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CIAO DATE: 3/99
Hidden Agendas of Participatory Politics in an Era of Globalization *
Rebecca DeWinter and Sohini Sarkar
School of International Service
American University
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Introduction
The contemporary debate surrounding globalization focuses predominantly on the contradictory forces of integration and disintegration embedded within it (Mittelman 1994, Rosenau 1997, Cox 1997, Gill 1997). Tied into this discussion are numerous conjectures regarding the democratic potential of an emerging global civil society, characterized by the strengthening of a diverse range of social movements and NGOs, who are bringing back the notion of participatory politics often as an alternative to pluralistic models of participation through the state (Wapner 1995, Falk 1987, Mathews 1997, Mittelman 1998). In contrast, other authors focus on the homogenizing threat of Western industrial civilization to global socio-economic, political and cultural diversity, because of the former’s asymmetrical control over the two prime mechanisms of integration, namely economic forces and technological innovations (Barber 1995, Mushakoji 1997). Notwithstanding some skepticism, the overall tone of the literature analyzing the emergence of non-state actors in global politics promises an optimistic future. These new social forces are often envisaged as the harbingers of deepening democratization, “counter-hegemony”, higher levels of social equality, diffusion of power, non-violent conflict resolution, “equality of civilizations” and space for the voices of the oppressed (Cox 1997, Gill 1997, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Schechter 1998). 1
In this paper, we redirect the focus away from the fragmentation/integration dialogue and the optimism surrounding the democratic potential of a power shift toward grassroots forces located within civil society to highlight the possible threat of cooption facing these forces. Specifically, we will shift our focus away from the “Third World” to examine the possibility of cooption by state and/or capital of NGO/social movement agendas within a “Western liberal democracy.” This allows us to examine a context where civil society, according to conventional wisdom, is considered to be vigorous and the issue of cooption is downplayed because of the dominance of a pluralistic discourse within society. Therefore, we propose to study how social movements in civil society interact with the state and capital within the context of globalization. 2 The emergence of these social forces are in fact, an effect of the global economic crisis of the 1970s, which led to the collapse of the Keynesian welfare state leaving private capital in control of large spheres of civil society and failing to provide legitimate political channels for popular protest (Leys and Mendell 1992, Hirsch 1997).
Using a middle-range theoretical analysis to understand the dynamics between forces in civil society and state/capital, we explore the cases of the corporate accountability movement and the gay and lesbian movement in the USA. These cases lead us to believe that there are reasons for tempered optimism. The democratizing potential of these social forces is influenced by the manner in which the state and capital respond to them. 3 Two important modes of response by the state and capital are benign inclusion and cooption, which constitute the leitmotif of this paper. 4 Benign inclusion reflects a gain in democratic content of the system and a progressive adjustment of the state and capital to the new challenges of globalization. Cooption, in contrast, does not further democratization of a complex system, 5 but represents incorporation of a movement’s agenda by the state or capital in lieu of symbolic rewards. While this constitutes a form of adaptation, the state and capital remain oriented to the preservation of the status quo.
Some Theoretical Issues Behind Cooption and Benign Inclusion:
Much of the optimism described above regarding the democratizing and emancipatory potential of new social movements stems from a dichotomous understanding of state and civil society relationships. By depicting social movements as emerging and operating outside the realm of the state, the degree to which state and civil society interpenetrate each other has been overlooked. On the one hand, this implies that the state may be able to exert its hegemony by using institutions within civil society to create consent. Cooption of social movements by the state represents a more extreme example of this phenomenon. On the other hand, this also implies that resistance to the state can be achieved by elements of civil society through a “war of maneuver” or a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971). While “a state constantly reenacts and modifies its project of domination by constantly referring to events in civil society....,” the latter is not merely a “passive recipient of forces unleashed by the state and the dominant classes...” On the contrary, it is active and dynamic, and the “site at which fundamental classes articulate class positions along with other social groups experiencing their particular interest...it is a terrain of contestation.” (Chandhoke 1995: 153-4, italics added).
However, it is important to remember that “with globalisation... resistance may or may not target the state” (Mittelman 1998: 851). This is particularly true in the case of identity-oriented movements which may at times be more interested in creating public spaces for alternative discourses within civil society, heightening consciousness, and identity formation. Furthermore, given the weakening of the state in an era of globalization and the growing importance of global capital, many actors have shifted their sites of resistance to address the latter instead of the former.
The lack of emphasis on the interpenetration of state and civil society, however, has been countered by recent writings on cooption and benign inclusion by Saward (1992) and Dryzek (1995). The concept of cooption is an inherently political one and it is difficult to come up with value neutral yardsticks by which to measure its occurrence. Cooption has been approached broadly from three perspectives: ideological, psychological, and institutional (Saward 1992: 6ff). Marxist and neo-Marxist literature understands cooption as “ideological processes whereby cooption involves the maintenance of similar patterns of assumption and belief between governors and administrators and non-state groups or individuals” (Saward 1992: 6). Psychological cooption, as elaborated by authors such as Michel and Edelman, “is a process referring to the creation, maintenance or encouragement of common patterns of thought through the manipulation of words and symbols” (Saward 1992: 6). Saward (1992: 31), however, rejects ideological and psychological approaches as overly grand theoretical approaches that overlook formal mechanisms of cooption, contain a priori claims about cooption’s effects and consequences, homogenize a variety of interests involved in state-non-state relations, and leave individual and collective motivations and aims unexamined.
In contrast, the author (Saward 1992: 6-7) opts for an institutional perspective in which cooption “refers to cases where a notionally private individual, group, or group representative is formally incorporated into state decision making as an advisor, informant, or colleague.” Certain variations of the functionalist approaches, the polity model and the neo-corporatist model provide limited examples of this approach. However, he favors refining the functionalist approach, which often views cooption as a reflexive defense mechanism of an organization (Selznick 1966), to conceive of cooption “as a strategy pursued by purposive actors acting on limited information drawn from the context in which they operate” (Saward 1992: 28). This perspective opens up the possibility that incorporation into the system will not necessarily be a zero-sum game.
Cooption and Benign Inclusion by the State:
We find this idea echoed in the writings of Dryzek (1996: 475) who, speaking in the context of democratization, argues that dependent upon the overlap between the agenda of groups in civil society and the imperatives of the state, inclusion into the state can be either cooption in a pejorative sense, or, benign inclusion in a positive sense. 6 Dryzek argues that benign inclusion is more likely when the imperatives of the state coincide with the agendas of the group which is included. In the case of benign inclusion, groups are incorporated into the state and can help determine “content of public policy, at a minimum influencing how imperatives are met... and how trade-offs between competing imperatives are made” (Dryzek 1996: 480). When co-option occurs, groups are merely granted symbolic rewards and bought off cheaply (Dryzek 1996: 480).
It is important to note that symbolic rewards may be extremely relevant for identity based movements for whom symbolism is a valuable political resource. 7 However, we have to remember that the state is usually more reactive than pro-active in including new social forces. The push to include usually comes from within the civil society, and the state, often faced with a threat that may undermine its legitimacy or stability, pursues incorporation as a strategy (Dryzek 1996: 479, Saward 1992: 29, Smith 1996: 6). In cases where the imperatives of the state do not coincide with those of the groups incorporated, the inclusion is not genuine and the groups fail to substantively impact decision-making processes and outcomes.
Historically, with the emergence of the capitalist state, legitimation and accumulation became the two prime imperatives of the state (Dryzek 1996: 479). In industrial, liberal democracies, physical coercion is no longer a prime means for repressing possible threats to stability. Thus, the need to maintain internal order has transformed itself into a legitimacy imperative for the state, which requires “voluntary” consent of the citizenry or at least a substantial part of it (Gramsci 1971, Habermas 1975). “Legitimation is secured when subordinate classes and categories with the capacity to destabilize the political economy instead support or accept that structure” (Dryzek 1996: 479).
Cooption and Benign Inclusion by Capital:
The other imperative, namely accumulation, has gained a new dimension in an era of globalization. With the emergence of a flexible regime of accumulation, the Keynesian welfare state has been put on the defensive. The state is more vulnerable to the external demands of a global economy, and less able to autonomously shape domestic policy. In addition, the neo-liberal environment makes it difficult for the state to regulate business, which now finds itself compelled to “restore the confidence of business in government” (Cox 1987: 281). With capital now mobile to an historically unprecedented extent, the state is also forced to act in an unprecedented extent to accommodate capital by facilitating the conditions necessary to hinder capital flight/strike and attract foreign capital.
Although capital has fortified its position in a global era, it still finds itself faced with the need to defuse any type of threats to the logic of accumulation which drives its activities. While the corporatist and neocorporatist models emerged to address this concern, it has not precluded capital from pursuing independent cooptive strategies to ensure its stability. The need to act independently has become more acute in the face of a weakening state, whose potential as an effective mediator between capital and opposing interests within civil society continues to decline, and with the overall growth of civic awareness of the negative impacts of economic globalization. 8
Capital cooption follows a similar logic to that of state cooption. Capital will seek to incorporate opposing interests when its accumulative imperative is threatened. As with the state, when incorporation leads to a group’s simply receiving token rewards, it can be considered cooption. Interestingly, benign inclusion, which involves a group gaining substantial leverage over corporate decision-making following incorporation, is difficult to imagine in the case of capital. Capital, unlike state, has rarely been conceived of as a contested political territory. By definition, capital is founded on notions of private property rights, the extraction of surplus value of labor as profit, and hierarchical modes of organization. Thus the ‘realm of the possible’ in the case of capital, including oppositional agendas, is restricted as compared to the state. However, if the imperative of an opposing group coincides with the accumulation and legitimation imperatives of capital benign inclusion might be a possibility. For instance, capital will never benignly include groups which ask for a radical reorganization of ownership and eradication of surplus value of labor. However, groups demanding better working conditions and environmentally sound production processes, two agendas of the corporate accountability movement, have better chances of being benignly included than their radical, anti-systemic counterparts.
Against this background, we will examine the corporate accountability and gay and lesbian movements in the USA. Specifically, we will assess whether the former (which has been incorporated by the state and capital), and the latter (which has been incorporated by the state) have been benignly included or coopted. This can be judged by evaluating whether the movements involvement with the state and/or capital has led to substantive policy changes or token rewards for the movements. We will also examine the positive and negative impacts of incorporation by analyzing the substantive gains that the incorporation has engendered in terms of promoting participation, accountability, efficiency, and equality in the respective movements, in the body politic (in the case of state incorporation) or the organization (in the case of capital incorporation) (Saward 1992). In order for inclusion to be legitimate, all four criteria need to be realized to some minimum degree.
