The Return of Nuclear War

CIAO DATE: 8/00

The Return of Nuclear War

Strategic Studies Institute
Army War College

International Studies Association
41st Annual Convention
Los Angeles, CA
March 14-18, 2000

As the Cold War ended pundits proclaimed a “postnuclear“ era. ₁ Edward Luttwak postulated the political implausibility of U.S. guarantees that have been offered against non-nuclear attack and stated that the political plausibility of extended deterrence against non-nuclear attacks was diminishing in “one setting after another.” ₂ He assumed this trend would increase in scope, especially as NATO’s conventional military power grew. Gary Guertner wrote that,

Nuclear weapons have a declining political-military utility below the threshold of deterring a direct nuclear attack against the territory of the United States. As a result, the post-cold war period is one in which stability and the deterrence of war are likely to be measured by the capabilities of conventional forces. ₃

The most striking aspect of these prophecies is how wrong they were. Current trends have begun to justify those who argued that proliferation is our most serious threat. ₄ But the developing situation mandates going beyond merely stopping proliferation. Many governments are increasing their reliance upon nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear attacks and as warfighting weapons even in small-scale wars. Far from losing utility, nuclear weapons appear to have increased utility. Even in the United States, the scope for nuclear use has grown during the 1990s. ₅ This trend to envision nuclear weapons for warfighting in scenarios other than nuclear attack is also undoing several other “sacred cows” of international security studies.

One of these ‘sacred cows” is the “major war is obsolete” school. It argues that the idea of major war between the great powers is increasingly obsolescent and strongly relates that development to the nuclear taboo. ₆ Another victim of this trend is the argument that that proliferation is a declining threat, or that new nuclear states will probably not use these weapons except for deterrence. ₇ This trend also makes Kenneth Waltz’s linked argument that more nuclear states are really better even more questionable. ₈ And, of course a third victim of this trend is a cornerstone of deterrence, i.e. the long-standing American belief that nuclear weapons have no discernible military-strategic utility other than to deter a nuclear attack. Therefore defenseless nuclear powers will deter each other from attacks. ₉

Instead it seems that Colin Gray correctly warned that the nuclear taboo — and implicitly the taboo against using any weapon of mass destruction (WMD) — may be broken much more easily than we assume, once someone uses such weapons. ₁₀ For example, in Russia’s war in Chechnya, the Chechens resorted to chemical weapons and Russia used what it considers to be WMD, fuel-air explosives, and cruise missiles. And Saddam’s use of gas against the Kurds went unpunished. ₁₁

This trend towards nuclearization disproves these prophecies. It tells us that too much American writing on military strategy is excessively ethnocentric and plain ignorant of foreign conditions. It demonstrates the absurdity of substituting theory for close observation of empirical facts. It also highlights one of the most disturbing features of writing on arms control, nuclear war, and proliferation. Namely, such writing far too often ignores new developments in contemporary warfare and strategy. Thus much of the writing on China rather complacently assumes that nothing China can do in the foreseeable future can alter the fact that, “with the proper mix of U.S. forces in the region, rimland and maritime Asia will always have the ability to “trump” Chinese projection attempts.” ₁₂ This approach neglects how fundamental changes in strategic geography due to the nuclearization and “missileization” of China and other Asian states pose rising threats to U.S. allies and interests in Asia. ₁₃

The trend to operationalize nuclear weapons transcends the proliferation debate. Not only new or would-be nuclear states are nuclearizing and then weaponizng for operational scenarios. China, Russia, and the United States are also doing so. Therefore the undoubted slowdown in non-proliferation is not just due to a lack of U.S. leadership or the work of benighted politicians, as some partisans of the cause tend to argue. ₁₄ These disturbing threats to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime must be related at least in part to trends in contemporary warfare.

