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Russia's New Draft Military Doctrine: Context, Content and Conclusions

Stephen Blank

International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA
March 14-18, 2000



The new Russian draft military doctrine represents a radical departure from the military doctrine approved by President Yeltsin in November 1993 and contradicts many of the assumptions found in the Russian national security concept of 1997. It is inherently anti-NATO and anti-U.S. in its description of the threats facing Russia and may serve as an instrument to restore military power to Russia as it moves to re-assert its political control of the North Caucasus and to enhance its power vis-a-vis its neighbors in the same region. While the draft does not explicitly treat the grand alliance with China and India proposed by former Prime Minister Yegeniy Primakov, it leaves open the prospect of radical military-political actions to counter what its authors call the threat of monopolarism, emanating from efforts by the United State to achieve global hegemony. The on-going war for the reconquest of Chechnya provides the context for the present draft and makes very explicit the link between restoring Russian sovereignty in this region and the struggle against monopolarism. As a declaratory statement of Russian intentions, the draft justifies the prosecution of that war as an exercise in restoring national sovereignty and territorial integrity and carries with it an implicit domestic agenda that puts a premium on the restoration of order.

The draft not only confirms a continuing adherence to Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘War is a continuation of politics by other, i.e., violent means," but also reinforces a particularly Russian reading of that dictum as a necessary prerequisite for engaging in military foresight about the nature of future war. 1 At the same time the current draft recalls the epigraph of another German thinker, Karl Schmitt, the legal theorist, critic of liberalism, "conservative revolutionary," and geopolitical theorist.

War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior. 2

Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and the Rechtsstaat (law-governed state) and his championing of a Volksgemeinshaft during the Weimar Republic went hand-in-hand with the notion of defining the political as divided into "friends and enemies" and with the assumption of a permanent conflict between continental (telurocratic) and maritime (thalossacratic) power, which some Russian geo-politicians have identified as the basis for the inevitable conflict between monopolarism/globalism and multipolarism in the post-Cold War world order. 3 The draft military doctrine places the presupposition of war at the very center of Russian politics with the most profound ramifications for the Russian state and society and for Russia’s place in the international system. As Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told officers at a naval base in Russia’s Far East, "The government has undertaken to rebuild and strengthen the military might of the state to respond to new geopolitical realities, both external and internal threats." Putin pointed to events in the Caucasus, Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan creating new threats for Russia and stated that "developments in Europe, in Yugoslavia, also prompt a lot of thought." 4 With an on-going war in Chechnya, the draft military doctrine provides both a rationale for seeking a military, as opposed to political solution, with the enemy and makes the prevention of external intervention in that conflict a necessary prerequisite to the achievement of that military victory. Russia is not only embarking on a new "great game" in the south but also anticipating the militarization of that game. At least one commentator has suggested that this militarization of the struggle in the Caucasus is a direct result of a new generation of post-Soviet generals, for whom Chechnya is the compelling military-political reality. Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin is identified as the moving force behind both the campaign in the Caucasus and the draft military doctrine with its enhanced role for the General Staff in directing the preparation for and conduct of combat operations against internal and external threats. 5



There are several initial points to make about the document, "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," published in Krasnaya zvezda on 9 October 1999. First, the document is a "draft." 6 It represents the work of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, which assumed the leading role in its preparation. As General-Colonel Valeriy Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, pointed out on the eve of the publication of the doctrine, the draft, which was recently approved by the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense, was to be debated over the next month before it goes to the Security Council for approval. 7 A lively discussion of the text quickly ensued on the pages of Krasnaya zvezda under the title "We Assess the Draft Military Doctrine." 8 It is still continuing. 9 Interviews with civilian analysts critical of specific aspects of the draft have also appeared in the ministry’s newspaper. 10

For over a month that discussion has focused upon a wide range of issues and demonstrated a diversity of opinions among the commentators. The readers agree on the utility of a unified military doctrine, see the need for the appropriate coordination of Russia’s various militaries under the guiding direction of the Armed Forces, stress the need for a doctrine informed by practical military experience, and call for the forging of an appreciation of the importance of military doctrine in the rest of the state and society. In discussing the factors that led to the publication of the draft military doctrine, one commentator notes: changes in the threat environment facing Russia, including the appearance of "non-traditional, qualitatively new forms of informational, technological, and economic expansion, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the rise of international terrorism and illegal arms trade." 11 The same author also notes the high probability of imminent armed conflict within Russia in the wake of the fighting in Dagestan and Chechnya and notes the need to adapt military doctrine to fundamental changes in the state’s economic and demographic status. He stressed the need to have a doctrine that fit Russia’s economic capacity. Other commentators have raised the same issue in other forms, pointing out that, according to the sources in the Ministry of Finance, current operations in Chechnya will consume all the additional revenues by the state for this year. 12 Points of criticism of the draft have increased as the debate has continued. These specific points will be treated in the discussion of the draft’s content. It is, however, worth noting that the criticisms touch upon the three main areas of the document, i.e., the military-political situation, the military-strategic situation and the military-economic support of military security. One author points out that the defects in the current draft are of such a nature to demand a serious review and worries that there is not sufficient time for such a review before it goes to the President for approval. 13 Another commentator, General-Lieutenant Anatoliy Sidyakin, Deputy Commander of the Ural Military District, calls for greater attention to officer preparation and the development of professionalism and warns against haste in approving the draft. 14 A third critic, General-Colonel Viktor Kopylov, Russian Army (retired), calls into question the draft’s threat assessment as insufficiently vigilant for not taking into account the increased risk of nuclear war. The general put the blame for such a risk on NATO and states that the alliance had shifted from a policy of a "concealed of creeping" nature" to one of a direct approach to war, an "open phase" of "violent excess, when the end justifies any means." 15 General-Major Stepan Tyushkevich, Soviet Army (retired) and a leading military theorist, calls attention to the fact that the proposed doctrine did not take into account the most recent military experience, i.e., Operation "Desert Fox" and the air campaign over Yugoslavia where one side was able to use its advanced weaponry to engage in "no contact" warfare involving aero-space and information technology." This failure to take into account this experience, according to Tyushkevich, is a direct result of the decline in the quality of Russian military theory and military science. 16 In some of the sharpest criticism of the draft, Rear Admiral Vasiliy Gulin, Russian Navy (retired) calls into question some of the document’s most basic assumptions about Russia’s role in the world, pointing to Russia’s economic and demographic decline, its international isolation, and its reduced influence in world affairs. Gulin simply doubts the ability of Russia to oppose the emerging post-Cold War order and suggests that Russia should seek an orientation toward Europe and prepare for "serious demographic threats from the East and South." Gulin also calls into question the role of the Armed Forces in mainlining internal order and raises the prospect of the domestic police function undermining both the armed forces’ ability to deal with external aggression and to maintain solid ties with the nation it is supposed to defend. 17