Substantive participation implies that there should be both formal and authentic opportunities for involvement in decision-making processes. Decision-makers must be accountable to their constituency for their decisions and non-decisions. The outcomes of decision-making processes should promote the efficient use of resources to promote want satisfaction. Finally, the involvement of movements with the state and/or capital should engender some improvement in the degree of substantive equality among the relevant constituencies (Saward 1992: 46). 9
Both of the social movements we examine reflect certain characteristics which are identified in the literature as typical of “new social movements.” 10 Because of the differences in the types of goals pursued by these “new” social movements actors, several authors have proposed a distinction between strategy- and identity-oriented movements (Pizzoro 1978, Cohen 1985). Kriesi et al (1995: 84) refine this distinction by classifying “new” social movements according to their logic of action and general orientation into identity/instrumental and internal/external. Instrumental movements are primarily externally oriented and distinguish between means and ends. This is essentially because most of their goals are material in nature and justify a wide range of methods for their attainment, including through statist and capitalist channels. Identity based movements, which exist in the subcultural realm, are primarily internally oriented and the dichotomy between means and ends is often absent. Their countercultural counterparts pursue externally oriented strategies, although in a more radical and confrontational manner than instrumental movements. They follow a much more expressive logic in which the collective actions and identities they produce become ends in themselves (Hirschman 1982). It should be noted that in a given political context the position of each type of movement may change over time depending on state and capital’s reaction to it.
The corporate accountability movement represents an instrumental movement oriented toward the attainment of material goals in the form of a redistribution of profit and control over the production processes. As will be demonstrated below, the movement has viewed cooperation with the state and capital as one method of attaining these goals. The gay and lesbian social movement, on the other hand, can be seen primarily as a subcultural movement, though there are both instrumental and countercultural trends within the movement.
“New” social movements co-exist with traditional social groupings such as classes, interests groups, and associations and, though their empirical features vary, they remain a stable component of contemporary social systems. Within the corporate accountability movement labor unions and trade associations work with NGOs and social movement organizations to set voluntary codes of conduct while continuing to exist outside the movement as independent and more traditional political actors. Through these movements, traditional mechanisms of political socialization, cultural innovation, and institutional modernization are continually redefined. For example, the gay movement’s action repertoire, which includes kiss-ins and “pink patrols” to combat street violence, have been the source of innovative political socialization outside the realm of traditional forms of political involvement. An example of institutional modernization and cultural innovation resulted from the gay liberation front’s constant pressure since the early 1970’s on American psychiatry which viewed homosexuality as a form of psychopathology. In 1973-4 in face of this pressure, the American Psychiatric Association was forced to remove homosexuality from its official diagnostic manual (Adam 1995: 87).
While the predominant theme of new social movement literature underscores forms of political action outside the traditional political structure (Melucci 1980, 1989; Hirsch 1988: Touraine 1988), our case studies indicate that parts of both the corporate accountability and gay and lesbian movement have aligned themselves with mainstream political practices and the state. For example in the gay and lesbian movement, there have been some elected political officials who have engaged in some amount of publicness either as incumbents who came out after winning their first election and managed to gain reelection in their second bid, such as Gerry Studds and Barney Frank, Democratic Congressional representatives from Massachusetts; or those winning elected office as openly gay candidates in district elections, as was the case with David Scondra’s election to the Boston City Council (Adam 1995: 140). Some additional features of such movements identified in the literature includes a lack of internal hierarchy, a lack of specific class character, and the focus on one single issue (Offe 1985, Leys and Mendell 1992).
The Case of the Corporate Accountability Movement:
The corporate accountability movement is a broad-based movement geared towards encouraging companies to uphold responsible business practices and making them accountable to communities, workers, and environmental concerns (Broad and Cavanagh 1997: 1). The movement represents a social movement as defined above to the extent that the main actors are a loosely connected array of groups ranging from established unions, human and labor rights groups, environmental groups, religious groups, investors, trade associations, to mobilized citizenry who, acting individually or through networks, have worked on diverse corporate accountability campaigns. The movement’s emergence in the 1970s, with the decline of the welfare state, reflects a response of elements of civil society to the diminished role of the state in dealing with the negative impacts of economic globalization. Thus, the targets of the movement’s activities have been primarily capital and the state. This corresponds to the two main instruments used by the movement to push its agenda, namely voluntary codes of conduct targeting corporations, and involvement in shaping trade initiatives and legislation through statist channels (Broad and Cavanagh 1997, Harvey et al 1998). 11
The focus of this case study will be on voluntary codes of conduct since much of the movement’s energies have shifted to codes, away from legislation linking trade and worker’s rights (Harvey et al 1998). However, this is not to imply that the movement has not viewed approaching state institutions to influence legislation and trade initiatives as a key instrument, as will be briefly discussed in the following section on the history of the movement. The section thereafter will highlight to what extent and in what manner the corporate accountability movement, as primarily represented through efforts to implement codes, has approached capital and the state. A typology of codes of conduct will elucidate the means by which the movement has been incorporated as well as the reasons for incorporation, since the movement can be argued to represent a threat to the accumulation imperative. An analysis of the outcomes of incorporation, which amounts to little more than symbolic rewards, will be supported in the final section by a discussion of the movement’s substantive gains based on four yardsticks: participation, accountability, effectiveness, and equality.
The History of the Movement:
Lobbying to influence trade initiatives and legislation has been, along with codes of conduct, one of the primary means through which the movement has sought to further its agenda. Lobbying activities, though one of the more traditional forms of political participation in the state, have led to few substantive gains for the movement. For example, in the 1980s the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) was formed out of labor, human rights, and religious activists to specify the most basic internationally recognized workers’ rights 12 and push for their linkage to trade and investment privileges granted primarily to developing countries (Broad and Cavanagh 1997: 26, Cavanagh et al 1988). 13 More recently, the ILRF has been involved in advocating passage of the 1994 Sanders-Frank Amendment, 14 and continues to file complaints with the US National Administrative Office protesting inadequate enforcement of the labor rights stipulations of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) labor side agreement. However, as will be detailed below, to date attempts to link labor and trade have not been very successful since the government has passed amendments that either have no real teeth or are simply not enforced (Harvey et al 1998: Sec B).
As a result, the movement has begun to concentrate its efforts on developing codes of conduct, which is currently one of its most high-profile strategies employed by the movement to influence corporate behavior. The Department of Labor broadly terms voluntary codes of conduct as “policy statements that define ethical standards for companies,” and are voluntarily developed “to inform consumers about the principles that they follow in the production of the goods and services they manufacture or sell” (Department of Labor 1998: 1). The scripting, implementation and monitoring of voluntary codes of conduct has primarily involved groups within the corporate accountability movement approaching corporations, but recently the US government has stepped in to offer a dialogue space for these actors to meet.
Although multilateral efforts involving states, business and unions to enforce work standards have been undertaken since the founding of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919, codes of conduct are a relatively new instrument, developed in the last 30 years. The number of codes, the actors involved in formulating and enforcing codes, and the types of industries adopting codes — paper, pharmaceutical, chemical, toy and sports equipment to name just a few — have proliferated. As of yet, few comprehensive examinations of the history of codes, their prevalence, and effectiveness have been undertaken (Department of Labor 1998: 2, Broad and Cavanagh 1997: 3). Rather than attempt to make up for this deficit, this case study will focus on one phase in the development of codes, namely their application to the garment industry in the 1990s. 15 The trend in this decade has been for apparel manufacturers to adopt codes in response to increased pressure by the movement to improve work conditions in assembly plants located primarily in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. This stage in the history of codes of conduct is of special interest within the framework of this paper because it represents an example of how transnational corporations, facilitated by the state, absorb the agendas of various pro-labor NGOs and the broader social movement in order to minimize possible resistance to their ability to profit from an open and expanded global economy.
As stated above, the approximately 30 year history of the development of codes of conduct can be divided into different phases. A surge in attempts to regulate the practices of transnational corporations did not begin until the 1970s. Increased public awareness of the influence and power of transnational corporations (TNCs) within an expanding global economy, primarily as a result of political scandals and cases of malpractice, 16 and demands from developing countries for a more equitable New International Economic Order, led to multilateral efforts to change corporate behavior. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the United Nations (UN) were the three primary international organizations to promulgate codes at the time. 17 However, none of the codes gained widespread acceptance, nor were they enforced.
While attempts to create intergovernmental codes of conduct have largely failed, corporate associations, fearing that agreement on a mandatory intergovernmental code could be reached, started formulating their own voluntary codes of conduct. 18 These initiatives, largely a reaction to public opinion and intergovernmental pressure, represent business’ first attempt to thwart mandatory regulations of profitable globalized production by establishing voluntary, market-based solutions. Yet the codes of these associations have remained little more than public relations measures and have lacked concrete enforcement mechanisms. 19
Intergovernmental campaigns to establish codes experienced a further set back in the 1980s with the widespread acceptance of neoliberal economic policies and deregulation of the private sector. 20 Groups within civil society became increasingly aware that governments and international institutions were more reluctant to limit the power of TNCs, and viewed their role as facilitating foreign investment and open trade (Corporate Watch 1998: 7). As a result labor, human rights, religious, and other groups, responded by formulating and pushing for the adoption of their own codes of conduct by TNCs. Interestingly, the codes contain standards for work conditions that are based on the ILO’s core labor standards, in order to increase the legitimacy of the codes (Clean Clothes Campaign 1998: 6). The Maquiladora Standards of Conduct and the Rugmark Campaign provide two examples of such NGO-driven codes. 21
Although codes formulated by NGOs have had limited success in attracting companies to sign up, since the 1990s, they have exerted increasing pressure on TNCs — through media exposure, boycotts, shareholder initiatives, law suits, and legislation — to improve their production practices (Compa and Hinchecliffe-Darricarrere 1995: 674-5). 22 Reluctant to accept codes formulated and monitored by NGOs, companies are responding by scripting their own self-supervised codes. Unlike the codes promulgated by NGOs, the majority of company codes do not cover the core ILO labor standards. Within the apparel industry, numerous manufacturers, such as Nike, Reebok, Wal-Mart, K-Mart, The Gap, and Levi’s (who in 1991 was the first company to adopt a code), now have codes in place regulating the work conditions within their subcontractors. 23
Recently, the US government has also become involved in setting out voluntary codes. In 1994, it established the Model Business Principles to diffuse pressure on the Clinton administration by human rights groups because of its decision to grant Most Favored Nation status to China. The Principles were established to be adopted by US corporations with overseas operations. 24 Just two years later, after numerous media exposures of appalling labor conditions within the garment industry here and abroad, the US government began a more elaborate campaign to develop a voluntary code of conduct acceptable to all relevant stakeholders. The White House Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) was created, bringing together big apparel manufacturers such as Liz Claiborne, Reebok and Nike, human and labor rights groups, including the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), and representatives from the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) and the Retail Wholesale Department Store Union, AFL-CIO. Those involved have agreed to implement a Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring, and have consented to establish a Fair Labor Association to independently supervise the implementation and monitoring of the code. The association will include the participation of industry, human rights and labor groups, and the government has agreed to provide the initial funding for the association. However, two companies, Karen Kane, Inc. and The Warnaco Group, resigned last year because they objected to the involvement of human rights and labor groups in the monitoring process (WWD 6/20/97: 14). Currently UNITE and the ICCR are withholding a full endorsement of the code because they feel workers should be paid a living-wage rather than the minimum wage stipulated by local laws as provided by the code. 25
Furthermore, they would like to place restrictions on manufacturing in countries not permitting unions (WWD 11/14/98: 2).