This does not mean we should now embrace nuclear proliferation. Rather we must realize that nonproliferation campaigns, however well-meaning, will fail unless they can account for visible trends in modern warfare. As Iraq, North Korea and previous proliferators tell us, truly determined proliferators cannot be stopped from succeeding. ₁₅ UNSCOM’s experience in Iraq also shows that extensive proliferation, e.g. a successful increase in Iraqi biological warfare capability, can take place even under the most severe inspection regime without the inspectors’ knowledge. ₁₆ Meanwhile foreign suppliers remain willing to help proliferators like Iraq. Nor can we expect that proliferators will follow our testing procedures or that our intelligence services can accurately warn us of their policies, strategies, intentions, and capabilities. ₁₇ Russia still denies the Rumsfeld Commission’s relevant conclusions on this point which surely apply even more dangerously to its environment. ₁₈

Nor can we attribute the disturbing trends to nuclearization and the spread of chemical and biological warfare capabilities solely to proliferators’ desire for bigger and better WMD. Established nuclear powers like Russia and China are acting in ways that apparently indicate that they favor proliferation. Russia and China are reportedly covertly violating the accords on preventing biological warfare even as they devise new missions for their nuclear weapons. ₁₉ Russia is exporting tritium to China to improve China’s nuclear weapons and is renewing its military collaboration with Iran. ₂₀ And as Russia and China draw closer together, their military cooperation in nuclear missile, launch, and space capability will continue and deepen. ₂₁ China also has developed its land-based ICBM’s and SLBM’s for greater range and precision, reflecting its desire to hold U.S. assets hostage in the event of conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere in Asia. ₂₂

Likewise proliferators and established nuclear powers are further extending their capacity to exploit space for military purposes and integrate space based satellites and sensors with missiles to target them more precisely. ₂₃ The Pentagon believes that China is attempting to develop an anti-satellite capability against the U.S.’ space satellites. ₂₄ That weaponization could come to include nuclear missiles or vital C4ISR components of nuclear arsenals like satellites and anti-satellite weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and anti-ballistic missiles. Nor would such weaponization of space be something new. During the 1980s the Soviet Union established a space theater of military (strategic) operations (Teatr’ Voennykh Deistviya) which was not just a C2 structure but also planned for the conduct of strategic operations in, to and/or from space. ₂₅ Moscow was hardly alone in this endeavor. The sheer scope of these nuclear, space, and conventional improvements to major players’ military capability therefore cannot be explained away as simply a failure of the non-proliferation campaign. Nor can we attribute the use of WMD against domestic opponents as Russia, Iraq, and Iran have done, or to gratuitously attack third parties as Iraq attacked Israel in 1991 to coincidence. ₂₆

We should consider these recent nuclear and military events:

