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CIAO DATE: 2/99
Asia-Pacific Regionalism And Northeast Asia Subregionalism *
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Monterey, California
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Introduction
There are ongoing debates about the growing trends of regionalism throughout the world. In the Asia-Pacific context, emerging regionalism has been discussed primarily as a consequence the end of the Cold War and the primacy of economics over security on national and international policy agendas. However, security issues have not been forgotten. On the contrary, the euphoria that swept the region in the early post-Cold War years has since given way to a more sobering assessment of the region’s security problems, ranging from the North-South Korean stalemate, the nuclear and missile development in North Korea, and the US-PRC conflict over mainland China’s relations with Taiwan. The changing balance of power in Asia-Pacific, particularly in its Northeast Asian part, also has prompted some heated discussions about the possibility and desirability of transferring European models of multilateral security and cooperation to the Asia-Pacific region. The scope of discussion has been expanded to include some un-conventional security issues that are also emerging, such as environmental security, energy security, ethnic tension, developmental gaps, demographic pressures on resources and the environment, and political and social instabilities in transition economies.
On the economic front, much has been made of the growing international interdependence and deepening market integration in Asia-Pacific. Discussion of the relationship between Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also followed the evolution of that relationship, with “Asianist” views and globalist views taking a jab at each other in the process. The “Asian crisis” since 1997 promises further discussion of the region-subregion relationship, as well as the market-driven integration of national economies and the need for policy coordination to manage its destabilizing consequences.
We have also witnessed a proliferation of writings about the possibility and desirability of multilateral cooperation in the geographically defined area of Northeast Asia, encompassing China, Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East. 1 There are also efforts underway to institutionalize international cooperation in this subregion, both at the governmental and non-governmental levels. 2 However, very little has been said about the relationship between various schemes for multilateral cooperation within Northeast Asia and that in the broader region of Asia-Pacific. Perhaps this is understandable. There is no ASEAN-like multilateral institution or a shared identity among the countries in Northeast Asia that represents a process of immediate consequence for Asia-Pacific. Nor are there sufficiently strong market forces unique to this subregion that can directly affect the ongoing process of market integration or policy coordination elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. But are these the only reasons why “Northeast Asia” has not emerged as a focal point of discussion either in the context of Asia-Pacific political economy or in connection with the ASEAN process? Moreover, what developments would elevate both cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries and the international community’s attention on this subregion to such a level that it would make sense, not only theoretically but also in terms of policy implications, to debate the relationship between Northeast Asia and APEC, ASEAN, and other regional institutions? These are the questions I will address in this brief analysis.
In order to answer the questions just posed, I need some guidance as to what factors to examine. Fortunately, there are some theoretical discussions and many studies of the actual cases of regional integration efforts in various parts of the world, including in Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia. I will not present a detailed description of the literature. I will simply point out that the existing literature points to four levels of analysis as relevant to the understanding of the factors shaping regional integration processes. They are: (1) the distribution of power at the international level, (2) the role of the state, (3) the role of the market, and (4) the objectives and goals of cooperation, rules for collective decision making and membership, and principles guiding cooperation. 3
The key questions to be asked at the first level of analysis are: Is power distributed fairly equally among the countries of the region, or is it concentrated in one or a few countries? If power is concentrated in one country, is it a hegemonic power or an isolationist power? If power is concentrated in a few dominant countries, are they friendly or hostile to each other? At the second level, we should ask: What role does the state play in the development and growth of the region’s economies, particularly the powerful economies that have a region-wide impact? Does the dominant state present a liberal ideology, encouraging transnational market integration and promoting the development of domestic and international environments in which market forces can proceed unimpeded by formal or informal impediments? Or does the state represent a mercantilist ideology, promoting or hampering international economic interactions depending on whether it sees the processes enhancing or weakening its own power and interests? At the third level, the corollary of the state-related questions are raised, about the role of the market in facilitating or obstructing regional cooperation. Is the market at the mercy of the state, or is it autonomous or even dominant in its relationship to the state? Are the market forces in a given region powerful enough to integrate the national economies in the area? Finally, at the fourth level are questions such as: What cultural norms do participants in regional cooperation bring to the process of decision making and implementation? What are the rules governing participation in regional cooperation with respect to membership, goal setting, agenda setting, and decision making, and what are the principles invoked to guide the cooperative scheme?
Empirical studies exist about the successful and not-so-unsuccessful efforts at regional integration, from the most heralded European Union (EU) to the unsuccessful Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), with a host of other regional attempts lying somewhere in between. 4 Of particular interest to our discussion here are the varied experiences in regional economic cooperation in the vastly different regional settings of Europe (the EU), North America (the NAFTA), Asia-Pacific (APEC), and Southeast Asia (ASEAN). It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a thorough analysis of all these experiences. I will be rather brief in describing the EU and NAFTA. The purpose is to illustrate how the five levels of factors noted above have influenced the institutionalization of the EU and NAFTA integration schemes. I will provide a somewhat more extensive discussion of the APEC and ASEAN experiences. The reason is simple. These two regional experiences have a more direct bearing on the future evolution of Northeast Asian regional cooperation. All Northeast Asian countries have important political, economic, and security interests affected by the development of APEC and ASEAN processes because they also participate in one or both of these institutions or their affiliated structures, namely the ASEAN Regional Forum or because, in the North Korean case, the country is a potential future member of APEC. Moreover, as the following analysis shows, the impact on Northeast Asia of the factors on the five levels of analysis identified above is likely to resemble the influences those factors have had on the evolution of APEC and ASEAN.
I will first provide a brief description of Northeast Asia as a region—a description that anticipates the discussion in the concluding section with respect to the likely impact of the five-level factors on multilateral cooperation in this subregion. Second, I will briefly review the EU and NAFTA cases and then provide a somewhat more detailed discussion of the evolution of APEC and ASEAN. I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the regional experiences thus analyzed for Northeast Asia.
Northeast Asian Realities 5
First, the distribution of power in Northeast Asia is uneven and has seen dramatic changes throughout history and in more recent decades. Today, Russia—one of the Cold War superpowers—has been reduced to one of the major powers in the region, with its resource base diminishing and international influence declining. China—an enigmatic developing country with a strategic nuclear arsenal—has become a great power not only for its destructive capabilities but also for its burgeoning economy. Japan—long an economic superpower but a military dwarf—is eyeing an expanded regional security role based on its enormous economic power and steadily growing defense capacity. The smaller powers of the region—Korea and Mongolia—have historically been subjected to imperialist rivalries among the bigger powers, with their territorial integrity violated, political independence stripped, and cultural identities suppressed. Today, they are either territorially and politically divided (in the case of Korea) or economically dependent on outside assistance (Mongolia), and their cultural identities subjected to external influences except in the case of North Korea, which keeps itself internationally isolated.