Second, although work on the draft has been going on for more than two years, the draft is very much a product of recent events -- NATO’s military intervention against Yugoslavia over Kosovo and the current fighting in the North Caucasus. In this regard, the document remains a work of Russia’s accursed "transition period." Transition here implies instability and uncertainty with regard to Russian internal political, economic, and social developments and the on-going process of military reform, and to the international system. With regard to the process of military reform General-Colonel Manilov anticipates that this draft doctrine will guide the reform process to 2005, when a "qualitatively-new military organization" will appear. Manilov states that over the next decade, (2005-2015), this doctrine could continue to function subject to further revisions. 18 The present draft is actually the culmination of a process that began in late 1996 with the consideration of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, which was approved in May 1997. 19 The latest draft is the sixth. In a subsequent study devoted to the process of formulating national security policy and published in 1998, General-Colonel Manilov and his co-authors wrote that, military doctrine is a necessary component of a coherent national security policy. Indeed, they expressly identified the working out of a new military doctrine as a priority national security task and as an integral part of the process of military reform. 20 The draft military doctrine is not a product of the published national security concept. Indeed, its appearance implies a profound change in the relationship between military doctrine and Russia’s national security concept. On the relationship between the draft military doctrine and the new national security concept, General-Colonel Manilov stresses the inter-penetration of the latter by the former. Manilov notes that the logic of affairs would suggest that the national security concept be approved first, but then he states: "This [approval] could be done simultaneously. The content of the national security concept and the military doctrine are completely compatible with one another. In the M[ilitary] D[octrine] the features of the N[ational] S[ecurity] C[concept] are concretized, detailed, and reviewed in greater detail." 21

Only a few days before the publication of the draft military doctrine Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chaired a session of the Security Council where the main topic under consideration was a new draft national security concept to replace the one approved in May 1997. 22 According to those who have read this draft, the concept has not only grown leaner but also has been fundamentally changed. Whereas the earlier version spoke of internal political, economic, social, and intellectual threats, the current draft speaks specifically of internal and external military threats. Vladislav Sherstyuk, former head of FAPSI [Federal Government Communications and Information Agency] and current first deputy secretary of the Security Council, emphasizes both the need for "the necessary armed forces to conduct nuclear deterrence as well as an effective defense in conventional wars." Moreover, the national security concept would also, according to Sherstyuk, provide a justification for an increase in the defense budget. In this context, it would appear that the draft military doctrine now plays a guiding role in the formulation of Russia’s national security concept, a direct reversal of the role expected by the authors of the current national security concept in 1997. 23 Andrei Korbut in his journalist commentary on the draft notes that "for unexplained reasons [this] political document was worked out in the bowels of the Russian Ministry of Defense." 24 This is particularly important with regard to the depiction of the military-political situation confronting Russia, especially regarding the dominant tendencies within the international system and the nature of national strategic leadership. The prominence of the military on military-political issues raises serious issues regarding the system of civilian control of the military in Russia.

The fact that the draft military doctrine appeared at a time when the post of Secretary to the Security Council stood open, i.e., after Putin’s appointment as Prime Minister in September and before the President’s announcement of the appointment of his successor as secretary, Sergey Ivanov, until then deputy director of the Federal Security Service, on 16 November, suggests the administrative vacuum in which the draft made its appearance. 25 Thus, it fell to Manilov and the Defense Ministry to lead the debate on the draft, even though the issues raised in the document went well beyond the sphere and competence of the Defense Ministry alone.

Indeed, Russian civilian analysts have raised serious concern over civil-military relations since the "dash" to Pristina in June. 26 A number of Russian commentators have expressed this concern in the aftermath of the renewed hostilities in Dagestan and Chechnya. While the armed forces are charged with articulating the military-technical means to counter external aggression, the idea that they would define the military-political environment and threats flies in the face of effective civilian control. As Andrei Kokoshin, former First deputy Minister of Defense and Secretary of the Security Council, has observed, "The army is an instrument of policy and of state policy since the army is a state institution." 27 To have the armed forces define the external and internal threats to the state raises serious questions with regard to its subordination to its civilian masters. Recent statements by senior officers and field commanders about the course and conduct of the current war in the Caucasus provide a disturbing context to the draft. These explicit warnings about dire consequences, i.e., mass resignations and even civil war, if the Russian politicians should once again "betray" those fighting by seeking a negotiated settlement with "bandits and terrorists," raise serious concern precisely in the area of civil-military relations. 28 At present the Putin government and President Yeltsin seem to see the successful culmination of conflict in Chechnya as a political end that has international and internal value which justifies the application of most extreme measures and does not acknowledge the grave risk that the militarization of foreign and domestic policy hold for Russia itself. But there are very serious tensions between the military and local authorities in the areas adjoining Chechnya. President Ruslan Aushev of Ingushetia recently questioned the conduct of Russian forces on the Chechen-Ingushetia border. 29 Defense analyst Pavel Falgenhauer has pointed out the grave risks associated with the current war in Chechnya and given a particularly ominous interpretation to the current political context.

Why has the Russian government sent its army into Chechnya at totally the wrong time of year without a single attempt to begin negotiations? Maybe the main target of the present operation is not Chechnya? An army of war criminals could help to insure the continuous hold on power in Russia of the present ruling kleptocracy, despite any elections and public dissatisfaction. The Kremlin may be using Milosevic as a model. 30

Such a policy would not only put at risk Russia’s political stability but would also have grave repercussions internationally, leading to its renewed isolation and a revival of military confrontation in the Caucasus and beyond.

At least one prominent retired military officer acknowledges this risk. General Makhmut A. Gareev, former Head of the Military-Scientific Directorate of the General Staff and President of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, in a recent speech to the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, a prestigious non-governmental think tank, warned of "insufficient provision with non-military means," calling it "the weakest element in Russia’s security system." Gareev recommended that Russia "avoid confrontations with the West and the East." 31 Given the military-political situation described in the draft military doctrine and the risks associated with the current conduct of operations in Chechnya, it is very difficult to see how such a confrontation can be avoided.

