eran Feitelson). In addition, neo-liberals also argue that fruitful encounters brought upon by regimes and institutions should lead to additional institutional building or cooperative behavior. However, while the JWC has been formed and epistemic communities discuss common problems and other efficient solutions and plans for expanded institutions have been offered, cooperation has been far from realized. In conclusion, while neo-liberal institutionalism tells us when and why regimes are desirable, it says little about the “supply-side,” that is, when and how the demand is likely to be met (Milner 1992; Muller 1994 in Mershon, International Studies Review pg.195). Therefore, while regimes may form optimal situations, the nature and scope of the larger political conflict and the political intricacies within a state may be the proximate reason for the failure to reach truly cooperative solutions.

This paper does not deny that theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism help to explain situations of cooperation and defection, but advances the argument that they do not offer students of the Middle East a sufficient explanatory spectrum. After the Oslo Accords both Israel and the Palestinian leadership recognized each other as legitimate parties. The Labor party, while still feeling the heavy burdens of sacrificing water-security, undermining active ideological sentiments, and pursuing land for peace, decided to take the tough steps towards peace. While the peace process and water negotiations included many schisms, Labor realized that cooperation and compromise were essential to solving the conflict in general and the water conflict and water scarcity in particular. This similar attitude has been neglected, under the Likud government.

It seems that the high politics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict returns to haunt political scientists, practitioners and politicians in search of a solution. Adding to the explanation of similar phenomenon, theories of international relations typically treat individual nation-states as sovereign systems whose internal politics can be ignored. However it is important to look at the causal links between domestic structures, international political decisions, conflict and cooperation. Therefore, neo-realist notions, such as of Kenneth Waltz, that “a systems theory of international politics need not deal with force in play at the national level” are dubious (Jacobsen, pg. 93 and 96). Intertwined here is also the historical perspective and issues such as ideology, asymmetrical powers and positions and other internal factors that make compromise difficult. Political parties and the positions of leaders, their constituents and their coalition members also play a large role. Under the Labor government the negotiating environment was more facilitating and trustworthy. Under Likud the environment has changed and the search for peace minimized. Therefore, in seeking to analyze how agreements, regimes and international political decisions are made the internal character and influences of a state must also be considered. When looking at instances of cooperation and conflict, theories of international relations neglect and exclude domestic factors. As Peter Gourevitch suggests: “the international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them.” (Gourevitch, 911) To obtain a more accurate image of this phenomenon one must, therefore, look at the rivalry within a state itself and the broader elements within the polity, which are also inevitably linked to history and political evolutions.

Lastly, and as section 6 will demonstrate in more detail, the issue of security also deserves analysis and additional discussion primarily when considering environmental issues. During the Cold War nuclear weapons, proliferation and nuclear war dominated both the professional and theoretical field of international politics. Even the past Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who is now the president of the environmental organization Green Cross International, admits that environmental issues could not become serious topics of discussion as two Super Powers were at times on the brink of nuclear war and more preoccupied with arms races. Theories of international politics have also become limited in their usefulness, especially those that have not adjusted to explain circumstances of the changing global environment. Not only should the definition of security make room for issues other than military significance, but theories of international relations should also consider environmental issues in their analysis and consider the appropriate related issues.

 

III. Power and Ideology Through History: the Israeli Case

The issue of water in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is an issue intertwined in asymmetries and power relationships, history and ideological beliefs. Not only did the early Zionists view water ideologically but they were also able to demonstrate their power over the Arab inhabitants through several schemes. The issue of water, security and scarcity also played a large role in how the Zionists viewed and now Israel views water and the necessity to control it and reluctance to share it. There is thus a kind of psychological scarcity, a scarcity of the resource in the eye of the beholder. Whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of water available shapes people’s attitude toward the environment (Cotgrove 1982; Whyte 1986 in Naff in Rogers and Lydon). In addition, the issue has become more ideologically entangled with the establishment of the settlements throughout the West Bank. The Palestinians on the other hand saw water less ideologically as compared to the manner in which they see it today. After 1967 water, among other issues, has become for the Palestinians another sphere of Israeli injustice towards them (Elmusa, 285). Palestinians see the water issue manifested in a power relationship with Israel unlawfully controlling the majority of the water sources, those sources that also deserve to be under Palestinian control. Palestinians strongly believe that if Israel has made the decision to make peace with them and recognize their rights this must also be extended to the water arena.

To the Zionist movement, which had been dominated by socialist trends from its inception through the 1930’s, water was important insofar as it was part of the “ideology of agriculture” in Zionist thought (Laquer in Lowi, 51). In addition, the entire Labor Zionist movement centered around encouraging new immigrants to work and own their own land. Hence, in this early period, with ramifications for later periods, the emphasis on agriculture had both social and ideological components. As the situation between the local Arabs and Jews intensified, agriculture became related to defense insofar as agriculture and access to resources were regarded as imperative to the existence of the Jewish worker. “Agriculture was cost-effective in that it established a presence in contested areas” (Feitelson, 3). Until this day, while it has diminished in importance as we will discuss later, agriculture, water and land have become a symbol of the roots of the State of Israel. Water, because it is an essential ingredient of agriculture, self-sufficiency and security was and still is considered relatively important by the State of Israel. Perhaps today water plays a larger tie to land and security rather than agricultural interests, since as Feitelson claims “the ideological preference for farming has virtually been eliminated; { but we still see a reluctance to compromise} (Feitelson, 8). Instead the preference has shifted to the security and ideological importance of the West Bank and its settlements. In addition, as we will see in a later section security is part of the perceptions of the ruling government. Some in Israel’s defense establishment and members in various political parties view the settlements as the “soul” of the Jewish State and cherish their military and ideological value.

A significant component of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the dispute over allocation of scarce water shared by the two peoples. Since 1967 Israel has effectively acted as the hegemon in both the Jordan system and the aquifer region. The occupation of the West Bank has given Israel control over the watershed that feeds directly into its crucial Yarqon-Taninim aquifer (Mountain Aquifer), within the borders of pre-1967 Israel (Waterbury, 9). In addition, since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip began after the 1967 Six Day War, Israeli military orders denied Palestinian involvement in the management and development of water resources and limited increases in water consumption by the Arab population for both agricultural and domestic use. Israelis consume a significantly larger amount of water per capita than Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Water-consumption figures for Israel and the Palestinian Territories illustrate the essentially political nature of the dispute. In a normal given year, water consumption for the two regions has been estimated as 2,100-2,200 mcm/y. The year to year amount depends on rainfall. Israeli and Palestinian water experts disagree on lower consumption figures at time of droughts, Palestinians claiming that Israelis are inflating the consumption amount while Israeli officials denying these accusations. In any case which ever figures are accurate, Israel and the Palestinian territories face a water balance that is wither precariously near even or one that produces an annual deficit of 150-200mcm/year (Rouyer, 61). Continued over utilization of such water supply will diminish its quality and threaten its future availability. But with projected increases in both population and consumption rates over the next 25 years, the deficit in the water balance could become much more critical (Rouyer, 60).

A large reason for Israel’s tough position over water is the environmental impact of the over-exploitation of local aquifers. Over-exploitation of the groundwater reservoirs will lead to salinization through sea water penetration. This process of salinization is irreversible and could spread to large parts of the Israeli water system. Therefore, excessive drilling on the West Bank may cause serious salinization of the Israeli water system. In 1978, Israel strongly believed that autonomy, or a Palestinian state, in the West Bank was considered a serious threat against the water security of Israel and excessive drillings may constitute a casus belli for Israel, because, in contrast to the situation elsewhere, no substitutes can be offered to Israel in this matter” (Amir Shapira in Al Hamishmar, 25 June 1978, quoted by Lindholm in Ohlsonn). The same fear is stemmed from Palestinian pollution of the aquifers.