This brief history of the movement illustrates the state’s unwillingness to regulate work conditions in corporations and their extensive network of subcontractors. As a result, groups within civil society have been forced to pressure TNCs to adopt codes. TNCs, for their part, do not want restrictions on their production practices, either by the government or the corporate accountability movement, and have sought to promote their own, self-enforced codes. The government has facilitated this process by providing forums for TNCs and groups within the movement to meet and discuss the establishment and implementation of voluntary labor standards. The end result is that TNCs have been able to maintain dominance in deciding who and what regulates their production practices.
Typology of Codes of Conduct: A threat to the accumulation imperative?
This brief historiography reveals that the state and capital have been actively involved to varying extent in the movement’s agenda to improve labor conditions around the world. Two questions remain: First, to what degree did the movement represent a significant enough threat to the accumulation imperative to warrant incorporation? Second, did incorporation lead to benign inclusion, with substantive gains for the movement, or cooption of the movement, with the granting of merely symbolic rewards? A typology of the strategic goals and the targets of the movement’s activity, as well as the types of codes enacted will assist in answering these questions.
If we examine types of codes based on the strategic goals and targets of the corporate accountability movement’s activities, intuitively one might presume that the movement is one which could be easily benignly included, since most of its goals coincide with the state’s accumulation imperative and corporations’ profit imperative. Broad and Cavanagh (1997: 5ff) define the strategic goals of the movement along a continuum ranging from “campaigns seeking to fundamentally change the corporation or to get rid of the corporation overall” at one extreme, through “campaigns that seek to change the rules that govern corporate behavior,” to “campaigns that seek to reform individual abusive practices of a corporation” at the other extreme. Enforceable and voluntary codes of conduct fall into the latter two categories. Both categories reflect a willingness of the movement to accept the existence of corporations and to primarily target corporations and the government to solicit cooperation in upholding responsible business practices. Thus, the foundations of capital accumulation are not called into question by either type of code; rather, such codes are focused on changing corporate practices shaping work conditions and the distribution of profit. 26
This continuum of strategic goals and targets of activity would seem to imply that codes of conduct cannot represent a tool utilized by groups of an anti-systemic character. Yet, the challenge that labor rights advocacy groups pose to TNCs should not be underestimated. First of all, the involvement of the state in the formulation of codes, as in the case of the AIP, would suggest that mounting public pressure to regulate work conditions abroad has grown significant enough to warrant a government response. Thus, market-based solutions like the AIP reflect a form of damage control. They suggest that the government has realized the need to temper its support of an unadulterated neoliberal policy, without simultaneously endangering the foundations of economic globalization, by moving to implement a compromise between strict government regulation and unhindered corporate activity. 27
Secondly, the sheer number of codes that have been adopted in the past few years and the lengths to which certain companies have gone to create a socially responsible image would imply that they view the corporate accountability movement as a concrete threat to their profitability if not necessarily their survival. Most codes and mission statements include language recognizing the need for ethical business practices. For example, Levi’s mission statement states: “We will conduct our business ethically and demonstrate leadership in satisfying our responsibilities to our communities and society.” 28 While such statements may contain a good bit of self-serving rhetoric, there is a recognition of heightened consumer awareness of conditions of production. 29 Most likely, the profit motive is a key factor behind the promotion of a socially responsible image, 30 yet the impact of the movement has been such that some companies have undertaken significant steps to improve their image. 31
Therefore, it seems that, although the corporate accountability movement does not necessarily reflect an anti-systemic movement, it has challenged two important aspects of the accumulation imperative — the distribution of profit and control over conditions of work — and has gained enough momentum and strength to warrant TNCs’ attempts to absorb and diffuse its influence
Finally, the extent to which possible cooption of the movement’s agenda by TNCs has become an issue is evident from the divides forming within the movement, as is the case with the White House AIP. Human and labor rights groups supporting cooperation with corporations have faced challenges from those groups who believe that a dilution of the movement’s original agenda has occurred within the AIP. 32 Although it is too early to argue that a true split in the movement has developed, such that part of the movement has been institutionalized while the other radicalized, the differences among movement actors may represent the beginnings of a dual strategy, as has proven advantageous to the democratizing potential of the gay and lesbian movement.
The corporate accountability movement has clearly posed a threat to the accumulation imperative. Examining the types of codes 33 promulgated, based upon the actors who formulate them, clarifies the manner in which the movement’s agenda has been incorporated by the state and capital, and provides insight into the extent to which possible substantive gains have been made by the movement. Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere (1995) differentiate between external and internal codes of conduct. 34 External codes are either multi-lateral and initiated by governments, as was the case with the ILO and OECD codes and the White House Model Business Principles, or privately drawn up by NGOs, as was the case with the Maquiladora Standards. Internal codes are formulated by companies themselves, more often than not in response to pressure from the public, media and shareholders. 35
Similarly, the Clean Clothes Campaign (1998) simply differentiates between governmental and non-governmental codes, which include codes formulated by corporations themselves as well as by NGOs.
Internal codes, external codes which are formulated by NGOs, and non-governmental codes are all second-best solutions to governmentally enforceable regulations because of their voluntary nature. It is perhaps for this very reason that voluntary codes are the preferred means by which the state and capital address the issue of labor rights. Voluntary codes give both the appearance of addressing the movement’s concerns without actually requiring significant new legislation and enforcement mechanisms. However, this is not to suggest that all voluntary codes are doomed to be ineffective. The key to a successful voluntary code is to institute truly independent monitoring through some type of foundation composed of all relevant stakeholders, as has been proposed by the Rugmark campaign, the Project to Eliminate Child Labor in the Soccer Ball Industry, 36 and the White House AIP. Unfortunately, until now these few examples of independent monitoring foundations remain more the exception than the norm. 37
Yet, it is not just voluntary codes of conduct whose effectiveness has been questioned. In an ILRF report (Harvey et al 1998: Sec. B, italics added; see also Center for International Policy 1991) it is stated in regard to attempts to shape trade initiatives and legislation that:
These U.S. experiments in trade-labor rights linkage have not been very successful for a number of reasons they offer insight into the political problems that will be encountered in seeking to develop and implement an enforceable social clause as part of the rules of trade. The most significant problem in realizing the objective of improved labor rights enforcement is that a combination of conservative U.S. governments and powerful lobbying by the MNCs has prevented any real enforcement of the laws. The administrations of Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton have consistently used their discretionary authority to decline to enforce the worker rights provisions of the various laws. The concerned bureaucracies at the U.S. Trade Representative and the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury opposed rigorous enforcement of the worker rights provisions, ultimately resulting in litigation brought by the ILRF to challenge the non-enforcement of the law This experience demonstrates that any future solution requires a mandatory and transparent process, not easily undermined by bureaucratic hostility or inertia.
These remarks by the ILRF made in reference to the movement’s other primary instrument suggest that the US government has not been willing to grant more than symbolic rewards in the regulation of labor-trade relations.
Cooption or Benign Inclusion? The impact of the corporate accountability movement:
As codes of conduct gain more prominence and become more readily accepted, the possibility of the cooption of the corporate accountability movement’s agenda by TNCs and the state is increasingly becoming an issue within the movement. Analyzing the impact of codes is telling of the extent to which codes perpetuate poor labor conditions by legitimizing corporate behavior that de facto remains unchanged.
One of the yardsticks to assess the impact of codes is participation. Clearly a number of the more progressive codes have involved all relevant stakeholders — Northern and Southern groups within the movement, consumers, corporations and the government — in the formulation, implementation and monitoring processes. Yet formal participation in itself is inadequate, and primarily a symbolic gesture towards the movement, unless there is accountability on the part of corporations. The lack of compulsory enforcement mechanisms remains the largest hindrance to effective codes. Few of the apparel manufacturers are prepared to allow outside independent monitors, who often enlist the aid of human and labor rights groups, into their operations for regular inspections. In fact, most of the large apparel manufacturers are not even prepared to disclose their sourcing information under the pretext that this would entail revealing trade secrets and diminish their competitive advantage (WWD 7/31/98: 4). A few corporations have agreed to use international social auditing firms, such as Ernst&Young (used by Nike) or SGS (Societe Generale de Surveillance, used by Disney). In sum, though, corporations willing to allow truly independent monitoring through a foundation comprised of all relevant stakeholders remain an anomaly.
Generally, it can be argued that while numerous codes are currently in existence, they have failed to effectively change TNC behavior on a large, industry-wide scale (Stichele and Pennartz 1996). More often than not, the adoption and implementation of voluntary codes of conduct represent a piecemeal response by TNCs to embarrassing media exposure of labor rights violations. Indeed, efforts to improve labor conditions often abate as quickly as they begin. For example, Levi Strauss received an award from the Council of Economic Priorities praising its efforts in implementing its code when shortly thereafter reports surfaced of labor rights violations in a subcontractor in Juarez, Mexico (Compa and Darricarrere 1995: 686). Recent reports by the National Labor Committee indicate that conditions in Wal-Mart’s subcontractors have worsened after violations were allegedly eliminated with the implementation of Wal-Mart’s code in the wake of the Kathie Lee Gifford scandal in 1996 (WWD 7/31/98: 4). Phillips Van-Heusen, a member of the AIP, was recently the subject of a Campaign For Labor Rights (1998) urgent action alert after it closed down a factory in Guatemala which was the only maquiladora in the country that had a collective bargaining agreement. The company stated that the factory was closed because of the loss of an important client, yet the company plans to continue its production with other non-union contractors in Guatemala that pay significantly lower wages.