The international system depicted in the draft military doctrine is in a state of tension between mono-polarity and multi-polarity, i.e., between the achievement of global hegemony by the United States and its allies with the marginalization of Russia and the emergence of a multi-polar system in which Russia would retain the role of a leading great power in a system dominated by a network of regional powers operating in a balance of power system. 32 This point is of sufficient importance to be repeated in the draft’s conclusion:

The Russian Federation affirms the strictly defensive direction of its activities for ensuring military security; its fundamental adherence to goals of preventing wars and armed conflicts and eliminating them from the life of mankind, of comprehensive disarmament, and of eliminating military blocs; and its resolve to achieve the creation of regional systems and a global system of general and comprehensive security and the formation of a balanced, equitable, multipolar world.

As Aleksandr Golts, the lead military correspondent for Itogi magazine, has suggested, the draft marks a clear shift in Russia’s strategic posture: "Russia gears up for a cold peace." 34

In both its domestic and international context, the current document invites comparison with the military doctrine of the Russian Federation approved in November 1993. 35 In spite of the radical content of recent developments in Russia’s security situation and the international environment, the present effort represents a much more premeditated and considered policy line than that of the military doctrine approved in November 1993. That document appeared in the wake of a prolonged internal political struggle which culminated in the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament and the storming of the White House in October of that year. It appeared at a time when a strategic partnership with the United States was still perceived as a viable proposition and before NATO had embarked upon its enlargement process. In the aftermath of NATO’s military intervention against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia over Kosovo, the draft military doctrine implicitly makes the limitation on NATO’s ability to intervene "out-of-area" a top priority of Russian military policy. In this regard, the old theme of splitting the West has appeared as a salient feature of the draft military doctrine. The political instrument of this campaign is the assertion of the primacy of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The venues of this campaign will be the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and Russia’s bilateral relations. 36 Yet, the continuation of the fighting in Chechnya and the rising tide of refugees and civilian casualties is very likely to leave Russia to face an aroused and hostile public opinion across the Atlantic and European communities.

Third, the current draft military doctrine has a long pedigree. The need for a unified military doctrine was acknowledged in the wake of Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Russian military theorists concluded that military doctrine was a necessary component of national strategy and planning for modern war. Military doctrine became an integral part and subject of debate in Soviet military theory. The Communist Party and the Soviet state defined the military-political conditions for the articulation of national strategy. The military in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff developed the appropriate military-technical responses to these political factors in the form of force structure, training, mobilization, military art, planning, and the conduct of military operations. Integration of the national economy into military doctrine assumed capital importance for it provided the sinews of war and undertook the development of news means of war. One of the first acts of the newly-created Russian Ministry of Defense in 1992 was the initiation of the discussion on a new military doctrine, which culminated in the document of November 1993. The Yeltsin Constitution of December 1993 requires that the Russian Federation have a military doctrine. Military doctrine [doktrina voyennaya] was defined and its importance affirmed in the multi-volume Military Encyclopedia, which began to appear in the mid-1990s. In 1995 the authors, however, stressed the growing similarity of national military doctrines with the end of the Cold War and the growing climate of partnership and cooperation. 37 Rumors about the publication of a new draft military doctrine began after the 1997 publication of Russia’s national security concept, but the current draft does not echo the assumption of that concept but represents a sharp break that reflects a greater emphasis on external and internal military threats, reflecting the present constellation of international and domestic events in the wake of Kosovo and renewed fighting in Chechnya. As Sergey Rogov, the Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, notes, the draft military doctrine is a declaratory document aimed at both domestic and international audiences. 38

Finally, it is in this context that confusion over the exact meaning of declaratory principles can have profound internal and external consequences for Russia. The response of foreign journalists and analysts to the draft military doctrine have been diverse, shifted over time, and been connected with the War in Chechnya and other military developments. CNN stated that the draft military doctrine in its presentation of the threat represented a focus on Kosovo and not the Caucasus. 39 The Jamestown Foundation Monitor placed the doctrine in the context of a revival of an anti-Western foreign policy in Moscow and the militarization of that policy which reminded the readers of the Cold War. 40 Giles Whittell, The Times correspondent in Moscow, depicted the draft as both a confirmation of the centrality of nuclear forces for Russia and the willingness of the Russian government to engage in first-use. 41 Chinese reports on the draft military doctrine, quoting General-Colonel Manilov, emphasized nuclear first use, 42 and the anti-Western tone of the doctrine’s struggle against monopolarity. 43 Closer to Moscow, Heorhiy Kryuchkov, The Chairman of the Rada’s Committee on National Security and Defense and a deputy from the Ukrainian Communist Party, declared that he did not see in Russia’s draft military doctrine "any threat to Ukraine." 44 This is a position in keeping with his party’s desire for the re-establishment of the Soviet Union and its strong objections to NATO’s armed intervention over Kosovo.



Given this context, the analysis of the draft military doctrine should be detailed and exact. The current draft military doctrine is composed of an introduction and three main sections -- Military-Political Foundations, Military-Strategic Foundations, and Military-Economic Support of Military Security. Each of these sections will be briefly analyzed as to their content and implications for Russian military strategy and national security policy.

Military-Political Foundations

The military-political foundations section of the draft military doctrine is quite extensive and contains twenty-nine distinct sections, covering a wide range of topics. 45 As noted in the introduction, military-political assumptions about the nature of the international system, the priority of Russian national interests, the threat environment, and the likelihood of armed conflict "determine the other parts of military doctrine," i.e., the military-strategic assumptions and military economic support of military The core assumption of the military-political situation is the tension between the tendency towards global hegemony in the policies of the United States and those supporting the emergence of a multi-polar environment, based upon a balance among regional powers. In this regard, the draft military doctrine is clear proof that, in spite of Prime Minister Primakov’s dismissal in May, his championship of a Russian foreign policy, based upon a gathering of strength, recuelliement [sosreditochnenie], remains the dominant direction of that policy. 46 The dominant assumption of Russian foreign policy is "that social progress, stability and international security can be insured only within the framework of a multi-polar world and it [Russia] will assist in its formation in every possible way." 47

The draft does enumerate a number of factors shaping Russia’s national security environment. It notes that the reduced risk of the outbreak of "world war, including nuclear war;." calls attention to the "development of the machinery for maintaining international peace and security on a global and regional level," addresses "the formation and strengthening of regional centers of power, and identifies threats arising from "ethno-national and religious extremism," "separatism," "the escalation of local wars and armed conflicts," intensification of regional arms races, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, "the exacerbation of information conflict" [protivoborstvo], and "the expansion and deepening of the transnational nature of organized crime, terrorism, and illegal trafficking in arms and narcotics." 48 Ivan Yegorov concludes that the center of gravity of the draft military doctrine is the preparation and conduct of local wars. 49 It provides an outline of methods that would allow Russia to conduct such wars in the defense of its vital interests and preclude the intervention of other powers or coalitions in such conflicts.