Second, there is a complex and diverse set of conflicts among the regional powers, both big and small, and the development of any schemes for regional cooperation requires an accurate understanding of those conflicts, their origins and contemporary implications. There are civilizational conflicts, as between Russia and most other countries of the region. Second, there are cultural conflicts within the same civilizational space, such as between China, Japan, and Korea. Together, civilizational and cultural differences present an enormous obstacle to the development of regional identity. This does not mean there are no factors that bring some sections of the national societies into cooperation. There are enlightened political leadership, transnational market forces, international epistemic communities, perception of environmental and other common regional threats, and extensive human contacts cannot overcome this obstacle. It just means that these factors must be further developed to compensate for the absence of a common civilization/cultural foundation in the region. The point is that, as noted below, there are other factors which also hinder regional cooperation, and the absence of common civilizational/cultural identity among the Northeast Asian peoples adds to the difficulty of building a regional community.
Northeast Asia is also home to state-to-state conflicts and rivalries, with nationalism a powerful force commanding the loyalty of citizens. There are in this region multiple territorial disputes, jurisdictional conflicts, and ethnic animosities. The countries of the region lack experience in collective problem solving; they are suspicious of each other; and they rarely encourage their citizens to engage with one another without their direct control or monitoring. As a result, “Northeast Asia” remains today a geographic referent rather than a political, much less a cultural community.
Third, the state-centric international relations of the prewar and the Cold War periods has established many negative and asymmetrical perceptions among the three great powers in Northeast Asia—China, Japan, and Russia—and given rise to emotional symbols of nationalism that color the contemporary perceptions of each other. Today, most official contacts among the leaders of these countries are along bilateral channels and this tends to create the perception that improvement in any dyadic relationship undermines or weakens the interests of the third power. Greater transparency in unilateral and bilateral initiatives is urgently required, particularly in the area of defense policy and political cooperation. Efforts to develop multilateral dialogue involving not only these three big powers but the other countries of the region, as well as those outside of the region, should be encouraged. What is essentially required are enlightened political leaders in Russia, China, and Japan that see their countries’ future promises in multilaterally engaged international relations in the region and beyond. A smaller power in the region, such as South Korea, may be able to serve as a catalyst in this process as well.
Fourth, the three big powers in the region are not multilaterally engaged with each other. China, because of its enormous size and importance, has the greatest potential to enhance or frustrate multilateral regional cooperation but remains the most reluctant to participate in multilateral processes. The leaders in Beijing want a stable and peaceful regional environment in which they can pursue their pressing domestic agenda, particularly on the economic front. However, they are keenly aware of the political cost of economic interdependence. They fear a loss of control over their own domestic policies under the pressures of internationalizing economy. On the other hand, when China exhibits enthusiasm about a multilateral project, such as the Tumen River Area Development Programme along the Russian-Chinese-North Korean borders, other countries fear the potentially overwhelming presence of China. Moreover, China is slow to heed the international call for greater transparency in defense policy.
Japan has long followed a policy of close alliance with the United States. Although Japanese intellectuals are increasingly interested in seeing their government take initiatives in multilateral institutions, such as the Group of Seven (G7), the APEC, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Tokyo remains committed first and foremost to the maintenance of the Japan-US alliance and defense cooperation for its peace and security. Even in the economic realm, Tokyo and Washington have developed a “special relationship” through bilateral market integration, with trade and economic problems managed primarily through bilateral negotiations.
Russia, the fallen superpower, is in no position to launch major multilateral initiatives, immersed as it is in the domestic political and economic crisis. Moscow’s “strategic partnership” with Beijing has definite limits, as does its relationship with Tokyo. Although a democratic, market-oriented Russia would be a boon to the region’s peace and stability, there is little the international community can do to influence the political climate and economic situation in Russia. 6
Fifth, there are growing economic linkages among many Northeast Asian countries. However, despite the growing literature on the linkage between economics and security, we still know too little about how economic development affects political stability and national security, much less how domestic economic changes affect international peace and stability. We need a better understanding of the impact of trade on income distribution, the effect of foreign investment on wealth distribution, and the consequences of economic development for the health of the natural and human environment. We are encouraged but not yet fully convinced by the liberal proposition that economic development leads to political democratization, which in turn promotes international peace and stability. We witness in Northeast Asian countries, for example, many cases of heightened social and ethnic tension, growing income and wealth disparities, and deteriorating environmental quality associated with expanding crossborder trade, foreign investment, and labor migration.
Sixth, the state has been the essential and the most dominant agent of both change and continuity in all Northeast Asian countries since the beginning of their respective periods of nation-building. The state has performed its central roles to varying degrees of success in cultivating a national identity among its people, in integrating economic processes within its national boundaries, in forging a national strategy for economic development, or in providing for national security. The private sector has been subservient to the dominant interests in their society as represented through the institutions of the state. With the development of democracy and market capitalism, however, Japan and South Korea have seen the growth of civil society and private institutions of production, commerce, consumption, and education. Russia and Mongolia are struggling to develop their own private sector institutions, with authoritarian habits at the state level competing for citizen loyalty against newly emerging private agents of change, including underground enterprises. In China, the economy is straddling the not-so-clear public-private divide but the state apparatus, under the Communist Party dictatorship, continues to control the political life in the country. Under these circumstances, the scope and role of non-governmental organizations varies widely from country to country in Northeast Asia. As transnational linkages among these groups grow with the widening economic, social, and even political openings at the border, they cannot but contribute to the diversification of social values. However, how the dominant state responds will determine the success of democratization of the region’s countries. If liberated from the state’s control, NGOs can help to promote the development of trust, elimination of prejudices, and cultivation of a sense of shared future among the peoples of Northeast Asia.
Seventh, regional cooperation in Northeast Asia cannot proceed unless it can take advantage of and contribute to the general trends in the broader Asia-Pacific economy, where there are powerful forces of internationalization and globalization. It may be true that the logic of international cooperation within Northeast Asia need not or should not contradict the logic of internationalization and globalization and both may proceed simultaneously. For example, WTO members located in Northeast Asia must abide by the principles of nondiscrimination and the goals of market liberalization at the global level while at the same time encouraging non-WTO member countries of the region to strengthen their domestic industries so that they can successfully meet the global market’s disciplines. If Northeast Asian countries are to advance their cause of cooperation among themselves and their agenda at the Asia-Pacific level, they need to develop a common conceptual framework. Such a framework should necessarily reflect the region’s peculiarities, including those noted here, the handicaps of some of its members, and the particular strengths of some of its members.
Given the characteristics outlined above, how is regional cooperation in Northeast Asia likely to develop? How is it likely to be institutionalized? What role will the state and the market respectively play? What will be the goals and objectives of multilateral cooperation in this subregion? What criteria are likely to be used to determine membership? What rules are likely to emerge to govern decision making and implementation? What principles are likely to inform and guide substantive decisions regarding subregional cooperation? I will come back to these questions in the last section.