North Korea successfully maneuvered Washington to buy it off in return for its development of a probable nuclear weapons system, aided Iran’s and Pakistan’s nuclear missile programs, and flight tested the Taepo-Dong 1 and Nodong missiles which could become the ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads as far as the continental United States. In response Seoul has sought since 1998 to develop or purchase longer range missiles against the North. ₂₇
India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, weaponized them, and are quickly developing short-range, medium, and long-range missiles as well as conventional forces. ₂₈ India’s new doctrine advocates early warning and deterrence which may be impossible given Pakistan’s proximity and also presages a very large nuclear arsenal. ₂₉
Both governments received material assistance from outside, China, the United States, and possibly Russia or the Soviet Union. India is building the Sagarika sub-surface nuclear missile, and nuclear powered submarines with Russian help. Its space program materially assists the construction of its nuclear missiles and is abetted by Moscow. ₃₀ Meanwhile, Pakistan continues tempting fate by inciting bloody, prolonged, low-level conflicts in Kashmir. ₃₁
Both states also clearly intend to have a robust space presence, presumably including first satellites and then probably other systems aiming to militarize space for their purposes. ₃₂
U.S. and Israeli officials now accept that Iran will have an IRBM and nuclear capability by 2005 with the Shihab-3 and will be close to expanding it into an ICBM capability with the Shihab-4. CINC CENTCOM, General Anthony Zinni publicly professed that Iran would have a nuclear capability within 3-5 years, and the CIA now says it cannot guarantee that Iran will not have a nuclear capability to go with its recently tested Shahab-3 IRBM. ₃₃ These developments were possible only with extensive Russian, Chinese, and North Korean proliferation. ₃₄
Israel is going beyond its acknowledged first-strike capability to a second strike sea-based nuclear capability by purchasing German Dolphin Class submarines. As predicted, Israel will respond to its enemies’ acquisition of a first-strike capability by building a credible second-strike sea-based option. ₃₅ Yet simultaneously Israel is building the Arrow missile which will also have an offensive capability “to cover all bets” and prevent missile attacks upon its territory or forces. ₃₆ Israel is also discussing providing Turkey with a modified form of missile defense against the missile threats that Ankara perceives from virtually all of its neighbors. ₃₇
Iraq’s programs to build nuclear, biological and chemical weapons continue despite all the UN-imposed restrictions on them. ₃₈ As no inspections have taken place for at least a year, despite desperate domestic conditions, Iraq undoubtedly is continuing Saddam Hussein’s lifelong quest for diverse WMD capabilities. ₃₉
The Senate decisively repudiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty despite widespread fears that this vote would encourage more proliferation. Other governments, e.g. Russia, seized that opportunity to proclaim that vote a threat to international stability and an invitation to proliferation. ₄₀ Meanwhile the Clinton Administration has all but delivered Moscow an ultimatum that it support amendments to the ABM treaty allowing the United States to construct a national missile defense.
Defense Secretary Cohen has also stated that any attack on U.S. satellites, a likely opening move by an enemy seeking to deny us our capabilities for precision strike and information dominance, would be regarded as an “infringement on our sovereign rights.” That attack could justify the use of all appropriate self-defense measures by the United States, including the use of force. ₄₁ And if that attack was a nuclear one in, to, or from, space, pressure for an equivalent riposte would be enormous.
Similarly the Clinton Administration has publicly stated that chemical or biological attacks on the United States could justify nuclear responses and it refuses to rule out the use of nuclear weapons as part of its counterproliferation program. ₄₂
Russia has repeatedly made it clear that it will deter even smaller-scale conventional attacks against key installations or allies (i.e. extended deterrence) with nuclear weapons. ₄₃ Its new draft security concept and defense doctrine repeated those statements, and analysts and officials told the author that the NATO invasion of Kosovo had stimulated doctrine writers to add scenarios for the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) against purely conventional attacks. ₄₄
Thus in December, 1999, Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, CINC of Russia’s nuclear forces stated that Russia, for objective reasons, must lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, extend the nuclear deterrent to smaller-scale conflicts and openly warn potential opponents about this. ₄₅ Meanwhile Russia would continue replacing old arms with new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles. ₄₆
Russia’s new national security concept and the draft defense doctrine postulate all-encompassing and growing military and non-military threats to Russian security including the proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles, and proclaims a readiness for a nuclear first-strike against threats to Russian vital interests that cannot be otherwise resolved. ₄₇