While the draft does not identify the United States and NATO as military threats to Russia, it does specify a series of developments that contribute to the de-stabilization of the military-political situation confronting Russia. Some of these relate directly to the risks of conflict on Russia’s own periphery. Others concern the fundamental stability of the international system and Russia’s position in it. Many of these factors relate directly to recent events in Yugoslavia. These include: support for ethno-national, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements; the employment of information and other, non-traditional means and techniques to the pursuit of "military-political goals;" the diminished effectiveness of the existing machinery for maintaining international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE; the use of force in circumvention of the recognized rules and principles of international law without the approval of the UN Security Council; violation of arms control and disarmament agreements; and basic threats to military security. 50

The heart of any military doctrine is the explicit threat environment confronting the state. The draft enumerates both external and internal threats and discusses both their intensity and imminence. Among the external threats the emphasis is upon both traditional state concerns and new threats arising out of the new international environment and technological developments. Of particular importance are those threats that arise from stability on Russia’s periphery, where conflict is already underway, and the threat of external intervention against Russia. These threats are linked to new, technologically-conditioned threats associated with information operations in the broadest sense of the term. Primary attention goes to: territorial claims against Russia; external intervention in Russia’s internal affairs; attempts to isolate Russia and reduce its role as a regional power center in a multi-polar world; the outbreak of conflicts on Russia’s periphery that threaten Russia and its allies; military concentrations on the land and maritime frontiers of Russia and its allies that upset the existing balance of forces; the expansion of military blocs and alliances at the expense of Russia and its allies; the introduction of foreign troops, without a UN Security Council mandate, into territory adjacent to the Russia and states friendly to Russia; the outfitting, support, and training of armed formations in foreign states with the intention of supporting their operations within Russia and the territory of its allies; armed attacks and provocations against Russian military facilities by such forces; information operations that hinder the operation of Russian national command authority; the military command and control system, nuclear command and control complex, early-warning system, strategic defense, and space surveillance, nuclear storage facilities, nuclear facilities, and the nuclear and chemical industries; psychological-informational operations directed against Russia; discrimination against and suppression of the rights of Russian citizens abroad; and international terrorism. 51

The presentation of internal threats focuses on developments associated with the outbreak of renewed fighting in the North Caucasus. These threats include attempts to overthrow "the constitutional system," the illegal actions of ethno-national, religious, and separatist groups seeking to disrupt the state’s unity and territorial integrity, actions aimed against the state structures, national economy, and information infrastructure; the raising of illegal armed formations; the proliferation of weapons, munitions, and explosives that can be used for terrorist and other unlawful purposes; and the growth of organized crime, terrorism, and smuggling on a scale that threatens the military security of the Russian state. 52

The draft addresses military security as "a most important direction of state activity," outlines the principles upon which the Russian Federation conducts it security policy and outlines the basic principles for ensuring military security. Most of the principles are declaratory in nature and stress Russia’s commitment to international agreements and the fulfillment of arms control treaties, its intent not to initiate hostilities, its maintenance of a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter aggression, and its commitment to a collective security for the Commonwealth of Independent States. The draft also declares that Russia will continue to champion nuclear non-proliferation, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and work toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons 53 . Under basic principles to ensure military security, the draft calls for "firm, centralized direction of the states military organization with civilian control over its activities." It speaks of the need for effective forecasting, timely discovery, and classification of military threats in order to ensure an adequate response. The watchwords on the structure of the armed forces are effectiveness and rational utilization of forces and means. Readiness and training of the armed forces are to be kept at a level to provide military security without being detrimental to international security and the security of other nations. 54

The draft military doctrine defines the tasks that are to be executed to maintain such security in peacetime and during a pre-war [threatening] period and in the initial period of war. Peacetime tasks are those associated with supporting Russian national interests. These tasks include deterrence of aggression and military deployment and naval presence in support of Russian interests. Of particular note are the sections devoted to the support, improvement, and readiness of the armed forces and other components of the state’s military organization. The emphasis is upon qualitative transformation of the force, including the modernization of the military-industrial complex and the increase in the "mobilization readiness of the economy." 55

In keeping with long-established Soviet military theory, much attention is devoted to the transition from peace to war and to the tasks involved in the initial period of war, which is considered decisive in determining the course and outcome of a future conflict. The tasks associated with a pre-war [threatening] period and the initial period of war provide for a shifting of the armed forces, state, society, and economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing. These measures, which include a timely declaration of war, address both domestic mobilization and international preparations. The draft specifies suspending arms control treaties and the organization and conduct of "armed, political-diplomatic, informational, economic and other kinds of warfare on a coordinated basis." 56 It looks to the mobilization of Russia’s allies and to the prevention of other states joining a coalition intent upon aggression against Russia. In the initial period of war, Russia will seek to mobilize the capabilities of the UN and other international organizations to compel the aggressor to terminate hostilities "at the earliest stage" and "to restore international stability, security and peace." 57

The draft also recognizes the growing capabilities of states, using improvement in the "means, forms, and methods" of armed struggle" [vooruzhennaya bor’ba], i.e., military operations other than war, "to achieve military-goals by indirect, non-contact actions." These capabilities, associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs, pose a "special danger of modern wars to peoples, states, and international stability in the world" and "dictate the vital necessity of taking exhaustive steps for their prevention and for peaceful settlement of contradictions at early stages of the appearance and development" 58 The draft implies here that there is a serious risk of uncontrolled escalation involved in such use of force, which could turn an indirect conflict into direct confrontation and local war. General Gareev made the relevance of B. H. Liddell-Hart’s "indirect approach" to post-Cold War armed conflict, one of his central observations regarding the contours of future armed conflict. 59 Indeed, Gareev has noted that the authors of the current draft military doctrine in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff "have started to listen more to their [military theorists’] opinion and this has been reflected in a new [draft] military doctrine . . . ." 60