While this list of violations by companies of the very codes they themselves formulated could be expanded, the point is that groups within the corporate accountability movement are limited in what they can do in response. Their campaigns to push for the adoption of more stringent codes primarily remain focused around one factory or corporation, and can hardly alleviate the situation of workers on a larger industry-wide scale corresponding to the global structure of production in the garment industry. While relying on media exposure and consumer boycotts has proven somewhat effective, the movements often lack the resources to continue monitoring companies (and their extensive supply networks) and to get the word out to large numbers of consumers.
The multitude of codes currently in existence points to two of the key problems with their use which restricts their effectiveness and ability to promote equality among laborers; a lack of uniform language and coherent approach. As already noted, most of the codes promoted by NGOs, irrespective of those penned with the input of business, cover what constitutes the core labor standards as adopted by the ILO. However, most of the codes formulated by either individual apparel manufacturers or their trade associations do not go beyond recognizing the need to uphold local laws and contain no mention of freedom of association or the rights to collective bargaining. This is particularly problematic in developing countries where labor laws are rarely enforced and EPZs are set up with sub-standard labor regulations to attract foreign investment. In addition, practically none of the codes limit the number of overtime hours that can be worked and do not contain a stipulation to pay a living wage. Local minimum wages often do not cover the basic living expenses of an assembly worker in a garment manufacturing subcontractor (National Labor Committee 11/25/97, Urgent Action Alert).
Furthermore, the number of codes are so great, they can subject a corporation and its subcontractors to a confusing array of standards, thereby making them difficult to implement. For example, an apparel manufacturer may have developed its own code, be member of a trade association which has penned a code, and be subject to the codes of its retailers, while possibly considering joining the AIP. The cost of fulfilling the monitoring obligations of all these codes would be relatively large and may actually encourage evasive tactics. However, the situation has not come to this, as most of the codes still rely on voluntary, internal monitoring of their enforcement by the manufacturers themselves.
This brief assessment of the impact of codes using the yardsticks of participation, accountability, effectiveness, and equality suggests that, at best, the movement’s agenda has been coopted by capital and government, who have granted nothing more than token rewards to the movement. The corporate accountability movement, as a movement seeking material gains at the expense of capital, has posed a clear threat to the accumulation imperative, thereby soliciting a joint response by capital and the state. Both have sought to diffuse the movement’s agenda by granting symbolic rewards such as participatory or consultative status in the process of the formulation of codes, which contain no real, government-backed enforcement mechanisms. However, with government supporting market-based solutions and displaying a relative unwillingness to become involved in multilateral regulation of TNCs, there may not be many alternatives — other than transnationally orchestrated campaigns by elements of civil society — to curtail the global meandering of capital seeking geographical locations with the cheapest factor endowments.
While media exposure and heightened public awareness may have some impact on corporations and force them to become somewhat more socially responsible, voluntary codes of conduct fail to challenge the right of capital to exploit differing labor standards in its global search for profit. Finally, while the corporate accountability movement may represent a new form of political authority, it can hardly fill the gap of a state that now finds itself confronted with diminished legitimacy to protect workers from the dictates of capital accumulation. This is not to suggest the inevitable demise of the corporate accountability movement due to the appropriation of its agenda by capital and the state, for there have been instances when the movement has managed to improve working conditions, raise wages, and bring factories to recognize rights to unionization. However, confronted with the power of global capital, the movement must raise public awareness to gain the mass momentum it needs to bring government enforcement behind its agenda. As we have seen above voluntary codes have not effectively enforced industry-wide regulation of work conditions. Perhaps splits in the movement will lead to the formation of a radical portion of the movement, which might in turn facilitate a shift in the imperatives of the state and capital, so that less radical portions of the movement can be benignly included in a substantive manner.
Gay and Lesbian Movement in the USA:
The study of the gay and lesbian movement in the US engenders a different picture which lends credence to the optimism surrounding social movements and NGOs as forces of democratization in a fast globalizing milieu. The motivation behind choosing the US as a case study lies in the fact that gay and lesbian engagement with state institutions is much higher in the US than in Canada, Britain or for that matter most other liberal democracies (Rayside 1998: 305). Such close links with state institutions obviously raise skepticism about the so-called “independence” of the movement from the state agenda. However, as Adam points out, it can also be a “sign of maturity of the movement that activists have learned the rules of the game to have begun to make significant headway through law reform in many countries. Increasingly organized through an indigenous press, in neighborhoods, at work, and at church, lesbians and gay men have forged a social movement that, like others, seeks to give them a voice in their own future and to defend themselves against the violence of state and of others” (1995: 128).
The first section of this case study begins with an exploration of the history of gay and lesbian politics in the USA. The second section describes the location of the movement within the state and mainstream politics. The third section analyses whether cooption can be said to have occurred in the case of the gay and lesbian movement, and the fourth studies whether benign inclusion has occurred. The final section summarizes the implications derived from the case study.
The History of the Movement:
The first stirring of the gay and lesbian movement in the USA can be traced back to the 1950s. While there is evidence confirming the existence of a homosexual underground prior to the 1950s, homosexuals could not express their sexual identities in the public sphere because of pervasive hostility in society against homosexuals. It was not till the 1950s that gays and lesbians organized to break the “conspiracy of silence” against homosexuality (Adam 1995: 148). 38 However, in the aftermath of World War II, the fresh surge of homophobia generated by McCarthyism failed to provide American gay and lesbian groups a safe environment for self-expression. The early movement surrounding gay and lesbian issues thus focused on survival and assimilation, rather than assertion and confrontation. Following the Stonewall Rebellion in 1969, however, the movement became more assertive through a new form of collective resistance: gay liberation. 39 Gay liberation questioned the homophile approach of assimilation of the earlier years.
This shift in the movement from mainstream reformism of the late 1950s and mid-1960s to more open assertive forms of collective resistance from the 1970s onward was in-step with broader trends in US politics during that period. The new gay militants, who came mainly from student and other New Left movements, were cynical of civil rights advocates’ approach to change and “often thought of themselves as revolutionaries rejecting a fundamentally unequal and corrupt power establishment in favor of participatory democracy whereby all the voiceless and suppressed could gain a measure of control over their own lives”(Adam 1995: 82). “Such a social and political climate greatly expanded the availability of meeting places for homosexuals and created the potential for developing political networks” (Rayside 1998: 282). With the decline of the New Left during the late 1970s, the radical gay liberation movement faded away, “leaving reformist groups in the political field and engendering a new proliferation of gay and lesbian interest groups organized within existing institutions: in the workplace, church, the theater, social services, business, and sports” (Adam 1995: 89).
The institutional character of gay and lesbian politics reified itself in the late 1970s and 1980s, in response to the growing popularity of the New Right, its moral authoritarianism, and its virulent anti-gay posture. The influence of the New Right in mainstream politics, made gay activists more aware of the need to use the state and mainstream politics to defend gains the movement had accrued, and reach out for new opportunities which seemed attainable. The Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic further mobilized the movement and forced it to walk down the traditional corridors of power. Interestingly, in contrast to its radical predecessors, who strongly decried the intrusion of state and its various institutions into the domain of sexuality, following the AIDS epidemic many of the gay and lesbian activists were actually demanding the state to assume responsibility for dealing with the medical crisis. The decline of the welfare state rekindled the urgency for a pragmatic engagement with the state to ensure that it live up to its social contract. Furthermore, the inadequate response of the government to the AIDS crisis engendered an ‘expertise gap’ which created some political openings for community-based activists. 40
Additionally, the progressive shift, albeit in fits and starts, in popular discourse around homosexuality since the 1950s, also fostered a more tolerant environment for gay and lesbian activists, encouraging them to join electoral politics. However, the gay and lesbian movement groups of the 1980s and 1990s have built on the foundation laid out by their homophile and gay liberation antecedents, who succeeded in both passing progressive legislation which guaranteed some fundamental gay and lesbian rights and created cultural and political networks. As Barry Adam observes of the contemporary profile of the movement, the “maturation of movement organizations, the developing infrastructure of gay and lesbian communities, and the integration into national political processes have created unprecedented conditions for the flourishing for same-sex desire, bonding, and cultures” (Adam 1995: 144).
However, this “mainstream turn” of the movement has not gone unchallenged. Radical elements have reemerged within the movement, criticizing the electoral and legislative strategies pursued by their more institutionalized counterparts. The “mainstream” political strategies are decried by these radical groups on the grounds that such politics homogenize the diversity within the gay movement both in terms of sexual orientation and political/ideological positions. More importantly, they argue, it entails operating within the parameters established by “heterosexual morality” and consequently legitimizes them. Hegemonic state discourse, they fear, “will impact upon and shape the arguments of all sides as competing forces strive to maintain ideological legitimacy as well as achieve political victory” (Cooper 1993: 203). These ideological issues apart, many within the movement are also skeptical about the movement’s strategic advantages in mainstream politics.
These contradictions have engendered fissures and the rise of new identities within the movement, including bisexuals, transgender and queers. New groups with more confrontational and radical postures like the Queer Nation 41 and Lesbian Avengers have emerged from within the movement. “The postulation of yet another identity label” as Adam rightly points out has risen “as a ‘solution’ to several changes and tensions that have come about in the quarter century since the Stonewall” (Adam 1995: 145). In some cases, these groups have added a counter-cultural dimension to the movement, while in other cases they have deepened the movement’s sub-cultural identity. These fissures also underline the fact that cooption is not merely a concern of theory, but an omnipresent shadow for those involved in praxis as well.