Specifically the security concept stated that the armed forces’ vital task is to exercise deterrence against aggression on any scale, nuclear or otherwise against Russia and its allies. It thereby extended deterrence to those allies, presumably CIS members. “Nuclear weapons should be capable of inflicting the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.” ₄₈ The concept also stated that nuclear weapons’ use would become possible “in the event or need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and proven ineffective.” ₄₉
Russian nuclear weapons serve two crucial but not necessarily complementary functions. They deter a wide range of contingencies along the spectrum of conflict that could conceivably threaten Russia. And they are also warfighting instruments that are conceivably to be used against a wide range of threats arising out of actual conflict situations. Their use is to be tailored to the particular threat at hand, as openly stated in the concept. ₅₀ These and other documents proclaim limited nuclear war as Russia’s officially acknowledged strategy of the Russian Federation in response to many different kinds of contingencies. ₅₁
Russian military writers now argue that these weapons are no longer just weapons of mass destruction. Instead, they are perfectly legitimate weapons capable of performing military missions. Essentially there is no clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear scenarios in the open sources. ₅₂
However, this policy fundamentally contradicts the notion that nuclear weapons are primarily for deterrence and makes nuclear weapons legitimate weapons of warfighting and of victory. Nor is it clear if Moscow distinguishes between tactical or strategic missiles. Indeed, many military-political analysts view NATO’s enlargement as preparation for a future military threat that can only be countered by the combat threat or use of tactical, if not strategic, nuclear missiles. ₅₃ Hence nuclear warfighting and nuclear victory scenarios also now become or are thought to be truly feasible options. ₅₄
Lastly, Russia and the United States retain a launch on warning system, meaning that they will launch nuclear weapons, not on actual attack, but if they perceive one to be in progress, rightly or wrongly. Since Russian military experts expect a surprise attack, and its early warning and air defense have significantly degraded since 1991, the possibilities for erroneous launch are high. Since Russian doctrine conventionalizes nuclear weapons as if they were just a bigger version of conventional weapons, the erosion of controls seriously enhances the dangers of LOW. Not only did we barely escape a nuclear crisis in 1995 when Norway’s weather rocket was first mistaken for a nuclear attack, North Korea’s 1998 test also revealed a lack of communication between early warning, military, and governmental centers in Moscow. ₅₅
Conventionalization of nuclear weapons and of nuclear warfighting scenarios in and of itself substantially lowers the threshold for nuclear use. It places enormous new stresses for adaptiveness, and high quality upon Russia’s decaying early warning and C2 systems to prevent unauthorized, and unintended nuclear strikes or excessive nuclear responses to conventional attacks. This trend also adds stress to an already overburdened, insufficient, and degraded C4ISR and Early Warning system and heightens the chance for unauthorized, mistaken, or unintended attacks. The two incidents described above tend to confirm this point.
These facts have two implications, apart from rogue actions. First, there is growing danger of accidental or unintended launches due to failure to distinguish real from false enemy launches. Second, Moscow could escalate a conventional war way out of control in the crazy belief that nuclear strikes can somehow limit warfare and give it escalation control, despite forty years of contrary argument, assertion, and policy. Accordingly, Russian writers openly speculate on how nuclear weapons might be adapted for conventional use. ₅₆ Doing so also implies incorporating a new generation of lethal, highly accurate, third generation nuclear weapons into Russia’s arsenal. Russia can do this by reducing the number and yield of nuclear warheads, and concurrently increasing the accuracy of delivery to the military target and the effectiveness of target engagement. ₅₇
But much of what is happening elsewhere resembles Russia’s situation of inadequate command and control. The recent revelations of India’s deficient crisis-management structure in the airline hijacking of December, 1999 should give us pause in this respect. ₅₈ Nor is that an isolated resemblance
China launched missile attacks on Taiwan (which it declares to be part of China) in 1995-1996 and has continued proliferating to Pakistan and Iran despite membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime. ₅₉ Furthermore China is evidently moving towards a new nuclear doctrine that actually contemplates use of those weapons, not only to deter, but also as warfighting weapons. ₆₀
China, aided by Russia, is undoubtedly modernizing its missiles and missile defense capability to gain the capacity to threaten the continental United States, diversify and expand its arsenal, and counter foreign missile attacks. ₆₁ This buildup is only part of a much larger comprehensive modernization of military technologies across the board. It aims to give China the means to fight for informational and strategic superiority by striking the enemy’s most critical targets first, even preemptively. ₆₂ This strategy and target set could easily mandate space war and/or nuclear attacks. ₆₃