The remaining items of the section on military-political foundations in military doctrine address national leadership in the area of military security, command and control arrangement, state military organization, and organizational development and training. These items delineate the roles of the President, the government, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the other power ministries, the military districts/strategic directions, and the commanders and the "unified command and control entities to direct coalition forces. Of particular interest is the draft’s presentation of the roles of the President and the government. The President is the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces. However, the draft states that the government [pravitel’stvo], i.e., the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, "directs the activity of the subordinate federal executive authorities . . . ." 61 This arrangement, as Andrei Korbut has pointed out, flies in the face of both the Constitution and the Law on Defense, which states that the government "executes measures relating to support of the country’s defense according to the "powers defined by laws and the President’s decrees." 62 Since the draft military doctrine must be signed by President Yeltsin to go into effect, it will be interesting to see if this provision survives. As it stands, the draft seems ex post facto to place upon Prime Minister Putin direct responsibility for Russian military policy in the midst of an on-going war in the Caucasus. It reflects the existing division of executive authority between the President and the Prime Minister as it has emerged over the last several months.

In 1993 Russia’s military doctrine explicitly abandoned the pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The draft military doctrine returns to this topic and contains an extended discussion of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and use. Should deterrence of aggression fail, the doctrine states that Russia will use nuclear weapons to inflict sufficient damage upon an aggressor or coalition of aggressors. Russia pledges not to use nuclear weapons against states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons. This pledge, however, is qualified in the case of a direct invasion of Russia, an attack upon the Russian Armed Forces or other troops, an attack upon an allied state that does not possess nuclear weapons, or an attack upon a nuclear state that is allied with Russia. The draft specifies that Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons to counter the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against Russia and to counter large-scale aggression by conventional forces in "situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies." 63

The final section of the draft on the military-political section stresses the importance of military reform and identifies the drivers that will determine "the basic content of comprehensive military reform: radical changes in the military-political situation, the content of missions, and the conditions for ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation." Military reform is described as a priority mission and embraces both the reform of the Armed Forces and other components of the state military organization. The draft does not, however, stipulate how such integrated and coordinated reform will take place.


Military-Strategic Principles — The Nature of Wars and Armed Conflicts

While this section pledges that Russia maintains its military exclusively to counter aggression and to protect the independence, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity of Russia, i.e., to ensure the military security of Russia and its allies, the content of the section explicitly treats the changing nature of war and armed conflict by their goals, means, and the scale of military operations. The draft outlines a theory of just and unjust wars [aggressors vs. those repelling aggression], means [wars involving the use of weapons of mass destruction and wars involving conventional weapons], and scale [local, regional and world]. 64

In describing the basic features of modern/contemporary [sovremennaya] war the draft speaks of its extension to all spheres of human activity and existence and outlines the broad use of "indirect strategic actions" which include political-military efforts to prevent wars and armed conflicts; economic sanctions; information warfare; and sea, air and land blockades of lines of communication. The draft also addresses "massive information preparation (information blockade, expansion, aggression)" and efforts to confuse and misinform the public opinion of certain states and world community at large. 65 The draft then turns to the actual conduct of military operations and these are seen as dominated by the systems that have emerged as part of the Revolution of Military Affairs: disorganization of national and military command and control systems; the disruption of combat command and control and fire control systems; the use of long-range fire and electronic engagement; the employment of the most advanced weapons systems, "including those based on new physical principles;" disastrous consequences of strikes against nuclear power, chemical, and other "dangerous" industries, the transportation and communication infrastructure, and those systems vital to life support. The involvement of irregular paramilitary units, in addition to regular troops, will be a feature of such armed conflicts and wars.

The draft speaks of the high-probability of the escalation and expansion of such conflicts. "A world war can result from the expansion of an armed conflict, local, or regional war." 66 It would be very likely that a world war that began as a conventional war would escalate into a nuclear conflict. Such expansion and escalation would lead to a total war in terms of both political objectives and national mobilization. Thus, prevention of the escalation and expansion of armed conflicts and local wars has replaced the notion of war prevention in general.

In describing military operations in a conventional regional war, the draft identifies certain key aspects. These include: "the decisiveness of the opposing sides’ operational-strategic goals; warfare in all spheres; coalition warfare; massive use of precision weapons and radio-electronic warfare and other modern types of warfare; the destruction of forces, logistics, economic infrastructure, and lines of communication throughout the territory of the opposing sides; and a strategic air operation which can determine the course and outcome of the war." 67 In the case of the involvement of nuclear powers such local wars will carry with them the "constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons." Regional wars, because of the importance of the military-political goals attached to their conduct, will demand "total strategic deployment of the armed forces," the mobilization of the national economy, and "high exertion" of the national will.

In both a world and regional war the strategic goals can be achieved in the initial period of war. Key operations during the initial period of war will be repelling aggression, regaining the strategic initiative, preserving stable state and military command and control, the achievement of information superiority and gaining or retaining air superiority. World and regional wars can be protracted and involve subsequent and concluding periods. Local wars will be waged by forced deployed in theater but can require the regrouping of forces and, if necessary, redeployment from other axes and a partial strategic deployment. 68

In local wars the opposing sides will pursue limited military-political objectives. The characteristic features of local wars will be: the limited involvement of the opposing sides’ forces and assets; the confinement of military operations to the territories of the belligerents, the non-linear nature of combat actions, and intensive information warfare. 69

The draft describes armed conflicts as arising from attempts to resolve ethno-national, religious, and "other non-vital contradictions" by use of armed actions. Such conflicts will not, as a rule, require strategic deployment. Such conflicts can arise as a result of "armed incidents, actions, and other armed clashes of a limited scale." Border clashes are treated as "a special form of armed conflict." Armed conflicts can be international, involving two or more states, or internal, i.e., confined within the territory of one state. In armed conflicts the opposing sides pursue "local military-political objectives." The draft characterizes armed conflicts by the following features: high involvement and vulnerability of the local population; the employment of irregular forces; wide use of sabotage and terrorist actions; the blocking and disruption of lines of communication; the psychologically and morally difficult circumstances confronting the troops; the dispersal of troops to provide route security and to protect troop dispositions; and the risk of the transformation of the armed conflict into a local war or civil war. 70 The draft provides for the creation of "temporary unified formations" of troops from various ministries and entities in order to provide a system of command and control in the conduct of operations during an internal armed conflict.