The European Experience 7
The European Union (EU) lies at one of the most developed stages of integration and leads all other regional integration schemes in the depth of integration.
The free trade area under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, led to the eventual creation, only a decade later, of the European Economic Community (EEC), when the Europe of Six—France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy—formed a full-fledged customs union. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the goals of the EEC. Politically, it expanded the skeleton of supranational policy coordination under the direction of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. Economically, it created a new entity which effectively reduced internal tariff barriers and quota restrictions. 8 The Treaty of Rome served and still serves as a constitutional basis for subsequent development and describes the basic objectives and institutions that have since developed into what is today the European Union (EU). The expansion of membership of the Union in the 1970s and 80s attests to the success story of European integration during those decades. 9
In 1986, the Treaty of Rome was amended to establish the Single European Act (SEA), expanding the powers of the European Parliament, giving the Council of Ministers qualified majority vote, and empowering the European Community (EC—formerly EEC) to address issues of foreign policy, defense, and security. This breakthrough earned the community the title of a true common market, the third stage of integration. Coordinated policy was initiated to remove remaining non-tariff barriers between member states, planning for the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services, to be achieved by 1992. 10 The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in Holland in February 1992 elevated European integration to the fourth level of integration by creating a European Union with a Single European Market that went into effect the following year. This set the stage for the entry of three new members, Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, bringing the total membership up to 15, the current membership in 1999. The enhanced supranational organization encompassed social policy, including defining European citizenship. 11 The Maastricht Treaty calls for the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and a common currency called the Euro to go into circulation for a core group of members in 2002.
The EU is unique among regional integration schemes in that it has not only economic goals, but political and social goals. Economically, the Union exists to enhance the economic welfare of its members. Among the definitive goals defined by the Maastricht Treaty are to limit inflation at 1.5 percent or less of the average of the three best performances among the 15 member countries, to cap long-term interest rates at two points over the average of the three countries in terms of price stability, to limit budget deficit at three percent of GDP, to curb public debt ratio to 60 percent of GDP or less, and to ensure stable currency for two years. 12 The political goals of the EU can be traced back to the inception of the Coal and Steal Community, the French desire to contain German power through a framework of European integration, and the goals of harnessing the powers of the two original engines of the EC—France and Germany—and to create an economy that could compete with the United States.
Ideologically, the EU promotes the adoption of a shared cultural European identity for its citizens. The Maastricht Treaty puts forth the goal of creating “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” 13 As the twenty-first century approaches, the EU is juxtaposed between the two goals of both deepening the Union and establishing a common currency on the one hand and, on the other, of broadening the Union by admitting new members. 14
The EU is making steady, if not linear progress toward the goal of European citizenship. Some sectors of the population are in fact gaining a sense of European identity. One poll shows, for example, that national sentiments are still high, but that as much as a quarter of Belgians, Germans, French, and Luxembourgers consider themselves European first and their original nationality second. Close to two-thirds of Europe’s citizens feel some sense of dual nationality, and as much as half feel themselves European second after their own nationality. 15 From its origins as separate countries with primarily nationalistic drives, the European Union has in fact built a cohesive community with shared values and clearly stated common interests, and indeed even some sense of collective identity.
Institutionally, the EU has an elaborate structure that goes far beyond the cooperation of separate sovereign nations and can effectively legislate discrete policy as a supranational entity. The EU today is organized on three pillars, the European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Home Affairs and Justice Policy pillar. 16 As far as membership is concerned, the history of the EU is one of periodic enlargement. The current membership stands at 15 and eleven of these states have been determined to qualify for adoption of common currency. 17 There are currently five East European countries that are surviving the transition to democracy and liberalized markets well enough to be considered for membership, although none of these countries come close to meeting the more stringent criteria for entry into the EMU. 18 Today, ten more countries are waiting in the wings and the possibility of a 25–member Union makes the objectives of inter-state budget transfers, unregulated movement of peoples, and membership into the EMU less tangible.
Along with the membership issue, the EU faces another important challenge. That is, the member countries are under increasing pressure to adjust their long-standing tradition of state intervention in the market. Welfare capitalism has been a serious hurdle in terms of increasing efficiencies in the EU. 19 The imperatives of liberal economics and the social and political goals of the EU clash. With the unemployment rate in the Union rising, there is growing pressure on the state to expand spending on social welfare programs. At the same time, member states come under greater pressure to meet convergence criteria, are soon to be under the umbrella of the Central European Bank, and so can no longer make truly autonomous choices to manipulate their economies.
The brief review of the EU leads to the conclusion that the combination of enlightened political leadership, common civilizational background, shared security concern during the Cold War era, and common economic interests has contributed to the development of ingenious mechanisms of integration, establishment of elaborate organizational structure, and timely expansion of membership. As a result, participants in European integration have achieved steady economic growth and prosperity and enhanced global presence. They have also developed a sense of community with a shared destiny.
NAFTA 20
Three facts stand out as one examines the evolution of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). First, the United States is by far the most dominant, even hegemonic power in North America, leading the way toward regional integration and providing most incentives for the other North American countries to participate in this scheme. Second, despite the clearly unequal distribution of power among the three parties to the agreement, the countries have entered the trade pact as equals and the central institution of NAFTA, the Free Trade Commission, has equitable representation from all three members. Moreover, the procedure for intra-NAFTA dispute settlement is based on arbitration panels agreed upon by the disputants, fostering a spirit of shared commitment and belief in the impartiality and fairness of the system. Third, because of the overwhelming US power and the relative peace in North America, NAFTA is focused on trade liberalization and market integration as its goal and does not deal with security issues, unlike in the case of the EU.
In 1988, the United States and Canada signed a free trade agreement called the C-FTA (Canadian Free Trade Agreement), which had its origins in the Automotive Pact and the Defense Sharing Agreement of the 1960s. 21 The C-FTA was designed to force Canadian businesses to increase their competitiveness and set up a mechanism for dispute settlement that was immune from US domination. In December 1992, Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the pact went into force on January 1, 1994. Mexico, eager to build a market for its developing economy, saw a North American free trade pact as an excellent method to instill growth. Mexico already had strong trade ties with the United States, and it made sense to join the regional partnership. Mexican President Salinas also wanted to validate the economic reforms he had been imposing on his people since 1985 before he lost his popular support. 22
NAFTA’s objectives are to eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services, to promote conditions of fair competition among the parties, to increase investment opportunities within the free trade area, to provide protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and to establish a framework for further cooperation to enhance the benefits of the agreement. Upon insistence of the US Congress and domestic groups in the United States, NAFTA also included the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), marking an important step toward the development of better labor protection standards throughout the region. The NAFTA also set up, for the first time in North America, a framework for addressing and resolving environmental issues through regional cooperation. 23 As noted above, NAFTA also has a dispute settlement mechanism that warrants attention from the standpoint of pragmatic and efficient resolution of disputes. Rather than an elaborate judicial process, the NAFTA outlines a form of arbitration by impartial arbitration panels agreed upon by the disputing parties. This helps to expedite the process of dispute resolution. The full effect of NAFTA will not be known until 2008, when the final tariff and duty phase-out is scheduled to take place.