Born out of the crucible of the mid-20th century and at the verge of stepping into the new millennium, the movement carries within it both the past, present and future of the politics of resistance. From its underground days of sub-culture, it has surfaced to become an extremely visible movement with socio-cultural and political networks proliferating both within and outside mainstream politics and the state. This nesting of the movement both within and without the state, is largely because the contemporary movement contains within itself both identity-oriented and instrumental impulses. 42
The Nesting of the Movement Within the State :
To understand whether the gay and lesbian movement retains its democratic impulses or has been coopted by the state, it is necessary to identify how the movement has located itself within the state and mainstream politics. As posited earlier, to be considered included/incorporated, a movement (or section/s of it) must be either involved in electoral/legislative politics, and/or should be engaged with the state through traditional forms of political participation such as lobbying, fund-raising to support electoral candidates, using public interest litigation to change policy, and partisan networking to influence legislation and policies.
The gay and lesbian movement in the US fulfills both criterions of inclusion. It has been involved with mainstream politics and the state, at both national and local levels. Gay and lesbian groups are now engaged in lobbying legislators and officials, providing financial and technical support to gay and lesbian electoral candidates, posing legal challenges through the courts, and trying to influence decision-making through partisan networks. Finally, since the late 1970s increasing numbers of gay and lesbian activists have started running for elected offices, at the state and city levels (though less so at the national level).
At the national level there are multi-purpose groups like the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the National Black Gay and Lesbian Leadership Forum, and Latino/a Lesbian and Gay Organization, which pursue multiple agendas and strategies to push for gay and lesbian rights. Some groups have specialized in using judicial means to attain equality, including the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights, American Civil Liberties Unions’ Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (Rayside 1998: 284-86).
Some sections of the movement have also tried to frame the issue in terms of human rights (as well as ‘minority rights’). Foremost among them is the Human Rights Campaign Fund (constituted in 1980 as a political action committee [PAC]) which lobbies and provides campaign funds to politicians supportive of gay and lesbian demands. Rayside (1998: 286) explains the ‘legal’ bias of the movement as part of the larger North American political culture, characterized by the dominance of individualism, the early constitutional entrenchment of the Bill of Rights, and the assertive position of judiciary vis-a-vis executive and legislative branches of the government.
Another important actor advocating gay and lesbian causes and closely connected with electoral politics is the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund. The 14th largest non-connected PAC in the US, it operates nationally to increase the number of openly gay and lesbian public officials. Since its inception, the fund has generated almost $2 million for openly gay and lesbian candidates at all levels of government. The Victory Fund has supported qualified candidates in 32 states and the District of Columbia. It has helped elect the first openly gay and lesbian state representatives in California, Oregon, Connecticut, Nevada, Illinois, Missouri, Rhode Island, Texas and Wisconsin. 43
This brings us to the issue of how the movement becomes incorporated into the state through directly elected officials. Over 125 gay and lesbians have now won elected office in the US making them “a visible phenomenon for the social movement as a whole, the national constituency of sexual minority members, and the mainstream press” (Rayside 1998: 288). Apart from securing direct representation in government, gay and lesbian activists and groups have also been actively involved in lobbying and building political connections with Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Thus, it is evident that a large section of the gay and lesbian movement has decided to invest their resources in mainstream politics and work both from within the state and with the state.
Has the Movement been Coopted?
Charges of cooption have been raised against the gay and lesbian movement by both movement activists as well as those outside the movement. Two factors which have been critical in fomenting these accusations are a) the involvement of certain sections of the movement in electoral/legislative politics and b) the human rights-oriented direction of the movement in the US, which focuses on reforms through legislation rather than more confrontational strategies.
However, to argue that the movement has been coopted by the state, based on the above two criterions, can be misleading. It is necessary to analyze whether the involvement of certain sections of the movement in mainstream legislative and electoral politics has been translated into substantive influence over decision-making or resulted in symbolic handouts by the state. When doors to executive and legislative offices are opened to gays and lesbians as officeholders and lobbyists, “access can be confused with influence” (Rayside 1998: 309). Additionally, the gay and lesbian movement in the US is probably less able than most other social movements in the country to ward off assimilative pressures from the state, if they arise, since the former is yet to marshal enough resources to force the state to perceive them as a serious threat to stability. 44
However, if one looks at the legislative record of gay and lesbian rights in the US and the electoral presence of gays and lesbians across the country (since the ‘mainstream turn’ of the movement), it is difficult to argue that the movement has been coopted. The inclusion of sexual orientation in the 1990 Hate Crimes Statistics Act 45 and the lifting of anti-gay restrictions in the 1991 Immigration Act represent important gains in terms of gay and lesbian rights. There has also been a significant increase in AIDS funding during the Clinton administration. The 105th Congress passed an omnibus bill with record funding for HIV/AIDS for 1999 fiscal year, including $110 million to help fight the epidemic in African-American communities. 46 The Clinton administration, not renowned for its effectiveness in upholding gay and lesbian interests, has secured some significant gains, especially with regards to protections against discrimination of federal employees on grounds of sexual orientation (Rayside 1998: 310).
The active and vocal presence of now openly gay Congressmen Barney Frank (D-MA) and Jerry Studds (D-MA) have significantly contributed to bringing gay and lesbian issues to the floor of the Congress. While a Republican Congress has substantially dampened prospects for securing major legislative gains at the federal level, Frank has publicly assumed pro-gay and pro-lesbian positions at least 23 times in the 104th and 105th Congress. 47 He introduced the Anti-Hypocrisy Act 48 to de-criminalize consensual sexual conduct (homosexual and heterosexual) in the military and the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act of 1997 for domestic partners of federal employees. 49 As a ranking democrat on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Frank led the fight against the Defense of Marriage Act, which bans federal recognition of same-sex marriages. Though on the issue of lifting the military ban on homosexual conduct Frank came under fire for compromising, his overall track record suggests that his presence in the legislature has contributed to furthering gay and lesbian interests both formally and symbolically, especially in the domain of mainstream politics.
At the local level, a number of states and localities have enacted measures prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. By the mid-1990s, 15 states had included sexual orientation in their hate crimes legislation. The same period also witnessed a reduction in the number of states with sodomy laws criminalizing homosexual acts. 50 More than one-fifth of United States citizens reside in local jurisdictions which have anti-discrimination measures that include sexual orientation (Rayside 1998: 311). The change is even more significant considering that as late as 1968, homosexual acts, even between consenting adults, was considered illegal in every state but Illinois (Button et. al. 1997: 63).
The courts too have provided some positive rulings in sexual orientation cases. Challenges to the military ban were successful in some cases, though less so in the higher courts. The movement won a significant victory in May 1996, however, when the Supreme court overturned a Colorado constitutional provision forbidding laws barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down the state’s 182-year old sodomy law by a 6-1 vote, ruling that the law violated the right to privacy guaranteed by the state’s constitution. 51
Through the 1990s, the number of openly gay and lesbian politicians at the state and local levels has increased steadily. Most of them have been candid about their sexual orientations (even while running their first elections). The high rate of reelection of these candidates and their acceptance by fellow legislators indicates a positive change in the discourse around homosexuality. The picture which emerges from the above analysis is optimistic. In fact, one can argue that despite the entry of a section of the movement into organized politics and state structures, the state has not yet succeeded in coopting the democratic initiatives from below. The rewards received have been more than symbolic.
There of course exists certain examples of symbolic rewards. However, as argued previously, in the context of an identity-oriented movement, the gains accrued from symbolism are significant (Melucci 1998). Apart from the fact that significant gains have been made in terms of legislation, the presence of gay and lesbian politicians, working as elected officials in the public sphere, has posed a symbolic challenge to the dominant discourse of heterosexuality. In addition to elected officials, a large number of gay and lesbians have made their way into the Clinton administration as professionals. The Clinton administration has had a record number of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered appointees in 1998. 52 The widespread involvement of gays and lesbians with various agencies of the state and mainstream politics (either as elected officials or professionals) has had an adverse impact on stereotypical images of gays and lesbians as “perverse” or “weird people.” Arguments by anti-gay advocates that homosexuality is a social evil and that homosexuals comprise a dispensable community are being increasingly rejected by the US public.
The movement’s engagement with the state and mainstream politics has increased the level of participation for non-heterosexual individuals, both directly and indirectly. It has also meant an overall gain in representation for the state, since issues concerning homosexuals and their rights have made an entry into the state’s politically contested territory.
The level of the state’s accountability to gay and lesbian concerns and issues is also on rise. Gay and lesbian elected officials, both at the federal and local levels, have not only had an impact on sensitizing fellow politicians, but have also affected the official discourse within mainstream politics. The linking of gay and lesbian rights to the human rights agenda by mainstream gay and lesbian activists who are willing to negotiate with the state has contributed to enhancing the accountability of the state. However, the issue of accountability within the movement following the ‘mainstream turn’ of the movement is heavily controversial. The movement in recent times have been marked by tensions between activists inside the Beltway and those outside it, since the latter feels that the former have lost touch with the grassroots.
In terms of efficiency, the involvement of gay and lesbian activists has enabled the state to better distribute resources for want satisfaction, especially on the AIDS issue. The involvement of the community-based AIDS movement in various governmental positions has contributed to heightening awareness of socio-economic disadvantages faced by homosexual communities, especially in resource-poor neighborhoods, and the consequences of such disparities in spreading AIDS. This no doubt, has resulted in more efficient distribution of resources to combat AIDS. Inclusion into the state has also enhanced the intra-movement to a large extent by allowing it to fight the New Right’s incursion into the official policy domain. It has allowed them to effectively use pro-gay sentiments within the Democratic Party and a few Republican politicians to secure some legislative gains.
However, on the question of equality results are more mixed. While the movement’s foray into mainstream politics and the state has precipitated the formulation of non-discriminatory legislation for non-heterosexual individuals, a large body of legislation remains anti-homosexual. More importantly, the drive to ensure legal equality is often founded on a minority rights perspective rather than an acceptance of difference. Many are prepared to support the notion of equal rights for gays and lesbians, but not their lifestyle. In other words, the increase in equality attained so far, as a result of the movement’s inclusion into the state has been primarily formal. As far as the movement is concerned, it is difficult to argue that its inclusion into the state has promoted equality within the movement per se. In contrast, it has given birth to more radical groups and different identities within the movement who feel that the mainstream gay and lesbian movement is actually trying to homogenize other sexual orientations, based on their privileged access to the traditional power corridors.
Is the Movement Benignly Included?