Turning to the "principles" covering the employment of the armed forces and other troops, the draft military doctrine affirms the legitimacy of Ňthe use of all forces and assets at its disposal, including nuclear by the Russian Federation. It expressly identifies three functions: 1) to counter external aggression, 2) to contain and neutralize anti-constitutional actions and unlawful armed violence that threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity and state unity, and 3) to conduct peacekeeping operations Ňin accordance with UN Security Council decisions and international obligations of the Russian Federation. The draft also speaks of a proportionality of military response in keeping to "the nature and scale of the military threat confronting Russia. 71 The draft further outlines the goals which the armed forces and other troops are to achieve across the spectrum of conflict. In the case of general and regional war these goals include the ability "to repel an attack, inflict damage on the aggressor, and conduct active operations, both defensive as well as offensive, with any variation of the initiation and conduct of wars and armed conflicts and under conditions of massive enemy use of modern and advanced weapons, including weapons of mass destruction in all their varieties." 72 The draft specifically states that Russia’s standing forces should be able to protect the country from aerospace attack, perform those missions necessary to repel aggression in a local war (armed conflict), and in a regional war with the deployment of additional forces to perform missions. Standing forces are also to provide the means for Ňpeacekeeping activities both independently as well as in the makeup of international organizations. 73 The draft also provides for the deployment of Russian forces abroad Ňin strategically important regions of the world with the purpose of Ňforming and maintaining a stable military-strategic balance of forces, and react adequately to the appearance of crisis situations in their initial stage. 74

Under the title of "Missions of Armed Forces and Other Troops" the draft outlines those basic activities which staffs and troops are to perform to provide military security. These include identification of developing threats and the preparation of armed attacks upon Russia and its allies, the preparation, training and mobilization of forces, procurement of necessary equipment and supplies, and strategic deployment. The draft differentiates between the missions to be performed by strategic nuclear forces and command and control systems to Ňguarantee the infliction of intended damage on an aggressor under any situation conditions and those by conventional forces to counter Ňaggression on a local scale. Much of the rest of this section provides an enumeration of the specific missions of armed forces and other troops (internal troops, border guards, security forces, etc.). The draft specifies a set of tasks to be performed in the case of armed aggression against the Russian Federation and designates these tasks "total strategic deployment. This section outlines the conduct of strategic operations to counter aggression and provides for Ňthe readiness for employment and the employment of the potential of nuclear deterrence 75 . Given the emphasis upon the use of nuclear weapons in a wide range of situations, this reference to deterrence clearly suggests that such actions are connected with war fighting and escalation domination.

After a short section devoted to peacekeeping missions and their conduct, the draft turns to the missions of the armed forces and other troops in internal conflicts. The primary task is: ŇEliminate unlawful armed units, bandit and terrorist groups and organizations, and their bases, training centers, depots and lines of communication. 76 The objectives of such operations are to re-establish law and order, prevent the spread of the conflict to adjoining regions, and facilitate the disarming of the population in the zone of conflict. Finally, the draft states that the armed forces and other troops may be employed to Ňassist bodies of state authority, institutions of local government and the population in relief operations following accidents, disasters and natural disasters. 77 What is quite new here is the clear articulation of the role of the armed forces in conducting internal combat missions. While the military doctrine approved in 1993 provided for such activities, the role for the armed forces was defined as supporting other forces, primarily the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in such actions. Moreover, such actions were defined and limited by the need for the President to impose a Ňmartial law situation with regard to the affected region. This document places the responsibility for conducting such operations (as are now under way) explicitly with the Ministry of Defense and under the direction of the General Staff.

The section ends with a discussion of the rationale for creating troop formations [strategic directions/military districts] within the Russian Federation. Primary consideration is given to: 1) potential military danger on specific strategic axes; 2) the relations of the Russian Federation with contiguous states; 3) industrial areas, areas of strategic resources and especially important installations vital to the Russian federation; 4) strategic deployment on threatened axes with a maximum decrease in the volume of movements, as well as interregional manoeuver; 5) the timely withdrawal of troops (forces) and logistic and technical support reserves from under probable missile/air strikes; 6) billeting and support to vital activities of troops and for resolving social and everyday problems; 7) status of a base for mobilization deployment; and 8) the socio-political situation in specific regions. 78 This set of priorities provides for a distinct differentiation of military threats on various axes, emphasizes the creation of forces to provide regional stability without strategic deployments, and plays down the role of general mobilization capabilities in keeping with the draft’s attention to internal conflicts, local wars, and regional hostilities.

The final articles of the section on military-strategic principles discuss the preparation of the country for hostilities. These include: operational preparation of the country, the establishment and development of the state's military infrastructure to support strategic deployment, the training of citizens for military service and the accumulation of the necessary number of militarily trained reserves, and the training of the population for territorial and civil defense both in peacetime as well as wartime. 79 The article on military-economic infrastructure specifically provides for the creation and maintenance of a state reserve and mobilization reserves to sustain combat operations in the initial period of war and longer in the case of certain kinds of supplies.


Military Economic Principles

Having introduced military-economic preparations in the preceding part of the draft, the text turns to the main goal of military-economic support, which is Ňthe financial and material support to the state's military organization and its equipment with effective armament systems, military and special equipment, property, and other materiel resources in quantities necessary for assurance of the Russian Federation's military security. 80 The draft discusses in outline the basic tasks of military-economic support, enumerates the top priority tasks, defines the basic principles of state policy, and articulates the basic principles covering the state management of the military-industrial complex. The primary military-economic task is to provide the necessary financial and materiel resources to ensure the military security of the state. This involves both maintenance of the scientific and technical, technological and production base of the military and the social support of the state's military organization and the level of everyday material conditions of servicemen's vital activities." 81 The draft devotes specific attention to the procurement of advanced weapon systems and identifies key areas of research and development. These include: mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops and a quality upgrade of the strategic arms complex. The draft identifies specific areas of technological improvement connected with the Russian military’s understanding of the revolution in military affairs. These include: "highly-effective systems of command and control of forces and weapons, communications, intelligence, strategic warning, radio-electronic combat, and precision, mobile non-nuclear means of destruction, as well as systems of information support." 82 The draft also calls for the simplification of the armed forces’ equipment park through "the unification, standardization and reduction of the types and classes of weapons and equipment." It concludes with a promise that the "improvement of the standard of living and the implementation of the social guarantees prescribed by legislation for servicemen and their families are a state priority.