Generally, the NAFTA holds positive implications for the future of the North American economies. The integration of the region’s economies has been credited with the relatively quick recovery of Mexico from its financial crisis of December 1994, in comparison with a similar crisis in 1982. Intra-regional trade continues to expand, with trade routes in the United States and Canada shifting from the traditional East-West orientation toward the North-South lines of transportation. 24
The NAFTA has been criticized for its potential trade diversion effect. Many critics have charged that the NAFTA’s Rules of Origin violates the spirit of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The rule states that for goods to receive full or partial benefits under the NAFTA, a certain percentage of their manufacturing must take place within the region. On the other hand, some analyses show that the Rules of Origin actually encourages foreign direct investment in North America, particularly in Mexico, where Japan, South Korea, and many European countries are investing to produce exports to the US and Canadian markets. 25
In summary, the US hegemonic power has been essential for the emergence and evolution of NAFTA. This does not necessarily mean that the United States imposed its political will upon its North American neighbors. It means that the US economy was so much more productive that it offered benefits of regional integration not only to domestic producers and consumers but also to those in Canada and Mexico. Each party benefits individually, or else politically the NAFTA would probably not have gotten off the ground. The signatories understand that regional economic success translates directly into strengthened national economic growth. Although obviously there are winners and losers in each country, the political leaders in all three countries believe that the net gain for their economies, individually and collectively, is substantially larger under the NAFTA arrangement than without it and that it will more than compensate for the cost of the necessary domestic adjustments.
APEC 26
In contrast to the institutionally-driven and civilizationally-grounded integration efforts in Europe, APEC has consciously avoided heavy institutionalization and accepted diversity among its participants as a given condition with which to work. Similarly, in contrast to the hegemonically-led, fast-paced, and legally-tuned market integration in North America, APEC has kept the United States’ hegemonic tendencies in check, adopted a slow and deliberate process of consensus-based decision making, and relied on what is known as “concerted unilateralism” without formal legal obligations for the participating countries. Most member countries have been particularly resistant to overarching frameworks. The leaders of APEC economies have successfully tended their unique “economic gardens” with measures that have been predominantly unilateral, and secondarily bilateral and subregional. 27 It should be added, however, that the economic progress the region’s economies have made over the last several decades is attributable in an important measure to the hegemonic presence of the United States as the provider of regional peace and stability. 28
Since its inception in Canberra, Australia in 1989, the APEC forum has made considerable progress toward the development of dialogue among the leaders of diverse economies with different political and cultural backgrounds. APEC encompasses the biggest and some of the most dynamic economies in the world, it brings together an impressive array of the world’s leaders, and it has established the ambitious goal of open economies for all its developed members by 2010 and its developing members by 2020. 29
APEC began as a forum for non-binding discussion. In its initial phases, APEC’s goals were to lend support for worldwide trade liberalization and to assess trade, investment, and other common economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 30 The institutional arrangement could not be simpler, with annual ministerial meetings attended by trade ministers and chaired by APEC members on a rotating basis. In the years 1990–93, this simple structure was complemented by the establishment of ten working groups, 31 the inclusion of the “three Chinas” (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) as members, general institutionalization and the establishment of a Secretariat in Singapore, and the establishment of the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG), charged with developing a vision of trade in the region to the year 2000.
The Seoul Declaration, adopted at the APEC meeting in the South Korean capital in 1991, set the objectives of APEC as sustained growth and development of the region, enhancement of positive gains from economic interdependence, the development and strengthening of the open multilateral trading system, and the reduction of trade barriers in goods, services, and investment in a manner consistent with GATT principles and without detriment to other economies. The declaration also called for “open regionalism” to extend the benefits of regional liberalization on a global scale. 32 The US attempt, at the first APEC summit in Seattle in 1993, to infuse APEC with a political purpose and a common vision proved premature, as Asian leaders were reluctant to endorse fully President Clinton’s call for the establishment of a “Pacific Community” based on shared strength, shared peace, and shared prosperity. Nonetheless, the US leadership heightened the sense of urgency with regard to the need to proceed with trade liberalization within the region. Consequently, at the Bogor Summit in November 1994, the APEC leaders adopted a “Declaration of Common Resolve” pledging to dismantle virtually all barriers that have impeded trade and investment between the region’s economies by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for developing members. The Osaka Declaration and the Action Agenda adopted in November 1995 reflected political realities. The declaration simply stated that APEC would not establish a free-trade zone, nor discriminate against countries and regions outside APEC. The Action Agenda called for progress on trade and investment liberalization, its facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation but failed to forge any significant initiatives in intra-regional trade liberalization.
“Open regionalism” is one of the eight basic principles guiding the APEC. The other principles are free trade and investment; international cooperation through bilateral, regional, and global channels; regional solidarity to be maintained through a process of consultation and exchange of views among high-level representatives of APEC economies; mutual benefit; egalitarianism in recognition of different societies at different stages of development with different perspectives, different capabilities, and different priorities; pragmatism and admonishment of over-institutionalization and over-bureaucratization; and consensus-based decision making and implementation to obtain realistic and productive outcomes. 33 Rejecting the EU model of regional economic integration, APEC has endorsed the idea of “concerted unilateralism,” according to which each member economy prepares its own plan to liberalize trade and investment. Each plan is then subjected to peer review to help assure compliance in achieving the ultimate goal. This approach allows APEC members to take small but concrete steps and gain greater confidence among themselves as the process of liberalization moves forward. 34
Many observers have characterized the APEC process as an “Asian approach.” 35 By this is meant consensus-based decision making with no legally binding commitments. Progress on trade liberalization at the regional level has stalled although APEC continues to facilitate unilateral action by a set of principles. Intra-regional tariff reductions will not be the means for achieving the Bogor Declaration’s promise of free trade by 2020. Instead, APEC will serve merely as a conduit for the unilateral advancement of the GATT/WTO obligations currently held by each APEC member. This has raised doubts about the political will and bureaucratic capacity to carry out the stated goal. In the aftermath of the currency and financial crises in 1997, these doubts are likely to grow more serious. On the other hand, the difficulties in the crisis-ridden Asian countries are likely to encourage developing countries to press for greater emphasis in APEC on economic assistance for development and financial stabilization over issues of market liberalization.