An additional barrier to cooperation and compromise has been the ideological importance of the settlements on the West Bank. Ever since the Six Day War and especially after Likud’s rise to power in 1977, heavy settlement activity in the West Bank began, referring to the territory as Biblical land. These settlements were also established for the purpose of military security. Led by Likud and supported by other nationalist and religious groupings, these Israelis were determined that the future of the West Bank and Gaza would be shaped exclusively by their own ideological vision. (Tessler, 745). No longer were settlements placed by the plans of the Allon Plan, on the Jordan rift (mainly for security reasons), but now they were dispersed on the West Bank. Ever since, the goal has been to make any territorial settlement with the Palestinians virtually impossible. While the Israeli government has gone through several coalitions the settler movement has found a partner in Likud as their revisionist thinking compliments one another.

While the Party of Greater Israel (Likud) and the settler movement have learned to accept “autonomy for the Palestinians” they are still very skeptical about “autonomy for the land.” While the Labor government rejected the fashion in which Likud was establishing settlements, Labor nonetheless had to be careful in dealing with the settlers as they carry much ideological and Zionist baggage that is quite influential in a country where ideas of secular Zionism, survival and security for the Jewish people are still relatively prominent ideas and associated with land.

Negotiating Position

While Palestinians have demanded their water rights, according to Avraham Katz Oz, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture and chief of the Israeli delegation to the multilateral talks, “the mountains do not own the rain that falls on them” (Interview with Avraham Katz-Oz in Rouyer, 67). Therefore rather than negotiate on water rights or water allocation the Israelis have proposed cooperation in developing and managing new sources of water for themselves and the Palestinians (Rouyer, 67). Israel bases its claim to the waters of the West Bank on the premise of prior use, primarily pre-67. According to Israeli negotiators, the water on the West Bank flows naturally into their territory, finding outlets in springs on the coastal plain which had not been developed until initial investments by Jewish farmers in the 1920’s and later by the Israeli government after 1948. Israel also claims that because Arabs did not exploit excess water in pre-1948 times and later by Jordanian rule of the West Bank this water was and still is considered excess flow. As explained by Rouyer, Israelis suggest that the same principles of international customary law which protect Egypt’s claim to most of the water of the Nile applies equally to their claim to the mountain aquifer (Rouyer, 67). They assert that since Israel has been using these resources for over 60 years they have a legitimate historical right to use them. Not only does Israel pose that all this water was not used prior to 1948 and pre-1967 under Jordan and therefore should be considered excess flows, but in addition that it has invested millions of dollars in developing wells, pumping facilities and investing in the National Water Carrier to distribute water throughout the country. Thus the same claim to most of the waters of the Nile applies equally to their claim in the aquifer. While the rain that feeds the Nile falls in Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, Egypt has been using and developing the river for over 4,000 years. Particularly, Israel points out to the Seoul Rules of 1986, where existing utilization is considered a major variable in determining resource allocation (Rouyer, 68).

As a result of the several topics discussed here (security, environmental concerns, ideology) Israel has been quite clear on its negative position to discuss Palestinian rights and reduction of Israeli consumption but forthcoming, under the Labor government, on the issue of water cooperation and development of new water sources. As Avraham Katz-Oz has said, “we tell them {the Palestinians} let’s quit talking about rights. You will need 100mcm/year in the next five years. Open your eyes, we are not going to give you 100mcm. We will need more water ourselves in the next five years. Let us work together in producing water; let us walk together in cooperation.” (Interview with Avraham Katz-Oz in Rouyer, 68) It seems that these issues have limited any party as it approaches negotiations.

 

IV. Asymmetries and Negotiating Positions: The Palestinian Case

The negotiating position of the Palestinians can be summed up in this paragraph by Sharif Elmusa:

“The Zionists and later the Israeli government progressively seized Palestinian and Arab territories and also acquired the associated water resources. The final talks about water, like those about land, are, or ought to be, essentially about reversing this process .”(Elmusa, 23).

For Palestinian peasants, before 1948, as for most farmers, working on the land was a way of life. Still, the proper way to look at it is as broadly cultural, rather than ideological. Needless to say, Palestinian peasants neither saw themselves nor were perceived by the rest of their society as heroic figures like the early Zionist settlers. As Sharif Elmusa explains, there was an absence of agricultural ideology and hence a lack of an associated water ideology. However, Palestinian perceptions of both agriculture and water drastically shifted after 1948 as many villagers were deposed of their land and gathered into desolate refugee camps. In the perceptions of Palestinians, they were being denied the land which they worked and hence, their livelihood, as well as the land which was their homeland, or watan (Lowi, pg. 52). Between 1948 and 1967, Palestinians shared with neighboring Arabs their concern about Israeli plans to divert the waters of the Jordan River, viewing the diversion as a means of strengthening Israel and of impeding their return to their homes. This can perhaps explain the first raid in 1964 by the guerrillas of al-Fateh, which would become the main faction of the PLO, aimed at the Israeli National Water Carrier that diverted the Jordan River’s water into the Negev (Elmusa, 287).

Israel’s stringent curbs on Palestinians’ access to water after its seizure of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 made the denial of water, like land confiscation, appear as an integral part of Israel’s endeavor to dispossess them. The Palestinians deemed the curbs as impediments confining their ability to produce their food, if not to pursue economic development. The unbalanced power structure and the significant asymmetries between the parties is naturally one of the strong motives for the enhancement of strong Palestinian nationalism which was manifested in the intifadah and also manifested today in the negotiating position of the Palestinians on the water issue. Symbolically, water has become for the Palestinians another sphere of Israeli injustice toward them. Israeli water-related policies and actions are seen as “usurpation” of Palestinian water rights and a violation of international law and conventions and the basic precepts of justice (Elmusa, 287 and Lindholm in Ohlsonn, 72).

To Palestinians the current issue is regarded as a practical matter of water rights, where Palestinians would take control of the water management, thus providing a tool for remedying past wrongs. What is even more compelling is that as the ideological outlook has receded in Israel, for the Palestinians the water question appears to have moved to center stage as another symbol of their dispossession.

Negotiating Position

Even with the Palestinian Authority’s control of Palestinian territories, Israel retains full control of water resources in most of the West Bank and Gaza. To Palestinians water rights are one component of their right to a state and the powers and privileges that possessing a state entails. Palestinians lay claim to all but a minute portion of the mountain aquifer’s water, all of Gaza Strip’s ground-water and to the portion of the Jordan Basin surface water that would have been assigned for use by the West Bank under the failed US-initiated negotiations in the 1950’s (Rouyer, 64). The Palestinians believe that these water rights must be recognized by the Israelis before more advanced negotiations on sharing and developing new water sources can take place. Like Ethiopian leaders, Saab Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator for permanent status talks, points out that while water rights are the main concern of the Palestinians, at this time the Palestinian Authority does envision cooperation with Israel in the future, “once the Israelis realize Palestinian rights” (Rouyer, 65). In addition, Palestinian officials claim that if Israel wishes to cooperate with the Palestinians, then the PA must know what Israel controls. This includes independent access to Israeli data on the water resources in the region, Israeli drilling in occupied Palestinian territory, and consumption, primarily by Jewish settlers. This is especially difficult as Israel is reluctant to disclose such information, regarding it a matter of a national security (Rouyer, 65).

Parallel to the request of data-sharing the Palestinians have also required that Israel stop all drilling in the West Bank until a final agreement is reached. Palestinians both in the past and the present have charged Israel with stealing water, and have argued that over-pumping by the Israelis has threatened the viability of water reserves (Tamimi and Nader al-Khatib in Baskin–taken from Rouyer, 65). Palestinians, arguing vociferously for water rights, largely appeal to international law as grounding for their claims. The Palestinians claim that water is an immovable property, which cannot be exploited without compensation, which has not been forthcoming from the Israelis. In addition, since Israel accepted Resolution 242 in the Declaration of Principles in 1993, all land should be returned to the Palestinians. As Rouyer explains, with sovereignty over the land comes sovereignty over the water, where land and water go together as property rights. Palestinian jurists also claim that Israel has violated the international legal principles of belligerent occupation codified in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions. According to these conventions an occupier is required to act in a usufructuary capacity over the occupied country until such time as a peace treaty is signed resolving the dispute (Black’s Law Dictionary and Goldie in Rouyer 65). Palestinian jurists state that Israel’s water policy in the Occupied Territories has been characterized by the confiscation of water far beyond the limits of usufructuary obligations not to cause harm to the occupied population. In the eyes of many Palestinians, Israel used the occupation of Palestinian territory to exploit, divert and utilize the existing resources not for the benefits of the existing population but to provide for Israel itself and its citizens. In the Palestinians case, the Palestinians suggest that Ethiopia’s claim to the Nile River applies equally to their sovereign right to dispose of resources arising on their territory and their economic potential that can only be brought about by more intensive use of their water resources. While Palestinians acknowledge that they will never achieve full control over the mountain aquifer because of their asymmetrical relationship with Israel, they have argued that they have a legal and historical right to a reasonable and proportional allotment of the areas water resources.