Thus we are witnessing the return of limited (and possibly even unlimited) nuclear war as a viable operational mission. And this is not a question of one or two states. Proliferators and established nuclear power see new justification for their use as threats change and as warfare becomes multi-dimensional to the degree that cyberwar is a reality as is the potentiality for weapons to strike from underwater, the earth, the sea, the air, and space at targets in any one of the other dimensions. And they are abetted by the trend whereby proliferating states then become salesmen of WMD systems to other proliferators, as China and North Korea have done.

The universal trend to find more missions for nuclear missiles occurs against a backdrop of widespread military modernization that is part of the RMA. Thus proliferators and established nuclear powers are also robustly modernizing their conventional and high-tech capabilities for waging war, including electronic, space, and information warfare. Frequently they acquire these capabilities not just for political reasons or for deterrence — which would be distressing enough if those were the only reasons — but in order to counter American military primacy in precisely those new and emerging technological-military capabilities. The nuclear buildup is inconceivable apart from this context. And the problem with too much U.S. thinking about nuclear issues: warfighting strategies, deterrence, and arms control, and proliferation, is its refusal to consider this changing context of war.

Finally these buildups also tend to disprove another “sacred cow” of American writing and policy under the Clinton Administration, namely that we can arrest or inhibit, or even prevent nuclear proliferation by supplying potential proliferators with high-quality (if not state of the art) conventional platforms and weapons or further reinforcements of pledges of extended deterrence. Increasingly it looks like that those states only pocket the conventional transfers and then return to developing their WMD capabilities. Moreover, even allies who in the past have desisted from developing nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them like South Korea, are now looking to extend the range and capacity of their missiles. ₆₄ Japan too is extending both the perimeter of its defense under the new guidelines with Washington and its space and reconnaissance capabilities. ₆₅ Since Japan could easily and quickly build nuclear weapons if it so chose and its plutonium program raises many eyebrows across Asia, its policies evoke some concern across Asia. Thus the trends towards ever better conventional missiles and space systems for military purposes are connected to the trend towards nuclearization and operationalization of those weapons.

Conclusions

These developments cut across the proliferation/possessor divide of nuclear weapons and express at least to some degree trends in modern warfare as well as responses to them. Thus part of the answer as to why this trend towards devising new missions for nuclear weapons must be fought in a cause larger than the canonical motives ascribed to proliferators. Trends in modern warfare and technology certainly are making nuclearization feasible and even desirable for established and potential nuclear states. Hence an exclusive concentration on non-proliferation, as has been the case, is bound to fail as it only deals with part of the problem. While it is self-serving for Russia and China to claim that Kosovo stimulated non-nuclear powers to consider going nuclear; they voiced a crucial truth even if only partly so and in a self-interested fashion.

Trends in modern war and strategy are driving this trend towards nuclearization. It may be unpalatable to the United States which is leading this revolution in modern warfare to hear that its embrace of “strategic preclusion”, information warfare, etc. is very much at fault here. But as long as we embrace a form of war whose conventionally or informationally achieved strategic results equate to those of nuclear war and pursue superiority over everyone else in nuclear and conventional war, our rivals and enemies will opt for weapons of mass destruction, the poor man’s weapons of today. This outcome may dismay us but it is not the first time that strategic doctrines conceived for one kind of war made another form of warfare much more conceivable. Clearly, the global trend towards nuclearization obliges us to rethink our strategy more closely than we have to date. For if we do not learn from what others are doing, we will have to learn from what they did to us.

Endnotes

Note 1: Edward Luttwak, “An emerging Postnuclear age?.” Washington Quarterly , XI, No. 1, Winter, 1988, pp. 5-15 Back.

Note 2: Ibid., pp. 12-15 Back.

Note 3: Gary Guertner, “Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces,” Washington Quarterly , XVI, No. 1, Winter, 1993, p. 142 Back.

Note 4: President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century , Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1999, p. 2 Back.

Note 5: Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, “The USA and counter-Proliferation: A New and Dubious Role for US Nuclear Weapons, “ Security Dialogue , XXVII, No. 4, 1996, pp. 387-399 Back.

Note 6: Michael Mandlebaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?, “ Survival;, XL, No. 4, Winter, 1998-99, pp. 20-38 Back.

Note 7: William H. Kincade, Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat?,” INSS Occasional Paper No. 6, Proliferation Series, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1995 Back.

Note 8: For a review of the issues surrounding proliferation see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate , New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999, Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, “ Adelphi Papers , No. 171, 1981 Back.

Note 9: This argument, of course, is one of the cornerstones of deterrence and the theory of mutual assured destruction, i.e. MAD and goes back at least to the 1960s if not earlier. Back.

Note 10: Colin Gray, The Second Nuclear Age , Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 93-95, 103-108, 122-123 Back.