These priorities are to be met by a linguistic slight of hand, a reordering of the relationship between state means and military requirements so that the later determine the former. The resources that the state is to provide will not only furnish Ňthe financial, logistic and intellectual resources necessary to perform the key missions of ensuring military security but will also ensure to Russia Ňtechnical, technological, information and resource independence in the development and production of basic kinds of military products. How such military autarky is to be achieved under the current economic system and fiscal circumstances remains unclear. The modest increase of industrial production over the last year and the increased revenues from taxes as a result of increased energy exports are hardly sufficient to this task, especially against the backdrop of increased operational costs associated with the prosecution of a protracted war in the Caucasus.

The draft does discuss a set of priorities covering the state’s management of the military-industrial complex that would, taken together, create a hot house of protection for defense enterprises. These measures, which include downsizing of selected enterprises, would guarantee fixed prices for products, support the maintenance of a national research and development capacity, guarantee patent and other legal protection to enterprises, sustain a skilled labor force in the defense sector, and underwrite the formation of state materiel reserves. As to the resources to support these benefits, the draft re-affirms the utility of foreign sales and speaks of "international production cooperation and military-technical cooperation" and "the export of science-intensive military and civilian products of enterprises of the defense industrial complex. The concluding section of the draft doctrine’s discussion of military-economic support addresses "international military and military-technical cooperation" precisely in terms of the benefits that the Russian Federation can derive from arms sales to support this allocation of resources to the military-industrial complex. 83 This solution, however, seems inadequate to the stated task and leaves this reader with the conclusion that the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff are seeking nothing less than a return to a command economy, where military security takes precedent over economic development, privatization, and marketization. Indeed, in the concluding discussion of the mobilization preparation of the economy this bias toward a command economy is most explicit. In order to make the transformation to a wartime economy the state will undertake in peace time a set of measures that guarantee an all-embracing system of state management throughout the national economy to ensure its stable functioning "in a period of transition to operation under conditions of wartime and in wartime." 84



The draft military doctrine all but names NATO and the United States as the primary military threats to Russia. The doctrine goes well beyond the foreign policy line set by Yevgeny Primakov when he was Foreign Minister and replaces a pro-active policy of maneuver with military measures as the necessary response to the threat of mono-polarity to Russia. It is a doctrine of a pre-war period of heightened tensions and anticipated armed conflicts. As a declaratory statement, the draft affirms Russia’s commitment to defend its vital national interests in internal conflicts and local wars, while providing military-technical mechanisms to preclude the escalation of such conflicts into regional wars or a world war. The implied threat in these cases is the armed intervention of the United States and NATO in those local conflicts on the model of the intervention against Yugoslavia over Kosovo. As the new draft sees the relationship between Russia and NATO, Yugoslavia ended any prospect of a cooperative partnership and moved the relationship to one of open competition in which Russian interests must be protected by military means. This involves a fundamental shift from the position laid out in the military doctrine approved in 1993. The fact that the draft was published before it was approved by the President via the Security Council leads Russian commentators to see the draft as a political gambit designed to assure that the military gets what it wants in terms of foreign and domestic policy and is ensured the lion’s share of national resources. The current operations in Chechnya provide the basic context of the draft. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff are firmly committed to achieving military victory in that theater as a necessary precondition for the establishment of Russia’s position as a great power internationally and for the imposition of law and order within Russia itself. The government of Prime Minister Putin is riding success in Chechnya in the hope of securing electoral success in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. By itself declaratory doctrine is not grounds for seeing a fundamental shift in Russia’s relationship with the West. But taken in connection with renewed military actions that speak of confrontation with the West and the decision to rely exclusively upon military power as the solution to Russia’s crisis in the North Caucasus, the declaratory doctrine raises the issue of a basic review of Western policy towards Russia.



Note 1: In his introductory essay to the republication of the 1937 Russian edition of On War, General of the Army V. N. Lobov, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, enumerates three key contributions of Clausewitz’s book: as a contribution to the theory of war, as an investigation of the relationship between politics and war, and as source for thinking about "planning and the forecasting of the development of events in the military-political sphere." See: V. N. Lobov, "Karl Klauzevits: Zhizn. Idei. Sovremennoe znachenie," in: K. Klauzevits, O voyne. trans. by A. Rachinsky (Moscow: Logos & Nauka, [1997]). Back.

Note 2: Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political trans. and intro. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 34.Back.

Note 3: Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskie budushchee Rossii (Moscow: "Arktogeya," 1997), pp. 74-81. Back.

Note 4: "Russian premier vows to rebuild military might," (Valdivostok, Russia) Reuters, (28 October 1999). Back.

Note 5: Evgeniy Krutikov, "General chechenskoy voyny," Izvestiya, (24 November 1999). Back.

Note 6: "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, (9 October 1999), p. 3. Russian titles cited here are from: Back.

Note 7: Oleg Falichev, "General-polkovnik Valeriy Manilov: Novaya Voyennaya doktrina - adekvatnyy otvet na vyzov vremeni,"Krasnaya zvezda, (8 October 1999). Back.

Note 8: "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. Prioritety voyennogo stroitel’stva," Krasnaya zvezda, (13 October 1999). Back.

Note 9: Anatoliy Sidyakin, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. V takom dele nel’zya speshit’," Krasnaya zvezda, (19 November 1999). Back.

Note 10: Vadim Markushin, "Neobkhodimost’ v takom dokumente davno nazrela," Krasnaya zvezda, (29 November 1999). Back.

Note 11: V. Chugunov,"Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. S uchetom vozmoshnostey strany," Krasnaya zvezda, (19 October 1999). Back.

Note 12: Aleksandr Kondrashov, "GORYACHAYA TOCHKA. Tsena voyny," Argumenty i fakty, (20 October 1999). Back.

Note 13: Sergey Chinennyy, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. Utochnit’ soderzhanie po tselyam i zadacham," Krasnaya zvezda, (13 November 1999). Back.

Note 14: Sidyakin, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. V takom dele nel’zya speshit’," Krasnaya zvezda, (19 November 1999). Back.

Note 15: Viktor Kopylov, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. Otvetstvennost’ dolzhna byt’ konkretnoy," Krasnaya zvezda, (16 November 1999). Back.