Thus,as Rouyer explains, while scarcity of water resources is a major technical and economic problem that must be addressed, inequality of access to these shared resources lies at the heart of the political dispute (Rouyer, 63).

 

V. Comparative Analysis: A Case of Egypt and Ethiopia

The Egyptian-Ethiopian water conflict over the Nile River may suggest a good comparable case for the Israel-Palestinian water conflict and the positions of each party. Egypt has exercised its power over Ethiopia through: being the favored party in colonial agreements, buildings dams and pipelines, supporting anti-Ethiopian government factions and using international support (Interview with Senai Alemu). However, Egypt being the powerful party but realizing that it must negotiate with Ethiopia and the rest of the Nile riparians to enhance sustainable use of the Nile in the future, has preferred to discuss cooperation rather than allocation. Nonetheless, the Ethiopians, like the Palestinians, are gaining much international recognition and attention. For this reason Ethiopia’s voice is being heard around the world and its position on allocation is gaining much backing on the international level. Like the Palestinians, the Ethiopians are not only arguing for a larger water allocation to feed their growing population but also to undue years of unfairness and usurpation of their rightful water sources by Egypt. (Interview with Senai Alemu). I will therefore use this section to show the similarities to the Israeli-Palestinian case, the power relationships that have developed, and the negotiating positions that have developed vis-à-vis these relationships.

The Nile is shared by ten sovereign states. However, for the sake of this discussion we will focus on two riparians: Egypt and Ethiopia. As John Waterbury explains, even when looking at the entire Nile Basin we encounter no hegemon. However, at present Egypt is the dominant military and economic power in the basin (Waterbury, 9). In addition, asymmetries among the riparians in the benefits to be derived from the utilization of the Nile are enormous. The situation we are faced with here is that one country, Egypt, exploits the Nile water intensively while Ethiopia, is making claims that it is permitted both by international law and by its rights to use more of the Nile waters for its needs.

The river system is composed of two major tributaries, the White Nile and the Blue Nile, which rise in Lake Victoria (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda) and Lake Tana (Ethiopia). The two branches meet at Khartoum (Sudan) to form the main Nile, which continues through Sudan and onto Egypt. However, all the waters of the Nile derive from rainfall upon the Ethiopian plateau and hinterlands of the Equatorial lakes, and all riparian states except for Egypt, the furthest downstream, make some contribution to the river flow (Lowi, 67).

Egypt uses the Nile River more than any other country in the Basin. It has developed extensive areas of land for irrigation in the last 100 years. Thus far, Egypt has based its Nile-related positions on an international water-law principle known as the Law of Prior Appropriation. The concepts of “historical rights”, “acquired rights”, and “established rights” are derivatives and extensions of the Law of Prior of Appropriation. Egypt first based its claim of Nile River waters on the concept of acquired rights in 1929, during negotiations for the Nile water agreement with Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Since then, Egypt has consistently relied on this concept.

The amount of economically feasible groundwater resources is believed to be limited and cannot possibly satisfy Egypt’s need for fresh water. Therefore, Egypt often stresses the fact that it “entirely depends” on Nile River waters for its requirements (Interview with Senai Alemu). In principle, Egypt recognizes the riparian rights of upstream Nile Basin states. In fact, Egypt, has not so far opposed the general concept of equitable entitlement of other riparian states to the Nile waters. However, some events in Egypt’s international relations with a few of the co-basin states in recent times have demonstrated that Egypt’s recognition of the rights of other riparians has not been complete. Egyptian leaders have in the past warned of military actions if Egypt’s share was threatened. For example in 1978, amid tense rhetoric with Ethiopia, Egyptian newspapers published an interview with a senior Egyptian official who asserted that his government would never permit the exploitation of the waters of the Nile by Ethiopia. (In Alemu, Dinar, Le Moign, 88). It has been established that Egypt believes equitable and joint cooperation are important but believes that it should be addressed throughout joint efforts. However, Egypt strongly suggests that regional cooperation takes a higher priority than equitable entitlement at this stage. “No negotiations on international water rights are possible without an agreed data base, which must be formulated on the maximum time scale” (Ezzat and Our 1993, NB-9-7, in Alemu, Dinar, Le-Moign, 88). Some scholars believe that while cooperation can be considered a genuine position by Egypt, it could also be understood as an excuse not to discuss allocation of water.

Egypt has for long demonstrated its power to deter weaker Nile riparians from increasing their share of water. While Ethiopia lacks the economic capabilities to fund different projects, Egypt’s power and potential use of force, has always deterred them from changing water distribution. While Egypt can’t project its power easily throughout the basin, no other riparian can afford to ignore it. In addition, as Waterbury explains “....and their economic distress is such that any upstream projects hostile to Egypt’s interests are not likely to be undertaken.” (Waterbury, 22). Another establishment of “facts on the ground,” and through it a demonstration of power, has been the Sinai Canal. In addition, Egypt is prepared to extend the Sinai Canal and supply needed water into the West Bank and Gaza and even to Israel. While the political implications of this plan are complicated Egypt’s abilities to flex its muscle are apparent.

Ethiopia’s tributaries contribute 86% of Nile River waters. While in the past Ethiopia has taken a very passive role regarding the Nile, the prevailing thinking in Ethiopia’s government has been that, it has the right to unilaterally use its Nile water resources without regard to the 1959 Nile Water Agreement. Therefore, Egyptian leaders and planners have been particularly worried about the fact that Blue Nile basin is outside their control (Collins, 1990, pg. 227 and 229). In response to Egypt’s determination to preserve its Nile water share, Ethiopia has accused the latter of “new hegemonic designs to control the sources of the Nile waters” (Foreign Ministry Press Release, The Ethiopian Herald, December 10, 1978, In Alemu, Dinar, Le-Moign, 93)

Currently Ethiopia asserts that it requires water for irrigation and other uses if it is to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. While no direct statements have been made as to the quantity of water needed a recent publication of the Ethiopian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection claims “at least a 50% share of all Ethiopia’s rivers that cross down its borders to neighboring countries” in its estimates for meeting demand (“Addis Zemen” 1994a in, Alemu, Dinar, Le-Moign, 96). As Lowi explains, as Ethiopia’s population grows and food security declines, it will more than likely aim at harnessing the abundant waters from the Nile. (Lowi, 72) Thus it is not so much what the Ethiopian government, or other riparian governments for that matter, have done with regards to the waters of the Nile, but rather what they might be doing- that is the cause of the anxieties in Cairo. This potential threat is the basis of a very real fear that dictates much of Egypt’s security policy. Egyptian leaders are acutely aware of the potential for conflict stemming from water shortage. After signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, President Sadat stated: “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.” (Starr, 1991, in Hultin in Ohlsonn, 27). To this day Egypt is still determined to go to war after this scarce resource. And as then Egypt’s minister of foreign affairs stated: “The national security of Egypt, which is based on the water of the Nile, is in the hands of other African countries (Pearce 1991, in Holtin in Ohlsonn, 27). In situations like this all national development plans made by one Nile riparian will be perceived as a threat by the other Nile riparians, primarily Egypt. As John Waterbury explains, Egypt’s strategy has been to try to persuade the upper Nile riparians that there are potentially high costs, that would accrue to them were they to unilaterally take actions against the common good of all the riparians. Egyptian leaders mainly fear that upstream governments may divert the flow of the Nile to urgently needed development projects in their countries and thus turn the tap right off at the source, or at least decrease its flow (Hultin in Olshonn, 40). However, to Egypt’s satisfaction, and to some extent doing, other riparian countries, especially Ethiopia, are too poor to finance such projects on their own and lack the political stability that is necessary to attract assistance from donor nations and lending institutions. In Egypt’s mind each Nile country expects different benefits from the control and management of water resources. According to Egypt, the other riparians have not reached the level of agriculture through irrigation as Egypt has, and therefore not as interested in the problem of water scarcity (Starr, 1991 in Holtin in Olshonn, 28).