Note 11: Timothy D. Hoyt, "Diffusion From the Periphery: The Impact of Technological and Conceptual Innovation," Paper Presented to the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1999 Back.

Note 12: Admiral Michael McDevitt (Ret.) USN, “Geographic Ruminations,“ Larry M. Wortzel, Ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century , Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War college, 1999, pp. 5-6 Back.

Note 13: Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age , New York: Harper Collins, 1999, particularly, pp. 2-35 Back.

Note 14: George Bunn, “The Nonproliferation Regime Under Siege,” Working Paper,Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, September, 1999, Amy Sands, “The Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk,“ Michael Barletta and Amy Sands, Eds., Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk , Occasional paper No. 3, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group, Monterey Institute of International Studies: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey CA., 1999, pp. 1-7 is the most overt expression of this sentiment, but the other essays in Barletta and Sands also mainly blame the original nuclear powers for proliferation as well Back.

Note 15: Avigdor Haselkorn, The continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence, New Haven CT.: Yale University Press, 1999, pp. 206-217 Back.

Note 16: Ibid. Back.

Note 17: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of the REPORT of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, July 15, 1998, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Report of the Commission To Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States , Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 1998 (Henceforth Executive Summary) Back.

Note 18: Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye , No. 45, November 19-25, 1999, in Russian, FBIS SOV , December 6, 1999 Back.

Note 19: Eric Margolis, “Another Doomsday Clock Is Ticking, Ticking, “ , Toronto Sun , February 6, 1999, Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator," Orbis, XLIV, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 91-107, Col. Larry M. Wortzel, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The View From Beijing,” Proceedings from the Conference on Countering the Missile Threat, International Military Strategies , (Henceforth Proceedings) Washington, D.C.: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1999, p. 193, Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelsman, “Is Russia Still Preparing for Bio-Warfare,?” Wall Street Journal , February 16, 2000, from the Pentagon’s Early Bird press selection for that day http://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird Back.

Note 20: James Risen and Judith Miller, “C.I.A. Tells Clinton An Iranian A-Bomb Can’t Be Ruled Out,” New York Times , January 17, 2000, p. 1, Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, January 15, 2000, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV ), January 17, 2000 Back.

Note 21: “China Remains Russia’s Strategic Partner, “ Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (Henceforth CDPP), LII, No. 3, February 16, 2000, p. 17, Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, January 18, 2000, FBIS SOV , January 18, 2000, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta , (Electronic Version), in Russian, January 18, 2000, and January 19, 2000 , FBIS SOV , January 18, and January 19, 2000, Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, January 18, 2000, FBIS SOV , January 18, 2000, Moscow, RIA, in English, January 18, 2000, FBIS SOV , January 18, 2000, Moscow, Interfax, in English, January 18, 2000, FBIS SOV , January 18, 2000,Beijing, Xinhua domestic Service , in Chinese, January 18, 2000, FBIS SOV , January 19, 2000, Beijing, Xinhua, in English, January 19, 2000 , FBIS SOV , January 19, 2000, Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao , in Chinese, January 19, 2000, FBIS SOV, January 19, 2000 Back.

Note 22: Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security , XXI, No. 1, Winter, 1995-96, pp. 5-42, Wortzel, pp. 190-203, Kathryn L. Gauthier, “China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space and Information Warfare,” Lawrence E. Grinter, Ed., The Dragon Awakes: China’s Military Modernization: Trends and Implications , Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 1999, pp. 25-34, Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States : Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999, pp. 96-109 Back.

Note 23: Ibidem. (Stokes and Gauthier), Steve Rodan, “Interview with Major General Eitan Ben-Eliahu Commander-in Chief Israel Defense Force-Air Force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , February 9, 2000, p. 32, Thomas G. Mahnken, “Moving Toward Life in a Missile-Armed World,” Proceedings, pp. 155-156, Cairo, MENA in Arabic, March 7, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Middle East and South Asia (Henceforth FBIS NES), 98-066, March 10, 1998 Back.