There is doubtless a tension between Asian and Western countries over the pace of liberalization and the level of commitment and obligations of APEC members. There is also a division between developed and developing members of APEC over the priority the forum should give to trade and investment liberalization vis-à-vis technical and economic cooperation, including development assistance, with the former group emphasizing the first set of objectives and the latter group the second.
Membership is another difficult issue for APEC. 36 The forum finessed the question of Chinese membership by allowing “three Chinas” to join in 1991, admitted Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 1993, and accepted Chile as a member in 1994. At the meeting in Seattle in 1993, members recognized that APEC needed to develop a more systematic means of addressing the issue of new members and established a moratorium on future membership. In Osaka (1995) and Subic Bay (1996), the APEC postponed decision on this issue. Finally, membership criteria were announced in Seattle in 1997 and three new members—Russia, Vietnam, and Peru—will be inducted as APEC members at the meeting in Malaysia in November 1998. This will bring the current membership up to 21 countries. APEC has reinstituted a moratorium on new membership for the next ten years. 37 The decision reflects the difficulty of balancing the need to build consensus among the membership on issues on the APEC agenda and the need to remain true to the forum’s avowed commitment to “open regionalism.” 38
Another issue demanding increasing attention from APEC leaders is the role of NGOs in the APEC process, particularly as regards issues of human rights, labor, and the environment. The United States has also openly entertained the idea of inserting security issues into the APEC agenda. From a different perspective, some Asian countries may want to articulate their views on the linkage between economic development and national security. The linkage has not been lost on Fred Bergsten, the chair of the Eminent Persons’ Group, who has suggested that by maintaining US economic interests in East Asia, APEC can ensure that the United States will maintain its current security presence in the region. 39 There is no question that these value-laden issues will further challenge the ability of APEC to move forward along the “Asian way.”
We can conclude that the slow, deliberate, and informal character of the APEC process is attributable to the great diversity in the region, in degree of economic development, social and political system, and cultures. Asia-Pacific does not represent a common civilizational space. APEC does not purport to forge a common political identity. Nor is it anchored on any sense of common security. The interdependence among the economies of the region has been led not by institutionalized mechanisms guided by common policy but by the liberalizing forces of markets. Although domestically the state in Asian countries has been dominant and interventionist vis-à-vis the private sector, outwardly their economies have benefited from market-driven transnational processes. Modest but realistic expectations have guided the APEC process rather than an overarching ideology. In short, pragmatism rather than lofty ideals has been the dominant force behind the process.
The ASEAN 40
The last case to be examined is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The group was formed in August 1967, with Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia as its founding members. From its very inception, ASEAN’s objectives have been rather broad, encompassing political, economic, developmental, social, cultural, and environmental issues, and over the years the scope has broadened even more.
The ASEAN Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, which established the ASEAN, listed seven aims and purposes of the Association: to accelerate economic, social, and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors; to promote regional peace and stability; to promote cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields; to provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the aforementioned fields; to collaborate more effectively in agriculture and industry, to expand trade, to improve transportation and communication facilities, and to raise the living standards of the peoples; to promote Southeast Asian studies; and to maintain close and beneficial relations with international and regional institutions with similar aims and purposes. 41 These aims and purposes were reaffirmed by the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, adopted at the first summit meeting of the ASEAN leaders in 1976. The declaration also listed a number of objectives for ASEAN states to seek cooperatively in order to guarantee political stability for each state and for the region as a whole: the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality; the elimination of poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy; assistance relief for member states that are in distress due to natural disasters; and the development of an awareness of regional identity and the creation of a strong ASEAN community. 42 In later years, the scope of ASEAN’s goals continued to widen. The Manila Declaration, adopted at the third summit meeting in 1987, stated ASEAN’s determination to find a solution to the Cambodian problem as well as to find an effective solution for the problem of Indo-Chinese refugees in Southeast Asia. 43 The Declaration also called for the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) and for the improvement of the Preferential Trading Arrangements between the ASEAN states.
The inclusive nature of ASEAN is evident not only in the objectives and agendas it has adopted over the years but also in its membership policy. The original membership list of five has been expanded to nine, with the addition of Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Laos and Myanmar in 1997. Although the ASEAN had decided to admit Cambodia in 1997, the outbreak of civil war in the country that year forced the postponement of Cambodia’s admission. There was international criticism against ASEAN’s decision to admit Myanmar into its membership because of the visible human rights violations in the country, but the ASEAN leaders decided it would be better to let Myanmar join the group than to keep the country isolated and vulnerable to Beijing’s influence. They justified their decision in the name of “constructive engagement.” What are the membership criteria? There are apparently only two requirements. First, a country wishing to join the ASEAN must be geographically located in Southeast Asia. Second, the country must be committed to open economic engagement and cooperation with the other ASEAN member countries. 44 In other words, the country’s human rights record in and of itself is not a sufficient reason for denying its membership application.
Given the broad scope of ASEAN’s agenda, its organization is rather complex. It is composed of numerous meetings between its members at all levels of government. Depending on the urgency and gravity of a given topic, meetings may involve heads of government, foreign ministers, permanent committees, or ad hoc committees. It is no wonder that there is not one day in the year which does not have some sort of ASEAN event or meeting taking place on it. 45 Experts place the number of ASEAN meetings at 300 to 400 a year. 46 Among the routinely held meetings, the most important is the annual meeting of the foreign ministers, referred to as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in the ASEAN Declaration. 47 This is where major agreements are hammered out and policy is formulated. Another important part of the ASEAN process is the series of formal summit meetings between the heads of state of the ASEAN nations. Major policy announcements are made and declaration adopted at these meetings. ASEAN leaders met in Bali in 1976, Kuala Lumpur in 1977, and Manila in 1987. They met in Singapore in 1992 and decided to hold regular formal meetings between heads of state every three years. The most recent summit took place in Bangkok in 1995.
Several principles guide the functioning of the ASEAN as a multilateral forum. As in APEC, consensus-based decision making is one important principle. The “ASEAN Way” is the term used to describe the slow deliberate manner in which the organization moves. It requires a non-confrontational attitude, a genuine willingness to see the points of view of others, a conscious refrain from exerting influence or coercion over other member states, and a willingness to be patient and persevere in reaching consensus. 48 Adherence to these principles practically guarantees slow and time-consuming decision making, which also produces decisions that are neither swift nor drastic.