Ethiopia does not find Egypt’s notion of regional cooperation viable but instead promotes the concept and its entitlement for an equitable use as the best way to settle Nile Water allocation issues (Speech in Alemu, Dinar, Le-Moign, 92). However, because Egypt is the most powerful country any tampering in the river system or change in water allocation is checked by Egypt’s superior power, Ethiopia is able to do very little regarding its current position. For obvious reasons Ethiopia’s main concern is the Nile water developments in downstream Sudan and Egypt. For example in 1957, during Egypt’s attempts to secure financing for its Aswan High Dam project, Ethiopia rejected this unilateral development plans. Therefore Ethiopia strongly believes that the water -allocation issue ought to be resolved if any meaningful basin-wide riparian cooperation is to be achieved. According to Ethiopia previous initiatives to bring about cooperation failed because “they were not designed to be beneficial to all co-basin countries,....and hence failed to address the real issues involved (Abebe, 1994 In, Alemu, Dinar, Le-moign, 94). It seems that Ethiopia, like the Palestinians, first wants to ascertain its riparian rights before committing itself to cooperate in other aspects of the Nile that may benefit downstream riparians. Like the Palestinians, the Ethiopians do not see cooperation as the only viable manner in which to solve the water crisis. Water rights, therefore, becomes an important factor as weaker parties employ them to undue past wrongs and ascertain political rights.

 

VI. Analysis of Theories and Additional Findings

Israel’s acceptance of Palestinian rights in 1993 provided a scene the world will never forget. Israel and the Palestinians committed to recognize one another as legitimate parties and began the long road to reconciliation. In 1995 the Taba Agreement was signed and demonstrated yet another remarkable feat. Israel now recognized the rights of the Palestinians to water in the West Bank. The Taba Agreement also advocated a shared vision of water cooperation and management between the two parties. As Sharif Elmusa adds, Israel’s acceptance of water rights as a viable issue may demonstrate Israel’s recognition that the existing allocations are unequal (Elmusa, 243). In fact, when Israel committed to the DOP and the Taba Agreement it understood that by the end of the final status talks some sort of a Palestinian entity would exist. While the Taba Agreement of September 1995 represented a major step towards reconciling this dispute, the specific rightful allocations of the Palestinians were left to the final status negotiations. Nonetheless, the Palestinians have always made their demands clear. If Israel wants a peace treaty that lasts, common water sources must be shared equitably. On the other hand Israel, for the most part, while recognizing Palestinian rights, has come to the table with a more pragmatic approach. Instead of equity they have tended to talk about cooperating on solutions for the region’s water problems. Israel in fact perceives the water conflict as a regional issue which should thus be approached on a regional basis. Whether or not Israel’s position has become an excuse to purposely refrain from discussing allocation (as some scholars have considered), the positions of both the Israelis and the Palestinians are at their core opposed, with their world views and perceptions of the process distant (Rouyer, 61).

This paper has also demonstrated that Egypt and Ethiopia hold similar positions to Israel and the Palestinians, respectively. Thus, the conception of employing prior use vs. equitable entitlement becomes also a contention in the Israeli-Palestinian water problem. In fact, if extended and seen from the views of the parties perceptions’ another similarity can be detected. The Palestinians with perceptions of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and equitable compensation, see the water that falls on a future Palestinian entity as rightfully theirs and thus the waters of the West Bank collecting on their land. These principles, it will be easily recognized, correspond roughly to the upstream-downstream principles in river basins (Waterbury, 11). However, the similarity is not only situated in international law but also in the fact that the Palestinians are situated upstream of the aquifers’ water flow and movement of rainwater. If one considers autonomy, or a Palestinian entity, the Palestinian geographical situation may confer an advantage over Israel in unilaterally exploiting the water reserves.

As specified above while the Taba agreement did not allot specific figures of allocation Israel nonetheless made concessions on limited amounts of water. In fact, implementing the agreement meant that Israel would transfer to the PA the power and responsibilities over water and sewage in the West Bank, previously held by the Civil Administration, while respecting each side’s powers and responsibilities in their own respective areas (Rouyer, 72). Furthermore, Israel agreed to the immediate availability of an additional 28.6mcm/y for domestic use by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during the interim period. From its own water system Israel agreed to supply the Palestinians 9.5 mcm/y, including 5 mcm/y for Gaza. Both sides also agreed to the total future needs of the Palestinians. While Israel agreed to make available all the relevant water data, both sides agreed that their agriculture would have to rely exclusively on recycled waste water after natural supplies are diverted exclusively to domestic use. As Alwyn Rouyer explains the concessions: “The basic slant of the Labor party was the understanding that when the Palestinians do not have water, Israel would not have peace” (Interview with Alwyn Rouyer).

Bringing in the realist and institutionalist debate to bear on the issue of hegemonic theory and cooperation, it seems that while Israel is an obvious partner and power necessary for a cooperative agreement with the Palestinians and other co-riparians of the Jordan Basin, coercion of the Palestinians into cooperation was not a function of this arrangement. Nontheless, it could very much be argued that the cooperative arrangement that was established was a function of the relative power of the Israelis. Still, due to a situation of physical interdependence actors demand institutions for the joint management of the common resource which results in explanations in which institutions fulfill specific functions, generate information, lower transactions costs, increase transparency and reduce uncertainty (Koehane, The Demand for International Regimes and Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy).

To accomplish their cooperative scheme, and a mechanism neo-liberal institutionalists would point to, {the two parties agreed to establish a Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the Interim period to oversee and coordinate all issues of mutual interest in the sphere of water and sewage} (Rouyer, 72). Some of the responsibilities of the JWC carry many institutionalist characteristics: 1) licensing the drilling of new wells and increasing water extraction, 2)developing and upholding yearly extraction quotas, 3)coordinating the management of existing water and sewage that would continue to be operated by each party, 4) planning the construction of new water systems. Lastly as part of the JWC, an enforcement mechanism, Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSET’s), were created to monitor and enforce the JWC decisions. With this cooperative regime and institutional basis, norms and standards of behavior were defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules for action were declared and decision making procedures for making collective choices were planned. (Krasner 1983 in Mershon, International Studies Review, 179). In addition, because of the high level of mistrust between the parties a trilateral committee with the United States was established to facilitate projects agreed to by the JWC. The parties, realizing that mistrust was prevalent, employed additional institutional frameworks to foster cooperation. In addition, promoting the value of institutions, a joint Israeli-Palestinian water research team headed by Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad has been working to formulate a joint water authority for the future. This water authority, while assuming water allocation, envisions monitoring, information sharing, crisis management structures and resource protection which will build confidence between the parties. In sum, because of interdependence it is assumed governments will demand international institutions to enable them to achieve their mutual interest through policy coordination even when there are asymmetries among the intensity of interest (Taken from Weithal—taken from Keohane, 325-355).

While the JWM incorporated steps to cooperation, these steps have been far from satisfactory from the Palestinian perspective. To Palestinians, without a movement to the final status talks, there has been no further definition of Palestinian water rights. Palestinians have claimed that Israel has used the same amounts of water and that there has been limited implementation of the water accords. In addition through the JWC and the trilateral committee, Israel retains a veto over all PA water projects except in Gaza and Jericho. In addition, all USAID water projects in the Palestinian territories must be linked directly to these water agreements and can be vetoed by Israel. Like the realist school, Palestinians contend that this is another form of Israeli use of power. As John Mearsheimer explains: “ Institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the system...they are arenas to act out power relationships”(Mearsheimer,7). The fact that the JWM leaves Israel a measure of control can also explain why large advances have not yet been made in the implementation of the water accords (Feitelson, 1). According to the realist view, implicit to its anarchy assumption, is that there is no capacity to enforce regulations as a means to protect parties from each other or to prevent doing damage to each other. Given this, states are motivated by fear and distrust and their principal concern is with their security and survival. But while power relationships and security concerns help explain the issue, additional explanations must be considered. As Rouyer explains: “The Israelis were trying to balance giving water with external constraints: 1) as realists contend they did not want to threaten the Israeli water supply but second and most important to this analysis 2) the Labor government was trying not to turn the politics against them so that Likud could make successful and damaging accusations” (Interview with Alwyn Rouyer). In fact Labor was challenged not only by the Likud opposition but also by ideological obstacles and ideologically sympathetic groups still active in the Israeli polity. Therefore, Labor needed to proceed but proceed slowly, making adjustments and appealing to the domestic population and polity regarding the changes envisioned in the negotiating table (Interview with Jerri Delli Priscolli). As Uri Shamir summarized the past situation: in the case of Israel both realist contentions of security interests and domestic pressures played a large role (Interview with Uri Shamir). The above, combined with the Palestinian-Israeli positions of allocation vs. cooperation, continues to make negotiations difficult.