Note 24: Richard J. Newman, “The New Space Race, “ U.S. News & World Report , November 8, 1999, pp. 30-40 Back.

Note 25: Stephen Blank, John H. Lobengeir, Kevin Stubbs, and Richard E. Thomas, The Soviet Space Theater of War (TV) : College Station, Texas: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas Engineering Experiment Station, Texas A&M University, September, 1988 Back.

Note 26: Apart from the documented uses by Iraq, Russia has used fuel-air explosives and cruise missiles in its war with Chechnya, weapons that it classifies as weapons of mass destruction. for other examples of the use of missiles and WMD in domestic civil wars in the last twenty years see Brigadier General Richard W. Davis, USAF, “Ballistic Missile Defense Family of Systems,” Briefing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., February 16, 2000 Back.

Note 27: For the origins of this program see the articles by Barbara Opall-Rome under the rubric, “S. Korea Revives Its Military Modernization,” Defense News , March 15, 1999, pp. 1, 40, Seoul Yonhap, in English, August 10, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asia (Henceforth FBIS EAS), August 13, 1998 Back.

Note 28: Raju G.C. Thomas, ”Missile Programs and the Indian Nuclear Deterrent, “ Proceedings, pp. 178-180, “Pakistan Tests New Missile and Revises command Structure, “ Jane’s Defence Weekly , February 16, 2000, p. 3, Pravin Sawhney, “How Inevitable is an Asian ‘Missile Race’,?” Jane’s Intelligence Review , January 2000, pp. 30-34, Hilary Synnott, “The Causes and consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests,” Adelphi Papers , No. 332, 1999, pp. 45-46 Back.

Note 29: Ibid., pp. 53-65, Sawhney, pp. 30-34 Back.

Note 30: Steven Lee Myers, “Russia Helping India Extend Range of Missiles, Aides Say,” New York Times , April 27, 1998, p. 1, Banglaore, Deccan Herald (Internet Version) , in English, December 23, 1998, FBIS NES, December 23, 1998, Daniel Goure, “WMD and Ballistic Missiles in South Asia,“ REPORT of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, July 15, 1998 Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, 1998, pp. 151-158, David R. Tanks, “Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: ARE ICBM’s A Future Possibility,?” REPORT of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, July 15, 1998 Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, 1998, pp. 317-331, Thomas, pp. 178-180 Back.

Note 31: “Dangerous Game, “ Far Eastern Economic Review , June 10, 1999, pp. 18-20 Back.

Note 32: Thomas, pp. 178-180, Henry Sokolski, “Space Technology Transfers and Missile Proliferation,” REPORT of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, July 15, 1998 Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, 1998 pp. 303-315, Richard H. Speier, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Security Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate June 5, 1997 Back.

Note 34: Executive Summary Back.

Note 35: Martin Sieff, “Israel Buying 3 Submarines To Carry Nuclear Missiles,“ Washington Times , July 1, 1998, p. 1, Gerald Steinberg, “Israel and the United States: Can the Special Relationship Survive the New Strategic Environment,?” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) , Meria Journal , II, No. 4, November-December, 1998, Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Post , in English, August, 1998, FBIS NES , August 8, 1998 Back.

Note 36: This is because any interceptor missile like the Arrow TMD missile is has an inherent offensive capability. Back.

Note 37: Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel Promotes Regional Arrow,“ Defense News , May 10, 1999, p. 3, for Turkish policy see “Turkey Adopts Two-Tier BMD Concept, “ Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 16, 2000. p. 3 Back.

Note 38: Haselkorn, pp. 206-217 Back.

Note 39: Ibid. Back.

Note 40: FBIS SOV, December 6, 1999 Back.

Note 41: David C. Isby, “US Funds Offensive and Defensive Space Systems,” Jane’s Missiles & Rockets , III, No. 11, November, 1999 np. (From Lexis-Nexis) Back.

Note 42: See, e.g. Kristensen and Handler, pp. 387-399, M.E. Ahrari, “The Beginning of a New Cold War,?” European Security , VIII, No. 3, Autumn, 1999, p. 127 Back.