In addition to the above procedural principles, the ASEAN has adopted substantive principles. The principles were first adopted as part of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia among the original ASEAN Five in 1976 and reaffirmed in 1987 with the Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. They include mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of states to be free from external interference or coercion; non-interference in the affairs of one another; settlement of disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of threats or force; and effective cooperation amongst member states. 49
What has been the effectiveness of the ASEAN in meeting its objectives? The ASEAN has made some progress toward trade liberalization, albeit after considerable international pressure. The summit meeting in 1992 adopted a Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation (also called the Singapore Declaration). This document produced the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Successful implementation of AFTA would remove trade barriers in the region, including tariffs, quotas, and non-tariff barriers but it would still allow member countries to set their own tariffs on imports from non-member states. The original terms of the agreement called for a period of fifteen years to implement AFTA, but under the new terms adopted at the 1995 summit meeting in Bangkok, ASEAN states will complete the implementation by 2003. ASEAN states will reduce tariffs for most products manufactured in the region to between zero and five percent. The Singapore Declaration also encouraged ASEAN states to liberalize capital and other financial resources, as well as the use of ASEAN currencies in trade and investments. 50
Another significant achievement of ASEAN has been the establishment in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for discussion about international conflicts. Initially the ARF was a rather small group composed of ASEAN and its dialogue partners, Japan, China, the United States, and the European Union, meeting annually at the ministerial level as an informal consultative body. Today the ARF is composed of twenty-one members: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. Some analysts feel that ASEAN represents an original vehicle for preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, 51 and is a natural to lead conflict resolution in the ARF region. Others, however, doubt whether the “ASEAN Way” can be effective in larger, more diverse forums, such as the ARF. Experts charge that ASEAN has been painfully slow in reacting to crises, including the financial crisis now sweeping Southeast Asia. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is trying to bail out the hardest hit of the ASEAN states in the current crisis, but it is too early to predict what the outcome will be for the ASEAN states. ASEAN central banks did work together to provide support for the Thai baht in the spring of 1997, when it became the first ASEAN currency to come under attack from speculators, but when the baht left its peg to the US dollar on July 2, the ASEAN central banks were “defenseless in the face of an onslaught against regional currencies.” 52
The ASEAN economies are closely linked to the other major economies of the Pacific Rim, particularly Japanese and U.S., and their ties to European economies are also growing. Much of the analysis that has been done on the ASEAN-NAFTA relationship has highlighted the fear of ASEAN states that trade and investment might be diverted from Southeast Asia to Latin American countries, which have some similar comparative advantages to those of the ASEAN economies. The United States is currently ASEAN’s biggest and most important trading partner. The preferential treatment that Mexico receives under NAFTA has already had negative effects on ASEAN’s exports to the United States of such products as textiles, clothing, electronics, etc. 53
The relationship between ASEAN and APEC has been generally favorable. Although the larger size of APEC means that its trade liberalization goal is much broader, both groups have similar goals and much to gain from cooperating together. The fact that all ASEAN members are also APEC members should facilitate the trade liberalization process. As well, the consensus-based decision making adopted by both APEC and ASEAN complements each other, although this has frustrated the efforts of the United States and other countries to speed up the process of trade liberalization. Many APEC members, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, have been ASEAN’s dialogue partners for several years and there is a history of cooperation on many levels between ASEAN and APEC. Some have feared that ASEAN might be swallowed up by APEC, but so far the concern has not materialized, with the ASEAN countries being able to develop their own schedule for trade liberalization via AFTA. Moreover, ASEAN leaders have been able to play key roles within the APEC framework, prime examples including the establishment of the APEC Secretariat in Singapore, the adoption of the Bogor Declaration, and the Manila Action Plan for APEC. It remains to be seen, however, whether the weakened economic basis of ASEAN countries following the currency and financial crises since 1997 will reduce their ability to pace the liberalization process to their liking. The APEC meeting in Malaysia in November 1998 should provide some indications on this question.
Implications for Northeast Asia
The experiences in regional cooperation reviewed above are instructive in terms of the impact of the five-level factors identified at the outset of this paper. Let us draw some theoretical conclusions and discuss what they suggest for the possible direction of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.
First, the distribution of power and the number of countries in a region are among the most important factors determining the shape and direction of regional integrative efforts. The pre-eminence of Germany and France and their historical animosity gave impetus to the initial efforts at regional integration in Europe, and the process was guided by enlightened political leadership and common security concerns. From the very beginning, political and security interests of the European nations were at the forefront of regional economic cooperation. Germany’s future as a peaceful nation and the framework of regional integration were inseparable issues. The deeper the integration and the greater the economic benefits of integration, the more secure the peace and security of Europe and of Germany. Multilateralism was an inevitable product of European diplomacy. In contrast, the hegemonic presence of the United States in North America obviated the need for multilateral diplomacy. On the other hand, the fear of US dominance needed to be alleviated by instituting rules that gave all three NAFTA member countries equal representation and fair and impartial arbitration in case of intra-regional disputes. The robust US economy led by a liberal ideology guaranteed its neighbors access to its huge markets. On the other hand, intensifying global competition facing US firms prompted them to seek access to the markets of its neighbors. In short, the economic needs of the North American countries were complementary. The free trade agreement therefore was almost an inevitability. In contrast, the uneven distribution of power and the large number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region place the region’s economies in a mix of competitive and complementary positions with each other. The fear of dominance by the more advanced economies led the smaller countries to demand a slow, deliberate approach to regional economic cooperation. In the case of ASEAN, the absence of a hegemonic power and the history of tumultuous relations within the region made for an even more cautious strategy for regional integration.
The uneven power distribution observable in the APEC and ASEAN regions is replicated in Northeast Asia, but the number of economies in the region is fairly small—six if North and South Korea are counted as separate entities. This means the power differentials will have even a greater impact on the overall character of international relations in the region. All of this argues for a slow, deliberate process toward regional economic cooperation. The diversity of political systems, economic development, and cultural backgrounds, along with the absence of experience in multilateral problem solving, also supports the incremental approach. China, Japan, and possibly even Russia are potentially hegemonic rivals. Schemes for multilateral regional cooperation would be met by resistance or obstruction by one of them if they should threaten the basic interests of the defiant power. Therefore, a realistic framework would start with issues that are removed from issues of national sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity.
Issues of economic development, trade liberalization, technical cooperation, environmental changes would be more palatable as initial agenda items. Deep integration at the level of common market, economic union, and total economic integration would be totally unrealistic goals if integration is to encompass all of the Northeast Asian economies. Even creating a free trade area or a customs union would be a formidable, if not totally impossible task in the near or intermediate future. Perhaps a bilateral free trade area may be negotiated, the best candidate for it being Japan and South Korea. Indeed, the two countries have recently begun discussion along these lines. Another approach would be the creation of free trade areas and other special schemes in narrowly designated areas. This has been the approach that China, North Korea, and the Russian Far East are attempting, China being the most successful.