Eran Feitelson explains that Israel’s willingness, specifically under Labor, to negotiate over water it currently controls and forgo at least some of it, would not have happened if perceptions and attitudes towards water in Israel had not changed. Feitelson seems to be extending Sharif Elmusa’s argument that water in Israel has lost some its ideological importance and specifically its tie to agriculture and Zionism, but extends more economic aspects to his explanation. Feitelson’s central question however regarding negotiations over water is therefore, “to what extent will Israel forgo additional water quantities?”(Feitelson, 1) This question is quite central as both Israel and the Palestinians must work together to prevent a water scarcity crisis.

In spite of the schisms, cooperation and a positive negotiation environment was nonetheless upheld under the Labor government. For example, as described by the Chicago Tribune: “Israel and the Palestinians initiated an historic agreement on February 13, 1996 on the management of scarce resources in the Middle East.” The declaration provided for a framework for the principles for cooperation on water related matters and new and additional water resources in the region. However, as the new coalition came to power the environment that was established has deteriorated. Cooperation fell apart, even in light of the institutional famework, as interests of one party began to differ. As Eran Feitelson explains, “basically after Har Homa the JWC ceased to meet” (Interview with Eran Feitelson). In fact, when the loss of faith and the deterioration of the peace process began on the macro-political arena, water negotiations were heavily affected. In fact, since Netanyahu’s Likud government has come to power, Likud is not disposed to regional cooperation with the Palestinians on managing joint water resources. As Alwyn Rouyer explains Likud is far too concerned with security and believes that water sharing rather than being the path to peace or an indicator of trust, will create future conflict (Interview with Alwyn Rouyer). The aftermath of the Wye Agreement also demonstrates that cooperation in the water arena is not likely to occur any time soon, at least until a new government is formed in May. Likud has thus been very reluctant to compromise or cooperate, making water a difficult element to negotiate over. As Yaakov Sagiv marked, “Likud is scared when it comes to water. They fear cooperation will not work.” (Interview with Yaakov Sagiv). Likud does not see the Palestinians as a viable negotiating partner, in practically any issue of the peace process. Arguments such as the untrustworthiness of the Arabs and the unreliability of the Arafat regime, to advance its justifications for the stalemate, have been common under the current government. However, the security concerns above also concerned the Labor party but their approach was much different. As Aaron Wolf explains: “when Labor was given the red line boundaries, (i.e. the territories where water security would be under grave risk if given to the authority of the Palestinians (Jenin, Tul-Karm and Qalkilia), Labor decided to make the tough decision for peace and go ahead with the transfer of authority.” As Wolf continued he marked that, “It comes down to the fact that giving water means giving up land and giving up land means giving physical autonomy to the Palestinians.” (Interview with Aaron Wolf) While both Labor and Likud face the same concerns, such as security and ideology, and obstacles to peace, one party, Labor, was desirous of moving in a positive manner and under a positive platform and knew it had to make concessions for peace.

It seems that hegemonic actors would benefit substantially from cooperation, especially in the case of the water issue between the Palestinians and the Israelis and the Egyptians and Ethiopians. For example, both Egypt and Israel are concerned with the quality of their water and their surrounding environment. “Even if Israel does not give up all the occupied territories back to the Palestinians, Israel would still be unable to stop the Palestinians from polluting the aquifers” (Interview with Eran Feitelson). In a thesis written on the power of ststes in the international arena and environmental issues, the issue of public goods and common pool resources was investigated. The author found that by focusing on the attributes of excludability and subtractability that shared resources display, it becomes apparent that CPR’s differ from other classes of environmental goods such as public goods (Weithal, 69-70). CPR’s, such as water, differ from other goods because it is arduous to restrict individuals from using and obtaining the benefits of the good, and at the same time, the effects can be felt by others—such as overuse and pollution. While it may be possible to exclude a party from using a large shared resource, this may become costly (transaction costs are high), inefficient and difficult. Nonetheless, as Waterbury marks: when users find themselves in situations of physical interdependence, the perception of scarcity generates the classic collective action dilemma (Waterbury, 19). It seems that for co-riparians, sub-optimal outcomes transpire when each riparian state follows an independently rational strategy concerning use and appropriation of the river system without taking into consideration the effects upon the other users. Independent appropriation rather than joint management can lead to crowding effects in the short term and in the long run may result in the ultimate destruction of a shared resource in which the resource can no longer be sustained for subsequent generations (Weithal 74-75, Interview with Senai Alemu, Interview with Jerri Delli Priscolli)

The outcome similar to the last section of the last paragraph seems less preferred by each individual actor. This may mean that an actor concerned about the quality of its water sources would be better off by managing and maintaining these common water sources in conjunction with the other riparians, to reap the most benefits. In addition, both in Egypt and Israel the population is increasing through immigration and birth and thus both countries are concerned about inter-generational water capacity (Interview with Senai Alemu). Sustainable water capacity is a phenomenon they can only realize with the cooperation and sustainable use of the ground West Bank water or the Nile River and cooperating to add new water sources or maintaining existing sources. As Jerri Delli Priscolli explains “with so little water and with water sources so vulnerable to environmental and human degradation, there is a shared interest in cooperating” (Interview with Jerri Delli Piscolli). Furthermore, “there is simply no hegemonic interest for Israel to control all the water sources. In fact, controlling the entirety of the water sources makes a hegemon, especially in the case of Israel, even more vulnerable while cooperation provides states with much more adaptability. The argument that the Likud party has used- that cooperation over water makes Israel vulnerable is not true. It will in-fact be political suicide for any party or state if their country lacks good water quality and availability, something that can only be reached through cooperation”(Interview with Jerri Delli Priscolli). Still unlike this accepted international and a large Israeli consensus, the current Israeli government has argued that losing one inch of land and sovereignty over the water to the Palestinians would hurt Israel’s security (Interview with Uri Shamir). This notion is very much tied to the debate of absolute vs. relative gains which is predominant in neo-liberal and realist arguments. In this case an actor is engaging in minimizing the relative gains of others and thus believing it is in fact maximizing its own security and power. Nonetheless in circumstances such as on the water issue allowing the other side to accrue relative gains may enhance one own’s security. Many scholars have thus concluded that Israel’s best interest should also be in promoting Palestinian security. Security of the flow and good quality of water is thus also dependent on Palestinian security. As Miriam Lowi explains: “Netanyahu’s bid for security will not be realized without cooperation with the Palestinians and cooperation will not come without allocation of water and autonomy”(Interview with Miriam Lowi). Therefore, it must be sought as to what other factors influence an actor from cooperating. At the same time absolute gains and relative gains are also quite salient in the perceptions and preferences of different involved or affected party. Different parties may see compromise in terms of absolute or relative gains which in turn affects the negotiating environment and the outcome of a deal. Labor leaning interest groups and parties tended to see the compromises and cooperation more in terms of absolute gains while the Likud leaning interest groups and parties saw the compromises and cooperation in terms of absolute losses to Israel—mostly as a function of the security dilemma (Interview with Hellen Milner). Thus, this dichotomy in preferences also played a role in shaping the different treaties, the future of negotiations and the manner in which different ruling governments saw its willingness to cooperate.