Establishing that the gay and lesbian movement has not been coopted, however, does not necessarily lead us to conclude that it has been benignly included in the state. In fact, Dryzek’s definition of cooption/benign inclusion creates an analytical dichotomy which is difficult to establish in this case for the gay and lesbian movement is far from being benignly included into the state. While the movement’s assimilation into the state structure has yielded more than symbolic rewards, it is difficult to claim that they have been able to make a “substantial” impact on decision-making. Discriminatory legislation and insensitivity to gays and lesbians are still very much a part of American sociopolitical reality.
A comparison of legislative records indicates that the US Congress is more resistant to equality than most legislatures in Canada and Northern Europe (Rayside 1998). To date, AIDS appropriations pass at the federal level only with clauses that explicitly prohibit the promotion of homosexuality. The legislative fallout from the Clinton administration’s failed attempt to lift the ban on homosexual conduct in the military nearly resulted in encoding the status quo ante. The 1996 passage of the Defense of Marriage Act, was signed willingly by President Clinton and implicitly validated the fears around social disruptiveness of gay and lesbian rights. In the Fall of 1996, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) failed in Congress, despite containing highly restrictive provisions which limited its application to workplace discrimination against individuals, and exempted small business, the military, and religious organizations.
Despite courting pro-gay constituencies in 1992, Clinton sought to maintain a safe distance from the movement at the 1996 Democratic Convention, during the election campaign and even afterwards, indicating that gay and lesbian issues are yet to be considered ‘safe’ by mainstream political circuits.
At the local level too, gains have not been the dominant trend. Vast parts of the US do not provide anti-discrimination protection to gays and lesbians and remain vulnerable to right wing threats which seek to dismantle the gains that have been made to date. The number of anti-gay measures introduced at the state level nation-wide have leapt from five in 1984 to 24 in 1994. Between 1991 and 1995, close to 40 anti-gay referenda were passed. By mid-1997, there were twenty-three states with a ban on same-sex marriage. (Rayside 1998).
While some positive rulings came through the courts (Romer v. Evans case), 53 it did not signify a large-scale shift in the attitudes of the judiciary. Justice Antonin Scalia, defending the Colorado amendment, observed that it was “designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans” (Rayside 1998: 311). Apart from limited progress in a material and legislative context, political skepticism about gay and lesbian politicians is still prevalent. At the local level, despite an aggregate increase in gay and lesbian elected officials, suspicions that they are special interest politicians are still dominant. Overall, social discrimination and wariness about homosexuals are still fairly common in American society. While the cultural and political spaces to express non-heterosexual identities have increased, they still comprise a peripheral political and cultural force. The recent killing of Mathew Sheperd is a poignant reminder of the fact that deep-rooted and often violent prejudices against homosexuals are still very much a part of contemporary American society.
The Space Between Cooption and Benign Inclusion:
This case study presents an interesting puzzle, for the gay and lesbian movement appears to have been neither coopted nor benignly included in the US. They have played both instrumental and symbolic roles in furthering democratization and tolerance of difference within both the state and civil society. This observation leads us to an interesting possibility that transcends beyond the dichotomy suggested in Dryzek’s (1995) model on inclusion. It is possible that movements or groups are neither coopted nor benignly included. The fact that there were 23 favorable and 25 unfavorable legislation pertaining to homosexual rights provides an empirical face to this contention. 54 This forces us to reconsider the need to develop analytical frameworks which can study movements that are located somewhere in between these two alternatives.
The case study also challenges commonly-held views that new social movements eschew traditional patterns of political participation, that they are more effective within civil society, and that any linkage with the state automatically leads to cooption. The gay and lesbian movement, often touted as a prominent example of a “new” social movement exhibits both instrumental and identity-oriented impulses embedded within it. A section of the movement has entered mainstream politics, and yet, the movement as a whole has been able to resist cooption. Thus, we should rethink the tendency to homogenize new social movements as actors that operate away from the interstices of traditional power structures. 55
This leads us to the third implication of the case study, namely, the need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of inclusion. It is evident that despite having a section of the movement involved in institutional politics, the movement has managed to avoid cooption. On the contrary, at times it has benefitted from such institutional ties, both materially and symbolically. Thus, the wariness among scholars and activists that a social movement loses purity as soon as its comes in contact with state structures and mainstream politics can be challenged in this case.
However, keeping in mind the movements intermediate stature, it is tempting to ask where can it possibly go in the future? Would it be benignly included into the state or will it be finally coopted within the state? While this paper makes no predictions, these questions bring to the fore the issue of state imperatives. Theoretically, one can argue in line with Dryzek (1995) that if the movement’s imperatives coincided with the state’s existing or emerging imperatives, there is a possibility that the state would incorporate them and that the inclusion would be benign. However, if they do not coincide, then chances are that the inclusion would lead to cooption. In exploring the possibility of the movement’s benign inclusion into the state structure, we need to conceive of a situation where the imperatives match. However, as Dryzek (1995) points out, the state has never been pro-active about changing its agenda and thus, the thrust to be benignly included must come from the movement. One possible way the movement can accomplish this is by ensuring that tolerance of diverse sexual orientations becomes an integral criterion for state legitimacy. This task would likely be easier in this era of globalization, since progressive changes in European liberal democracies with regard to gay and lesbian rights are likely to exert some external political and cultural pressure on the US. While activists and theoreticians might argue over the best way to do this, advocates of “dual strategy” present a strong case in this context.
This movement has already shown that it is possible to avoid cooption despite being incorporated into the state structure and forging ties with mainstream politics. On one hand, the ‘insiders’ have helped to build their influence and resources within the state to prevent the extreme Right and other reactionary forces from dominating the official agenda on sexuality. On the other hand, the ‘outsiders’ have helped to keep the agendas alive in the civil society and, through their often radical and confrontational postures, they have forced the state to take cognizance of them. 56
This duality is critical for the gay and lesbian movement, which unlike the corporate accountability movement, does not substantially threaten the accumulative imperative of the state. While this has been advantageous for the former movement, since the state has not been too aggressive in its efforts of cooption, it has also been problematic, since the movement lacks a major bargaining chip, not being able to threaten accumulation. In fact, it can be argued that this has made the dual character of the movement an absolute necessity. The radical segments of the movement, operating outside the sphere of the state, have been able to pose some threat to the stability of the state through its disruptive action repertoire and ideologies, forcing the state to open up to those who are more moderate and willing to partake in the official game of politics.
Conclusion:
Examination of the corporate accountability and gay and lesbian movements affirms the need for tempered optimism regarding the democratic potential of contemporary social movements. Contrary to the arguments that depict a state withering away in an era of globalization, our case studies suggest the need to more closely examine how elements of civil society interact with state and capital, and the possibilities of the latter coopting the former. The interpenetration of civil society and the state, as observed by Gramsci (1971), allows for the possibility of both cooption and benign inclusion, as well as possible intermediate phases of inclusion. However, it is important to keep in mind the relatively resource rich position of the state (even a weakened one) vis-a-vis most of the democratic initiatives from below, which makes it difficult for the latter to wage either a “war of position” or a “war of maneuver.” Additionally, the historical symbiotic relationship between the state and capital, suggests that the modern state and global capital are likely to collaborate if there are substantial threats to their accumulation imperatives.
The corporate accountability movement demonstrates how the state and capital have allied to coopt a movement in response to the threat that it posed to the unrestricted operation of an open and expanded global economy. It also illustrates the state’s relative impotence in regulating global capital in a regime of flexible accumulation. In contrast, the gay and lesbian movement validates to some extent the optimism surrounding the “power shift.” An essentially sub-cultural movement with some sections of it incorporated into the state structure, the movement has been successful in resisting cooption and engendering progressive changes in both policy and discourse. However, as argued above, the movement is yet to be benignly included, highlighting the need to move beyond the dichotomous model of cooption and benign inclusion.
The case studies allow us to posit some tentative implications relevant for further research. As far as contemporary social movements are concerned, it is critical to avoid homogenizing these movements as functioning in a realm separate from the traditional power structures. While it may be true that some movements, or sections within them, do operate away from such structures, the generalization fails to explain the activities of many of them, as demonstrated by both case studies. 57 In fact, our cases suggest that contrary to pervasive skepticism regarding the professionalization and institutionalization of social movements amongst scholars and activists, at times following a dual strategy — by which a portion of the movement works within the state (and capital) and another works within civil society to bring about discursive changes — may be a more viable means of facilitating a shift in state imperatives to the movement’s advantage. “In the state, groups would not only pursue group goals, but also seek the development of a supportive constitutional, legal, and policy context for continued movement activity in civil society. Legislation and policy in turn would draw sustenance from a supportive cultural context in civil society” (Cohen and Arrato [1992] quoted in Dryzek 1996: 484).
In addition, it appears from the case studies that instrumental movements with materialistic ends are more vulnerable to cooption than identity oriented movements. The former tends to pose a greater threat to the twin accumulation and legitimation imperatives than the latter, thereby soliciting more intense efforts by the state and capital to resolve a crisis. Identity oriented movements, on the other hand, often do not challenge the accumulative imperative and are less likely to attract the state’s attention. The flip-side of this, as argued earlier, is that the movement may lack the bargaining leverage necessary to modify state behavior. Most significantly, this study underlines the pressing need to eschew unbridled optimism in favor of a critical scrutiny of the complex nature of emerging participatory politics in a globalizing world, as well as the evolving role of state and capital within that context.
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Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: This is not to suggest that some of the non-democratic tendencies embedded in this power shift from state to civil society have been neglected in the literature. For example, literature focusing on social forces countering globalization within the developing world has pointed to the phenomenon of cooption of NGO/social movement agendas by state, capital and foreign interests (Hurrell and Woods 1995, Hulme and Edwards 1997, Mittelman 1998). There is also growing concern about state substitution, whereby NGOs (less so social movements) are becoming mere service providers on behalf of a state which is constantly shedding its welfare role (Hulme and Edwards 1997, Mittelman 1998). Back.
Note 2: A distinction is often made between social movements and NGOs. However, social movements often comprise loosely connected individuals, associations, and networks which include NGOs within their fold. For the purpose of this paper, we will not specifically focus on NGOs, although both the social movements discussed include NGOs as prominent actors. Back.
Note 3: We are not suggesting that the democratizing potential of a movement is solely determined by state and capital responses to a movement. The overarching political opportunity structure, the resource mobilization by the groups, the manner in which issues are framed, and the historical context are some other variables which can be used to explain the democratizing potential of a movement. Back.
Note 4: This is not to ignore the myriad other possible state and capital responses, including active and passive exclusion which will be discussed briefly below. However, exclusionary strategies contain no promise or impression of democratization and hence will not be discussed extensively. Back.