Second, as far as the role of the state is concerned, state involvement in the process of regional integration has been much more extensive in Europe, where state intervention has been largely successful, and in Southeast Asia, where it has had only limited impact, than in North America, where the state simply has had to facilitate further crossborder openings for the already well developed market forces, and in Asia-Pacific, where integration, albeit quite uneven, has been led by market forces. It should also be added that state intervention has been the most extensive where there has been broad consensus on political and security agendas, such as in Western Europe. Even in Southeast Asia, once the original ASEAN member countries were able to overcome their historical animosities, they were able to develop a common understanding of their political and security needs. They were even able to identify common threats to their peace and prosperity and act on ways to reduce them, through dialogue and engagement. In North America, since there were no security threats that were regime threatening, the three participating states had no need to reach a common agenda other than on economic issues. In Asia-Pacific, the governments of the region are far from developing a common political or security agenda.
In Northeast Asia, it is highly unlikely that the region’s governments will quickly develop a common political or security agenda. Even on economic issues, they will not easily reach a consensus view. Nor is it likely that the state in each country will voluntarily surrender its control over the level and direction of transnational economic processes to market principles.
I have pointed out elsewhere that in all Northeast Asian countries the state has an interventionist tradition and that currently market forces are too weak to substitute for the state as the engine of economic integration. International cooperation in this region, therefore, requires enlightened state intervention. 54 Enlightened state intervention does not mean the state should control how the economies of the region interact with each other. On the contrary, the state should actively remove barriers within their own society to trade, investment, and other forms of economic exchange and encourage others to do likewise. Given the state dominance characteristic of the developmental pattern in Northeast Asian countries, we are likely to see the state continue its traditional roles. The state’s role will be central to the development of the necessary physical and legal infrastructure to aid private sector activities in international trade and investment. The state will be concerned that the outcome of increased economic transactions across national borders will not disrupt the peace and stability of the territory under its control.
The state will play an important role in facilitating the development of a regional political environment in which economic agents can effectively seek their opportunities. No doubt, the state’s willingness to promote economic cooperation will be politically motivated. If relations between the region’s economies are seen as a zero-sum game, the state will lean toward mercantilist policy, to the detriment of regional integration. If, on the other hand, economic cooperation is seen as a positive-sum game, beneficial to all, then the state is likely to promote cooperative initiatives. In Northeast Asia, where historical animosities abound and power differentials are great, there is the real danger that the state will see the benefits of closer economic ties to each country in terms of relative gain and relative loss. This will not be conducive to long-term regional cooperation. In order to provide an incentive structure in which all governments feel their economies are gaining sufficiently to continue their participation in the cooperative scheme, the agenda during early stages of regional cooperation will have to be limited to non-controversial issues.
Third, the role of the market is the corollary of the role of the state. So not much needs to be stated except to point out that the institutions of the state that will be charged with charting a path toward regional economic cooperation will closely monitor (and control, if necessary) private-sector initiatives. The state will admonish or frustrate efforts by businessmen, researchers, journalists, educators, etc. that threaten its political and security agendas. A good example of this is the conspicuous absence of Japanese participation in the Tumen River Area Development Programme under the United Nations Development Programme.
Fourth, procedural rules governing decision making in the regional institutions we have reviewed range from the most elaborate and formalized in the EU to the simplest and the most informal in the APEC. The latter group has explicitly agreed to avoid the heavy institutionalization characteristic of the EU. Consensus decision making is central to both the APEC and the ASEAN. The ASEAN has placed equal, if not greater importance on the process of dialogue than visible, short-term achievements in the area of economic cooperation.
For Northeast Asia, the most realistic approach to multilateral decision making would resemble the procedural rules practiced by the ASEAN, i.e., consensus-based decision making based on the least common denominator. The Northeast Asian countries that participate in the ARF may be able to transfer their experience as dialogue partners in that process to a future Northeast Asian security forum. In such a forum, initial emphasis will likely be placed on the process of dialogue and consultation rather than on formal decisions or commitments, much less visible and dramatic achievements. Consensus will be required for all issues that entail substantial domestic adjustments, for political reasons or even for purely economic reasons. However, some non-controversial issues may be put to a majority vote as a package to develop a habit of cooperation, collective decision making, and cross-issue bargaining.
Fifth, substantive principles guiding regional cooperation are equally varied. In the EU, the goals and agenda for regional cooperation have changed as integration has proceeded from the establishment of a free trade area to the formation of a customs union, a common market, and an economic union, and to the achievement of total economic integration. 55 Supranational authority has gradually been accorded to legislative, executive, and even judiciary institutions of the EU. Membership criteria are explicitly and formally determined at each stage of integration. In the case of NAFTA, the goal so far has been limited to the establishment of a free trade area in North America. There is no supranational institution to enforce the politically negotiated treaty that provides the legal basis for the regional scheme. Membership is geographically determined, but it can be expanded to include Central and South American countries if political and economic conditions warrant it. The absence of supranational authority works in favor of membership expansion as criteria for membership can be politically negotiated as necessary. Dispute settlement also avoids elaborate legal requirements in favor of impartial and fair arbitration. In both cases of the EU and NAFTA, regional identity fosters and is further strengthened by economic cooperation. In contrast, the APEC lacks such identity and therefore the discussion of guiding principles itself is a difficult and time-consuming process. This was also true of ASEAN in its earlier stages of cooperation. The group has found it necessary to continue to reaffirm its guiding principles. Common policies are required of all the EU members and NAFTA signatories, but diversity is accepted among the APEC members and the ASEAN member states. The latter two groups have called for member states’ market liberalization but the requirement is not legally binding and enforcement is left to each member state.
The disparate abilities of the Northeast Asian countries to meet international expectations lead us to expect that differential standards may be applied, with the more developed countries taking higher standards of compliance than the less developed economies. Differentiated obligations can also be expected with regard to the member states’ commitments to each other and vis-à-vis global institutions, such as the WTO and APEC. In other words, it would be unrealistic to expect the same standards from non-WTO members in the region as from countries that are WTO members, namely Japan and South Korea.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: There are competing definitions of “Northeast Asia,” but in the present study the term is given a narrow geographical definition to include China (particularly its northeastern provinces), Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia (particularly its Far Eastern regions). See the discussion of “Northeast Asia” as a region in Steve Chan, “Asia Pacific Regionalism: Tentative Thoughts on Conceptual Basis and Empirical Linkages,” paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999, pp. 1–12. See also Tsuneo Akaha, “Introduction: Northeast Asia as a Region,” in Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention, New York: St. Martin’s (forthcoming 1999). Back.
Note 2: For a comprehensive analysis of these efforts, see Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia. Back.
Note 3: See Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, “The Political Economy of Regionalism: An Overview,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998. Back.
Note 4: Measures of success or failure vary, of course, depending on the goals and objectives of the given cooperative scheme. According to regional economic integration theory, there are five stages of increasing integration: the free trade area, the customs union, common market, economic union, and total economic integration. (Philippe Barbour, The European Handbook, Chicago, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1996, p. 109.) Back.