In observing the above arguments on security issues, the realist contention of security seems important but is problematic and insufficient in the case of environmental concerns. As Thomas Naff asks: “security of, from, or against what?” The bedrock meaning of security comes down to being secure from harm or annihilation-being safe from something or someone (Naff in Rogers and Lydon, pg. 255). Nonetheless, the concept of security remains complex and multi faceted. Those who ascribe to the doctrine of political realism in international affairs define security in variations on the following theme: the capacity of a state to secure its safety perceived national interests from violence by means of such assets as military power, population and vital resources relative to other who are seen as real or potential enemies. While it cannot be argued that the above assumptions of security are not fundamental determinants of state security, as Naff explains, overweighing these elements and de-emphasizing others—such as environmental or water problems- that can’t be defined to one country alone, leads to distortions of reality. As Homer Dixon has found by investigating the environmental aspects of security, the renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate resource war is river water (Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict) Because the realist analytic approach is based on constricted assumptions, realists are apt to “squeeze environmental issues into a structure of concepts including, state, sovereignty and territory. The fit is bad which may lead theorists to ignore, distort, or misunderstand important aspects of global environmental problems {and their resolution}” (Homer-Dixon 1991, pg. 84-85 in Naff in Rogers and Lydon, pg. 256). Because rivers and underground aquifers break political and thus sovereign barriers, this concept of physical interdependence conflicts with the realist and institutionalist principal of the international system based upon the territorial nation-state. While the traditional meaning of security, focuses on machines of war and economic arsenals, the world is approaching an era with increasing populations, ecological problems, and such a world needs an expanded definition of security which should include water and other resources. The concept of security is therefore multi-faceted. On the hand parties may claim that sharing control of a resource is detriment to its security. On the other hand it seems that with a detrimental resource such as water, cooperation involving state actors or other quasi-state actors, becomes imperative for the resolution of many of these present and potential conflicts associated with water scarcity and degradation.

In addition the disjunction between state sovereignty and physical interdependence distinguishes environmental issues from other types of cooperation dilemmas at the international level. Because of this it seems that governments, in order to resolve environmental collective action problems, will need to reconcile state sovereignty with state interdependence (Hurrel and Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment). With issues of environmental and economic sustainability of a state, which are largely related to water and environmental issues in many states, how much politics should conflict with environmental constructs becomes a central issue.

Security is also a perception of nationalism. The nation, encompassing religion and ethnicity and expressed ideologically as nationalism, remains an influential mode of political and cultural identity. This mode in fact promotes a very strong bent toward a self-absorbed nationalism. In fact, nationalism has played a very important role in the stalemate we see today between the Israelis and Palestinians. While memories of the Zionist ideology and importance of water to land play a role in the schisms and the stalemate between Israeli and Palestinians, nationalism and the manner it is played through party politics is also a key issue. As Alwyn Rouyer explains: “the notion of water redemption and land, the importance of the land, not making concessions, and nationalist revisionist ideas are also playing a large role in this resistance to consensus in this resistance to rationality.” (Interview with Alwyn Rouyer). In addition, according to Likud not only would concessions endanger Israel, but since a large support for the Likud government comes from the nationalist settler movement, the Likud government is not prepared to make concessions that can hurt its supporters or its underlying revisionist ideology. As explained by Boutwell and Mendelsohn even in the interim accord with the Palestinians the majority of the Likud Party, right wing and national religious parties, and the settler organizations were completely opposed to any concessions (Boutwell and Mendelsohn, 15). After the election of 1996 Likud’s coalition partners farther to the right, had concluded that Arafat has not and never would be a real partner. Therefore, these coalition members were more interested in unmasking autonomy for the Palestinians for the dangerous charade that it was (Garfinkle, 254).

Prominent Israeli journalist Ehud Yaari, nonetheless, believes that no significant change in policy between Labor and Likud can be detected over the water negotiations. In fact, according to Yaari the rules established at Oslo II/Taba have been followed and both the Palestinians and Israelis understand they have to be quite careful when it comes to water. Yaari admits that the current stalemate in the negotiations in the peace process have also had an effect on the water negotiations but does not believe the two governments {Likud and Labor} have handled the water issue in different matters (Interview with Ehud Yaari). However, while Yaari believes the high politics of the conflict affect the water issue (low politics) it seems that Yaari neglects to detect the lack or even desire of Likud to cooperate on the water issue. As expressed by many scholars and in the literature throughout this paper it is obvious that water equity is an obstacle manifested by the history of the conflict. Nonetheless the attitudes and desires of the two governments have been different at their core thus leading to different negotiating environments. The Likud coalition’s reluctance to cooperate derives from its security concerns and reluctance to trust the Palestinians primarily when it comes to drilling wells. In line with this view, Likud’s policy is that, proposals to manage water resources jointly would lead to conflict and is doomed to failure. In fact, cooperation in the water arena is practically non-existent. Likud’s coalition is also strongly configured by interest groups and parties associated with the far right position who deem compromise and cooperation with the Palestinians with suspicion and disdain.

While institutional frameworks have been employed in the Israeli—Palestinian water arena they have not been able to materialize solutions since the political environment has restricted these possible solutions. In fact, as described above, the epistemic water community as a liberal/institutional mechanism, has not been able to materialize their findings due to the political environment. As Priscolli and Wolf explain: “The water epistemic community has never stopped talking. We share the same language, knowledge and thus provide opportunities to cooperate and share knowledge. However this form of cooperation and idea sharing has not yet penetrated the high politics of the conflict” (Interview with Jerri Delli Priscolli and Aaron Wolf). Feitelson also admits that the epistemic community knows that cooperative methods on water are attainable. However, as Feitelson explains: “the politicians do not want to take the process forward and do not use the information to take it forward” (Interview with Eran Feitelson). In fact neo-liberals suggest that once in place institutions may be effective in promoting further cooperation. But what both neo-liberals and neo-realists fail to pay much attention to is the unlikelihood that institutions and epistemic communities will not be established or become effective unless there is some form of political or ideological interest which can only come from within the state. Therefore the arguments by Wolf and Feitelson demonstrate that the epistemic communities and institutional frameworks are not only at the mercy of the distribution of power in a regional context but also at the mercy of decision makers and their preferences, which is very much related to the inner workings of a state (Interview with Helen Miner). The strength of cooperative arrangements will be determined by the domestic power amassed by members of the epistemic community within their respective governments. As political scientist Helen Milner argues: “epistemic communities and domestic politics are linked. How the epistemic community penetrates domestic politics and alters states’ preferences is less well documented, however” (Milner, 479). On the issue of water this is very much the case for as Feitelson explained, water is an issue that is less known in the public domain. It will be the role of the talking groups to reach the people and thus to reach the government (Interview with Eran Feitelson). Thus the role of information may be very much linked to the concept of optimal decisions. Asymmetric information in the political system may thus cause non-optimal situations. This link can’t be analyzed through the systemic level but must be analyzed through the domestic level. In conclusion, liberal/institutional approaches presume that institutions helps states realize common interests as well as confer functional benefits uniformly across all domestic actors (Weithal, 53). Because realism and institutionalism assume states are unitary actors, they overlook situations in which the domestic political benefits of cooperation are distributed unevenly (Moravscik, 1).

Furthermore, according to the consensus in the water epistemic community it is in Israel’s interest to share information, knowledge and ideas and engage in discussions. In fact discussions on water can be a learning basis for democracy. In addition, this form of discussion encourages free speech and develops the process of democracy further. “This becomes an opportunity for your neighbor, the Palestinians, to learn about democracy and develop institutions, thus leading to additional cooperation and an additional layer of peaceful life”. As Priscolli concluded: “It is also in Israel’s best long term security interest for democracy to flourish in a Palestinian entity” (Interview with Jerri Delli Priscolli). Therefore, as said above, there are instances where increasing the relative gains of the other party, whether they be through direct physical sacrifices or through indirect regime and institutional frameworks, may maximize or at least add to the security of the other party. However, like in the case of environmental sustainability and beneficial cooperative behavior among countries, high politics and domestic politics have also taken their toll on the benefits provided by institutional and other liberal frameworks.