Note 5: Complex systems are characterized by networks of high-density information, the participants of which require a measure of autonomy. Simultaneously, the high degree of differentiation which results from such autonomy, stimulates a need for greater systemic integration and intensified control, which shifts its pattern from content to codes and from patterns of conduct to the pre-conditions of action (Melucci 1989: 12). Back.
Note 6: Under inclusion we understand the involvement of a movements activists in electoral politics or engagement of a movement (or a section of it) with the state through traditional forms of political participation. Back.
Note 7: An example of the value of symbolic rewards can be found within the civil rights movement’s Brown v. the Board of Education victory. It did not bring about concrete changes in the Afro-American educational system, but did serve as a symbol which gave impetus to the movement because the decision made it clear that racism and segregation were not systemic and unconstitutional (Smith 1996: 14). See Goodin (1980: 123-56) on this issue. Back.
Note 8: Rosenau talks of heightened civic awareness in terms of a “skill revolution” allowing individuals to more effectively cope with the consequences of globalization (Rosenau 1997: 58ff). Back.
Note 9: This is not to ignore the wide range of intellectual debates surrounding each of these principles. The idea here is not to come up with a precise definition nor unit of measurement for these principles but to suggest the broad parameters which should be kept in mind will looking at the content of incorporation critically. Back.
Note 10: Social movements are “made up of loosely connected individuals, networks, and associations... sharing an identity, a belief, or a political objective. Their adherents usually want to see a change in the policies or behavior of state institutions [and/or capital], but may be at least as interested in building their own communities, securing their identities or legitimizing themselves in public opinion” (Rayside 1998: 3, italics added). Back.
Note 11: Other instruments used include direct actions, lawsuits, ethical competitors, shareholder resolutions and actions, dialogues with companies, legislative instruments at the local, national and international levels, and actions to influence consumers such as boycotts, labeling, shopping guides and alternative trading organizations (Broad and Cavanagh 1997).
Recently the Department of Labor suggested a surprising new means for enforcing responsible behavior within the domestic garment industry: holding factors and banks responsible for work conditions in the manufacturing firms to which they lend. As of yet this proposal has not moved beyond the phase of preliminary discussions (Women’s Wear Daily [WWD] 07/20/98: 22). Back.
Note 12: The rights identified based on ILO conventions include freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, bans on child and prison labor, and minimum standards with respect to wages, working conditions, and health and safety. Back.
Note 13: The ILRF together with other labor and human rights groups brought members of Congress to amend the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and the Trade Act of 1974 to include workers’ rights provisions and allow non-governmental actors to petition the government in cases of non-compliance (Cavanagh et al 1988, Center for International Policy 1991). In addition, the ILRF was involved in filing suit against the Office of the US Trade Representative in 1990 when it refused to look into labor conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines as stipulated by Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Back.
Note 14: The Sanders-Frank Amendment requests the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the US Executive Directors of the World Bank and IMF to use the vote of the US to urge the institutions to adopt policies to encourage borrowing countries to guarantee internationally recognized workers’ rights (Harvey et al 1998). Back.
Note 15: We primarily use examples from the apparel industry for the simple reason that it has received the most publicity and has attracted the largest number of movements pushing for the adoption of codes. In addition, the apparel industry provides an example of an industry that stands to make gains in profit by exploiting workers through constant downward pressure on wages, since profits and productivity cannot be as easily increased through investment in capital equipment and training of workers due to the nature of garment production which requires extensive detail work. Back.
Note 16: For example, it was discovered that IT&T had assisted in the Chilean coup of 1973. TNCs were also targeted for discriminatory employment practices which resulted in 1977 in the Sullivan Principles to end discrimination in TNCs in South Africa. Another example, is the scandal in the 1970s around Nestle’s attempts to encourage the use of breast milk substitutes in impoverished countries. Citizens responded with a boycott and the WHO and UNICEF adopted the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes in 1981. Back.
Note 17: In 1975, the OECD penned The Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, and the ILO adopted the Tripartite Declaration on Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy in 1977. Both of these codes remained largely ineffective and unenforceable primarily because they were voluntary, reports on the implementation of the codes could not include comments on specific companies, and a general concern was expressed that the codes would conflict with national legislation and possibly lead to discrimination against TNCs in favor of domestic firms (Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere 1995: 669-671, Broad and Cavanagh 1997: 19, Clean Clothes Campaign, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: 3-4).
In 1975, the UN began negotiations on a United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. However, under opposition from the US administration, Japan and some European governments, negotiations collapsed and eventually the commission discussing the code was dismantled in the 1990s (Broad and Cavanagh 1997: 19). Ironically enough the UN Center for Transnational Corporations, which was created in 1974 and worked on drafting the code, was converted in 1993 into the Commission on International Development and Investment and placed within UNCTAD. As Corporate Watch (1998: 2) notes: “Now instead of attempting to counterbalance the power of TNCs, the commission strengthens them by facilitating flows of foreign investment and strengthening ties between TNCs and developing countries.”
Recently Secretary General Kofi Annan urged the world’s most important business leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum to consider the wide spread adoption of such codes to regulate labor and environmental conditions in their businesses in developing countries (Washington Post 2/1/99: 15). Back.
Note 18: For example, the International Chamber of Commerce wrote its Business Charter on Sustainable Development and business leaders from Japan, Europe and the US gathered to form the Caux Round Table which penned its own Principles for Business (Broad and Cavanagh 1997: 20-1). Back.
Note 19: Last year the American Apparel Manufacturers Associations (AAMA) penned a code, partially in response to criticism of the White House Apparel Industry Partnership’s efforts. The code establishes an independent certification agency comprised of industry, non-governmental actors, and academics to ensure code enforcement (Martin 1998). The AAMA felt that consensus was too difficult to reach within the AIP and refused to accept union involvement (Women’s Wear Daily [WWD] 9/28/98: 12). Back.
Note 20: The US government seems to view voluntarism on the part of corporations as the prime means to compensate for the deficit in government regulation. Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich is quoted as saying rather fatalistically, “if government is going to do less, then the private sector will have to do more” (quoted in Rothstein 1996: 37). Yet, groups within the corporate accountability movement argue that it is not a matter of government doing less, but rather government supporting the agenda of global capital. A report from the National Labor Committee summarizes documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act from the Department of Commerce outlining the Department’s expenditures to encourage corporations to move production to Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in the Caribbean and Latin America (National Labor Committee 1998) Back.
Note 21: The Maquiladora Standards, which appealed to US corporations to ensure a safe and healthful workplace and an adequate standard of living for workers in the Mexican EPZ, were penned in 1990 and promoted by the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, an international coalition of environmental, religious, community, labor, women’s and Latino organizations. The Rugmark Campaign, whose goal was to eradicate child labor in rug manufacturing in India, Pakistan and Nepal through the labeling of rugs made without child labor, was already underway in Germany when in 1994 the Child Labor Coalition began its campaign in the US in cooperation with Indian carpet industry representatives, the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude and the Indo-German Promotion Council (Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere 1995: 672-3, Corporate Watch 1998: 7). Back.
Note 22: For example, in 1997 the National Labor Committee teamed up with Hard Copy to do an expose on poor working conditions in Nicaraguan garment assembly plants producing for Wal-Mart, K-Mart and JCPenney (National Labor Committee 11/25/97). Boycotts have been used in the past, for example against Nestle and Shell, however Stichele and Pennartz (1996: 43) point out that boycotts can put a company on the defensive and hinder dialogue, as well as lead to a company pull out, which harms workers dependent upon those jobs. The Interfaith Center for Corporate responsibility represents one of the primary organizations of stockholders that attend board meetings to challenge management practices (Corporate Watch 1998: 8). Lawsuits are a less frequently used instrument, however recently two federal class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of garment workers in the Northern Mariana Islands accusing US manufacturers and retailers and garment factories on the islands of failing to pay overtime and imposing intolerable work and living conditions on their employees (Washington Post 1/14/99: A14). Various bills have been proposed by Congress to curtail child labor (HR 1301 — Child Labor Free Consumer Information Act of 1997, and HR 1328 — Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1997) and sweatshop conditions (HR 23 — Stop Sweatshops Act of 1998). Back.
Note 23: These codes can be found on the companies websites. The codes often contain vaguely defined standards and are incomplete to the extent that standards regarding wages and hours often do not go beyond the recognition of local laws, which allow long hours and minimum wages that are not “living wages,” and make no mention of rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining (Clean Clothes Campaign 1998: 9). For example, WalMart’s and K-Mart’s codes suffer from all these shortcomings. Nike and Reebok, as members of the White House Apparel Industry Partnership, recognize the rights to collective bargaining and freedom of association. In addition, they place emphasis on upholding local labor laws but limit the number of work hours a week to sixty, unless there are exceptional circumstances. Gap and Levi’s codes contain the same standards, with Levi’s code making no mention of the right to collective bargaining. Back.
Note 24: The Model Business Principles did not develop into more than a statement of objectives which were protested by NGOs as being inadequate and by corporations as being too stringent. Back.
Note 25: It is interesting to note that — although the Workplace Code of Conduct is fairly standard in advocating what are widely accepted as core labor standards regarding forced labor, child labor, discrimination, health and safety, freedom of association and collective bargaining, and levels of compensation as stipulated by local laws — the provision on hours of work is actually more progressive and would impact American labor standards, since employers agree not to allow employees to work more than 12 hours overtime beyond the 40 hour workweek. Currently US labor law does not limit the amount of overtime that can be worked as long as the appropriate compensation is paid (New York Times 4/9/97: 14). Back.
Note 26: Accordingly the target of the activity of such campaigns is either single corporations, an entire industry, or corporations in a geographic area. It should be noted that while most campaigns larger goal is impacting an entire industry, the strategy of targeting specific corporations is most often pursued because of limited resources and greater effectiveness gained by channeling those resources and public attention on one corporation. The hope is that other corporations fearing similar negative publicity will pro-actively change their labor practices (Stichele and Pennartz 1996: 40). Back.
Note 27: This is similar in form, although not in degree, to the inclusion of the working class in a corporatist mode of accumulation (Cox 1987, Dryzek 1996: 479). Back.
Note 28: Source: Levi’s web site at http://www.levistrauss.com/about/vision.html. Back.