Note 5: For a fuller discussion, see Tsuneo Akaha, “International Cooperation in Establishing a Regional Order in Northeast Asia,” Global Economic Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 3–26. Back.
Note 6: For a recent analysis of Russia’s role in Northeast Asia, see Tsuneo Akaha, "The Russian Far East as a Factor in Northeast Asia," Peace Forum, Number 25 (Winter 1997–98), pp. 91–108. See also Tsuneo Akaha, "A Paradigm Shift in Russo-Japanese Relations," Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 347–362, and Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific, London: Routledge, 1998. Back.
Note 7: I acknowledge with appreciation the contributions made to this section by my student Mary Aldrich at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Back.
Note 8: Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century, New York: Vintage Books, 1993, p. 257. Back.
Note 9: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986. Back.
Note 10: David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, The Emerging European Union, New York: Longman Publishers, 1996, p. 23. Back.
Note 11: William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 471. Back.
Note 12: Dominique Fremy, “Principles of Cohesion,” in Quid ‘98, Paris: Robert Laffont S.A., 1997, p. 877. Back.
Note 13: “More-or-Less European,” The Economist, Vol. 336, No. 7929 (1996), p. 46. Back.
Note 14: The latter goal requires the redistribution of funds and reform development and agricultural policies to adapt to new entries. (“Agenda 2000,” Business Europe, Vol. 37, No. 10 (1997), p. 1.) Back.
Note 15: “More-or-Less European,” p. 46. Back.
Note 16: For a comprehensive study of the EU after the Maastricht Treaty, see Michael J. Baun, An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. Back.
Note 17: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. (“EU Takes Historic Step: Recommends Eleven Nations for Euro,” Europe, Vol. 375 (1998), p. S1.) Back.
Note 18: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia. (Colin Jones, “Knocking on the EU’s Door,” The Banker, Vol. 148, No. 867 (1998), p. 43.) Back.
Note 19: In Western Europe, government spending, although declining, is still very high. It accounted for about 50 percent in 1995. (James Ball, “The European Union: The Road to Nowhere,” European Business Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1996), p. 27.) Back.
Note 20: I thank my student Michael Kaiser for his contribution to this section. Back.
Note 21: Donald T. Wismer, “Perspectives from Canada,” in Karen Roberts and Mark I. Wilson, eds., Policy Choices: Free Trade among NAFTA Nations, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996, p. 7. Back.
Note 22: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment, Revised Edition, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993, p. 1. Back.
Note 23: The United States International Trade Commission, Operation and Effect of the NAFTA: Executive Summary, Washington, D.C.: The United States International Trade Commission, 1997. Back.
Note 24: Jerry Fruin, Liberalization in the Transportation Sector in North America, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997, p. 18. Back.
Note 25: Hufbauer and Schott, pp. 120–127. Back.
Note 26: I acknowledge with appreciation the contribution made to this section by my students David Lovejoy and Mary Walsh. Back.
Note 27: Jane Khanna, “Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and Challenges for Political Leadership” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 257. Back.
Note 28: Donald C. Hellmann and Kenneth B. Pyle, eds., From APEC to Xanadu: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific, New York: The National Bureau of Asian Research, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 5. Back.
Note 29: Richard Stubbs and Nicole Gallant, “APEC’s Dilemmas: Institution-Building around the Pacific Rim,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Summer 1997), p. 203. Back.
Note 30: Andrew A. Faye, “APEC and the New Regionalism: GATT Compliance and Prescriptions for the WTO,” Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Fall 1996), p. 177. Back.
Note 31: The 1990s Singapore ministerial meeting developed seven working groups: Trade and Investment Data, Trade Promotion, Investment and Technology Transfer, Human Resources and Development, Energy, Marine Resources Conservation, and Telecommunications. Three additional working groups were established the following year in Korea: Transportation, Tourism, and Fisheries. Back.
Note 32: Europa World Year Book 1997, Volume I, Part One: International Organizations, London: Europa Publications, 1997, p. 107. Back.
Note 33: These principles are elaborated in EPG–1994, Eminent Persons Group Report, “Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific,” August 1994. See also C. Fred Bergsten, “Fifty Years of the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the Past for Strategies for the Future,” Working Paper 98–3, Paper presented at the symposium on the World Trading System in Geneva on April 30, 1998, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998. Back.
Note 34: Robert P. O’Quinn, “Restoring American Leadership at the Asian Trade Summit,” Asian Center Backgrounder No. 144, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, November 19, 1996, p.3. Back.
Note 35: See, for example, Faye, p. 193. Back.
Note 36: The original members included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. Back.
Note 37: The economies in the queue for APEC membership include India, Pakistan, Macau, Mongolia, Panama, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Ecuador. (P. Parameswaran, “Russia, Vietnam, and Peru to Join APEC in November: Official,” Agence France Presse, January 18, 1998, p. 2.) Back.
Note 38: “Open regionalism” has been extensively discussed by many analysts. See, for example, Richard Higgot and Richard Stubbs, “Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia-Pacific,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 518–522. Back.
Note 39: Fred Bergsten, “The Case for APEC: An Asian Push for World-Wide Free Trade,” The Economist, January 6, 1996. Back.
Note 40: I acknowledge with appreciation the contribution of my student Christy Carnegie Fujio to this section. Back.
Note 41: ASEAN Declaration, Thailand, August 8, 1967. Back.
Note 42: Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Indonesia, February 24, 1976. Back.
Note 43: Manila Declaration, Manila, December 15, 1987. Back.
Note 44: Hussin Mutalib, p. 80. Back.
Note 45: Hussin Mutalib, “At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millennium,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1 (June 1997), p. 77. Back.
Note 46: Ibid. See also Simon J. Hay, “The 1995 ASEAN Summit: Scaling a Higher Peak,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 18, No. 3 (December 1996), p. 265. Back.
Note 47: Simon J. Hay, p. 255. Back.
Note 48: Hussin Mutalib, p. 79. See also Bilson Kurus, “The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Cooperation,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 4 (March 1995), p. 405. Back.
Note 49: Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, February 24, 1976, Article 2. Back.
Note 50: Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation, Singapore, January 28, 1992. Back.
Note 51: Simon S.C. Tay and Obood Talib, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Preparing for Preventive Diplomacy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 3 (December 1997). Back.
Note 52: John Funston, “ASEAN: Out of Its Depth?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 1998), p. 29. Back.
Note 53: Suthiphand Chirathivat, “ASEAN, APEC, and the Americas: Its Interconnections in Regional Integration,” http://www.orpheus.ucsd.edu/las/prrpsc.htm (Accessed on July 17, 1998). Back.
Note 54: “Northeast Asian Regionalism: State-directed Economic Interdependence?” The Sejong Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (November 1995), pp. 81–112. Back.
Note 55: Philippe Barbour, The European Handbook, Chicago, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1996, p. 109. Back.
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