National interests and instances of international/regional cooperation or defection are thus not simply based on a rational account of utility maximization but must also consider domestic politics. As Milner suggests, whether the concern is over absolute or relative gains one still needs a theory of domestic politics to determine how gains and losses are calculated. In addition, establishing cooperative agreements occurs when domestic actors agree to abide by the terms negotiated internationally (Milner, 493). By also regarding the state as the primary actor in world politics and relying upon the usual game-theoretic analyses and structural explanations, such institutional approaches neglect domestic politics and overlook how states’ interests are generated (Haggard and Simmons, 499). In conclusion, actors within a state do not have similar preferences and must therefore be included in the analysis of state behavior.

 

VII. Concluding Remarks

This paper has advanced the argument that cooperation and conflict in the water conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians cannot merely be analyzed through the lenses of international theories, primarily neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. While this paper has used neo-realist and institutionalist arguments to advance different arguments, it has also employed ideological reasoning arguments, historic issues and domestic politics arguments to obtain a fuller spectrum of cooperation and conflict. In fact neo-realism, for example, helps to explain different phenomenon, but the picture is simply not complete without other explanations. As this paper argued the assumption that a state is a unitary rational actor deserves scrutiny in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Interests are embedded in historical accounts, ideologies and belief system that stretch across time. In addition, international politics is also a function of foreign policy and national interests which are not accounted for completely in such theories.

Institutional frameworks in the Israeli-Palestinian water arena were a result of the Oslo Accords and more specifically of the Taba Agreement. Peace and recognition had to occur in order for an official institution such as the JWC and JSET to be established. Epistmeic water communities, while convening years before the official handshake in the White House in 1993, had minimal effects. Once in place institutions may be effective in promoting cooperation. In the Israeli-Palestinian arena institutional frameworks were at times effective and at times not effective. What is interesting in the Israeli-Palestinian arena is that success and failure in the institutional/liberal frameworks established was a function of power relationships (what neo-realists would call on to demonstrate the failure of institutions), high politics and also the domestic politics. Therefore it is insufficient to analyze cooperation and conflict in terms of the structure of the international system and distribution of power with in it. While such theories as neo-realism and institutionalism provide us with necessary tools, domestic level approaches are also necessary for analysis of cooperation and conflict which emanate from within states rather than from the overarching structure in which states find themselves (Weithal, 43). By focusing on the internal features of states, domestic level approaches help us to account for a wider array of cooperation including the means by which international institutional arrangements are created, maintained and dissolved. Domestic level factors also demonstrate the origin of state preferences and interests. Because neo-realism and institutionalism assume the primacy of the nation state and conceive of it as a unitary actor, these systematic theories miss how changes in the international system arise at the domestic level. As for cooperation, most conventional theories of cooperation are useful in defining the conditions conducive to or serving as impediments to cooperative outcomes, but as those working on domestic level point out, they often fail to describe the cooperative process itself (Weithal, 58).

In this paper I have also argued that the party relationships, developed throughout history, have led to the differing negotiating positions of the parties today, and have made this conflict difficult to resolve. In addition to the issue of sovereignty, which may act as a barrier to the effective management of a shared resource, the two different positions of Israelis and Palestinians make the water issue difficult to settle. The history of the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis which have opted the parties more towards conflict than cooperation has made negotiations quite difficult today. As Miriam Lowi asserts: when a dispute over water resources is embedded in a larger conflict the former can neither be conceived of as a discrete conflict over a resource nor be resolved as such (Lowi, 9). As Feitelson asserts: The fact that we are at a stalemate is not simply a function of the water issue, but also an outcome of the peace process, where land-water-and autonomy becomes inter-related (Interview with Eran Feitelson)

History, ideology and nationalism render compromise difficult. While as Sharif Elmusa and Eran Feitelson have explained agricultural ideology to have diminished, I argue that political ideology and the relation of water to land is still active in complicating cooperation. At the same time Palestinian desires to undo Israeli injustices through asserting rights is also at the core of the impasses certainly when compared to the far from identical Israeli position. It is important therefore to look at historical issues and their link to bargaining positions. In addition to history John Waterbury identifies, topography as a determinant for negotiating position (Waterbury, Transboundary Water and he Challenge of International Cooperation in the Middle East). Combined they shape, to a large extent, the degree of similarity or difference of interests and capabilities among parties.

Nonetheless, at one point, cooperation and compromise did occur. The Labor coalition decided that after 100 years of conflict it was ready to come to the table. The government was desirous of moving in a positive manner under a positive platform. In the case of the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict it is also important to see a positive environment as a viable and important signal of present cooperation and future cooperation. When the Likud coalition came into power in 1996 the environment was drastically sabotaged. As Jerri Delli Priscolli describes: “when I was part of the consultary group to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations I could sense a great fear in the questions this government {Likud} was asking; This government {Likud} is definitely inhibiting the negotiations” (Interview with Jerri Delli Priscolli). Therefore, it seems that both Labor and Likud faced the same obstacles of ideology, security concerns and domestic pressures. Like Feitelson’s use of water ideology and its relation to agriculture to explain cooperative schemes I also use ideology and security concerns and the differing parties’ reaction to it to explain cooperation and defection. I argue that both Likud and Labor reacted to ideology differently, each understanding the ideological issues and their importance, but one (Labor) working with it but making concessions while the other (Likud) embedded in it and using it for their nationalistic agenda. As Sharif Elmusa explains: “Labor in fact went through the shift in paradigms, Likud is still in the process” (Interview with Sharif Elmusa). It can also be said, on the water issue that one party has realized the realities of physical interdependence while another has realized the realities of physical interdependence but has not fully internalized it and acted upon it.

Thus there are many different forces and people that make up a state and its polity. The interests of the state are not fixed but perceived. Different politicians, controlling the government see the state differently. It is therefore necessary to analyze certain aspects of cooperation and conflict by bringing together differing theories. One theory alone can’t explain certain phenomenon. Both academics and the discipline befit much more from bridging the gap between theories and utilizing several tools in analyzing international occurrences. In conclusion, as this paper has explained, the premise of rationality has to yield to domestic political matrix, ideology and perceptions. The presupposition that states as unitary actors could be treated as rational power maximizers and calculators of national interest is an inadequate and often diversionary basis for analyzing foreign policies (Halliday, 13). While the nature of international politics depend on the systemic level it also depends on the domestic level.

 

References

Interviews

Uri Shamir, April 2, 1998. Uri Shamir is a Professor at the Technion, Haifa, Israel. Prof. Shamir is now on Sabbatical and is at the Kennedy School Negotiation Program, Harvard University. Shamir was also a former member of the Israeli negotiating team on water.

Senai Alemu, April 3, 1998. Senai Almeu is an Ethiopian consultant to the World Bank’s Africa Region, Inter River Basin Initiative.

Jerri Delli Priscolli, April 4, 1998. Jelli Delli Priscolli is Editor in Chief of Water Policy Journal; Priscolli is also a Dispute Resolution Specialist for the US Corp of Engineers.

Alwyn Rouyer, April 6, 1998. Alwyn Rouyer is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Idaho.

Eran Feitelson, April 9, 1998. Eran Feitelson is a Professor at the Department of Geography, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem. Mr. Feitelson is currently on sabbatical at: The Center for Urban Policy and the Environment, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University. Mr. Feitelson is also a co-head of the joint Israeli Palestinian research team on joint management of aquifers.

Aaron Wolf, April 11, 1998. Aaron Wolf is a Professor at Oregon State University.

Sharif Elmusa, April 17, 1998. Sharif Elmusa is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Washington, D.C, and a leading Palestinian expert on the water issue.

Miriam Lowi, April 17, 1998, Miriam Lowi, Professor of Political Science, Trenton University.

Yaakov Sagiv, April 28, 1998. Yaakov Sagiv is the current Israeli agricultural attaché to the United States.

Ehud Yaari, May 2, 1998. Ehud Yaari is a leading Israeli journalist, Middle East expert, and currently working in Washington D.C. for Israel TV.

Helen Miner, October 29, 1998. Helen Miner is a Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.

 

Literature

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Lowi, M., Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1993.

Mearsheimer, J. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19:3, Winter 1994/1995.