Note 43: “Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Proekt,“ Krasnaya Zvezda , October 9, 1999,pp. 3-4, Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in Russian, January 14, 2000, FBIS SOV , January 14, 2000 Back.

Note 44: Ibid., “Voyennaya Doktrina”, pp. 3-4, Conversations with Russian officials and analysts in Moscow and Helsinki, June, 1999 Back.

Note 45: Martin Nesirsky, “Russia Says Threshold Lower for Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, December 17, 1999 Back.

Note 46: Ibid Back.

Note 47: “Voyennaya Doktrina,” pp. 3-4, FBIS SOV , January 14, 2000 Back.

Note 48: Ibid. Back.

Note 49: Ibid. Back.

Note 50: Ibid., and the article by Deputy defense Minister, Vladimir Mikhailov, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta , in Russian, October 12, 1999, FBIS SOV , October 12, 1999 which lays out the limited nuclear war strategy explicitly as did the national security concept. Back.

Note 51: Ibidem. Back.

Note 52: Stephen Blank, ”Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in Russian Strategy,” Report of the Commission To Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States , Appendix III, Unclassified Working Papers, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 1998, pp. 57-77 which is based on extensive Russian sources in support of this argument Back.

Note 53: Ibid. Back.

Note 54: Ibid. Back.

Note 5: Moscow, Russkiy Telegraph , in Russian, September 2, 1998, FBIS SOV , September 2, 1998 Back.

Note 56: Col. V. Kruglov, and Colonel. M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, “[The]Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Deterrence,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military thought), No. 6, 1997, pp. 12-16, Moscow, Voprosy Bezopasnosti , in Russian, December, 1997, FBIS SOV , 98-064, March 5, 1998, examines debates over tactical nuclear weapons, see also Anton Surikov, “Some Aspects of Russian Military Reform,” European Security , VI, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 49-65, Andrei Kokoshin, “Reforming Russia’s Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl’ , No. 5/6, 1996, p. 18, Lt. General (Ret) Ye. B. Volkov, “Start II and the Security of Russia,” Voennaya Mysl’ , No. 1, January-February, 1996, pp. 17-21, Major General V.A. Ryaboshapko (Ret.), “Nuclear Conditions: conditions of Possible Resort to Nuclear Weapons,” Voyennaya Mysl’ , No. 4, July-August, 1996, pp. 10-14, Col. O.A. Kobelev, N.N. Detinov, “Upgrading the Nuclear Arms Proliferation Control System, Voennaya Mysl’ , No. 9-10, September, October, 1994, p. 3, Sevastopol Flag Rodiny , in Russian, December 10, 1997, FBIS SOV , 98-009, January 12, 1998, Moscow, Itogi, in Russian, December 16, 1997, FBIS SOV , 98-020, January 23, 1998, Stephen Blank, “Russia, Ukraine, and European Security,” European Security , III, No. 1, Spring, 1994, pp. 192-198, Mary Fitzgerald, “The Russian Shift Toward Nuclear War-Waging,” Hudson Institute , Washington, D.C., 1993 Back.

Note 57: Ibidem, all, and Personal Communication from Mary Fitzgerald, see also, Fitzgerald, pp. 6-13 Back.

Note 58: Robert Marquand, “India’s Red Phone: Crossed Wires,” , Christian Science Monitor , January 21, 2000, p. 1 Back.

Note 59: See Federal News Service, “Testimony of Robert Walpole to the Hearing of the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental affairs committee, February 9, 2000” Back.

Note 60: Stokes, passim. Gauthier, pp. 25-34, Wortzel, passim. Johnston, passim., Bracken, passim, David J. Smith, “Sun Tzu and the Modern Art of Countering Missile Defense,” Jane’s Intelligence Review , January 2000, pp. 35-39. Back.

Note 61: Ibidem. Back.

Note 62: Ibidem. Back.

Note 63: Ibidem. Back.

Note 64: Ibidem. Back.

Note 65: Thomas A. Drohan, The US-Japan Defense Guidelines: Toward an Equivalent Alliance , IIPS Policy Paper 238E, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, 1999, p. 16 Back.