Note 29: As a Reebok spokesperson stated: “consumers today hold companies accountable for the way products are made, not just the quality of the product itself” (quoted in Compa and Hinchliffe-Darricarrerre 1995: 668). Back.
Note 30: One Levi company official hinted at the profit motive when he stated: “As we expand our production to more diverse cultures and countries, it makes sense to select partners whose practices are compatible with our aspirational and ethical values, otherwise we may end up with contractors who don’t abide by responsible business policies, and our association with them could damage the image of our brands and our company” (quoted in Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere 1995: 676). Back.
Note 31: Nike (Nike Workers 1998) provides one example. Not only has Nike begun three pilot projects to conduct independent monitoring involving NGOs in plants in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, but it has also raised the legal working age at its footwear plants above local laws to the age of 18, and increased the minimum wage it pays in Indonesia above the local minimum wage in response to the Asian crisis. In addition, the company has started projects in Vietnam to offer educational training and micro-credits to its workers. Back.
Note 32: As stated above, not only have UNITE and ICCR refused to endorse the code because they feel it does not go far enough to ensure a living wage, to restrict production in countries that do not permit unions, and to require that an adequate number of factories be inspected (WWD 11/4/98: 2), but the Board of the ILRF had difficulty reaching a majority decision when the time came to vote to accept the code because of the resistance of its union members (ILRF Press Release 1998). In addition, other NGOs involved in the corporate accountability movement have been highly critical of the AIP because of the compromises that have been made regarding the lack of stipulations on a living wage and the exclusion of local grass roots leaders in factory inspections (WWD 6/20/97: 14). Corporate Watch (1998: 5) has stated that the code “entrenches even more deeply the indecent wages, inhumane hours, and lack of accountability that pervades the industry by lending its stamp of approval to the existing exploitative system.”
Maggie Gray, Director of Development and Administration at the National Labor Committee (NLC), stated in a phone interview (1/20/98) that the organization is openly critical of the AIP, referring to it as a “beltway compromise.” The NLC’s main points of contention are that members do not have to disclose their subcontractors, that it does not call for a living wage, nor involve grassroots organizations in monitoring, and has no stipulations regarding production in countries that are known human rights violators. In addition, the NLC feels that inspection of a mere percentage of a corporations manufacturing plants is inadequate.
Medea Benjamin, executive director of the human rights group Global Exchange, and one of seven labor and human rights groups to release a statement expressing dissatisfaction with the AIP code, stated that “companies could still pay their workers 20 cents an hour, push them to do countless hours of voluntary overtime, use accounting firms that have no connections to workers as their external monitors and be rewarded for this behavior with a no sweatshop seal of approval” (Journal of Commerce 4/15/97: 5A). Back.
Note 33: Stichele and Pennartz (1996) and Broad and Cavanagh (1997) have provided typologies of the broader corporate accountability movement. Stichele and Pennartz (1996: 10) distinguish between NGOs whose campaigns are aimed directly at changing corporate behavior, those focused on broader issues where TNCs may be the main or subsidiary actors who have to be targeted in order to implement change, and groups geared towards providing research and information as the basis for campaigns. Broad and Cavanagh (1997: 2-3) offer a more comprehensive typology distinguishing between movements based on their strategic goals, target of the activity, methods used, initiating actors, and geographic scope. Back.
Note 34: It should be noted that this distinction between internal and external codes is not always clear cut since at times governmental and non-governmental actors have combined forces to create codes, as was the case with the Project to Eliminate Child Labor in the Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan, and at other times business actors have cooperated with NGOs and government to formulate codes, as is the case with the AIP. Back.
Note 35: Levi Strauss’ Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection is an example of an internal code that was implemented in the wake of exposure of abusive labor practices in subcontractors in Saipan (Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere 1995: 676). Back.
Note 36: The Project to Eliminate Child Labour in the Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan was a response by the international sporting goods industry to a similar Foul Ball campaign proposed by the ILRF and supported by unions. It is unusual in that not only does it involve a wide array of governmental, non-governmental, and business actors (the ILO, UNICEF, Save the Children Fund, the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce, the World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry, the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association, and the Soccer Council Industry Council of America), but it also allows for unannounced inspections by an independent third party monitoring body. However, the social protection program, if implemented as described, is truly progressive. Money raised from the participants will be used to provide the displaced child laborers with an education and the families who are losing the income of their children with alternative sources of income such as employment or microcredits (SGI, SGMA, SICA 2/14/97 News Release). Back.
Note 37: Companies such as Nike have been allegedly conducting independent monitoring by hiring international auditing agencies such as Ernst&Young to undertake reviews of their subcontractors, but the Clean Clothes Campaign considers this to be a form of company-controlled monitoring and points out that such auditing firms are employed by Nike and told what to look for, thereby compromising their true independence. Nike has also been unwilling to share the results of Ernst &Young’s audits with the public. The first audit report of a Nike subcontractor in Vietnam was leaked to the press and revealed that the subcontractor was in violation of a number of Vietnamese environmental and labor laws although the factory was still found by Ernst&Young to be compliance with Nike’s code of conduct (Clean Clothes Campaign, Nike Case 1998: 8). Back.
Note 38: Adam (1995) provides an excellent account of the reasons behind the emergence of the movement. Back.
Note 39: On June 27-28, 1969, New York Police Department (NYPD) conducted raids on the a bar located in Greenwich village called Stonewall Inn. In the preceding three weeks the NYPD had already raided five gay bars, creating a politically charged environment. However, it was during the Stonewall raid that visible protest finally coalesced. Drag Queens, princesses, ladies-in waiting, bar boys and street people confronted the police first with jeers and then by throwing bobby pins, compacts, curlers and finally, stones, coins, and parking meters. (New York Times 06/29/99: 33; New York Times 06/30/99: 22 ). Back.
Note 40: Indeed, the number of paid staff positions in New York city gay and lesbian organizations saw a rapid increase from less than a dozen in 1981 to two hundred in 1990. (Rayside 1998: 284). Back.
Note 41: Queer Nation was formed in 1990 when a group in New York city met to discuss the bashings of lesbians and gays in the East Village in New York City. They appropriated a former term of shame to construct a confrontational identity and a discursive opposition. Allan Bérubé and Jeffrey Escoffier suggests that Queer Nation was “trying to combine contradictory impulses: to bring together people who have been made to feel perverse, queer, odd, outcast, different and deviant, and to affirm sameness by defining a common identity on the fringes” (Bérubé and Escoffier 1991: 14). It dissolved in 1992 failing to resolve the conflicts of difference within “the common identity on the fringes.” Back.
Note 42: For a detailed discussion on identity-oriented movements and instrumental movements (including the differences between counter-cultural and sub-cultural movements) see Kriesi et al. (1995: 82-110). Back.
Note 43: Source: Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund’s web site at http://www.victoryfund.org/VF/history/facts.htm. Back.
Note 44: However, as will be later argued, the fact that they do not pose a serious threat to stability might work to the movement’s advantage, to the extent that the state would not bother to coopt them. Back.
Note 45: The Act (H.R. 1048) was reauthorized in 1990 through the year 2002. This law calls for states and localities to voluntarily report all hate crimes to the FBI, including those committed because of a person’s real or perceived sexual orientation. The only other federal Hate Crimes legislation is the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993 (S.1522, introduced on 10/06/93). It provides for tougher sentencing when it is proven beyond a doubt that the crime committed was a hate crime (Source: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bdquery.html). These tougher sentences result, on average, an increase of one-third additional the actual time served. Currently, two federal hate crimes laws include “sexual orientation” as a protected (Source: Human Rights Campaign’s web site at http://www.hrc.org/issues/antigay/index.html). Back.
Note 46: Source: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force’s web site at http://www.ngltf.org/98CGAL/summ98activity.html. Back.
Note 47: He was the key person in pressing the administration to follow through on its commitment made in 1993 to issue an Executive Order prohibiting any discrimination in the granting of security clearances based on sexual orientation. The Order was finally issued and the administration acknowledged that Congressman Frank was the major advocate for it. He also led the effort to block Republican threats to repeal this Order by legislative action. He was also instrumental in persuading President Clinton to strongly endorse the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), and leading a successful effort to defeat the Hefley Amendment to overturn President Clinton’s Executive Order protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination in executive branch employment. (Source: Washington Office of Congressman Barney Frank. Highlights of Barney Frank’s Efforts Against Homophobia in the 104th and 105th Congresses. Facsimile document dated 2.2.99. Back.
Note 48: H.R. 1915. Introduced on 6.17.97. Source: http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery. Back.
Note 49: H.R. 2761. Introduced on 10.29.97. Source: http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery. Back.
Note 50: Courts in Michigan and Kentucky, and the legislatures in Nevada and District of Columbia effecting reform (Rayside 1998: 310). Back.
Note 51: The law invalidated by the court was the same law that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in a famous 1986 case, Bowers v. Hardwick, saying it did not violate the federal right to privacy. American Civil Liberties Union. Press Release. Monday, November 23, 1998 at http://www.aclu.org/news/n112398b.html. Back.
Note 52: Special Assistants to the President Ginny Apuzzo and Karen Tramantano were joined by over 50 others in the White House and other executive branch agencies. Source: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force’s web site at http:///www.ngltf.org/98CGAL/summ98activity.html Back.
Note 53: In Colorado, a state-wide referendum in 1992 banned civil rights protection on the basis of sexual orientation, thereby overturning local laws in Denver, Boulder, and Aspen. This action was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Romer, Governor of Colorado, et al. v. Evans et al. case (517 U.S. 620, 1996). Source: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-1039.ZO.html. Back.
Note 54: Source: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force’s web site at http://www.ngltf.org/98cgal/laws.html. Back.
Note 55: It should be noted that this conclusion is being drawn based on our use of a middle-range theory, which does not address the ideological or psychological dimensions of cooption adequately. Back.
Note 56: See Cooper (1993) for a detailed analysis (though more skeptical) of the possibilities and limitations faced by oppositional sexual forces engaged with the state and the two-way relationship between them. Back.
Note 57: Tarrow (1999) argues that social movements stand fully outside institutionalized politics mainly in undemocracies or semidemocracies. In developed democracies, contention can be expressed through both institutional and non/anti-institutional strategies. In fact he suggests that one of the most important characteristic of contemporary social movements is “their capacity to straddle institutional and non-institutional repertoires and move back and forth between contentious and institutional politics” (Tarrow 1999: 11). Back.
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