Note 16: Stepan Tyushkevich, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. Tol’ko na nauchnoy osnove," Krasnaya zvezda, (23 November 1999). Back.

Note 17: Vasiliy Gulin, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voyennoy doktriny. Prochny li basovye osnovy?" Krasnaya zvezda, (26 November 1999).Back.

Note 18: Vitaliy Dzhibuti, "U Rossii vot-vot poyavitsya novaya Voyennaya doktrina. Pervyy zamestitel’ nachal’nika Genshtaba general-polkovnik Valeriy Manilov," Interfaks AIF, (14 October 1999). Back.

Note 19: Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, "Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii," (Moscow, 1997). See also: "U Rossii kontseptsiya national’noy bezopasnosti," Rossiyskie vesti, (13 May 19997). Back.

Note 20: M. I. Abdurakhmanov, V. A. Barishpolets, V. L. Manilov, and V. S. Pirumov, Osnovy natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossii, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo "Druza," 1998), p. 191. Back.

Note 21: Mukhin, "Shestoy variant," Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, (29 October 1999). Back.

Note 22: Il’ya Bulavinov, "Kontseptsiya izmenilas’," Kommersant-Daily, (6 October 1999). Back.

Note 23: Ibid.. Back.

Note 24: Andrei Korbut, "Proekt voyennoy doktriny mestami podmenyaet konstitutsiyu," Nezavisimaya gazeta, (13 October 1999). Back.

Note 25: "Peremeny v Sovbeze," Rossiyskaya gazeta, (16 November 1999) Back.

Note 26: "Kosovo i kontrol’ nad vooruzhennymi silami," Voyennyy vestnik No. 5 (Moscow: Mezhregional’nyy Fond infomatsionnykh tekhnologii, 1999), pp. 1-34.Back.

Note 27: This is a point made in Andrei Kokoshin’s examination of the problem of politization of the Soviet Armed Forces. See: Andrei Kokoshin, Armiya i politika: Sovetskaya voyenno-politicheskaya i voyenno-strategicheskaya mysl’, 1918-1991 gody, (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1995), pp. 257-258. Back.

Note 28: "Increasing Tension between Russian Military and Civilian Leadership over Chechnya," Jamestown Foundation Monitor (4 November 1999). Back.

Note 29: Ibid.. Back.

Note 30: Pavel Falgenhauer, "DEFENSE DOSSIER: Is Victory Really the Goal?" Moscow Times, (4 November 1999).Back.

Note 31: "Russia May Adopt a New Military Doctrine," Moscow, Itar-Tass, (25 October 1999). Back.

Note 32: "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii,"Krasnaya zvezda, (9 October 1999). Back.

Note 33: Ibid.. Back.

Note 34: Aleksandr Golts, "Against a Familiar Enemy," The Russian Journal, No. 34 (18 October 1999). Back.

Note 35: Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, Sovet Bezopasnosti, "Osnovnye polozheniya voyennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii," (Moscow, 1993). Back.

Note 36: "Russia May Adopt a New Military Doctrine," Moscow, Itar-Tass, (25 October 1999). Back.

Note 37: Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, Ministerstvo Oborony i Institut Voyennoy Istorii, Voyennaya Entsiklopediya v vos’mi tomakh, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1995), III, pp. 101-107. Back.

Note 38: Vadim Markushin, "Neobkhodimost’ v takom dokumente davno nazrela," Krasnaya zvezda, (29 October 1999). Back.

Note 39: CNN News Day, (15 October 1999). Back.

Note 40: "Russian Military Draws Criticism from the West," Jamestown Foundation Monitor (14 Octboer 1999). Back.

Note 41: Giles Whittell, "Russia Test Fires A Topol Missile; Russia Dusts Off Nuclear Plan; Chechen President Defiant To Russian Threat" FBIS MS1410133599, London, The Times (Internet version) (14 October 1999). Back.

Note 42: "Russian Doctrine Allows First Use of Nukes," FBIS: OW1710092499, Beijing, Xinhau, (17 October 1999) Back.

Note 43: "Russia Military Doctrine Rejects Western Dominance," FBIS: OW2010155999, Beijing, Xinhua, (20 October 1999) Back.

Note 44: "Ukrainian Deputy: Russian Military Doctrine Not Threat," FBIS: LD1410155099, Kiev, UNIAN, 1700 GMT, (13 October 1999). Back.

Note 45: "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, (9 October 1999), p. 3. Back.

Note 46: Yevgeny Primakov, ŇRussia in World Politics: A Lecture in Honor of Chancellor Gorchakov, International Affairs, 44, no. 3 (1998), pp. 7-12. Back.

Note 47: "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, (9 October 1999), p.3. Back.

Note 48: Ibid.. Back.

Note 49: Ivan Yegorov, "Doktrina lokal’noy voyny," Vremya MN, (21 October 1999). Back.

Note 50: Ibid.. Back.

Note 51: Ibid.. Back.

Note 52: Ibid.. Back.

Note 53: Ibid.. Back.

Note 54: Ibid.. Back.

Note 55: Ibid.. Back.

Note 56: Ibid.. Back.

Note 57: Ibid.. Back.

Note 58: Ibid.. Back.

Note 59: M. A. GareevŐs If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict, (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1998), pp. 74-75. Back.

Note 60: "Russia May Adopt a New Military Doctrine," Moscow, Itar-Tass, (25 October 1999). Back.

Note 61: "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, (9 October 1999), p. 4. Back.

Note 62: Korbut, "Proekt voyennoy doktriny mestami podmenyaet konstitutsiyu," Nezavisimaya gazeta, (13 October 1999). Back.

Note 63: "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda, (9 October 1999), p. 4. Back.

Note 64: Ibid.. Back.

Note 65: Ibid.. Back.

Note 66: Ibid.. Back.

Note 67: Ibid.. Back.

Note 68: Ibid.. Back.

Note 69: Ibid.. Back.

Note 70: Ibid.. Back.

Note 71: Ibid.. Back.

Note 72: Ibid.. Back.

Note 73: Ibid.. Back.

Note 74: Ibid.. Back.

Note 75: Ibid.. Back.

Note 76: Ibid.. Back.

Note 77: Ibid.. Back.

Note 78: Ibid.. Back.

Note 79: Ibid.. Back.

Note 80: Ibid.. Back.

Note 81: Ibid.. Back.

Note 82: Ibid.. Back.

Note 83: Ibid.. Back.

Note 84: Ibid.. Back.