Milner, H. International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, Review Article, World Politics.

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A Theoretical Analysis Of The Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflict
Shlomi Dinar

Do realism or neo-liberal institutionalism provide students of the Middle East sufficient tool to analyze cooperation or defection primarily in the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict?

 

Realism and neo-liberal institutionalism

realism:

• hegemonic stability
• rationality: environmentally and sustainability speaking
• but when cooperation is the most rational vis-a vis cost benefit analysis why will a party not vow for cooperation

institutionalism:JWC and epistemic community

• relative gains
• monitoring, reduce cheating.....
• security concerns
• epistemic community
• If institutions are so successful why do we see cooperation vis-vis institutions and sometimes not. Put in a different way the supply side of institutions is not explained.

 

Other explanations: findings

• ideology, domestic politics, negotiating positions are different, history, settelments, parties in power are also needed to analyze the issue.

 

As one can see Israeli water policy, although decreasing in importance, has in the past been driven by the perceived necessities of warfare and ideology rather than a concern for economic efficiency. These policies have included the development of Israel’s arms industry as well as the stockpiling of huge quantities of raw materials. For example, primarily after the 67 war, Israel’s earliest settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were located in the Jordan River Valley and the Katif Bloc, in order to limit the operation of the feyadeen infiltration units of the PLO. While PLO attacks from within the territories or other countries have ceased, Israel’s defense establishment and other political parties are still convinced of the military value of these agricultural settlements. This is why the Nahal brigade is still dedicated to the continued development of new agricultural settlements. While the intense ideological attachment to water has diminished, Israelis, particularly the older ones, maintain a romantic attachment to agriculture and to the communal/cooperative settlements that dominate agriculture in Israel, viewing them as the “soul” of the Jewish state and living testimony to the struggles of establishing that state. Consequently agriculture has enjoyed the majority of Israel’s water sources. As Wolf, explains the Israeli agricultural sector gains significant political power and relevance through its ties to settlements and, in turn, to security. While there is an increasing rate of wastewater recycling use for agriculture, thus replacing freshwater use for agriculture, the high degree of salience of agriculture, gives the agricultural lobby more impact on national water policy than any other sector or lobby. According to Israeli law the Water Commission is the ultimate authority for all water planning and operations are under the Ministry of Agriculture, which has recently moved to the Ministry of Infrastructure.

#1 During World War I, as it became clear that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and as the course of the war became apparent, French and British, Arabs and Jews, all began to refine their territorial interests; the location of the region’s scarce water resources was a critical factor in the decision making process of each party. From the outset, unrestricted access to water resources was perceived as a non-negotiable prerequisite for the survival of a national Jewish home in Palestine. At the Paris Peace Conference on February 3, 1919 the World Zionist Organization expressed its concern thus: “The economic life of Palestine like that of every other semi-arid country depends on the available water supply. It is therefore of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources (Lowi, 40). The Organization justified its claim: “The boundaries outlined above are what we consider essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural outlets to the seas and that of its river and their headwaters.” However despite Zionist efforts, and largely at the insistence of the French, the frontiers of Mandatory Palestine were delineated in such a way that the country was deprived of the areas the WZO wanted. They remained within the territories of French mandated Lebanon and Syria (Lowi, 40: 86). Hence given the resource scarcity of Palestine on the one hand and given the manner in which the Mandate power delineated the boundaries, the stage was set for a future contest over land and water resource; a contest that was bound to intensify with the advancing of settlements, state building, socio-economic development, and inter-communal hostility in the region (Lowi, 41). Throughout the period of the British Mandate the Zionist Organization was primarily concerned with the economic viability and security of a Jewish state. The Zionists began to formulate their desired boundaries for the “national home” to be determined by three criteria: historic, strategic, and economic considerations (Zionist publications cited in Ra’anan 1955, In Lowi, 37). Among the three criteria, economic security was defined by access to water sources. As Chaim Weizmann wrote: “So far as the northern boundary is concerned the guiding consideration with us has been economic, and economic in this connection means water supply (Weizmann Letters, 1968). The WZO established an effective institutional structure to enhance Jewish land purchase and settlement. At the same time the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, who had expected to have an independent state once the mandate was terminated were perturbed by the waves of immigration of Jews and largely angered by the purchase of agricultural land. As Miriam Lowi explains: “ territorial accumulation went along with power accumulation, and violent clashes accompanied the land purchases” (Lowi, . 42).

However the Yishuv’s attitude was that, “in order to accumulate maximum territory, ever-increasing rates of immigration.....were necessary, while extensive land purchases were perceived as essential for the absorption of both the ongoing immigration and future immigration.” (Lowi, 43: 96). The Arabs, however, were hostile to Jewish immigration. They perceived the situation as zero-sum: the country could maintain only a fixed or limited population, hence, “the arrival of any Jew was at the expense of an Arab.” (Lowi, 43:97). As Lowi explains, one feared for the security and future of a Jewish national home; the other feared expropriation by colonizers..

 

Dear Professor Rouyer:

Thanks again for your help with my paper. Thank you especially for granting me an interview last April. Our conversation was intriguing and I learned a lot about an issue I would like to pursue in my future academic endeavors.

Many thanks on taking the time to comment on my paper. I look forward to receiving your comments on the theory and other relevant issues discussed in the paper. Please also feel free to suggest ideas you believe may help strengthen the paper, as I am also submitting it to the International Studies Association Conference in Washington this year.

I congratulate you on finishing your book and wish you all the best in the remainder of your time in Spain. I hope you enjoy yourself as much as possible in such a beautiful country.

Best regards and wishes

Shlomi

 

Questions for Milner:

• In your book: Interests Institutions and information —Section 4 you look at Poltical Institutions and relate them to the manner in which different distributions of legislative power between the executive and legislature and you say it affects the outcomes of international negotiations. Looking at political institiutions how can this same idea be linked to parliamentary govs?

• How come we can’t explain cooperation or defection in general simply on the idea of relative vs. Absolute gains and other relaist conceptions? NOW TO BE SPECIFIC Can we apply this same question to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (explain to he how I see the giving up land and water—-as relative gains—that Israel was willing to make. In your Review article theories of Cooperation...you say that at difffernet times states are motivated by bth concerns. The characteristics that make participants more prone to relative calculations need more study. You reiterate the study of domestic politics may contribute to theorizing.

• Issues of security:
  You scrutinize Greico’s argument on the link between relative gains and security:
  minimizing the relative gains of others in every situation necessarily maximize one owns security and independence and power. In fact you saay that over time one may be weakened by such redistribution of powr and resources, do you conclude that we need to look at domestic factors to look at this. Furthermore we may also conceive a more complex defintion to security.

• Link to epistemic community where ertain schientific elites can and can’t penetrate the political elites. Does neo-liberal Institutionalism who highly regards institutional models—admit that penetration of the political elite can be a finction of domestic politics.

• Role of information and the fact that it may not be available to specific groups0asymmetric information as causing non-optimal situautions to occur or conflict ot occur. At the domestic level this also may be the case as svarious actors lack the correct information about an issue.—Israeli citizenry not knowing the information provided by the epistemic communities.

• Hegemonic Stability theory: Power concentrated in ones hands. If the party chooses to cooperate cooperation will occur because it the hegemon. Nonetheless, what may cause a hegemon to stop cooperating this is also not fully explained by realism and NLI. Why might they stop cooperating.

• Ratification process is also a function of the domestic variables. As coalitions are built differently and cabinets structured differently treaties at home might be ratified diff.

• Institutions and preferences interact. Actors have certain preferences and thus determines their references over which institutions.

• How can we apply rationals behaviors or rationalist choice to this discussion. In what manner can we conclude that a rational actor should have done this, or that a hegemonic power would be better off doing this? (Interviews with hydrologists, economist and political scientists). In your Theories of Cooperation paper you argue that the argument that states are unitary rational coherent actors is descriptively inaccurate. You say that governments do not choose between alternative tactics, as a single decision make might—to maximize a return or for a payoff. You say when domestic politics are introduced.... can we also conclude that when domestic politics are introduced coherence and rational may be obscured.

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Endnotes

*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999.  Back.